Agricultural Investment and the Interwar Business Cycle
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Working Paper Series¤ Department of Economics Alfred Lerner College of Business & Economics University of Delaware Working Paper No. 2003-10 Agricultural Investment and the Interwar Business Cycley James L. Butkiewicz and Matthew A. Martin October 2003 ¤http://www.be.udel.edu/economics/workingpaper.htm y°c 2003 by author(s). All rights reserved. Agricultural Investment and the Interwar Business Cycle James L. Butkiewicz Department of Economics University of Delaware Newark, DE 19716 [email protected] Matthew A. Martin Economy.Com, Inc. 600 Willowbrook Lane West Chester, PA 19382 [email protected] October 2003 This paper is based on sections of Matthew Martin’s Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Delaware. The authors acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions from Farley Grubb and Toni Whited. Responsibility for errors is ours. Abstract During the interwar period, the agricultural sector was a much larger component of the United States economy than at present. Thus, changes in agricultural fortunes had a larger impact on macroeconomic events than is the case today. The Great Depression and concomitant collapse of commodity prices adversely affected the farming sector, as did the drought that distressed many farming regions during this period. Farmers’ income plummeted, sharply curtailing investment in farm equipment. One key goal of the New Deal agricultural policies was to reverse the fortunes of the agricultural sector. Price supports and production control programs attempted to increase farmers’ incomes, enabling them to reverse the dramatic drop in equipment investment that occurred during the contraction period. This paper investigates the macroeconomic impact of investment in agricultural equipment on the aggregate economy. Results obtained support the hypothesis that increased expenditures for agricultural equipment contributed to the strength of the recovery, especially during the crucial early years of the recovery. JEL Classification: N, E3 “Purchasing power placed in the hands of the people on the farm is certain to be used. Like a blood transfusion for a dying man, it circulates through the arteries of our economic body and brings a new vitality.” (George Peek in Nourse, Davis, and Black, 1937, p.422.) “The tractors came over the roads and into the fields… Snub-nosed monsters, raising the dust and sticking their snouts into it, straight down the country, across the country, through fences, through dooryards, in and out of gullies in straight lines.” (John Steinbeck, 1984, p.36.) 1. Introduction During the interwar period (1919-1939), the agricultural sector experienced three independent and distinguishable events. The first was the broad adoption of new technologies, including the tractor and related machinery. The second was repeated and severe drought throughout the Midwest growing regions. The third was unprecedented government aid programs, including inaugural measures to limit agricultural production. In this paper, we examine the macroeconomic impact of these developments for the U.S. economy and provide evidence that government aid to farmers in the 1930s led to increased equipment expenditures, and furthermore, the increase in farm expenditures in the 1930s aided the general recovery, despite several years of repeated and severe drought. Table 1 lists the annual purchases of tractors and related equipment. As a testimony to the surge in agricultural equipment investment in the 1930s, consider the fact that more tractors were purchased in the 1930s (1,107,000) than in the 1920s (1,077,000), even though the 1930s includes nearly five years of economic contraction and several years of severe drought. Table 1 also shows that the annual purchases of other farm machinery increased substantially in the 1930s. The simultaneous increase in farm equipment expenditures and occurrence of drought seems counterintuitive at first. However, several important New Deal farm policies were introduced in 1 1933, particularly the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which provided farmers with additional forms of income, much of which was spent on new machinery. To understand the relationship of these events to the aggregate economy, the remainder of the paper is arranged in the following way: the next section summarizes the important developments for agriculture in the interwar period; the third section examines the transmission of agricultural shocks to the broader economy. The fourth section discusses the empirical methods, while the fifth presents the empirical results. The final section offers some conclusions. 2. Historical Summary1 Agriculture in the 1920s can be summarized as a period of overproduction and low farm prices in the aftermath of World War I. Figure 1 shows how grain prices fell in the early 1920s. Nevertheless, as technological improvements in the early 1920s made the tractor and other farm machinery more efficient and cost effective, purchases of these items increased. Table 1 shows that tractor purchases reached a pre-depression peak of 140,000 in 1920, but purchases averaged only 104,000 annually for the remainder of the decade. Part of the reason for the lower average stems from the number of farm failures due to low agricultural prices and related debt repayment problems. The farm foreclosure rate increased to 10.7 per thousand in the 1920s, up from 3.2 per thousand the previous decade (Alston, 1983). During the Great Contraction, farmers received little government assistance even though agricultural prices fell more quickly than the price level.2 The Roosevelt administration, however, placed priority on agricultural assistance and on May 12, 1933, the Agricultural Adjustment Act became law.3 By the fall of 1933, the AAA announced the first programs for future crop reduction. These programs varied by crop, but all programs presented farmers with some sort of “adjustment payment” in return for agreeing to limit acreage under cultivation. Farmers could then decide if they wished to participate. Once an individual farmer signed a contract, part of the adjustment payment 2 was often reserved until compliance was assured. In the end, a majority of farmers growing corn, wheat, and cotton agreed to sign production control contracts.4 Production control programs also existed for tobacco, rice, sugar, and peanuts, and a variety of smaller crops. In addition to the production control programs of the AAA, the New Deal assisted farmers through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) and the Farm Credit Administration (FCA). The first of these programs put cash into the hands of farmers by loaning them money based on a fixed price per bushel times the number of bushels placed into storage. If the market price of the crop climbed above the loan price, farmers could sell the crop, pay off the loan and pocket the difference. CCC loans were no recourse loans, so repayment was not required if market prices remained below the loan price. The FCA enabled farmers to borrow new funds and refinance existing debt. Thus, farmers were able to reduce the burden of the debt accumulated in the previous decade at the same time that they received some security regarding their cash receipts in the near future. The sign up for the 1934 production control programs had been largely completed when it became clear that the weather was going to affect certain crops. The winter wheat crop, which had been planted the previous fall, gave the first indication that the rest of the wheat crop would be partially destroyed by drought. Since the drought seemed likely to accomplish crop reduction without a government program, Secretary Wallace removed many of the planting restrictions that contract signers had agreed to earlier. However, farmers still received the benefit payments promised by the government. A similar production control program was in force through 1935. In 1936, the Supreme Court declared the AAA to be unconstitutional, but the program continued under the auspices of soil conservation. That same year was also one of severe drought. From 1933 to 1936, the AAA distributed $1.8 billion as benefit payments to farmers under the production control programs. The wheat and corn-hog programs alone received over 3 $800 million (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1942, p. 749). Additional payments were made in the following years under the soil conservation program. The FCA was credited with helping half a million farmers keep their homes (Saloutos, 1982). Additionally, CCC commodity loans totaled nearly a billion and a half dollars for the years 1933 through 1939. Rucker and Alston (1987) estimate that farm credit programs prevented 77 thousand farm failures, while all forms of government aid are estimated to have prevented 186 thousand failures. Perhaps more important than the actual dollar amounts received by farmers was the fact that, beginning in the latter part of 1933, most farmers had a portion of their income secured by government assistance that allowed many to withstand the ravages of drought of the 1930s. Farm foreclosures peaked in 1933, then fell quickly so that by 1935 the rate was similar to that of the late 1920s (Alston, 1983). As farmers began to receive cash income and other assistance through government programs, the number of tractors purchased annually increased substantially. Table 1 shows that tractors purchases were at an interwar period low of 25,000 in 1933, but increased to a record 221,000 by 1937. Similarly, the purchase of other farm implements, especially those pulled by tractors, increased dramatically. Only 15,000 tractor drawn cultivators were purchased in 1931, a figure that increased to 127,000 by 1937. 1937 was also a record year for the purchase of tractor plows and cultivators, while 1938 was a record year for corn picker and combine purchases (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1941, p. 565). 3. Transmission of Agricultural Shocks The transmission of sectoral shocks to the macro economy has long been a part of economic theory. In the early part of the twentieth century, business cycle research included several mechanisms through which agricultural shocks could affect the aggregate economy.