May-June 2010 | Volume 23 | Issue 3
Articles 6 Trauma Training Students in the Special Operations Combat Medic Course work in urban areas and hospitals to learn trauma management firsthand.
10 Preparing for Hybrid Threats Dealing with an adaptive adversary requires that Soldiers out-think the enemy. 14 Persistent Engagement: CMSEs Operating 6 in the CENTCOM AOR Civil-military support elements provide CENTCOM leaders with a unique resource.
24 Back to His Roots An Afghan general revisits the school where he took SF training nearly 40 years ago.
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Departments 4 From the Commandant ON THE COVER 5 Update Civil Affairs Soldiers conduct decisive military-to-civilian 26 Career Notes engagements in the CENTCOM AOR. 27 Book Reviews U.S. Army photo Special Warfare Commander & Commandant Major General Thomas R. Csrnko
Editor Jerry D. Steelman
Associate Editor Janice Burton
Graphics & Design Jennifer Martin
Webmaster Eva Herrera
14 SUBMISSIONS
Special Warfare is an authorized, official bimonthly Special Warfare welcomes sub- in a timely manner. Special Warfare publication of the United States Army John F. Kennedy missions of scholarly, independent reserves the right to edit all contribu- Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C. Its research from members of the armed tions. Special Warfare will attempt to mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the forces, security policy-makers and afford authors an opportunity to review examination of established doctrine and new ideas. -shapers, defense analysts, aca- the final edited version; requests for Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do demic specialists and civilians from the changes must be received by the not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publica- United States and abroad. given deadline. tion does not supersede any information presented in Manuscripts should be 2,500 to Articles that require security clear- other official Army publications. 3,000 words in length. Include a cover ance should be cleared by the author’s Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, letter. Submit a complete biography chain of command prior to submission. USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN with author contact information (i.e., No payment or honorarium is autho- 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax 432-6950 or complete mailing address, telephone, rized for publication of articles. Mate- send e-mail to [email protected]. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. fax, e-mail address). rial appearing in Special Warfare is Manuscripts should be submitted in considered to be in the public domain Published works may be reprinted, except where copy- righted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and plain text, double-spaced, and in a digi- and is not protected by copyright un- the authors. tal file. End notes should accompany less it is accompanied by the author’s Official distribution is limited to active and reserve works in lieu of embedded footnotes. copyright notice. Published works may special-operations units. Individuals desiring private sub- Please consult The Chicago Manual of be reprinted, except where copyright- scriptions should forward their requests to: Style, 15th Edition, for footnote style. ed, provided credit is given to Special Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 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Commercial: (910) 432-5703 Secretary of the Army All submissions will be reviewed DSN: 239-5703 1010203 Headquarters, Department of the Army While Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, place great emphasis on the selection and training of warriors, it is important to remember the more humanitarian aspects of the ARSOF mission. All of our components have a role in that aspect of our mission. Civil Affairs Soldiers work not only to re-establish government services but also to assist other government and nongovernment agencies in providing humanitarian as- sistance in areas where war and natural disasters have left inhabitants and governments unable to provide for them- selves. Psychological Operations Soldiers use their abilities to deliver messages to the populace regarding public safety and the availability of shelter and supplies. Special Forces Soldiers also provide civic assistance as needed, and one of SF’s most important missions can be the provision of medi- cal and veterinary care by our SF medical NCOs. In this issue, Major Ross Lightsey writes about the role of Civil Affairs Soldiers in the civil military support elements op- erating in the United States Central Command. As a means of unifying the efforts of a number of military, government and volunteer organizations, the CMSE is a valu- able tool in providing security and support. In CMSE operations, Major Lightsey points out, what is impor- tant is not so much the project itself as the community involvement and popular support that it generates. Also in this issue, authors from the Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center describe the training in trauma management given to students in the Special Operations Combat Medic Course. Al- though they are training to be combat medics, our students hit the streets and hospitals of major urban areas, where they receive comprehensive training in a full range of situations, including labor and deliv- ery and management of patients from the ER to the ICU. In the remote areas in which they will operate, they may be the only medical professionals available for any type of treatment. During a recent visit to Fort Bragg, Lieutenant General Sher Mohammad Karimi, chief of operations for the Afghanistan National Army, revisited the Special Warfare Center and School, where he had com- pleted the Special Forces Qualification Course in 1973. After returning to Afghanistan, he lived through a military coup in Afghanistan in 1978, the Soviet invasion in 1979, 15 months of torture and imprison- ment, service with the mujahedeen, a flight to Pakistan to escape the Taliban and finally restoration to active military service. During his visit, we presented him with new certificates of training to replace the ones he had lost over nearly 40 turbulent years. In turn, he shared his insights on the need to counter insurgency by providing security and internal development, ideas perhaps shaped here during the SFQC and certainly tempered by 40 years of experience. “Fighting alone will not bring peace,” he said. “As one of our prov- erbs goes, ‘You cannot build communities by force.’ ” General Karimi’s comments remind us of an important lesson: That the Soldiers we train may have to free the oppressed not only from tyranny but also from poverty, famine and chaos. While we must train warriors, our Soldiers’ nonlethal operations are an important part of ARSOF and, in certain situations, may prove to be some of the most effective and lasting things that we do.
Major General Thomas R. Csrnko
4 Special Warfare U P D A T E
USAJFKSWCS offers master’s degree proGram Beginning Sept. 7, the JFK Special Warfare writing of a thesis, students will develop strate- collaboration with diverse partners. Center and School, in partnership with the gies for working with other agencies and with The SWCS/NDU master’s program will be National Defense University,or NDU, will offer a members of the international coalition. Through fast-paced and demanding. Students’ education fully accredited program for a master of arts in a combination of academic and practical learn- backgrounds will vary — some may have com- strategic security studies. ing, the program will prepare professionals to pleted their undergraduate degree recently, while The program will mirror the master of arts develop and implement national and interna- others may have completed it years ago. To bet- in strategic security studies, or MASSS, offered tional security strategies for conditions of peace, ter prepare all students for the academic rigors by NDU’s College of International Security crisis and war. of the program, the Education Management Affairs. The NDU program is designed for Students who complete the MASSS degree Division of the SWCS Directorate of Regional students from U.S. departments and agencies, should be able to meet the following learning Studies and Education is coordinating with the congressional staffs and military and civilian objectives: Army Center for Enhanced Performance-Fort representatives of the international community (1) Analyze the 21st-century geopolitical en- Bragg to develop an academic-success program who operate in the Washington, D.C., area. The vironment characterized by the rise of nonstate tailored to the needs of the students. SWCS/NDU program will be offered to NCOs armed groups and the uneven erosion of state Soldiers may still apply for this year’s in grades E7 and above, warrant officers and sovereignty; program, but they should apply as quickly as officers from all special-operations branches (2) Evaluate the roles of power and ideology, possible. Applications should be sent to the SWCS who have a bachelor’s degree from a regionally the rise of newly empowered and politicized Directorate of Force Management and should in- accredited institution. ideological movements and the bases for au- clude an application for the NDU College of Inter- The 10-month curriculum will offer a thority and legitimacy; national Security Affairs (available at http://www. strategic perspective on the global threat (3) Understand the relationship between ndu.edu/cisa/index.cfm?pageID=112&type=page), environment; the rise of newly empowered and political objectives, strategy and all instruments official transcripts from all colleges and universi- politicized ideological movements; the relation- of national power; ties previously attended, and a letter of release/ ship between political objectives; strategy; all (4) Develop skills needed for thinking criti- endorsement from the current unit commander. instruments of national power; and the roles of cally and strategically and for differentiating For additional information, telephone the SWCS power and ideology. Through seminar partici- between policy and analysis. Put knowledge into education counselor at DSN 239-9604 or com- pation, independent study, research and the practice in complex circumstances involving mercial (910) 432-9604.
Gaming: The future of training by Angela Kershner A training specialist at the JFK Special Warfare Center and will be able to create dL materials that will be able to compete with School recently won the prestigious dL Maverick Award at the ninth commercial games. annual Army Distributed Learning Conference. Short credits his team with winning the dL Maverick award. “I Created in 2007 by self-professed “maverick” Dr. Connie felt proud initially — then awkward,” he said. “Those are the guys Wardell, the director of the Individual Training Support Directorate that bring it to life. For me to accept the award as if I’m the only one for the U.S. Army Training Support Center, the award is designed to that completed the race … it’s just awkward. To me dL has always recognize mavericks in the field of distributive learning. been a team effort, not an individual effort.” This year’s winner, Preston Short, serves as a supervisory train- Colonel David Witty, director of DOTD, nominated Short for ing specialist in the Office of Interactive Multimedia Instruction in the award because he is a recognized pioneer in his field. “It’s just the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine. He was one of eight phenomenal what all he’s done,” said Witty. “Anything that happens nominees Armywide. in the battlefield we can recreate digitally with very good effect.” Short, a former Special Forces operator, draws on his training, Short and his team use a commercially available software program real-world experience and passion for video gaming to run the in- to create realistic battlefield simulations. house gaming-development division. In fewer than five years, he has Witty appreciates the future possibilities of using gaming to train brought the concept of using gaming in SWCS distributed learning troops. “This new generation of kids — we call them digital natives from an idea to reality, building a team that has the capabilities to — they absorb information differently than we do.” make it happen. Aside from the efforts of his team and the quality of the prod- “I surrounded myself with people that could get me to the vision ucts IMI is producing, Short sees the dL Maverick Award as much of where we were going,” said Short. Working with another former- more than a recognition of their efforts. “The special thing about SF operator and gaming enthusiast, and with two programmers that Maverick Award,” Short said, “is that it recognizes the out-of- lured from high-end gaming companies, Short hopes that the IMI the-box thinking that’s prevalent here at SWCS.”
May-June 2010 5 TRAUMA TRAINING: by Lieutenant Colonel LoryKay Wheeler, Hospital Corpsman Senior Chief Petty Officer Mark E. McNeil, Sergeant First Class Matthew D. Campbell, Michael J. Lasko and Danny J. Yakel
6 Special Warfare Emergency medical services workers wheel a male patient with multiple gunshot wounds into the emergency department’s trauma bay. The patient has been shot in the back, and the bullets have penetrated into his chest and ab- domen. In less than 30 seconds, Specialist Noah Smith per- forms an endotracheal intubation, which is the placement of a flexible plastic tube into the trachea to provide a secure and stable airway. Next, he moves to place bilateral chest tubes for the treatment of pneumothorax (the collection of air or gas in the chest cavity), then continues to assist with further assessment and treatment of the casualty. In another urban location, Specialist John Olson’s ex- perience reinforces the importance of situational awareness and expecting the unexpected as he rides with first re- sponders to the point of injury in a “rough neighborhood.” When they arrive, the situation on the ground is much worse than reported by dispatch. Smith and Olson are students participating in clinical training as part of the Special Operations Combat Medic Course, or SOCM, conducted at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School’s Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center, or JSOMTC, at Fort Bragg, N.C. The JSOMTC is a 75,000-square-foot, tri-service facility that is staffed by the Special Warfare Medical Group and has under its auspices the Naval Special Operations Medi- cal Institute. The staff and cadre train more than 1,500 students annually from all subordinate units of the U.S. Special Operations Command and from allied special-oper- ations units. In addition to SOCM, the JSOMTC conducts four other medical-training courses: the Special Forces Medi- cal Sergeant Course, the Special Operations Independent Duty Corpsman Course, the Civil Affairs Medical Sergeant Course and the Special Operations Combat Medic Skills Sustainment Course. SOCM is the prerequisite course for all special-operations medical training. During the aca- demically demanding 26-week course, students receive more than 1,200 hours of classroom instruction and hands-on training. SOCM is divided into six phases: medical fundamen- tals, three progressively intense phases of trauma training, training in civilian urban-trauma centers and a block on military medicine. During the first phase, medical funda- mentals, students receive training in anatomy and physiol- ogy, pathophysiology, pharmaceutical calculation, physical examination and medical patient assessment. After completing medical fundamentals, students begin their trauma training, where they learn how to Hospital Rotations Critical assess and manage trauma patients from the point of injury through casualty evacuation. From that training, Facet of Training Special students must demonstrate proficiency in a wide array of life-saving skills, including advanced airway man- Operations Combat Medics agement, hemorrhage control, splinting, vascular and intraosseous access (access through the marrow of the bone), medication administration, shock management and a variety of emergency surgical procedures. Those
May-June 2010 7 Trauma training
All Children’s Hospital, SOCM students provide care to the full spectrum of medical and trauma patients. They spend a significant amount of their clinical-rotation time working in the adult emergency department, where they become proficient in emergency assessments and life- sustaining procedures. Training in other departments is crucial to the devel- opment of well-rounded special-operations combat med- ics. Students obtain further training in areas such as labor and delivery, where they assist with deliveries and learn how to manage newborns and obstetrical complica- tions; the operating room, where they obtain and man- age patient airways and assist in surgical procedures; various intensive-care units, such as neurosurgical and burn, where students assess and monitor patients who have traumatic brain injuries and assist with the man- agement of burns; and the pediatric emergency depart- ment, where students treat patients ranging from infants to adolescents. During the field internship with EMS, students as- signed to Richmond work with the Henrico County Division of Fire, and those in Tampa and in St. Peters- burg work with Tampa Fire Rescue. Field internships give SOCM students vital experience in providing medi- cal care at the point of injury or illness. It’s important MAKING ROUNDS An SF medical student works in an emergency that the medic be able to provide medical care, but he room as part of his trauma training. U.S. Army photo. must also be able to lead a cross-trained team in provid- procedures include cricothyrotomy (an incision through ing that care, especially in the event of a mass-casualty the skin and cricothyroid membrane to secure a patient’s situation. Therefore, a critical element of SOCM training airway during certain emergency situations), chest-tube is teaching students to perform a variety of team-leader thoracostomy (the insertion of a flexible plastic tube roles throughout the clinical experience. through the side of the chest to remove air or fluid from It’s also important to note that although the special- the area) and venous cutdown (the surgical exposure of operations combat medic must be able to assess a patient a vein in order to gain vascular access in trauma and and perform acute life-saving interventions, he must also shock patients). be able to manage the patient through the myriad of com- Students receive training in combat casualty care as plications that can arise during a prolonged delay in casu- well as certification in civilian-recognized programs, includ- alty evacuation. He must develop medical critical-reasoning ing Basic Life Support, Pre-Hospital Trauma Life Support, skills by monitoring and assisting in the management of National Registry of Emergency Medicine Technicians-Ba- patients from the point of injury or serious illness, through sic, Pediatric Education for Pre-Hospital Professionals and the emergency department and through the first 24-48 Advanced Cardiac Life Support. These civilian certifications hours of ICU care, in order to recognize and appropriately are paramount in the SOCM students’ ability to train in treat potential complications. civilian urban trauma centers. That training composes the The coordination and provision of the necessary clinical fifth block of SOCM training. training to ensure that SOCM students acquire these skills The highlight of SOCM is the training conducted is an incredible undertaking. The SOCM program assigns during a comprehensive four-week deployment to one of an active-duty-military or government-service employee as three metropolitan areas: Richmond, Va.; Tampa, Fla.; a clinical coordinator at each of the three sites for program or St. Petersburg, Fla. During those four weeks, students management. It relies heavily on dedicated civilian precep- deliver health care to ill and injured citizens of those tors at the sites to train the medics. On-site clinical coordi- communities while completing a 144-hour clinical rota- nators have established an incredible relationship with their tion of hospital training and a 144-hour field internship respective hospitals and fire departments. of pre-hospital training with emergency medical services, In November 2009, Danny Yakel, a retired Special or EMS. Forces medical sergeant and the SOCM clinical coordina- During the hospital clinical rotations, conducted at tor in Richmond, was asked by Virginia Commonwealth Richmond’s Virginia Commonwealth University Medical University’s Department of Emergency Medicine to give Center, Tampa General Hospital or through a combina- a presentation at the National EMS Symposium, held in tion of St. Petersburg’s Bayfront Medical Center and Virginia Beach, Va. The convention is the largest of its kind
8 Special Warfare and is attended by representatives from EMS departments ter and busy EMS system will pale in comparison to what throughout the United States. Yakel’s presentation por- they will experience later in the field.” trayed a real-life comparison of civilian EMS and special- Ward pointed out that members of the faculty, residents, operations medicine to give the civilian EMS departments nurses and members of the paramedic staff involved in train- a better understanding of the training and capabilities of ing the SOCM students uniformly consider themselves to be special-operations combat medics. beneficiaries of the program because of the model behavior of Clinical coordinators are primarily responsible for edu- the SOCM students. cating the preceptors on the SOCM training level, scope of “The professionalism and hunger for knowledge that these practice, requirements and objectives of the clinical expe- young men demonstrate to us, day in and day out, while they rience. Preceptor education became especially imperative are with us, is a true inspiration for all. While we are not on during the past year, because of the establishment of new the field of combat, the presence of the SOCM students is a program requirements and patient-management goals. It is constant reminder to us of the War on Terror and the impor- one thing for preceptors to receive a briefing on the training tance of constant vigilance. … We are one of the few civilian and capabilities of the combat medics, but their com- medical centers who can say we are truly contributing to the prehension is taken to a new level when they experience war effort. We try to constantly remember that because of the training firsthand. Annual preceptor site visits to the what the SOCM students will be doing, we can continue to do JSOMTC to observe SOCM training have significant affects what we do without fear.” on preceptor buy-in. Clinical rotations and field internships are essential After a recent site visit, Dr. John Cha, a trauma sur- elements of SOCM training. SOCM students rely on civil- geon from Tampa General Hospital, said, “It was a real ian health-care providers to assist in perfecting the criti- eye-opener to see the medics perform technically complex cal medical skills acquired at the JSOMTC. When SOCM
“We are one of the few civilian medical centers who can say we are truly contributing to the war effort. We try to constantly remember that because of what the SOCM students will be doing, we can continue to do what we do without fear.”
clinical maneuvers a mere six months into their rigorous students return to Fort Bragg, they complete the sixth and program, particularly considering that a significant num- final phase of training, a one-week block on military medi- ber of them had no prior medical education. I am confident cine. After that, Special Forces Qualification students go on that I was nowhere near the SOCMs’ level of proficiency to the second half of training in their military occupational after medical school and even several years into my surgi- specialty, but the remaining SOCM graduates report to cal residency. As for the SOCMs’ performance during their their units and are subject to being deployed within weeks rotation with us, it is a testament to their training that of their departure from the JSOMTC. they integrate well with the trauma resuscitation team. I have found the SOCMs to be always ready, motivated and professional in conduct. I only wish that they rotated with us for a longer period of time.” Site visits also provide preceptors with a better un- Lieutenant Colonel LoryKay Wheeler is an emergency medicine physician and director of the Special Operations derstanding of the combat medics’ typical work environ- Combat Medic Course. ment and available equipment. Tracy Brown, a registered nurse and a preceptor at Tampa General, said, “I have Hospital Corpsman Senior Chief Petty Officer Mark E. McNeil is the SOCM senior instructor. all the most advanced equipment and unlimited access to many specialty services, and yet these boys go out Sergeant First Class Matthew D. Campbell is the SOCM with a backpack and save many lives.” That understand- clinical coordinator with Bayfront Medical Center and All ing allows preceptors to ask students thought-provoking Children’s Hospital. questions, such as, “How would your treatment of this Michael J. Lasko, a retired Special Forces NCO, is the patient differ if you were in an austere location with lim- SOCM clinical coordinator with Tampa General Hospital ited resources?,” further expanding the development of and Tampa Fire Rescue. students’ critical reasoning. Danny J. Yakel, a retired Special Forces NCO, is the SOCM Dr. Kevin Ward, the program director at Virginia Com- clinical coordinator with Virginia Commonwealth University monwealth University Medical Center, noted, “Even the Medical Center and the Henrico County Division of Fire. challenges that exist in an inner-city, level-one trauma cen-
May-June 2010 9 case study American citizens trapped in Lebanon are evacuated by the U.S. Navy. The 2nd Lebanon War is a perfect case study on deal- ing with hybrid threats. U.S. Navy photo. Preparing for Hybrid Threats Improving Force Preparation for Irregular Warfare by William Fleser
As the United States military transitions in Iraq and and will tailor their strategies and employ their capabilities addresses new challenges in Afghanistan, a strategic in sophisticated ways. question looms: “And then what?” The challenges of those Thus, the QDR moves away from its previous Long two wars have consumed much of the strategic think- War strategic construct toward more flexibility: It recog- ing over the past eight years, and while those operations nizes the increased complexity of war, the multiplicity retain priority, it is probably prudent at this point to think of actors involved and the resulting tendency to blur the about what today’s challenges tell us about the nature of lines between traditional forms of conflict. It recognizes future conflicts. that today’s adversary may engage in “hybrid approaches” As Karl von Clausewitz noted, it is important to under- that demand preparation for a broad range of potential stand the nature of the war before engaging in it, but in conflicts.2 Hybrid adversaries, including state-sponsored some respects, we don’t have that luxury.1 In February, entities, independent individual actors with access to high the Department of Defense released its 2010 Quadrennial technology, terror franchises and aligned criminal orga- Defense Review, or QDR, which provides a more-than- nizations, may use terror as a tactic, as an operational adequate discussion of the pre-eminent security challenge concept or as a strategic gambit. They often use inter- facing our nation today and into the future: national humanitarian organizations to raise funds, and The continued dominance of America’s armed forces in they employ proxies where needed to accomplish their large-scale, force-on-force warfare provides powerful incen- ends. Hybrid threats readily employ the technologies of tives for adversaries to employ methods designed to offset the 21st century to provide security, perform operational our strengths. From nonstate actors using highly advanced planning, obtain lessons learned and provide safe havens. military technology to states employing unconventional They often act like nation states with state foreign-policy technologies, our current adversaries have shown they can objectives while simultaneously employing terror, para-
Note: Observations expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect official positions of the U.S. Depart- ment of Defense or the U.S. Joint Forces Command. Quotations are not attributed to avoid risk of compromise.
10 Special Warfare military militia, humanitarian, political, criminal and even warfare with Israel, they also put at risk the support of the conventional military capabilities.3 population on which their continued legitimacy depended.5 The purpose of this paper is not to engage in another By not exploiting that weakness, the IDF enabled the inter- debate over a new military term. Let’s simply start with the national press and biased information outlets to praise He- assertion that it does not matter what terminology we use, zbollah for “standing up” to Israel, while locally, Hezbollah because, in the end, the enemy gets a vote. And although was able to win hearts and minds through the distribution he routinely reads our doctrine, he doesn’t care about our of humanitarian aid, gaining a victory by information.6 internal intellectual debates. This paper is intended only to During a rigorous self-examination following the war, advance some ideas on what can be done to better prepare the Israelis noted their unpreparedness for that kind of “the force” (special-operations forces, or SOF) to deal with conflict. They recognized that military power alone is insuf- irregular or hybrid threats. Given that our forces have been ficient for dealing with the complex problem sets posed involved in nonstop combat operations since mid-October by the geopolitical situation unfolding during the summer 2001, we have gained a great deal of operational experi- of 2006.7 The IDF’s military-heavy approach left it un- ence. But our adversary has also learned. What can we able to capitalize on the inherent contradictions between expect to deal with in the future, and how do we deal with Hezbollah’s hybrid nature (a terrorist organization with emerging hybrid threats? conventional capabilities masquerading as a humanitarian The experiences of the Israeli Defense Force, or IDF, governing agent), and thus the IDF lost the strategic narra- during the 2nd Lebanon War provide some examples of the tive, both at home and abroad. challenges inherent to hybrid conflicts. This is not to say Conversely, in 2008 the IDF successfully adapted and that what they learned automatically translates to our situ- exploited the contradictions and friction between the vari- ation, because the adversary also learns by experience. In ous factions within Hamas, achieving a favorable strategic 2006, Hezbollah, operating in Lebanon, was simultaneous- outcome. IDF operations against Hamas were characterized ly a state-sponsored terrorist group, a political movement, by precision air strikes, a skillful combination of ground a humanitarian organization and a conventional military maneuver and special operations — synchronized with the force. Hezbollah employed new technologies as force mul- delivery of humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population tipliers, including strategic rocket assaults, unmanned — and homeland defense measures, all reinforced by an aerial vehicles, night-vision technology, IEDs and the latest active information campaign. In short, the IDF successfully antitank guided missiles. To combat Hezbollah, the IDF applied the lessons of 2006 to achieve victory.8 was forced into a type of hybrid warfare: warfare that goes This is useful information for the theorist and the strat- beyond conflict between states and armed groups and in- egist, but it does not provide any actionable conclusions cludes multiple forms of combat simultaneously, including or templates that can be used to prepare the joint force to conventional maneuver warfare, irregular tactics, informa- deal with hybrid threats. There were no templates generat- tion warfare, terrorist acts and criminal disorder.4 ed from the 2nd Lebanon War, because the adversary also Revisiting the 2nd Lebanon War in detail is also not the adapted after the conflict. That the IDF learned and adapt- purpose of this paper (for an excellent discussion of the ed from its 2006 experiences was obvious by the results of conflict, see Russell W. Glenn,All Glory is Fleeting: Insights the 2008 conflict. In the case of our current hybrid adver- from the 2nd Lebanon War (Suffolk, Va.: National Defense saries, they also learn from their mistakes and successes, Research Institute, 2008). From a force-preparation per- and they adapt. In preparing for the next hybrid conflict, spective, i.e., “How do we get ready for this kind of war- teaching U.S. and partner-nation organizations how to deal fare?,” we can draw at least three insights from IDF experi- with complex problems and to find unique, adaptive and ences in Lebanon and Gaza. innovative solutions is as important as teaching them to The first insight is that there is a need to understand perform tasks to doctrinally acceptable standards during a the nature of irregular or hybrid adversaries. The IDF noted training exercise. that hybrid organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas, which All that leads to the second insight, namely, that prepa- combine criminal and terror activities along with political, ration for hybrid warfare necessitates that we teach staffs religious and civic roles, seek victory through non-defeat and leaders how to think, not what to think. Prior to 2006, and “disappearance” into the local population. That strat- the IDF had been immersed in irregular warfare and coun- egy has inherent weaknesses that can be exploited. The or- terinsurgency, or COIN, including an 18-year occupation of ganization’s need to hide within the population makes that southern Lebanon. During that time, the IDF lost much of population vulnerable to the kind of retaliation visited on its proficiency in high-end joint operations of the type that the region of southern Lebanon in 2006. Simultaneously, characterized its rapid victories in the Yom Kippur and Six there is a need to protect that host population, to the great- Day wars. It was essentially not prepared for a new emerg- est extent possible, from the ravages of war and to ensure ing scenario in 2006.9 that the people understand where the real problem lies. Engagement in long-term COIN did not prepare the That was Hezbollah’s strategic paradox: By inviting open IDF for the incursion into Lebanon, leading to the conclu-
May-June 2010 11 Preparing for hybrid threats
sion that operational activity is no substitute for training kind of agile command and control necessary to combat against emerging scenarios. The lesson to a force that has adaptive adversaries, if it is not offered the opportunity to constantly been in conflict since October 2001 is obvious think about the problem set. but painful: All that operational experience is potentially Additionally, SOF are rarely the supported elements negated if we do not develop opportunities for “thinking in joint operations and are more often than not seen as through” hypothetical but realistic scenarios of what a hy- enablers instead of as the main effort — a fact somewhat brid adversary might throw at us. inconsistent with the nature of hybrid threats. U.S. con- The third insight on hybrid warfare comes from the ventional forces sometimes have cultural difficulty support- author’s personal interview with an IDF officer in 2006.10 ing SOF. Also, SOF organizations, with very few exceptions, While discussing the relationship between close coopera- do not consistently train to be the supported command. tion and interoperability between SOF and conventional The 2010 QDR notes the need for more supporting and forces and success against hybrid adversaries such as enabling capabilities for SOF, but absent creative thinking Hezbollah, the author asked an Israeli colleague for his on how to employ them and effective command and con- views on the role of leadership in operations involving trol, employment of “enablers, support and sustainment” conventional forces and SOF. The Israeli officer stated capabilities could be sub-optimal in future conflicts. that in the IDF, it is common for conventional units to be Smart people can make the complex sound really subordinated to or directly support a special-operations simple. A professor at the National Defense University once unit, regardless of the rank of the SOF commander. This captured the essence of irregular or hybrid warfare: “Put was particularly true when the SOF unit had been operat- your best plan in place and then play for the breaks.” The ing in the area and knew the population and terrain better problem is, without aggressive training against complex than its conventional counterpart. In the IDF, experience scenarios, staffs and leaders will lack the kind of agility and combat perspective outweighed considerations of necessary to effectively “play for the breaks.” There may be
“The experiences of the IDF in Lebanon are an instructive example of the challenges of dealing with a hybrid or irregular enemy.” rank as deciding factors in determining supporting/sup- a trend in the SOF community similar to one the IDF expe- ported relationships. The Israeli colleague also stated that rienced leading up to 2006: specifically, viewing operational IDF special-operations forces were well-versed in employ- activity as a substitute for training and wargaming against ing conventional units as part of their operations.It seems future scenarios. At the same time, that operational activity that successful leadership against hybrid threats is more constrains SOF from participating in training exercises. a function of experience and knowledge, both cultural and Given the cycle times between deployments to Iraq and geographic knowledge, than it is a matter of rank. Afghanistan, there is no room for new training programs. So what can be gleaned from these insights and turned Also, programs like joint mission-readiness exercises do into actionable recommendations? It would be easy at this not provide optimum training experiences for SOF leaders point to dismiss some of these observations by noting the and staff teams. SOF presence in those programs normally differences between the IDF and the U.S. Department of consists of “response cells” focused on the integration of Defense. The IDF is smaller, with different strategic consider- SOF and conventional forces. A force-preparation experi- ations that come from being surrounded by enemies and hav- ence that builds staff proficiency in complex problem- ing a lack of strategic depth, a reliance on its reserves for ma- solving is missing. Finally, exercising SOF as a supported jor operations, etc. Conventional wisdom might say that there command may sound like a minor consideration, but if is nothing to be learned from the IDF because of its inherent in future conflicts SOF are called into a lead role, they differences in size, make-up and strategic focus. However, if may be poorly prepared to employ the wide array of joint there is genuine concern over “what next after Afghanistan,” enablers available and needed for victory. That will likely there is one potential challenge in the SOF community that require cultural as well as operational innovation. “Who’s can be addressed, based on the IDF’s experiences. in charge” makes a difference. Current joint-training programs do not adequately train While this problem is in itself complex, the following leaders and teams to think adaptively under pressure in recommended actions could be undertaken now to help regard to dealing with future hybrid threats and adversar- improve force preparation for hybrid threats. ies. Joint training is often focused on the process, not on The first recommendation is that we develop a joint- problem-solving. As a result, the joint force could lack the training working group as part of the Global Synchroniza-
12 Special Warfare tion Conference, or GSC, hosted by the U.S. Special Opera- tions Command approximately every six months. It is a true global forum, during which participants discuss strat- egies for dealing with current problem areas and formulate solutions. The GSC audience includes combatant com- mands, or COCOMs; theater special-operations commands, or TSOCs; other government agencies; and allied partners. A GSC joint-training working group could be focused on identifying best training practices and opportunities, and on developing a broad community approach to training. A second recommendation is to add wargaming to the force-preparation toolbox, particularly for the TSOCs. As the operational SOF entity in each COCOM, TSOCs have an inordinately high operational tempo. While training ex- ercises provide some means for gaining proficiency in prob- lem-solving, rarely do TSOCs have the ability to “wargame” their potential strategies and test assumptions about their own theater and operational plans. As we move into the realm of steady-state irregular warfare, TSOC theater plans need to be wargamed to determine a potential steady-state demand signal for both SOF and conventional forces. In recognition of the fact that conventional-force capabilities are needed for steady-state IW, TSOC wargames would be better identified as “subordinate unified command” wargames. The intent would be to provide the TSOCs with a forum, prepared and executed by an outside supporting helping hand U.S. Marines help evacuate American citizens from the beach in Lebanon onto a landing craft. U.S. Navy photo. agency, in which they could build proficiency in complex problem-solving while also building an understanding of Notes: the joint functional requirements necessary for addressing 1 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88. hybrid-warfare contingencies. 2 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, February 2010, A related recommendation would be to pursue develop- (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2010), 8. 3 ment of immersive training simulations that would enable Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 52, 1st Quarter 2009, 34, available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/ TSOC and SOF-unit staffs to take advantage of available i52/9.pdf. training time in small blocks in order to build proficiency. 4 Hoffman, 34. These simulations could be configured to push staffs to 5 The initial IDF incursion into Lebanon was in retaliation for the ambushing and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. See “2nd Lebanon War”: http://www.zionism-israel.com/dic/ the limit against “virtual” adversaries, providing the kind Second_Lebanon_war.htm. of stresses that are not practical in larger exercises. This 6 Max Boot, “The Second Lebanon War,” Council on Foreign Relations, at http://www.cfr. capability would be intended to provide training capabili- org/publication/11363/second_lebanon_war.html. 7 ties “to the edge,” for use when and where unit leaders Haartz Staff: “The main findings of the Winograd report on the 2nd Lebanon War,” at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/854051.html. find time available. The U.S. Joint Forces Command’s 8 Toni O’Laughlin, “Israel mounts PR campaign to blame Hamas for Gaza destruction,” Small Group Scenario Trainer is an example of this kind of in The Guardian, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/28/israel-gaza-hamas. emerging technology. 9 Boot and Haartz Staff. We know that we are engaged in a protracted conflict 10 Author interview with IDF officer, 12 October 2006. and that our adversaries will continue to adapt and find new William Fleser is director of plans, policy and integration ways of exploiting our weaknesses. The experiences of the in the Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command. IDF in Lebanon are an instructive example of the challenges During more than 30 years of service to the Department of of dealing with a hybrid or irregular enemy. What is per- Defense, he has served in Infantry and Special Forces bil- haps more instructive are the improvements the IDF made lets, including assignments to the 1st and 3rd battalions of between Lebanon and Gaza to institutionalize advancements the 10th SF Group. His joint special-operations experience in its capabilities: rigorous analysis, application of lessons includes four years at Special Operations Command-Europe, learned, wargaming of new approaches and the addition of from which he retired in 2001. Since joining USJFCOM, he new training programs. As a result, they out-adapted Hamas has worked in future-concept development, in homeland in Gaza. Making institutional changes to force-preparation defense and in SOCJFCOM. He is a 2007 graduate of the turns out to be one of the key ways to out-think, out-adapt National War College. He welcomes feedback to this article and out-fight our hybrid adversaries. directed to: [email protected].
May-June 2010 13 PersistEnt Engagement Civil Military Support Elements Operating in CENTCOM by Major Ross F. Lightsey Sr.
14 Special Warfare May-June 2010 15 PERsistent engagement
In ongoing irregular conflicts, other U.S. agencies. Teams also share • Country and regional analysis the civil-military support element, information with and facilitate the courses. or CMSE, is a unique resource that efforts of international organizations • Government financial and resource provides military commanders and and nongovernmental organizations, support familiarization. United States ambassadors in various or NGOs, that are involved in building CMSEs throughout the CENTCOM regions and countries with a means host-nation capacities. CMSEs provide region can be expected to work auton- of conducting decisive military-to- much-needed interagency support omously. That requires a high degree civilian engagements. Within the area to the on-ground commanders. It of professionalism, maturity and a of responsibility, or AOR, of the U.S. is a complicated and complex mis- keen sense of situational understand- Central Command, or CENTCOM, sion, and CMSE teams are receiving ing of the environment. A CMSE must strategic leaders are employing this vi- national-level attention as the conduit be able to adapt very quickly in an tal tool to synchronize and unify joint, for the civil-engagement effort. uncertain environment. Environments interagency, intergovernmental and range from fully permissive to nonper- multinational civic actions. CMSE concept missive — and all these environments The new national civil-engage- The CMSE concept is a non- can occur within the same country if ment strategy seeks to establish doctrinal approach for addressing it has a high degree of contention. relationships and an enduring a nondoctrinal enemy. Irregular CMSEs do indeed meld into the presence in areas of interest and to warfare, or IW,1 calls for a system- populace extremely well, as the teams assist partner nations in building a atic process that includes efforts are trained to operate independently, capacity for recognizing and deny- throughout the DoD; DoS; United but securely. However, when security ing terrorist safe-havens around the States Agency for International situations are tense, CMSE operations globe. The 95th Civil Affairs Bri- Development, or USAID; NGOs and can extend beyond the reach of our gade, recently activated within the partner nations. The CMSE concept nonmilitary partners. With the CMSE U.S. Army Special Operations Com- is simple: SOF engage high-priority level of training, maturity and deploy- mand, or USASOC, supports a key countries separately, but collectively, ment background, an embassy’s re- component of the new strategy: the they conduct multiple security-and- gional security officer, or RSO, is usu- Civil Military Engagement Program, support engagement initiatives; such ally amicable in allowing movement. or CMEP. as infrastructural assessments, hu- CMSEs always work closely with RSOs The strategy of persistent engage- manitarian assistance, educational throughout these regions — regard- ment is a worldwide effort to provide programs and health programs. less, there are undoubtedly multiple support from Civil Affairs, or CA, to Working with embassy country risks involved with operating amid an the combatant commanders through teams and TSOCs, CMSE teams uncertain population with limited as- five theater special-operations com- assess and analyze civic infrastruc- surance of security and safety. mands: Special Operations Com- tures, identify critical requirements Where other interagency sup- mand-Central, or SOCCENT; Special for governance, determine critical civil port structures are forbidden access, Operations Command-Europe; Spe- capabilities and examine targeted CMSE members are typically allowed cial Operations Command-Pacific; countries’ overall vulnerabilities. As to conduct assignments, such as Special Operations Command-Africa; the common link to all these entities, infrastructural assessments, key- and Special Operations Command- the CMSE seeks to combine their ef- leader engagements, humanitarian South. forts into a universal strategy — and assistance and civil reconnaissance. Building on its extensive knowl- to mitigate redundancy and overlap- CMSEs may be differently configured edge derived from supporting com- ping of projects and initiatives. based upon mission requirements, bined joint special-operations task To accomplish its mission, a CMSE but a typical CMSE is composed of forces, or CJSOTFs, in Iraq, Afghani- needs to have extensive training and 2-6 CA-trained personnel who can be stan and the Philippines over the experience,2 including: configured in modules, is tailored to past eight years, the 95th CA Brigade • Cross-cultural experience and the country and mission, and provides trains, equips and deploys CMSE training. persistent, long-term engagement to teams that currently support op- • Foreign-language training. high-priority countries. erations in 23 countries. The CMSE • Dialogue, mediation and negotia- The CMEP is part of a long-term mission is intended to fuse efforts tions training. strategy that calls for a concerted logis- of the Department of State, or DoS; • Joint-interagency [NGO, DoS, tics effort, including embassy housing, Department of Defense, or DoD; and DoD] operational experience. office space, vehicle requirements, a
16 Special Warfare GROUND TRUTH Civil Affairs Soldiers talk with Tajik villagers about improvements to infrastructure. U.S. Army photo. communications base and an opera- CMSEs must collaborate. According team serves as the link between the tional platform at an embassy. A CMEP to Ambassador Robert Oakley, “The humanitarian and developmental is different from a standard six-week country team must work with unified strategies that it executes as part of joint combined exchange training, or purpose. … The country team builds a country team and the objectives of JCET, as JCETs are episodic in na- the American image abroad and the U.S. government. That combined ture. JCET missions do in fact engage implements strategy.”4 DoD/DoS strategy is termed the mis- countries and partner-nation forces; CMSEs and country teams are cur- sion performance plan, or MPP5 — and however, JCETs do not provide a con- rently engaging contentious regions it includes the CMSE, the forward tinual presence in any given country. A within the Middle East and in central commander and the USAID. Though JCET’s intent is to obtain or give train- Asia other than Iraq and Afghani- the MPP varies from one country to ing, whereas a CMSE is focused on stan. We must engage these countries another, it sums up the overarching partner-nation requirements. CMSEs because the enemy is reaching out to requirement to be the civic conduit demand a degree of funding and effort those neighboring regions. between multiple elements. through DoD channels, and the 95th Examples of CMSE key tasks: CA Brigade resources its CMSE mis- CMSE mission • Build capacity of local leadership, sion through the U.S. Special Opera- The CMSE mission is to provide military and regional key players. tions Command, or USSOCOM.3 civil-military planning and execution • Conduct key leader engagements The country team is one of the as part of a larger spectrum of joint or — face-to-face dialogues with the most integral partners with whom country-team operations. The CMSE populace.
May-June 2010 17 PERsistent engagement
STRAIGHT TALK A Civil Affairs Soldier talks with a construction worker about ongoing work at a facility. U.S. Army photo.
• Legitimize local governance Nonkinetic strategy however, the need for the indirect through programs and humanitar- In a 2009 article in Foreign Affairs, application of tangible infrastructural ian assistance. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates resources and governance incentives • Gather critical infrastructural in- said, “Where possible, what the mili- has received greater attention — and formation to determine civil tary calls kinetic operations should the need is growing. vulnerabilities. be subordinate to measures aimed at For example, during the combat • Collaborate with USAID and devel- promoting better governance, econom- surge in Iraq in 2007, General David opmental organizations. ic programs that spur development, Petreaus said, “We employed non- • Maintain positive relations through and efforts to address the grievances kinetic means to exploit the opportu- interaction, media information and among the disconnected, from whom nities provided by the conduct of our local events. the terrorists recruit.”6 kinetic operations.”7 In a televised • Support the ambassador’s public- His statement represents the interview in September 2009, Gen- diplomacy mission. purpose of the CA methodology to eral Stanley McChryrstal alluded to • Build enhanced engagement into engage the populace and determine Gates’s article, saying that efforts the civil structure. the population’s needs first, much like need to shift away from kinetic opera- • Develop enhanced governance and the MPP. A CMSE takes this approach tions toward nonkinetic operations for spur economic growth. and applies nonkinetic, or nonlethal, a new strategy in Afghanistan.8 • Facilitate interagency synchroni- strategies that are developed at the In the article, the Secretary of De- zation with DoS, DoD, NGOs and TSOC level. There will always be a fense talked about “elevating measures partner nations. need for direct combat operations; that were previously thought to only
18 Special Warfare reside in Department of State.” What will ignore, malign or abuse, result- manager, but one dual-hatted with he meant to convey is the idea that it is ing in the likely collapse of the state. mayoral duties in his region. He is far better economically to engage and We cannot always force the “carrot” responsible for anything that occurs develop the governance of a nation- onto one of the rogue countries that in his region, regardless of the town state that may be on verge of collapse is not aligned with normal economic or village. When the CMSE team con- than to invade it with multiple brigade prosperity, way-of-life fundamentals ducts a project, everything is done by combat teams. The adage, “An ounce of and human-rights awareness. There or with the local leaders. The funding prevention is worth a pound of cure,” are a handful of countries that neither comes from DoD; however, our taking may be applied in this scenario. Is it respect nor desire a more pleasant ap- credit would hinder the overall strat- more efficient to build or to destroy proach to international diplomacy — egy of legitimizing the local leaders. and then have to rebuild? Economical- they react more to the “stick” aspect of The CMSE team nominates, and then ly speaking: sending CMSEs to a coun- diplomacy. manages, the project through various try, along with governmental programs, Regardless, when nation-states contractors and in conjunction with at a cost of several million U.S. dollars, accept U.S. governmental and military the hukumat. When it comes to com- is a small price to pay and more effi- efforts, we can measure the benefits pleting a project during a re-opening cient than sending five brigade combat of employing CMSE, USAID and other event, efforts are made to ensure teams later on to quell an all-out civil aid organizations. If the populace has that media are present and that the war. Conducting military intervention a distinct infrastructural requirement, local leadership takes credit. This is can cost U.S. taxpayers billions. If we then let’s address what is needed. not putting a “Tajik face” on an ef- are speaking of the human equation, That is not to say that we are engaged fort — such a term is insolent. The continued large-scale military interven- in winning hearts and minds. A strat- CMSE team ensures that the Tajik tion through kinetic operations can egy of winning the hearts and minds contractors have coordinated with the cost thousands of servicemembers’ of the people in contentious regions various school districts, who in turn lives. does not work — for we will never win have organized involvement with the It is difficult to measure nonkinetic their hearts or their minds — but we hukumats. efforts and deliverables from just one can gain their trust and confidence Responsibility and liability are year, but they may have to be mea- that the U.S. government will do the placed upon the Tajiks, with respect sured over several years. The lack right thing at the right time. to quality control, productivity, stan- of warfare may be a basic measure- dards, equal opportunity and effi- ment of effectiveness. For example, CMSE efforts in central Asia ciency. The multiple projects were not the widespread Ethiopian famine and CMSE operations in Tajikistan are unilateral and included collaboration internal strife from the early 1970s a good example of our current strategy and synchronization with the efforts and mid-1980s were eventually cured in the CENTCOM AOR. Tajikistan has of USAID and the U.S. Embassy’s through the infusion of millions of had its full share of discord and con- country team. Therefore, a solid mea- U.S. dollars in aid programs and en- flict, with civil wars, famine and a pre- surement of effectiveness is a notable hanced governance agendas.9 viously corrupt governance. The char- increase in the respect the district’s Objectively, there still exists some ter of the CMSE team in Tajikistan is populace had for its leaders, as well as instability in Ethiopia, however, that to build upon the current educational a notable increase in the government’s country is now one of the strongest and health systems. From 2008-2009, accountability to its people. The members of the African Union and has in a nine-month rotation, the CMSE CMSE team derived these measure- a well-trained military. Ethiopia has team in Tajikistan renovated three ments through “atmospherics,” which come a very long way in the course hospitals, refurbished four schools, require the team to engage the local of more than 20 years, thanks to a restored an orphanage, rebuilt water populace and gain valuable feedback. long-term, nonkinetic NGO/USAID pump stations and hosted a medical Obtaining an objective temperature of approach that averted sending thou- civic-action program. the populace is critical for determining sands of U.S. troops to the region. So how have these engagements success or shortcomings. “Correlation does not mean causality”; brought us closer to stability in Tajik- CMSEs across the CENTCOM AOR however, it is safe to say that applied istan? That can be measured through conduct projects and atmospherics building programs from USAID and the increased involvement and not for their own sake but to achieve DoD can indeed stabilize a region. interest of local leaders. Throughout the long-term intent. Random proj- Unfortunately, there are incen- Tajikistan, the district head is a hu- ects could actually be detrimental in tives that many near-failing states kumat — the equivalent of our county the long term. The goal is not to build
May-June 2010 19 PERsistent engagement
a school, but to build a community organizations can attest to the civil members from the USAID, the DoS, that is involved in the school and closeness that is achieved through the Pakistani military, local maliks, responsible for it. A school is simply a this type of engagement. According to political agents and the CMSE. There building with four walls, desks, chairs one SOCCENT tactical commander, were unmistakable positive indica- and books. However, a school with a “The CMSE projects continue to be tors in the increased willingness of community involves teachers, parents, the primary vehicle for getting to the local Pakistani leaders to take civil managers, faculty, principals, ac- population. … We have been able to action and to become more involved countability and standards in student engage with the local population and in the establishment of reconstruction testing. Building an accountable com- maliks during these missions, which teams. Undoubtedly, there is much munity is the long-term intent. has allowed us to learn more about room for improvement in Pakistan, The results of our efforts determine the tribes and their needs.” and the CMSE approach will surely our success, not the dollar amount Using the same strategy as in result in continued measurable ben- spent. Many governmental accoun- Tajikistan, the CMSE makes all efforts efits. A more concerted nonkinetic ef- tants get fixated on the dollar amount to ensure that local maliks, police, fort in Pakistan will avert total military of aid programs and lose sight of the military commanders and the com- involvement in that critical region. intent. It is easy for CA practitio- munity as a whole are heavily involved ners to get absorbed in the physical in taking care of the people’s needs. CMSE efforts in Yemen project, as well, but Soldiers must Again, the CMSE team takes a back The CMSE team in Yemen was continually take a step back and ask seat during the process and ensures established in the spring of 2009. Be- themselves whether they are keeping that the existing governance or tribal cause it is relatively new to the area,
“The new national civil-engagement strategy seeks to establish relationships and an enduring presence in areas of interest and to assist partner nations in building a capacity for recognizing and denying terrorist safe-havens around the globe.” the overall goal to the forefront. leaders get full credit. the Yemeni government is ensuring In Pakistan, the CMSE efforts Ultimately, we have to assess ob- that security measures are emplaced were, to some extent, similar to jective measurements of effectiveness. prior to all engagements. Tight securi- those in Tajikistan. Despite the fact For example, the enhanced, positive ty thus limits movement outside of the that both are central Asian states, relations with local media are clearly capital city, Sana’a. The CMSE team however, the angle of approach was evidenced by the dozens of articles in Yemen ventures throughout Sana’a somewhat different: CMSE efforts in and news interviews that show the to engage the populace and is heavily Pakistan were mainly humanitarian- Pakistani government and military in involved with the interaction and col- assistance in nature. Pakistan is a favorable light. Additionally, maliks laboration with USAID, Yemenia’ Joint fraught with internal conflict, and are more involved at humanitarian- Venture, local civil governments and open civic projects are difficult. Se- assistance sites, evidence that they multiple NGOs. curity is paramount there, and the are taking a more positive control over One of the CMSE’s most promis- CMSE team was continually accompa- the distribution of aid and full man- ing accomplishments so far has been nied by local military elements. agement of the populace. working with USAID to assist in the The CMSE team in Pakistan is Another effort that the CMSE team long-term engagement and develop- one of the most efficient U.S. gov- focused on was the development of ment strategies. One of the CMSE ernment maneuver elements that a civil-military coordination cell, or team members attended a Yemen conducts projects through physical CMCC, which increased the effective- strategy conference in Cairo, which coordination. The CMSE team is on ness of government institutions and opened a number of opportunities for the ground, conducting face-to-face exercised responsibility and account- sharing collective plans for the devel- coordination with the region’s leaders ability among the civil structures opment of the Yemeni economy. USAID (termed maliks) for humanitarian- attempting to rebuild the war-torn re- also invited the CMSE to work with the aid projects, school projects, well gions. The CMSE initiated the CMCCs political and economic advisers during projects, playgrounds, etc. Very few as a type of forum that included the interagency design team conference
20 Special Warfare RIGHT DIRECTION A Civil Affairs Soldier conducts a needs assessment at a Tajik Hospital. U.S. Army photo. in Sana’a. The CMSE has also worked factions or rogue nation-states. CMSE advantage if it is used correctly. with USAID’s Basic Education and operations can assist the political and • Military. The U.S. military cur- Skills Training, which allowed the team irregular-warfare battle by tapping rently dominates any head-to-head to engage educational leaders in Sana’a into all four DIME principles: operations by conventional forces. and determine the locations, types and • Diplomacy. CMSE teams are While CMSEs do not engage in any sizes of schools throughout Yemen. trained in international relations, combat operations, their military That type of data is critical to identify- cross-cultural relationships and training and experience give them ing civil vulnerabilities. It also allowed mediation between factions. The the ability to interact with foreign the CMSE to propose projects and get mere fact that American CMSE military forces and to teach or to educational leaders’ recommendations teams hold dialogues with foreign take the lead in basic CMO with on the best sites for providing educa- states and conduct grass-roots as- partner nations. tional support. sessments is, itself, diplomacy. • Economic. When used efficiently, • Informational. CMSEs can best CMSEs, USAID and other govern- Supporting the DIME principle be used in the course of successful mental programs can have an in- Members of DoD and DoS are information operations aimed at the fluence in enlivening and reviving familiar with the DIME principle10 — local populace. In the Middle East local economies. Again, we must that diplomatic, informational, mili- and central Asia, most ideological be careful to remember that while tary and economic factors can be used views are formed through word-of- money can be a tool, the dollar to affect and engage other nation- mouth interaction rather than pub- amount spent is not a measure- states or even to influence recognized lished media, which can work to our ment of effectiveness.
May-June 2010 21 PERsistent engagement
grand opening The U.S. Ambassador to Tajikistan (in blue scarf) is on hand for the opening of a new orphanage. U.S. Army photo.
Human terrain upon those relationships, who will? insurgents are providing sustenance It is crucial that CMSE teams, as Al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents to the populace and our partner well as the company-level civil-mil- surely know the importance of main- nation is not, then the insurgents itary operations center, conduct an taining interpersonal connections appear to be compassionate. Basic analysis of the human terrain prior with the local populace. CMSE teams needs for sustenance have to be to deploying to areas such as the are keenly aware of the importance met by someone, something or some Middle East. Knowing the intended of interpersonal relationships and, organization. It is not in anyone’s audience in Pakistan and the way at times, must put themselves in the best interest to have our sworn the tribal community is organized, mindset of a central Asian or Middle enemies supporting the very people for example, is critical to overall Eastern layman. with whom we are trying to partner, mission success. because of bonding and the strings Power in central Asia and the Conclusion that may be attached by terrorists. Middle East moves through interper- Franklin D. Roosevelt said, “True Therefore, we must take action in sonal relationships. We have a similar individual freedom cannot exist these contentious regions to ensure system, sometimes called the “good without economic security and in- that our allied governments are ‘ole boy” system. Regardless of how dependence. People who are hun- responsible, willing and capable of we view the system, we still must ac- gry and out of a job are the stuff of providing the people’s needs. cept the fact that it is the way certain which dictatorships are made.” With SOF CMSE teams are very re- societies operate. And if we don’t build that said, if al-Qaeda and Taliban sourceful in providing flexibility
22 Special Warfare and a nation. A newly built town hall is merely a physical structure — our goal is to get the people to respect their elected officials, and for those officials to bear responsibility. Those actions will ultimately provide stabil- ity in the region, fostering coopera- tive prosperity, freedom of trade, individual property rights, rule of law, equal justice and international economic globalization.
Notes: 1 Irregular Warfare, http://www. dtic.mil/whs/directiyes/corres/ pdf/300007p.pdf. 2 Also refer to Civil Affairs Quali- fication Course curriculum, JFK Special Warfare Center and School, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, Fort Bragg, N.C., 2007. 3 Major Force Program-11, SOF Programming, Special Operations Command. 4 Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr., “The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First Line of Engagement,” Joint Forces Quarterly, issue 47, 4th Quarter 2007. 5 See USAID Mission Perfor- HOSPITAL CALL A Civil Affairs team inspects a local hospital during a needs assessment. mance Plan, FY 2004-2009,
May-June 2010 23 Back to his Roots
by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe and Dr. Troy J. Sacquety
case study Lieutenant General Sher Mohammad Karimi observes a class at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. U.S. Army photo.
Lieutenant General Sher Moham- intelligence-officer training and the Nations High Commissioner for mad Karimi, the chief of operations National Defense College. Refugees shortly before 9/11, Karimi for the Afghanistan National Army, Following his foreign-military chose to remain in Pakistan to await or ANA, returned to his special- training in the 1970s, Karimi re- the outcome of the American effort operations roots at Fort Bragg, N.C., turned to Afghanistan to serve in to topple the Taliban regime. That Feb. 10-11. what became a communist-domi- proved to be a wise decision. Karimi attended the United States nated Afghan army. After the coup Faced with a dearth of experi- Army Special Warfare School, the of 1978 and the Soviet invasion in enced professional officers to lead forerunner of today’s JFK Special 1979, he was imprisoned for having conventional brigades and divisions, Warfare Center and School, in 1973 a Western education. After enduring the Afghan government realized the as a student in the Special Forces 15 months of torture and captivity in necessity of restoring Soviet-trained Qualification Course. The Special a 6-foot-by-6-foot cell with four other former officers to command posi- Warfare School was only one of a men, sharing a single blanket in win- tions. Those with the formal military number of international military ter, Karimi, by then severely crippled, training, experience and leadership schools Karimi attended. Follow- was released. Despite the ordeal and skills necessary to command bri- ing his graduation from the Military his physical condition, Karimi was gades and divisions were rare com- Academy in Kabul, he attended the not discharged from service and was modities. Karimi was recalled to ac- Royal Military Academy at Sand- denied retirement pay. After two tive service in 2003 as the ANA G3, hurst, United Kingdom, and was its years of recuperation, during which where his expertise was put to the first Afghan graduate. After train- time he worked with the communist test in increasing the Afghan Army ing in Great Britain, he came to military, Karimi elected to assist the from 100,000 to 172,000 by the fall the United States, where he com- mujahedeen in driving the Soviets of 2011 as part of the U.S.-led coali- pleted Airborne, Ranger and Special out of Afghanistan. When the Taliban tion exit strategy. Forces training and attended the seized power, Karimi and his family The need to balance Afghani- Army Command and General Staff fled to Pakistan. Though granted asy- stan’s two major ethnic groups was College. In India, he attended the lum in the U.S. through the United another reason for Karimi’s recall.
24 Special Warfare Karimi, like Lieutenant General the border of the Nangarhar rebuilding and creating a sound Mohammad Akram, who headed Province. It was the first of six administration, so that security the communist Afghan Army’s tripartite coordination centers measures can move parallel to southern regional command planned along the Afghanistan- reconstruction. We need to win in the early 1990s, is from the Pakistan border. The commander the people’s hearts and minds, Tanaie tribe of ethnic Pashtuns of the Pakistani XI Corps, Lieu- because as one of our proverbs in southern and eastern Af- tenant General Masood Aslam, goes, ‘You cannot build communi- ghanistan, the heartland of the commented: “Both of our coun- ties by force.’ ” Taliban insurgency. The ANA tries have suffered the maximum While Karimi was able to share chief of staff, General Bismullah for the last eight years … and that sage advice with the troops Khan Mohammadi, a former aide we … have been the victims of at Fort Bragg, he was also able to the late mujahedeen leader all types of all terrorism for over to regain some of his documents Ahmad Shah Masood, is Tajik. 30 years.” Karimi joined him that were destroyed while he was The presence of members of both and Major General David Rodri- imprisoned. Lieutenant General groups in the senior ranks helps guez, commander of Regional John Mulholland, commander of reduce perceptions that the ANA Command East in Afghanistan, the U.S. Army Special Operations is dominated by Tajiks, whose in planting three small trees to Command, presented Karimi with militias overthrew the Taliban symbolize the long-term partner- new diplomas from Ranger School with American assistance in ship of Afghans, Pakistanis and and the Special Forces Qualifica- 2001 and currently dominate the international forces. tion Course, as well as a Yarbor- ANA officer corps. The lessons in foreign inter- ough Knife, enabling the general Fluent in Pashtu, Dari and nal defense and development to put some missing pieces of his English, the highly respected, that Karimi learned at Fort Bragg past back together. well-educated Karimi advocates nearly 40 years ago have stuck Dr. Charles H. Briscoe is the national unity. In early 2006, he with him: “Since 2003 and 2004 chief historian for the U.S. Army “raised the flag” about resurgent we have been shouting loudly that Special Operations Command. al-Qaeda and Taliban threats fighting alone will not bring peace. Dr. Troy J. Sacquety is a his- in Afghanistan, citing specific We need to bring about recon- torian for the U.S. Army Special examples of increased terrorism struction for the people … while Operations Command. and drug-trafficking. American SOF in-country faced the reali- ties of that phenomenon, but it was two years before the U.S. and NATO shifted priorities back to Afghanistan from Iraq. Late in 2006, Karimi implored Pakistan to post more troops along the po- rous border to reduce al-Qaeda and Taliban infiltration and to strengthen cross-border coun- terterrorism operations with the Afghan military. Progress toward that end was finally achieved on March 29, 2009, when the Tripartite Commission, composed of mili- tary officers from Afghanistan, Pakistan and coalition forces in Kabul, met to break ground for lost and found Lieutenant General John Mulholland presents Lieutenant General Sher Moham- the construction of the Khyber mad Karimi with diplomas from Ranger School and the Special Forces Qualification Course. U.S. Army Border Coordination Center on photo.
May-June 2010 25 Education Opportunity Board to consider applicants for NPS, ISP The board to consider Soldiers • Must possess a bachelor’s de- of endorsement from the brigade com- in Army special-operations forces for gree from an accredited institution. mander or his representative. attendance at the Naval Postgraduate • Master-sergeant applicants Applications from officers in Military School, or NPS, and the Interagency must have completed 24 months as Intelligence must have a letter of rec- Studies Program, or ISP, will convene a team sergeant. ommendation from the G2 of the U.S. the week of July 12. • Sergeant-major applicants must Army Special Operations Command. NPS is an 18-month program open have completed 12 months as a com- Applications from NCOs must to ARSOF officers, warrant officers pany sergeant major. include a letter of recommendation and NCOs. The school conducts two • Must have remaining enlistment from the applicant’s group command cycles: winter (January start) and equal to or greater than three times sergeant major. summer (June start). Applicants must the length of the requested schooling. ISP application requirements are: Career Notes nOTES Career cAREER specify whether they are applying for a • NCOs will incur a three-year • Obtain transcripts from all educa- winter or summer start. additional service obligation and will tional institutions. ISP is open to commissioned officers be slated by the command sergeant • Submit a copy of the latest officer in Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations major of the U.S. Army Special Op- record brief. and Special Forces. The program, taught erations Command to serve in a key • Submit a letter of recommendation. at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., runs concur- utilization billet following graduation. • Submit copies of the last three rently with Intermediate Level Education NPS application requirements are: evaluation reports. and ends in late July or early August so • Obtain an academic profile code • Submit an essay of 500 words titled, that personnel will arrive at their new as- from NPS. “How Interagency Studies Will Contrib- signments in late summer. • Have an undergraduate grade- ute to My Career Goals and Strengthen Target groups this year for both point average of 2.5 or higher. SOF’s Defense Contributions.” programs are CA and PSYOP officers • Obtain transcripts from all educa- Application packets for both pro- in year groups 1999, 2000 and 2001; tional institutions. grams must be submitted to the JFK SF officers in YGs 1998, 1999 and • Complete DA Form 1618-R. Special Warfare Center and School’s 2000; SF warrant officers in grades • Submit a copy of the latest en- Directorate of Force Management by CWO 3 and CWO 4; and CA, PSYOP listed or officer record brief. June 30; no late packets will be ac- and SF NCOs in the grade of master • Submit a letter of recommendation. cepted. DFM, in coordination with the sergeant and sergeant major, or ser- • Submit copies of the applicant’s Army Human Resources Command, geant first class with a waiver. last three evaluation reports. will determine the applicant’s eligibility. There are some additional consid- SF warrant officers must be in E-mail packets to Jeanne Gold- erations for ARSOF NCOs: grades CWO 3 or CWO 4 and have mann ([email protected]) in PDF or • Must be on active duty. less than two years time in grade. TIF format, or mail them to: Com- • Must have completed the NCO PSYOP officers assigned to the mander; JFK Special Warfare Center educational programs appropriate for 4th PSYOP Group must have a letter and School; ATTN: AOJK-SP (Ms. grade and years of service. of endorsement from the group com- Goldmann); Fort Bragg, NC 28310. • Must not have more than 22 years mander or his representative. For additional information, telephone of active federal service, as of the re- CA officers assigned to the 95th Jeanne Goldmann at DSN 239-6922 port date to the academic institution. Civil Affairs Brigade must have a letter or commercial (910) 432-6922.
SF Warrant Officers Needed for Active, NG Units Special Forces NCOs who seek greater opportunities can apply to become SF warrant officers. Some opportunities available are: • Serving in a direct, ground-combat leadership role as the assistant detachment commander of a detachment. • Spending an average of five additional years on a detachment. • Leading specialized teams in advanced special operations, counterterrorism, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs and other mis- sions, as directed. • Serving in joint, strategic, operational and tactical assignments at all levels of planning and execution of special operations worldwide. • A critical skills accessions bonus of $20,000 for eligible active-duty Soldiers and $10,000 for members of the National Guard. For more information, go to www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant or http://www.1800goguard.com/warrantofficer/warrant.html. Applicants can also get assistance by contacting the unit senior warrant officer or by contacting CWO 3 Bobby Craig in the Director- ate of Force Management: DSN 239-7597, commercial (910) 432-7597, or send e-mail to [email protected].
26 Special Warfare Carnage and culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power In his book, Carnage and Cul- encourages initiative on the battlefield, ture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of free markets lead to technological in- Western Power, Victor Hanson has novation, and democracy (which gives penned a highly readable, although soldiers a stake in the battle’s outcome) sometimes controversial view of the accounts for the West’s preference for Western military tradition as being a ruthless, decisive warfare. direct offshoot of the values inherent The book describes nine battles — in Western civilization. from Salamis in the 490s B.C. to the The central lesson of the book is Tet Offensive in 1968 — that illustrate that the West’s rise to dominance the Western way of war at work. Each was no accident. Hanson contends case study describes the battle and that Western military prowess over attempts to provide reasons for its out- the centuries has been the result come. Hanson’s sources are neither of “larger social, economic, political extensive nor completely up-to-date, and cultural practices that them- but they’re solid and authoritative, Details selves seemingly have little to do with and the case studies are entertaining. war.” He argues that Western na- Though historians and military ex- Victor Hanson tions have “a long-standing Western perts could surely debate the excep- New York: Anchor, 2002. cultural stance toward rationalism, tions and minor details of Hanson’s ISBN: 978-0385720380 (Paper) free inquiry and the dissemination of examples, he generalizes in order to 544 pages. $16.95. knowledge that has its roots in classi- present the underlying fundamental Reviewed by: cal antiquity.” elements with clarity. Indeed, at one Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Petersen Hanson describes important his- point he acknowledges, “Although U.S. Air Force torical battles to present ideas about important exceptions should always Air Land Sea Applications Center the foundation of Western civilization be noted, generalization — so long and its cultural values in contrast avoided by academics out of either to those of Asia, Africa and South fear or ignorance — is indispensable wrong war at the wrong time. But America. The vignettes are employed in the writing of history.” their armies, for the cultural reasons to address overarching issues, such In essence, Hanson’s view is that this book has outlined, fought with a as the reasons why Europeans colo- there is no clearer example of the dif- much greater margin of error than did nized undeveloped areas of the globe. ferences in ideas and values that form their adversaries.” He further contends The author also provides theories as the basis of cultures than in the clash Western armies “enjoyed innate advan- to why Western values now seemingly between East and West on the battle- tages that over the long duration could dominate the world. field. What is clear, however, is that offset the terrible effects of imbecilic Central to the book’s theme are once developed, the West — ancient generalship, flawed tactics, strained the notions of individualism and civic and modern — has placed far fewer supply lines, difficult terrain and infe- militarism — ideas that were developed religious, cultural and political im- rior numbers.” Hanson submits that exclusively in ancient Greece. In fact, pediments to natural inquiry, capital these advantages were immediate and Hanson attempts to relate every facet of formation and individual expression entirely cultural, and that they were history to the ancient Greeks. He con- than have other societies, which often not the product of the genes, germs or tends there is a distinct “Western way were theocracies, centralized palatial geography of a distant past. of war” that began in ancient Greece dynasties or tribal unions. Even if you end up questioning and has brought Western nations vic- Hanson points out, “Western some of Hanson’s conclusions, you will tory over non-Western ones ever since. armies in Africa, Asia and the Ameri- not easily dismiss the strength of his The essential features of Western war- cas, as soldiers everywhere, were ideas. Overall, the book is a worthwhile fare, Hanson argues, are deeply rooted often annihilated — often lead by fools read, and the points it makes are infor- in Western culture. Individualism and placed in the wrong place in the mative and thought-provoking.
May-June 2010 27 Department of the Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School ATTN: AOJK-DTD-MP 2175 Reilly Road, Stop A Fort Bragg, NC 28310
This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited • Headquarters, Department of the Army • PB 80-10-3
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