COARSE THINKING AND PERSUASION*
SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN
JOSHUA SCHWARTZSTEIN Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/123/2/577/1930852 by Harvard Law School Library user on 15 June 2021 ANDREI SHLEIFER
We present a model of uninformative persuasion in which individuals “think coarsely”: they group situations into categories and apply the same model of in- ference to all situations within a category. Coarse thinking exhibits two features that persuaders take advantage of: (i) transference, whereby individuals transfer the informational content of a given message from situations in a category where it is useful to those where it is not, and (ii) framing, whereby objectively useless information influences individuals’ choice of category. The model sheds light on uninformative advertising and product branding, as well as on some otherwise anomalous evidence on mutual fund advertising.
I. INTRODUCTION Most societies devote huge resources to persuasion (McCloskey and Klamer 1995). Selling, advertising, political cam- paigns, organized religion, law, much of the media, and some ed- ucation are devoted to changing beliefs in a way advantageous to the persuader. Persuasion is not simply an expenditure of re- sources: the content of the message crucially shapes its effective- ness.1 But what constitutes persuasive content? Economists usually assume that only one type of persua- sive content matters: objectively useful information. Stigler (1987, p. 243) defines advertising as “the provision of information about the availability and quality of a commodity.” Economists typ- ically model persuasion, including advertising (Stigler 1961), political campaigns (Downs 1957), and legal argument (Milgrom
* This paper replaces an earlier draft with the same title, as well as “Per- suasion in Finance” by Mullainathan and Shleifer. We are grateful to Nicholas Barberis, Gary Becker, Dan Benjamin, Daniel Bergstresser, Olivier Blanchard, Lauren Cohen, Stefano DellaVigna, Daniel Gilbert, Edward Glaeser, Xavier Gabaix, Matthew Gentzkow, Simon Gervais, Robin Greenwood, Richard Holden, Emir Kamenica, Lawrence Katz, Elizabeth Kensinger, David Laibson, Owen Lamont, Steven Levitt, Ulrike Malmendier, Richard Posner, Andrew Postlewaite, Matthew Rabin, Christina Romer, Jesse Shapiro, Jeremy Stein, Rene Stulz, Richard Thaler, Robert Waldmann, Glen Weyl, Gerald Zaltman, Eric Zitzewitz, three anonymous referees, and especially Nicola Gennaioli, Giacomo Ponzetto, and the fourth anonymous referee for helpful comments. We also thank Michael Gottfried, Tim Ganser, and Georgy Egorov for excellent research assistance. Schwartzstein acknowledges financial support from an NSF graduate fellowship. All errors remain our own. 1. A vast advertising literature makes this point (see, e.g., Zaltman 1997; Sutherland and Sylvester 2000). Bertrand et al. (2006) present some clear evidence that persuasive content matters in a field experiment using loan advertisements by a South African consumer lending institution. C 2008 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2008
577 578 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS and Roberts 1986b; Dewatripont and Tirole 1999), as provision of information. In some models, such as those of Grossman and Hart Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/123/2/577/1930852 by Harvard Law School Library user on 15 June 2021 (1980), Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), Crawford and Sobel (1982), Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura (1990), and Glazer and Rubinstein (2001, 2004), the persuader uses informa- tion strategically, but conveys information nonetheless. Psychologists and marketers understand persuasion quite differently. They argue that people evaluate various propositions or objects using representativeness, metaphors, analogies, and more generally associative strategies (Gilovich 1981; Edelman 1992; Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Lakoff 1987; Zaltman 1997). The strategy of persuasion is to take advantage of these mental strategies, which we refer to as coarse thinking, to improve the audience’s assessment of the persuader’s issue or product. In this paper, we present a model of coarse thinking and per- suasion. We distinguish two ways in which persuaders, such as product advertisers, can take advantage of coarse thinking. First, the audience might already have some analogy for the product in mind; it already thinks of the product in terms of something else. In this case, one way to persuade is to advertise attributes of the product that are positively related to quality in the anal- ogous situation. The coarse thinker transfers the informational content of these attributes across analogous situations and so im- proves his view of the product. We call this form of coarse thinking “transference.” Second, and more fundamentally, persuaders may themselves try to shape or create the relevant analogy by advertising at- tributes associated with that desired analogy. This method per- suades successfully when it changes the lens through which a thinker views all features of the product. Following Goffman (1974), we call this form of coarse thinking “framing.” In many instances, successful persuasion takes advantage of both trans- ference and framing, but these forms of coarse thinking are con- ceptually distinct.2 To illustrate these ideas, consider several examples: Alberto Culver Natural Silk Shampoo was advertised with a slogan “We put silk in the bottle.” The shampoo actually contained
2. Recently, the term framing has been used much more narrowly to describe the coding of gains and losses in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Goffman’s original and broader meaning of framing as a lens or “model” through which the audience interprets data is what we try to capture below. COARSE THINKING AND PERSUASION 579 some silk. During the campaign, the company spokesman con- ceded that “silk doesn’t really do anything for hair” (Carpenter, Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/123/2/577/1930852 by Harvard Law School Library user on 15 June 2021 Glazer, and Nakamoto 1994).3 This example is a relatively pure case of the persuader relying on transference. Culver takes ad- vantage of the co-categorization of shampoo with hair, which leads consumers to value “silk” in shampoo (not very sensible) because they value “silky” in hair. By adding silk to the bottle, Culver ef- fectively transfers a positive trait from hair to shampoo to make its product more attractive. For about forty years, Avis Car Rental advertised itself with the slogan “We are number two. We try harder.” Besides this key message, most ads contain few data. We think of this campaign as a relatively pure case of framing. When Avis was getting started, many of its potential customers knew that it was smaller than Hertz. How the attribute “being second” is interpreted depends on categorization: either negatively as a loser or positively as an underdog. Because the underdog image favors Avis, the campaign primed this frame by stressing the attributes of underdogs (they try harder). The fact that Avis lagged behind Hertz in sales be- came a sign of higher rather than lower quality. Most persuasive messages take advantage of both transfer- ence and framing. Take two examples, one from the economic and one from the political sphere. Over the course of the Internet stock market bubble (1994– 2003), the brokerage firm Merrill Lynch ran six advertising cam- paigns, respectively called “a tradition of trust,” “the difference is Merrill Lynch,” “human achievement,” “be bullish,” “ask Merrill,” and “total Merrill.” The motto of each campaign always appeared in the ad. Roughly speaking, the first two campaigns preceded the bubble, the third and the fourth appeared during it, and the last two ran after the sharp market decline. One way to compare these campaigns is to look at a repre- sentative ad from each. “A tradition of trust” ads often portray a grandfather and a grandson fishing together. The ads talk about slow accumulation of wealth and Merrill’s expertise. The activi- ties of fishing and, even more so, teaching to fish suggest slow- ness, tradition, skill, consistency, and patience. The ads advise on how to protect oneself and one’s family financially. Ads from “the
3. A recent reincarnation of this marketing idea, discovered by inspecting products in a drugstore, is Pure Cashmere Softsoap, which contains “cashmere extract.” Cashmere adds quality to sweaters, not soap. 580 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS difference is Merrill Lynch” campaign likewise show grandfathers and grandsons with fishing rods, and they recommend saving. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/123/2/577/1930852 by Harvard Law School Library user on 15 June 2021 This message changes in 1999. A “human achievement” ad from 1999 shows a twelve-year-old girl wearing a helmet and car- rying a skateboard. The image is much hipper than those from the previous campaigns. The next campaign, from 2000–2001, simply intones: “be bullish.” One ad shows a Merrill Lynch bull wired as a semiconductor board (the word “wired” itself has two mean- ings, connected and hyperactive). The theme of protection is gone; growth and opportunity emerge. After the market declines, Merrill switches to the “ask Merrill” campaign, with its emphasis on uncertainty in the world, and the company’s expertise in protecting and advising its cus- tomers. A representative ad is dominated by a page-sized question mark, invoking insecurity, uncertainty, and the need for answers. Finally, by the end of the decade, the firm moves to the “total Merrill” campaign, with its familiar emphasis on expertise and intergenerational fishing. Merrill’s campaigns take advantage of both transference and framing. In quieter markets, Merrill seeks to frame or position it- self as an expert and adviser, much like a doctor, or a grandfather teaching his grandson to fish. It then wants the audience to trans- fer the positive attributes of this expert to enhance the perceived value of its own advice. At the peak of the bubble, Merrill recog- nizes that many investors are seeking to get rich quickly, to grab the opportunities created by the technology boom. It then frames itself as the agent of such opportunities and wants the audience to transfer the positive attributes of “technology” to its own services. After the crash of the bubble, the patient advisor again becomes an attractive frame. As a final example—from the area of political persuasion— consider Arnold Schwarzenegger’s memorable speech at the 2004 Republican National Convention. In the best remembered part of his speech, Schwarzenegger defended free trade: “To those critics who are so pessimistic about our economy, I say: Don’t be economic girlie men! ... Now they say India and China are overtaking us. Don’t you believe it. We may hit a few bumps—but America always moves ahead. That’s what Americans do.” Schwarzenegger’s speech takes advantage of both framing and transference. He frames international trade as war, with win- ners and losers, not as an economic model in which everyone gains. With this frame in mind, he transfers America’s as well as his COARSE THINKING AND PERSUASION 581 own (a former champion as well as The Terminator) propensity to win onto trade. This message of victory, although helpful for Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/123/2/577/1930852 by Harvard Law School Library user on 15 June 2021 assessing U.S. military engagements and Schwarzenegger’s own accomplishments, is of limited value in evaluating globalization. We will come back to these examples as we discuss our an- alytical results. In our model, individuals deviate from Bayesian rationality in two crucial ways: first, they group situations into categories based on the data they receive and, second, they fail to differentiate between co-categorized situations and use one model of inference for all situations in the same category. Such coarse thinking allows the persuader to create uninformative messages that frame the interpretation of public information (laggard in car rentals) through category choice (underdog). Coarse thinking also allows the persuader to take advantage of transference by creat- ing messages (we will win) that are uninformative in the relevant situation (free trade) but still induce a reaction because they are informative in the co-categorized one (war). The model presented in this paper shares many elements with Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) model of strategic information transmission. Indeed, our model of transference is mathemati- cally similar to an extension of Crawford and Sobel in which the audience does not know the exact situation (the underlying game being played), and so may react to messages that do not contain decision-relevant information in the relevant situation.4 On the other hand, framing through category choice does not have a nat- ural counterpart in the cheap talk literature. Even if we focus on transference, our interpretation of the underlying mathematics is very different. We suppose that the audience knows the situation it is in but uses a single model of inference to interpret information in multiple situations. We do not think that the audience reacts to the message “contains silk” because it is uncertain whether adding silk improves the shampoo. Rather, we suggest that the audience thinks coarsely and reacts to the message “contains
4. Crawford (2003) presents a cheap talk model in which uncertainty sur- rounding the Sender’s type (e.g., whether or not he is strategic) may enable a strategic Sender to “fool” a sophisticated Receiver into taking a suboptimal ac- tion in equilibrium. Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007) present a related model that incorporates the possibility of equilibrium deception or misinterpreta- tion of information. They extend the basic cheap talk model by assuming that a fraction of the Sender’s audience misinterprets equilibrium messages with some nonequilibrium-based rule (e.g., they always blindly believe the Sender’s recom- mendation). In the equilibria they identify, the Sender always sends an inflated message that deceives the “na¨ıve” agents. 582 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS silk” because it interprets messages about shampoo and hair similarly. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/123/2/577/1930852 by Harvard Law School Library user on 15 June 2021 Associational or analogical thinking is both extremely com- mon, and extremely useful in everyday life because it reduces the evaluation of new situations to comparison with familiar ones. Edelman (1992) thinks that, for this reason, our brains have evolved so as to make metaphor and analogy standard hard-wired forms of reasoning. Of course, the patterns of thought that are usu- ally extremely helpful are not always so. Persuaders take advan- tage of people utilizing a strategy that, though generally useful, may not be useful in the situation of interest to the persuader.5 A large literature looking at persuasion deals with advertis- ing. Nelson (1974) broadens the range of what might be seen as in- formative advertising.6 Stigler and Becker (1977) and Becker and Murphy (1993) put advertising into the utility function. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and Shapiro (2006) offer behavioral models of advertising. Recent research on persuasion has gone beyond advertising, and includes studies of hatred (Glaeser 2005), media (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2002, 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007), and political persuasion (Becker 2001; Murphy and Shleifer 2004; Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shapiro 2005). As far as we know, our paper is the first to study persuasion in a model of associative thinking so central to psycho- logical work. The next section outlines our model of coarse thinking and compares Bayesian and coarse decision makers. Section III presents the results on persuasion, showing how the persuader takes advantage of transference and framing. Section IV uses the model to understand a crucial aspect of marketing, namely prod- uct branding. Section V applies the ideas of the model to the case of mutual fund advertising and presents some evidence on such advertising during the Internet bubble. Section VI concludes.
5. Economic theory has also considered analogical reasoning in thinking both about how individuals forecast the payoffs to different actions under uncertainty (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1995) and about how they forecast opponents’ strategies in game theoretic environments (Eyster and Rabin 2005; Jehiel 2005). Ettinger and Jehiel (2007) apply Jehiel’s equilibrium concept to a model similar to Crawford’s (2003) and show how a strategic Sender can exploit the fact that a Receiver who thinks coarsely about strategies may misinterpret the Sender’s actions in equilibrium. 6. Research following Nelson (1974) (e.g., Kihlstrom and Riordan 1984; Milgrom and Roberts 1986a) focuses on how, in equilibrium, the amount of ad- vertising may signal quality. This literature does not make predictions regarding the equilibrium content of advertisements. COARSE THINKING AND PERSUASION 583
II. MODEL Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/123/2/577/1930852 by Harvard Law School Library user on 15 June 2021 II.A. Basic Setup An individual must assess the quality of a given object, such as a shampoo, a mutual fund, or a political candidate. We denote this underlying quality of the object by q ∈ Q, where Q is some subset of R. In assessing the quality of the object, the individual faces one of three similar, but not identical, observable situations s ∈{0, 1, 2}. For instance, s = 0 could be “selecting a mutual fund,” s = 1 could be “selecting a professional service,” and s = 2 could be “grabbing an opportunity.” Our analysis pertains to the assess- ment of quality in situation s = 0. The individual observes a piece of public information r ∈{u, d} sent by nature that is potentially informative about q. The public information is meant to capture any piece of data available to the audience that cannot be controlled by a persuader. For instance, r could stand for past stock market performance, and u and d could stand for up and down, respectively. Later, the individual receives a potentially informative message m ∈{a, b} about q. In situation s = 0, this message is sent by a persuader who privately observes signal x ∈{a, b} prior to sending m, but in situations s = 1 and s = 2, nature sends signal m = x directly. The individual then uses (r, m) to form expectations about underlying quality. The timeline of the individual’s decision problem in s = 0 is given in Figure I.
FIGURE I Timeline of Decision Problem in s = 0
II.B. Bayesian Thinking The underlying joint distribution function over quality, pub- lic information, private signals, and situations is p(q, r, x, s)and is common knowledge. We assume that the induced joint prob- ability mass function of public information and private signals conditional on situations, p(r, x|s), satisfies p(r, x|s) > 0 for each r, x,ands. We also assume that the marginal probability mass of situations, p(s), satisfies p(s = 0) + p(s = 1) + p(s = 2) = 1and p(s) > 0 for each s. 584 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
The individual has beliefs about the probability mass of mes- sages conditional on public information, private signals, and sit- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/123/2/577/1930852 by Harvard Law School Library user on 15 June 2021 uations (i.e., beliefs about the strategy of the persuader and of nature),σ ˆ (m|r, x, s). These beliefs, combined with p, generate a joint probability distribution over quality, public information, pri- vate signals, messages, and situations,p ˆ(q, r, x, m, s). Prior to making some decision in s = 0, the individual uses (r, m) to form an expectation of the underlying quality of the ob- ject. Because the situation is observable, the updated Bayesian expectation of quality is (1) E[q | r, m, s = 0] = E[q | r, x, s = 0]p ˆ(x | r, m, s = 0), x∈{a,b} where E[q | r, x, s = 0] is calculated using p andp ˆ(x | r, m, s = 0) is uniquely derived from p andσ ˆ using Bayes’ rule whenever possible. (Otherwise it is an arbitrary distribution.) To study the efficacy of persuasion, it is useful to examine the marginal effect of the message sent by the persuader on the individual’s assessment of quality conditional on public in- formation r. We define the Bayesian’s reaction to m to be the difference between the Bayesian’s expectation of quality prior to receiving a message from the persuader and his expectation of quality after receiving the message. Hence, the Bayesian’s reac- tion, E[q | r, m, s = 0] − E[q | r, s = 0], is given by
(2) (ˆp(a | r, m, s = 0) − p(a | r, s = 0)) × (E[q | r, a, s = 0] − E[q | r, b, s = 0]).
As illustrated in equation (2), the Bayesian’s reaction to m is the product of two terms: (i) the revision in the probability placed on the persuader’s private signal being x = a as a result of the message and (ii) the extent to which the conditional expectation of quality is different under private signal x = a than under x = b. Thus, the Bayesian only reacts to a message when he believes both that it is informative about the persuader’s private signal and that the private signal is predictive of quality. When E[q | r, m, s = 0] = E[q | r, s = 0], we say that message m is informative in s = 0 given r;whenE[q | r, m, s = 0] = E[q | r, s = 0], we say that message m is uninformative in s = 0given r. The message m = “looks silky” is informative in situation s = “evaluating hair” when it comes from a trustworthy source but m = “contains silk” is always uninformative in situation COARSE THINKING AND PERSUASION 585 s = “evaluating a shampoo” because silk does not affect the quality of shampoo. A Bayesian would react to m = “silk” in the former Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/123/2/577/1930852 by Harvard Law School Library user on 15 June 2021 situation but not in the latter.
II.C. Coarse Thinking The first essential assumption in our model is that different pieces of data may prime different mental representations or cate- gorizations. For example, the advertisement “be bullish” may lead individuals to think of investing with Merrill Lynch as grabbing an opportunity to get rich. They then interpret decision-relevant information about Merrill accordingly. The second essential assumption is that individuals do not have separate mental representations for every situation. Instead, they have only one representation for all the situations in a cat- egory and are effectively unable to differentiate between these situations. If individuals perceive foreign trade as a kind of war, they interpret the message “Americans are likely to win” in the same way when assessing globalization and military conflict. Cat- egorical thinking has been modeled by Mullainathan (2000), Fryer and Jackson (forthcoming), and Peski (2006);7 we rely most closely on Mullainathan (2000). Specifically, we assume that coarse thinkers either group sit- uation s = 0 together with similar situation s = 1, denoted by categorization C1 ≡{0, 1}, or group situation s = 0 together with similar situation s = 2, denoted by categorization C2 ≡{0, 2}. They can think of investing with Merrill Lynch as grabbing an oppor- tunity, or as hiring professional advice. Crucially, we assume that coarse thinkers do not have a separate mental representation for s = 0 and that they cannot group s = 0 together with both s = 1 and s = 2 at the same time. The latter assumption could arise out of a richer model of associations where s = 1 and s = 2 are sufficiently dissonant. The assumption that coarse thinkers have the same men- tal representation for distinct situations is motivated by evi- dence from psychology. Krueger and Clement (1994) asked ex- perimental participants to estimate the average temperatures of
7. There are some related finance models. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) present a model in which some investors group risky assets into categories and do not distinguish among assets within a category when formulating their demand. Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007) present a model in which investors use simplified univariate theories to forecast dividends. The theories investors use change over time in response to data. 586 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
48 different days of the year. Participants tended to underesti- mate the difference between the average temperature of two days Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/123/2/577/1930852 by Harvard Law School Library user on 15 June 2021 belonging to the same month (e.g., August 12 and August 20) and to overestimate the difference between the average tempera- ture of two days belonging to neighboring months (e.g., August 25 and September 2). Because months are mental categories, coarse thinkers may estimate temperatures to be more similar within months than across months. Carpenter, Glazer, and Nakamoto (1994) asked experimen- tal participants to rate the quality of hypothetical products de- scribed by a list of attributes. Participants preferred products with irrelevant differentiating attributes (“alpine class fill” for down jackets) to products without such attributes even when told that such attributes were irrelevant. One interpretation is that participants responded positively because alpineness con- tains decision-relevant information in a similar situation, for ex- ample, buying skis. The coarse thinker relies on categorization C1 or C2 to form beliefs about quality. The specific categorization depends on the data received. Denote the map between the data received and the chosen categorization by C : {u, d}×{Ø, a, b}→{C1, C2}.With a slight abuse of notation, (r, m) = (r, Ø) denotes the information available to the individual prior to receiving the message from the persuader. We assume that individuals choose the most likely category given the data received,8,9 (3) C(r, m) = arg max pˆ(s ∈ C | r, m) for all C∈{C1,C2} (r, m) ∈{u, d}×{Ø, a, b}, and ignore the alternative category (Mullainathan 2000). This map is meant to capture the idea that different mental rep- resentations or schema may be primed by different stimuli.10
8. Maximizing the expression in (3) is equivalent to solving max pˆ(s | r, m) s∈{1,2} for all (r, m) ∈{u, d}×{Ø, a, b} because s = 0 is in both C1 and C2,where σˆ (m | r, x, s)p(r, x | s) p(s) x∈{a,b} pˆ(s | r, m) = . σˆ (m | r, x, s)p(r, x | s) p(s) s∈{0,1,2} x∈{a,b} 9. With multiple solutions to max pˆ(s ∈ C | r, m) for some (r, m) ∈{u, d}× C∈{C ,C } {Ø, a, b}, pick C1. 1 2 10. Smith (1998) reviews mental representation and psychological models of association. The idea that the coarse thinker chooses the most likely category given the observed data and ignores alternative categories is motivated by experimental evidence (Murphy and Ross 1994; Malt, Ross, and Murphy 1995). COARSE THINKING AND PERSUASION 587
For instance, an individual might associate—and therefore co- categorize—investing with Merrill Lynch with grabbing another Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/123/2/577/1930852 by Harvard Law School Library user on 15 June 2021 opportunity when looking at the ad “be bullish” or with seeking professional advice when looking at “a tradition of trust.” The coarse thinker applies the same model of inference to all situations in the category C(r, m). One natural way to model coarse thinking is as Bayesian thinking with a coarser information set; that is, the coarse thinker forms his beliefs about quality as a Bayesian who observes the category C(r, m) he is in but not the specific situation:
(4) pˆ(q | r, m, Ci) = pˆ(q | r, m, s = 0)p ˆ(s = 0 | r, m, Ci)
+ pˆ(q | r, m, s = i)ˆp(s = i | r, m, Ci), where Ci = C(r, m)forsomei ∈{1, 2}. This update rule (4) implies that, upon receiving (r, m), the coarse thinker’s expectation of quality is
(5) E[q | r, m, Ci] = E[q | r, m, s = 0]p ˆ(s = 0 | r, m, Ci)
+ E[q | r, m, s = i]ˆp(s = i | r, m, Ci).
An alternative way to model coarse thinking, which we actu- ally follow, is to assume that the coarse thinker does not condition on the information received in weighing each situation, but in- stead uses constant weights p(s | Ci). Such a coarse thinker forms beliefs about quality according to the rule
Ci (6) pˆ (q | r, m, s = 0) = pˆ(q | r, m, s = 0)p(s = 0 | Ci)
+ pˆ(q | r, m, s = i)p(s = i | Ci), where Ci = C(r, m)forsomei ∈{1, 2}. Updated rule (6) implies that, upon receiving (r, m), a coarse thinker’s expectation of quality is
Ci (7) E [q | r, m, s = 0] = E[q | r, m, s = 0]p(s = 0 | Ci)
+ E[q | r, m, s = i]p(s = i | Ci).
These two models share many features. Both capture the idea that the coarse thinker updates as if he cannot distinguish the situations within a category: Under each specification, the coarse thinker’s expectation of quality in s = 0 is a weighted average 588 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS of the Bayesian’s expectation across all situations co-categorized with s = 0 given (r, m). In the first model, a coarse thinker weighs Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/123/2/577/1930852 by Harvard Law School Library user on 15 June 2021 the expectation of quality in situation s by the likelihood of s in the category given the information received:p ˆ(s | r, m, Ci) . In the second, a coarse thinker weighs the expectation of quality in situation s by the likelihood of that situation in the category: p(s | Ci). In both models, the coarse thinker’s inference approaches the Bayesian’s as p(s = 0 | Ci) tends to 1. We do not favor one model over the other based solely on psy- chological evidence. Because the model of coarseness with weights p(s | Ci) greatly simplifies the formulas and proofs, we focus on it in what follows. We demonstrate in Appendix II that our main results hold with inessential modifications under the alternative assumption that coarse thinkers update using more “Bayesian” weightsp ˆ(s | r, m, Ci). We are interested in how the coarse thinker reacts to the mes- sage sent by the persuader conditional on the public information r. Fixing public information r, assume (without loss of general- ity) that the coarse thinker co-categorizes situation s = 0 with situation s = 1 before receiving the persuader’s message. That is, let C(r) ≡ C(r, Ø) and assume that C(r) = C1. Then the coarse thinker’s expectation of quality is EC1 [q | r, s = 0] (as given by (7)) before he receives a message from the persuader. To evaluate the coarse thinker’s reaction to m, we distinguish the cases where the coarse thinker either does or does not re- categorize situation s = 0 after receiving the persuader’s message. We say that message m is pivotal given r if
(8) C(r, m) = C(r).
Message m is pivotal given r if it leads the coarse thinker to recategorize situation s = 0. First, consider the case where m is not pivotal given r. In this case, the model produces empirically plausible patterns of under- and overreaction to data relative to the Bayesian benchmark. Comparing the magnitude of the coarse thinker’s reaction to m, | EC1 [q | r, m, s = 0] − EC1 [q | r, s = 0] |,tothe Bayesian’s, | E[q | r, m, s = 0] − E[q | r, s = 0] |, suggests two dis- tortions. First, because p(s = 0 | C1) < 1, the reaction of the coarse thinker only mutedly depends on his reaction to message m in situ- ation s = 0 itself, as measured by E[q | r, m, s = 0] − E[q | r, s = 0]. This effect can lead to an underreaction to data. Take, for example, COARSE THINKING AND PERSUASION 589 the case where E[q | r, m, s = 0] = E[q | r, s = 0], so m is informa- tive given r in s = 0,andE[q | r, m, s = 1] = E[q | r, s = 1], so m is Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/123/2/577/1930852 by Harvard Law School Library user on 15 June 2021 uninformative given r in s = 1. We see here that C1 | , , = − C1 | , = (9a) E [ q r m s 0] E [q r s 0] = | , , = − | , = = | E[q r m s 0] E[q r s 0] p(s 0 C1) < E[q | r, m, s = 0] − E[q | r, s = 0] .
Coarse thinking leads to an underreaction to news relative to Bayesian thinking. The uninformativeness of the data in the co- categorized situation dilutes its impact in situation s = 0 precisely because the current situation is underweighted in the update rule. However, continuing to consider the case where m is not piv- otal given r, the coarse thinker’s response also depends on a term that the Bayesian’s does not depend on: the informativeness of the message in the other situation s = 1 in the same category. This implies that the coarse thinker could react to noninforma- tion or overreact to information. Take, for example, the case where E[q | r, m, s = 0] = E[q | r, s = 0], but E[q | r, m, s = 1] = E[q | r, s = 1]: the message m is uninformative in situation s = 0 given r, but is informative in co-categorized situation s = 1. Then C C (9b) E 1 [q | r, m, s = 0] − E 1 [q | r, s = 0] =| E[q | r, m, s = 1]
−E[q | r, s = 1] | p(s = 1 | C1) >| E[q | r, m, s = 0] −E[q | r, s = 0] |= 0.
The coarse thinker now reacts to an uninformative message in situation s = 0 because it is informative in the co-categorized situation. His use of the same model to interpret messages in all situations in the category may lead him to overreact to nonin- formative messages. This, we suggest, is part of what a person responding to “We put silk in the bottle” is doing. We call this pro- cess transference. This transference of the informational content of messages across situations within a category drives the first set of our results below. Indeed, if the persuader cannot affect how individuals categorize a situation, the strategy of uninformative persuasion is to trigger such transference: successful persuasion in that case takes advantage of overreaction. Now consider the case where message m is pivotal given pub- lic information r,som leads to the recategorization of s = 0 from C1 to C2. Comparing the magnitude of the coarse thinker’s reaction 590 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS