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Philosophy and the Art of Living Aristotle, Spinoza, Hegel

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Philosophy and the Art of Living Aristotle, Spinoza, Hegel Philosophy and the Art of Living Osher Life-Long Learning Institute (UC Irvine) 2010 The Masters of Reason and the Masters of Suspicion: Aristotle, Spinoza, Hegel Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre When: Mondays for six weeks: November 1 ,8, 15, 22, 29, and Dec. 6. Where: Woodbridge Center, 4628 Barranca Pkwy. Irvine CA 92604 NOTES AND QUOTES: Aristotle: 384 BCE- 322 BCE (62 years): Reference: http://www.jcu.edu/philosophy/gensler/ms/arist-00.htm Theoretical Reason contemplates the nature of Reality. Practical Reason arranges the best means to accomplish one's ends in life, of which the final end is happiness. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/#IntVir Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtue (1103a1-10): those that pertain to the part of the soul that engages in reasoning (virtues of mind or intellect), and those that pertain to the part of the soul that cannot itself reason but is nonetheless capable of following reason (ethical virtues, virtues of character). Intellectual virtues are in turn divided into two sorts: those that pertain to theoretical reasoning, and those that pertain to practical thinking 1139a3-8). He organizes his material by first studying ethical virtue in general, then moving to a discussion of particular ethical virtues (temperance, courage, and so on), and finally completing his survey by considering the intellectual virtues (practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom, etc.). Life : Aristotle was born in northern Greece in 384 B.C. He was raised by a guardian after the death of his father, Nicomachus, who had been court physician to the king of Macedonia. Aristotle entered Plato's Academy at age 17. After Plato's death, he supervised the education of the young Alexander the Great. He started his own school, the Lyceum, at age 49. He fled Athens after the death of Alexander the Great, fearing an attack from the anti-Macedonians. He died in 322 B.C., at age 62. 1 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellectual_virtue Aristotle analyzed virtues into moral and intellectual virtues (or dianoetic virtues, from the Greek aretai dianoetikai ). He... identified five intellectual virtues as the five ways the soul arrives at truth. He grouped them into three classes: • Theoretical • Sophia - wisdom. • Episteme - scientific knowledge, empirical knowledge. • Nous - mind. • Practical • Phronesis- practical wisdom/prudence. • • Productive • Techne-craft knowledge, art, skill. Intellectual virtues are displayed in • Euboulia-deliberating well, deliberative excellence; thinking properly about the right end. • Sunesis- understanding, sagacity, astuteness, consciousness of why something is as it is. • Gnome-judgment and consideration; allowing us to make equitable or fair decisions. • Deinotes-cleverness; the ability to carry out actions so as to achieve a goal. plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/#IntVir Happiness The Greek "eudaimonia," which we translate as "happiness," more precisely means "excellence" or "living well." Happiness is our highest good. Happiness is virtuous activity that fulfills our proper function. Such activity is satisfying and brings pleasure. But our ultimate end isn't pleasure; if it were, we'd be no better than the beasts. Physical pleasures, indeed, can tempt us with excesses and lead us away from virtue and happiness. Reason The distinct human function that separates us from other beings is reason. Thus our highest good (happiness) must involve reason. The harpist's function is to play the harp and to play it well, and the heart's function is to pump blood and to pump it well. So also our function is to use reason and to use it well. As we do this, we fulfill the natural end to which we are oriented. Our happiness consists in the excellent use of reason -- in virtue. 2 Virtue The virtue of a thing is its proper excellence. Our virtue consists in excellent rational activity. Virtue is a habitual way of acting -- not an emotion or a capacity. There are intellectual virtues (about thinking) and moral virtues (about character). Virtue is a mean between excess and deficiency. For example, courage is a mean between recklessness and cowardice. We judge the mean by perception -- not by mathematical calculation. A virtuous act requires that we do the right thing knowingly and willingly, that we act in character, and that we do the act for its own sake (and not from an ulterior motive or reward). Moral Development Virtue doesn't arise naturally; it requires training and habitual action -- that we keep doing the right thing with the right motivation. We become what we do; we form our moral character through our choices and actions. For example, your marriage commitment (a virtue) can be formed and nourished by daily actions that express your commitment and love. A virtue is a habit -- but not one that is mechanical or automatic; rather, it is voluntary and purposeful. We are responsible for what we do and who we are. We cannot excuse ourselves from ignorance, weakness, or even addiction. Practical Wisdom A person of practical wisdom deliberates well about the proper means to the goal of happiness. This presumes a good upbringing in virtue, a wide experience of life, and an intelligent calculation of how to achieve the highest good in the concrete situation. Socrates thought that virtue consisted in knowledge; once we know virtue, we will be virtuous. But virtue isn't knowledge, it's an habitual activity. We become virtuous by doing virtuous acts. Contemplation The highest form of happiness is contemplation (philosophical wisdom). This involves scientific understanding -- the intuitive grasp of eternal first principles combined with demonstration. Of all the pleasures in life, contemplation is the most continuous and self-sufficient. It aims at nothing outside of itself. It realizes a divine element in us. It directs our highest activity toward the highest objects. Philosophical wisdom combined with a virtuous character is complete happiness. 3 Virtue Ethics: www/drury.edu/ess/reason/Aristotle. Dr. Charles Ess, Druty U Aristotle observes that each "science" such as mathematics, ethics, politics, psychology, biology, physics, etc. admits of different degrees of certainty and demonstration. The same degree of certainty and demonstration is not possible in ethics that is possible in mathematics. Moral excellence is to become moderate in one's habits, hitting the mean between extremes in feeling, action and emotion. Aristotle notes that “...to experience fear, courage, desire, anger, pity, and pleasure at the right times and on the right occasions and toward the right persons and for the right causes and in the right manner is the mean or the supreme good, which is characteristic of virtue.” And in another passage: “By the mean considered relatively to ourselves I understand that which is neither too much nor too little; but this is not one thing, nor is it the same for everybody. Thus if 10 be too much and 2 too little we take 6 as a mean in respect of the thing itself; for 6 is as much greater than 2 as it is less than 10, and this is a mean in arithemtical proportion. But the mean considered relatively to ourselves must not be ascertained in this way. It does not follow that if 10 pounds of meat be too much and 2 be too little for a man to eat, a trainer will order him 6 pounds, as this may itself be too much or too little for the person who is to take it....the right amount will vary with the individual. This being so, everybody who understands his business avoids alike excess and deficiency; he seeks and chooses the mean, not the absolute mean, but the mean considered relatively to ourselves.” "the good of man is activity of soul [psyche] in accordance with virtue [excellence], or, if there are more virtues than one, in accordance with the best and most complete virtue." [A "happy" man is] one who is active in accord with perfect virtue and adequately furnished with external goods, not for some chance period of time, but for his whole lifetime. ( - because achieving virtue requires a moderate amount of material foundation) Our present study is not, like other studies, purely theoretical in intention; for the object of our inquiry is not to know what virtue is but how to become good , and that is the sole benefit of it. We must, therefore, consider the right way of performing actions, for it is acts that determine the character of the resulting moral states. The virtue or excellence of man will be such a moral state as makes a man good and able to perform his proper function well. Finally, consider the following from the last book in the Nichomachean Ethics: In fact, however, arguments seem to have enough influence to stimulate and encourage the civilized ones among the young people, and perhaps to make virtue [excellence] take possession of a well-born character that truly loves what is fine; but they seem unable to stimulate the many towards being fine and good. For the many naturally obey fear, not shame; they avoid what is base because of the penalties, not because it is disgraceful. For since they live by their feelings, they pursue 4 their proper pleasures and the sources of them, and avoid the opposed pains, and have not even a notion of what is fine and truly pleasant, since they have had no taste of it. What argument could reform people like these? For it is impossible, or not easy, to alter by argument what has long been absorbed by habit [_ethos_].... Arguments and teaching surely do not influence everyone, but the soul of the student needs to have been prepared by habits for enjoying and hating finely, like ground that is to nourish seed. For someone whose life follows his feelings would not even listen to an argument turning him away, or comprehend it; and in that state how could he be persuaded to change? From: http://tab.faculty.asu.edu/chapter102.html Aristotle: "Well suppose that the gods are alive and in work, since surely they are not asleep like Endymion.
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