Bulletin The North American Paul Tillich Society

Volume XL, Number 1 Winter 2014 Editor: Frederick J. Parrella, Secretary-Treasurer Religious Studies Department, Santa Clara University Kenna Hall, Suite 300, Room H, Santa Clara, California 95053 Associate Editor: Jonathan Rothchild, Loyola Marymount University Assistant to the Editor: Vicky Gonzalez, Santa Clara University Telephone: 408.554.4714/ 408.554.4547 FAX: 408.554.2387 Email: [email protected] Website: www.NAPTS.org/ Webmeister: Michael Burch, San Rafael, California ______

In this issue:

❏ The Annual Meeting of the North American Paul Tillich Society in Baltimore and the New Officers of the Society ❏ Call for Papers for the 2014 Meeting of the North American Paul Tillich Society and the American Academy of Religion Group “Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture” in San Diego ❏ Call for Papers for a Conference on Paul Tillich in Oxford, 14–15 July 2014 ❏ Call for Papers for the Annual Meeting of the Deutsche Paul-Tillichs Gesellschaft, 11 – 13 April 2014 ❏ New Publications ❏ Tribute to Professor Robert P. Scharlemann by Mary Ann Stenger ❏ Announcement: Publication Opportunity—God in Popular Culture by Stephen Butler Murray ❏ The Annual NAPTS Banquet Address by Marion Hausner Pauck: “Looking Back While Looking Forward” ❏ Beyond Kantian Criticism: Paul Tillich’s First Philosophy of Religion by Claude Perrottet, reviewed by Jean Richard ❏ “Inevitable, but not Necessary: Using Tillich’s Ontology to Formulate a 21st Century Interpretation of the Fall and Original Sin” by Annette Neblett Evans ❏ “Yes, But Only If God Does Not Exist: A Tillichian Answer to the Question of God’s Necessity for Morality” by Alexander T. Blondeau ❏ “Anxiety, Finite Freedom and the Fall of Humanity in Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Tillich” by Christian Danz

Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 2

The 2013 Annual Meeting of the NAPTS Call for Papers North American Paul Tillich Society 2014 Meeting and the Election of New Officers San Diego, California

he annual meeting of the North American Paul he North American Paul Tillich Society T Tillich Society was held in Baltimore, Maryland T (NAPTS) welcomes proposals for its Annual on Friday, November 22, and Saturday, November Meeting that will take place Friday and Saturday, 23, 2013, in conjunction with the meeting of the November 21–22, 2014, during the Annual Meeting American Academy of Religion. The AAR Group, of the American Academy of Religion (AAR) in San “Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture” Diego, California, 22-25 November, 2014. We wel- also met on Sunday and Monday, November 24 and come proposals for individual papers to become part 25. The meeting on Monday was a joint meeting of panel discussions on the following issues: with the AAR’s Kierkegaard Society The annual banquet of the Society was held on 1. Open session exploring the relation of Tillich’s Friday night, November 22, 2013 at the Baltimore thought to the particular research interests of indi- Convention Center. The guest speaker at the banquet vidual Tillich scholars. was Marion Hausner Pauck. Her address is pub- 2. Critical discussion of Ron Stone’s recent book, lished in this Bulletin. At the banquet, it was read by “Politics and Faith: Niebuhr and Tillich at Union the Society’s president, Echol Nix, since Mrs. Pauck Seminary in New York” (Friday, early afternoon) was unable to be present in person. (three best papers submitted, with response by Unfortunately, the attendance at this year’s ban- Stone) quet was very low, and the Society suffered a serious 3. Tillich’s Systematic Theology fifty years later. We financial loss. If you have not paid your 2013 dues, invite papers on each volume of the Systematic, ex- or if you attended the banquet and did not pay the ploring the systematic connection of that volume secretary treasurer, please send a check made out to with the whole, and/ or on the system as a whole and the NAPTS at your earliest convenience. Thank you. the roots of Tillich’s notion of “system.” New officers were elected to serve the Society: 4. The Philosophical Roots of Tillich’s Thought. We President invite papers devoted to the influence on Tillich of Duane Olsen, McKendree University Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Papers address- President Elect ing more than one of these figures will also be con- Charles Fox, SUNY/ Empire State College sidered. Emeritus Vice President Proposals should be sent to the President Elect and Bryan Wagoner, Davis and Elkins College Program Chair of this year’s meeting (electronic Secretary-Treasurer submissions preferred): Frederick Parrella, Santa Clara University Dr. Charles W. Fox Past President and Chair, Nominating Committee [email protected] Echol Nix, Furman University (Please put NAPTS Call in the subject line) Three new members of the Board of Directors 37 Belden St. were also appointed for a three-year term, expiring Williamstown, MA 01267 in 2016: 413-458-8571 (land) Christopher Rodkey 413-884-5333 (cell) Zachary Royal Deadline: 15 April 2014 M. Lon Weaver The Officers and the Board of the Society ex- tend their most sincere gratitude to those members of the Society who have served on the Board for a three-year term expiring in 2013: Please send your 2014 papers to the Nathaniel Holmes, Florida Memorial University editor ([email protected]) for Bryan Wagoner, Davis and Elkins College publication. Wesley Wildman, Boston University Congratulations to the new officers! Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 3

Call for Papers Method American Academy of Religion Group PAPERS: Please go to aarweb.org. There you will “Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, fine PAPERS, the AAR Call for Papers Submission and Culture” System that provides complete instructions about 2014 Meeting submitting a proposal. A 150 word abstract and a San Diego, California 1,000 word proposal are evaluated by the Program Unit Leadership and due by March 3, 2014. Statement of Purpose Process: This Group fosters scholarship and scholarly ex- Proposer names are visible to chairs but anonymous changes that analyze, criticize, and interpret the to steering committee members thought or impact of Paul Tillich (1886–1965) and Leadership: that use his thought — or use revisions of or reac- Chairs tions against his thought — to deal with contempo- 1 Sharon Peebles Burch, [email protected] rary issues in theology, religion, ethics, or the politi- 2 Stephen G. Ray, [email protected] cal, social, psychotherapeutic, scientific, or artistic Steering Committee spheres of human culture. We cooperate with the 1 Adam Pryor, [email protected] North American Paul Tillich Society (a Related 2 Courtney Wilder, [email protected] Scholarly Organization of the AAR), which is linked 3 Loye Ashton, [email protected] with the German, French, and other Tillich societies. 4 Stephen Butler Murray, Papers at our sessions are published in the Society’s [email protected] quarterly Bulletin without prejudice to their also ap- pearing elsewhere. Call for Papers Oxford Meeting Call for Papers Paul Tillich's theology contribution was distinc- Please find below the Call for Papers for a small tive in the twentieth century in the extent to which conference dedicated to the thought of Paul Tillich he recognized that theology must respond to its con- to be held in Oxford, 14-15 July 2014 temporary situation. In his Systematic Theology as The meeting will take place at Ertegun House, St well as his writings in theology of culture (and his Giles and is sponsored by Ertegun House, St Benet's sermons), Tillich sought to correlate the substance of Hall and the Oxford Centre for Theology and Mod- the Christian message to the questions of his context. ern European Thought. Keynote speakers include In 2014 the AAR Tillich Group invites propos- Marc Boss (Montpellier), Douglas Hedley (Cam- als for papers and/or panels that take up Tillich's bridge), Anne-Marie Reijnen (Paris) and Christoph legacy and reassess correlational theology for the Schwëbel (Tübingen). The conference is co- twenty-first century. As new situations pose new convened by Werner Jeanrond (St Benet’s Hall), questions, what are the theological resources avail- Russell Re Manning (Aberdeen) and Samuel Shearn able to a contemporary Tillichian? Is the method of (Ertegun House). correlation still viable at all, given the rise of libera- We welcome proposals for 20-minute papers on tion and contextual theologies? We welcome pro- any aspect of Tillich's thought and/or his legacy. posals that engage any aspect of Tillich's thought Paul Tillich features on anyone’s list of most and/or that address contemporary concerns. significant and influential 20th Century theologians. We also welcome proposals that explore how In an age where it is tempting to retreat into intra- Paul Tillich’s thought may be used in constructive theological discussion or dismiss the secular world, and creative ways to engage a theology of the arts Tillich’s vision for a theology which engages with that sees the arts not merely as a medium for theo- culture and connects religious language with phi- logical reflection but rather a generative source for losophical reflection continues to influence and pro- theological thinking about, and engagement with, the voke contemporary theological reflection. natural and cultural worlds. This conference aims to stimulate and provide a In addition, we seek papers addressing love, platform for current work on Paul Tillich in anticipa- eros, desire, sexuality and pornography in relation to tion of the commencement of the publication of the the work of Paul Tillich (for a cosponsored session Collected Works in English from 2015, as well as with the Queer Studies in Religion Group). providing space and time for scholars with an inter- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 4 est in Tillich’s work to meet, get to know each other, und Geist, Geschichte und Reich Gottes – Tillichs and discuss their work. Formel „das, was uns unbedingt angeht, ist das, was We welcome the submission of abstracts for 20 über unser Sein oder Nichtsein entscheidet“, suchte minute papers which will provoke engagement with den Christus präsens, das neue Sein aller Kreatur. and discussion of Paul Tillich’s theology. For exam- Das Kleinste wurde ihm Symbol des Großen, das ple: Partikulare leibhafter Zeuge des Absoluten. Welch • Explorations of aspects of Tillich’s theology Weite des Herzens: „die erste Pflicht der Liebe ist • Tillich’s intellectual development es, zuzuhören“ • Tillich’s influence on other thinkers Seine Frömmigkeit gab ihm die Kraft für‘s Neue. • Applications of Tillich’s approach Die sozialistische Entscheidung gegen die Nazis Please send abstracts of between 300 – 500 words to geschrieben, lehrte er nach seiner Flucht 1933 bis [email protected] by Friday 14th 1955 am Union Theological Semi-nary in New February 2014, with a short biographical note. York, danach noch in Harvard und Chicago. „Komm See http://tillichoxford2014.wordpress.com/ for ins Offene, Freund“. Höl-derlins Lockung kommt more details. Tillichs Bild vom ‚gebrochenen Mythos‘ sehr nahe. It would be wonderful to see any of you there, but Paul Tillichs Gespür für die Korrelationen von Pro- also please do spread the word widely. fanem und Heiligem, Augenblicklichem und Ewi- Best wishes, gem, Traditionellem und Modernem, spielte Russell Re Manning Imaginäres und Sinnliches ineinander. Sein wissen- schaftlicher Diskurs war eine Lebenshaltung voller Call for Papers Neugier, bar aller Orthodoxie. Deutsche Paul-Tillichs Gesellschaft Was kann uns sein ‚Denken auf der Grenze‘ heute sagen? Dazu laden wir alle Interessierten sehr Paul Tillich – Moderne & Religion herzlich ein an den Starnberger See.

11. – 13.4.2014 / Tutzing Prof. Dr. Christian Danz, Universität Wien, Vor- Er hatte ein Gespür für die Korrelationen von Pro- sitzender der DPTG fanem und Heiligem, Augenblicklichem und Ewi- Pfr. Dr. phil. Jochen Wagner, Evangelische Akade- gem, Traditionellem und Modernem. Seine dialek- mie Tutzing tische Theologie spielte Imaginäres und Sinnliches (Studienleiter, Gesellschaftswissenschaftliches Ref- ineinander. Sein wissenschaftlicher Diskurs war eine erat, Evangelische Akademie Tutzing – für die Lebenshaltung voller Neugier, bar aller Orthodoxie. Liste) Paul Tillich heute? (Wagner) New Publications

Titel: Paul Tillich – Moderne & Religion Gounelle, André. “Le symbole: langage de la relig- Untertitel: Wie aktuell ist der Denker auf der ion.” Bulletin de L’Academie des Sciences et Grenze? Lettres de Montpellier. La pensée symbolique Öffentliche Jahrestagung der DPTG 2014 N0 spécial (November 2012): 65–76. Klappentext „Mensch sein heißt Utopien zu haben“ Rodkey, Christopher, with Peter Rollins (foreword) Paul Tillich (1886-1965) and Thomas J. J. Altizer (afterword). Too Good To Be True: Radical Christian Preaching, Year Gott und Mensch, wie sind sie beisammen, ist es A. Christian Alternative, 2014. ISBN 978- doch ein Gott, der Welt und Heil gewährt? Paul Til- 1782791300. lichs Theologie, besser: Kulturtheologie und Relig- ionsphilosophie, faszinierte, in den existenziellen A Tribute to Professor Fragen der Zeit das religiöse Begehren wahrzuneh- Robert P. Scharlemann men. Sind nicht alle sakralen Vorstellungen der Er- lösung zutiefst mit den Bildern von Glück This tribute to Professor Scharlemann includes verschwistert? excerpts from a tribute I published in the Newsletter Sein und Gott, Vernunft und Offenbarung, Leben of the North American Paul Tillich Society, Vol. Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 5

25/1 (Winter 1999), pp. 6-7. Prof. Scharlemann was the Ecstatic I (Chicago and London: University of my doctoral mentor at the University of Iowa, 1970- Chicago Press, 1991). He published several other 1977, and we worked together over many decades in monographs and edited volumes in philosophical the North American Paul Tillich Society (NAPTS). theology with the University Press of Virginia. He Although I had gone to the University of Iowa also served as Editor of the Journal of the American for graduate school to study religion in India, Prof. Academy of Religion in the early 1980s. Scharlemann’s well-organized and well-argued lec- In all of his academic work, Prof. Scharlemann tures on 19th century theology in the Spring of 1970 was quietly effective, committed to high quality re- convinced me that I wanted to work with him. He search, and willing to give of his time and financial agreed to take me as his mentee with a focus on Paul resources, and yet he never expected recognition for Tillich’s theology. Bob was a wonderful advisor and his work. With his many other students, both at the teacher who empowered his students rather than try- University of Iowa and the University of Virginia, I ing to clone his own theology and methodology. express deep gratitude for the privilege of having Semester after semester, he designed seminars for worked with Professor Robert Scharlemann. his students that creatively integrated the next steps Mary Ann Stenger we needed to take in our work while allowing each Professor Emerita, Humanities of us to pursue our individual interests. Never did he University of Louisville set a seminar to further his own research but always ours. Really, he was doing double research— Publication Opportunity—God in preparing for our seminars and working on quite Popular Culture different thinkers and topics in his own writing. He challenged us and set high standards for us, treating Are you interested in contributing a chapter to a us all equitably. book on God in Popular Culture? I am co-editor for On Tuesday nights, Professor Scharlemann took a two-volume book that will be published later this time away from his scholarship to join a group of the year with ABC-CLIO on this topic, looking at how School of Religion faculty and students at a local God is represented in popular culture, interpreted pub where we gathered to drink beer, talk, and laugh widely across television, film, music, visual and per- together. It was in that setting that I experienced formance media, and sports. As we come down to Bob’s political acumen, his broad cultural knowl- the deadline of submitting our volumes to the pub- edge, and his delightful sense of humor. lisher, we find that we need a few more chapters, One of the co-founders of the NAPTS, Scharle- although we need them in a rather quick turnover mann served as Vice-President (1977), President time: No later than March 15, 2014. (1978), and Secretary-Treasurer and Editor of the If you would be interested in contributing a Newsletters (1979-1982, 1988-1997). As the chapter (5,000-8,000 words typically), please get NAPTS informal liaison, he regularly attended the back in touch with me ([email protected]) conferences of the Deutsche Paul Tillich Ge- RIGHT AWAY and let me know 1-3 ideas you have sellschaft, the Tillich Symposia in Frankfurt spon- about what sort of contribution you would like to sored by Prof. Dr. Gert Hummel, and the colloquia make to the volume. This can be a 1-4 sentence pro- of the Association Paul Tillich d'Expression fran- posal, and does not need to be an AAR-style formal çaise. His two major books on Tillich are Reflection proposal. In turn, I’ll get back to you within 24 and Doubt in the Thought of Paul Tillich (New Ha- hours to let you know whether or not we could use ven: Yale University Press, 1969) and Religion and the chapter that you have proposed. Reflection: Essays in Paul Tillich’s Theology (Mün- So, if you have an otherwise unpublished essay ster: LIT Verlag, 2005). His critical contributions to or a conference paper that you would like to see pub- the study of Tillich included not only his own papers lished and were looking for a good avenue for that: but also those of several doctoral students, and he here it is. We’d love to have you be part of the pro- regularly raised questions that stimulated our think- ject, and I look forward to hear back from you soon. ing and clarified our understanding. Also, if you want to send this on to any of your Outside of his enduring scholarship on Tillich, friends, colleagues, or graduate students, please feel Scharlemann explored theological reasoning and free to do so. truth, especially in The Being of God: Theology and the Experience of Truth (New York: Seabury, 1981) God appears throughout television and film, on FOX and in The Reason of Following: Christology and News and the New York Times, on Twitter and Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 6 beliefnet.com. In nearly every aspect of popular cul- personality, and character are being reassessed. Paul ture, God plays an unparalleled role in determining Tillich who attended Kennedy’s inauguration on a the importance of storylines and moral reflection. bitter cold winter day in 1961 and Reinhold Niebuhr Why do authors and directors use God as a vehicle who had also been invited but was unable, by reason to examine the human condition? What about God of his frailty, to attend the ceremony, lived to expe- sparks such strong concern in news reports and po- rience this event. Kennedy had in fact already de- litical commentary? Who is the God depicted in cided to present the Medal of Freedom (this nation’s comic books and music videos? Contemporary highest honor) to Reinhold Niebuhr but it fell to popular culture is fascinated by God at a time when President Johnson, JFK’s successor, to bestow it mainstream churches are failing. Do we rely on cul- upon him. Niebuhr was prouder of this award than ture to feed our imagination of the divine and dis- any other he had received, and rightly so. cuss matters of ultimate meaning, rather than de- On the afternoon of November 22, 1963, Wil- pend on doctrine and theology to determine the helm Pauck was expected at tea time by the Nie- course of cultural expression? This set of volumes buhrs in their apartment on Riverside Drive. He explores why popular culture needs God, and why, had not yet heard the announcement of Kennedy’s in fact, God might need popular culture. death, and was therefore puzzled when the elevator Thank you so much for your consideration, and I man bringing him up to the Niebuhr’s floor won- hope to hear from you in the remarkably near future! dered out loud how Vice President Johnson was Best wishes, feeling. A few moments later in the Niebuhr apart- Stephen Murray ment, he caught up with the tragic news. Niebuhr The Rev. Dr. Stephen Butler Murray turned on the television and wondered in his charac- Dean of the College and Associate Professor of teristic way, “Can we compare him to Lincoln?” Theology, Barrytown College A second far more personal 50th anniversary will Senior Pastor, The First Baptist Church of Bos- ton, Massachusetts occur a year from now when longtime friends will American Baptist Chaplain to Harvard Univer- remember and celebrate Wilhelm Pauck’s and my sity wedding day. We were married in Christ Chapel, Denominational Counselor and Lecturer in Min- Riverside Church, New York on November 21, istry, Harvard Divinity School 1964. Reinhold Niebuhr was best man, and Paul Til- lich the officiating minister. The congregation was composed of a small company of distinguished theo- Looking Back While Looking logians, historians and their wives, as well as friends Forward and family of the bride and groom. John Bennett,

president of Union Theological Seminary, and his Marion Hausner Pauck wife Anne, Samuel Terrien, biblical scholar and his

th wife Sara, Tom Driver, theologian and his historian Today we mark (rather than celebrate) the 50 wife Anne Barstow were present. anniversary of the assassination of President John Of course, both Ursula Niebuhr and Hannah Til- Fitzgerald Kennedy. Those of us who were alive on lich were in the congregation. I had known Ursula that terrible day remember precisely where and with Niebuhr since my first year at Barnard College, and whom we were when the news was announced. I we were friends at first sight; I had met Hannah Til- was eating lunch in a noisy bar on Madison Avenue, lich at the post Tillich sermon parties at Union Theo- New York in the company of a friend, a Harper book logical Seminary, and in Cambridge, Massachusetts editor; we were discussing the Tillich biography on at special lunches that Tillich hosted during my vis- which I had begun to work. Suddenly there was total its, but I did not yet know her well. silence. We heard Walter Cronkite’s trembling voice During the wedding, everyone present stood in announce that President Kennedy had been shot and rapt and joyful attention while Tillich read one of his killed. Later as I walked north on Madison Avenue, I most heartfelt and fatherly wedding prayers but then entered an Episcopal church where many had al- pronounced an unexpectedly unorthodox and some- ready gathered in silent prayer. what hilarious blessing as follows: “In the name of As you all know, the events of that day in Dal- God the Father, and God the Son, and God the las, Texas are being telecast and written about and Ghost.” He had been up late the night before and widely discussed, and Kennedy’s achievements, his was excited and tired. Immediately after the service, Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 7

Paul Lehmann claimed that we had not been prop- third banquet address. But at this moment, I am erly married since Tillich had flubbed such a crucial taken back to the beginning. line. I first heard the names Paul Tillich and Reinhold A graduate student at Union hearing about the Niebuhr when I was 16. My Lutheran pastor, Paul wedding later in the day quipped, “That was not a Scherer, one of half a dozen great preachers in New wedding. It was a Protestant summit meeting.” York, quoted Niebuhr and Tillich and other notable The 50th anniversary that concerns this/our society thinkers in his sermons. He was especially fond of most deeply will take place in two years, on October Niebuhr and called him a great genius. He admired 22, 1965, marking Paul Tillich’s death. Many of us Tillich and was somewhat in awe of him but he felt here and all over the world, friends, family, and his thought was too deeply influenced by Greek phi- scholars will mark the day celebrating his life and losophy to be genuinely Christian. By then I had work rather than mourning his death. We will in this fallen in love with Greek literature and philosophy way express our continuing gratitude for one of the and was therefore not disturbed by this characteriza- most dazzling and creative minds of the 20th century. tion. The Greek gods seemed, and I trust this will He was for some of us not only a teacher but also a not sound blasphemous, far more intriguing and fas- pastor and close friend. These celebrations will of cinating than did the Christian triune God. For like course be precious to us all, but I suspect they will humans they too succumbed to temptation of all be especially poignant for those of us who knew Til- kinds, and although some of their escapades were lich personally and even more so for members of his destructive others were quite enchanting. I truly family. hope this does not sound heretical or simple. For By way of preparation for the 50th anniversary of every Sunday morning, when I recite the Nicene Tillich’s death, I am proud to have been invited to Creed in my Lutheran church, I understand the deliver this after dinner speech. And I hope to pro- meaning of the words in a special way, a way in vide additional materials about Tillich in response to which our bishop might consider heretical. But my many requests to publish my memoir. The question private interpretation makes it possible for any skep- has become not so much whether I will remember ticism in my mind I to live side by side with my everything, but rather how I will be able to contain faith. and convey a veritable flood of memories: how to I am therefore in the precarious position of the separate the important fact from over-abundance; person on the high wire (thus did Reinhold Niebuhr what to say and what not. Indeed, our biography of describe Tillich’s thought). I am able to accept the Tillich will be republished in the near future in a teachings of the Enlightenment on the one hand and new design and with minor changes. This is espe- accept the reinterpreted articles of the Christian faith cially gratifying. on the other. Tillich’s definition of faith as ultimate I am still taken into the past filled with a “thou- concern but even more his phrase, “the God beyond sand” names and faces especially those from whom I God,” are keys that helped me unlock the most diffi- learned so much about Tillich before I was privi- cult paradox. My private certainty lies in this: the leged to know him very well. More than anyone words of the creed and the words of Tillich are both else, John Dillenberger, Mary Heilner, John and signs and symbols of a reality beyond my compre- Grace Smith, come to mind. They were ten years my hension. And Tillich’s definitions make it possible senior and enthusiastic purveyors of wonderful sto- for me to do this without feelings of guilt and denial ries about their hero whom they had come to know and without the sacrifice of my intellect. My pastor intimately. Also in this context, Jim Adams and to whom I referred earlier was not alone in his ad- Wilhelm Pauck were inexhaustibly filled with anec- miring criticism of Tillich. When I was a student at dotes and history, not with fable; and finally, Tillich Union I heard this description of Tillich again and himself was extraordinarily open with a superb again, “Tillich is a great thinker but he is too Greek memory for the telling story. to be Christian,” spoken by Henry Sloane Coffin, I anticipate these celebrations with great joy. and Henry P. Van Dusen, by Reinhold Niebuhr, Perhaps my eagerness may strike some of you as Frederick Grant, and James Muilenberg. But such unduly optimistic; I have, after all, just celebrated words were not used by David E. Roberts. Roberts my 85th birthday. But my physicians assure me that I was a brilliant young theologian who was expected will be around for another 20 years and if that turns to succeed Tillich; his premature death devastated us out to be the case I had better start working on my all. I recall Tillich’s telling me that David was the Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 8 only member of the Union faculty at that time who relationships to women were made public; he felt it really understood his thought, and that he would be was inevitable that the truth would out and he there- his ideal successor. We had several conversations fore took great pains to discuss this side of his per- about this tragic loss. Tillich was as shaken and be- sonality with us. In some few cases of which I know reft by Roberts’s death as by any other except for directly, the latter did happen. A brilliant woman, that of his closest friend Hermann Schafft. I remem- having read about Tillich’s dalliances with women, ber seeing tears in his eyes when he told us of immediately threw out every book of his that she Schafft’s death. David Roberts and Richard Kroner had in her library. This was the most extreme and ill- gave a fascinating seminar on Greek Philosophy and considered reaction of which we heard. Most admir- Christian theology, in which each one took different ers, scholars and non-scholars alike, however were sides and debated one another. Kroner had been a momentarily surprised but not alienated; they con- colleague of Tillich’s in Dresden; he was a skilled tinued to study his books and honor his ideas. Who writer and a fine scholar, but he did not receive the among us is without fault? public recognition in America that Tillich achieved. The recent lamentable death of Robert Scharle- He admired Tillich greatly but was a bit puzzled by mann reminds me that he was one of the most im- his success. Roberts and Kroner were not the only portant interpreters of Tillich in the generation that scholars who did not accuse Tillich of being a non- followed Wilhelm Pauck and Jim Adams. Indeed, he Christian. At the University of Chicago, Wilhelm took courses with each of them. His unique interpre- Pauck compared Tillich’s thought to Schelling tations, however, were not reflections of his teach- whose published work he knew very well. Schelling ers’ ideas but rather represented his own extraordi- was not yet available in English translation and not nary and original understanding as a radical theolo- therefore known to younger colleagues. Far from gian with a highly individualistic style. His students being a criticism of Tillich, Pauck was telling the add their own interpretations influenced by him but truth as Tillich himself had recognized in his pub- growing beyond him. And so we are a third step lished work and his unpublished conversations. Til- away from the original Tillich. lich had swallowed Schelling whole and had recre- Indeed, when we look to the generation follow- ated his thought in own way. This is not as simple as ing Adams and Pauck, we must salute many indus- it sounds. James Luther Adams, who by the way trious scholars, e.g., John Smith, John Dillenberger, wrote his doctoral dissertation under the guidance of and Roger Shinn, all three teachers and colleagues of Wilhelm Pauck, also knew what he was talking mine and now sadly deceased. Tom Driver in his about since he too was one of the few on the Ameri- early years wrote with verve and imagination but can scene who had read Schelling. after decades of admiration for his teacher, Driver These two interpreters of Tillich’s thought stand moved in another theological direction. Durwood out as giants of their time in their own fields. Both Foster and Rob James have each written a great deal and each bring me closer to Tillich himself than any about Tillich. Each of these gentlemen were/are ex- other interpreter. They were the first, and I believe ceedingly sovereign over Tillich’s architectonic the most reliable, American interpreters of Tillich’s thought and bring new forms to old ideas in their work. This is not to say that those who have fol- lively conversations as well as in their written work. lowed are less intelligent or less creative. But it The spice that the Foster/ James encounters elicit means that they are inevitably further away from the would please Tillich. On more than one occasion he original. The flesh and blood Tillich has disappeared said that every friendship needed a bit of pepper as into an iconic figure. This is to be sure inevitable well as salt to make it more lively. He also said this and perhaps necessary in order to introduce Tillich’s about love affairs but that is another matter! thought to generation after generation. And it is Frederick Parrella and the late Ray Bulman, rep- worth pointing out that Tillich would not have resenting the continuing Roman Catholic under- minded this transformation at all since he was keenly standing and interest in Tillich’s thought, provide interested in two things as he moved closer to death: solid scholarship in their book on Paul Tillich: A first, he hoped that his thought would not die with New Catholic Assessment that rings true. Guy him, for he realized that his personal charisma at- Hammond in his book on homosexuality was one tracted large audiences and the printed page might step ahead of the Supreme Court in its decision to not. Second, he hoped that his work would not be allow homosexuals to marry. Each in his own way diminished in importance when the stories about his gives us new insights into the ideas behind the icon. Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 9

Ron Stone’s encyclopedic book about Reinhold transform his Germanic English into American Eng- Niebuhr and Paul Tillich is valuable and intriguing, lish. Moreover, they found publishers for his work at and I am reading it now and am preparing a long a time when Tillich was virtually unknown in this review. In the younger group Lon Weaver and Bryan country. And they recommended him to colleges, Wagoner, and many others, are opening up new universities, and seminaries for speaking and preach- ways of understanding Tillich—each generation has ing engagements. Not everyone who came to this different points of view and each scholar finds new country had as much immediate support. And not points of emphasis in their many-sided subject. Fi- everyone had the richness of intellect and the ability nally, Bill Crout continues to invite scholars from to adjust with which Tillich was blessed. various fields to Cambridge to give lectures about Adams and Pauck were there at the beginning Tillich and/or Tillich related subjects in the “Paul and Tillich remained grateful for their help and their Tillich Lectures at Harvard.” special friendship until the end. He was faithful to In Germany, special attention should be paid to Adams, the greatly admiring American scholar, and the painstakingly scholarly work of Werner to Pauck, his younger German American close friend Schüssler, Edward Sturm, and Christian Danz. With one whom Reinhold Niebuhr named, “Tillich’s the exception of the prolific historian, Friedrich W. guide to America.” Their common language and Graff, who courageously reveals the flaws as well as their membership in the Wingolf Society, a non du- the virtues of the thinkers he studies, these German eling fraternity created a special closeness from the scholars reveal an emotional distance from the Til- time of their first meeting. Whenever they attended lich about whom they write. Their careful detail is meetings at the cathedral in Washington, D.C. they always impressive but sometimes fails to come to bought several bottles of the best Beaujolais that terms with his complex and fascinating personality. they drank as they talked until late in the night. Once Thought and life cannot and should not be separated. when a young priest opened the door for them (they In this realm, Tillich seems to have become a statue, had forgotten their keys) Tillich blurted out, “Oh not a person. And Graf tries to remedy this although thank you very much. We are the bad boys…” his views sometimes run to the extreme. Tillich’s When the time came for me to begin work on special attachment to women does not cancel out the the biography Tillich and also Pauck and Adams value of his thought and I am hopeful that Graf were most generous with their time, their knowl- agrees. edge, and their support. I was the recipient of count- The French Tillich Society has also contributed less letters, phone calls, interviews, lunches and din- lively and valuable ideas to the Tillich corpus. Jean ners with these gentlemen. At the time, incidentally, Richard, Theo Junker, Anne Marie Reijnen, and I was an assistant editor of Religious Books at the Marc Boss stand out as especially valuable and in- Oxford University Press in New York. Endless con- teresting scholars. versations of the most fascinating variety enchanted I apologize for the inevitable omission of names me. Pauck lived in New York where I did, so our of those who have done creative work here and in conversations about Tillich were frequent and I took the British Isles, in Ireland, and in other parts of the copious notes. Adams was of course in Cambridge, world. So many scholars everywhere have written Massachusetts, and he wrote voluminous letters and lectured about Tillich’s thought. He would be throughout the years—they are still in my possession both pleased and amazed. I believe strongly that Til- and will become part of the Wilhelm and Marion lich would be content that, albeit we do not all have Pauck Manuscript Collection in Princeton. It was an the same views nor do we each speak/write from the enormous gift to me that these two gave me so much same perspective, we can always learn from one an- support and information generously and voluntarily. other. This openness to respecting one another even I had Tillich’s support and theirs as well. (The vo- when we do disagree has been a characteristic of this luminous notes I took in several long interviews society that I have long admired. with Tillich himself will also soon be in print.) In- But to return to the beginning, one of the par- deed the vast majority of American and German ticularly alluring qualities about two scholars who scholars and friends of Tillich, with only two excep- were contemporaries of Tillich namely Adams and tions on both sides of the Atlantic were enthusiastic Pauck is the fact that they helped to put Tillich into and cooperative. print in America. They were the first even before But to return to my struggle with the Nicene Tillich’s students at Union Theological Seminary, to Creed—and this is of course an example of many Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 10 struggles that we are all prone to if we are honest with Paulus. Tillich wrote and published so much, about the problem of faith and reason—here is one Pauck much less. It’s a shame that no one followed way in which such a dilemma can be addressed. As a him around with a tape recorder.” And I said, “They Lutheran in the 20th and the 21st centuries, I found should be taping us too although we would not be that like Tillich I was driven to live on the boundary speaking so openly about our great friend and between the secular and the sacred, the material and teacher, Paulus, and about ourselves, if someone the spiritual worlds. The Enlightenment and the dev- were listening to us right now.” Nevertheless, these astating events of the 20th century have clearly made conversations between Pauck and Tillich at which I their impact on all serious believers. We have been was present, will be woven into the memoir, which I forced to look again at the basic statements of our have been writing for some time. Indeed, I hope to faith. Some of the most able theologians and mem- include the heart of many conversations between bers of the Christian church have left the church and John and myself, not to mention conversations with have become open agnostics or even atheists. As Jaroslav Pelikan, Albert Outler, Reinhold and Ursula one who wished to remain in the church despite this Niebuhr. They will be woven into a long memoir conflict between faith and reason, I find that when- which I have been writing on and off for some time. ever I speak the words of the Apostles’ but espe- When recently an American publisher expressed cially the Nicene Creeds, I reinterpret them in a Til- interest in republishing our biography of Tillich I lichian manner. mentioned my memoir. The publisher immediately There is a reason of course why Tillich, Nie- expressed interest also in it. buhr, and Pauck became members of the United I regret very much that I cannot be present at Church of Christ: the UCC lacked the dogmatism this year’s North American Paul Tillich Society that they could not accept in the Lutheran church in meetings. I wish to thank Professor Echol Nix for this country. his kind and enthusiastic invitation. And I wish to In my college years, I majored in philosophy and thank him also for his willingness to read my paper minored in foreign languages and history. I was for- in my absence; not an easy thing to do. I salute you tunate beyond my dreams to study under John E. all: members, friends, and especially Mutie Tillich Smith who himself had studied with Tillich and Farris. I send you warmest greetings from the great Kroner. John’s reading list included the most re- state of California. I look forward to seeing you all cently published books by Tillich and introduced us next year in San Diego. to his philosophy. John himself was so clear in his interpretations of intricate thought that we were eas- Beyond Kantian Criticism: Paul ily persuaded that we really understood philosophers Tillich’s First Philosophy of Religion like Hegel and Schelling. Some years later while by Claude Perrottet1 listening to a private conversation between Pauck and Tillich I realized they were communicating on A Review by Jean Richard an entirely different level. It was not the German language that came between them and me (I have laude Perrottet teaches philosophy of religion at always been bilingual) but something else: they were Cthe University of Bridgeport (Bridgeport, CT). walking skillfully on a high wire called total recall He also specializes in Kantian studies. After discov- and wide and deep reading and quoting verbatim ering Paul Tillich’s first course on the philosophy of from scholarly sources in several languages. Their religion (Berlin, 1920), a document that had only performance was breathtaking and like the greatest recently been published by Erdmann Sturm,2 he de- high wire artists they did not fall off. Moreover, as cided to make it the topic of a doctoral dissertation. John Dillenberger often pointed out, they were in a The fact that Kant’s thought was—rather unexpect- special intellectual realm of their own. Others could edly—central to Tillich’s considerations was a major listen but not participate and like me they remained source of interest. In this newly discovered course, in awe. Kant is indeed Tillich’s main discussion partner, John Dillenberger, who was my Master’s thesis which immediately clarifies the meaning of what advisor and a close friend, used to say during our Tillich calls his “critical-intuitive” method—the in- many luncheon/ dinner conversations, “Someone tuitive element being in turn borrowed from Husserl. should have taped Pauck as he delivered his fabulous Tillich’s inspiring combination of the critical and lectures and especially during his long conversations intuitive elements offered something that went be- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 11 yond the inevitably austere nature of Kant studies. Over against supernaturalistic dogmatism, Kant in- Tillich’s reflections are not purely theoretical—they sists on the immanence of the religious element. And are grounded in his concern for the deep religious contrary to reductionist positivism, he demonstrates crisis that affected those whom he addressed. Well how transcendence is key to our relationship to the aware of the contemporary situation, Tillich sought world. In Perrottet’s words: “For Tillich, Kant’s to offer new elements towards a response. considerable merit is…to have preserved the abso- 1. In this context, the epistemological status of lute by protecting it against attacks by both relativis- religion and philosophy of religion is particularly tic empiricism and dogmatism; the latter did uphold important. Tillich makes this issue the topic of his the absolute, but as an object, though a supreme one, first chapter. First comes the transition from the im- and thus exposed it precisely to the deadly attacks of mediate nature of religious experience to the stage of the other side—which made it even more danger- religious reflection. Religion as an immediate reality ous” (86). corresponds to what Troeltsch calls “naïve relig- In terms of religion, the Kantian revolution thus ion”—religion as it appears before it is subjected to consists of acknowledging the absolute (or the un- rational critique. Similarly, Tillich speaks of conditioned) within consciousness itself, rather than “strongly religious” periods, or periods of intense as a Supreme Being external to it. This means that religious awareness. the question of the objective truth of religion be- Tillich’s own time was quite different, and so is comes identical with that of its subjective validity: ours. These are times of religious crisis due to the “The proof of religion’s truthfulness,” says Tillich, phenomenon of secularization, a process Tillich sees “lies in the proof of its necessity for the functioning as defined by the autonomy of the different func- of consciousness, which is its validity as understood tions of our mind. Thus, religion ends up being mar- by [Kantian] criticism” (89). Kant’s real aim here is ginalized as a residual function that is gradually for- to confirm the unity of our consciousness, hence the gotten. Hence, the urgent need for a reflection on unity of the phenomenal world. To this end, he pro- religion. Historically, this reflection has developed ceeds with the deduction of the categories, which are into two different directions. Upstream, one finds nothing but the forms that allow consciousness to reflection as a dogmatic and apologetic tool meant to assemble all objects in the unity of the self (the “I”). justify religion based on rational proofs of God. But there is more to this. Perrottet reminds us of Downstream, on the other hand, religious studies Kant’s words in the preface to the second edition of intend to explain religion as a psychological and so- the Critique of Pure Reason, where the notion of the ciological phenomenon. These two approaches are unconditioned is first introduced: “It is the uncondi- still based on the common notion of religion. Per- tioned that necessarily pushes us to go beyond the rottet defines them by using the terms of “objectify- confines of experience and of all phenomena. Rea- ing dogmatism” and “reductionist empiricism” re- son inevitably requires its presence in the things in spectively. As for Tillich, his goal is to revolutionize themselves, in addition to the conditioned, and it is the notion of religion by applying the method of phi- fully entitled to do so, because the series of condi- losophy of religion. He will seek to transcend these tions needs to be complete” (120). This is where Til- two opposing views by applying the critical ap- lich sees that Kant offers an opening towards a new proach, which is that of consciousness reflecting way of doing philosophy of religion. But this new upon itself. This indeed is Kant’s approach to the way is barely suggested and religion is not even ex- problem, which explains why Tillich will focus on plicitly mentioned. Additionally, the cumbersome his thought. presence of the “thing in itself” maintains the threat 2. The next two chapters (chapters 2 and 3) of of a return to an objectified view of the uncondi- Perrottet’s book focus on the way Tillich interprets tioned. Kant’s approach to religion, i.e., the role Kant attrib- 3. The next chapter thus offers a precise analysis utes to the religious element among the functions of of what Kant means when he speaks of the thing in our mind. Kant’s importance in philosophy of relig- itself (Ding an sich)—a sort of residual byproduct of ion becomes obvious, even if Kant himself does not the critical approach, which shows that laws and use that terminology. The revolutionary aspect of his forms of reality are given by consciousness in order thought is well summarized in a formula we owe to to grasp things. These formal laws presuppose a con- Husserl: “transcendence in immanence.” This allows tent, or substance, to which they refer. But how can Kant to move beyond dogmatism and positivism. this content be reached and known? Here lies the Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 12 whole problem of the “thing in itself” as opposed to Tillich’s other reference in that context is Rudolf a “thing for us.” As Perrottet observes: “Tillich does Otto. In his famous Das Heilige (The Idea of the not really criticize Kant for believing in “something” Holy), Otto highlights the importance of the non- beyond the phenomenal world that is apprehended rational element and its relationship to the rational by the formal laws of our consciousness. He chal- element in the experience of the sacred. According lenges him for trying to grasp this something to Perrottet, “Otto concludes that religious phenom- through the critical, hence rational, approach alone” ena contain an element that is irreducible to rational (154). This being the case, falling back into an ob- analysis. To describe it, Otto coined the well-known jectifying perspective is inevitable. The “thing in term the numinous, which consists of the equally itself” then becomes a thing like all other things; it is well-known mysterium tremendum et fascinans fully part of the phenomenal world. (219). Tillich greatly admires Otto’s phenomenol- There is, however, more than this to Kant’s ap- ogical description of the sacred, but he considers at proach. Tillich has tried to show “how both the criti- the same time that Otto fails to sufficiently consider cal and the intuitive approaches have a common ori- or discuss the rational and critical element. gin in Kant’s thought, even though the intuitive ele- 5. Perrottet’s book ends with a chapter in which ment is only present in embryonic form” (171). In he offers an overview of the evolution of the critical- his effort to clarify his own notion of intuition, Til- intuitive method in Tillich’s thought. Two dates will lich states the problem in somewhat different terms. serve as an easy reference: 1922 and 1962. In 1922, He no longer makes the difference between phe- Tillich has just discovered Karl Barth’s Römerbrief, nomena and noumena, or between the forms of con- for which he has considerable praise. Tillich’s article sciousness and the substance of reality; rather, he on The Conquest of the Concept of Religion in the makes the distinction between thought and being. Philosophy of Religion (1922) is without a doubt the This opens the way to a twofold approach of being: most Barthian of his writings. Tillich himself feels an original, intuitive approach, as well as that of ra- that he and Barth share a same position of principle, tional reflection. Here is how Perrottet summarizes which he applies to philosophy of religion, while the process: “One of the main characteristics of the Barth (and Gogarten) apply it in the realm of theol- critical-intuitive method is that, from its perspective, ogy. But this does not prevent Tillich from pursuing it is impossible to think apart from an intuitive ap- his own quest in philosophy of religion. He ends his prehension of what is given to us, but it is equally 1922 article by reaffirming his choice of the critical- impossible to hold or to express such an intuition intuitive method. The critical or rational method is without giving it form through reflection” (180). insufficient, because it is unable by itself to reach 4. The fourth chapter of the book is devoted to reality itself beyond its given forms. the study of relevant sources and to the elaboration In his 1962 Harvard course on philosophy of re- of that intuitive element. Here, Edmund Husserl’s ligion, Tillich not only applies the same overall idea phenomenology is the main reference. “Contrary to as in his earlier writings—he even uses the same Kant, Husserl believed in intellectual intuition, terminology, that of the critical-intuitive method. As which essentially is our ability to grasp certain ulti- Perrottet notes, there is, however, a small but sig- mate principles in the function of our mind before nificant difference in the way Tillich formulates the discursive language comes into play” (205-206). name he gives to his method: “critical-intuitive” has This is corroborated by a quote from Logical Inves- become “intuitive-critical.” The inverse order of the tigations where a distinction is made between im- elements making up the name does not make any mediate and mediated knowledge: “It is thus obvious essential difference, but the emphasis is now made that asking for a fundamental justification of all me- on the precedence of intuition over rational critical diate knowledge can only make sense if we are able reflection. Additionally, within the intuitive element, to cognize certain ultimate principles through imme- an ontological dimension is added to the phenome- diate intuition, since all justification ultimately rests nological one. The intuitive-critical method will thus on such principles” (206). Tillich concurs. In the consist of the following three elements: first, the in- seventh lecture of his course, he comments: “…This tuition of human finitude; second, the intuition of the requirement is of the highest importance. The phe- phenomena of religious life; and third, the critical nomenological method demands that there be an in- consideration of our human spiritual structure. tuition and intent of thought prior to any explanation The following sentence, taken from Tillich and or valuation” (208). quoted by Perrottet, perhaps best encapsulates his Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 13 contribution made by the 1920 course: “The way divine as being outside our human reality, and hence towards God goes through religion. The way is a source of religious heteronomy. Tillich supports towards religion goes through the Absolute” (215). the perspective of autonomy, over against that of To which one could add that the way to the Absolute heteronomy. For him, we must start our itself passes through the critical analysis of human considerations with human reality. It is in the very consciousness. In the same passage of lecture 8 of immanence of human consciousness that the Tillich’s 1920 course (EGW XII, 385), we further transcendence of the unconditioned emerges, as find the following statement: “God can only be Kant has shown. This approach of transcendence grasped through religion—not the opposite.” And through critical analysis of consciousness will also also: “It is consciousness that so to speak creates allow us to avoid objectifying God as a Supreme God as God.” Being, i.e., as a being, a First Cause in addition to The full implication of the notion of method in others. This explains how Tillich can affirm that, “it philosophy of religion is now clear. It represents the is consciousness that, so to speak, creates God!”— approach of the religious phenomenon, the starting with God, thus conceived, as the symbolic point and the process of thinking. This is where expression of the unconditioned perceived at the Tillich’s revolutionary contribution becomes really heart of human consciousness. obvious. Commonly speaking, religion is defined by These are the key points that strike me in Claude God: religion is thinking about God and worshipping Perrottet’s publication, a must-read for anyone who God. If God does exist, religion is thereby grounded. wishes to seriously tackle Tillich’s extensive course If God does not exist, religion is annihilated by that on philosophy of religion given in Berlin in 1920. very fact. Thus, philosophy of religion will have to directly address the issue of God and prove his 1 Claude Perrottet, Au-delà du criticisme kantien. La existence in order to justify the validity of religion. méthode critique-intuitive dans la première philosophie Tillich, for his part, suggests a method that takes the de la religion de Paul Tillich [Beyond Kantian Criticism: exact opposite direction: grasp God based on The Critical-Intuitive Method in Paul Tillich’s First Phi- religion, and grasp religion by starting with our losophyof Religion], Québec, Canada: Presses de consciousness. l’Université Laval, 2012, 403 p. What is at stake in this reordering of precedence 2 Paul Tillich, “Religionsphilosophie” (1920), EGW is immediately obvious. First of all, it represents a XII, 333-565. protest against supernaturalism that sees God and the

Inevitable, but not Necessary: which the Bible speaks; for this drama requires free- Using Tillich’s Ontology to dom both for God and for man, and is negated by Formulate a 21st Century Interpre- ontologies which subject either God or man to an tation of the Fall and Original Sin ontological necessity.”2 Tillich disagrees, saying that a full discussion must include ontology: “There is no Annette Neblett Evans ontological thought in biblical religion; but there is no symbol or no theological concept in it which does 3 Preliminary Remarks: The Criticisms Aimed at not have ontological implications.” Since both men Tillich’s Interpretation of the Fall have valid points—Niebuhr, to uphold the Biblical truth expressed in the story of the Fall, and Tillich, Xxx Two of the greatest theological minds of to attempt to explain it ontologically (and thereby the 20th century—Paul Tillich and Reinhold Nie- expand its meaning to a non-Biblical audience), a buhr—disagree on a fundamental point of theology: way beyond their impasse must be found. how to explicate the myth of the Fall into sin found Simply stated, criticism focuses on the important in Genesis 3. Niebuhr and others1 argue that the Bib- distinction between ontological necessity and his- lical perspective prohibits ontological clarification. torical inevitability in the Fall. The demands of clas- He says: “A part of the function of a systematic the- sical theodicy require that creation cannot be fall. To ology is to refute ontological speculation about God counter Niebuhr’s criticism, that if God creates man and man which falsify or negate the drama about to fall, then man cannot be held responsible for the 4 fall, Tillich’s ontological analysis must be inter- preted to show that the Fall is inevitable, yet not Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 14 necessary. Tillich’s clearest statement of the rela- scendent and the immanent. Early in the course of tionship between creation and fall is that “…the ful- the controversy, Niebuhr cites this passage from Til- fillment of creation and the beginning of the fall are, lich’s Propositions: “The myth of the ‘transcendent though logically different, ontologically the same.”5 fall’ describes the transition from essence to exis- Tillich’s words are clear, but his concepts are not, tence as a universal event in ontological terms. The and his supporting arguments are not easy to clarify. myth of the ‘immanent fall’ describes the transition The preceding comments leave this question: can as an individual event in psychological terms.”10 It Tillich’s use of ontology explain the Fall in such a would seem that, in the first citations (above), Til- way that his stated distinction makes sense, that lich is referring to the transcendent fall, or the state creation and fall are distinguishable, yet distinct? In of existence in which human beings find themselves. addition, can this information then be used to make It is a given that humans are in existence, and they the Fall not simply an ancient myth, but an interpre- are neither free to choose this condition, nor are they tation, which makes the process of sin in the 21st responsible for this type of fall. By contrast, refer- century understandable? ences to “finite freedom” refer to the immanent fall, The answer is yes to both questions. Niebuhr’s or the fall for which human beings are responsible, criticism can be met by showing that, in Tillich’s because, to Tillich, finite freedom is another word thought, the Fall is an inevitable result of creation, for human being.11 but not an ontologically necessary one. The task of Tillich commits the fallacy of equivocation clarifying Tillich’s thought is not an easy one. Many throughout ST II in pages 29 to 42, by discussing, interpreters have tried, but they do not succeed be- simultaneously, the characteristics of these two very cause they stay mired in Tillich’s unclear terminol- different falls. It seems strange that the distinction ogy. Therefore, to make the argument, several between them does not carry over from the Proposi- sources of confusion in Tillich’s thought must be tions to the cited section of ST II (in which there is identified and resolved, since one cannot argue for no use of the word “immanent” to describe the indi- or against his interpretation without making it more vidual fall). Rather, the characteristics of the two are intelligible. To this end, three clarifications must be so mixed up, and used so interchangeably, that Nie- made. buhr, et al. are correct to say that Tillich seems to make the fall necessary. The transcendent fall, by Clarification #1: Distinguish between the setting up the conditions of existence, is correctly Immanent and Transcendent Falls referred to as necessary. Because the transcendent fall is a given, there is no way to argue that humans Langdon Gilkey begins his analysis of Tillich’s are in any way responsible for the situation in which fall with a footnote that is open to debate; he says they find themselves. 12 that “Tillich is very careful, in fact precise, about the Surprisingly, however, even after citing the language he uses in this connection: about how and needed distinction, Niebuhr argues that, “It is in the when he wishes to employ the symbols of ‘Fall,’ sin, actualization of the potentiality that reality becomes evil and so on.”6 In fact, confusion abounds in his ambiguous, that is, evil as well as good. The sinful- terminology, which is why so many have pointed it ness of man is thus an ‘ontological fate.’”13 Niebuhr out. At first reading, it is easy to cite numerous pas- needs to clarify his language as well. Simply be- sages from Systematic Theology II that support the cause a concept is explained ontologically does not ontological necessity of the fall into existence: “Ex- make it a fate. Rather, ontology is simply descrip- istence is a fact, not a derived dialectical step,”7 and tive, and the idea that fate is connected to ontology “The transition from essence to existence is the as if the two are one is incorrect. In any case, the original fact.”8 Other statements support the fall’s description of the human situation of “being here” is inevitable or unavoidable nature: “The fall is the a situation that requires both speculation and clarifi- work of finite freedom, but it happened universally cation.14 in everything finite, and therefore unavoidably….”9 A careful reading of ST II reveals a series of contra- Clarification #2: Use the Biblical story of Adam dictions so evident that an alternate way to make and Eve to clarify the immanent, not the tran- Tillich’s thought coherent must be sought. scendent, fall The simplest way to resolve the confusion is to distinguish at the outset between two Falls: the tran- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 15

As Niebuhr states: “There is no myth of the ontologically necessary because it is. It is both nec- ‘transcendent fall’ in the Bible, but only the myth of essary and universal, as a precondition for existing at the historical fall.”15 The immanent fall is the his- all, so that humans have every excuse for being in torical fall, the fall that happens in each individual this situation. Since human fault for the transcendent life, and it is not problematic to say that humans are fall is not open for debate, the transcendent fall can responsible for this fall. The Biblical story of the fall be left out of the debate from this point. It is the attempts to explain why humans are sinful, and so situation, and must be accepted literally. It estab- must be understood in the context of the rise of eth- lishes estrangement, which is not itself sin, but is the ics that took place during the Axial Age, a time pe- condition of the possibility of sin. And, by saying riod described by Karl Jaspers as a world-wide the fall represents a ‘transhistorical fact’, Tillich awakening to the problems of meaning and ethics.16 gives us permission to analyze the process that leads Understood in the context of morality, the story of to each individual’s sin, a state which Gilkey sums Adam and Eve describes the process by which sin up in the assertion that “…we are not only the condi- enters the world. It is a series of steps that are both tioned victims of estrangement; we are also partici- eternal and universal because the mental process has pants in it and so perpetuators of it.”20 Therefore, always happened in every individual human life im- meaningful discussion about man’s fault or inno- mediately preceding the commission of sin. Individ- cence must center on whether Tillich’s analysis of ual sins affirm our (prior, universal, given, neces- the immanent (personal) fall makes fallen-ness inevi- sary, and transcendently) fallen nature. Tillich’s table or necessary. word for this type of interpretation is “transhistori- cal,” which signifies that it both transcends the his- Clarification #3: Use ontological concepts torical (has universality) while also maintaining the consistently temporal element (in the individual life). 17 Distinguishing between two falls helps to ex- Agreeing that Tillich is describing an immanent, plain another unclear Tillichian phrase, half way de- not a transcendent fall in ST II leads to the possibil- mythologization. Tillich tends to use it as a way of ity of interpretive clarity. However, confusion arises saying he accepts some elements of the myth, while again when Tillich says that the immanent fall must rejecting others. However, it more clearly means that be described in psychological terms, and the tran- the pre-historical element of the myth is rejected, but scendent in ontological terms.21 To be useful, de- the other ‘half’ of the myth contains key symbols scription must be consistent both linguistically (by that explain the advent of sinfulness into each per- making the distinction) and methodologically (by sonal life. In simple terms, each man and woman is using ontology). So, in order to make his explana- his/her own Adam/Eve. This assertion contradicts tion consistent, both falls must be understood in on- Gilkey’s observation, that “In some strange way the tological terms. Fall is, therefore, an event, a non-necessary mo- It would be helpful if one term or concept could ment….”18 It is not strange at all, since it is an event be used as an ontological standard. Fortunately, one in every personal life. Equally questionable is of his fundamental concepts—faith—is a concept Gilkey’s statement that “Human evil is, therefore, whose ontological explanation makes the psycho- bafflingly both situation and act, and neither one can logical understandable. Simply stated, faith as polar be construed ‘literally’ (ST II: 55-58)”.19 The imma- balance is such a structure. For instance, dreaming nent fall can be construed literally, albeit with the innocence is Tillich’s term for the ontological struc- use of analogical/symbolic language. Saying that the ture of moral perfection, which is self-centeredness myth in Genesis is used as a guide helps to clarify or balance. In this paper, the term ontological faith the path to sinfulness, but certainly does not clarify will be used to designate this structure. As such, on- Tillich’s retelling altogether. tological faith is an idea in our mind of what we To summarize, clarification of terms is a neces- ought to be, or how we ought to act. Thus, both psy- sary step in approaching the problems related to Til- chology and morality in this context presuppose on- lich’s discussion of the fall. The disagreement that tology, which takes priority. Tillich has with Niebuhr and others is founded on These three clarifications must be accepted be- Tillich’s tendency towards equivocation in his use of fore the attempt to interpret Tillich’s explication of almost every important concept he uses in his expla- the fall: (1) the acceptance that there are two falls, nation. He is right to say that the transcendent fall is and that humans are only responsible for the imma- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 16 nent one; (2) the fact that the immanent fall is told in polarity is a more unlimited principle that gives life the myth of Adam and Eve, which is the story of the and power to the other side—freedom, the individ- individual’s fall into sin; and (3) the fact that the ual, and dynamics. Both sides of the polar structure immanent fall must, like the transcendent fall, be are needed to create a whole. Wholeness for being- analyzed ontologically through the central term of itself is a given, since being–itself lies beyond all faith. distinctions, while at the same time containing them. Within being itself, the ground of all that is, the po- The Method larities create a whole that is never actually threat- ened with breakage, or non-being. Being–itself con- An analysis of both the transcendent and the tains non-being, but continually overcomes (or tran- immanent falls requires beginning with Tillich’s on- scends) the threat it poses. Theoretically, the tension tological description of creation. One strength of his of breakage may be present, but it is continually thought is his ability to establish a definitional con- overcome. According to Tillich, God is being- sistency based on ontology between four different, itself.23 yet related, types of being: being-itself (God), essen- There is a direct ontological relationship be- tial finite being (Adam), existential finite being (the tween being-itself and three other concepts: essential existing human), and essential finite being under the finite being; existential finite being; and essential conditions of existence (the Christ). finite being under the conditions of existence. These This clarification allows for four states of being three types of being—in Biblical terms, Adam in the in which the ontological structure finds expression: garden, Adam outside the garden, and Jesus who is God; the essential human being, Adam; the existing the Christ—are logically derived from the analysis human; and the essential human under the conditions of being-itself, but are ontologically distinguishable of existence, the Christ. The explanation will also by two characteristics: (1) the actual degree to which require us to go beyond Tillich’s stated analysis to the polarities are held in tension or are threatened by another part of his system that will provide us with breaking; and (2) the degree to which each state is the support for and clarification of Tillich’s state- chosen. ment that the immanent fall is inevitable, though not ontologically necessary. This concept will be found Essential Finitude, or Adam in the Garden in the ontological analysis of the role of the Other in the immanent Fall. First, there is essential finite being. The word With these terminological and methodological ‘finite’ has many meanings in Tillich’s thought. In clarifications in place, we can now proceed to the agreement with most definitions of finite, Tillich first question addressed by the paper, the fundamen- defines it as “being threatened by non-being.”24 tal question Niebuhr poses: Does Tillich’s ontologi- However, going beyond other thinkers, Tillich also cal analysis of the concepts found in the Biblical implies that finite as an adjective in conjunction with account of the Fall of human being into sin make sin freedom, finite freedom, means human being; it is a inevitable or ontologically necessary? The answer— way to differentiate human being from the ground of that the immanent Fall, and subsequent sinfulness, is being, to make it a recognizable entity. The polar inevitable, but not necessary—will be found in an tension in essential finite freedom is threatened by exposition of the role of Otherness in the immanent breakage but remains unbroken due to its proximity Fall. to the ground of being. This is the presumed state of human being at the time of creation. In Genesis, hu- The Argument: God as the Original Manifesta- man being is created in God’s image: “Then God tion of the Balance of all Opposites said, Let us make in our image, after our likeness…” (Genesis 1:26).25 Although Tillich asserts that this As a philosophical concept, Tillich defines the image is found in man’s “finite freedom.” it can also concept of being-itself as containing within itself all be argued that man is in God’s “image” by sharing possible contradictions. To name but a few, these are this polar structure. freedom and destiny, individuality and participation, The state of dreaming innocence is the mythical and dynamics and form.22 In each set of polarities, state of Adam and Eve before the Fall, the state of one side is a limiting principle—such as form, des- essential finitude. In it, the ontological balance is tiny, and participation—and on the other side of the found, but it is not real, given that is unchallenged. Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 17

The state of dreaming innocence is important, even can say that it is incomplete because it does not re- if mythical, for it describes the ontological goal of quire choice, and all moral actions must be chosen. human life: to maintain the self’s ontological bal- Humans must be confronted by choice in order ance (faith) when it is actually threatened under the to make moral decisions; and choice creates aroused conditions of existence in which humans find them- freedom. Immediately prior to each individual’s selves as a result of the transcendent Fall. Apart moral decision, two possibilities exist: to act in such from the abstract definition that Tillich provides of a way that the self chooses to remain in balance (the dreaming innocence, it seems that the function of the balance of freedom/destiny, etc.), or to act in such a concept is to provide the ontological goal of human way that the self’s balance or center is lost (which being under the conditions of existence: a finite results in the self being thrown out of balance, re- structure in which the ontological structure is bal- sulting in sin). One can see from this that the state of anced. faith under the conditions of existence is ontologi- cally the same as the state of faith in the ideal world Existential finitude, aroused freedom, faith and of essential being, but they are logically different in bad faith a fundamental way. The latter is a given, and the former is chosen. The conditions of existence give rise to existen- tial finite being, which is the state that humans find Essential finitude under the conditions of exis- themselves in as the original fact. In this state, the tence: true faith through choice polar structure is present, and tension is created by the very real threaten of nonbeing (the source of This third and final instance of this ‘image’ of which is the focus of this paper). When the pre- being-itself is found in essential finite being under dominance of one side of the polar structure occurs, the conditions of existence. This structure is identi- the polarity acts as the center of the self, and causes cal to the ontological structure of essential finite be- the entire self to be off-center. Without the other ing. Being finite, its centeredness is threatened by polarity to balance it, the unified self loses its cen- non-being, even in the theoretical state of essential teredness or wholeness. Centeredness is faith,26 and, being. However, it differs in one significant way: the because that which is not faith is sin, the self be- self’s balance is achieved under the conditions of comes, in ontological terms, sinful. Whether this existence, through choice.30 state is inevitable or ontologically necessary has yet Tillich interprets Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ, to be determined. as the New Being, the only human instance of essen- Freedom is the power that the individual has to tial ontological balance who is able to maintain his achieve faith.27 The balance is possible for humans, polar balance under the conditions of existence. 31 Of though not likely, since the conditions of existence the numerous Biblical titles describing Jesus’ role, exert a very powerful force on the self’s polarities the one that best admits of ontological clarification that lead, eventually, to their breakage. When the is the idea of the Christ as the ‘second Adam’, given self loses its center, or the power that it had to hold by the apostle Paul (1 Cor 15:45-48) and elaborated its polarities in balance, human beings fall into sin. by Tillich (as the New Being). As “the Christ”, he is Given that, for the self, faith is balance among the a new type of being, a second Adam, because he polarities, it can be implied that the loss of balance is lives under the conditions of existence, prone to the bad faith. sin of ontological imbalance, but, through his choice, maintains both his own balance and his un- Freedom vs. finite freedom disrupted unity with God.32 Adam loses his essential unity with himself and God as the sustaining struc- The state of finite freedom, which is another ture of the self (for reasons we have yet to ascertain); term for simply being human,28 leads to the fall into Jesus as the Christ reestablishes the bond with God sin, in part, because the state of essential finite be- for all humans. The structural being of Adam and ing, in theory, is incomplete.29 Completion requires Eve is identical to that of the Christ—the polar ten- the choice to remain centered, or the choice of onto- sions are present but are not overcome by non-being, logical faith. Freedom is necessary to choice. This and so remain in perfect balance. The two differ- choice is revealed when the choice of destiny is af- ences in them are that, in Adam, polar balance is firmed through finite freedom. In moral terms, one given under the conditions of essence and (assumed Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 18 to be) unchallenged and not chosen; whereas in the ters 1 and 2) and Fall (Chap 3): God disappears from Christ, the balance remains unbroken under the con- the story; the serpent appears; and the first other per- ditions of existence, through choice. Jesus as the son, a woman named Eve, appears. Christ saves mankind from the consequences of the Given these three new elements, it can be asked Fall of the first Adam, and restores to Creation what whether Tillich interprets them symbolically and was originally lost. How Jesus accomplishes this is ontologically in such a way that his statement is true, the subject under consideration, and will require that that “….simultaneously acknowledge the tragic uni- Tillich’s ontological analysis be pushed to describe versality of estrangement and man’s personal re- not only what immanent fallen-ness is, but also why sponsibility for it.”?35 The answer is yes; it is an an- it inevitably comes about. swer that will require a more extensive analysis of the role of the Other in the immanent fall. Because Summary to this point he does not have an overt reference to the Other in the fall, and so no clear understanding of the onto- There are strengths to be noted in Tillich’s logical implications presented by the Other, it will analysis to this point. His thought provides ontologi- be necessary to find a different source in his thought cal clarification of four fundamental terms necessary to which he assigns a role to the Other. For this to the understanding of fallen-ness: God; Adam be- source, one need look no further than Tillich’s fore the fall; Adam and Eve after the fall; and the Christological formulation. Christ. The ontological consistency in these concepts makes them more coherent. The analysis is theologi- Essential being, the conditions of existence, and cally sound, since human being, as created, is good, the affirmation by the Other: achieving ontologi- created in God’s image, and God is not involved, to cal faith with the implied ‘missing link’ this point of analysis, in the immanent fall of human being. Jesus as the Christ, it will be remembered, is the Unfortunately, however, Tillich’s theory lacks appearance of the ontological structure of faith under definitional clarity at another fundamental point: the conditions of existence. To be considered ‘the why does Adam sin (what is the cause of this first, Christ’ requires three things, two of which we have original sin)? And, if ‘original’ is interpreted as discussed: First, Jesus must be aware of his God ‘foundational’, what is the cause of sin in each indi- given polar structure, his unique freedom and des- vidual? What happens in the moments prior to sin- tiny. Second, he must also affirm his destiny through ning? If Adam (as the representative of all humans) his finite freedom; his polar balance must be reached is created with polar balance, what causes him to through choice. To this point, we have reached the lose it? Biblical theology explains the immanent fall conclusion that the life of the Christ manifests the as a result of Adam and Eve’s disobedience, without only conditions necessary for the centering of the answering the much needed question of why human self after the fall into existence: self- knowledge— beings would disobey their Creator. Tillich’s onto- the individual must know what faith is; and free- logical answer is no better than the Biblical one, dom— that s/he can freely choose to affirm his/her since he blames finite freedom,33 which can be seen ontological faith, or self-centeredness. It seems that as simply another term for ‘created human being’. If faith would be simple, if it is only a matter of per- Adam is created as finite freedom, and if finite free- sonal choice. That it is not simple implies that there dom is responsible for the fall, the responsibility for is a power or force at work within existence that the immanent fall goes back (once again) to the crea- works against the individual, to pull the individual tor, God. 34 self apart, regardless of the self’s willingness to be centered. There must be some third component that The Introduction and Explanation of Key Onto- helps to establish centered selfhood, and, if lost, logical Concepts in the Biblical Story makes centered selfhood difficult to attain. The third component of his ontological faith is It is necessary to look into the details of the Bib- not quite as obvious as the first two because it is not lical story for key concepts that could be used, sym- found in the story of fallenness that is under review. bolically, in Tillich’s interpretation. Three signifi- But it is a crucial component in both the life of the cant concepts arise when three significant changes Christ, and in understanding the immanent fall. occur in the Biblical story between Creation (Chap- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 19

This third component can be found within Til- in the immanent Fall, or the point in time that each lich’s system: it is the concept of Otherness. As an individual experiences as the moment before sin oc- implied concept, it is often overlooked, but is crucial curs. This is the moment that is referred to in the to the establishment of faith, or self-centering, under myth of Adam and Eve: it describes the process that the conditions of existence. The importance of the occurs in each individual as s/he begins the process Other in the state of faith is interpolated from Til- that results in the act of sin. Tillich’s ontology, cou- lich’s well-known explanation of the point at which pled with the myth, results in an explanation of the Christianity begins. Tillich cites the verse in Mat- ‘transhistorical quality’ that Tillich asserts. thew 16, when Peter, asked by Jesus who he (Jesus) In order to follow the myth more exactly, three is, responds, ‘Thou art the Christ.’36 This analysis more ontological clarifications must be added. These implicitly affirms a third thing that is required for ontological clarifications will show how the con- the fulfillment of ontological faith under the condi- cepts of finite freedom, faith, and bad faith are de- tions of existence: the affirmation of one’s God rived from ontology. given self by the Other. To Tillich, Peter’s believing As has been noted many times, the ontological reception in some way transforms Jesus, the faithful structure of faith is identical to the ontological de- man, into the Christ. In terms of faith, Jesus, as es- scription of essential finitude. The goal of existence sential being, has a polar structure. It is maintained is to attain this state of centeredness, through free through his consistent use of his finite freedom to choice. (This explains the statement that, though on- affirm his God-given destiny. However, in his case, tologically the same, the two are logically different). it seems that the power that is within Jesus’ ‘destiny’ 39However, because Adam’s act of finite freedom is is not released, or completed, until the Other recog- considered to be sinfulness, which results in the un- nizes his destiny and affirms it. centeredness of the self, more analysis of why this Since the immanent fall (which results in polar happens is necessary. Now, with the introduction of imbalance) can be understood as being the contrary the Other, we can take the analysis to another level to faith (polar balance), the role of the Other in the by analyzing the most important component in the fall must be considered. This would seem to provide story—the creation of the other, Eve. a hidden premise in the discussion of faith: ontologi- cal faith requires not only God as the One who es- Exploring Sartre’s ontology to clarify Tillich’s tablishes it, and the self as the One who chooses it, definitional shortcomings but the Other as necessary to affirming it. The com- plete power of the self is only released when one is Surprisingly, perhaps, is that one way to clarify recognized by the Other as being what the individual Tillich’s theistic existential ontological system can (whose destiny is established by God) claims to be.37 be found in the work of Jean Paul Sartre, a contem- To summarize: humans, as created, are in God’s porary of Tillich’s, who, like Tillich, uses ontology image. They are created to be centered, but their in elaborating his atheistic existential philosophy. In centeredness must be chosen. For some inexplicable Being and Nothingness, Sartre discusses in great reason that Tillich attributes to finite freedom, man, detail the ontological make-up of human being. In when first confronted with choice, chooses sin.38 the following paragraphs, the attempt will be made This makes Niebuhr’s assertion that there is a neces- to relate a few of the salient features from his de- sary relationship between freedom and sinfulness scription to Tillich’s explanation to fill an interpre- valid. But is this what Tillich meant? tive void in Tillich’s explanation. If the answer of To answer this question requires transposing this the Role of the Other is to be found in Tillich’s ontological analysis into the myth. Hopefully this thought, it is not obvious. In fact, Tillich himself will bring about the much needed clarification about claims that irrationality must be evoked at points in how finite freedom leads to the fall. the explanation.40 This is certainly true in all areas of speculative theological discourse, but the point at Tillich’s Ontological Analysis and Genesis which rational discussion breaks down, and irration- Chapters 1-3 ality is accepted, can be argued and debated. It seems that Tillich stops short in his analysis, and not Since an ontological description of most compo- only can but must be pushed further in the direction nents has been given, the attempt can be made to of rationality. This can be done if Sartre concepts are relate these components to each other as they occur used to clarify Tillich’s. Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 20

A Sartrean analysis of the Fall is difficult be- cally complete and self-contained: they are not what cause Sartre doe not believe in one crucial compo- they are not, and they are what they are. Sartre does nent of it: God. To Sartre, the idea of God is a limi- express a goal for human being: being- in- itself- for tation on human possibility. 41 For this reason, Til- –itself, or, to be to others what one is to oneself. The lich and Sartre must work together with the hope difference, and a point that must be disputed, is that that Tillich’s ontological missing link can be ex- Sartre believes this goal to be unattainable, a futile plained through Sartre’s similar ontological thought. passion, 44 whereas in Tillich it is seen as a very real Because it may seem unfair to use an atheist’s view possibility manifest in the Christ as the New Being. to strengthen a theist’s argument, I will say that my Sartre, like Tillich, believes that centered self- use of Sartre is simply to suggest the direction in hood is the goal of the self, and that a self that goes which an ontological elaboration of Tillich’s thought too far in the direction of any one polarity is dam- should proceed. What Sartre lacks, Tillich provides, aged. Sartre calls the tendency to go too far in the and vice versa. Such an elaboration will help to direction of the in-itself, or to make the self into a broaden the contemporary understanding of sin. thing, ‘bad faith. It works like this: conscious beings, First, in order to make the comparison with Til- disturbed by the negation that is at the center of the lich’s polar structure, it is necessary to begin with self, as well as the lack of identity caused by tran- Sartre’s ontology in terms of polarities. Two fun- scendence, want to sacrifice their unique being-for- damental terms are necessary for the discussion. The itself to attain the ontological fullness of some thing. two opposites would be the being-for-itself, the be- It is worth noting that Sartre’s ontology sets man up ing of the human self. Defined as the being of con- for what appears to be a no-win situation: on the one sciousness, it is transcendent, and always beyond hand, man is doomed to be free. Freedom is, as it is itself.42 On the other side of the self is the polarity of in Tillich, human being’s greatness and weakness. 45 the in-itself, which is the being of objective reality, Yet in Sartre, freedom is the source of anxiety that or things. Being in-itself is determinate, non-free and humans want to give away. By being determinate, by non-transcendent.43 First and foremost, in Sartre’s giving up one’s for-itself, one achieves the com- thought, the ontological structure of human being is pleteness, that is, the identity and security, of the in- defined as being-for-itself. As such, the structure of itself. However, one then loses the essence of what the self lacks self-identity, because being-for-itself is human being is—freedom as it is revealed through always projecting itself beyond itself. Humans have transcendence. The cost of security is high. One the ability to transcend the here and now, to project lives in bad faith when one attempts to play a role of themselves into the future, and to work towards the some sort, chosen by someone else, not authentically future. Two things result from this: being-for-itself is one’s own. This role limits one’s being- for-itself, never stagnant or at rest, but is dynamic, always one’s being in the world, and hence one’s possibil- pushing the self forward. The second consideration ity. Humans become what other people see them to is that being-for-itself is consciousness, conscious- be.46 A person is in ‘bad faith’ when his/her polar ness again that is beyond itself. When consciousness structure collapses on the side of being-in-itself. turns itself upon itself, it sees the nothingness at the Human being becomes nothing more than an object, core. Thus, within the core of man is nothing, liter- with all its limits, by giving up the subjective side of ally. So, instead of being a good thing, Sartre sees the self. human being as a ‘futile passion’, an entity that, by Does bad faith change the way that people exist the lack of self identity, has an inferior ontological in the world? Resoundingly, it does. Sartre asserts status. that man is constantly trying to give to others the For Sartre, the world of the ‘thing’ constitutes freedom tht he finds too overwhelming to harness. It another aspect of being. The thing, ontologically is by limitation that we gain control over this aspect defined as being-in-itself, is the other principle way of being human. We literally play at life, by playing of being in the world. It is ontologically distinct at the roles we create for ourselves. We are ‘the from the for-itself. Sartre reserves the term for the good wife’; ‘the good daughter’; the ‘excellent stu- world of things; since they are what they are, they dent’. Not thinking for ourselves, we only have to have an ontological completeness as well as a prior- look to society, the unthinking herd, to tell us what ity over the for-itself world of conscious beings. is involved in playing each of these roles. We seek Ironically, Sartre tends to give things an ontological wholeness, ironically, through objectivity. priority over humans, because things are ontologi- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 21

But, to be fair, on the other side of Sartre’s de- 3:1; Eve, who was created in Genesis 2, now appears scriptive ontology, too much emphasis on the for- as a dynamic presence in the story at Genesis 3:2 itself leads to a transcendence that is literally “nega- and following; and human beings subsequently fall tion, or nothingness.” Tillich agrees with Sartre that into sin (Genesis 3:7). too much emphasis on either side of the polar struc- Following the line of reasoning that has been es- ture leads to problems, including the predominance tablished, it would make sense to ask, what happens of the polarity of freedom that results in chaos. ontologically when the Other arrives in the garden? Since Sartre’s emphasis on man’s absolute freedom Biblical tradition asserts that it is Eve’s power of leads him to despair of man being anything but a seduction that makes Adam sin.49 However, it seems futile passion, freedom must be limited by some- more plausible that it is not what Eve does that cre- thing. Sartre clearly does away with God as this ates the state of sin; rather, it is that Eve, by her very limitation, but leaves open in his ontology the goal presence in the garden, and particularly her ability to of the blending of the two sides in his being–in- see, changes everything in the garden, ontologically itself–for itself. To have ontological completion, speaking. The force of Eve’s gaze puts Adam into a both sides of the polar tension must be brought into state of “bad faith,” and ontologically changes his one in a being-in-itself-for-itself. 47 structure. He needs her to complete himself.50 Theo- To this point, we have seen that the structure of retically, she would affirm him by affirming what he human selfhood is expressed by polarities that are is created to be (a creature with freedom balanced by held in balance in essential being through the power limitation), an understanding that he has received of being. We have also added Sartre’s basic onto- from God in the prohibition given in Genesis 2:15- logical distinction to this list of polar tensions. As 17. Instead of affirming his understanding, she chal- well, choice is key to the analysis since freedom is lenges it by preferring the understanding of human not actualized unless choice is presented. 48 With this being–ness given to her by the Serpent in Genesis overview, we can now relate Tillichs and Sartre’s 3:4: “But the serpent said to the woman, ‘You will concepts to the fundamental question, which has not die.’” It is the gaze of the Other that creates limi- now been modified to read: why did Adam and Eve tation and provides the ontological force that trans- sin? forms Adam and causes him to fall from faith (polar balance) to bad faith (polar imbalance which empha- A Synthesis of Tillich’s and Sartre’s Thought sizes the objective side) through his own choice. His freedom, which had been in perfect balance with his It is now time to attempt to intertwine the Bibli- destiny, becomes limited, or finite, when he is seen cal story of the fall with the ontological analysis by Eve. It is this finite freedom that is responsible provided by Tillich and Sartre. for the “transition from essence to existence.” It First, God creates human being in his image, works in exactly the opposite way that Peter’s af- constituted by polarities, defined by freedom, con- firmation of Jesus as the Christ starts the movement fronted by choice. Tillich’s pre-lapserian Adam has of Christianity. In this case, it is Eve’s non- perfection through his (unchallenged and unchosen) affirmation of Adam’s being that leads to the sin of polar balance. The power of being-itself, mythically bad faith. Because it is chosen, and because of the expressed as man’s dwelling in the garden with God, human need for others for completion, the immanent keeps Adam in polar balance, or in the state of fall is inevitable, though not ontologically necessary dreaming innocence, before the fall, since the power (or given). of being-itself continuously overcomes the threat of Is it possible that the power of the Other’s look, non-being which could upset the balance. Adam then, ontologically changes subject into object? The lives within God’s watchful vision. Sartre’s Adam, answer is yes. Through an ontological interpretation, had he postulated such a person, would have been the immanent fall has nothing to do with Eve’s the perfect blend of the in-itself-for-itself. Human sexuality, but rather with her gaze. The fact that being is, in one important sense, almost perfect. That Adam and Eve choose to do something that God told which keeps it from being perfect is that the state of them not to do was not sin; it was a manifestation of man before the fall is given, not chosen. the prior sin of objectification. As an example of the The immanent fall occurs in Genesis 3, after change in perspective, their nudity (a manifestation three important things happen: God’s presence is of their objectification of each other) becomes prob- replaced by the presence of the serpent in Genesis lematic only after their fall not before it: “Then the Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 22 eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they tion through his look, and allows Adam to use his were naked” (Gen 3:7). The possibility of sin and (Adam’s) gaze to name His creatures: “…and the actuality of disobedience do not enter the Garden brought them to the man to see what he would call until a second person is created. them;” (Genesis 2:19). Of course, the existence of the other is not only a Hopefully it has been shown, through ontologi- negative; it is also a necessity. Sartre says, and Til- cal clarification, that Tillich’s interpretations of the lich affirms, “There is no person without an encoun- Biblical story of creation and fall has enduring merit ter with other persons.”51 This would lead to the ac- for understanding the human situation. Human be- ceptance of the theory that full personhood is only ings, created by God in his image, are fundamentally attained when the person discovers his/her purpose, good. This goodness is related to their original con- that is given to him/her by God, and that this pur- stitution, given to them through God’s gaze, which pose is affirmed by the Other. The Gospel account empowers them to be what He creates them to be- also supports Tillich’s view. In Matthew 13:55, Je- creatures who live in harmony with Him. sus, in his hometown, becomes the object of ‘bad The Biblical story tells us how this original crea- faith’ and corresponding ontological imitation, tion is transformed: Eve (representing the real world shown by the words of the crowd: “Is not this the of the Other) creates the possibility of the polar carpenter’s son?” Later in the chapter, their ‘offense’ break through her gaze. In a perfect human creation, at him renders him unable or unwilling to do freedom and destiny, as well as the other polarities, “mighty works” there, “because of their unbelief.” are balanced through an individual’s faith that is af- (Matthew 13:58) Bad faith negates the power of be- firmed by the Other. In the garden narrative, Eve’s ing. “look” introduces the threat of non-being into essen- tial being. The threatened break of the polar struc- The contemporary relevance of this understand- ture can then occur; specifically, Eve’s gaze, by not ing of the Fall and Original Sin affirming Adam’s destiny, to be at once both himself and at one with God, de-centers him. Any action that Is objectification through the Other the original occurs from a self that is not centered is sin. The sin? The answer is a resounding Yes. The essence of power to lose one’s center is exacerbated through the fallenness, or the sin which underlies all other sins, conditions of existence (of which the Other is a pri- is objectification. The Biblical story tells us what mary component). Gilkey’s summary is correct: happens when humans strip each other of their “The centering, shaping and directing of the self— unique combination of subjectivity-objectivity, their the self-constitution of the self—depend on real rela- original fullness, the ontological goodness and com- tions to others, participation inwardly through com- pletion that were given in a polar balance or self- mitment in those relations, and real but limited pro- centering: the world and everything good that dwells jects on the world.”54 Without this, the world loses in it stands over against us as an Object. If original its subjectivity: “It is filled only with flat, empty ob- can be understood as foundational, it can be shown jects, objects there ‘for me’ and for my use.”55 As that the sin that underlies all other manifestations of Tillich asks, “…then what does the term ‘fallen sin is objectification.52 If this analysis is correct, it world’ mean?”56 It can be suggested that human per- strongly suggests that bad faith—the act of objectifi- spective, the way that humans look at the world, is cation and subsequent limitation of one person by fundamentally changed through the tendency to ob- another—is the original sin. jectify. Given the force of the ontological analysis pre- Though often dismissed as ‘only a myth’, the sented herein, is there other Biblical evidence for story of original sin expresses the more fundamental this conclusion? Again, yes. What is seen in the first truth of what happens, in every life and at every two chapters of Genesis affirms this hypothesis. God time, to make sin happen. It is the condition that un- creates through his word, and then He pronounces derlies every manifestation of sin. Gilkey agrees: “In his creation good when he sees it. 53 In the current speaking of both estrangement and sinew are point- analysis, it is not that God sees that his creation is ing below the surface of events, choices, acts and good after creating it; it is, rather, it is the seeing consequences to a ‘deeper level’, a level below con- itself that establishes the goodness in creation. God, sciousness and so below the manifold of experience, by the act of looking on all that he creates, renders a level which for Tillich in large part affects, in fact creation good. He also sustains the goodness of crea- almost determines, the events, choices, and acts on Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 23 the ordinary historical surfaces of life.”57 “What vidual, awake at every moment and before every makes Tillich so helpful, therefore, is not only his action, to freely choose to objectify Self and Others. clear interest in method, but also the fact that his This tendency leads to sin. ontological approach to theology helps bring to con- sciousness, even prominence, the universality and 1 Langdon Gilkey Gilkey on Tillich (New York: The the ‘already there’ character of the experience of Crossroads Publishing Co., 1990), 114: “To his many human evil.”58 The explanation based herein is both ‘biblical’ theological colleagues—notably Reinhold Nie- ontological and existential; it answers Niebuhr’s buhr—he was, especially on this issue, too ‘ontologi- criticism, that sin must be understood in such a way cal’…..” that it is inevitable, though not ontologically neces- 2 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Biblical Thought and Onto- sary. Finally, as well, this interpretation shows the logical Speculation in Tillich’s Theology,” Theology of ontological distinction between creation and fall, Paul Tillich, (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1956), 216- through what Gilkey calls “Some combination of 217. ontology and myth….”59 3 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology Volume II (Chi- Questions concerning why we are created the cago: University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 1957), 12. way we are will always be asked, so that there are 4 Niebuhr, “Biblical Thought”, 218: “But if the struc- still points of mystery in the story. Humans would ture of his existence, defined as finite freedom, is inevita- be arrogant to assume that they can know the mind bly self seeking, man has every excuse.” of God. 5 Paul Tillich, “Reply to Interpretation and Criti- The story of the immanent fall explains why cism”, Theology of Paul Tillich, 342 human beings have such a strong inclination towards 6 Gilkey, 114 (footnote) wanting to objectify those things which never should 7 ST II, 29. be objectified: objectifying people leads to stereo- 8 ST II, 36. typing; even stronger cases lead, as Kant says, to 9 “Reply,” 343. treating others as a means to an end; and the most 10 “Biblical Thought”, 220. extreme cases of objectifying others lead to crimes, 11 ST II, 31: “One can say that nature is finite neces- such as rape and murder, in which the subjective sity, God is infinite freedom, man is finite freedom.” humanity of the Other is totally negated. Objectifica- 12 Gilkey, 115: “Hence sin cannot be conceived as an tion in the realm of ideas transforms the spirit into ordinary personal act for whose consequences we are in the letter of the law. The list of examples of how the ordinary way responsible. When did any of us ‘de- humans transform the essential goodness of creation cide’ against God, or determine to rebel? Even if we did, into something that goes against the original intent is how would such a particular, historical act infect every- endless. one?” Humans are created to be free, ontologically, 13 “Biblical Thought”, 220. and can achieve polar balance (faith) with God’s 14 Gilkey, 116: “….his ontological approach to theol- help, with individual effort, and with the affirmation ogy helps bring to consciousness, even prominence, the of the Other. Unfortunately, humans are so uncom- universality and the ‘already there’ character of the expe- fortable with this God-given freedom, that they take rience of human evil.” the easy way out, making themselves and others ob- 15 “Biblical Thought”, 220. jects. It is a matter of free choice; it is not out of on- 16 Newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/axial age (online) tological necessity. Before every encounter with the 17 ST II, 40: “ ….the transition from essence to exis- Other, there is always the choice to affirm his/her tence is not an event in time and space but the transhis- subjectivity. Frequently and inevitably, however, we torical quality of all events in time and space.” choose to live in the concrete, limited world of bad 18 Gilkey, 118. faith, which reduces others to objects. 19 Gilkey, 115. Hopefully, this paper has suggested a way of 20 Gilkey, 115. understanding original sin that is relevant to the 21st 21 “Biblical Thought”, 220, quoting Tillich’s Proposi- century. Original sin is not an inherited flaw that tions makes us sinful without our consent. Rather, the 22 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology Volume I (Chi- concept of original sin, derived from the Biblical cago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 165. “Three story and interpreted ontologically, explains the uni- basic pairs of elements constitute the basic ontological versal and eternal tendency, found within each indi- structure: individuality and universality, dynamics and Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 24

form, freedom and destiny. In these three polarities the 40 ST II, 91: “But the transition from essence to exis- first element expresses the self relatedness of being, its tence, from the potential to the actual, from dreaming power of being something for itself, while the second innocence to existential guilt and tragedy, is irrational.” element expresses the belongingness of being, its charac- 41 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism”, ter of being a part of a universe of being.” from Robert Solomon, ed., Existentialism (New York: 23 ST I, 235. Random House, Inc. 1974), 198:”Thus, there is no human 24 Ibid, 188: “Being, limited by nonbeing, is finitude.” nature because there is no God to have a conception of it.” 25 The New Oxford Annotated Bible, Revised Stan- 42 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New dard Version, ed. Metzger and May (New York: Oxford York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 629: “Being-for- it- University Press, Inc., 1962, 1973). All Biblical citation self is the being of consciousness.” are from this source. 43 Ibid, 74: “The in-itself is full of itself, and no more 26 Paul Tillich, The Dynamics of Faith (New York, total plenitude can be imagined, no more perfect equiva- Harper and Row, 1957), 5-6: “For faith is a matter of lence of content to container. There is not the slightest freedom. Freedom is nothing more than the possibility of emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack through which centered personal acts.” Sin becomes the opposite: when nothingness might slip in.” centering of the self is not present. For more elaboration, 44 Kurt Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt (New see pp. 49-52. York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1952), 160- 27 See note 11. 1: “The goal of all human striving is thus an ‘self’, com- 28 ST II, 31: “…..God is infinite freedom, man is fi- bining the fullness of being with the fullness of con- nite freedom.” sciousness….But such a goal is impossible of attain- 29 Ibid, 34: “Temptation is unavoidable because the ment….Man is therefore, Sartre concludes, ‘a futile pas- state of dreaming innocence is uncontested and unde- sion’”. cided. It is not perfection.” 45 See note 29. 30 Ibid, 32-33: “For the freedom of turning away from 46 BN, 628: “Through bad faith a person seeks to es- God is a quality of the structure of freedom as such. The cape the responsible freedom of Being- for- itself.” possibility of the Fall is dependent on all the qualities of 47 Ibid, 621: “If we wish to resolve these difficulties, human freedom taken in their unity. Symbolically speak- we must take into account what is required of an existent ing, it is the image of God in man which gives the possi- if it is to be considered as a totality: it is necessary that the bility of the Fall…..His greatness and his weakness are diversity of its structures be held within a unitary synthe- identical.” sis in such a way that each of them considered apart is 31 Ibid, 118: “New Being is essential being under the only an abstraction.” conditions of existence, conquering the gap between es- 48 Gilkey, 120. sence and existence.” 49 ST II, 37, discusses the rise of sexual conscious- 32 Ibid, 119,: “The New Being is new in so far as it is ness in the myth. the undistorted manifestation of essential being within 50 God himself affirms this in Genesis 2: 18, that “it is and under the conditions of existence.” not good that man should not be alone”. 33 Tillich’s vagueness about finite freedom is the 51 ST I, 177; BN, 222 :“But at the same time I need source of much of the confusion. See discussion, above, the other in order to realize fully all the structures of my ST II, 31ff. being.” 34 See note 4. 52 BN, 263. Sartre straightforwardly states this: “My 35 ST II, 39. original Fall is the existence of the Other.” 36 Ibid, 97. 53 The phrase God “saw” that creation ‘was good’ ap- 37 Matthew 13:55:”Is not this the carpenter’s pears seven times in the first chapter of Genesis. son?....13:58: “And he did not do many deeds of power 54 Gilkey, 132. there, because of their unbelief.” Greek English Interlin- 55 Ibid. ear New Testament, trans. Robert Brown and Philip Com- 56 ST II, 40. fort, ed. J.D Douglas, (Tyndale House 1990) 57 Ibid. 38 Reply, 343: “The fall is the work of finite freedom, 58 Ibid, 116. but it happened universally in everything finite, and there- 59 Ibid, 118. fore unavoidably….” 39 Ibid, 342.

Yes, But Only If God Does Not Exist: phetic and the mystical.5 It is the prophetic frame- A Tillichian Answer to the Question work that asks, “Is God necessary for morality?,” of God’s Necessity for Morality and it is the mystical framework that answers, “Only if God does not exist.” Alexander T. Blondeau In what follows I intend to show, with reference to a contemporary debate in moral ontology: (1) Introduction1 How the prophetic way of conceiving of God’s onto- logical necessity fails, and (2) How Paul Tillich’s The question is this: Is God ontologically neces- appropriation of the mystical tradition in conversa- sary for morality? The answer, I say, is only if God tion with Thomas Aquinas reframes the discussion does not, in an important sense, exist. This is a para- in such a way as to avoid the troubles of the first doxical statement. It is paradoxical in Paul Tillich’s way while providing a fruitful structure in which our sense of being contrary to “…opinion which is based theological and moral terms might take shape. on the whole of ordinary human experience, includ- ing the empirical and rational.”2 My claim is that for 1. The Prophetic Question and Its Limits God to be necessary for morality this paradox must be held intact. If the cognitive objectification of God We can enter into the prophetic attempt to con- that occurs in our thought of God is understood as a ceive of God as necessary for morality by way of the roughly adequate ontology, then, indeed, God is not Euthyphro dilemma. Any theistic moral ontology necessary for morality.3 At most God becomes an needs to find some answer to Plato’s classical di- epistemic prop, or a motivational carrot or stick. lemma. The basic form of this dilemma is this: Is the Such a God sits comfortably within the structure of moral goodness of something constituted by the fact ordinary human experience, but morality, with its that it is approved of by God (thus making the stan- self-transcending claim, is far from ordinary. dard of evaluation internal to God in the form of The question and answer that form the heart of command or will), or does God approve of some- this paper contain a question from one tradition,4 and thing because it is good (and, presumably, this an answer from another. Because of this, they do not goodness is external to God)? Those who accept really sit well together. The answer does not make some form of the first horn are said to be theological sense within the framework of the question, and the voluntarists. Their task must then be to give a re- question does not make sense within the framework sponse to the charge that “good” is arbitrary since of the answer. My own commitments have come to God, supposedly, could have approved of something lie with the framework of the answer. This paper different, or even something evil. Those who accept will be a brief attempt to show one reason for my the second horn of this dilemma are said to be theis- transition by focusing on a particular bind that the tic Platonists. For them, an impersonal good is the 6 framework of the question gets itself into. ultimate principle by which the (now finite) God The basic parting of ways between these two must itself be judged. Are there any other options for ways of thinking lies firstly in their conceptions of the prophetic meta-ethicist? It is difficult to say, but how to relate God’s essence to God’s existence, and, there are those who attempt to articulate a way secondly, how to relate divine essence to the human through. essence. In the framework of the question, God’s These theorists are those working since Robert essence does not include God’s existence, and, as Merrihew Adams’s 1973 essay, “A Modified Divine such, God’s essence is conceived of as existing apart Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness.” The way from our own human essence. In this way, God’s they try to get past Euthyphro is to assign divine essence serves as an exemplar of the Good. The commands a more limited role. Drawing from social framework of the answer, on the other hand, draws contract theory, they conceive of divine commands upon the idea of divine simplicity. Here God’s es- as constitutive of moral duty, or obligation, rather 7 sence includes existence. The human essence, there- than moral goodness. God, they want to say, ap- fore, is related to the divine essence by way of par- proves of something because it is good, but this ticipation rather than emulation. These two ap- goodness is judged not on the basis of an external standard; rather, it is judged on the basis God’s own proaches are well captured by Tillich’s lifelong out- 8 working of the principles of contrast and identity, or, essence. Thus the standard for evaluation is internal as I will be using the terms in this paper, the pro- to God, but goes deeper than God’s mere will or Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 26 command—in Robert Adams’ succinct formulation: prophetic project must be committed to. Moral Goodness is God.9 goodness remains for them as arbitrary as the exis- But what is critical to understand is that for Ad- tence of the God they seek to tie it to.15 ams, as well as all other representatives of what I am Of course, these theorists here object that such a calling “the prophetic meta-ethical project,” God is, scenario is impossible. God, they say, is not a con- as Adams says, “…concrete (though not physical) tingent being, as creatures are, but a necessary being individual. Indeed [God] is a person, or importantly in at least the broadly logical sense. That is, God is a like a person.10 “And therein lies the trouble. If God metaphysically necessary being.16 Yet, the reason is a concrete individual, then it seems impossible to this assertion never settles the argument is that the avoid the metaphysics of concrete particularity that existence of the God in play is not logically identical entails that God is composed of some combination with God’s essence. That being the case, it is impos- of essence and existence. sible not to be able to conceive of this God not exist- According to Michael Loux, metaphysicians ing in at least some possible world. But the trouble conceive of a concrete particular as either substance with metaphysical necessity is that (quoting propo- plus attributes, or perhaps a bundle of attributes, or nents of the prophetic project, William Lane Craig perhaps even an Aristotelian “kinds” + attributes.11 and J.P. Moreland): “There are no clear criteria But whatever way this is sliced, concrete particulars which can be applied mechanically to determine do not have an essence identical with their existence. whether a proposition is metaphysically necessary or The existence of a concrete particular entails varia- impossible. One chiefly has to rely on intuition or tions in the exemplification of attributes, thus the conceivability.”17 And since it is so easy to conceive exemplification of particular attributes is not neces- of such a God as failing to exist or changing, the sary in the strict logical sense. If this is admitted the assertion of metaphysical necessity just does not Euthyphro dilemma can make a second appearance, stick.18 Any being we can conceive of whose essence but on a deeper level. does not include existence, without violence to logic, As theistic Platonist Wes Morriston argues, “if can be imagined not to exist. This, it seems, is the we ask what makes it so that love, generosity, jus- final limit of the prophetic meta-ethical project. tice, faithfulness, and kindness are good, [the] an- Only by willing the mind to avoid certain logical swer [for the view under consideration] would ap- possibilities can such metaphysical necessity be pear to be that these qualities are good because they maintained. are united in God’s nature.”12 But Morriston begins to unravel the prima facie simplicity of this view by 2. The Mystical Answer asking what a “nature” is. And given that the god- concept in play is a concrete particular, he reaches This basic failure within the framework of the for an account of “nature” that involves the composi- question “Is God necessary for morality?” leads us tion of existence and essence. He says that, “[a] per- now to a different (arguably much older) framework. son’s nature is that set of properties which she pos- This is the ontology that Paul Tillich was thinking sesses in every possible world in which she exists.”13 out of when he said repeatedly that, “God does not That being the case it can reasonably be asked, “Is exist. He is being-itself beyond essence and exis- God good because [God] has these properties? Or tence.…[T]o argue that God exists is to deny him.”19 are they good because God has them?”14 It is from here that the mystical answer to the pro- From here one need only to imagine how we phetic question comes. would respond to the following questions: What For many in our day, Tillich’s claim remains a would happen to goodness if the exemplification of rather shocking thing for a theologian to say. Yet, it these properties in God was terminated? What if is really not so radical as the form he uses might in- God ceased to exist or changed? It seems counterin- dicate. This fundamental assertion in Tillich’s ontol- tuitive, indeed, to imagine that if someone were to ogy reaches back to the Augustinian tradition in run through these doors with news that God had in which God’s essence is thought of as being identical fact died due to injuries sustained by local authori- with God’s existence.20 This is what Tillich means ties, or perhaps that God had given up on this whole when he says that God is beyond essence and exis- “goodness” thing and was now the embodiment of tence. pure spiteful evil, that such news would alter the This quasi-concept of divine simplicity is ex- metaphysical status of goodness. But this is what the tremely difficult to get across as it does not itself

Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 27 yield determinate knowledge,21 but must be seen in that, I think, would otherwise save the term “exis- contrast with all created things that exist contin- tence” from the dustbin.31 In criticizing the scholas- gently or, as Aquinas says, “by participation.”22 To tics Tillich says, have being contingently is to be in such a way that The scholastics were right when they asserted essence and existence are not identical with one an- that in God there is no difference between es- other. This is what makes it possible for all things sence and existence. But they perverted their in- other than God to fail to exist and to change. The sight when in spite of this assertion they spoke existence of creatures stands in no necessary rela- of the existence of God and tried to argue in fa- tionship to their essence. Divine simplicity, how- vor of it. Actually they did not mean 'existence.' ever, is basically the denial of contingency, by way they meant the reality, the validity, the truth of of uniting God’s way of being with God’s essence. the idea of God, an idea which did not carry the Moreover, created things are, from a common point connotation of something or someone who of view, either concrete things or abstractions,23 but might or might not exist.32 God, as simple, is neither concrete24 nor abstract.25 It was from this idea (before I had read much God is not a being, nor an idea, but Being-itself.26 Aquinas) that I took the title for this paper, which is What is critical to grasp at this juncture is that sort of a problem for me since it is not quite right. God as simple cannot fail to exist, nor can God Aquinas, at least, really did mean “existence,” but he change. This is partially due to the pure logic of es- did not mean it in Tillich’s special sense. Yet, he sence and existence, and partially due to the way the meant it in a very precise sense that, I think, captures meanings of the terms “exist” and “change” largely Tillich’s concern without losing the term.33 slip out of our fingers when predicated of the simple For Aquinas, existence is a form of actuality. He deity. To conceive of God, thusly described, as says, “…existence is that which makes every form changing or ceasing to exist is to participate in the or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spo- very understandable failure of simply not grasping ken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as the implications of divine simplicity. Indeed, this is existing.”34 In this sense both creatures and God part of the point.27 But whatever else is said, the tra- have something in common: actuality. But since dition Paul Tillich is drawing upon is logically and God does not emerge from potentiality into actuality therefore necessarily immune from troubles that the as creatures do, God’s actuality, and therefore exis- Euthyphro dilemma brings out in the prophetic at- tence, is of a radically different form than creaturely tempt to ground the moral good in God.28 actuality.35 God’s actuality is the absolute actuality What we have instead is a conceptual scheme in that precedes and gives rise to all contingent actual- which, to quote Aquinas, “all beings apart from ity. Thus, for Aquinas, we cannot predicate existence God…are beings by participation.”29 Thus, just as all of God univocally36 (and this seems to be Tillich’s creaturely being inheres in God’s simple perfection, real concern), but even so we can still say that God so all goods, including the moral good, relate to God does indeed exist. It’s just that, in the words of De- in the same way. This mirroring of being and good- nys Turner, “…we are bound to have lost most of ness operates as it does because, as Aquinas says, our grip on the meaning of ‘exists’ as thus predi- “Goodness and being are really the same, and differ cated of God.”37 This, it seems to me, is Tillich’s only in idea.”30 From this we can see how little sense basic point, and noting the bind that the prophetic it makes to ask “is God necessary for morality?” project gets itself into by rejecting this insight, his from within this framework. It would make as much concern does not seem to be an idle one. So I sense as asking if a efficient cause was necessary to think—if you do not mind—I will just keep the title explain contingent being. of my paper! Yet, for those familiar with Tillich’s thought there may seem to be a difficulty with how I have 3. Conclusion gone about this. So far, I have been suggesting a fairly seamless union between the thought of Tillich So, what has been shown here? I have tried to and Aquinas, and yet, it might be remembered that make clear, by way of juggling two incompatible Tillich himself criticized Aquinas on this point. Til- traditions, what we must mean by God if God is to lich, himself, emphatic that we must not speak of be ontologically necessary for morality. If we let our God as existing, but his substantive critiques of both ontology follow from our ordinary human experi- the scholastics and Aquinas lack a certain nuance ence and therefore come to think of God as a con-

Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 28 crete particular, then, I’m with the atheists; I do not Davies, Brian. An Introduction to the Philosophy of think that such a God is necessary for morality. Mo- Religion. 3 ed. Oxford England; New York: rality, if it is anything, is at least the idea that some Oxford University Press, 2004. 1982. ways of being are good or bad regardless of what Loux, Michael J. Metaphysics: A Contemporary anybody says about them, even a god.38 This follows Introduction. Contemporary Introductions to from what Tillich called the religious source of mo- Philosophy. edited by Paul K. Moser. 3rd ed. rality, “…the self-transcendence of the spirit toward New York: Routledge, 2006. 1998. what is ultimate and unconditioned in being and MacIntyre, Alasdair C. After Virtue: A Study in meaning.”39 What I have called the prophetic meta- Moral Theory. 3rd ed. Notre Dame: University ethical project operated by way of a god-concept that of Notre Dame Press, 2007. remained conditioned by our ordinary human expe- Moreland, J.P., and William Lane Craig. rience. Such a god was, like us, a particular being Philosophical Foundations for a Christian and therefore not, Being-itself. Calling this being Worldview. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity necessary was shown to be an arbitrary assertion. Press, 2003. In the wake of this failure, I have held up, by Morriston, Wes. “Must There Be a Standard of way of Tillich and Aquinas, the classical ontology of Moral Goodness Apart from God?”. Philosophia divine simplicity as a more adequate alternative. The Christi 3, no. 1 (2001): 127-38. moral good and God’s essence were in this way re- Ricoeur, Paul. The Rule of Metaphor: Multi- lated to each other in the same way that all being is Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning related to God’s essence. This was not by way of in Language. Toronto; Buffalo: University of one particular being an exemplar for another, nor Toronto Press, 1977. was it by some nebulous relation of a universal to a Ross, Robert R. N. “Non-Existence of God: Tillich, particular. Rather, the relation of essence to exis- Aquinas, and the Pseudo-Dionysius.” Harvard tence is where the crux lies. In the words of Tillich, Theological Review 68, no. 2 (1975): 141-66. “Essence empowers and judges that which exists. It Rowe, William L. Religious Symbols and God: A gives it its power of being, and, at the same time, it Philosophical Study of Tillich’s Theology. stands against it as commanding law.”40 God, as this Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968. power of being is therefore necessary for morality, Thatamanil, John. “Tillich and the Postmodern.” In but that is a relatively trivial thing to say since God The Cambridge Companion to Paul Tillich, is in this way also necessary for any being whatso- edited by Russell Re Manning. Cambridge ever. What is less trivial is the suggestion that radi- Companions to Religion, 288-302. Cambridge: cal questioning in the realm of moral ontology might Cambridge University Press, 2009. lead to the doorstep of classical theism, but that is Tillich, Paul. A History of Christian Thought: From just the suggestion with which I wish to leave you.41 Its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism. New York: Touchstone, 1972. Bibliography _____. Morality and Beyond. Religious Perspectives. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. Adams, Robert M. Finite and Infinite Goods: A _____. Systematic Theology: Existence and the Framework for Ethics. New York: Oxford Christ. 3 vols. Vol. 2, Chicago: University of University Press, 1999. Chicago Press. 1975. 1957. ______. “A Modified Divine Command Theory of _____. Systematic Theology: Reason and Ethical Wrongness.” In Divine Commands and Revelation, Being and God. 3 vols. Vol. 1, Morality, edited by Paul Helm. Oxford Readings Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1973. in Philosophy, 83-119. Oxford; New York: 1951. Oxford University Press, 1981. Turner, Denys. “How to Be an Atheist.” New Aquinas, Thomas. The Summa Theologica of St. Blackfriars 83, no. 977-978 (2002): 317-35. Thomas Aquinas: Complete English Edition in Wielenberg, Erik J. Value and Virtue in a Godless Five Volumes. Translated by Fathers of the Universe. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge English Dominican Province, 2nd rev. ed. Notre University Press, 2005. Dame, Indiana: Christian Classics, 1981 [1911]. Becker, Ernest. The Denial of Death. New York: Free Press; Simon & Schuster, 1997. 1973.

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1 I would like to thank Rory Misiewicz, Tracy Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Witham and Peter Susag for carefully reading earlier Christian Worldview, 531. drafts of this paper and offering very valuable feedback. 13 Morriston, “Must There Be a Standard of Moral In addition I would also like to thank Kiara Jorgensen, Goodness Apart from God?.”, 129. Derek Maris, David Smoker, Dana Scopatz, Paul Greene, 14 Ibid., 129. Thomas Watson, Josh de Keijzer, and Lois Malcolm for 15 It’s worth noting that Adams does not seek to tie the very helpful conversation about to this paper. goodness to God in this way. Rather he argues that God is 2 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology: Existence and a suitable candidate to fill the semantic role that our usage the Christ, 3 vols, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago of the term “good” picks out. Even so, these considera- Press, 1975), 92. tions render his conclusion questionable since his God 3 Tillich takes the cognitive objectification of God to needs to deal with the consequences of the metaphysics of be necessary in any thought of God, but denies that this concrete particularity. objectification gives us an adequate ontology. Systematic 16 Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations Theology: Reason and Revelation, Being and God, 3 vols, for a Christian Worldview, 106. vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; repr, 1973), 17 Ibid., 503. 172. 18 For an illustration of this point by way of the truth 4 By tradition, one might be helped to think in terms functionality of counterfactual conditionals, see of a philosophical research program. Morriston, “Must There Be a Standard of Moral 5 A succinct treatment of this issue in Tillich’s own Goodness Apart from God?”, 134-5.. The formal logic historical context can be found in Paul Tillich, A History says one thing, but Morriston’s intuitive conceptualization of Christian Thought: From Its Judaic and Hellenistic says another. This is due, I argue, to the non-simple na- Origins to Existentialism (New York: Touchstone, 1972), ture of the deity he is conceiving. 370-1. 19 Tillich, Systematic Theology: Reason and 6 God is “finite” in the sense that there is an inde- Revelation, Being and God, 1, 205. pendent reality apart from God (Forms, the Good, basic 20 “…an existence of God which is not united with its ethical facts, etc.). essence is a contradiction in terms. It makes God a being 7 Robert M. Adams, “A Modified Divine Command whose existence does not fulfill his essential potentiali- Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” in Divine Commands and ties.” Ibid., 236. Morality, ed. Paul Helm, Oxford Readings in Philosophy 21 This is much the same as what John Thatamanil ar- (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 83. gued with respect to Tillich’s use of “Being-itself.” John 8 J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Thatamanil, “Tillich and the Postmodern,” in The Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview Cambridge Companion to Paul Tillich, ed. Russell Re (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 531. Manning, Cambridge Companions to Religion 9 Robert M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 295. Framework for Ethics (New York: Oxford University 22 Thomas Aquinas, The “Summa Theologica” of St. Press, 1999), 3. Thomas Aquinas: Complete English Edition in Five 10 Ibid., 42.; c.f. also Brian Davies who points out Volumes, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican source material showing how Alvin Plantinga and Rich- Province, 2nd and rev. ed. (Notre Dame, IN: Christian ard Swineburne fall into this camp. Brian Davies, An Classics, 1981), ST I, Q 44, A 1. Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 3 ed. (Oxford 23 Tillich attributes this idea to the basic nominalist England; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 9. criticism wherein only a particular thing has reality, mak- 11 Michael J. Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary ing universals into mere abstractions. Tillich, Systematic Introduction, ed. Paul K. Moser, 3rd ed, Contemporary Theology: Existence and the Christ, 2, 10-11. Introductions to Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 24 The denial of concrete gods comes naturally to the 2006), 84-117. modern consciousness, but it is therefore easy to mistak- 12 Wes Morriston, “Must There Be a Standard of enly embrace the inverse, as Ernest Becker does in the Moral Goodness Apart from God?,” Philosophia Christi following quote. “The personality can truly begin to 3, no. 1 (2001), 128. And indeed, this is just the point that emerge in religion because God, as an abstraction does Moreland and Craig make: “God may be said to be good not oppose the individual as others do, but instead pro- in the sense that he possesses all these moral virtues—and vides the individual with all the powers necessary for in- he does so essentially and to the maximal degree!” dependent self-justification.” Ernest Becker, The Denial

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of Death (New York: Free Press; Simon & Schuster, imply, nor were they taken to imply, that God is subject to 1997), 202. the conditions of finitude—time, space, [page break] etc. 25 “The ontological question is: What is being itself? Hence, it would seem that Tillich has not given any con- What is that which is not a special being or a group of vincing reason as yet why it would be a mistake to say beings, not something concrete or something abstract, but that God exists when ‘exists’ is used not in Tillich’s spe- rather something which is always thought implicitly, and cial sense, but either in its ordinary sense or in some sense sometimes explicitly, if something is said to be?” Tillich, in which the classical theologians used it.” William L. Systematic Theology: Reason and Revelation, Being and Rowe, Religious Symbols and God: A Philosophical Study God, 1, 163. of Tillich’s Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago 26 Again, Thatamanil has a very good discussion on Press, 1968), 76-77. why predicating “Being-itself” of God is not a straight- I think Rowe is right about the sense of the scholas- forward predication, but rather a sort of limit expression tics, but in spite of that, I think that sometimes arguments between conceptual and religious discourses. Thatamanil, about God’s existence are arguments about whether or “Tillich and the Postmodern”, 290-8. not God is finite, as is evidenced by the discussion of the 27 Denys Turner makes this point beautifully when he prophetic attempt to ground the moral good in God above. argues that “…if we say, as Thomas does, that whatever 32 Tillich, Systematic Theology: Reason and the answer [to the question, ‘Why is there something Revelation, Being and God, 1, 205. rather than nothing’], it is ‘what people refer to when they 33 Robert R.N. Ross saw this clearly when he wrote talk of God, then we know at least one thing about God: that in light of Tillich’s technical use of “exists” that we know that we could not know what it means to say “…one can see on what basis he is led to make the claim ‘God exists’ because the notion of existence has now run “God does not exist.” Yet the cost of the questionable off the edge of our intelligible world, even if it was neces- forcefulness gained in making it comes high. In affirming sities of thought about our world which led us to it: before the reality of God there is a confusion—a confusion God, language has, as it were, run itself out of the possi- Aquinas appreciated but sought to avoid. But because the bilities available to it.” Denys Turner, “How to Be an confusion is a genuine one, it cannot be removed, as Til- Atheist,” New Blackfriars 83, no. 977-978 (2002), 330. lich thought, by merely attempting to remove the concept 28 Morriston recognizes this point well. He says, “I of ‘existence,’ or by somehow making it inoperative. mention one solution to this problem only to put it to one Thus, in the case of Tillich, and perhaps the Pseudo- side. Those who accept the doctrine of divine simplicity Dionysius as well, the price paid for (sometimes) disal- can pass unscathed between the horns of this dilemma. If lowing the possibility of asserting God’s existence is that God is God’s nature, the problem disappears. Since God’s of losing sight of where to focus our confusion.” Robert nature is not something over and above God, there can be R. N. Ross, “Non-Existence of God: Tillich, Aquinas, and no question of its providing a standard of moral goodness the Pseudo-Dionysius,” Harvard Theological Review 68, apart from God. But for the rest of us — those of us who no. 2 (1975), 156. cannot see how God could be his nature or how his nature 34 Aquinas, The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas could be simple — things are not so easy. We must Aquinas: Complete English Edition in Five Volumes, ST choose between the horns of our Euthyphro-like dilemma I, Q 4, A 4. and make the best of it.” Morriston, “Must There Be a 35 “…the first being must of necessity be in act, and Standard of Moral Goodness Apart from God?”, 129-30. in no way in potentiality.” Ibid, ST I, Q 3, A 1. 29 Thomas Aquinas, The “Summa Theologica” of St. 36 Paul Ricoeur has a tremendous section in The Rule Thomas Aquinas: Complete English Edition in Five of Metaphor that analyzes Thomas’ “…desire to encom- Volumes, STI, Q 44, A 1. pass in a single doctrine the horizontal relation of the 30 Ibid, ST I, Q 5, A 1. categories of substance and the vertical relation of created 31 William Rowe pointed to this when he noted that things to the Creator.” Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of “[Tillich] does use ‘exists’ in such a way that to say that Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of ‘x exists’ is to imply that x is subject to the conditions of Meaning in Language (Buffalo: University of Toronto finitude. What this means is that ‘existence’ and ‘exists’ Press, 1977), 272-80. He concludes that the result of this are technical terms in Tillich’s system. When people ar- monumental effort was a renewed split between the gue about the existence of God they are not arguing about speculative (univocal) and poetic forms of discourse. Po- whether God is finite or not. When the classical theologi- etic discourse is thought to deploy neither univocal, nor ans asserted the existence of God they did not mean to equivocal attribution, but instead metaphorical attribution,

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and metaphorical attribution contains an irreducible ele- Alasdair MacIntyre came to after writing “After Virtue.” ment of indeterminacy. He says, “…I had now learned form Aquinas that my at- 37 Turner, “How to Be an Atheist.”, 321. tempt to provide an account of the human good purely in 38 This might be thought of as a point of contact be- social terms, in terms of practices, tradition, and the narra- tween the mystical meta-ethical project and atheistic tive unity of human lives, was bound to be inadequate thinking on the topic. As Eric Wielenberg writes, “If there until I had provided it with a metaphysical grounding. It is are ethical truths at all, then some of them lie at the bed- only because human beings have an end towards which rock of reality, created by no one, under no one’s control, they are directed by reason of their specific nature, that passing judgment on the actions and character of God and practices, traditions, and the like are able to function as man alike.” Erik J. Wielenberg, Value and Virtue in a they do. So I discovered that I had, without realizing it, Godless Universe (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge presupposed the truth of something very close to the ac- University Press, 2005), 67. count of the concept of good that Aquinas gives in ques- 39 Paul Tillich, Morality and Beyond, Religious tion 5 in the first part of the Summa Theologiae.” Perspectives (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 18. Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral 40 Systematic Theology: Reason and Revelation, Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Being and God, 1, 203. Press, 2007), x, xi. 41 It is worth noting that my arrival at the idea of di- vine simplicity is somewhat similar to the revelation that

Anxiety, Finite Freedom, and the Fall gaard work out very different answers, which are of Humanity in Schelling, nevertheless in agreement, that it is in anxiety that Kierkegaard, and Tillich the human person gains access to his own freedom. My considerations here are oriented toward their Christian Danz respective elaborations of this connection. Schelling’s philosophy of freedom is the starting t is well known that Martin Heidegger attributed a point for this. I basic function to anxiety in the self-apprehension Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the of Dasein. As he explains in Being and Time, anxi- Nature of Human Freedom from 1809 is without ety makes accessible the “being free for the freedom question one of the central points of reference in the of choosing and grasping itself”1 and therein calls it debate about freedom, finitude and anxiety. This out its fallen-ness in “the They”. With his concept of text, difficult to interpret and therefore highly con- anxiety, Heidegger draws on Søren Kierkegaard as troversial, belongs to the context of so called identity 5 well as Schelling, about whose freedom text he con- philosophy. Here Schelling is working on a natural ducted a seminar in the same year in which Being philosophical groundwork of human freedom, as is and Time was published.2 Likewise, Heidegger sees evident in the countless references to his identity his own philosophy as an alternative project to Ernst philosophy texts. Going back as far as his Magister Troeltsch and Paul Tillich.3 Since the end of the dissertation of 1792, he takes up earlier reflections 1920s Tillich conceived his anthropological reflec- into the (difficult to illuminate) line of argument of tions in explicit contention with Heidegger.4 the Investigations. Already in his Magister disserta- Tillich’s reflections are also focused on the con- tion the young Schelling—referencing Kant and the nection between freedom, finitude and anxiety and contemporary exegetical debates—had interpreted stand—as with Heidegger’s reflections—in the re- the fall of humanity as the transition from the state ception history of Schelling and Kierkegaard. With of nature to the consciousness of freedom, thereby that, I have named the theme of my following eliminating the traditional doctrine of original sin. thoughts, which have to do with how the human per- Articulated in the biblical myth of the fall is the son in his concrete, determined self-understanding awakening of human freedom. Connected to this is becomes conscious of his own freedom. Against the the loss of the dreaming innocence of the state of backdrop of Schelling’s thought, Tillich and Kierke- nature. The Investigations frames the character of hu- man freedom in terms of absoluteness, freedom, and natural philosophy. In the human, as the result of the

Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 2014 32 process of nature, the two forces of the universal and are the passages about “‘Dreaming Innocence’ and of self-will come into union. Thus, the human is si- Temptation”13 in the second volume of the System- multaneously in nature and “above and outside all atic Theology. The recently published early lectures nature.”6 Unlike God and Nature, the unity of both from exile (held by Tillich in the USA in 1934/35), principles is severable. In his life, the human person which include lectures on anthropology, cast new faces the task of harmonizing these two principles, light on Tillich’s thoughts on the relation of free- i.e., the general type and selfhood. The becoming dom, finitude, and anxiety.14 conscious of one’s own state of freedom, and its Tillich transforms Kierkegaard’s philosophy of necessary realization through humanity, is described spirit into a historically oriented anthropology. It is by Schelling as anxiety.7 concerned with the question as to how the human, in It is well known that, after ending his engage- his concrete life, arrives at an understanding of him- ment to Regine Olsen, Søren Kierkegaard went di- self. The anthropology, which Tillich—dismissing rectly to Berlin in the winter semester of 1841/42 object-oriented conceptions—calls the doctrine of and listened to and took notes on—albeit without the man, carries forward the deliberations of the phi- much patience—Schelling’s Lectures on the Phi- losophy of mind of the 1920s. The topics to be losophy of Revelation. As Tonny Aagaard Olesen treated in the doctrine of the human are the freedom has recently made clear, it is rather unlikely that the and finitude of the human person. The human being Danish thinker had read Schelling’s works, espe- is freedom. Freedom is only real in its performance. cially the work on freedom from 1809.8 Neverthe- Therefore, freedom and necessity overlap in self- less, in his treatise from 1844, The Concept of Anxi- determination. Tillich examines one’s grasping of ety, Kierkegaard worked out a theory of a concrete the inner structure of his freedom under the central individual subject that stands within the problem- concept of finitude. Like Schelling and Kierkegaard, horizon of idealistic debates concerning the Spirit. Tillich determines the coming to awareness of one’s Following Fichte, the Dane transfers the theory of own finite freedom, in the self-realization of the in- the absolute and the natural philosophical frame of dividual, as anxiety. In anxiety, the human person Schelling’s treatise on freedom to the individual becomes aware of the facticity of his own self- self-realization of the concrete subject, which is self- determination, its ambivalent realization, as well as understanding and which relates to its self- his having to die. Furthermore, for Tillich, the per- understanding.9 The self or spirit is a synthesis of sonality is also a task that every individual must re- freedom and necessity, infinity and finitude, etc., alize. It consists in the transparency of finite free- which is only real in the act of self-positing. For the dom in its ambivalent structure. concrete subject, the underivable disclosedness of Looking over the thoughts discussed here on the this synthetic structure is anxiety. The latter is “free- relation of anxiety, freedom, and finitude in dom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility.”10 In Schelling, Kierkegaard and Tillich, it becomes ap- anxiety, the subject grasps itself as simultaneously parent that the self and its self-aware self- finite and infinite, real and possible, while also be- determination is increasingly actualized and dynam- coming aware of the task of constructing a concrete ized. The imagination of a fixed core of the person is self-understanding. Thus, anxiety is ambiguous. A dissolved by Kierkegaard, and even more by Tillich, self-disclosed consciousness of freedom is always at into the symbolic presentation of the self in its own the same time a consciousness of guilt, knowledge performances. In Tillich, the concept of anxiety be- of the ambivalence of the realization of freedom. If comes a basic anthropological determination. It freedom grasps itself in this way, then—as with the thereby receives a basic function in a Dasein- young Schelling—the natural state of dreaming in- hermeneutical theory of the finite human. In Being nocence is already left behind.11 and Time, Martin Heidegger worked out just such a During his studies at the theological faculty of theory, although he explicitly wanted to think of his the university of Halle, from 1905 to 1907, Paul Til- program as being distinct from any anthropology.15 lich took part in a student reading group dedicated to the thinker from Copenhagen.12 This did not fail to leave an impression on his later study of Schelling. 1 M. Heidegger, Being and Time (Albany, 1996) p. On the whole, then, Tillich’s theology and philoso- 176. phy of religion bespeak an interweaving of Kierke- 2 Cf. M. Heidegger, Schellings Treatise: On Essence gaardian and Schellingian motifs. Most well-known Human Freedom, Ohio 1985. More recently in German

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cf. Heideggers Schelling-Seminar (1927/28). Die Pro- Ein Lebensbild in Aufsätzen, Reden und Stellungnahmen, tokolle von Martin Heideggers Seminar zu Schellings Stuttgart 1972, GW XIII, p. 27-33, esp. 29. ‚Freiheitsschrift’ (1927/28) und die Akten des Interna- 13 P. Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. II, Chi- tionalen Schelling-Tags 2006. Lektüren F.W.J. Schellings cago/London 1975, p. 33-36. I. Hrsg. von Lore Hühn und Jörg Jantzen unter Mit- 14 Vgl. P. Tillich, Frühe Vorlesungen im Exil (1934- wirkung von Philipp Schwab und Sebastian Schwen- 1935), ed. v. E. Sturm, Berlin/Boston 2012. zfeuer, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2010. 15 I express my thanks to Jason Valdez (Vienna) for 3 Cf. M. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of the Re- translating this paper. ligious Life, Indiana 2010. Cf. additionally C. Danz, Re- ligion der konkreten Existenz. Heideggers Religionsphi- losophie im Kontext von Ernst Troeltsch und Paul Tillich, in: Kerygma und Dogma 55 (2009), p. 325-341. 4 Vgl. nur P. Tillich, Vorlesungen über Geschicht- sphilosophie und Sozialpädagogik (Frankfurt 1929/30), A word from the editor: ed. E. Sturm, Berlin/New York 2007. 5 For the state of the discussion cf. C. Danz/J. Jantzen (eds.), Gott, Natur, Kunst und Geschichte. Schelling I encourage you to receive the Bulletin zwischen Identitätsphilosophie und Freiheitsschrift, Göt- electronically if at all possible. Postage tingen 2011; C. Danz, Die Durchsichtigkeit des Selbst im Gottesverhältnis. Kierkegaard und Schelling über die rates have risen on 26 January 2014. menschliche Freiheit, in: G. Linde/R. Purarthofer/H. Schulz/P. Steinacker (eds.), Theologie zwischen Pragma- If you have not paid your dues for 2013, tismus und Existenzdenken. Festschrift für Hermann Deuser zum 60. Geburtstag, Marburg 2006, p. 469-486. please do so at your earliest conven- 6 F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into ience. The Society sustained a consid- the Nature of Human Freedom, Albany 2006, p. 33. 7 erable loss on the banquet in Baltimore. Cf. F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophical Investigations, Albany 2006, p. 47, 48: „The fear of life itself drives man out of the centrum into which he was created: for this Many thanks. centrum as the purest essence of all willing, is for each particular will a consuming fire; in order to be able to live within it the man of all particularity must become extinct, which is why the attempt to step out of this center into the periphery is almost necessary in order to seek there some calm for his selfhood.” Please send any new publications to 8 Cf. T.A. Olesen, Kierkegaards Schelling. Eine his- torische Einführung, in: J. Henningfeld/J. Stewart (eds.), the editor ([email protected]). Kierkegaard und Schelling, Freiheit, Angst und Wirk- lichkeit, Berlin/New York 2003, p. 1-102. 9 Cf. on this Kierkegaard‘s determination of the syn- Book reviews are also appreciated. thetic structure of the self in: Sickness Unto Death, Princeton 1983, p. 16f. For extensive treatment of this cf. C. Danz, Die Durchsichtigkeit des Selbst im Gottes- verhältnis, p. 478-484. 10 S. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, Princeton 1980, p. 42. 11 Cf. S. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, p. 35ff. 12 Cf. P. Tillich, Erinnerungen an den Freund Hermann Schafft, in: id., Impressionen und Reflexionen.

The Officers of the North American Paul Tillich Society

President Duane Olsen, McKendree University

President Elect Charles Fox, SUNY/ Empire State College/ Mentor of Philosophy and Religious Studies Emeritus

Vice President Bryan Wagoner, Davis and Elkins College

Secretary Treasurer Frederick J. Parrella, Santa Clara University

Past President Echol Nix, Furman University

Board of Directors

Term Expiring 2014 Marc Dumas, Université de Sherbrooke Janet Giddings, Santa Clara University and San Jose State University Marcia MacLennan, Kansas Wesleyan University

Term Expiring 2015 Tom Bandy, www.ThrivingChurch.com Adam Pryor, Bethany College, Lindsborg, Kansas Devan Stahl, Saint Louis University

Term Expiring 2016 Christopher Rodkey, Penn State University, York Zachary Royal, Garrett Theological Seminary M. Lon Weaver, Marshall College Preparatory School 16