Political Ethics and the Spirit of Liberalism in Twentieth-Century Political Thought

Political Ethics and the Spirit of Liberalism in Twentieth-Century Political Thought The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Cherniss, Joshua. 2014. Political Ethics and the Spirit of Liberalism in Twentieth-Century Political Thought. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13070021 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA Political Ethics and the Spirit of Liberalism in Twentieth Century Political Thought A Dissertation Presented by Joshua Laurence Cherniss to The Department of Government in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Political Science Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts June 2014 © 2014 Joshua Laurence Cherniss Professor Nancy L. Rosenblum Joshua Laurence Cherniss Political Ethics and the Spirit of Liberalism in Twentieth Century Political Thought Abstract Liberalism is often criticized as too moralistic and removed from the realities of politics; and too complacently accepting of injustices. Such criticisms, familiar among contemporary political theorists, were expressed far more forcefully in the earlier twentieth century. Liberalism then came under attack from anti-liberals who wholly rejected the institutional and ethical limits on the political deployment of violence and fear insisted upon by liberals. Such anti-liberals advanced arguments for political ruthlessness on behalf of a truer morality – either the morality of pursuing morally imperative political goals; or the morality of “realistically” responding to threats to public order. Liberals found themselves faced with a dilemma: to adhere to their principles at the price of hampering their ability to combat both existing injustices, and the threat posed by ruthless anti-liberal movements; or to abandon their scruples in seeking to defend, or transform, liberal society. The criticisms and challenges confronting liberalism between the end of World War I, and the end of the Cold War, thus centered on opposing responses to problems of political ethics. They were also shaped by opposed ideals of political ethos – the “spirit”, dispositions of character, sensibility and patterns of perception and response, which characterize the way in which actors pursue their values and goals in practice. In this dissertation I reconstruct these debates, and explicate the ethical claims and questions involved, presenting accounts of the opposed – yet often convergent – positions of moral purism, end-maximalism, and realism. I offer accounts of the ethical arguments and ethos of such anti-liberals as Lenin, Trotsky, and Lukacs; and explore the ambivalent commitments and iii ambiguous arguments of Max Weber, who influenced both critics and defenders of liberalism. Finally, and primarily, I reconstruct the ethical arguments and ethos of “tempered liberalism” – a strain of liberalism, represented by Reinhold Niebuhr, Isaiah Berlin, and Adam Michnik, which sought to re-imagine liberalism as an ethos which rejected both the innocence and complacency of some earlier liberalisms, and the ruthlessness of anti-liberalism, and steered a “moderate” ethical path between hard-headed, skeptical realism, and values of individual integrity and idealism. iv Contents Acknowledgments vi Preface xi Introduction: Political Ethics in the Twentieth Century: Anti-liberalism as a Moral Problem, Liberalism as an Ethical Project 1 Part I. Between the Spirit of Tragedy and the Spirit of Utopia: Political Ethics and the Crisis of Liberalism in Early Twentieth-Century Europe Chapter 1. A Liberal Ethos Between Responsibility and Conviction?: The Enigmatic Ethics of Max Weber 77 Chapter 2. Tactics and Ethics Between Realism and Utopia: The Uneasy Bolshevism of Gyorgy Lukacs 136 Chapter 3. A Dead Man on Holiday: Arthur Koestler on the Ethos of Revolutionary Morality 174 Part II. A Political Ethics Between Ruthlessness and Purity: The Ethos of Tempered Liberalism Chapter 4. Between Cynicism and Sentimentality: Reinhold Niebuhr and The Chastening of Liberalism 202 Chapter 5. “The Courage of … Our Doubts and Uncertainties”: Isaiah Berlin on the Ethics of Moderation and the Ethos of Liberalism 263 Chapter 6. Neither Angel Nor Maggot: Adam Michnik and Oppositional Liberalism 322 Conclusion 382 v Acknowledgments This project has not always been light work; but it has certainly benefited from the aid of many hands. I have been immensely fortunate in working on this project with a dissertation committee who, while highly varied, have all been engaged, kind, and (in different ways) deeply sympathetic. Eric Beerbohm has been an ever-cheerful and considerate source of support throughout the project; late in the process (and at a time when he had many other things to do) he was particularly helpful in providing two marathon sessions of exhilarating chapter-by-chapter discussion of the near-completed text. He continues to pose conceptual questions that I continue to fret over. Michael Rosen saw the central point of the project, and its urgency for me, earlier than just about anyone else (myself included), and insisted that I pursue it; he has continued to offer reassurance, encouragement – and in some cases, much-needed pressure to press on – throughout, as well as a seemingly bottomless supply of useful, or at least entertaining, information about European philosophy, the history of the Left (and particularly its many factions), and political jokes, songs and doggerel. His understanding agreement on some points, and skepticism about others, have been spurs to keep going, and do better. Richard Tuck has shared his vast knowledge, brilliant intuition of what is significant, and unflagging good cheer; his reminders of the sheer fun and exuberance of the life of the mind, as well as his kindness, have been sustaining through tough times and petty worries. He has also nudged me to pursue questions that did not fit so comfortably into my mental framework, and to expand my perspective – particularly backwards into the nineteenth century. Although I have, in the interest of achieving coherence and keeping this work from growing beyond its already excessive length, resisted many of these suggestions, I continue to ponder them – and I suspect that the work is the better for it. Finally, Nancy Rosenblum has been an exemplary chair of my dissertation committee. Responsive, responsible, reassuring, sure-footed and sage in her advice, she has been a patient, encouraging, and wonderfully practical-minded mentor and guide through both the intellectual and professional hurdles of graduate vi school. She has read more drafts (and written more letters on my behalf) than I like to think and than she probably cares to remember. Even more than that, her dazzling intelligence, ability to grasp and clarify the important points of my argument and its subjects, deep psychological insight and political good sense have lit my way, and provided a model of how to do political theory in a way that balances thought and life, realism and romanticism, toughness and sympathy, all in a truly liberal spirit. My thinking reflects, in ways I probably could not identify, the influence not only of my committee members, but of the larger community of political theorists and political philosophers at Harvard: among others, Adriana Alfaro, Daniela Cammack, Prithviraj Datta, Ryan Doerfler, Michael Frazer, Sam Goldman, Jon Gould, David Grewal. Emily Gustafson, Kerstin Haase, John Harpham, Frances Kamm, Tae-Yeoun Keum, Madhav Khosla, Joe Kochanek, Adam Lebovitz, Charlie Lesch, Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Yascha Mounk, Joe Muller, Eric Nelson, Marie Gryphon Newhouse, Michael Nitsch (who offered crucial help with the idea of ethos), Nick O'Donovan, Jen Page, Nataliya Palatnik, Gladden Pappin, Sabeel Rahman (who helped me work out some central parts of the argument), Arjun Ramamurti, Patrick Riley, Jacob Roundtree, Rahul Sagar, Syed Shimail Reza, Jacob Roundtree, Paul Schofield, Mark Somos, Lucas Stanzcyk, Dennis Thompson, Andrea Tivig, Cheryl Welch, and Bernardo Zacka (who particularly helped me think about method). I have also been fortunate in my friends outside of political theory – including Josh Csehak, Francis Czyzowitcz, Sophie Duvernoy, Justin Grimmer, Elena Llaudet, Kristen Looney, Margot Lurie, Chika Ogawa, Ruxy Paul, Shauna Shames, George Soroka, Anya Vodopyanov. While such comparisons are invidious, I owe a special debt to those friends who have offered not only intellectual stimulation, but particularly close companionship, support, and diversion: Michael Lesley, Don Tontiplaphol, Emily Baldoni, Emma Saunders-Hastings, Matt Landauer, Jonathan Bruno, Daria van Tyne, Sean Ingham, Eleana Whyte. Aaron Garrett has been a source of much learning and stimulation, and occasional, timely and vital support (as well as an inadvertent reminder of how much vii cooler my taste in music and film might be). George Scialabba has been a frequent if irregular conversation partner who, with his unique blend of vehemence, subtlety, and gentleness, has posed particularly agonizing questions, which strike at the heart of the argument presented here; it has always been stimulating and beneficial – if not always comfortable – to think along

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