SYRIA CHEMICAL WEAPONS ATTACKS IN AND KHAN SHAYKHUN

December 2017

Issue overview

The CBAP Conflict Report, whose first issue you are currently reading, is a new project aiming to provide on-point information about problems relevant to the selected conflict. Every issue of the Conflict Report will focus on specific aspects of a selected armed conflict raging around the world, analyse them and offer insight into their inner and outer dynamics.

The topic of this issue is the usage of chemical weapons in . In particular, the issue inspects the different dimensions of the usage on two cases – the Ghouta attack in 2013 and Khan Shaykun attack in 2017. These two attacks were selected as they are the only two cases of the use of gas in the war, and therefore offer an ideal option for their comparison and analysis.

In this regard, the presented issue offers three texts providing an insight into distinct aspects of the chemical weapons attacks. The first article, by Radka Roháriková and Samo Žilinčík, addresses the question of the strategic significance of these attacks for the Syrian government. Then, the piece by Michal Myklín and Natália de Figueiredo Coelho Maciel looks into the difference in soft power usage between the responses to the two attacks. Finally, Jakub Kuchar and Tereza Novotná’s work analyses how the international actors constructed the discourse in relation to the selected incidents.

1 Branislav Mičko Page CBAP Conflict Report Project Manager

Strategic Effects of the Chemical Weapons Usage in the Syrian Civil War Radka Roháriková & Samo Žilinčík

Introduction means the use that is made of force or threat This section aims to examine strategic effects of force for political purpose1. At the core of produced by the employment of chemical a strategy is the permanent conversion weapons in the Syrian civil war. The analysis is between force (armed forces) and political tied to two main questions asking what consequences. The strategy is done by tactics strategic effects did the use of chemical (use of weapons and forces on the battlefield). weapons produce and whether the strategic One of the main functions of strategy is to effect for the Syrian government was positive direct whatever happens at the tactical level or negative. Authors employ two specific to produce favourable political instances of the use of chemical weapons in consequences. Any weapon in every war is the Syrian conflict, more precisely, Ghouta always used tactically but also produces Chemical Attack (2013) and Khan Shaykhun strategic (and political) effects.2 Needless to Chemical Attack (2017). These are examined say, this happens even without strategic in detail and with the subsequent analysis of guidance. In this regard, chemical weapons the consequences the weapons produced. are no exception. They too, produce strategic The selection of attacks that occurred at the effects, whether intentionally or not. However, beginning of the Syrian conflict and in the due to their rare employment, their strategic recent past is purposeful, as the authors effects are seldom examined. This article is an consider them vital aspects to the final attempt to rectify this gap in knowledge. conclusions drawn from the comparison of the two attacks. The research is based on Methodology theoretical and methodological background, In order to measure a strategic effect, two both of which are explained in the paragraph central concepts are necessary. The first one below. This study concludes with the is control; the other one is the freedom of comparison of selected cases and the action. Control stands for the ability of one assessment of whether the effects of the first belligerent to influence the actions of attack were strategically more efficient for the 3 another. Freedom of action stands for an 2 Syrian government rather than the effects ability of belligerent to choose and follow his caused by the second attack. Page own plans and policies, and it is necessary in Theoretical Background order to control the adversary. The two concepts are closely related, and through The strategy of belligerents in any war is what them, it is possible to measure strategic effect defines each war’s unique character. Strategy

1 Gray.C.S. 1999. Modern Strategy. Oxford: Oxford 3 Wylie, J.C.1967. Military Strategy: A General University Press. p.17 Theory of Power Control. Annapolis: Naval 2 Gray, C.S. 2016. Strategy and Politics. London: Institute Press. p.77 Routledge. p.3

by analysing the levels of control one has over several important successes within the his opponent. suburbs of the city. On August 21, 2013, large- scale chemical weapons attack occurred in There are three basic levels of control over an the Ghouta region, where Syrian forces had adversary. The first level of control is the been attempting to expel the rebels. The weakest one. On this level, the actor is only attack had affected two separate opposition- able to avoid being controlled (coerced or controlled districts and resulted in hundreds deterred) by the opponent. On the second of victims either killed or seriously injured. The level, the actor is capable of actively reducing evidence concerning the type of rockets and the opponent´s freedom of action. On the launchers used in these attacks strongly final level, an actor is capable to influence suggested that these are weapon systems opponent’s policy and force him to accept the known and documented to be only in former’s will.4 possession of the . The Syrian government has denied its Using the Case study method to compare two responsibility for the attack, and has blamed particular cases of chemical weapons usage - opposition groups, but has presented no (2013) and Khan evidence to back up its claims. The evidence Shaykhun Chemical Attack (2017) - authors examined by suggests analyse strategic effects produced by the that the August 21 attacks employment of chemical weapons through on Eastern and Western Ghouta were carried two central concepts mentioned in the out by government forces. However, no paragraph above. Firstly, the level of control official attribution on the international level achieved by the employment of chemical exists6. weapons is identified. Then the political Consequences reactions of other main actors in the conflict and their freedom of actions is assessed. Given the unprecedented successes of Finally, the comparative analysis of the two opposition forces in the early August, the case studies is applied in order to examine possible use of chemical weapons by Assad whether the combined strategic effect was meant to produce positive tactical effects benefited the Syrian government or its for the government by a mixture of opponents. annihilation, terror and control of the territory.

But were these tactical effects also positive on

Case Study 1: Ghouta Chemical the level of strategy? 3

attack (2013) Page Control Overview By their very nature, the primary purpose of Beginning on July 24, rebel forces in Syria chemical weapons is to cause annihilation and launched a major offensive in city.5 invoke terror in the survivors and observers of Throughout early August, they achieved the attack. Annihilating opponent´s armed

4 Milevski, Lukas. 2015. “Asymmetry is Strategy, opposition-advances-damascus Accessed: Strategy is Asymmetry,” Joint Force Quarterly, 25.11.2017 No. 75, 4th Quarter, p.81 6HRW, Attacks on Ghouta, 5 ISW, The Opposition Advances in Damascus, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syr http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ ia_cw0913_web_1.pdf , p.1

forces disarms him, which can lead at least to of the territory on their own. By annihilation the achievement of the first level of control, or the threat of it, they can force opponent’s that is, avoidance of being controlled by the forces out of an area. But forcing the opponent. But annihilation does not opponent out does not automatically automatically constitute control. If we accept translate into one’s own control of the the figure for victims of the attack to be territory. The government failed to do so. The several hundred, a large portion of that fighting continued during the following days.9 number were non-combatants7. The Freedom of action evidence further suggests that dozens of combatants were also killed or wounded. The attack also did not widen Syrian However, this number is too small to produce government’s possibilities. Quite the contrary, a direct impact on the rebels’ capability to response by Western governments was very exercise control and thus it did not produce hostile, and the government had to do control over for the Syrian anything to avoid foreign intervention on the government. side of opposition forces. Just a few days after the attack, U.S. warships were in position and While terror could, in theory, lead to any ready to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles amount of control, this was not the case of the against various targets of the Syrian 10 Ghouta attack. The reason being that government . The government had to international community pushed Syrian evacuate several places considered to be government into destroying most of its tempting targets for the U.S. missiles and stockpiles of chemical weapons.8 That meant redeploy its forces to safe spaces, where they 11 that Syrian government could not use the were far less useful . All this led to a situation threat of another chemical attack to control where lots of government’s resources had to the behaviour of the opposition. Any threat of be allocated to discourage foreign terror by the chemical attack would not be intervention, and they could not have been seen as credible since the U.S. armed forces used to fight the opposition. were prepared to intervene in case of Syrian dis-obedience. In the long-term, the government destroyed most of its chemical weapons, which led to Control of the territory is a powerful tool for the lesser possibility for coercion of

achieving the first level of control. However, opposition forces to submission through the chemical weapons cannot guarantee control 4

Page 7 HRW, Attacks on Ghouta, 10 ISW, U.S. Navy Positions Ships for Possible https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syr Strike Against Syrian Targets, ia_cw0913_web_1.pdf Accessed, 25.11.2017, p. 13- http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ 14 us-navy-positions-ships-possible-strike-against- 8 ACA, Fact Sheets, syrian-targets Accesseed: 25.11.2017 https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/syriaprofi 11 ISW, Syrian Military Evacuations in and Around Accessed: 25.11.2017 Damascus, 9 ISW, Syrian Military Evacuations in and Around http://iswresearch.blogspot.cz/2013/08/syrian- Damascus military-evacuations-in-and.html Accessed: http://iswresearch.blogspot.cz/2013/08/syrian- 25.11.2017 military-evacuations-in-and.html Accessed: 25.11.2017

threat of another chemical attack12. As is clear Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) from the second case study, the government found that victims in the Khan Shaykhun has kept some chemical weapons, but it could attack were exposed to sarin, a deadly nerve not use them to produce psychological agent and subsequently the U.N Commission coercion against opposition forces. Their sole of Inquiry attributed the attack to the Syrian purpose from now on could be annihilation. government14. Syrian air force used sarin in Khan Shaykhun, Idlib, killing dozens, the Summary majority of whom were women and children. Government’s use of chemical weapons had The commission based its findings on positive tactical consequences, but their interviews with 43 witnesses, satellite imagery, strategic effect seems to be negative. On the photographs, and videos, and claims it has tactical level, the attack was able to annihilate evidence the attack was conducted by a a minor portion of the rebel army, possibly Sukhoi SU-22 aircraft, a type that only Syrian invoke terror among the survivors and government forces use. Syrian and/or Russian eliminate portions of rebel forces from forces continued to target hospitals and specific areas. On the strategic level, the medical personnel15. attack led to the increased hostility of Consequences international community towards the government and the threat of foreign As in the first case study, the chemical attack intervention. The government also lost the was meant to produce positive tactical effects possibility to intimidate rebels with chemical for the government by a mixture of attack due to the restrictions imposed by the annihilation, terror and control of the territory. Chemical Weapons Treaty. But were these tactical effects also positive on the level of strategy? The following lines C as e St u dy 2 : Khan Shaykhun examine whether the attack produced the Chemical attack (2017) desired results. Overview Control

On 4 April 2017, an incident was widely Chemical attack was used tactically to create reported in the international press and social positive effects by annihilation, terror and media alleging an attack involving the use of control over the territory. The attack resulted a chemical weapon in the Khan Shaykhun in killing dozens and injuring hundreds of

area of southern Idlib in the Syrian Arab people, among which many were severely 5 Republic.13 The Organisation for the wounded16. Still, these numbers do not Page

12 ACA, Fact Sheets, On the Syrian Arab Republic https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/syriaprofi http://www.ohchr.org/SiteCollectionImages/Bodie Accessed: 25.11.2017 s/HRCouncil/IICISyria/COISyria_ChemicalWeapon 13 OPCW, Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding s.jpg Accessed: 26.11.2017 Mission in Syria Regarding an Alleged Incident in 15 UN, Col Report Khan Shaykhun, Syrian Arab Republic https://documents-dds- https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/Fact_Fin ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/172/341/8X/PDF/172 ding_Mission/s-1510-2017_e_.pdf Accessed: 3418.pdf?OpenElement Accessed: 26.11.2017 26.11.2017 16 OHCHR, Chemical Weapons’ Attacks 14 OHCHR, Chemical Weapons’ Attacks Documented by the U.N. Commission of Inquiry Documented by the U.N. Commission of Inquiry On the Syrian Arab Republic

indicate the inhibition on the side of the rebels use the threat of another attack for the to exercise control over the enemy. Majority purposes of coercion in the future. of the victims were civilians, which in no way impedes the capacity of opposition forces to The International response did not incur continue fighting. So, the tactical effect of serious penalties to limit government’s annihilation did not produce the positive possibilities. U.S. launched a missile attack on strategic effect of disarming the enemy and one Syrian base, but this caused no serious rendering him harmless. damage to any of the governments’ military tools.18 Economic sanctions targeted at There is no evidence that the effect of terror several people associated with the had a direct impact on the behaviour of the development of the chemical weapons did opposition, nor on its ability to exercise not limit government’s spectrum of control. However, the long-term effect possibilities in any way. produced by terror is the vulnerability of Summary opposition to the government’s future coercion by chemical attack. In this way, the Government’s use of chemical weapons government acquired the second level of produced annihilation and terror among control over the opposition, because it could portions of the rebels, but it did not produce from now on the influence the policy of control over the territory. Furthermore, even rebels. these tactical successes did not generate any level of control over the opposition for the The attack failed to produce even the basic government. The attack increased requirement for gaining control over the government’s freedom of action by adding contested territory. Opposition forces coercion by the threat of another chemical continued fighting in the area. The attack, attack as a possible tool in its arsenal. No therefore, did not generate any level of consequences occurred to limit the control for the government through the possibilities at government’s disposal. control of territory. Conclusion Freedom of action The examination of two case studies led to the The attack demonstrated the possession of a following findings. In both cases, chemical

specific type of chemical weapons by the attacks sought to produce tactical effects by

Syrian government, despite their proclaimed annihilation, terror and control of the territory. 6 destruction 17. This widened the spectrum of Both accomplished these tactical effects to Page government’s possibilities since it could now some degree.

http://www.ohchr.org/SiteCollectionImages/Bodie 18 U.S. Department of Defense, Trump Orders s/HRCouncil/IICISyria/COISyria_ChemicalWeapon Missile Attack in Retaliation for Syrian Chemical s.jpg Accessed: 26.11.2017 Attacks, 17 UN, Syria rejects report of OPCW-UN Joint https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/114 Investigative Mechanism, 4601/trump-orders-missile-attack-in-retaliation- https://www.un.int/syria/statements_speeches/syri for-syrian-chemical-strikes/ Accessed: 26.11.2017 a-rejects-report-opcw-un-joint-investigative- mechanism Accessed: 26.11.2017

In the first case, these tactical effects did not translate into the higher level of strategy, and net strategic effects of their use were negative for the Syrian government. None of the tactical effects produced any amount of control for the government, neither did it enhance government’s freedom of action. On the contrary, government’ freedom of action was reduced because it was not able to use coercion of another chemical attack with any credibility.

In the second case, these tactical effects translated into positive net strategic effects. While they produced the only limited level of control over opposition forces, they enhanced government's freedom of action. By demonstration of existing arsenal and lack of serious punishment from the opposing actors, Syrian government effectively acquired credible threat of chemical attack as another tool in its arsenal.

These findings indicate that translation of tactical effects produced by chemical weapons into positive strategic effects is an immensely difficult task. The only positive strategic effect in any of the cases was the re- acquirement of one possibility, which had been lost precisely as a result of the use of previous chemical attack. These findings

suggest that any actor considering the use of chemical weapons should think twice not only 7

because of the moral perspective, but Page because the generated strategic effects seem to be mostly of psychological nature.

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Roles and Contributions of the Major Actors to the Discourse of the Chemical Weapons Use in the Ongoing Syrian Civil War Jakub Kuchar & Tereza Novotná

Introduction had on the discourse of the conflict - igniting Syrian Civil War (SCW) has proven itself to be the highly scrutinized processes of fact- a conflict with a high degree of complexity, finding and decision making - are intertwining a large amount of local, regional, unparalleled in both the scale and scope by and global actors on a common battlefield. It any other chemical weapon proliferation is therefore of the utmost importance, to be during the SCW. Ghouta and Khan Shaykhun aware of the narratives put forward by each incidents are unprecedented hallmarks for of the sides to the conflict, in order to analyse any thorough research of the chemical it objectively and accurately. This article aims weapons use in Syria. to put forward a comprehensible sum of narratives and positions, means of Method communication, perceptions of reality, and Each identified actor will be analysed through their development, hoping to aid in any such their preferred means of communication, endeavours, with regard to the chosen actors. developments and changes in the nature of

their positions will be highlighted, as well as In line with the previous articles, this section their contribution to the discourse formation will also be focusing on the Ghouta and Khan and their stance on the prevailing perception Shaykhun chemical attacks. Alongside the of reality - i.e. truth. United Nations (UN), and similarities that allow for a side-by-side partly Organisation for the Prohibition of

comparison, presented in realist and liberal 15 Chemical Weapons (OPCW) will be occupying sections, both incidents bear two significant

a special role in this regard, slightly different Page comparative indicators for the discursive part from the rest of the actors: UN claims for itself as well. One, the immediate response to the the position of the discursive authority - alleged chemical attack was fast and extensive 1 effectively meaning the monopoly on truth. on either of the occasions, with many actors Other parties will, therefore, interact with joining the exchange of views to express their them in an unusual way, as they will either positions. Two, the impact the events have

1 OPCW cannot be treated as such in the full confirmed usage. It is the UN that seeks to extent, since the reports it puts forward are establish the assessment of blame. not able to point out the perpetrator of a

uphold their authority, be ambivalent towards statements, through reports, to full-length it, make a move to challenge it or try to sessions. influence it. OPCW

As mentioned above, the article will be In the context of the surrounding actors, dealing with Ghouta and Khan Shaykhun organisation acts more-or-less as a uniform incidents and will be further split into two body, using its own web as the primary subcategories: imminent reactions, and channel for issuing statements and reports to reactions to the reports issued by the UN fact- the public. finding missions (FFM) and the subsequent The Syrian Arab Republic voting procedures in the related UN bodies. The government presents itself chiefly The entirety of the analysed speech acts, with through the statements of the president, all the necessary references can be found Bashar al-Assad, the Minister of Foreign here. Affairs, Walid Al-Muallem, and Minister of Information, Omran al-Zoubid. The main Actors and channels node is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and The actors identified by this article as major, Expatriates web-page, and a state-run Syrian are the actors studied in the other two parts Arab News Agency (SANA). 2 of this report, and go as follows: United Russian Federation Nations (UN) and their respective bodies,3 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical The country is personally represented the Weapons (OPCW), Syrian Arab Republic most by the President, , his (SAR), Russian Federation (RF), United States spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, and the of America (USA), French Republic (FR), Minister of Foreign Affairs, . United Kingdom (UK), and Human Rights Each prefers his own way of communication: Watch (HRW) press conferences for Vladimir Putin, the ministry of foreign affairs’ web portal for United Nations Sergey Lavrov, and direct communication The main personality for the UN is through teleconferences with news agencies undoubtedly the Secretary-General, formerly such as REUTERS and TASS for Dmitry Peskov.

Ban Ki-moon, presently António Guterres. USA

Throughout the conflict, bodies such as 16 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), The President of the United States, formerly Page Human Rights Council (HRC), Joint Barrack Obama, presently Donald Trump, and Investigative Mechanism (JIM), and the special its’ Press Office is seconded by the secretaries commissions also played and continue to play of his government, such as for a significant role. The UN heavily relies on its Barrack Obama, and Rex Tillerson for Donald own media capabilities (except for press Trump - however, compared to his conferences), mainly a number of web- predecessor the incumbent president plays a portals, where it issues everything from rather assertive role in this regard. The

2 With the exception of rebel/opposition 3 Identified further ahead in the text on a case- forces. by-case basis.

Pentagon is also a vital part of the structure, Prime Minister’s office, formerly occupied by more so in the recent Khan Shaykhun events. , recently by Theresa May, The office of the President uses its own White plays a vital role in the UK’s foreign House channels, such as the official web- representation, followed by their respective page, and briefings in the notable James S. Foreign Secretaries, and Boris Brady Press Briefing Room, while the Johnson. Her Majesty’s Government government also uses its own web and press communicates largely through its own resources to issue statements. The Pentagon structures - the GOV.UK portal-node in usually communicates via its’ spokesperson particular. Cpt. Jeff Davis directly with the news agencies, HRW preferably REUTERS. HRW joins the dialogue in support of the EU discursive authority of UN and its affiliates, as The European Union joins the discourse in a a unified body, since it shares its values very limited way, mainly through the regarding human rights issues. HRW uses its imposition of sanctions. There is no distinct own website to issue statements and reports figure trying to shape the discourse regarding regarding the SCW. the chemical weapons usage - the EU is overwhelmingly represented by its member All of the abovementioned actors use various states, mainly FR and UK, the permanent media outlets - some in a limited way, some members of UNSC, and their figures. EU uses on a more frequent basis - for their its own apparatus to release the information statements in the form of interviews. A good it deems to be important. example of such would be the Laurent Fabius interview on BFM TV,4 heavily quoted France interview with Bashar al-Assad, undertaken by High-level representation considered by this the French news agency Agence France- report surprisingly does not cover the Presse (AFP),5 or even ’ President, either François Hollande or (NYT) interview with .6 Emmanuel Macron - the discourse is shaped chiefly by its foreign ministers, Laurent Fabius Setting and Jean-Marc Ayrault, using either their Before delving into the specific discourses ministerial web-portal or various news surrounding both events, it is important to

agencies for interview purposes. keep in mind the change in the general 17 narrative that happened during the past four United Kingdom Page years. The summer of 2013 was the summer

4 Laurent Fabius, “Laurent Fabius - 22/08,” Ketz, AFP, April 13, 2013, Interview by Jean-Jacques Bourdin, Bourdin http://sana.sy/en/?p=104255 Direct, BFMTV, August 22, 2013, 6 Angela Kane, “Missed Opportunity in Syria http://www.bfmtv.com/mediaplayer/video/bourdi Haunts U.N. Official,“ Interview by Rick n-direct-laurent-fabius-2208-303809.html Gladstone and Somini Sengupta, NYTIMES, 5 Bashar al-Assad, “Khan Sheikhoun incident October 2, 2013, totally fabricated..,” Interview by Sammy http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/world/ middleeast/syria.html

following the OPCW’s Third Review international community in general, rather Conference, convening in April. High than to a specific trigger event, bound to a representatives and academics from around specific actor. What would have prompted a the globe came together and sent out a vision swift diplomatic action then, will simply give of a better, less violent world. The momentum way to a force measure now. This created by this can be arguably seen in the phenomenon is also prone to a solid handling of the Ghouta chemical attack and understanding through the lenses of its aftermath - accession of the SAR to the discursive analysis, but such would need to Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has venture way beyond the content restrictions been viewed as a big leap forward in the of this article. For the purpose of this article, disarmament community, even more so for we shall suffice with what has been said those interested in the Middle East.7 It is above. arguable that the disarmament community played an important role in the political Events and responses process of 2013 - bringing to mind the former Ghouta UN High Representative for Disarmament Upon the arrival of the information regarding Affairs, Angela Kane, and her work. USA and an alleged chemical weapons use, Ban Ki- RF have just held their first Geneva platform moon “reiterated”8 that a chemical attack talks - a symbol of the Kerry-Lavrov would be a breach of the international cooperation. This was also a world unaware of humanitarian law. This was also supported by the upcoming military achievements of the the HRW, in its report from 10th September.9 Islamic State (IS) and the consequent upsurge UN also noted the presence of the professor of the worldwide terrorist attacks orchestrated Åke Sellström and his already-mandated by the group. The European Union was far team in the country and made a move for from drafting its’ Global Strategy on Foreign them to swiftly investigate the current events. and Security Policy, and the events of the Secretary-General called for both the SAR and ongoing Ukrainian crisis were yet to unfold. the rebel forces to allow for UN personnel to

investigate the matter. SAR denied its Some of the possible changes of behaviour, responsibility for the attack, through the positions, and narratives of the actors, statement of Minister of Information, Omran regarding the issue of chemical weapons use

al-Zoubid, who called in question even the in the SCW that may have happened during mere existence of chemical weapons in Syria. these four years, might therefore be 18 RF immediately suggested that the attack was attributed to the change of the mood in the a pre-planned provocation, fiercely denied Page

7 Christian Weidlich, “The biggest challenge? https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sgsm15227.do Military robotic capabilities,“ interview by Jakub c.htm Kuchar, Mezinárodní politika, IIR, December 18, 9 Human Rights Warch, Attacks on Ghouta: 2014, http://www.iir.cz/article/weidlich-the- Analysis of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in biggest-challenge-military-robotic-capabilities Syria (United States of America: Human Rights 8 Ban Ki-moon, “‘Shocked’ by Reports from Syria, Watch, 2013) Reiterates that Any Use of Chemical Weapons https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syr Would Violate International Humanitarian Law,“ ia_cw0913_web_1.pdf Secretary-General, UN, August 21, 2013,

the claims of SAR being the perpetrator of the expressed belief in their own analytic attack, and called for a thorough and capabilities with movements calling for the objective investigation. FR was the first of the use of force, undertaken in their countries’ western countries to use the word “force”, legislative bodies. David Cameron failed to voiced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, gather enough support in the House of Laurent Fabius, on a BFM TV talk-show Commons, which put the UK out of the Bourdin Direct.10 UK called upon SAR to allow picture; Barrack Obama started to pose a for a UN-led FFM to investigate the matter significant threat, with his statement, in which immediately. SAR complied with the requests he announced the willingness to circumvent and provided assistance after meeting with the UN procedures, in case he would be given the High Representative for Disarmament congressional support for the use of force. Affairs, dispatched to the country by Extensive telephone communication between Secretary-General, although noting that the John Kerry and Sergey Lavrov, Sergey area is currently rebel-held. Lavrov’s negotiation with Walid Al-Muallem, and Barrack Obama’s move for congressional UK, USA, and FR issued their reports on the approval of the use of force, resulted in an alleged attack on August the 29th11, 30th12, and announcement from SAR to access to the September the 3rd, respectively, all claiming CWC, in order to avert the threat of escalation the perpetrator to be SAR.13 In order to posed by the existing USA’s legislative challenge the discourse authority claimed by process; details were agreed upon in a new UK, USA, and FR, RF promoted the round of face-to-face talks on the Geneva information put forward by Mother Agnes platform: Geneva II Conference on Syria, Mariam al-Salib - which were later shaped resulting in an agreement announced on the into a lengthy report, released on 11th of 14th of September.15 September.14 UK and USA nevertheless

10 Laurent Fabius, “Laurent Fabius - 22/08,” syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons- Interview by Jean-Jacques Bourdin, Bourdin august-21 13 Direct, BFMTV, August 22, 2013, Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, http://www.bfmtv.com/mediaplayer/video/b “Syria/Syrian chemical programme – National executive summary of declassified intelligence,“ ourdin-direct-laurent-fabius-2208-

MAEDI, September 3, 2013, 303809.html https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Syrian_C 11 Joint Intelligence Organisation, “JIC assessment 19 hemical_Programme.pdf of 27 August on Reported Chemical Weapons 14 Mother Agnes Mariam of Cross, “The Chemical Page use in Damascus,“ JOI, August 29, 2013, Attacks in East Ghouta Used to Justify a Military https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system Right to Protect Intervention in Syria,“ The /uploads/attachment_data/file/235094/Jp_115_JD International Support Team for Mussalaha in _PM_Syria_Reported_Chemical_Weapon_Use_wit Syria, September 11, 2013, h_annex.pdf http://www.globalresearch.ca/STUDY_THE_VIDEO 12 The White House, „Government Assessment of S_THAT_SPEAKS_ABOUT_CHEMICALS_BETA_VER the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical SION.pdf Weapons on August 21, 2013,“ Office of the Press 15 John Kerry and Sergey Lavrov, “Remarks With Secretary, TWH, August 30, 2013, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov After https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press- Their Meeting,“ Remarks, Secretary of State and office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-

After the release of the report by the UN, RF chemical weapons elimination process in attempted to challenge its results through an Syria, is an evident example of this”.18 argumentation based on further promotion Khan Shaykhun of Mother Agnes’s report and materials handed to RF by SAR that disprove SAR’s FR immediately called for an emergency th 19 involvement in the perpetration, even though UNSC meeting, which convened at 5 April. the mission itself did not possess the mandate The meeting was nevertheless unable to to assign blame; RF ultimately called upon produce any resolution or a tangible result OPCW as an authority in the matters of with regard to the progress of the discourse. chemical weapons. Ban Ki-moon confirmed In response, Donald Trump authorized a the prominent position of John Kerry and strike on al-Shayrat air-base, in a gesture to Sergey Lavrov in the discourse regarding the show its willingness to go through with the solution, although assuring of UN’s vow for repercussions stemming from the 2013 deal; severe repercussions against a perpetrator of although the strike was announced to the RF the chemical attack. UNSC’s 7038th meeting beforehand, in order to prevent extensive sealed the deal regarding the SAR’s chemical material damage and loss of life, SAR claims weapon capabilities, with the Resolution the attack still resulted in casualties, 2118,16 while OPCW also passed their decision accompanied by a severe damage. EU on the destruction of SAR’s chemical released a declaration supporting UN as a weapons, EC-M-33/DEC.1, on the same day.17 body in possession of the discursive authority, It is worth noting, that on 10th of October, on together with OPCW, and reaffirmed its the occasion of Nobel Peace Prize sanction imposing mechanisms against the bestowment, RF named OPCW to be “one of confirmed violators. Vladimir Putin expressed the most effective international structures in a strong disbelief of SAR’s responsibility for the area of disarmament and non- the attack, rather suggesting it to be a false- proliferation”, further adding, that “the flag operation put forward in order to legitimize the use of force by the USA, and

Russian Foreign Minister, September 14, 2013, Foreign Affairs regarding the question of the https://2009- mass media about the award of the Nobel Peace 2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/214250 Prize to the OPCW,“ Information and Press

.htm Department, MID, October 12, 2013, 16 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/- 20 2118 (2013),“ United Nations Security Council, UN, /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/9262 September 27, 2013, 6 Page https://undocs.org/S/RES/2118(2013) 19 Jean Marc-Ayrault, “Chemical attack in Syria – 17 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Statement by Jean-Marc Ayrault, Minister of Weapons, “Decision: Destruction of Syrian Foreign Affairs and International Development (4 Chemical Weapons (EC-M-33/DEC.1),“ The April 2017),“ Minister of Foreign Affairs and Executive Council, OPCW, September 27, 2013, International Development, MAEDI, April 4, 2017, https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M- https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country- 33/ecm33dec01_e_.pdf files/syria/events/article/chemical-attack-in-syria- 18 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian statement-by-jean-marc-ayrault-minister-of- Federation, “Comment by the Information and foreign Press Department of the Russian Ministry of

warned against the possible use of such deaths, as a leader of the coalition against IS. tactics in the future. Bashar al-Assad labelled Dimitry Peskov appeared to be puzzled with the events as a fabrication, pointing out the the USA’s assessment of the situation, since feasibility of video manipulation, effectively he had no information of any possible threat, denying government’s involvement. noting that such statements against SAR are unacceptable. UK and RF clashed during a UNSC meeting at 12th of April over the remarks of Matthew OPCW issued report from 29th of June Rycroft, who blamed the SAR for perpetration prompted Boris Johnson to urge for an action of the chemical attack, citing UK’s own against SAR, even though it only confirmed investigation, calling upon RF to stop siding the use of sarin and did not assign blame - with “a murderous, barbaric criminal”, while Secretary Johnson derived the perpetrator Vladimir Safronkov responded, that he from the already-mentioned UK assessment. “cannot accept that [Matthew Rycroft] insults This report also marks a major challenge on Russia”.20 This is indeed a very different the discourse authority of OPCW by the SAR, picture of the relationship between the two which questioned the methods of research countries than the one that was developing applied by the FFM, did not back down from four years ago. its claims of having possession of no chemical weapons at all, and yet again condemned the Almost two weeks later, FR reacted with a use of such as immoral and unjustified. release of a National Evaluation report, confirming both sarin usage and government On 8th of August, Independent International perpetration of chemical attack in Khan Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Shaykhun. SAR struck back the next day, Republic (ICI) under the UN’s HRC released a noting amongst other denunciations, that FR groundbreaking resolution A/HRC/36/55 that has no legal capacity to put forward such confirmed the attack taking place and conclusions, further referring to the OPCW to assigned the blame for the perpetration to the provide the objective information regarding regime forces.21 RF subsequently decided to the attack. veto all of the autumn initiatives, effectively hindering the UN-OPCW JIM, leaving OPCW The USA further escalated the tensions in late with only a limited mandate branching out

June, warning Syrian government against from the 2013 agreements. The issue of

further chemical attacks. This sparked an chemical weapons proliferation in Syria is 21 outrage on the side of SAR, denouncing the therefore put to a stand-still, after the most Page USA, and suggesting its support for terrorist up-to-date UN document, S/2017/904 with its forces in Syria and its responsibility for civilian assessment by the Leadership Panel, explicitly

20 United Nations Security Council, “Security 21 Human Rights Council, “Report of the Council: Seventy-second year: 7921st meeting: Independent International Commission of Inquiry Wednesday, 12 April 2017, 10 a.m.: New York,“ on the Syrian Arab Republic,“ Human Rights United Nations Security Council, UN, April 12, Council, UN, August 8, 2017, 2017, http://undocs.org/A/HRC/36/55 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?sy mbol=S/PV.7921

assigning the blame to the SAR, resulting in a the U.S.-led coalition attacks, having resulted statement from the SAR repeating its in civilian casualties, by the SANA - it is hard allegation of FR being responsible for the 2013 to enjoy a moral high-ground with regard to Ghouta attack, and calling out an existence of the chemical weapons discourse, when your a western plot against the Syrian regime. potential adversary tirelessly points out your own humanitarian mishaps. It certainly Conclusion represents a field of opportunity for a larger The 2013 crisis resulted in a solution and more thorough research into the acceptable for all of the parties (as long as a discourse surrounding the chemical weapons compromise is deemed to be acceptable), usage in SWC, unfortunately not well-suited effectively meaning neither party had to step- for the format of this conflict report. down from their positions regarding the truth formation, but maintaining the role of the Hopefully, this article provided the reader with discursive authority for the UN and OPCW as a richer concept of what does the chemical well, with all of the actors being a part of a weapons discourse looks like when talking positively viewed result. about Syria, and that it contributed to the other parts of this report in a complementing On the other hand, 2017 events put a wedge manner. between the major parties, splitting western partners with SAR and its allies, prominently USA and RF, which were able to cooperate very effectively in 2013. The challenge to the authority of UN, JIM, and OPCW is unprecedented, not only by the SAR and RF but also by the USA by launching an attack on Shayrat air-base without a proper investigation by the UN mechanisms. The actual consequences of this challenge remain to be seen yet. Finally, it is imperative to keep in mind the limitations of the narrow research presented above. The role of the media has

not been analysed at all, yet, it cannot be 22 disputed that the media represent a Page significant force shaping the discourse. In order to keep the context of the issue fluid for the reader, let us indulge in a pair of examples, encountered during this analysis. For example, the western media might be a target of bias accusations, when jumping to conclusions of blame assignment, resulting from merely neutral reports. Another notable example of the discourse shaping by the media might be the methodical listing of all of

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Would Violate International Humanitarian Law.“ Secretary-General, UN, August 21, 2013.

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24 Page

CBAP Conflict Report, Issue no.1, December 2017

Editors: Branislav Mičko Adriana Oboňová

Strategic Effects of the Chemical Weapons Usage in the Syrian Civil War: Radka Roháriková Samo Žilinčík

Comparison of Western Soft Power Usage After Chemical Attacks in Syria: Michal Myklín Natália de Figueiredo Coelho Maciel

Roles and Contributions of the Major Actors to the Discourse of the Chemical Weapons Use in the Ongoing Syrian Civil War: Jakub Kuchar Tereza Novotná

cbap.cz [email protected] facebook.com/pg/CBAP twitter.com/cbap_cz

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