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71- 12,629 WILLIAMS, Charles Fredrick, 1943- WILLIAM M. JARDINE AND THE DEVELOPMENT DE REPUBLICAN FARM POLICY, 1925-1929. The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1970 History, modern University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan Copyright by Charles Predrich Williams 1971 THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED THE UNIVERSITY OP OKIilHOM GRADUATE COLLEGE WILLIAM M. JARDINE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OP REPUBLICAN PARM POLICY, 1925-1929 A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE COLLEGE In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OP PHILOSOPHY CHARLES PREDRIOE WILLIAMS Norman, Oklahoma 1970 WILLIAM M. JAHDINE AND THE DEVELOPMENT CE REPUBLIOAN PAEM POLICY, 1925-1929 DISSERTATION COMMITTEE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Acknowledgments are due Dr. Bill 6. Reid who first introduced me to this subject, and Dr. Gilbert C. Fite who directed this study. Special appreciation is also extended to Dr. Donald G. Berthrong, Dr. A. M. Gibson, Dr, Dougald Calhoun, and Dr. Victor Elconin, all of whom read the manuscript. iii TABLE OP ODUTEETS Chapter Page I . THE REPUBLIOAN PARM DILEMMA............... 1 II. THE ROAD TO WASHINGTON .................... 33 III. THE NEW SECRETARY'S PARM PORMULA........... 65 17. THE SEARCH POR A PARM POLICY: PHASE I ..... 94 7. THE SEARCH POR A PARM POLICY: PHASE II 138 71. PARM POLICY CHALLENGED:MCNARY-HAUGENI8M ... 16? 711. PARM POLICY POUND: THE JARDINE P L A N ..... 190 7III. PARM POLICY DEPENDED: THE 1928 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN......... 215 IX. CONCLUSION ....... 243 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................. 250 It WILLIAM M. JARDINE AND THE development OP REPUBLIOAN PARM POLICY, 1925-1929 CHAPTER I THE REPUBLIOAN PARM DILEMMA When Warren G. Harding finished his inaugural oath on March 4, 1921, he inherited one of the most perplexing farm problems ever faced by an American President. Agriculture had been generally prosperous during the first two decades of the century, but beginning in the summer of 1920, prices began a decline that continued for over a year. Isolating the causes for the depression proved difficult, but most economists agreed that much of the blame could be placed upon World War I and the conditions growing out of that con flict.^ With the outbreak of war in 1914, agricultural prices The best study of the postwar farm depression is James H. Shideler's Parm Crisis. 1919-1923 (Berkeley, 1957). Also see the pertinent chapters in U. S, Department of Agricul ture, The Yearbook of Agriculture. 1940 (Washington, 1941); Gilbert C. Pits. Geojree )r. Peek and the Fight for Parm Parity culture Discontent in the Middle west, 1900-1939 (kadison, 1951) and Murray R. Benedict, Parm Policies of the United States. 1790-1950 (New York, 1953). 2 began to move upward. Moreover, they continued to climb in the immediate postwar period. High prices were accompanied 2 by rapid expansion in production and cultivated acreage. As an example, wheat acreage increased from 55,000,000 acres to more than 73,000,000 between 1914 and 1919,^ In the South, cotton production also climbed, and in the Midwest hog numbers displayed a similar trend. But what was more important to the farmers, prices stayed high and generally A in line with the wages earned by city workers. Prom an average of ninety-seven cents per bushel in 1914; wheat rose to $2,47 by June, 1917. This was the price paid at the farm; still higher prices were offered at ter- 5 minal markets. Likewise cotton, after a slow start, brought enormous profits. Beginning in 1917, and for three years thereafter, cotton averaged over twenty-five cents a pound and in 1919, with the prices at thirty-five cents, the cot ton crop earned more than $2,000,000,000— a price which to g that date had not been equaled. The same trend was evident in the livestock industry. ^Yearbook of Agriculture. 1940 (Washington, 1941), 277-94, S, Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statis tics. 1936 (Washington, 1936), 6, ^Ibid.. 75-76, 219. 5lbid,. 6, ^U, S, Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agricul ture. 1928 (Washington, 1936), 6, 3 particularly in hog production. In 1914 prices were about #8 per hundredweight at the farm; by January 1919 the price had risen to approximately #15,50 and in July of that year it was #19,7 Olosely associated with hog production was the development of corn acreage. Since corn was used pri marily as hog feed, the price per bushel tended to fluctuate with the price of swine. However, the increased demand for corn brought on by the war, and two poor crop years occur ring the same period, forced prices so high that it was un profitable for the producers to buy corn to fatten hogs. In the spring of 1914 the price of corn w " ■ seventy-five cents g per bushel and gradually moving upward. What is more, there were no price controls on corn such as that of the Food Adminstration's on wheat, and it appeared that the hog industry would be ruined because of expensive feed. But in the fall of 1917 the Chicago Board of Trade set the maximum price for corn at #1,28 per bushel and refused to accept any higher bids. At the same time the work of Pood Administra tion officials in enlisting the cooperation of buyers to as sure a price of at least #15,50 per hundredweight for hogs Q permitted producers to make profits. Beef cattle prices followed a pattern similar to that of the pork market. Before the war Argentina had been the 7lbid,, 930, ^Ibid.. 714, ^Yearbook of Agriculture. 1940. 286-87, 4 primary source of meat for Europe; but after the conflict began, a shipping shortgage limited Argentine ability to reach the European markets. The United States was able to capitalize upon this situation by having adequate shipping and being much closer to European centers of trade,In 1914, exports of beef from American ports were approximately 145,000,000 pounds; by I9 I8, though, the figure was 583,000, 000 pounds. Beef cattle prices advanced from an average of $6,24 per hundredweight in 1914 to a high of $10,40 at the end of the war. By 1919, however, due in part to the 20 percent increase in cattle numbers during the war years, prices had declined to $9,61,^^ Much of this wartime prosperity for farmers, however, was absorbed in higher costs of operation. While agricul tural prices rose, the cost of production also increased. The price of farm land, hired labor, livestock feed, and in terest rates on rural mortgages more than doubled between 1914 and 1921. The expense of farm implements more than tripled, freight rates increased, and the cost of living soared upward, E, Warren and F, A, Pearson, The Agricultural Situation (New York, 1924), 20-21, Yearbook of Agriculture. 1928. 911* IP U, S, Congress, House, Report of the Joint Oonmisslon of Agricultural Inquiry. 67th Cong,, 1st Sess,, Serial ?9^2, Part I, pp. 182, lo4, 188-96; Business Men's Commission on Agriculture, The Condition of Agricult^e in the United States and Measures for its Improvement (Washington, 1927). 81-8 3. 5 These conditions made It extremely difficult for far mers when deflation set In, Beginning In the early summer of 1920, farm prices began to drop drastically. Cotton sold for 37 cents a pound In July, however, by December It brought only 14 cents. Less than one year later, June, 1921, the price had plunged to 10 cents— a figure below the prewar av erage. Other commodities, wheat, pork and cattle, followed a similar trend, Minneapolis wheat was selling for $2,96 a bushel In July, 1920 but had dropped to 92 cents by Decem ber of the following year. Prices of good steers, which In September, 1920 averaged about $14,95 per hundredweight, had slipped to around $7,31 by November, 1921, As a result of these changes, the price index paid to producers fell 40 points between June and September 1920 and by 1921 gross farm income had declined to $10,521,000,000, In 1919 farm income had been $17,825,000,000,^5 Reasons for the sharp price decline could be found In a number of areas. To begin with, the end of the war had severely limited European markets, and other agricultural nations which had also enjoyed wartime expansion, rose to challenge the United States' position In world trade. These countries enjoyed a particular advantage, since their labor costs were less than half of those of the American farmer, Their land prices were also lower. In addition, most 13u, 8, Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agricul ture. 1922 (Washington, 1923), 593; Yearbook of Agriculture. 194o. 260-89 . 6 American competitors remained largely debtor nations and could trade in "kind" on world markets. The decline in foreign markets in turn, forced agricul turalists to become more dependent upon the metropolitan areas for a market. Unfortunately the growing industrial society was changing in ways that were not always beneficial to farmers. American dietary habits were changing as people consumed more fruits and dairy products and reduced their consumption of fats and starches; tractors were replacing many horses and mules which freed millions of acres for food production that had been previously needed for livestock feed. The discovery of rayon and other synthetic materials also served to reduce the demand for cotton products. Since production of wheat, cotton and fats had been especially stimulated by the war the farmer found himself faced with the prospect of producing huge amounts of commodities for which there was no profitable market.^5 The farmers' plight was increased by the fact that they had gone into considerable debt to produce their crops.