Organizations and efficiency in lighthouses: the English case revisited Oliver Dunn1, Dan Bogart2, Eduard J Alvarez-Palau3, and Leigh Shaw Taylor4 PRELIMINARY DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE Abstract5 Complex policy challenges in the infrastructure sector are seen in a fresh light when studying one of the most celebrated historical examples: lighthouses in England. We show that in 1832, the largest actor in the market, Trinity, provided services more efficiently than numerous private operators. Trinity’s advantages partly came from lower revenue collection costs. Moreover, Trinity was pressured into charging lower prices, which proved illuminating to policy makers. While much of analysis shows the advantages of Trinity, we document that privates built many more lighthouses. Trinity became active only after a technological shock which increased the utility of lights. Finally, our analysis sheds light on a largely ignored provider: harbour authorities. They relied on alternative pricing and bundling strategies, achieved low operating costs, and served in markets largely ignored by Trinity and privates. 1 Research Associate in History, University of Cambridge,
[email protected] 2 Professor, Department of Economics, UC Irvine,
[email protected] 3 Senior Lecturer, Economics and Business, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya,
[email protected] 4 Senior Lecturer, Faculty of History, University of Cambridge,
[email protected] 5 New data for this paper was created thanks to grants from the Keynes Fund at Cambridge University. Earlier grants from the Leverhulme Trust grant (RPG-2013-093) Transport and Urbanization c.1670-1911 and NSF (SES-1260699), Modelling the Transport Revolution and the Industrial Revolution in England helped develop prior data.