University of South Carolina Scholar Commons Theses and Dissertations 2018 What Makes Killing for Organs Wrong? A Philosophical Defense of the ‘Dead Donor’ Rule Adam Omelianchuk University of South Carolina Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Omelianchuk, A.(2018). What Makes Killing for Organs Wrong? A Philosophical Defense of the ‘Dead Donor’ Rule. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/4610 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. What Makes Killing for Organs Wrong? A Philosophical Defense of the ‘Dead Donor’ Rule by Adam Omelianchuk Bachelor of Science University of Northwestern, 2009 Master of Arts Biola University, 2013 Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences University of South Carolina 2018 Accepted by: Christopher O. Tollefsen, Major Professor Jennifer A. Frey, Committee Member George Khushf, Committee Member Jeffrey P. Bishop, Committee Member Cheryl L. Addy, Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School Copyright © 2018 by Adam Omelianchuk All rights reserved. ii Abstract The purpose of my dissertation is to give a philosophic defense of the so-called “dead donor” rule (DDR) in transplant ethics, something that is sorely lacking in the current literature on the topic. Part of my project is concerned with the rule’s correct formulation: What exactly does it forbid? I answer that it is primarily concerned with prohibiting the killing of the donor for his or her organs, and that it need not be concerned with requiring that the donor be dead before surgery begins (as important as that might be).