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Egypt's New Regime and the Future of the US- Egyptian Strategic

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Egypt's New Regime and the Future of the US- Egyptian Strategic Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrate- gic analysis. The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on: • Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined employment of military forces; • Regional strategic appraisals; • The nature of land warfare; • Matters affecting the Army’s future; • The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and • Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army. Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern top- ics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of Defense, and the larger national security community. In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of conferences and topically-oriented roundtables, expanded trip reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders. The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army participation in national security policy formulation. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press EGYPT’S NEW REGIME AND THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-EGYPTIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP Gregory Aftandilian April 2013 The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press publications enjoy full academic free- dom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeop- ardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and some- times controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering de- bate on key issues. ***** This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010. ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this re- port may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted or reprinted in part or in full with permission and ap- propriate credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Insti- tute and USAWC Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. ***** The Strategic Studies Institute and USAWC Press publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic com- mentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/. ISBN 1-58487-565-8 ii FOREWORD Egypt’s domestic scene has profoundly changed since early 2011 when a popular revolution, ultimate- ly backed by the military, forced President Mubarak to resign. New and old political players and organiza- tions are contesting Egypt’s more open political space, and public policy is likely to be more influenced by public opinion than ever before. Egypt’s transition is still incomplete, but it now has a newly-elected presi- dent from the once-banned Muslim Brotherhood who is exercising leadership in domestic politics, foreign affairs, and in the military and security spheres. In a bold move in August 2012, he replaced the leadership of the military, which had been running the country since February of 2011, with individuals drawn from a younger generation of officers. As of September 2012, with the new Constitution still unfinished and new parliamentary elections months away, we do not know the delineation of powers between the branches of government or how much power the new president will ultimately wield. It is against this backdrop that Mr. Gregory Af- tandilian, a consultant, academic, and a former State Department Egypt analyst, wrote this monograph on how the United States can best preserve its strategic relationship with Egypt given these changes. Egypt has been a strategic partner of the United States for more than 3 decades, and has been one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid, most of which has been to assist the Egyptian military. Egypt has not only played a pivotal role in the Arab-Israeli peace process but has cooperated with the United States in many re- gional security matters such as providing overflight rights for U.S. military aircraft and expedited transit iii for U.S. naval ships passing through the important Suez Canal on the way to the Arabian Sea and the Per- sian Gulf, especially during times of crisis. Mr. Aftandilian cogently analyzes the develop- ments in Egypt from January 2011 to August 2012, especially the relationship between the military and the civilian authorities. He outlines several scenarios that could ensue and gives sound recommendations on how the United States can best preserve its stra- tegic interests in Egypt while supporting that coun- try’s democratic transition. He also offers specific rec- ommendations for the U.S. Army in its relationship with Egypt. The Strategic Studies Institute hopes the findings in this monograph will be of assistance to U.S. policy- makers and U.S. Army officers as they deal with a crit- ical ally during this very sensitive transition period. DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press iv ABOUT THE AUTHOR GREGORY AFTANDILIAN is an independent con- sultant, writer, and lecturer, who has spent over 21 years in government service, most recently on Capitol Hill. He was foreign policy advisor to Congressman Chris Van Hollen (2007-08), professional staff mem- ber of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and foreign policy adviser to Senator Paul Sarbanes (2000- 04), and foreign policy fellow to Senator Edward Ken- nedy (1999). Prior to these positions, Mr. Aftandilian worked for 13 years as a Middle East analyst at the U.S. Department of State where he was a recipient of the Department’s Superior Honor Award for his analyses on Egypt. His other government experiences include analytical work for the U.S. Department of Defense and the Library of Congress. He was also a research fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University (2006-07) and an International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York (1991-92). In addition, Mr. Aftandilian is an adjunct faculty member at Boston University, an as- sociate of the Middle East Center at University of Mas- sachusetts-Lowell, and a Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center for National Policy. Mr. Aftandilian is the author of Egypt’s Bid for Arab Leadership: Impli- cations for U.S. Policy (1993); and Looking Forward: An Integrat ed Strategy for Supporting Democracy and Human Rights in Egypt (2009). Mr. Aftandilian holds a B.A. in history from Dartmouth College, an M.A. in Middle Eastern studies from the University of Chicago, and an M.S. in international relations from the London School of Economics. v SUMMARY This monograph, completed in August 2012, ana- lyzes the developments in Egypt from January 2011 to August 2012 and addresses the following questions that are pertinent to U.S. policymakers: How does the United States maintain good relations and preserve its strategic partnership with Egypt under Cairo’s new political leadership and the changing political environ- ment in the country? How does it do so while adher- ing to American values such as supporting democracy even when those coming to power do not share U.S. strategic goals? The monograph first examines Egypt’s strategic importance for the United States by exploring Egypt’s role in the Arab-Israeli peace process, its geographical role (providing air and naval access) for U.S. military assets heading to the Persian Gulf, and joint training programs. With so much at stake in the Middle East, “losing” Egypt as a strategic ally would be a signifi- cant setback for the United States. The Egyptian revolution of early 2011 was wel- comed by U.S. officials because the protestors wanted democratic government, which conformed to U.S. ide- als, and the institution that would shepherd the transi- tion, the Egyptian military, had close ties to the United States. However, the transition was marked by many difficulties, including violence by military authorities against protestors, a crackdown on American non- government organizations (NGOs), and the military’s reluctance to cede real power to civilian authorities. Nonetheless, U.S. officials continued to court the mili- tary because they believed it had equities they needed to protect, and they developed relations with the Mus- lim Brotherhood, an organization that was critical of vii many U.S. foreign policy goals, because the Brother- hood had emerged as the strongest political organi- zation in the country. In the process, many Egyptian liberals felt slighted by this “two-stop shopping” by high-ranking U.S. officials. The first round of Egypt’s presidential elections divided the polity, and the top two vote-getters were a former Mubarak prime minister and a Brotherhood official, both of whom alarmed many Egyptians.
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