Belarus Protests: Information Control and Technological Censorship Vs Connected Societies

978-9934-564-89-5 BELARUS PROTESTS: INFORMATION CONTROL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CENSORSHIP VS CONNECTED SOCIETIES Published by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Authors: The report is prepared by the International Strategic Action Network for Security (iSANS). iSANS is an international expert initiative established in 2018 aimed at detecting, analyzing and countering hybrid threats against democracy, rule of law and sovereignty of states in Europe and Asia. The initiative’s attention is focused on hostile networks of influence within Central and East Europe and former Soviet countries. Project Manager: Marius Varna Language Editing: Annie Geisow Special thanks to Amanda Rivkin Design: Linda Curika Riga, 8 December 2020 NATO STRATCOM COE 11b Kalnciema Iela Riga LV1048, Latvia www.stratcomcoe.org Facebook/stratcomcoe Twitter: @stratcomcoe This publication does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO or NATO StratCom COE. © All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Reports may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE. The views expressed here do not represent the views of NATO. Introduction The Belarusian presidential election on 9 August Telegram messenger, due to its encrypted mes- 2020 was a turning point in the history of modern saging, has become the most important informa- Belarus. Disagreeing with the apparently falsified tion channel and in a short time turned into the results of the vote, protesting Belarusian citizens most influential news agency. In all the attempts flooded the cities around the country. Lukashen- by the Belarusian government to disconnect con- ko’s response was lightning fast and brutal. In sumers from Internet resources, e.g. by instruct- order to conceal any information about the bru- ing telephone companies to disconnect digital tality of the law enforcement structures against internet or block social media platforms, Belaru- peaceful protesters, Lukashenko attempted to sians were increasingly finding ways to circum- take control of the information environment and vent these barriers. To access the internet, Belar- restrict access to all information channels - espe- usians used free anonymizers, VPNs (i.e. Psiphon cially Internet resources. and Tachyon) and proxy servers. At the height of the protests, the internet and dig- This paper explores the events in Belarus and how ital media became a window for Belarus onto the Lukashenko’s loyal structures sought to secure world, to speak about what is happening in Belar- control of the information space. us and hear a response. The Belarussian government has almost full Unlike traditional media, the internet is harder to control over traditional media. Such long-lasting control. Most Belarusians have access to the in- focus on one part of the media has created the ternet and therefore during the protests in Belar- conditions for the development of a strong IT us, many were not only consumers but sources sector and internet infrastructure, simultaneously and creators of information. allowing the public to adapt to these unfiltered information channels. The government’s attempts to restrict access to online sources of information was likely linked This paper provides an analysis of how the Be- to the idea that Belarusians would opt for more larussian government was preparing for possible easily accessible sources - television, radio and protests. What internet traffic control equipment print media (most of which are state-controlled). and software was purchased and tested? What Paradoxically, however, this provoked the opposite solutions did the protesters use to avoid traffic re- reaction as people began to look for opportunities striction and gain access to the internet? to access unbiased news in online resources. ____________________________________________________________________________ 3 August 2020 event timeline Post-election protests against Aliaksandr Lu- about the largest and longest protests in the post- kashenka have been ongoing in Belarus for many war history of Belarus. months. The situation inside the country is becom- On the day of the Belarusian presidential elections, ing increasingly turbulent as it enters the most August 9, the blackout started with slower speeds severe political and economic crisis since the late for services like YouTube and Google, and poor 1980s when the country broke away from the USSR. delivery of Telegram without proxies. Then foreign The dramatic gap between the population of the websites stopped downloading almost complete- country and the Belarusian leadership is increasing. ly, and finally local websites ceased to respond. The president Lukashenka, who is not recognized Virtual Private Network (VPN) services ceased neither by the European Union nor other democrat- to operate over time, while proxies required Wi-Fi ic countries, aims to do everything possible to tar- connection to operate with minimum speeds. 3G get his main enemy, the Internet, and its power to and 4G internet ‘dropped’ closer to 1800-2100 lo- supports and mobilise the energy of protest. cal time depending on location within Belarus. The internet blackout of August 9-12 left most The connection varied from one Internet service Belarusians in an information vacuum for 4 days provider (ISP) to another, but overall they were only and was, beyond any doubt, a violation of the able to re-establish their regular service provision international legal ban on arbitrary Internet dis- by the morning of August 12. A week later, some connections. The vast majority of independent 50 news websites were banned in the territory of online media was unavailable for the duration. Belarus1. More followed2. Between August 1 and Whilst newspaper delivery was suspended during September 3, the authorities blocked at least 86 the first few days after election day, state TV and websites related to political news, human rights, radio remained the main sources of information. and peaceful activism, as indicated by OONI Web However, they did not contain much information Connectivity analysis.3 4 _____________________________________________________________________________ Pre-requisites and instruments For many years, Belarusian state has had a com- the protests just as happened in December 2010. plete monopoly on incoming and outbound in- Neither heavy collateral damage (coinciding with ternet traffic via two state-owned organizations the launch of the Belarus Nuclear Power Station which control Border Gateway Protocol con- whose personnel are dependent on ‘civil’ mobile nectivity in Belarus: National Traffic Exchange and internet connection), nor economic costs Center (NTEC, НЦОТ, Национальный центр (that were later estimated at up to $ 170 million)5, обмена трафиком, ncot.by) and Beltelecom nor subsequent stability of the acting authorities (state-owned telecommunications operator with were important enough to choose another weap- cross-border gateways into and out of the coun- on to crack down on Telegram. try and ownership of most fixed communication The results were the opposite of those desired. Af- channels in Belarus). No other ISPs in Belarus ter four days of silence, Telegram exploded. Instead have direct access to any foreign Internet traffic of shutting down, pro-democratic Telegram chan- without peer-to-peer channels established with nels grew their audiences by hundreds of thou- either Beltelecom or NTEC. sands of subscribers, and turned into more than Since late 2019, Telegram has become the driv- just coordination tools. They became nationwide ing instrument of mobilization and the main po- media outlets with loyal audiences of at least 2.5 litical media tribune in Belarus.4 Despite repeated million readers daily. However, the remainder of the attempts to oppose pro-democratic media and digital media and news websites fared worse. Telegram channels in particular (for instance, by Between around 1600 on August 9, 2020 and ear- arresting their administrators), neither Lukashen- ly morning on August 12, 2020, most websites, ka nor his security forces were able to limit the in- social networks (including Facebook, Instagram, fluence of their challengers. On the contrary, Tele- Twitter, YouTube), instant messengers (WhatsApp, gram channels have become the most influential Telegram, Viber), search engines (Google, Yandex, ‘news agencies’, setting up the daily agenda for Mail.Ru), application (AppStore!), and online taxi non-governmental press and Lukashenka himself. services were virtually inaccessible to most peo- Whilst it was technically impossible to halt the ple within Belarus – including even basic Google work of Telegram channels alone (which have services6. A major independent news outlet, tut. become the real fourth power in Belarus by early by was able to find out that its ISP, Beltelecom, 2020), the state officials attempted to stop them capped its bandwidth at 25%7 of its normal ca- at any cost. State bureaucracy understood the pacity with no explanation and no information on potential of Telegram with regards to post-elec- when it would return to normal capacity. tion protest activity long before August 9. An in- ATMs, payment terminals and all internet-con- ternet blackout was likely chosen as a tool that nected real-life services and financial instruments was supposed to quickly stop Telegram and cut ____________________________________________________________________________ 5 ceased to operate, but so did two major grass- that a limited number

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