Operation Askari

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Operation Askari Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 22, Nr 4, 1992. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za OPERATION ASKARI (A SUB-COMMANDER'S RETROSPECTIVE VIEW OF THE OPERATION) Brig R.S. Lord* INTRODUCTION For many years, up to the spring of 1983, this had been the pattern of the By 1983 the war in SWA/Angola had conduct of the war. A summer incur- developed a predictable cyclical pat- sion by SWAPO PLAN and a semi-con- tern. The seasonal variations allowed ventional/convential offensive by Se- SWAPO to take up the offensive during curity forces into Angola during the the summer passage of the Inter-tropi- winter. cal Convergence zone (ITCZ) across Northern South West Africa. The ITCZis The military results of these activities that low pressure belt of unstable moist were overwhelmingly in the favour of air, that traverses southwards to the the security forces, as can be deduced latitude of Rehoboth during late Octo- from the following table of Operational ber and November and returns north- losses: wards across Owamboland in late January through to April. The passage YEAR SWAPO SECURITYFORCES of this belt gives rise to the phenom- enon of the "small rains" before Christ- 1981 1494 61 mas and the "big rains" from February 1982 1280 77 to April. 1983 913 96 The rainy season gave mobility to the The economic and socio-political ef- SWAPO insurgents. It supplied the wa- fects on South West Africa and the ter they required for their trek to the SADF were however appreciable. To south. The foliage on the trees and counter an insurgency requires the de- bushes provided concealment from ployment of a large number of forces, the security forces. The very heavy in the ratio of about 1 insurgent to 8 rains washed out the tracks they had security force personnel. The direct left, making follow-up difficult and cost factor is therefore considerable, they criss-crossed the full shonas to in- as is the insidious effect of keeping crease the difficulties of the trackers. able bodied men out of the economic Therefore, the SWAPO insurgency, usu- work force. An additional factor was ally commenced in late January of the war weariness of the population. every new year and continued until The war had become so predictable the end of April, or early May, when that it was difficult to foresee how this the water started to dry up. process of violence could be halted. The onset of the dry season brought In an attempt to surprise the enemy about a change in the tactical situa- and to alter the pattern of predictabil- tion. SWAPO withdrew its forces to ity, Operation Askari was planned .. bases in Angola for the so-called "re- Bearing in mind the difficulties of mo- hearsals" - the regrouping and retrain- bile operations in the wet season, it ing of their members, prior to the next was decided that Askari would be a year's incursion. With Swapo concen- semi-conventional operation using trated in bases, it became cost-effec- conventional arms against Swapo Plan, tive for the SADF/SWATFto launch of- while they were still massed in their fensive operations into Angolan training bases before the start of their territory during the dry winter months. 1984 insurgency campaign. The timing The mobility of vehicles in the torrential of the operation proper was therefore rains of summer was always consid- set to commence just after the "little ered a restricting factor. rains" in mid-December 1983. Milifaria 22/4 7992 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 22, Nr 4, 1992. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za PLANNING e. Security forces must maintain the initiative. The planning for Askari was conceived f. An infiltration during 1984 must and carried out at the HQ Sector 10 at simply not take place. Not even Oshakati under the guidance of Brig J. 10 terrorists must successfully infil- Joubert for the ground forces and Col trate.2 R.S. Lord for the Air plan.] From con- ception the plan was a joint plan, with The SAAF aims for Askari were as fol- the air involvement being in support of lows: the ground forces objectives. The overall aim of the operation was "to a. To gain and maintain a favour- prevent a Swapo special forces infiltra- able air situation over Cahama- tion to the South". The operation had Mulondo-Cuvelai. to begin in Nov 1983. b. To prevent the expansion of en- Among the general guidelines were emy air defence capabilities in the following: the Mulondo-Quiteve-Cuvelai ar- eas. a. The enemy must be stopped ex- ternally. c. To expand the SAAF interdiction programme: b. Deep reconnaissance coupled to i. Up to Chibemba. offensive actions must be com- menced at an early stage. ii. North of Mulondo. c. Maximum use of mobile elments iii. Up to Cassinga. for follow-ups must be made. d. Extend Maanskyn (Impala night d. Security forces must operate pro- operations) north of the 150 km actively, not re-actively. line. ANGOLA: 5 MILITARYREGION ] This plan should have been initiated at the strategic level of planning. ie Army/Air Force HQ in Pretoria. It should have been part of the SADF military strategy. which in turn should have evolved out of the national strategy. 2 In retrospect this guideline was totaily impracticai and shouid therefore not have been included. 2 Militaria 22/4 /992 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 22, Nr 4, 1992. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za e. Preference was to be given to on Caiundo was completely removed joint attacks on SWAPOtargets.3 from the plan. The plan was divided into four phases: After all the discussions and alterations Askari was approved, to the relief of a, Phase 1. Deep reconnaissance everyone present. At that stage every- by Special Forces followed by a body was glad to be able to come SAAF attack on the "Typhoon" / away with the authority to go ahead. I Volcano" base close to Lubango did not realise it at the time, but nei- between 1 November and 30 De- ther did the twelve Generals and one cember 1983. Admiral, that what had started life as a joint plan, was now no longer a bal- b. Phase 2. Offensive reconnais- anced joint plan. What should have sance/isolation of Cahama, Mu- happened was that we should have londo and Cuvelai from 16 No- gone "back to the drawing board" vember to mid January 1983. The and rehashed the situation to once aim being, to cut enemy commu- more come up with a joint plan. This nication and logistic lines in the was a vital lesson. deep area and to terrorise and demoralise Fapla to such an ex- RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES tent that they would withdraw. PHASES 1 AND 2 While I do not intend to go into detail c. Phase 3. To establish a domi- about all the involvement of the "Rec- nated area from west of the ces", there are a few points that need Cunene River, through Quiteve, to be brought up. It must be stated Mupa, Vinticet, eastwards from the outset, that ASKARIcalled for through londe, by the beginning the largest Recce effort of the war. A of Feb 1984. total of five teams of varying sizes were deployed. They were deployed west d. Phase 4. The final stopping of the of Cahama, east of Cahama, in the vi- incursion, internally if necessary. cinity of Mulondo, in the outskirts of Cuvelai and were also tasked to rec- PLAN APPROVAL onnoitre the Lubango area. The joint Army/Air Force plan was pre- These teams provided the tactical in- sented to GOC SWA and OC Western telligence on which the battle plans Air Command and approved without were made and in general performed major alterations. It was then pre- a difficult task well. The command and sented at Army HQ to the Chief of the control of these teams was however a Defence Force. Present in the audi- bit of a problem from the Air Force ence that day were 12 Generals plus point of view. Each team operated as one Admiral. At the presentation the a separate entity. Each team had its Army plan was accepted in toto. The own tactical HQ at Xangongo - but Air plan however, was only accepted each in a separate locality. The Air after much discussion and much al- Force had provided a Mobile Air Op- teration. The reason for the changes erations Team (MAOT) to be co-lo- being made are not open for discus- cated with the Army HQ at Xangongo. sion - but the fact remains that the Air Air support which had been promised plan was altered.4 Limits and restric- to each of the recce teams was thus tions were placed on the employment disjointed .. The problem that could of the aircraft, which did not co-incide have arisen was one of priorities. If all with the limits of action of the ground the teams were in trouble, who would forces. In addition the deception strike decide on the priority for air support? 3 An additional Air Force aim was a night strike by Impalas on Caiundo. Although the FAPLA garrison stationed there was no real threat to our planned operation. the idea was to sow confusion in the minds of the FAPLA high command as to what our exact intentions with Askari were. This option was not authorised. 4 It is my opinion that there was a personality clash between C SADFand OC Western Air Command, This I believe was the only reason that the air plan was changed.
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