Above and Below the Line Voting2 from 1984 to 2016.3 It Also Examines the Impact of the Number of Candidates Running for Election on Variations in Rates
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Australian Foreign Policy the Hon Julie Bishop MP Senator the Hon
Australian Foreign Policy The Hon Julie Bishop MP Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop is Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party. She was sworn in as Australia’s first female foreign minister in September 2013 following four years as Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. She previously served in the Howard Government as Minister for Education, Science and Training, as Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Women’s Issues and as Minister for Ageing. Prior to entering Parliament as the Member for Curtin in 1998, she was a commercial litigation lawyer at Clayton Utz, becoming a partner and managing partner. Senator The Hon Penny Wong Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong is a Labor Senator for South Australia and Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, a position she has held since 2013. Senator Wong previously served as Minister for Climate Change and Water, before her appointment to the Finance and Deregulation portfolio. Born in Malaysia, her family moved to Australia in 1976. She studied arts and law at the University of Adelaide. Prior to entering federal politics, she worked for a trade union and as a Ministerial adviser to the NSW Labor government. The Hon Kim Beazley AC FAIIA National President, Australian Institute of International Affairs During 37 years in politics, Kim Beazley served as Deputy Prime Minister, Leader of the ALP and Leader of the Opposition. He has been Minister for Defence; Finance; Transport and Communications; Employment, Education and Training; Aviation; and Special Minister of State. After retiring from politics, he was Winthrop Professor at UWA and Chancellor of the ANU. -
David Bartlett, MP PREMIER Dear Premier in Accordance with The
David Bartlett, MP PREMIER Dear Premier In accordance with the requirements of Section 36(1) of the State Service Act 2000 and Section 27 of the Financial Management and Audit Act 1990, I enclose for presentation to Parliament, the 2007-08 Annual Report of the Department of Premier and Cabinet. Yours sincerely Rhys Edwards Secretary 17 October 2008 The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPAC) is a central agency of the Tasmanian State Government. The Department is responsible to the Premier and the Minister for Local Government as portfolio ministers, and also provides support to the Parliamentary Secretary and other members of Cabinet. The Department provides a broad range of services to the Cabinet, other members of Parliament, Government agencies and the community. The Department works closely with the public sector, the community, local government, the Australian Government and other state and territory governments. The Department also provides administration support to the State Service Commissioner and the Tasmania Together Progress Board, each of which is separately accountable and reports directly to Parliament. Department of Premier and Cabinet Annual Report 2007-08 2 Content Secretary’s Report 5 Departmental Overview 7 Governance 8 Activity Report 2007-08 12 Output Group 1 - Support for Executive Decision Making 13 Output 1.1: Strategic Policy and Advice 14 Output 1.2: Climate Change 18 Output 1.3: Social Inclusion 21 Output Group 2 - Government Processes and Services 23 Output 2.1: Management of Executive Government Processes -
The Transilient Fiji- Indian Diaspora Engagement and Assimilation in Transnational Space
Transnational Indian Diaspora Engagement and development: The transilient Fiji- Indian diaspora engagement and assimilation in transnational space Manoranjan Mohanty The University of the South Pacific, Fiji Abstract The Indian immigrants or ‘girmitiyas’ under British indenture labour system have gradually transformed to Indian Diaspora in transnational space be it from Mauritius, British Guiana, Trinidad, South Africa, Fiji, Jamaica or Suriname. The onset of globalization has stimulated the contemporary diasporic movements and social and economic networking and in turn, a greater diasporic engagement... Cheaper means of communication and growth of mass media and ICT, have contributed much to diaspora movement across border, creating ‘transnational communities’, globally. Today, the diaspora has been emerged as a new resource and an agent of change and development. It has been a major source of remittance, investment, and human and social capital and has been emerging as an alternative development strategy. The role of diaspora in contemporary development of both country of origin and country of residence draws greater attention today than ever before. The ‘girmitiyas’ in Fiji that arrived between 1879-1916 have undergone generational changes, and gradually transformed to distinct Fijian-Indian Diaspora within Fiji and abroad. These ‘transient’ and ‘translient’ migrants, through a ‘double’ and ‘triple’ chain- migration have formed distinct transnational Fijian-Indian diaspora especially in the Pacific- Rim metropolitan countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and USA. They are deeply engaged in social, cultural and economic development and assimilated in transnational space. Bollywood films have helped binding Indian diaspora especially Fiji- Indians abroad who have maintained Indian cultural identity in the global space. -
Federalism, Bicameralism, and Institutional Change: General Trends and One Case-Study*
brazilianpoliticalsciencereview ARTICLE Federalism, Bicameralism, and Institutional Change: General Trends and One Case-study* Marta Arretche University of São Paulo (USP), Brazil The article distinguishes federal states from bicameralism and mechanisms of territorial representation in order to examine the association of each with institutional change in 32 countries by using constitutional amendments as a proxy. It reveals that bicameralism tends to be a better predictor of constitutional stability than federalism. All of the bicameral cases that are associated with high rates of constitutional amendment are also federal states, including Brazil, India, Austria, and Malaysia. In order to explore the mechanisms explaining this unexpected outcome, the article also examines the voting behavior of Brazilian senators constitutional amendments proposals (CAPs). It shows that the Brazilian Senate is a partisan Chamber. The article concludes that regional influence over institutional change can be substantially reduced, even under symmetrical bicameralism in which the Senate acts as a second veto arena, when party discipline prevails over the cohesion of regional representation. Keywords: Federalism; Bicameralism; Senate; Institutional change; Brazil. well-established proposition in the institutional literature argues that federal Astates tend to take a slow reform path. Among other typical federal institutions, the second legislative body (the Senate) common to federal systems (Lijphart 1999; Stepan * The Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa no Estado -
Lessons on Voting Reform from Britian's First Pr Elections
WHAT WE ALREADY KNOW: LESSONS ON VOTING REFORM FROM BRITIAN'S FIRST PR ELECTIONS by Philip Cowley, University of Hull John Curtice, Strathclyde UniversityICREST Stephen Lochore, University of Hull Ben Seyd, The Constitution Unit April 2001 WHAT WE ALREADY KNOW: LESSONS ON VOTING REFORM FROM BRITIAN'S FIRST PR ELECTIONS Published by The Constitution Unit School of Public Policy UCL (University College London) 29/30 Tavistock Square London WClH 9QU Tel: 020 7679 4977 Fax: 020 7679 4978 Email: [email protected] Web: www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/ 0 The Constitution Unit. UCL 200 1 This report is sold subject ot the condition that is shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. First published April 2001 Contents Introduction ................................................................................................... 3 Executive Summary ..................................................................................4 Voters' attitudes to the new electoral systems ...........................................................4 Voters' behaviour under new electoral systems ......................................................... 4 Once elected .... The effect of PR on the Scottish Parliament in Practice ..................5 Voter Attitudes to the New Electoral Systems ............................................6 -
Strategic Coalition Voting: Evidence from Austria Meffert, Michael F.; Gschwend, Thomas
www.ssoar.info Strategic coalition voting: evidence from Austria Meffert, Michael F.; Gschwend, Thomas Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with: SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Meffert, M. F., & Gschwend, T. (2010). Strategic coalition voting: evidence from Austria. Electoral Studies, 29(3), 339-349. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2010.03.005 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non- Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses This document is solely intended for your personal, non- Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. all copyright information and other information regarding legal Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie document in public. dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder conditions of use. anderweitig nutzen. Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an. -
Unicameralism and the Indiana Constitutional Convention of 1850 Val Nolan, Jr.*
DOCUMENT UNICAMERALISM AND THE INDIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1850 VAL NOLAN, JR.* Bicameralism as a principle of legislative structure was given "casual, un- questioning acceptance" in the state constitutions adopted in the nineteenth century, states Willard Hurst in his recent study of main trends in the insti- tutional development of American law.1 Occasioning only mild and sporadic interest in the states in the post-Revolutionary period,2 problems of legislative * A.B. 1941, Indiana University; J.D. 1949; Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Uni- versity School of Law. 1. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW, THE LAW MAKERS 88 (1950). "O 1ur two-chambered legislatures . were adopted mainly by default." Id. at 140. During this same period and by 1840 many city councils, unicameral in colonial days, became bicameral, the result of easy analogy to state governmental forms. The trend was reversed, and since 1900 most cities have come to use one chamber. MACDONALD, AmER- ICAN CITY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 49, 58, 169 (4th ed. 1946); MUNRO, MUNICIPAL GOVERN-MENT AND ADMINISTRATION C. XVIII (1930). 2. "[T]he [American] political theory of a second chamber was first formulated in the constitutional convention held in Philadelphia in 1787 and more systematically developed later in the Federalist." Carroll, The Background of Unicameralisnl and Bicameralism, in UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURES, THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL DEBATE HAND- BOOK, 1937-38, 42 (Aly ed. 1938). The legislature of the confederation was unicameral. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, V. Early American proponents of a bicameral legislature founded their arguments on theoretical grounds. Some, like John Adams, advocated a second state legislative house to represent property and wealth. -
2019 TB Caucus Report
AUSTRALIAN TB CAUCUS 2019 ANNUAL REPORT PREPARED BY RESULTS AUSTRALIA ABOUT AUSTRALIAN TB CAUCUS Launched in March 2016, the Australian TB Caucus (ATBC) is a bipartisan parliamentary group committed to ending tuberculosis. The Australian TB Caucus is currently Co-Chaired by the Hon. Warren Entsch, MP and the Hon. Sharon Claydon, MP. The ATBC is formally registered with the Presiding Officers as the Parliamentary Friends of Tuberculosis Group. RESULTWS WInWter. nRaEtiSoUnaLlT (AS u. OstRraGli.aA) Uis t h| e 9s0ec1r,e t1a0ri0at WofA thL eK TEBR C SauTc, u Ns. O R T H S Y D N E Y | A U S T R A L I A N T B C A U C U S P A G E 1 MESSAGE FROM THE CO-CHAIRS 2019 has been an extraordinary year for TB advocacy in Australia and internationally. We saw the Global Fund to Fight AIDS TB and Malaria achieve its target to raise US$ 14 billion for 2020 to 2022. Australia pledged $242 million, which was an increase to our last replenishment contribution of $220 million for 2017 to 2019. Global TB research funding totaled US$906 million in 2018, an increase of $134 million from 2017. In Australia, TB received additional funding for detection, treatment, research and development. The Minister for Health announced $13 million to help support global efforts in eradicating tuberculosis, which includes $5 million to support intensive TB detection and treatment under Australia’s Health Security Initiative for the Indo-Pacific region and $8 million through the Medical Research Future Fund to fund anti-microbial resistance and drug- resistant TB research projects. -
Random Errors Are Not Necessarily Politically Neutral
Random errors are not necessarily politically neutral Michelle Blom1[0000−0002−0459−9917], Andrew Conway[0000−0001−6277−2442], Peter J. Stuckey2[0000−0003−2186−0459], Vanessa Teague3;4[0000−0003−2648−2565], and Damjan Vukcevic5;6[0000−0001−7780−9586] 1 School of Computing and Information Systems, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia 2 Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Clayton, Australia 3 Thinking Cybersecurity Pty. Ltd. 4 College of Engineering and Computer Science, Australian National University 5 School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia 6 Melbourne Integrative Genomics, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia Abstract. Errors are inevitable in the implementation of any complex process. Here we examine the effect of random errors on Single Transferable Vote (STV) elections, a common approach to deciding multi-seat elections. It is usually ex- pected that random errors should have nearly equal effects on all candidates, and thus be fair. We find to the contrary that random errors can introduce systematic bias into election results. This is because, even if the errors are random, votes for different candidates occur in different patterns that are affected differently by random errors. In the STV context, the most important effect of random errors is to invalidate the ballot. This removes far more votes for those candidates whose supporters tend to list a lot of preferences, because their ballots are much more likely to be invalidated by random error. Different validity rules for different vot- ing styles mean that errors are much more likely to penalise some types of votes than others. For close elections this systematic bias can change the result of the election. -
The Many Faces of Strategic Voting
Revised Pages The Many Faces of Strategic Voting Strategic voting is classically defined as voting for one’s second pre- ferred option to prevent one’s least preferred option from winning when one’s first preference has no chance. Voters want their votes to be effective, and casting a ballot that will have no influence on an election is undesirable. Thus, some voters cast strategic ballots when they decide that doing so is useful. This edited volume includes case studies of strategic voting behavior in Israel, Germany, Japan, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, and the United Kingdom, providing a conceptual framework for understanding strategic voting behavior in all types of electoral systems. The classic definition explicitly considers strategic voting in a single race with at least three candidates and a single winner. This situation is more com- mon in electoral systems that have single- member districts that employ plurality or majoritarian electoral rules and have multiparty systems. Indeed, much of the literature on strategic voting to date has considered elections in Canada and the United Kingdom. This book contributes to a more general understanding of strategic voting behavior by tak- ing into account a wide variety of institutional contexts, such as single transferable vote rules, proportional representation, two- round elec- tions, and mixed electoral systems. Laura B. Stephenson is Professor of Political Science at the University of Western Ontario. John Aldrich is Pfizer- Pratt University Professor of Political Science at Duke University. André Blais is Professor of Political Science at the Université de Montréal. Revised Pages Revised Pages THE MANY FACES OF STRATEGIC VOTING Tactical Behavior in Electoral Systems Around the World Edited by Laura B. -
A Chamber of Though and Actions
CANADA’S SENATE A Chamber of THOUGHT AND ACTION © 2019 Senate of Canada I 1-800-267-7362 I [email protected] 2 ABOUT THE SENATE The Senate is the Upper House in Canada’s Senators also propose their own bills and generate Parliament. It unites a diverse group of discussion about issues of national importance in accomplished Canadians in service the collegial environment of the Senate Chamber, of their country. where ideas are debated on their merit. Canada’s first prime minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, The Senate was created to ensure Canada’s regions famously called it a chamber of sober second thought were represented in Parliament. Giving each region but it is much more than that. It is a source of ideas, an equal number of seats was meant to prevent inspiration and legislation in its own right. the more populous provinces from overpowering the smaller ones. Parliament’s 105 senators shape Canada’s future. Senators scrutinize legislation, suggest improvements Over the years, the role of senators has evolved. and fix mistakes. In a two-chamber parliament, the Senate In addition to representing their region, they also acts as a check on the power of the prime minister and advocate for underrepresented groups like cabinet. Any bill must pass both houses — the Senate Indigenous peoples, visible and linguistic and the House of Commons — before it can become law. minorities, and women. There shall be one Parliament for Canada, consisting of the Queen, an Upper House styled the Senate, and the House of Commons. Constitution Act, 1867, section 17 3 HISTORY Canada would not exist were it not for the Senate. -
Report: the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's Commitment To
The Senate Environment and Communications References Committee The Australian Broadcasting Corporation's commitment to reflecting and representing regional diversity March 2013 © Commonwealth of Australia 2013 ISBN 978-1-74229-788-0 This document was printed by the Senate Printing Unit, Parliament House, Canberra Committee membership Committee members Senator Simon Birmingham (LP, SA) (Chair) Senator Doug Cameron (ALP, NSW) (Deputy Chair) Senator Catryna Bilyk (ALP, TAS) Senator the Hon Ron Boswell (NATS, QLD) Senator Anne Ruston (LP, SA) Senator Larissa Waters (AG, QLD) Substitute members Senator Scott Ludlam (AG, WA) to replace Senator Larissa Waters (AG, QLD) Participating members Senator Carol Brown (ALP, TAS) Senator Christine Milne (AG, TAS Senator the Hon Lisa Singh (ALP, TAS) Senator the Hon Lin Thorp (ALP, TAS) Committee secretariat Ms Sophie Dunstone, Acting Secretary Mr Chris Lawley, Senior Research Officer Mrs Dianne Warhurst, Administration Officer Committee address PO Box 6100 Parliament House Canberra ACT 2600 Tel: 02 6277 3526 Fax: 02 6277 5818 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=ec_ctte/ index.htm iii iv Table of Contents Committee membership ................................................................................... iii Abbreviations and acronyms ...........................................................................vii Chapter 1 - Introduction .................................................................................... 1 Conduct