The Arab Democratic Wave

European European Union Union Institute for Institute for Security Studies Security Studies The Arab democratic wave How the EU can seize the moment Report N° 9 March 2011 Edited By Álvaro de Vasconcelos CONTRIBUTORS Amr Elshobaki, George Joffé, Sami Kamil, Erwan Lannon, Azzam Mahjoub, Luis Martinez, Mohammed Al-Masri, Gema Martín Muñoz, Mouin Rabbani, Abdallah Saaf, Paul Salem, Álvaro de Vasconcelos. European Union Institute for Security Studies www.iss.europa.eu • [email protected] This multi-author report, edited by Álvaro de Vasconcelos, was conceived as a response to the recent uprisings in Tunisia and in Egypt and the ‘democratic wave’ that has struck the Arab world. Clearly, these democratic uprisings call for a radical shift in the way in which Euro-Mediterranean relations are formulated and conducted. The report seeks to examine the significance of these events in this context. The first part of the report focuses on individual countries in the region, in the following sequence: Morocco (Abdallah Saaf), Algeria (Luis Martinez), Tunisia (Azzam Mahjoub), Libya (George Joffé), Egypt (Amr Elshobaki), Palestine (Mouin Rabbani), Jordan (Mohammed Al-Masri), Lebanon (Paul Salem), and Syria (Sami Kamil). The second part of the report consists of three chapters addressing the question of human rights and the rule of law in the region (Gema Martín- Muñoz), the social and economic aspects of the democratic transition process (George Joffé), and the European Neighbourhood Policy (Erwan Lannon). Institute for Security Studies European Union 43 avenue du Président Wilson 75775 Paris cedex 16 tel.: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 30 fax: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 31 [email protected] http://www.iss.europa.eu Director: Álvaro de Vasconcelos © EU Institute for Security Studies 2011. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the EU Institute for Security Studies. ISSN 1830-9747 Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur. Graphic design by Metropolis, Lisbon. Contents Executive Summary 3 Introduction 5 I. Case studies 11 Les Marocains et la révolution tunisienne 11 Vers une vague démocratique en Algérie ? 15 Les défis de la transition en tunisie 18 Libya faces its ‘day of rage’ 20 How can the eU support transition to democracy in egypt? 23 Palestine: same crisis, different reasons 26 Jordan: at a political crossroads? 29 Lebanon: governance stagnation versus regional agitation 33 Quid de la syrie ? 36 II. Economic and social dimensions 41 the dignity of the rule of law 41 social and economic implications 46 the revision of the european neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean 51 Annexes 56 the recent political situation in the countries of the Middle east and north Africa 56 european Commission democracy support instruments in the MenA region 62 Abbreviations 67 notes on the contributors 68 The Arab democratic wave: how the EU can seize the moment exeCUtiVe sUMMAry The failure of the authoritarian model in the Mediterranean calls for a radical over- haul of EU Mediterranean policy and for a new paradigm. Political reforms should be reinstated as the major priority. This report seeks to identify: (i) what the impact of the democratic revolutions has been in the countries of the region; (ii) what are the main challenges to a successful democratic transformation; and (iii) what priorities the EU needs to address in order to assist the pro-democracy forces, in particular in Tunisia and Egypt, and how it should adapt its Mediterranean policy to that end. The democratic revolutions and the failure of the Union for the Mediterranean should be regarded as an opportunity to define a new common objective to be achieved as part of a multilateral initiative: building a Euro-Mediterranean community and revising the Neighbourhood Policy accordingly. Main recommendations for the EU: 1. To deal as a matter of priority with the socio-economic situation, including con- vening an international donors’ conference to support Tunisia and Egypt, and assist in easing the immediate economic and financial impacts of the uprisings. This should include the creation of a financial institution based on the experi- ence of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in cen- tral and eastern Europe in the 1990s. 2. To urgently adapt the instruments and facilities under the Neighbourhood Policy to the specific demands of supporting democratic transformation, and move from the ill-defined ‘advanced status’ currently offered to some countries in the region to inaugurating a new generation of association agreements. These would be open to the countries undergoing democratic transition, and would in time give their citizens access to all the freedoms of the single market, including, progressively, the free movement of people. Economic cooperation should now prioritise an economic model that is appropriate for the region and an approach to trade relations that should favour job creation, social cohesiveness and social justice. 3. To build, in collaboration with the countries now on the path to democratic governance, a new partnership with the explicit objective of creating a Euro-Mediter- ranean Community of Democratic States by the end of the decade. This partnership should be open to the states willing to sign up to its charter, in particular its democratic objectives. 4. To make available EU ‘know-how’ on all critical areas of the democratic process, in particular with a view to the consolidation of democratic political parties and trade unions, security sector reform and reform of the media. Technical knowl- edge, consultancy and training courses could be delivered through established local NGOs. 3 ISSReportNo.09 5. To accept the role of political Islam in the democratic processes of the respective countries and reach out to those parties who accept the rules of constitutional politics. 6. To prioritise human rights in relations with the dictatorships and, in the face of lack of progress, to decide on sanctions targeting the dictators, their entourages and members of the repressive state apparatus, following the model applied to Belarus. These recommendations are addressed to the European Union in the wider sense: EU institutions, European capitals, foundations and civil society groups all have a role to play with the objective of actively supporting democratic processes in the region and opposing dictatorial regimes and violations of human rights. 4 ISSReport No.09 The Arab democratic wave: how the EU can seize the moment INTRODUCTION Álvaro de Vasconcelos The shared goal of a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States The democratic uprisings in North Africa call for a radical shift in the EU’s approach to Euro-Mediterranean relations. These have traditionally been dominated by economic concerns, founded on the misguided belief that globalisation will bring well- being for all if Southern countries make their economies attractive to foreign invest- ment. The present upheavals, however, clearly demonstrate that politics and social challenges must be brought to the forefront of EU-Mediterranean relations. The wisdom of the Union for the Mediterranean’s strategy of ignoring the political and social dimensions in order to ensure the goodwill of authoritarian leaders for the development of a number of concrete (though as yet unrealised) projects is thus called into question. The European Union now needs to revise its Mediterranean policy: in order to do so, it needs to build on some good practices of the past and pursue them in a more consistent way. This should translate, first of all, into prioritising the citizens’ agenda, which in fact corresponds to the basic principles articulated in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, where EU Member States and the Southern Mediterranean countries jointly stated that they would seek ‘to develop the rule of law and democracy in their political sys- tems.’ This objective was not consistently pursued, however, and this was highlighted in the important debate that took place on both shores of the Mediterranean during the preparation of the Barcelona summit of 2005. As was pointed out then, the main conclusion of the overview and evaluation of the first ten years of the Barcelona Proc- ess was that ‘the causal and sequential link between economic reform and political liberalisation has failed to materialise. If there has been any progress in human development terms, it has been neither uniform nor sufficient to respond to the grave social problems of the region. Economic reforms have largely failed to encourage political reform.’1 In consequence, it was therefore proposed that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership abandon a path that was leading nowhere and concentrate on meeting the aims set forth in the founding 1995 declaration, through the implementation ‘of specific ac- tions designed to create a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States.’ This aspiration was already shared by the civil society of the south and has since then been reiterated on many occasions by their representatives. 1. ‘Barcelona Plus: Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States’, report prepared by the EuroMeS- Co network at the request of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Partnership, April 2005. 5 ISSReportNo.09 The European Commission took on board many of these recommendations in the action programme that was approved at the 2005 summit, where it was established that the members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership would ‘strive to achieve their mutual commitments’ in the implementation of the democratic objectives of Barcelona over the following five years through a number of measures, for example ‘extend[ing] political pluralism and participation by citizens, particularly women and youth, through the active promotion of a fair and competitive political environ- ment, including fair and free elections’.2 In virtually all Southern Mediterranean countries, however, this commitment was blatantly ignored.

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