ATTITUDES 1

The Associative-Propositional Duality in the Representation, Formation, and Expression of Attitudes

Bertram Gawronski University of Texas at Austin Skylar M. Brannon University of Texas at Austin Galen V. Bodenhausen Northwestern University

One of the most significant developments in the distinct principles of information processing and history of social psychology has been the emergence of behavior determination. The reflective system is dual-process theories (for reviews, see Gawronski & assumed to influence behavior through reasoned Creighton, 2013; Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, decisions that are based on beliefs about facts and 2014). The central assumption underlying these values. In contrast, the impulsive system is assumed to theories is that judgments and behavior are the product elicit spontaneous tendencies of approach and of two qualitatively distinct mental processes, one of avoidance through the spread of activation within which operates in an automatic fashion, while the other associative networks. Although the RIM shares many operates in a controlled fashion. This idea also had a assumptions with Smith and DeCoster’s (2000) major impact on attitude research, which has been framework, the two theories differ in their emphasis of guided by dual-process theories since their first central characteristics of the proposed systems. appearance in the field. For example, the MODE model Whereas Smith and DeCoster’s theory expands on provided valuable insights into two distinct pathways connectionist models of learning and memory that by which attitudes guide behavior (Fazio, 1990); the distinguish between the incremental formation of elaboration-likelihood model (ELM) integrated a wide associations and the rapid learning of inferential rules range of disparate findings by distinguishing between (McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995), Strack central and peripheral routes to attitude change (Petty and Deutsch’s theory emphasizes the interactive roles & Cacioppo, 1986); and the heuristic-systematic model of associative and propositional processes in the (HSM) illuminated the interplay of heuristic and determination of human behavior. Since the publication systematic processes underlying the effects of of Strack and Deutsch’s seminal article, the associative- persuasive messages (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, propositional duality has had a major impact on attitude 1989). research, including our own work under the umbrella of Integrating these and various other dual-process the associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model theories within a single unifying framework, Smith and (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). DeCoster (2000) argued that the proposed dualities can Although attitude research guided by the be understood in terms of two mental systems with associative-propositional duality has led to many distinct functional properties. One system, described as invaluable insights, it has also been the target of associative, is assumed to capture observed regularities criticism. The most prominent critique is that the through the slow, incremental formation of associations observed phenomena can be explained by single- on the basis of feature similarity and spatio-temporal process propositional accounts without invoking any contiguity. The other system, described as rule-based, reference to the notion of associative processing (e.g., draws on symbolically represented rules that can be De Houwer, 2009, 2014; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, learned rapidly on the basis of very few experiences. 2011; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999; Mitchell, De Smith and DeCoster’s integration of various domain- Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). In the current chapter, we specific dual-process theories provided the basis for the address this criticism with an emphasis on the different development of generalized dual-process theories that meanings of the associative-propositional duality in the aim to identify basic principles of information attitudes literature. Our main argument is that the processing and their implications for human behavior. associative-propositional duality has been used One of the most influential examples of such interchangeably to refer to three different aspects of generalized dual-process theories is Strack and attitudes: (1) the nature of stored evaluative Deutsch’s (2004) reflective-impulsive model (RIM). representations in long-term memory, (2) the processes According to the RIM, human behavior is guided by by which evaluative representations are formed, and (3) two interacting systems that are characterized by the processes involved in the behavioral expression of

To appear in: R. Deutsch, B. Gawronski, & W. Hofmann (Eds.). Reflective and Impulsive Determinants of Human Behavior. New York: Psychology Press. ATTITUDES 2

stored evaluative representations. Drawing on a Associations can be understood as dormant links conceptual analysis of the three aspects, we argue that between nodes that constrain the spread of activation some disagreements between dual-process and single- within associative networks. Activated patterns of process theorists involve genuine empirical issues, associations, in turn, are assumed to provide the basis whereas others are the product of differing terminology for momentarily constructed propositions about states and mischaracterizations of the dual-process view. On of affairs. From this perspective, any proposition is the basis of our analysis, we conclude that the based on patterns of activated associations; there is no associative-propositional distinction is (1) theoretically association-independent storage of propositional implausible for the nature of evaluative representations, statements in a different part of long-term memory. (2) empirically supported for the formation of A second feature that is often used to distinguish evaluative representations, and (3) conceptually between associations and propositions is that warranted for the behavioral expression of evaluative propositions describe how two (or more) concepts are representations. related. This capacity is claimed to be absent in Nature of Evaluative Representations associations, which capture the mere fact that two (or more) concepts are related (De Houwer, 2009). In the context of evaluative representations, the According to this view, a simple associative link associative-propositional duality has sometimes been between A and B does not provide any information on used to refer to associations and propositions as distinct whether A causes or prevents B, or whether A likes or knowledge structures in long-term memory. dislikes B. This argument is particularly important for Theoretically, associations are mental links between attitude research, because the nature of the relation nodes that may differ in terms of their relative strength; between objects and events can have different propositions are mentally represented statements about implications for the evaluation of an attitude object. For states of affairs that may be deemed accurate or example, an object that prevents positive outcomes is inaccurate. According to this conceptualization, likely perceived negatively despite the association with associations and propositions differ in two fundamental something good, and being disliked by a dislikeable ways (De Houwer, 2009). First, whereas propositions person may be perceived as something good despite the have a subjective truth value in the sense that they may association with something bad (Heider, 1958). There be deemed accurate or inaccurate, associations are is no doubt that humans have the capacity to understand neither true nor false. Second, it has been argued that these differences, which has led proponents of propositions go beyond mere associations by specifying propositional accounts to reject the idea of associations the manner in which concepts are related (e.g., A is a as a basis for stored knowledge (e.g., De Houwer, 2009; cause of B vs. A is an effect of B). We argue that either Mandelbaum, 2015). of these characteristics provides a weak basis for duality We argue that this rejection is based on a very claims at the level of stored knowledge structures in narrow interpretation of associative representations that long-term memory. reduces them to primitive links between two concept Although some theorists assume that people can nodes. After all, multi-layer connectionist models have two distinct attitudes toward the same object involving both excitatory and inhibitory links are stored in memory (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; perfectly able to represent complex relations between Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000), we argue that a objects and events (e.g., McClelland et al., 1995). Such duality account based on the distinction between models often include a hierarchical structure, in that associations and propositions as two independent activated concepts at higher levels specify the relation memory structures is theoretically implausible. Such an between activated concepts at lower levels. Mental account would imply that propositional statements representations of this kind could be described as about states of affairs are stored in a manner that does propositional, because they capture relational not involve any kind of associative links. Counter to this information. Alternatively, they could be described as idea, most theories that are based on the associative- associative, because they are based on associative links propositional duality do not assume two distinct between nodes. From this perspective, the preferred memory stores for associations and propositions (e.g., label becomes a matter of terminological taste rather Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Instead, these theories than genuine theoretical disagreement. In our view, the propose a single associative store that provides the basis central question is not whether associative networks are for propositions about states of affairs in the form of capable of representing complex relations between patterns of momentarily activated associations. stimuli. Rather, the more important question is whether According to this view, the distinction between observed co-occurrences of stimuli in the environment associations and propositions does not describe two can create unqualified links between the co-occurring distinct types of stored knowledge structures in long- stimuli irrespective of their relation (e.g., an unqualified term memory, but different states of stored knowledge.

To appear in: R. Deutsch, B. Gawronski, & W. Hofmann (Eds.). Reflective and Impulsive Determinants of Human Behavior. New York: Psychology Press. ATTITUDES 3

associative link between A and B, when A prevents B).1 direct investigations of these issues suggest a negative This question does not pertain to the status of answer to the first question, there is strong evidence for associations and propositions as distinct knowledge an affirmative answer to the second question. structures in long-term memory, but to the role of In response to the challenge of single-process associative and propositional processes in the formation propositional theories, Peters and Gawronski (2011a) of evaluative representations. conducted a series of studies that investigated the Formation of Evaluative Representations interactive effects of observed contingencies and their perceived validity on spontaneous and deliberate In the context of attitude formation and change, the evaluations. Using a simple impression formation task, associative-propositional duality has been used to participants were presented with evaluative statements describe two functionally distinct mechanisms by about four target individuals. For two of the four which mental representations are formed (Gawronski & targets, 75% of the statements were positive and 25% Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). The first mechanism, often were negative. For the other two targets, 75% of the described as associative learning, involves the statements were negative and 25% were positive. formation of mental links on the basis of observed Participants’ task was to guess whether each statement spatio-temporal contiguities between objects and was correct or incorrect. Orthogonal to the events. Resonating with the Hebbian principle of fire manipulation of valence proportions, participants together, wire together, this learning mechanism is received feedback on their individual guesses, such that assumed to capture regularities in the environment by for two of the targets the majority information was creating direct mental links between simultaneously always correct and the minority information was always activated concepts: “The general idea is an old one, that incorrect; for the remaining two targets the feedback any two cells or systems of cells that are repeatedly suggested that the minority information was correct and active at the same time will tend to become associated, the majority information was incorrect. Afterwards, so that activity in one facilitates activity in the other” spontaneous evaluations were measured with two (Hebb, 1949, p. 70). The second mechanism, often variants of affective priming (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, described as propositional learning, involves the & Williams, 1995; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, formation of mental representations on the basis of 2005); deliberate evaluations were assessed with a self- newly acquired information about states of affairs. report measure. Similar to the distinction between associations and Drawing on the assumption that spontaneous propositions as mental structures, the two learning evaluations are more sensitive to the effects of mechanisms differ in two fundamental ways. First, associative learning whereas deliberate evaluations are whereas associative learning is based on observed more sensitive to the effects of propositional learning regularities regardless of their perceived validity, (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), Peters and propositional learning depends on the perceived Gawronski expected that spontaneous evaluations validity of newly acquired information. Second, would show an unqualified main effect of the observed whereas the representational products of propositional valence contingencies, such that participants’ learning capture the relation between two co-occurring evaluations would reflect the relative proportion of stimuli, the representational products of associative positive and negative statements irrespective of their learning reflect the mere co-occurrence of stimuli validity. In contrast, deliberate evaluations were regardless of their (presumed or actual) relation. expected to show an interaction of valence proportions Proponents of single-process propositional theories and validity feedback, reflecting the actual validity of have questioned the existence of associative learning, the observed statements rather than the mere claiming that all learning in humans is the result of proportions of positive and negative statements. propositional processes (e.g., De Houwer, 2009; Counter to these predictions, both spontaneous and Mitchell et al., 2009). Based on a conceptualization of deliberate evaluations showed a significant interaction, associative and propositional learning in terms of indicating that validity information fully qualified the perceived validity and relational information, two effects of the observed contingencies. These results central questions in this debate are: (1) Is there evidence pose a challenge to dual-process theories of learning, for effects of environmental regularities when the which assume that observed regularities can influence observed regularities are deemed invalid? (2) Is there evaluative representations through associative learning evidence for effects of mere co-occurrences regardless even when these regularities are deemed invalid. of the relation of the co-occurring stimuli? Although

1 It is worth noting that even associatively represented co-occurrence and thunder occur together). From this perspective, the involves relational information that may serve as a basis for representation of relational content reflects a gradual feature propositions about states of affairs (e.g., an unqualified association involving different levels of complexity rather than a categorical between lightning and thunder as a basis for the proposition lightning difference between two distinct types of mental representations.

To appear in: R. Deutsch, B. Gawronski, & W. Hofmann (Eds.). Reflective and Impulsive Determinants of Human Behavior. New York: Psychology Press. ATTITUDES 4

At first glance, Peters and Gawronski’s findings more favorable judgments of stimuli that stopped may seem inconsistent with earlier findings showing unpleasant sounds compared with stimuli that stopped that negation (or invalidation) is often ineffective in pleasant sounds. In contrast, the measure of qualifying the effects of positive and negative spontaneous evaluations reflected the mere co- information on spontaneous evaluations (e.g., Deutsch, occurrence of CSs and USs regardless of their relation. Gawronski, & Strack, 2006; Gawronski, Deutsch, That is, participants showed more favorable responses Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008). Yet, an important to stimuli that co-occurred with pleasant sounds difference between the two lines of research is that compared with stimuli that co-occurred with unpleasant Peters and Gawronski investigated the impact of sounds, regardless of whether the stimuli started or negation during the formation of evaluative stopped the sounds. representations, whereas earlier research focused on Hu et al. (2015) recently replicated this pattern negation effects during the expression of existing using an affective priming task (Fazio et al., 1995) and representations. In fact, when Peters and Gawronski a manipulation of relational information that may be included a delay between the encoding of evaluative regarded as more ecologically valid. In this study, information and its invalidation, they replicated the participants were presented with image pairs involving typical dissociation between spontaneous and pharmaceutical products and positive or negative health deliberate evaluations, showing that spontaneous conditions. Participants were told that the evaluations were less sensitive to negation than pharmaceutical products either cause or prevent the deliberate evaluations. Together, these findings suggest depicted health conditions. This manipulation was that negation-related dissociations between based on the idea that pharmaceutical products can have spontaneous and deliberate evaluations are due to positive effects (e.g., curing eczema; causing healthy processes operating during the expression rather than skin) as well as negative side-effects (e.g., causing the formation of evaluative representations. eczema; impairing healthy skin). Consistent with Although Peters and Gawronski’s findings suggest Moran and Bar-Anan’s (2013) results, Hu et al. found a rejection of the associative-propositional duality with that deliberate evaluations of the pharmaceutical regard to the impact of subjective validity during products reflected the relation between the product and learning, there is evidence that observed co-occurrences the depicted health condition. Specifically, participants can influence evaluative representations regardless of showed more favorable judgments of products that the relation between co-occurring stimuli. This caused positive health conditions compared with evidence comes from research on evaluative products that caused negative health conditions. conditioning (EC), showing that repeated pairings of a Conversely, participants showed more favorable neutral conditioned stimulus (CS) with a positive or judgments of products that prevented negative health negative unconditioned stimulus (US) can lead to conditions compared with products that prevented valence-congruent changes in the evaluation of the CS positive health conditions. In contrast, spontaneous that are unqualified by the particular relation between evaluations of the products remained unqualified by t