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APA NEWSLETTER on Feminism and Philosophy NEWSLETTER | The American Philosophical Association Feminism and Philosophy SPRING 2014 VOLUME 13 | NUMBER 2 FROM THE EDITOR BOOK REVIEWS Margaret A. Crouch Pamela Sue Anderson: Re-visioning Gender in Philosophy of Religion: Reason, ARTICLES Love, and Epistemic Locatedness Lauren Freeman Reviewed by Molly B. Farneth Creating Safe Spaces: Strategies for Jennifer Mather Saul: Lying, Misleading, Confronting Implicit and Explicit Bias and and What Is Said Stereotype Threat in the Classroom Reviewed by Kevin Graham Justin Harrison Jocelyn Boryczka: Women, Virtue, and Limits to the Pursuit of Philosophy for Vice in Backlash Politics Post-Traditional Female and Minority Students in On-Ground and Online Reviewed by Selin Gursozlu Educational Modalities Elizabeth Anderson: The Imperative of Nancy J. Holland Integration Humility and Feminist Philosophy Reviewed by Elizabeth Hackett Carmen Maria Marcous José Medina: The Epistemology How to Solve the Diversity Problem of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Amy Olberding, Sherri Irvin, Stephen Ellis Resistant Imaginations Best Practices for Fostering Diversity in Tenure-Track Searches Reviewed by Michael Monahan Ella Myers: Worldy Ethics: Democratic Phyllis Rooney Politics and Care for the World An Ambivalent Ally: On Philosophical Argumentation and Diversity Reviewed by Richard A. Lynch Sonia Kruks: Simone de Beauvoir and the Daniel Susser Politics of Ambiguity Philosophy’s Climate Problem: A Primer Reviewed by Sally Scholz VOLUME 13 | NUMBER 2 SPRING 2014 © 2014 BY THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION ISSN 2155-9708 APA NEWSLETTER ON Feminism and Philosophy MARGARET A. CROUCH, EDITOR VOLUME 13 | NUMBER 2 | SPRING 2014 Nancy J. Holland’s “Humility and Feminist Philosophy” is FROM THE EDITOR focused on the “masculinity” of philosophy. She argues that since the 1600s, it is possible to divide philosophies Margaret A. Crouch into those that are and those that are not characterized by EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY what she calls “ontological humility.” Ontological humility is opposed to Marilyn Frye’s “arrogant eye,” which Holland In May 2013, the first “Diversity in Philosophy Conference” claims provides the west’s basic assumptions about the was held at the University of Dayton. The theme of that world itself, including the status of women and other conference provides the theme for this issue of the oppressed groups. While not all feminist philosophy exhibits newsletter. Some of the essays in this issue were developed ontological humility, much does, and Holland provides two from conference presentations, while others address the contemporary examples: Patricia Hill Collins’s Black Feminist themes of the conference, though they were not presented Thought and Ladelle McWhorter’s Racism and Sexual at the conference. The essays discuss a wide range of Oppression. Holland asks why, if ontological humility has responses to the issue of diversity—rather, its lack—in characterized at least some philosophy for four hundred philosophy. They range from the practical to the theoretical, years, it was not thematized by these philosophers, to show and integrate the two, showing how philosophical its political implications. She suggests that the answer may commitments have implications for professional practice. lie in the meaning of the word “humility,” which was and still All of the articles are thoughtful and passionate. is considered a “feminine” trait. Holland’s article provides a thought-provoking perspective on types of philosophy that Lauren Freeman’s “Creating Safe Spaces” targets the stage are attractive to members of groups committed to ending of philosophical education where we lose perhaps the oppression, and their continued overshadowing by more greatest numbers of underrepresented students: between arrogant and less humble philosophical perspectives. the introductory course and the major. Freeman argues that implicit bias and stereotype threat, among other things, In “How to Solve the Diversity Problem,” Carmen prevent many students from flourishing in our philosophy Maria Marcous considers three possible attitudes that courses and classrooms, and suggests practical ways of members of philosophy departments might take to removing such obstacles. This is one of several articles in the underrepresentation in philosophy of women and this issue that I intend to distribute to my own philosophy minority ethnic and racial groups: skepticism, acceptance, colleagues for discussion about how to retain more of our and affirmation. In this context, skepticism denies that women, racial and ethnic minority, and disabled students, this underrepresentation has any adverse impact on in the major and beyond. a department, the field of philosophy, or on the body of knowledge constituted by philosophy. An attitude In “Limits to the Pursuit of Philosophy for Post-Traditional of acceptance recognizes that underrepresentation of Female and Minority Students in On-Ground and Online nontraditional groups is problematic, but characterizes the Educational Modalities,” Justin Harrison similarly addresses problem as one of social justice. Affirmation acknowledges the barriers to participation in philosophical education that underrepresentation constitutes a problem for a faced by underrepresented groups of students, but focuses department, the field of philosophy, and the knowledge particularly on students who are the first in their families to of which it is comprised. Marcous then argues, with attend college, or “first-generation.” He points out how the reference to Charles Mills, that due to the fact that traditional structure of higher education presents barriers members of social groups are likely to have different of time and space, and suggests that online courses experiences depending on their group membership, and can help to breach these barriers. However, even online so develop different knowledge and different approaches courses present obstacles to the participation of students to knowledge, the correct attitude for philosophers to in philosophy. For first-generation students, philosophy is adopt is affirmation. It is only when the field of philosophy a luxury. Harrison suggests some ways in which philosophy is inclusive of nontraditional perspectives that it can can be worked into the curriculum to benefit students aspire to theoretical and methodological adequacy. This that may not recognize what philosophical education theoretical argument has practical consequences, for can do for them. Again, this is an article I will share with the inclusion of nontraditional people in philosophy my colleagues, since we have a large number of first- requires that departments intentionally seek to diversify generation students, and other non-traditional students, their philosophy students and faculty, and that the enrolled in our university. perspectives members of nontraditional philosophers bring be fully integrated into the teaching and scholarship APA NEWSLETTER | FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY of the department. Equally important is the shift in power Daniel Susser’s “Climate Change Guide” is an extremely that such a perspective enacts. Rather than a student or useful primer for distribution to one’s entire department. job candidate being regarded as the beneficiary of the It explains the issue of departmental climate and provides institution’s largesse, as is the case in other justifications suggestions for positive change that can be understood for affirmative action, the empowerment-based approach and at least entertained, even by those who have not endorsed by Marcous puts the student or candidate in reached “Affirmation” (Marcous, this issue). the position of benefitting the department or discipline by providing their much needed epistemological The articles in this issue help all of us to think about, and act perspective. This empowers the nontraditional philosopher toward, making our profession and discipline more diverse. to critically engage dominant philosophical methodologies As one can see from these essays and their references, and theories with the knowledge that he or she has there is a growing literature on diversity in philosophy, philosophical reasons for finding such methodologies or something that could not be said not so very long ago. We theories unconvincing or incomplete. Marcous’s argument have come quite a way, but there is still a long way to go. elegantly combines theoretical work on epistemology and These articles help us on our way. arguments for diversity, and applies them to the discipline of philosophy. “Best Practices for Fostering Diversity in Tenure-Track ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ON Searches,” by three colleagues at the University of Oklahoma—Amy Olberding, Sherri Irvin, and Stephen Ellis— FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY provides concrete steps for fostering diversity in hiring. Basing their recommendations on the latest relevant social The Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy is sponsored scientific research, Olberding, Irvin, and Ellis have done by the APA committee on the status of women (CSW). all of us a great service by developing and sharing what The newsletter is designed to provide an introduction they have learned about what enables and what prevents to recent philosophical work that addresses issues of diversity in hiring. They assume a range of implicit biases— gender. None of the varied philosophical views presented about race and disability, for example, but also about what by authors of newsletter articles necessarily reflect the counts as
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