Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 22, Nr 4, 1992. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

OPERATION ASKARI

(A SUB-COMMANDER'S RETROSPECTIVE VIEW OF THE OPERATION)

Brig R.S. Lord*

INTRODUCTION For many years, up to the spring of 1983, this had been the pattern of the By 1983 the war in SWA/ had conduct of the war. A summer incur- developed a predictable cyclical pat- sion by SWAPO PLAN and a semi-con- tern. The seasonal variations allowed ventional/convential offensive by Se- SWAPO to take up the offensive during curity forces into Angola during the the summer passage of the Inter-tropi- winter. cal Convergence zone (ITCZ) across Northern . The ITCZis The military results of these activities that low pressure belt of unstable moist were overwhelmingly in the favour of air, that traverses southwards to the the security forces, as can be deduced latitude of Rehoboth during late Octo- from the following table of Operational ber and November and returns north- losses: wards across Owamboland in late January through to April. The passage YEAR SWAPO SECURITYFORCES of this belt gives rise to the phenom- enon of the "small rains" before Christ- 1981 1494 61 mas and the "big rains" from February 1982 1280 77 to April. 1983 913 96

The rainy season gave mobility to the The economic and socio-political ef- SWAPO insurgents. It supplied the wa- fects on South West Africa and the ter they required for their trek to the SADF were however appreciable. To south. The foliage on the trees and counter an insurgency requires the de- bushes provided concealment from ployment of a large number of forces, the security forces. The very heavy in the ratio of about 1 insurgent to 8 rains washed out the tracks they had security force personnel. The direct left, making follow-up difficult and cost factor is therefore considerable, they criss-crossed the full shonas to in- as is the insidious effect of keeping crease the difficulties of the trackers. able bodied men out of the economic Therefore, the SWAPO insurgency, usu- work force. An additional factor was ally commenced in late January of the war weariness of the population. every new year and continued until The war had become so predictable the end of April, or early May, when that it was difficult to foresee how this the water started to dry up. process of violence could be halted.

The onset of the dry season brought In an attempt to surprise the enemy about a change in the tactical situa- and to alter the pattern of predictabil- tion. SWAPO withdrew its forces to ity, Operation Askari was planned .. bases in Angola for the so-called "re- Bearing in mind the difficulties of mo- hearsals" - the regrouping and retrain- bile operations in the wet season, it ing of their members, prior to the next was decided that Askari would be a year's incursion. With Swapo concen- semi-conventional operation using trated in bases, it became cost-effec- conventional arms against Swapo Plan, tive for the SADF/SWATFto launch of- while they were still massed in their fensive operations into Angolan training bases before the start of their territory during the dry winter months. 1984 insurgency campaign. The timing The mobility of vehicles in the torrential of the operation proper was therefore rains of summer was always consid- set to commence just after the "little ered a restricting factor. rains" in mid-December 1983.

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PLANNING e. Security forces must maintain the initiative. The planning for Askari was conceived f. An infiltration during 1984 must and carried out at the HQ Sector 10 at simply not take place. Not even Oshakati under the guidance of Brig J. 10 terrorists must successfully infil- Joubert for the ground forces and Col trate.2 R.S. Lord for the Air plan.] From con- ception the plan was a joint plan, with The SAAF aims for Askari were as fol- the air involvement being in support of lows: the ground forces objectives. The overall aim of the operation was "to a. To gain and maintain a favour- prevent a Swapo special forces infiltra- able air situation over - tion to the South". The operation had Mulondo-. to begin in Nov 1983. b. To prevent the expansion of en- Among the general guidelines were emy air defence capabilities in the following: the Mulondo-Quiteve-Cuvelai ar- eas. a. The enemy must be stopped ex- ternally. c. To expand the SAAF interdiction programme:

b. Deep reconnaissance coupled to i. Up to Chibemba. offensive actions must be com- menced at an early stage. ii. North of Mulondo.

c. Maximum use of mobile elments iii. Up to . for follow-ups must be made. d. Extend Maanskyn (Impala night d. Security forces must operate pro- operations) north of the 150 km actively, not re-actively. line.

ANGOLA: 5 MILITARYREGION

] This plan should have been initiated at the strategic level of planning. ie Army/Air Force HQ in Pretoria. It should have been part of the SADF military strategy. which in turn should have evolved out of the national strategy.

2 In retrospect this guideline was totaily impracticai and shouid therefore not have been included.

2 Militaria 22/4 /992 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 22, Nr 4, 1992. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za e. Preference was to be given to on was completely removed joint attacks on SWAPOtargets.3 from the plan.

The plan was divided into four phases: After all the discussions and alterations Askari was approved, to the relief of a, Phase 1. Deep reconnaissance everyone present. At that stage every- by Special Forces followed by a body was glad to be able to come SAAF attack on the "Typhoon" / away with the authority to go ahead. I Volcano" base close to did not realise it at the time, but nei- between 1 November and 30 De- ther did the twelve Generals and one cember 1983. Admiral, that what had started life as a joint plan, was now no longer a bal- b. Phase 2. Offensive reconnais- anced joint plan. What should have sance/isolation of Cahama, Mu- happened was that we should have londo and Cuvelai from 16 No- gone "back to the drawing board" vember to mid January 1983. The and rehashed the situation to once aim being, to cut enemy commu- more come up with a joint plan. This nication and logistic lines in the was a vital lesson. deep area and to terrorise and demoralise Fapla to such an ex- RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES tent that they would withdraw. PHASES 1 AND 2 While I do not intend to go into detail c. Phase 3. To establish a domi- about all the involvement of the "Rec- nated area from west of the ces", there are a few points that need Cunene River, through Quiteve, to be brought up. It must be stated , Vinticet, eastwards from the outset, that ASKARIcalled for through londe, by the beginning the largest Recce effort of the war. A of Feb 1984. total of five teams of varying sizes were deployed. They were deployed west d. Phase 4. The final stopping of the of Cahama, east of Cahama, in the vi- incursion, internally if necessary. cinity of Mulondo, in the outskirts of Cuvelai and were also tasked to rec- PLAN APPROVAL onnoitre the Lubango area.

The joint Army/Air Force plan was pre- These teams provided the tactical in- sented to GOC SWA and OC Western telligence on which the battle plans Air Command and approved without were made and in general performed major alterations. It was then pre- a difficult task well. The command and sented at Army HQ to the Chief of the control of these teams was however a Defence Force. Present in the audi- bit of a problem from the Air Force ence that day were 12 Generals plus point of view. Each team operated as one Admiral. At the presentation the a separate entity. Each team had its Army plan was accepted in toto. The own tactical HQ at - but Air plan however, was only accepted each in a separate locality. The Air after much discussion and much al- Force had provided a Mobile Air Op- teration. The reason for the changes erations Team (MAOT) to be co-lo- being made are not open for discus- cated with the Army HQ at Xangongo. sion - but the fact remains that the Air Air support which had been promised plan was altered.4 Limits and restric- to each of the recce teams was thus tions were placed on the employment disjointed .. The problem that could of the aircraft, which did not co-incide have arisen was one of priorities. If all with the limits of action of the ground the teams were in trouble, who would forces. In addition the deception strike decide on the priority for air support?

3 An additional Air Force aim was a night strike by Impalas on Caiundo. Although the FAPLA garrison stationed there was no real threat to our planned operation. the idea was to sow confusion in the minds of the FAPLA high command as to what our exact intentions with Askari were. This option was not authorised.

4 It is my opinion that there was a personality clash between C SADFand OC Western Air Command, This I believe was the only reason that the air plan was changed.

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5 MILITARY REGION

In future, a joint HQ is the only answer, gade had ensconced themselves in with a representative of all involved fortified positions in the environs of the parties present.5 little town, to the north and south of the Caculuvar river. Numerous forays At 0920B on 29 Dec 1983 four Bucca- and probes by our ground forces over neers attacked the Tobias Hanyeko the preceeding years had been under- Training Centre, (THTC), just outside taken against Cahama's perimeters. Lubango. This SWAPO training centre The Air Force had attacked radar and had over the years been responsible Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) sites in the for the training of SWAPO recruits. area on many occasions. None of From THTC they were posted straight to these activities had succeeded in dis- the various front headquarters. The lodging FAPLA, or in fact even denting aim of the strike was to demoralise the the peripheral defences. Our analysis recruits before they had even left the of the situation was that we had never safety of their training base. 32 x 460kg concentrated all our effort into trying bombs were dropped into the target to take Cahama. If it had of been our area. Approximately half of the bombs aim, we could have taken the place. exploded on contact, and the others were fitted with delay fuzes from one FAPLA's analysis of the continual as- to thirty six hours, rendering the centre saults was that they had always suceeded uninhabitable. The air strike was on in chasing the "boere" away. They time on target and suffered no losses. were therefore confident of their ability Round one to the "Boere"! to hold Cahama, and contrary to our own widely disseminated intelligence OFFENSIVE ACTIONS PHASE 2 on the troops in the town, their morale was in fact high. Chama. Throughout the duration of the war, Cahama had remained a 61 Mechanised Battalion plus artillery . tough nut to crack. FAPLA's 2nd Bri- were tasked to pressurise FAPLA's 2nd

5 All arms of the service, particularly the Recces, tend to be parochial. That is, they plan within the limits of their own involvement. Although security of an operation is a definite factor, especially with clandes- tine operations, joint planning is always the best solution.

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Brigade, by probes, feints and artillery ture an SA-8 system. This section of the bombardments. Offensive recce teams overall Askari plan, was given top prior- were to cut FAPLA's logistic lines be- ity. tween Cahama and Chibemba, while the Air Force carried out strikes against This plan was well on the way to suc- identified targets within the defensive ceeding. The SA-8 batteries had been perimeter of the town. The combined forced to move their position twice, results of these actions were to demor- both times towards Ediva as planned. alise and terrorise the FAPLA and By the end of December, the clamour- SWAPO forces, to such an extent, that ing in the world press to censure South they would either withdraw or desert Africa, because of the military pres- from Cahama. It was envisaged that ence in Angola, had reached a cre- this "uitmergeling" would take place scendo. A political decision was then between 16 Nov 1983 and mid-January made to cease all activities on the 1984. Time was required to allow all Cahama front by 31 December 1983.6 the desired effects to play their part. All forces were withdrawn, FAPLA obvi- In the event this was naive planning in ously breathed a sigh of relief, and the the extreme. Between mid-November status quo around Cahama returned and mid-December the recce forces to normal. Once again the 2nd Bri- were indeed active, but a Brigade gar- gade had beaten off a determined as- rison, which in their view had success- sault by the "Boere". We lost that fully beaten off the "boere" repeat- round! edly, would not be disturbed by the activities of two small recce teams. Mulondo. The aim here was: The real offensive pressure started a. To isolate and demotivate FAPLA around 16 December, with the ad- in both Quiteve and Mulondo to vance of 61 Mechanised Battalion from the extent that the troops would the Quiteve area. This approach must withdraw or desert. have been detected by the defenders in Cahama. The bombing and bom- b. To monitor the route Matala- bardments which were then started Mulondo-Quiteve, to see if Swapo and continued around the clock, must was using it as an infiltration have had a detrimental effect on the route. defenders. Had the time limit of mid- January been open-ended, then the The time period for this sub-operation plan might have been successful be- was to be 16 Nov to 15 Jan '84. The cause by the end of December, the ground forces used would be the same morale of the 2nd Brigade was still rea- that were to take Cuvelai. The Air sonable. Force was to carry out speculative bombing against selected targets, in It was known that SA-8 batteries were and around Mulondo, to heighten the positioned about 2 kms South West of tension prior to the final assault by the the town, close to the road to Ediva. A ground forces. sub-operation within Askari was Opera- tion Fox. This called for a combined On their advance towards Cahama 61 effort of ground and air forces to Mech took Quiteve almost without fir- bomb and bombard in such a pattern, ing a shot. This phase was so success- that the SA-8batteries would be forced to ful that it was then decided to send a change their position by moving to the small fighting group with artillery sup- south. The idea was to drive them out port, northwards on the western side of of the protective ring surrounding the Cunene river, to begin the process Cahama, into the vicinity of FAPLA's of isolating Mulondo. AAA defensive sites in the area of Ediva. Once in this area a concerted As a result of the high state of alert effort by the ground forces, (both Army throughout Angola, FAPLA's 19th Bri- and Recce), was to attempt to cap- gade in Mulondo had sent out their

6 Maintenance of the aim is a fundamental principle of war. All the effort put into the Cahama operation was not only wasted. it reinforced the enemies morale.

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ANGOLA: "PHASE 2 - CAIUNDO" own recce teams to protect their front. 68mm rockets. The weather was atro- These troops performed an excellent cious with large cumulo-nimbus clouds. task for FAPLA, in that they pin-pointed After the fourth attack in the area, the the position of our fighting team. They wingman was struck by a SAM in the never used the intelligence to come tail, but he managed to land safely out offensively against our forces but, back at Ondangwa.8 whenever we moved our artillery into range, they proceeded to bombard The pre-amble to the plan for forcing our positions with their D-30 cannons. FAPLA to leave Mulondo was unsuc- These guns outdistanced our artillery cessful. Political considerations in early by 3 to 4 kms, which resulted in our January 1984 were such, that the SADF forces having to undertake a quick did not continue with the Askari plan withdrawal after firing just a few salvos. for Mulondo. In the eyes of FAPLA's 19th Brigade they had succeeded in This diversion from the original Askari beating off a determined attack by plan, had repercussions on the air the "Boere". We lost that round! plan. Support had to be flown for the ground forces in the area, thus utilising Caiundo. This small stronghold on the aircraft hours and weapons that were eastern bank of the Cubango river was set aside for the Cahama and Cuvelai never a part of the original Askari Army battles. It had a further tactical disad- plan. The Air Plan however, had in- vantage in that the element of surprise, cluded a strike on the HQ unit, as part that was to be gained with the air at- of the overall deception plan. This re- tacks on Cahama, was lost. After our quest was not approved, and there- Mulondo strikes the entire air defence fore no operational or logistical plan- system of Southern Angola was placed ning was carried out for operations in on the highest alert states.7 this eastern sector.

On 23 Dec 83, 2 x Impalas attacked The offensive actions, as detailed in torgets in the Mulondo area using the Askari plan, commenced around

7 Surprise. as a principle of war. has become even more important with the advent of SAM defences.

8 Repeat attacks in the same target area are recipes for disaster!

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16 December. Both air and ground londo fronts, to the unplanned for forces were engaged in offensive ac- Caiundo area, which continued unin- tions in the Quiteve-Mulondo-Cahama terrupted for the remainder of opera- areas. Imagine my surprise, shortly tion Askari. There was a substantial re- thereafter, when I was casually in- duction in the air effort over the formed that there was an Army group planned Askari key points, which re- of ours that was deployed within 20 duced the pressure on the enemy and kms of Ca/undo, on the western bank. allowed FAPLA to remain in control of When I enquired about their presence, their troops and their emotions, in both I was told that they had been ordered Cahama and Mulondo. to act as a deception force in that area and that they were in fact troops In spite of a large air effort over a pe- from Sector 20, who would otherwise riod of 21 days, Caiundo was not not be utilised in Operation Askari. taken. Despite a heavy air bombard- ment and a determined ground assault This was never part of the joint Askari the FAPLA minefields and defensive plan, and as such, it had a detrimental bunkers remained intact. FAPLA's 53rd effect on the outcome of Askari. To Brigade had reason to celebrate their

ANGOLA: "PHASE 2 - CUVELAI"

everyone's surprise and consternation, successful defence of Caiundo against this force was attacked on the night of the "Boere". We lost that round! 19/20 December. FAPLA recces had discovered that one platoon of this CUVELAI. Phase 2 of the original Army force were deployed outside the main operational plan called for the isola- defensive perimeter, and were much tion of Cuvelai, between 16 Nov 1983 closer to Caiundo than they should and 15 January 1984. The aim was have been. During the night FAPLA threefold: sent a Company to attack this platoon. a. To isolate, grind down "Uitmergel" This they did successfully, killing five and terrorise Cuvelai, to the ex- and capturing one SWA Territory Force tent that FAPLA would either soldier, plus 13 light machine guns, 3 leave on their own accord, or rifles, 3 radios, a 60 mm mortar and a their soldiers would desert on a Unimog. large scale.

This set-back resulted in a switch of air b. To carry out operations against activities from the Cahama and Mu- SWAPO elements such as the Mos-

Milifaria 22/4 7992 7 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 22, Nr 4, 1992. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za cow, Alpha and Bravo battalions attacked in turn by the FAPLA 11th Bri- in the Cuvelai area. gade and were in real danger of be- ing cut-off. It was then decided to re- c. To give early warning of a SWAPO assign 61 Mech under the command of incursion. Cmdt Van Lill, who were then on the outskirts of Cahama, to assist the en- The Air Force plan thus called for: dangered battle-group. In a little over 16 hours, 61 Mech moved, under bat- a. Extensive photo-recce of Cuvelai. tle conditions, from the Cahama area, b. Speculative bombing day and across the temporary bridge over the night of SWAPO targets in the vi- Cunene river to the outskirts of cinity. Cuvelai. This forced march was itself an epic of determination and perse- c. Air attacks on AAA sites that had verance, especially as those troops a direct bearing on ground force had to go straight into battle at operations. Cuvelai when they arrived on 3 Janu- ary 1984. In mid-December the photo-reconnais- sance (PR) was flown, and up to date On the afternoon of 3 January the ac- photos of all the AAA sites in Cuvelai tual attack on Cuvelai took place. It were obtained. It must be remem- commenced with a co-ordinated air bered that in the history of our activi- attack aimed at all the known AAA ties in Angola, the PR flights were al- and artillery sites. Each pilot was ways understood by the enemy to be equipped with up to date enlarged the precursor of an attack. Round 1 of photographs of his particular target. the psychological battle had been 10 Impalas led the raid, followed by 4 won! Canberras. Between them they dropped 60 x 120kg, 18 x 250kg, 2 x On 27 December at 1405B,two Impalas 450kg and 600 Alpha bombs. A sec- dropped lOx 120 kg bombs on a ond wave of Impalas dropped a fur- SWAPO target in the area. At 1628Bon ther 32 x 250kg bombs. This was argu- the same day, four Canberras dropped ably the most effective strike flown by 600 Alpha bombs, 2 x 460kg bombs the SAAF, throughout the history of the and 16 x 250kg bombs on targets in war in Angola. and around the town. On completion of the air strike, an in- The following day at 1335B,two Impalas tercepted message from the OC of carried out a further recce of the AAA Cuvelai to his Lubango headquarters sites in Cuvelai. At 1439B Canberras was picked up. The gist of what he carried out attacks on targets close to said was "You better send help, 75% of the Cuvelai airstrip, dropping 17 x my artillery is out of action as a result 250kg, 2 x 460kg as well as 300 Alpha of the SAAF bombardment." bombs, which obtained a 90% cover- age of the target. At 1610B eight The SAAF played another important Impalas dropped 32 x 250kg bombs on role while supporting the ground forces various targets in and around the as they attacked the town after the air town. strike. The Army was faced with two major problems - navigation through All these flights were undertaken with the minefields and the destruction of the aim of achieving results against the the last remaining resistance. Two enemies AAA defences, as well as ob- Alouette gun-ships, led by Capt Carl taining the psychological advantage Alberts, provided the assistance the while attempting to grind-down Army required, against all doctrine (uitmergel) FAPLA. and at great risk to themselves. Capt Alberts was awarded the Honorus Crux The Army meanwhile had sent a battle (HC) for his dedication to task. group, consisting mainly of citizen force troops, to engage the SWAPO After bogging down and losing a Ratel headquarters and logistic base 5 kms in the minefields, the ground forces en- north-east of the town, This group was tered Cuvelai to find that the enemies,

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both SWAPO and FAPLA, had fled, In of which 361 were killed during Askari. fact, 32 Battalion who had troops in The remainder were as a result of the the Tetchamutete area, used these normal summer incursion. The one troops as stoppers to capture a large positive factor was the reduction in Se- number of FAPLA who were running curity force deaths, from 96 in 1983 to northwards, 39 in 1984, 13 of these 39 were killed during Askari. The battle for Cuvelai was a success, Large amounts of war materiel were Nevertheless an incursion did occur, so captured, The reason for the success it must be stated that the "Boere" lost was that for the only time during the that round, four major battles that comprised Askari, air power was utilised correctly, followed by a determined assault by SUMMARY the ground forces, The aim was main- tained and the concentration of Over the years Askari has been looked forces, using a joint plan, overcame on as a major success, This perception the enemy, Measured against the prin- began right from the first de-brief held ciples of war, this sub-operation was at Oshakati in February 1984, It cer- bound to succeed, The "Boere" won tainly is true that: this round! a. We captured Cuvelai along with INTERNA TIONAL PRESSURE masses of war materiel.

By the first week in 1984 the pressure on b, FAPLA suffered a severe defeat in the South African government reached terms of men and equipment, a peak, Our military presence and op- erations in Angola were being con- c, Apart from their successful attack demned from all quarters, with threats on a platoon of ground forces of even greater sanctions and boy- outside Caiundo, FAPLA never cotts, This pressure, plus the relatively achieved any other offensive suc- slow progress of the weather ham- cess, pered operation, made the politicians decide to halt Askari on 10 January The question remains "Is it true that 1984, Captured equipment was recov- Askari was a success?" ered to South West Africa and all par- ticipating forces were stood down. The Rhodesians were fond of stating the fact that, "they never lost a battle" PHASE 3 in their bush campaign, but they did lose their war! Did the same happen in A dominated area was established by Askari? Let us examine the facts, February 1984 that included all the ter- ritory between the Cunene and Cu- Our acknowledged enemy was SWA- bango rivers, as far north as a line run- PO, They used Angola as a safe har- ning east/west through Tetchamutete. bour, from where they launched their The area west of the Cunene was still attacks into South West Africa, After "Injun territory", but for purposes of the initial large scale raid by the SADF Askari it can be assumed that the to Cassinga during operation Reindeer, "Boere" won that round, Swapo realised the inherent dangers of establishing permanent bases that PHASE 4 could be attacked by the SADF, To protect their Headquarters and train- This phase was to be the final stopping ing establishments, they moved these of the incursion internally, if necessary, facilities under and behind, the um- This always seemed to be a contradic- brella protection provided by the tion of the guide-lines set for Askari, A FAPLA forces, thus making FAPLA a "le- study of the results of operational gitimate" target, losses for 1984 are an indication of whether this phase was successful or During December 1983 - January 1984 not, SWAPO suffered 916 dead in 1984, we lost 32 soldiers compared to the 407

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SWAPO terrorists that were killed. A ra- nist inspired organisations have a his- tio of nearly 13:1. The overall figures tory of going to the negotiating table for 1983 were 96 security force to 913 whenever they are in trouble, and then SWAPO's, a ratio of just under 10:1, utilising the breathing space to re-plan, The ratio increased in 1984 to 23: 1, so re-organise and re-equip. This is pre- in that respect Askari reaped benefits cisely what they did during the pro- and in fact for the remainder of the tracted life of the Joint Monitoring war this ratio stayed over 20: 1. SWAPO Commission (JMC), that was brought PLAN never succeeded in regaining into being for the purposes of negotia- the offensive capability it had prior to tions. Askari. The second significant occurrence was The overall aim of Askari however, was the subtle change in the whole struc- to prevent an infiltration to the south in ture of the war. FAPLA gradually re- 1984. 555 Terrorists were killed during placed SWAPO as our main enemy. 1984, in addition to those killed during The war entered a phase of greater so- Askari, indicating that although they phistication and the low intensity coun- suffered losses, the pattern of the insur- ter-insurgency bush war, escalated gency war continued. We failed to over the next four years, to a high in- achieve the main aim. tensity undeclared conventional war, between the armed forces of the RSA Phase 2 of the plan called for offensive SWA and UNITA on the one hand, and action against FAPLA strongholds. We FAPLA the Cubans plus their Russian comprehensibly beat the 11th Brigade advisors, on the other. at Cuvelai, but we did not achieve our goals at either Cahama or Mulondo. The war was no longer a regional con- In addition we did not succeed in dis- flict. It had become internationalised lodging the FAPLA forces out of and as such the solution was no longer Caiundo. Seen out of FAPLAs'eyes, in the hands of SWAPO or the RSA. An they lost Cuvelai but won the battles international solution had to be sought for Cahama, Mulondo and Caiundo. with all the accompanying implica- tions. Askari became the watershed in the course of the Angola/SWA war. CONCLUSION SWAPO PLAN was reduced in military strength and from then onwards no "Was Askari a success?" It can be longer posed a major threat. On the fairly stated, that as an operation other hand FAPLA grew in stature and against SWAPO, Askari produced re- evolved into the major factor in the sults that effectively eliminated SWAPO pursuance of our war against SWAPO, PLAN as a major element in the military Our readiness to attack FAPLA, wher- struggle. Although the organisation still ever or whenever they protected SWAPO, provoked them into aquiring existed, their military efforts had lost an air defence system to protect their potential and were easily countered. Although we required a large eco- interests, that was second only to that nomic outlay to maintain this status assembled in the Warsaw pact coun- quo, they realised and we realised, tries. that they could not beat us militarily. In this aspect Askari was successful. Two significant events occurred after Askari. Firstly, initiatives were taken to bring the South Africans and the An- I do not believe that the conse- golans to the negotiating table, South quences of Askari, in terms of factors Africa, being in the position of other than SWAPO, were originally en- strength, welcomed the proposal as visaged. The four years, from 1984 to did the Angolans, who were suffering the culmination of hostilities outside militarily and psychologically at that Cuito Canevale and Calueque in 1988, stage. saw the opportu- stretched our reserves and capabilities nity as a chance for peace in the re- severely. The wholesale build up of So- gion. Angola on the other hand siezed viet arms, within this time period, cre- the opportunity as a tactic. Commu- ated a situation that was becoming

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daily more difficult to handle, The cost Askari, had repercussions that affected factor in terms of both men and the entire future of the war, materiel was placing a critical burden on our resources, Many lessons can be extracted from the limited success of Askari, that af- fect all levels of authority in the Repub- The internationalisation of the conflict lic, An operation of the magnitude of led to us becoming increasingly in- Askari requires vetting and authority to volved with extricating UNITA from situ- be granted at Sector, Theatre, Chief of ations that they could not handle, Staff and Cabinet level. War is an ugly These unmanageable situations for the thing which possesses the potential to guerilla forces of UNITA were brought escalate beyond imagination, Before about by their inability to counter one commits forces to battle, it must heavy equipment, such as the tanks, be ensured, that the operation is in ac- helicopters and artillery, that FAPLA cordance with the countries military had aquired specifically to counter strategy, that in turn must be part of South African attacks, These factors the national strategy, No future opera- lend support to the belief that the con- tion should be approved that does not ventional attacks on Fapla, during satisfy these two criteria.

* Brig R.S. Lord. Officer Commanding AIR FORCE COMMAND POST

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ALPHA BOMB, A circular shaped anti-per- "Boere", A general useage term used by sonnel bomb weighing 6 kg's, Dropped both SWAPO and the Angolans to de- from level flight that gave a natural scribe the RSA/SWATF security forces, dispersion pattern, The bomb would HC (Honoris Crux), The highest decora- strike the surface activating the fuzing tions for military valour that can be mechanism, and then bounce into the awarded to members of the South Afri- air to explode about 6 meters above can Defence Force, There are three the ground, This bomb was an im- classes namely: proved version of that used by the Rho- desian Air Force and 300 of them could a, Bronze HC be loaded into the bomb-bay of the c, Silver HCS Canberra bomber, c, Gold HCG AAA (Anti-aircraft artillery), Triple A was JMC (Joint Monitoring Commission), This the overall term used to describe the commission was brought into being by anti-aircraft guns that were employed the recognised need by both the in a limited manner by SWAPO, but ex- South African and Angolan antagonists tensively by the Angolan Defence to estabiish a forum wherein matters Force, These guns covered the com- that could lead to a peaceful settle- piete range of Soviet supplied weap- ment were to be discussed, The onry and include the following jointness of the commission was em- a, 12,7mm phasised by the fact that members of b, 14,5 mm the Defence Forces and Foreign Affairs c, 20,0 mm departments of both countries were in- cluded, It was oniy after the second d, 23,0 mm Note This included the towed twin barrelled version which was JMC was formed, after operations probably the most widely used and ef- Moduler,Hooper and Packer, that a fi- fective gun used in the entire campaign nal peaceful settiement was negoti- by either side, both in the ground to air ated, and ground to ground mode, The four LMG - Light machine gun barrelled tracked version (Shilka) was also utilised, MAANSKYN, The name given to the e, 37,0 mm highly successful night interdiction op- f, 57,0 mm Note, These radar guided erations that were carried out by guns were originally equipped with the Impala aircraft from the early 1980's fire-can radar, and later this was up- until the cessation of the war, A highly dated with the flap-wheel system, skilled form of flying requiring intense

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concentration, that dominated the SAM (Surface to Air Missile). A missile, battle area of Angolas Cunene prov- guided by either infra red or radar, ince for a large period of the war. fired from a launcher on the ground at an airborne target. By the end of the MAOT (Mobile Air Operations Team). war the Angolans had an array of mis- These small teams were usually under siles that included the following the command of a Pilot with Majors rank, and consisted of an Operations a. SAM-2 Fixed site Officer, an Intelligence Officer and a b. SAM-3 Fixed site radio operator. They were sometimes c. SAM-6 Mobile tracked deployed by air, but were more often d. SAM-7 Shoulder launched mounted in Buffel, Ratel and later e. SAM-8 Mobile wheeled Casspir vehicles. They were co-located f. SAM-9 Mobile wheeled with the Army ground commander for g. SAM-13 Mobile tracked internal (within SWA) and external op- h. SAM-14 Shoulder launched erations. Their main function was to as- i. SAM-16 Shoulder launched sist the ground forces commander with Note: During Askari an Impala was hit at planning for his air requirement, and Mulondo by a SAM-7 while another had the liason back to the next Air Force his right tailplane removed by a SAM-9 over Cuvelai. Both aircraft returned Headquarters. with battle damage. The first to its base PR (Photographic Reconnaissance). A at Ondangwa. while the second most important intelligence gathering landed at Ongiva. This Angolan base function of the Air Force. Good up to had been resurfaced by the Airfield date photography often meant the dif- Maintenance Unit of the SAAF shortly before this emergency. ference between success and failure of air operations. TYPHOON. The name given by SWAPO to their elite group of most highly trained Recces. A general term of common troops, whose specific task was the in- useage that could be used to de- filtration of SWA. Although highly prized scribe: by SWAPO they did not in fact achieve a. A member or Unit of the South Afri- any more notable successes than their can Reconnaissance Regiment. normal PLAN contemporaries. b. A ground intelligence gathering op- UNIMOG. A four by four transport vehi- eration. cle, based on a Mercedes Benz chassis c. A special air sortie aimed at gaining and engine, that bore the brunt of intelligence. bush operations until SWAPO mine-lay- ing forced the introduction of mine- RSA - Republic of South Africa protected vehicles. Shona. An open area in the bush that fills UNITA. The breakaway party led by Jonas with water during the rainy season, and Savimbi that was eventually supported is invariably dry during the winter by the western powers, including South months. Africa, in the fight against the commu- SAAF - nist backed MPLA in Angola. It must be noted that it was in the interest of the SADF - South African Defence Force RSAto support UNITA, as their presence SWA - South West Africa (Now Namibia) protected the long SWA border from SWAPO - South West African Peoples Or- the eastern edge of Owamboland right ganisation (A misnomer as the organi- through to the end of the Caprivi strip, sation truly represented only the from SWAPO insurgency. Owambo people) "Uitmergel". An Afrikaans word that liter- SWAPO PLAN (The Peoples Liberation ally translated means to exhaust or Army of Namibia). The militant wing of grind down. SWAPO that used the territory of neigh- Volcano. The name given by SWAPO to bouring states from which to launch at- the training base approximately 14 tacks against the peoples and state kilometers north east of Lubango, representatives of the South West Afri- where specialised training was con- can government. ducted for their Typhoon troops.

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