CHAPTER 14 Dual Process Th eories
Bertram Gawronski and Laura A. Creighton
Abstract
Dual process theories divide the realm of mental processes into two general categories depending on whether they operate automatically or in a controlled fashion. This chapter provides an overview of dual process theories in social psychology, focusing on their historical and conceptual developments. Identifying three general categories of dual process theories, the chapter distinguishes between domain-specific theories that focus on particular phenomena, generalized dual process theories that identify domain-independent principles underlying various kinds of phenomena, and formalized dual process theories that quantify the joint contributions of automatic and controlled processes to responses within a single task. The chapter also discusses critical arguments against each type of dual process theorizing, which are integrated in a general outlook on future directions. Key Words: attitudes, attribution, automaticity, control, dual process theories, impression formation, persuasion, prejudice, stereotyping
Introduction Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000), prejudice and For the past three decades, a large body of research stereotyping (e.g., Devine, 1989), impression forma- in social cognition has been shaped and guided by tion (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), a class of theories that are generically described as and dispositional attribution (e.g., Gilbert, 1989; dual process theories (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Th e Trope, 1986), dual process theorizing in the past defi ning characteristic of these theories is that they decade shifted toward integrative models that aim at divide the mental processes underlying social judg- identifying general principles assumed to be domain ments and behavior into two general categories independent. Th ese integrative models can be fur- depending on whether they operate automatically ther divided into generalized dual process theories or in a controlled fashion. Because the distinction that describe mental processing by means of two between automatic and controlled processes has domain-independent operating principles (e.g., become a central component in virtually all areas Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2003; Lieberman, 2003; of social psychology (see Chapter 12), it is diffi cult Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) to imagine what contemporary social psychology and formalized dual process theories that quan- would look like without the theoretical guidance of tify the contributions of distinct mental processes dual process theories. to behavioral responses by means of mathematical Whereas early dual process theories focused pri- modeling techniques (e.g., Payne, 2008; Sherman marily on domain-specifi c phenomena, such as per- et al., 2008). suasion (e.g., Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, Th e aim of the current chapter is to provide a 1986), attitude–behavior relations (e.g., Fazio, 1990; general overview of dual process theories in social
282
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 228282 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:07:29:07 PPMM cognition with the goal of identifying both his- psychology involve combinations of the proposed torical and conceptual developments since their features, which classify them as “automatic” in one emergence in the mid-1980s. For this purpose, sense and “controlled” in another (Bargh, 1994). we fi rst provide a brief discussion of the distinc- Th is insight has inspired a disjunctive conceptual- tion between automatic and controlled processes, ization of automaticity, according to which a pro- which serves as a basis for our overview of dual cess can be characterized as automatic if it meets at process theories. We then review the most infl uen- least one of the four criteria of automaticity. Th at is, tial phenomenon-specifi c theories that have set the a process can be described as automatic if it is either foundation for the ubiquitous dual process paradigm (1) unintentional, (2) effi cient, (3) uncontrollable, within social psychology. Expanding on this review, or (4) unconscious. the following two sections discuss the tenets of gen- Even though the disjunctive treatment of auto- eralized and formalized dual process theories that maticity is rather common in social psychology, it have gained considerable impact within and beyond involves several problems. First, if the presence of a social psychology during the past decade. At the end single feature is suffi cient to call a process automatic of each section, we also discuss critical arguments or controlled, it is possible that a given process will that have been raised against phenomenon-specifi c, have to be described as automatic and controlled generalized, and formalized dual process theories, at the same time. Needless to say, such a descrip- which are integrated in our outlook in the fi nal part tion can be rather confusing if it is not specifi ed of this chapter. in which particular sense the process is described as automatic and in which sense it is described as Automaticity and Control controlled. Second, the generic use of the term Dual process theories have their roots in the automatic to describe any of the four operating assumption that the universe of mental processes conditions can lead to confusion about conceptu- can be divided into two general classes: those that ally distinct fi ndings that are described with the operate automatically and those that operate in a same term. For example, a given Process A may be controlled fashion (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiff rin described as automatic because it does not require a & Schneider, 1977). In social cognition, automatic large amount of cognitive resources, whereas another processes are typically characterized in terms of four Process B may be described as automatic because operating conditions: (1) they are elicited uninten- it is elicited unintentionally. Yet, the two processes tionally; (2) they require little amounts of cognitive may still diff er in their operating conditions, if, resources; (3) they cannot be stopped voluntarily; for example, Process A, but not Process B, can be and (4) they occur outside of conscious awareness stopped voluntarily. Based on these considerations, (Bargh, 1994). Conversely, controlled processes are several theorists have recommended that researchers characterized as those that (1) are initiated inten- should be more precise in their use of terminology tionally; (2) require considerable amounts of cogni- by describing each feature of automaticity with its tive resources; (3) can be stopped voluntarily; and proper label, that is, unintentional, effi cient, uncon- (4) operate within conscious awareness (for a more trollable, or unconscious (Bargh, 1994; Moors & fi ne-grained analysis of these features and their De Houwer, 2006). As we will outline in the follow- interrelations, see Moors & De Houwer, 2006). ing sections, diff erent kinds of dual process theories Initially, automatic and controlled processes emphasize diff erent features of automaticity, which were conceptualized in an all-or-none fashion, makes terminological precision particularly impor- implying that a given process can be characterized tant to avoid conceptual confusion. either by the four features of automatic processing or by the four features of controlled processing. Phenomenon-Specifi c Dual According to this dual mode view, the “four horse- Process Th eories men” of automaticity (i.e., intentionality, effi ciency, As noted in the introductory section of this controllability, awareness) constitute a fi xed set of chapter, early dual process theories tended to be characteristics that are perfectly correlated (see domain specifi c in that they focused on particular Moors & De Houwer, 2006). However, challeng- phenomena. In the current section, we fi rst review ing the usefulness of this all-or-none conceptualiza- the core assumptions of the most infl uential the- tion, it soon turned out that there is virtually no ories of this kind and then discuss criticism that process that meets all four operating criteria (Bargh, has been raised against phenomenon-specifi c dual 1992). Instead, most processes studied within social process theories.
Gawronski, Creighton 283
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 228383 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:09:29:09 PPMM Persuasion elaboration likelihood model Two of the most prominent dual process theories Th e central notion of Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) are the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty ELM is that attitude change occurs along an elabo- & Cacioppo, 1986) and the heuristic systematic ration continuum whereby persuasion is determined model (HSM; Chaiken, 1987) of persuasion. Th e by how motivated and able an individual is to engage central question of these models concerns the con- in eff ortful information processing (Figure 14.1). ditions under which diff erent aspects of a persuasive Th e basic assumption is that the higher an indi- message (e.g., strength of arguments, attractiveness vidual’s cognitive elaboration, the more likely he or of the source) infl uence the eff ectiveness of persua- she is to process all object-relevant information. At sive appeals. the high end of the elaboration continuum, people
PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION PERIPHERAL ATTITUDE SHIFT changed attitude is relatively temporary, not predictive of behavior, and susceptible to counterpersuasion MOTIVATED TO PROCESS? (personal involvement, etc.) NO YES
YES IS A PERIPHERAL NO PROCESS OPERATING? ABILITY TO PROCESS? (expertise of source, source (distraction, prior knowledge, etc.) attractiveness, use of heuristics, etc.)
YES
NO WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE PROCESSING? (argument quality, etc.)
MORE MORE RETAIN INITIAL ATTITUDE FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE NO attitude does not change from THOUGHTS THOUGHTS previous position THAN BEFORE? THAN BEFORE?
YES YES
IS THERE A CHANGE IN NO COGNITIVE STRUCTURE? (thought rehearsal, reflection time, etc.)
YES YES favorable unfavorable
CENTRAL POSITIVE/NEGATIVE ATTITUDE CHANGE changed attitude is relatively enduring, predictive of behavior, and resistant to counterpersuasion
Figure 14.1 Th e elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. (Adapted from Petty & Cacioppo, 1986. Reprinted with permission.)
284 Dual Process Theories
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 228484 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:09:29:09 PPMM assess all of the available object-relevant information (2) by serving as a cue, (3) by determining the extent (e.g., strength of the presented arguments) and inte- of cognitive elaboration, and (4) by producing a grate this information with their stored knowledge bias in the processing of the available information in order to obtain a carefully considered (although (Petty & Wegener, 1999). Th ese assumptions make not necessarily unbiased) evaluation (central route ). the model very fl exible in accounting for a variety Conversely, at the low end of the elaboration con- of eff ects in the persuasion literature. At the same tinuum, people engage in considerably less scrutiny time, the multiple-roles hypothesis makes it diffi cult of object-relevant information (peripheral route ). to predict the outcome for a given persuasion situa- When elaboration is low, attitude change can be tion, if the conditions under which a particular vari- eff ected from a cursory examination of the available able will take on any of the proposed roles are not information (e.g., by examining only a subset of the specifi ed. available information) or by the use of heuristics and other types of information processing shortcuts heuristic systematic model (e.g., I agree with people I like). Compared with atti- Similar to Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) ELM, tudes that are changed through the central route, Chaiken’s (1987) HSM describes two basic per- attitudes changed through the peripheral route tend suasion processes that may guide an individual’s to be relatively weak, susceptible to counterpersua- judgments of an attitude object (see also Chen sion, and less predictive of behavior (e.g., Petty, & Chaiken, 1999; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983). 1989). Systematic processing involves comprehen- Addressing a common misconception about the sive consideration of object-relevant information, ELM, Petty and Wegener (1999) pointed out that which requires high levels of motivation and ability the infl uence of a particular persuasion variable will to engage in eff ortful processing. Heuristic process- not necessarily increase or decrease as one moves ing, in contrast, relies on the activation, accessibility, along the elaboration continuum. For example, and applicability of learned heuristics that require a common interpretation of the ELM is that high relatively few cognitive resources (e.g., I agree with elaboration increases the impact of primary features people I like). According to the HSM, the likelihood of the persuasive message (e.g., argument quality), that an individual engages in systematic processing is whereas low elaboration increases the impact of sec- guided by the suffi ciency principle, which states that ondary cues (e.g., source attractiveness). Th is inter- the motivation to engage in systematic processing pretation is qualifi ed by the ELM’s multiple-roles increases to the extent that an individual’s desired hypothesis, which specifi es that a given variable can level of confi dence falls below his or her actual level infl uence attitudes by diff erent processes at diff erent of confi dence. Th at is, individuals are more likely points along the elaboration continuum. To illus- to engage in systematic processing when the diff er- trate this assumption, consider a commercial ad in ence between their desired and their actual levels which a physically attractive source endorses either of confi dence is high. Conversely, people are more a beauty product (relevant source attractiveness) or likely to engage in heuristic processing when the the services of a roofi ng company (irrelevant source diff erence between their desired and actual levels of attractiveness; see Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). Under confi dence is low. Importantly, systematic process- conditions of low elaboration, source attractiveness ing may not necessarily lead to unbiased judgments may have a positive eff ect on evaluations of both the because systematic processing can be infl uenced beauty product and the roofi ng company by virtue by defense motivation and impression management. of mere association. Under conditions of high elabo- Defense motivation refers to the desire to defend ration, however, source attractiveness may infl uence preexisting attitudes, whereas impression manage- evaluations through a diff erent process with diff erent ment refers to the desire to hold attitudes that sat- outcomes for the two products. Whereas evaluations isfy specifi c social goals. of the beauty product may be infl uenced by source Another central assumption of the HSM is that attractiveness because of its perceived relevance for heuristic and systematic processing may co-occur evaluating the product, the persuasive eff ect on eval- and interact with each other to exert either inde- uations of the roofi ng company may be attenuated pendent or interdependent eff ects on evaluations. because of the perceived irrelevance of source attrac- First, according to the model’s attenuation hypoth- tiveness. Overall, the multiple-roles hypothesis states esis, systematic processing can completely override that any persuasion variable can infl uence attitudes the eff ects of heuristic processing (e.g., Maheswaran in four diff erent ways: (1) by serving as an argument, & Chaiken, 1991). Such attenuation eff ects are
Gawronski, Creighton 285
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 228585 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:09:29:09 PPMM likely to occur when systematic processing yields mode model information that contradicts the validity of simple One such dual process theory is Fazio’s (1990) persuasion heuristics. Second, the information gen- M otivation and O pportunity as DE terminants erated by heuristic and systematic processing may (MODE) model, which specifi es two distinct pro- jointly infl uence evaluations in an additive manner cesses by which attitudes can guide behavior depend- (e.g., Maheswaran, Mackie, & Chaiken, 1992). ing on the person’s motivation and opportunity to According to the model’s additivity hypothesis, such engage in deliberate processing (for recent reviews, eff ects are likely to occur when the two processing see Fazio, 2007; Olson & Fazio, 2009). A central modes do not yield confl icting reactions. Finally, component of the MODE model is the defi nition of when the message content is ambiguous, heuristic attitude as the mental association between an object cues may bias the eff ects of systematic processing, and a person’s summary evaluation of that object as described by the model’s bias hypothesis . For (Fazio, 1995, 2007). To the extent that this associa- example, if the strength of a persuasive argument tion is suffi ciently strong, the evaluation associated is ambiguous, the argument may be perceived as with the object may be activated automatically upon more convincing if it is presented by an expert than encountering that object (i.e., without intention to if it is presented by a layperson (e.g., Chaiken & evaluate the object; see Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, Maheswaran, 1994). & Kardes, 1986). Such automatically activated In terms of its core assumptions, the HSM shows attitudes are assumed to infl uence an individual’s considerable resemblance to the ELM (Petty & spontaneous interpretation of the current situation, Cacioppo, 1986). For example, both models main- which in turn will guide the individual’s behavior tain that attitude change can occur through either without him or her necessarily being aware of the (1) systematic/central processing that requires some attitude’s infl uence ( spontaneous attitude–behavior degree of motivation and capacity or (2) heuristic/ process ). Alternatively, individuals may scrutinize peripheral processing that is assumed to require lit- specifi c attributes of the object and the current situ- tle motivation or capacity. However, the two models ation (deliberate attitude–behavior process). However, diff er in their treatment of heuristic and peripheral such deliberate analyses require that an individual processes (Chen & Chaiken, 1999). Whereas the has both the motivation and the opportunity (i.e., ELM assumes an inverse relationship between cen- adequate time and cognitive resources) to engage in tral and peripheral processing along the elaboration eff ortful information processing. Th us, to the extent continuum, the HSM assumes that systematic and that either the motivation or the opportunity to heuristic processing may occur simultaneously with engage in eff ortful processing is low, automatically either independent or interactive eff ects. Hence, activated attitudes may guide behavior through the ELM holds that there is a trade-off between their eff ect on the spontaneous construal of the cur- peripheral and central processing, such that the rent situation. However, if both the motivation and importance of one processing mode decreases as the the opportunity to engage in eff ortful processing are importance of the other processing mode increases. high, the impact of automatically activated attitudes In contrast, under the HLM’s conceptualization, on behavior will depend on particular aspects of the individuals can engage in systematic and heuristic current situation, including specifi c attributes of the processing simultaneously. attitude object or salient norms (Fazio, 1990; see also Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Attitude–Behavior Relations An important application of the MODE model Expanding on the question of how attitudes are concerns the relation between explicit and implicit formed and changed, another class of dual process measures of attitudes (see Fazio & Olson, 2003, theories describes the mechanisms through which Olson & Fazio, 2009). According to the MODE attitudes guide behavior. Th ese models have been model, implicit measures of attitudes—such as evalu- inspired by recurring debates about whether and ative priming (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, to what extent attitudes infl uence behavior (e.g., 1995) or the implicit association test (Greenwald, Wicker, 1969). By shifting the focus from asking McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998)—reduce partici- “Do attitudes guide behavior?” to the question, “How pants’ opportunity to engage in eff ortful process- do attitudes guide behavior? ” dual process theoriz- ing. Consequently, participants’ responses on these ing provided important insights into the condi- measures will directly refl ect their automatically tions under which attitudes do or do not infl uence activated attitudes (but see Olson & Fazio, 2004). behavior. In contrast, verbally reported evaluations assessed
286 Dual Process Theories
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 228686 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:09:29:09 PPMM by explicit measures are relatively easy to control. Another important implication of the dual atti- Th us, to the extent that participants lack either the tude model is that implicit attitudes should be more motivation or the opportunity to engage in eff ortful diffi cult to change than explicit attitudes. Even processing, explicit measures should reveal the same though this prediction has been confi rmed in several automatically activated attitudes that are refl ected studies that used implicit measures to assess implicit in implicit measures. If, however, participants have attitudes and self-report measures to assess explicit both the motivation and the opportunity to engage attitudes (e.g., Gawronski & Strack, 2004; Gregg, in a deliberate analysis of the current situation, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006), there is accumulating evi- explicit measures may refl ect whatever evaluation dence that attitudes assessed with implicit measures is implied by these inferences. Within the domain can sometimes change rather quickly, with little of racial prejudice, for example, the infl uence of an counterattitudinal information (e.g., Gawronski & automatically activated prejudicial attitude on ver- LeBel, 2008; Olson & Fazio, 2006). In addition, bally reported evaluations may be mitigated if an attitudes assessed with implicit measures have been individual is motivated to control his or her preju- shown to be highly context sensitive, such that the diced reactions. Consequently, automatic prejudi- same object may elicit diff erent evaluative responses cial attitudes assessed by implicit measures should as a function of the context in which it is encoun- be directly refl ected in explicit evaluative judgments tered (for a review, see Gawronski & Sritharan, when the motivation to control prejudiced reactions 2010). Th ese fi ndings have inspired the development is low, but not when it is high (e.g., Dunton & Fazio, of alternative models that were especially designed 1997). More generally, these assumptions imply that to explain diff erent patterns of implicit and explicit implicit attitude measures should be better predic- attitude change (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, tors of spontaneous behaviors that are relatively dif- 2006a, 2011; Petty, Bri ñ ol, & DeMarree, 2007). fi cult to control (e.g., nonverbal behavior), whereas explicit attitude measures should be better predic- Prejudice and Stereotyping tors of deliberate behaviors that are relatively easy to One of the most striking fi ndings in research on control (e.g., content of verbal responses). prejudice and stereotyping is that public opinion polls in North America showed a steady decline in dual attitude model negative evaluations of racial minority groups after Similar predictions are implied by Wilson World War II, whereas racial confl icts showed only and colleagues’ (2000) dual attitude model, even a moderate reduction (e.g., Greeley & Sheatsley, though its underlying assumptions about attitude 1971; Taylor, Sheatsley, & Greeley, 1978). Th is representation are quite diff erent from the core discrepancy inspired social psychologists to postu- assumptions of the MODE model. According to late more subtle forms of racial prejudice, such as the dual attitude model, people may simultane- modern (McConahay, 1986), aversive (Gaertner & ously hold two attitudes toward the same object, Dovidio, 1986), or symbolic (Sears, 1988) racism. which are described as implicit attitude and explicit Th e general notion underlying these constructs is attitude (see also Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). that racial prejudice has simply changed its face, Such dual representations are assumed to emerge rather than been abandoned. A very similar idea when a previously acquired attitude is challenged provided the inspiration for Devine’s (1989) dis- by counterattitudinal information, and the newly sociation model, which was seminal in introducing formed, explicit attitude does not erase the previ- the distinction between automatic and controlled ously acquired, implicit attitude from memory. To processes to research on prejudice and stereotyping. the extent that the old, implicit attitude is highly overlearned, it may be activated automatically. In dissociation model contrast, retrieving the newly formed, explicit atti- A central aspect of Devine’s (1989) dissociation tude from memory is assumed to require cognitive model is the distinction between the knowledge eff ort. As a result, earlier acquired, implicit attitudes of a social stereotype and the belief in the accu- should guide judgments and behavior when either racy of that stereotype. According to Devine, both the motivation or the capacity to engage in eff ortful low-prejudice and high-prejudice individuals tend processing is low. However, judgments and behav- to be familiar with the contents of prevailing cultural ior should be infl uenced by more recently acquired, stereotypes. However, the two groups diff er with explicit attitudes when both the motivation and the respect to their personal beliefs about the accuracy capacity to engage in eff ortful processing are high. of these stereotypes. To the extent that stereotypic
Gawronski, Creighton 287
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 228787 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:09:29:09 PPMM knowledge is acquired during early childhood to misidentify harmless objects as weapons when and highly overlearned as a result of socialization they are held by a black person rather than a white processes, stereotypic knowledge is assumed to be person (for a review, see Payne, 2006). According activated automatically upon encountering mem- to the MODE model, such unintentional errors bers of stereotyped groups, and this occurs for both reveal an individual’s personal attitudes when the low-prejudice and high-prejudice individuals. In individual does not have the opportunity to adjust contrast, the rejection of stereotypic knowledge is his or her automatic responses to egalitarian norms. assumed to be the result of egalitarian, nonpreju- In contrast, from the perspective of Devine’s (1989) dicial beliefs, which tend to be acquired later in model, unintentional errors in weapon identifi - the socialization process (e.g., Banse, Gawronski, cation reveal the ubiquitous infl uence of cultural Rebetez, Gutt, & Morton, 2010). Because these stereotypes that are independent of the individual’s beliefs are less overlearned than earlier acquired personal beliefs. stereotypic knowledge, replacing automatically acti- vated stereotypes with egalitarian, nonprejudicial Impression Formation beliefs requires the operation of controlled pro- Similar to Devine’s (1989) dissociation model cessing. In other words, while the model assumes of prejudice and stereotyping, dual process theo- that automatic stereotype activation is equally ries of impression formation emphasize the role strong and inescapable for both high-prejudice of social category information in early processing and low-prejudice individuals, the two groups dif- stages. However, whereas Devine’s model focuses fer at the level of controlled processing, such that particularly on the unintentional activation versus low-prejudice but not high-prejudice individuals controlled suppression of stereotypes, dual process replace automatically activated stereotypes with theories of impression formation specify the con- egalitarian, nonprejudicial beliefs. In terms of the ditions under which personal impressions of an four characteristics of automaticity, these assump- individual are dominated by category-related or tions imply that the activation of social stereotypes person-specifi c information. occurs unintentionally, even though their impact on overt behavior can be controlled through eff ortful continuum model processes. Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) continuum model A notable aspect of Devine’s (1989) dissociation of impression formation proposes that the processes model is that it implies a rather diff erent view on by which people form opinions of other individuals the roles of personal beliefs and social contexts than operate along a continuum that refl ects the degree the MODE model. Whereas the MODE model to which perceivers utilize category-related versus assumes that personal attitudes tend to be activated person-specifi c information (Figure 14.2). Th e basic automatically and that the overt expression of these assumption of the model is that category informa- attitudes is sometimes suppressed when they con- tion enjoys general priority because the processing fl ict with social norms (Fazio et al., 1995), the dis- of such information does not require substantial sociation model proposes that socially transmitted amounts of cognitive resources. Specifi cally, per- stereotypes are activated automatically and that the ceivers are assumed to categorize individuals on the overt expression of these stereotypes are suppressed basis of salient category cues (e.g., gender, age, eth- when they confl ict with personal beliefs (Devine, nicity), and this categorization is assumed to occur 1989). In other words, whereas the MODE model unintentionally upon encountering a target indi- locates an individual’s authentic self at the level of vidual. Contingent on the relevance of the target automatic processes and extrinsic, social infl uences for the perceiver’s momentary goals, perceivers will at the level of controlled processes, the dissociation direct their attention to individual attributes of the model locates extrinsic, social infl uences at the level target, thereby moving toward the more thought- of automatic processes and the individual’s authen- ful end of the processing continuum. If the target is tic self at the level of controlled processes. Even judged to be irrelevant to the perceiver’s momentary though questions about what should be considered goals, the fi nal impression of the target will be based the “authentic self” are philosophical rather than exclusively on the initial categorization. If, however, empirical, these diverging views have important the target is judged to be relevant to the perceiv- implications for the interpretation of automatic er’s momentary goals, the perceiver will attempt to stereotypic biases (Gawronski, Peters, & LeBel, integrate person-specifi c attributes into a coherent 2008). One example is the automatic tendency impression of the target.
288 Dual Process Theories
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 228888 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:09:29:09 PPMM ENCOUNTER TARGET PERSON
Person of INITIAL CATEGORIZATION minimal interest occurs immediately upon perceiving person or relevance?
YES NO ATTENTION ALLOCATION to target attributes
CONFIRMATORY CATEGORIZATION if successful occurs when available information is interpreted to be consistent or nondiagnostic with respect to current category
if unsuccessful
RECATEGORIZATION if successful occurs when a person is interpreted as categorizable but not with respect to current category; includes accessing new category, subcategory, or exemplar
if unsuccessful
PIECEMEAL INTEGRATION attribute-by-attribute analysis of person; occurs when the target is interpreted as not easily categorizable
category-based piecemeal-based affect, cognitions, and affect, cognitions, and behavioral tendencies behavioral tendencies
possible public expression of response
Is further YES assessment of target required?
Stop NO
Figure 14.2 Th e continuum model of impression formation. (Adapted from Fiske & Neuberg, 1990. Reprinted with permission.)
Overall, the continuum model assumes that per- that the additional information is interpreted to be ceivers attempt to maintain the impression implied consistent with the initially identifi ed category, the by their initial categorization while processing fi nal impression of the target will be based on the individual attributes of the target. To the extent initial categorization. If, however, the additional
Gawronski, Creighton 289
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 228989 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:09:29:09 PPMM information is inconsistent with the initial catego- dual process model rization, perceivers will attempt to recategorize the Whereas Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) continuum target in an attempt to fi nd a more suitable category model attributes a dominant role to category-based than the initial one. For example, if person-specifi c processing, Brewer’s (1988) dual process model attributes of a target individual seem inconsistent argues that impression formation may take either a with the impression implied by his or her category top-down or a bottom-up route (see also Brewer & membership, perceivers may use subtypes to assign Harasty-Feinstein, 1999). Both routes are assumed the target to a more appropriate category than the to start with an automatic identifi cation of salient initial, general category (Richards & Hewstone, features of the stimulus person (Figure 14.3). Th is 2001). If this recategorization process success- processing step can be described as the mere recogni- fully integrates the available information about the tion of feature confi gurations (e.g., male, dark skin target, the fi nal impression will be based on this color, business suit). To the extent that the target is newly applied category. However, if the attempt to irrelevant to the perceiver, the processing sequence recategorize the target fails, perceivers are assumed is assumed to remain at this level without further to move on to a process of piecemeal integration, processing of category-related or person-related in which they engage in an attribute-by-attribute implications of the identifi ed features. If, however, assessment of individual characteristics of the target. the target is relevant to the perceiver, further pro- Yet, according to Fiske, Lin, and Neuberg (1999), cessing of the identifi ed features can take either a such piecemeal integration likely occurs quite rarely, top-down or a bottom-up route depending on the given that perceivers tend to construct ad hoc theo- relative involvement of the perceiver. ries to account for contradictory information in Bottom-up processing is assumed to occur the initial stages of the impression formation con- under conditions of high involvement, in which tinuum (e.g., Asch & Zuckier, 1984; Kunda, Miller, perceivers are assumed to adopt an interpersonal & Claire, 1990; Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992). orientation. In this person-based processing mode,
Stimulus Person
NO Automatic Processing Identification Relevant? Stop
YES
NOSelf YES Categorization Involved?
Processing YES
d Fit?
e Stop ll Contro NO
Individuation Personalization
Figure 14.3 Th e dual-process model of impression formation. (Adapted from Brewer, 1988. Reprinted with permission.)
290 Dual Process Theories
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 229090 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:09:29:09 PPMM perceivers are assumed to draw inferences directly social psychologists in the 1960s proposed various from the identifi ed features, which are integrated theories of causal (e.g., Kelley, 1967) and disposi- into a coherent impression of the target ( personal- tional (e.g., Jones & Davis, 1965) attribution (see ization). Depending on the motivation and ability Chapter 6). However, deviating from the predic- to engage in eff ortful processing, this person-based tions of these models, empirical research soon dem- impression may be more or less complex. In other onstrated that perceivers tend to give more weight to words, personalization is not an eff ortful process dispositional compared with situational factors (e.g., per se. Rather, the degree of cognitive elaboration Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz, is assumed to infl uence the complexity of the fi nal 1977). Th is tendency to overestimate the role of impression, such that low elaboration will lead to dispositional compared with situational factors has relatively simple person-based impressions, whereas become known as the fundamental attribution error high elaboration will lead to relatively complex (Ross, 1977). A particular instantiation of the fun- person-based impressions. damental attribution error is the correspondence bias Top-down processing is assumed to occur under (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones, 1990), which is conditions of low involvement, in which perceiv- defi ned as the tendency to draw correspondent dis- ers are assumed to adopt an intergroup orientation. positional inferences from observed behavior even if In this category-based processing mode, the target the behavior is constrained by situational factors (for is initially categorized on the basis of salient fea- a discussion of conceptual diff erences between the tures (e.g., black businessman). Th is categorization fundamental attribution error and the correspon- process, in turn, may activate stereotypic contents dence bias, see Gawronski, 2004). In the 1970s, the associated with the applied category, which serve discrepancy between theoretically derived predic- as a fi lter for the integration of other target-specifi c tions and empirical results led to the odd situation information. Whereas target-specifi c information that the models that had originally been designed to that is related to the stereotypic content of the cat- describe and explain perceivers’ inferences acquired egory will be integrated into a coherent impression, a normative status, such that empirically observed target-specifi c information that is unrelated to the deviations were depicted as judgmental biases or category stereotype will be ignored. To the extent errors (see Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983) instead of that the category-related target information is con- counterevidence against the proposed models. Th is sistent with the category stereotype, the process is situation did not change until the emergence of dual assumed to stop at this point, leading to a target process theories in the mid-1980s. Th ese theories impression in line with the category stereotype turned attention back to describing the processes (stereotyping ). If, however, the category-related tar- that underlie perceivers’ inferences, with a particular get information is inconsistent with the category focus on explaining when and why the correspon- stereotype, the inconsistency has to be resolved in dence bias occurs. order to achieve a coherent impression of the tar- get. Th e result of the latter process is an individu- three-stage model ated impression of the target, which is based on a One such dual process theory is Gilbert’s (1989) systematic integration of target-specifi c informa- three-stage model of dispositional inference. tion ( individuation). However, this integration According to this model, dispositional inferences is still regarded as a category-based process, given involve three sequential processes that are claimed that the initial categorization of the target serves as to require diff erent amounts of cognitive resources: a fi lter for the processing of category-related versus (1) behavioral categorization (i.e., what is the actor category-unrelated target information. Th us, like doing?), (2) dispositional characterization (i.e., what person-based processing, category-based processing disposition does the behavior imply?), and (3) situa- can be more or less eff ortful, such that stereotyping tional correction (i.e., what situational determinants is the likely outcome of low elaboration, whereas might have caused the behavior?). Whereas behav- individuation usually requires high elaboration. ioral categorization and dispositional characteriza- tion are assumed to occur unintentionally without Dispositional Attribution requiring large amounts of cognitive resources, Another important question in the context of situational correction is assumed to be an inten- impression formation is how perceivers make sense tional, relatively eff ortful process. Applied to the of other people’s behavior. To describe the processes correspondence bias, these assumptions imply that that underlie inferences from observed behavior, the tendency to draw correspondent dispositional
Gawronski, Creighton 291
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 229191 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:09:29:09 PPMM inferences from situationally constrained behavior to depend on the inferential goal of the perceiver. should be lower when perceivers have both the moti- Because correction processes are assumed to require vation and the cognitive capacity to engage in the more capacity compared with characterization pro- eff ortful process of situational correction. However, cesses, motivation and cognitive capacity to engage the tendency to commit the correspondence bias in eff ortful processing should have diff erent eff ects should be enhanced if either the motivation or the on social inferences as a function of perceivers’ infer- cognitive capacity to engage in eff ortful processing ential goals. Specifi cally, reduced cognitive elabora- is low. Th ese predictions have been confi rmed in tion should increase the tendency to commit the several studies that investigated eff ects of process- correspondence bias when perceivers have the goal of ing motivation (e.g., D’Agostino & Ficher-Kiefer, inferring dispositional characteristics of the actor. In 1992; Vonk, 1999; Webster, 1993) and cognitive contrast, reduced cognitive elaboration should have capacity (e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988) the opposite eff ect when perceivers are interested on dispositional inferences from situationally con- in characteristics of the situation (e.g., Krull, 1993; strained behavior. Krull & Dill, 1996; Krull & Erickson, 1995). An important extension of Gilbert’s (1989) three-stage model was proposed by Krull (1993), two-stage model who merged Gilbert’s (1989) assumptions about Another infl uential model that aims to describe the eff ortfulness of situational correction with pre- the processes underlying dispositional attributions vious research on judgmental anchoring in disposi- is Trope’s (1986) two-stage model. According to tional inference (Quattrone, 1982). Deviating from this model, trait judgments are the product of two Gilbert’s (1989) assumption that social inferences sequential processes, which are described as iden- follow a fi xed sequence, Krull (1993) argued that tifi cation and inference (Figure 14.4). At the iden- the particular sequence of processes depends on the tifi cation stage, perceivers categorize momentarily inferential goal of the perceiver. According to Krull, available cues in trait-relevant terms. Th ese cues perceivers interested in inferring an actor’s disposi- may be related to the actor’s behavior (behavioral tion will (1) categorize the behavior, (2) character- cues), the situational context of the behavior (situ- ize a corresponding disposition, and then (3) correct ational cues), or the actor’s personal characteristics these characterizations for situational constraints. or group membership (prior cues ). For example, a If, however, perceivers are interested in the causal person’s behavior might be categorized as friendly or impact of situational factors, they will (1) categorize hostile, the situational context as facilitating friendly behavior, (2) characterize the situation, and then or hostile reactions, and the actor as belonging to (3) correct these characterizations for dispositional a stereotypically friendly or hostile group. To the factors. In other words, the contents of both the extent that the relevant cues within each of the three characterization and the correction stage are assumed dimensions are unambiguous, they fully constrain
Situational Situational Cues Categorization − effects
Behavioral assimilative Behavioral + Dispositional Cues Categorization Inference
effects + Prior assimilative Prior Cues Categorization
Identification Inference
unintentional, effortless, unconscious intentional, effortful, conscious
Figure 14.4 Th e two-stage model of dispositional inference. (Adapted from Trope, 1986. Reprinted with permission.)
292 Dual Process Theories
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 229292 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:09:29:09 PPMM their corresponding categorizations. Th at is, behav- hostility. Similarly, categorization of the actor as ioral cues fully determine the categorization of the a member of a stereotypically hostile group will behavior, situational cues fully determine the catego- also promote inferences of dispositional hostility. rization of the situation, and prior cues fully deter- Situational cues identifi ed to provoke hostile reac- mine the categorization of the actor. If, however, a tions, however, should have an inhibitory eff ect on particular cue is ambiguous, its categorization may inferences of dispositional hostility. Such informa- be biased by contextual cues in an assimilative man- tion should discount the informational value of the ner. For example, if an actor’s behavior is ambigu- other two dimensions, and hence reduce correspon- ously hostile, it may be perceived as more hostile dent inferences of dispositional hostility (see Kelley, when the situational context is known to facilitate 1972). Importantly, whereas contextual infl uences hostile rather than friendly behavior (e.g., Snyder at the identifi cation stage are assumed to operate & Frankel, 1976; Trope, Cohen, & Alfi eri, 1991; effi ciently, unintentionally, and outside of conscious Trope, Cohen, & Maoz, 1988) or when the actor awareness, the integration of the diff erent kinds of belongs to a stereotypically hostile rather than a information at the inference stage is assumed to be a stereotypically friendly group (e.g., Duncan, 1976; conscious, intentional process that requires varying Gawronski, Geschke, & Banse, 2003; Hugenberg & amounts of cognitive resources depending on the Bodenhausen, 2003; Kunda & Sherman-Williams, salience of the three kinds of information (Trope & 1993; Sagar & Schofi eld, 1980). Similar eff ects may Gaunt, 2000). occur for the categorization of ambiguous situational Like Gilbert’s (1989) three-stage model, Trope’s cues (e.g., Trope & Cohen, 1989) and the categori- (1986) two-stage model implies that the tendency zation of ambiguous prior cues (e.g., Hugenberg & to draw correspondent dispositional inferences from Bodenhausen, 2004), both of which may be biased situationally constrained behavior should be more by unambiguous behavioral cues. Because perceiv- pronounced when cognitive elaboration is low than ers tend to consider their subjective categorizations when it is high (but see Trope & Gaunt, 2000, for “as perceptual givens rather than as context-derived” a qualifi cation of this prediction). However, Trope’s (Trope & Gaunt, 1999, p. 170), deliberate correc- model also implies that perceivers may sometimes tion of such biased perceptions is rather unlikely, draw strong correspondent inferences from situ- even when the validity of the biasing contextual ationally constrained behavior even when perceiv- information is discredited afterward (e.g., Trope & ers consider the importance of situational factors at Alfi eri, 1997). In combination with studies showing the inference stage. To illustrate this case, consider a biasing eff ects of contextual cues under conditions study by Snyder and Frankel (1976) in which par- of depleted cognitive resources (e.g., Trope & Alfi eri, ticipants were presented with a videotaped inter- 1997; Trope & Gaunt, 2000), these fi ndings sug- view of a target behaving somewhat anxiously. Th e gest that the processes involved at the identifi cation sound of the interview was muted, so that partici- stage operate unintentionally, effi ciently, and outside pants focused only on the target’s behavior. Half of of conscious awareness (for a review, see Trope & the participants were told that that the target per- Gaunt, 1999). son was interviewed about an anxiety-provoking Once behavioral, situational, and prior cues have topic (e.g., sexual fantasies), whereas the remaining been categorized, the outputs of the identifi cation half were told that the topic was not anxiety pro- stage serve as inputs for more or less deliberate dis- voking (e.g., favorite books). Results showed that positional inferences (see Figure 14.4). At this stage, participants in both conditions inferred equal levels perceivers’ categorizations of the behavior, the situa- of dispositional anxiety from the observed behavior. tion, and the actor are integrated into a unifi ed judg- At fi rst glance, this result may suggest that partici- ment of the actor’s disposition. However, in contrast pants in the anxious topic condition ignored the to the generally assimilative nature of contextual anxiety-provoking topic as a situational factor for infl uences at the identifi cation stage, dispositional the observed behavior when they made their attri- judgments at the inferential stage are infl uenced by butions of dispositional anxiety. However, Snyder the three kinds of information in diff erent ways. and Frankel’s (1976) data also showed that partici- Whereas both behavioral and prior information pants perceived the target’s behavior as more anxious infl uence trait judgments in a positive direction, when they believed that she was interviewed about situational information has a subtractive eff ect. For sexual fantasies than when they believed that she example, behavior that is categorized as hostile will was interviewed about favorite books. Given that facilitate correspondent inferences of dispositional higher levels of perceived behavioral anxiety should
Gawronski, Creighton 293
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 229393 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:10:29:10 PPMM promote corresponding attributions of dispositional by which the two kinds of information are inte- anxiety, the biasing eff ect of situational information grated into attitudinal judgments may be the same on the identifi cation of the target’s behavior may (e.g., Erb, Pierro, Mannetti, Spiegel, & Kruglanski, have concealed the subtractive infl uence of situ- 2007). According to this criticism, the two kinds ational information at the inference stage. In other of information may simply diff er in their levels of words, participants perceived the target’s behav- complexity, thereby requiring diff erent amounts ior as more anxious when the interview topic was of processing resources. Th us, if the complexity of anxiety provoking, but then they considered the the two kinds of information is controlled or inde- anxiety-provoking nature of the interview topic as a pendently manipulated, message arguments may situational explanation for this behavior when they infl uence attitudes even under conditions of low drew correspondent dispositional inferences. Th ese elaboration (e.g., when their complexity is low), or considerations imply that the presumed interview source characteristics may infl uence attitudes only topic may infl uence dispositional attributions in when cognitive elaboration is high (e.g., when their Snyder and Frankel’s (1976) paradigm in two dif- complexity is high). ferent ways. First, the interview topic may have an Similar arguments have been raised against dual indirect positive eff ect on attributions of dispositional process theories of dispositional attribution (e.g., anxiety that is meditated by the biased identifi cation Chun, Spiegel, & Kruglanski, 2002) and dual pro- of the target’s behavior. Second, the interview topic cess theories of impression formation (e.g., Chun may have a direct negative eff ect if it is considered & Kruglanski, 2006). For example, challenging a situational explanation for the observed behavior Trope’s (1986) assumption that the biasing infl u- (e.g., Trope & Alfi eri, 1997). Because the proposed ence of contextual cues in the categorization of indirect eff ect of situational information is opposite ambiguous behavior is an effi cient process, Chun to the proposed direct eff ect, the two eff ects may and colleagues (2002) have shown that the eff ects of sometimes cancel each other out on measures of assimilative behavior identifi cation are attenuated trait attribution unless the proposed indirect eff ect by cognitive load when the categorization of ambig- is statistically controlled (e.g., Gawronski et al., uous behavior is relatively diffi cult. Along the same 2002). Importantly, this pattern of simultaneous, lines, Chun and Kruglanski (2006) showed that yet antagonistic, direct and indirect eff ects implies individuating information has a stronger impact that perceivers may draw strong correspondent compared with category information under condi- inferences from situationally constrained behavior, tions of resource depletion if the complexity of the even if they consider situational factors to have a individuating information is lower compared with strong impact on the target’s behavior. In other the complexity of the category information. Th is words, they commit the correspondence bias, even fi nding challenges a central assumption of Fiske though they do not commit the fundamental attri- and Neuberg’s (1990) continuum model, which bution error (Gawronski, 2004). implies that category information enjoys general priority. As an alternative to phenomenon-specifi c Criticism of Phenomenon-Specifi c dual process theories, Kruglanski and colleagues Dual Process Th eories (2007) proposed a unimodel of human judgment, Overall, the reviewed phenomenon-specifi c which proposes that diff erent kinds of evidence dual process theories have gained strong empirical (e.g., message arguments vs. source characteristics; support, and many of them have been seminal in category vs. individuating information) are inte- shaping the fi eld of social psychology over the past grated in a single inferential process whose out- decades. Nevertheless, these theories have also been come depends on several judgmental parameters, the target of criticism. One of the most important including information relevance, processing diffi - arguments raised against these models is that they culty, processing motivation, processing capacity, equate distinct contents with distinct processes (e.g., and processing order. Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, Erb, & Chun, 2007). A related concern about phenomenon-specifi c For example, Kruglanski and Th ompson (1999) dual process theories is that they all seem to address argued that dual process theories of persuasion tend very similar issues. Yet, it remains unclear how to confl ate diff erent types of evidence (e.g., message the diff erent models are related to each other and arguments, characteristics of the source) with dif- what general principles of information processing ferent types of processes (e.g., peripheral vs. central; underlie the studied phenomena. Th is concern heuristic vs. systematic), even though the processes echoes criticism by Kruglanski and colleagues’
294 Dual Process Theories
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 229494 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:10:29:10 PPMM (2007) unimodel, according to which diff erent Th e rational system is characterized by inten- kinds of information are integrated in a single tional, eff ortful processing that is based on logical epistemic process that is infl uenced by several relations between elements (i.e., what is rational). processing parameters. An alternative response is Encoding of reality in the rational system is claimed implied by generalized dual process theories, which to occur in abstract symbols, words, and num- identify two general processing principles that are bers, involving analytic responses that are oriented assumed to provide the foundation for the reviewed toward delayed action. Th us, responses driven by domain-specifi c phenomena. the rational system are characterized by diff erenti- ated, highly integrated representations that tend to Generalized Dual Process Th eories be abstract, logically coherent, and context indepen- Generalized dual process theories aim at identify- dent. Changes in the rational system are assumed to ing domain-independent principles of social infor- occur more quickly compared with the experien- mation processing that underlie various kinds of tial system, with changes depending on argument phenomena. Most of these theories fall into the cat- strength and availability of new evidence. egory of dual system theories, in that they propose According to Epstein (1994), the two systems two processing systems that operate on the basis of operate in parallel, such that each system can inde- qualitatively distinct principles. In the following pendently produce its own response tendency. In sections, we fi rst review the core assumptions of the cases in which these response tendencies are incon- most prominent examples, and then discuss criti- gruent, people tend to experience a “confl ict between cism that has been raised against generalized dual the head and the heart” (p. 710), such that the expe- process theories. riential system may produce an intuitive, aff ective response tendency that confl icts with a rational, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Th eory logical response tendency produced by the rational Th e groundwork for generalized dual pro- system. At the same time, the two systems may inter- cess theories was put in place by Epstein’s (1994) act with each other, such that preconscious processes cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST), which is in the experiential system may continuously infl u- based on his foundational work on the nature of ence conscious processing in the rational system. the self-concept as a global theory of personality However, the proposed interaction between the two (Epstein, 1973). In general terms, CEST proposes systems is assumed to be asymmetrical because infl u- two interacting systems that are characterized by ences from the experiential system usually remain diff erent processing principles. Th e fi rst is described outside of conscious awareness. As a result, these as the experiential system; the second is described as infl uences often remain uncontrolled by the ratio- the rational system (for an overview, see Epstein & nal system because there is no awareness that there is Pacini, 1999). anything to control to begin with. Still, there can be Th e experiential system is assumed to operate individual and situational variations in the relative in an automatic, eff ortless manner on the basis dominance of the two systems. For example, Epstein, of associative connections that are closely linked Pacini, Denes-Raj, and Heier (1996) developed to aff ective principles of pleasure and pain (i.e., the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI), which what feels good or bad). Encoding of reality in the includes two individual diff erence measures that are experiential system is claimed to occur in concrete specifi cally designed to identify stable individual dif- images, metaphors, and narratives, involving holis- ferences in the dominance of intuitive-experiential tic responses that are oriented toward immediate and analytical-rational thinking styles. Other mod- action. As such, responses driven by the experien- erating factors include situational circumstances tial system are characterized by broad, schematic and emotional arousal. Whereas circumstances that generalizations that tend to be incoherent, crudely require a formal analysis of the current situation are integrated, and context specifi c. Changes in the assumed to give priority to the rational system, emo- experiential system are assumed to occur slowly, tional arousal is assumed to shift the balance toward requiring repetitive or relatively intense experi- the experiential system. ences. Th ese processing principles are assumed to Although the role of CEST in empirical research be rooted in brain structures that developed early has mostly taken the form of a conceptual frame- in evolution and that have not been replaced by work for the interpretation of results rather than a more recently evolved structures that build the source for the deduction of testable predictions, it foundation for the second, rational system. clearly deserves the credit of setting the groundwork
Gawronski, Creighton 295
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 229595 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:10:29:10 PPMM for generalized dual process theorizing. In fact, Using the distinction between associative and many of its core assumptions can be found in its rule-based processing in the two memory sys- successors, some of which have been more success- tems, Smith and DeCoster (2000) integrated the ful in generating novel predictions through the phenomena identifi ed and studied by various specifi cation of earlier claims and the inclusion of domain-specifi c dual process theories within a sin- new propositions. During the past few years, these gle generalized framework. For example, peripheral/ theories have gained more impact compared with heuristic processing in dual process theories of per- CEST. Yet, as the fi rst theory of this kind, CEST suasion (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) still enjoys the status of being the most frequently is characterized as the use of well-learned associa- cited generalized dual process theory. tions of salient cues (e.g., source attractiveness) with positive or negative evaluations. Central/systematic Associative Versus Ruled-Based Processing processing, in contrast, is described as the eff ortful Another milestone in the development of search for relevant information that is evaluated generalized dual process theories is Smith and using rule-based processes on the basis of logical DeCoster’s (2000) conceptual integration of vari- principles. Along the same lines, automatic atti- ous domain-specifi c dual process theories. Drawing tude activation in Fazio’s (1990) MODE model is on Sloman’s (1996) distinction between associative described as automatic access to evaluations that are and rule-based processing and McClelland and col- associated with an attitude object through repeated leagues’ work on fast-learning versus slow-learning pairings. Deliberate analysis of an object’s attributes, memory systems (McClelland, McNaughton, in contrast, is characterized as the search for and & O’Reilly, 1995), Smith and DeCoster (2000) appraisal of relevant information on the basis of log- argued that the phenomena identifi ed and stud- ical rules of inference. Correspondent dispositional ied by domain-specifi c dual process theories refl ect inferences in Gilbert’s (1989) three-stage model the operation of two distinct memory systems that are described as the use of traits that are semanti- are guided by diff erent processing principles: a cally associated with a person’s observed behavior, slow-learning system that is characterized by asso- whereas inferences about alternative causes (e.g., sit- ciative processing and a fast-learning system that is uational factors) are assumed to involve rule-based characterized by rule-based processing. Associative processes that are guided by principles of logical processing is further specifi ed as being structured inference. Similar considerations apply to Devine’s by similarity and contiguity, drawing on simple (1989) dissociation model of prejudice and stereo- associations between objects and events that are typing, such that automatic stereotype activation learned slowly over many experiences. Associative is assumed to be the result of highly overlearned processing is assumed to occur automatically in a associations between social groups and stereotypic parallel fashion without awareness of the involved information, whereas suppression of these automat- processing steps, even though their output may ically activated stereotypes involves eff ortful access be accessible to conscious awareness. Rule-based to personal beliefs in order to override the impact of processing, in contrast, is characterized as being stereotypic information. Finally, automatic catego- structured by language and logic, drawing on rization in dual process theories of impression for- symbolically represented rules that can be learned mation (Brewer, 1988, Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) is quickly with very few experiences. Attributing a described as the use of information that is associated dominant role to associative processing, rule-based with a person’s salient category (e.g., gender, race, processing is further assumed to occur optionally age), whereas individuation involves the processing in a sequential fashion if both the motivation and and appraisal of multiple individual characteristics the capacity to engage in eff ortful processing are to form a personal impression. present. Its processing steps are often accessible to conscious awareness, such that the applied rules System 1 and System 2 Processing of inference can be verbalized. Similar to Epstein’s Working toward a theoretical integration of ear- (1994) CEST, Smith and DeCoster (2000) pro- lier research on heuristics and biases (for reviews, see pose an asymmetrical interaction between the two Gilovich, Griffi n, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, memory systems, such that rule-based processing Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), Kahneman (2003) pre- may draw on inputs from both memory systems, sented a generalized dual process theory that whereas associative processing is exclusively based shares many features with Smith and DeCoster’s on the slow-learning system. (2000) and Epstein’s (1994) models. To this end,
296 Dual Process Theories
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 229696 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:11:29:11 PPMM Kahneman (2003) distinguished between two sys- to Tversky and Kahneman (1983), people commit tems, generically described as System 1 and System the conjunction fallacy when they judge Linda as 2 (cf. Stanovich & West, 2000), that are assumed more likely to be (1) a bank teller and active in the to underlie intuition versus reasoning. Sharing char- feminist movement than (2) a bank teller. Because acteristics of basic perceptual processes, intuitive the conjunction of two distinct events can never processing in System 1 is described as fast, paral- be more likely than one of the two events by itself, lel, automatic, eff ortless, associative, slow learning, such a judgment violates basic principles of statis- and emotional. In contrast, reasoning processes in tical probability. Drawing on Kahneman’s (2003) System 2 are described as slow, serial, controlled, theoretical conceptualization, this judgmental eff ortful, rule governed, fast learning, and emotion- tendency can be explained by accessibility-driven ally neutral. At the same time, information process- attribute substitution, in that individuals substi- ing in the two systems is assumed to diff er from tute a relevant judgmental attribute (i.e., statistical basic perceptual processes, in that both intuition probability) with an irrelevant, yet highly accessible and reasoning can be evoked by verbal informa- attribute (i.e., feature similarity). Other examples of tion, involving conceptual representations of the accessibility-driven attribute substitution include past, the present, and the future. Th ese features dif- framing eff ects, in which people tend to show a fer from basic perceptual processes, which involve preference for positively over negatively framed stimulus-bound percepts that are driven by current objects, events, and decisions (e.g., a sausage that is stimulation. Th us, whereas the outputs of System 1 described as 80% lean vs. 20% fat), even if the two may be described as intuitive impressions , the out- descriptions are semantically equivalent. puts of System 2 are judgments that can be based on Although Kahneman (2003) adopted the System impressions or on deliberate reasoning. In that sense, 1/System 2 distinction from Stanovich and West’s an important function of System 2 is to monitor (2000) infl uential work on rationality in human the activities and inputs of System 1. If no intuitive reasoning, his reanalysis of key fi ndings of the heu- response is generated by System 1, judgments and ristics and biases research program contributed behavior are exclusively computed by System 2. If, signifi cantly to the current dominance of this dis- however, System 1 provides an intuitive response as tinction in the literature on judgment and decision input for System 2, System 2 may either (1) endorse making. Th is impact went even beyond the tradi- this response, (2) adjust the response for other fea- tional boundaries of psychology, in that philoso- tures that are recognized to be relevant, (3) correct phers have started to use it as a basis for speculations the response for a recognized bias, or (4) block the about the general architecture of the human mind response from overt expression if it is identifi ed to (e.g., Carruthers, 2009; Samuels, 2009). Yet, simi- violate a valid rule of inference. lar to Epstein’s (1994) CEST, the theory has been Whereas the intuitive responses generated by criticized for providing no more than a conceptual System 1 are determined by the accessibility of men- framework that can be applied to empirical data in tal contents (Higgins, 1996), processing in System a post hoc fashion without generating novel predic- 2 is guided by the application of logical rules of tions that could be empirically confi rmed or discon- inference. In the case of heuristic judgments, highly fi rmed (Keren & Schul, 2009). We will return to accessible contents in System 1 will often pass the this concern in our overarching discussion of criti- monitoring activities of System 2 through a process cism against generalized dual process theories. of attribute substitution. In general terms, attribute substitution occurs when an “individual assesses a R e fl ection–Refl exion Model specifi ed target attribute of a judgment object by Th e refl ection–refl exion model proposed by substituting a related heuristic attribute that comes Lieberman (2003; see also Lieberman, Gaunt, more readily to mind” (Kahneman, 2003, p. 707). Gilbert, & Trope, 2002) combines the basic idea Th is process can be illustrated with the well-known of the dual system approach with recent advances Linda problem that has been used to demonstrate in social cognitive neuroscience (see Chapter 34). the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, Deviating from conceptualizations that describe 1983, p. 297): “ Linda is 31 years old, single, out- automatic processes as more effi cient variants of spoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. insuffi ciently practiced controlled processes (e.g., As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of Bargh, 1997), the refl ection–refl exion model argues discrimination and social justice, and also partici- that automatic and controlled processes use qualita- pated in anti-nuclear demonstrations .” According tively distinct representations that have their basis in
Gawronski, Creighton 297
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 229797 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:11:29:11 PPMM distinct neural structures. According to Lieberman incorrect inferences of p in the presence of q from (2003), the automatic–controlled distinction is observed relations of the format “if p , then q .” insuffi cient, if not misleading, because it simply Arguably, the most signifi cant contribution of describes the operating conditions of a given process the refl ection–refl exion model is the identifi cation (i.e., when does the process operate?) without speci- of distinct neural underpinnings of automatic and fying the underlying computational properties (i.e., controlled processes. Th us, it does not seem surpris- what is the process doing?). Because the refl ection– ing that the theory has enjoyed its strongest infl u- refl exion model assumes distinct representational ence in the area of social cognitive neuroscience (for underpinnings, it also allows for complex interac- a review, see Lieberman, 2007). Yet, in traditional tions between automatic and controlled processes. social psychology, its impact has mostly taken the Such interactions are diffi cult to reconcile with the form of citations in sample lists of generalized dual view that automatic and controlled processes draw process theories, with few examples of studies that on the same underlying mental representations, the have tested novel predictions derived from the only diff erence being that automatic processes oper- theory. ate more effi ciently as a result of practice. Th e fi rst system, called the X-system with refer- R e fl ective–Impulsive Model ence to the term refl exive , is proposed to involve the One the most infl uential dual system theories amygdala, basal ganglia, and lateral temporal cortex. to date is Strack and Deutsch’s (2004) refl ective– Refl exive processes in the X-system link aff ect and impulsive model (RIM) of social behavior. Th e meaning to currently represented stimuli by means RIM argues that social behavior is guided by two of simple stimulus-stimulus associations (semantic simultaneously operating systems of information meaning) or stimulus-outcome associations (aff ec- processing, which are described as the refl ective sys- tive meaning). Th ese associations build the founda- tem (RS) and the impulsive system (IS), respectively. tion for a person’s implicit theories and generalized Even though both systems are assumed to operate in expectations about the world, which are assumed to parallel, the IS enjoys priority over the RS because develop slowly over time and over extended periods the RS operates only under conditions of suffi cient of learning. Th e neurons in the X-system are highly cognitive capacity, whereas information processing interdependent, in that they are mutually infl uenced in the IS is assumed to be resource independent. by the neurons they are infl uencing. As a result, the Similar to other dual system theories, the RIM states activation of associations in the X-system operates that the IS operates on the basis of simple associa- in a parallel fashion on the basis of similarity and tive links between elements that are formed and pattern matching, such that observed relations of activated according to the principles of similarity the format “if p , then q ” will create a refl exive ten- and contiguity. Information processing in the RS, dency to draw the logically incorrect inference “if in contrast, is assumed to involve propositionally q , then p .” represented relations between elements, which are Th e second system, called the C-system with ref- tagged with truth values (i.e., true vs. false). Th ese erence to the term refl ective , is proposed to involve operating characteristics make the RS capable of the anterior cingulate cortex, prefrontal cortex, various operations that cannot be performed by the and medial temporal lobe. Th e operation of the IS, the most important of which are the processing C-system is assumed to be conditional on the fail- of negations and representations of the future. Th us, ure of the X-system to achieve a momentary goal, even though accessible associations in the IS provide such that refl ective processes are initiated only if the basis for propositional representations in the RS, (1) the implicit theories or generalized expectan- their functionally distinct operating principles can cies in the X-system are violated, or (2) there are no have diff erent behavioral implications if processing implicit theories or generalized expectancies in the in the RS involves the negation of activated associa- X-system that are applicable to guide behavior in a tions in the IS (see Deutsch, Gawronski, & Strack, novel situation. As such, the primary function of 2006; Gilbert, 1991) or the delay of gratifi cation the C-system is to handle context-specifi c “excep- (see Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). tions to the rule” for which the generalizations in Another central assumption of the RIM con- the X-system are not prepared. Refl ective inferences cerns the translation of mental representations into in the C-system are assumed to operate in a sequen- behavior. Th e RIM assumes that the RS and the tial manner on the basis of causal and logical rela- IS infl uence behavior through a common pathway tions, which allows the C-system to block logically that includes the activation of behavioral schemata
298 Dual Process Theories
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 229898 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:11:29:11 PPMM of varying abstractness (Norman & Shallice, 1986). processing make it more similar to generalized Th ese behavioral schemata can be activated directly dual process theories than phenomenon-specifi c through the spread of activation from momentarily dual process theories of persuasion. Th e theoretical accessible associations in the IS, which may elicit an core of the APE model is the distinction between impulsive tendency to either approach or avoid a associative and propositional processes. Associative given object. Alternatively, behavioral schemata may processes are defi ned as the activation of associa- be activated indirectly through behavioral intentions tions in memory, which is driven by principles of generated in the RS, which are guided by (1) the similarity and contiguity. Propositional processes subjective hedonic quality of future states that may are defi ned as the validation of the information result from a given behavior (i.e., value) and (2) the implied by activated associations, which is assumed subjective probability with which the behavior may to be guided by principles of logical consistency. produce the focal outcome (i.e., expectancy). To the extent that the propositional information Going beyond other dual process models that implied by activated associations is consistent, it focus primarily on cognitive and aff ective processes, will be used for judgments and behavioral deci- the RIM attributes an important role to motiva- sions. If, however, the information implied by acti- tional processes, which may operate in the IS in at vated associations is inconsistent, aversive feelings least two diff erent ways. First, the RIM assumes that of dissonance will induce a tendency to resolve the motivational orientations to approach or avoid an dissonance-provoking inconsistency before a judg- object may be elicited by mere processing of posi- ment or behavioral decision is made (see Festinger, tive or negative information, mere perception of 1957). In general terms, inconsistency may be approach or avoidance movements, the experience resolved either by rejecting one of the propositions of positive or negative aff ect, or the execution of that are involved in inconsistent belief systems or by approach or avoidance motor actions. Conversely, searching for an additional proposition that resolves motivational orientations of approach or avoidance the inconsistency (Gawronski & Strack, 2004). are assumed to facilitate the processing of infor- To the extent that the inconsistency is resolved by mation, the experience of aff ective states, and the rejecting one of the involved propositions, activated execution of behavior that are compatible with the associations and endorsed propositional beliefs current motivational state (see Neumann, Fö rster, will show a dissociation because mere negation of & Strack, 2003). Second, the RIM integrates basic a proposition (e.g., “it is not true that old people principles of homoeostatic dysregulation, such that are bad drivers”) does not necessarily deactivate the deprivation of basic needs is assumed to activate mental associations that underlie that proposition behavioral schemata that are linked to successful (i.e., the association between the concepts old people satisfaction of those needs through a history of past and bad drivers ). Th e prototypical example of such experiences. cases are dissociations between explicit and implicit To date, the RIM enjoys the status of being the measures, given that explicit self-report measures most infl uential dual system theory in the genera- assess the outcome of propositional validation pro- tion of empirical research. Th is research includes cesses (e.g., survey questions asking participants to a wide range of topics within and beyond social report their agreement or disagreement with a par- psychology, such as the roles of impulse and con- ticular statement), whereas implicit measures (e.g., trol in self-regulation (e.g., Hofmann, Rauch, implicit association test, sequential priming tasks) & Gawronski, 2007), limits in the processing of provide a proxy for the activation of associations negations (e.g., Deutsch et al., 2006), the relation in memory. Even though the original formulation between personality traits and behavior (e.g., Back, of the APE model was primarily concerned with Schmukle, & Egloff , 2009), and emotional eff ects the role of associative and propositional processes of food deprivation (e.g., Hoefl ing et al., 2009). in evaluation (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006a, 2006b), its basic principles are equally applicable to Associative-Propositional Evaluation Model nonevaluative, semantic information (Gawronski, Even though Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s LeBel, & Peters, 2007; for an example, see Peters & (2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2011) associative–prop- Gawronski, 2011). ositional evaluation (APE) model was originally By emphasizing the ubiquitous roles of associa- designed to resolve various inconsistencies in the tive and propositional processes in social information literature on implicit and explicit attitude change, processing, the APE model has a strong resemblance its emphasis on general principles of information to other generalized dual process theories. However,
Gawronski, Creighton 299
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 229999 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:11:29:11 PPMM the APE model also includes a number of assump- processes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007, 2009, tions that distinguish it from these models. First, 2011). For example, even though the activation of whereas most generalized dual process theories associations may occur unintentionally, associations propose the existence of two systems with dis- may also be activated intentionally. In a similar vein, tinct operating characteristics (e.g., Epstein, 1994; complex propositional inferences may require cog- Kahneman, 2003; Lieberman, 2003; Smith & nitive eff ort, but propositional inferences may occur DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), the APE quickly and eff ortlessly if the complexity of these model does not make any assumptions about inher- inferences is low (see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, ent links between processes and systems (Gawronski 2007, 2011). & Bodenhausen, 2011). In that sense, the APE model can be described as a dual process theory in Criticism of Generalized Dual the original sense of the term, whereas most other Process Th eories generalized dual process theories represent examples During the past decade, generalized dual process of dual system theories . Second, the APE model does theories have been extremely infl uential in guid- not make any claims implying that one process is ing interpretations of empirical data far beyond the fast learning whereas the other is slow learning. To boundaries of social psychology. In fact, their steadily the contrary, the APE model argues that either the increasing impact seems to be associated with a outcome of associative processes or the outcome of decreasing infl uence of their phenomenon-specifi c propositional processes can be more or less robust precursors, some of which have already acquired the against external infl uences depending on (1) the status of “historical milestones” that have ceased to nature of the external infl uence, and (2) mutual inspire novel research. However, despite their over- interactions between the two processes (Gawronski whelming infl uence, generalized dual process theo- & Bodenhausen, 2006a, 2007, 2011). Th ird, the ries have also been the target of criticism. APE model makes specifi c assumptions about how One argument that has been raised against the associative and propositional processes interact with distinction between associative and rule-based pro- each other. Th ese assumptions imply a number of cesses is that information processing can be parsimo- novel predictions about the conditions under which niously described in terms of general if–then rules a given factor should produce (1) changes in explicit (e.g., Kruglanski & Dechesne, 2006; Kruglanski, but not implicit evaluations (e.g., Gawronski Erb, Pierro, Mannetti, & Chun, 2006). Because & Strack, 2004; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006); this description can be applied to both associative (2) changes in implicit but not explicit evaluations and rule-based processes, the proposed distinctions (e.g., Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; Grumm, Nestler, between qualitatively distinct processes is claimed & von Collani, 2009); (3) corresponding changes to be misleading. In an abstract sense, all inference in explicit and implicit evaluations, with changes in processes could be described as rule-based in terms implicit evaluations being mediated by changes in of general if–then rules. According to Kruglanski explicit evaluations (e.g., Peters & Gawronski, 2011; and colleagues, such rule-based inferences may be Whitfi eld & Jordan, 2009); and (4) corresponding infl uenced by various judgmental parameters, such changes in explicit and implicit evaluations, with as subjective relevance, task demands, cognitive changes in explicit evaluations being mediated by capacity, accessibility, and diff erent kinds of moti- changes in implicit evaluations (e.g., Gawronski & vations. Th us, data patterns that have been inter- LeBel, 2008; Whitfi eld & Jordan, 2009). Finally, preted as refl ecting the operation of qualitatively the APE model draws a sharp line between operat- distinct processes may in fact refl ect the operation ing principles (i.e., associative vs. propositional) and of a single rule-based process that is modulated by operating conditions (i.e., automatic vs. controlled) the proposed processing parameters. of mental processes, in that operating principles rep- In response to this criticism, however, one could resent defi nitions of what a given process is doing, object that the proposed interpretation in terms of whereas operating conditions represent empirical general if–then rules seems too abstract to specify assumptions about the conditions under which how exactly rule-based processes are operating. In the process is operating. Importantly, the model fact, claiming that all psychological processes follow assumes that there is no perfect overlap between general if–then rules does not go far beyond stating operating principles and operating conditions, that all psychological processes follow identifi able such that both associative and propositional pro- regularities instead of being completely random. cesses can have features of automatic or controlled Because all of the reviewed models agree that both
300 Dual Process Theories
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 330000 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:12:29:12 PPMM associative and rule-based processes follow identifi - every empirical fi nding in a post hoc fashion. At the able regularities and that neither of them is random, same time, they do not provide precise predictions one could argue that the single-process criticism mis- that could disconfi rm them, nor do they include construes the basic distinctions of generalized dual specifi c claims that could empirically distinguish process theories. According to these theories, associa- them from other dual system theories. Even though tive processes are guided by similarity and contiguity, these concerns seem applicable to several of the whereas rule-based processes are guided by syllogistic reviewed models, it is important to note that they relations and logical consistency. Moreover, by intro- also apply to the single process models that have ducing several parameters that presumably modulate been proposed as superior alternatives. Of course, a single rule-based process, the proposed alternative this does not invalidate the criticism of imprecision implicitly assumes that the operation of these param- and lack of testable predictions. To the contrary, eters does not require further specifi cation—an the fact that theories with a high degree of general- assumption that is rejected by generalized dual pro- ity often lack the level of specifi city that is required cess theories. For example, stating that rule-based for the derivation of testable predictions (Quine & inferences are infl uenced by subjective relevance does Ullian, 1978) has important implications for theory not clarify how relevance is determined in the fi rst construction in social psychology. We will return to place. Similarly, stating that accessibility infl uences this issue in the fi nal section of this chapter. what information is considered in rule-based infer- ences does not clarify why some information tends Formalized Dual Process Th eories to be more accessible than other information. From Simultaneous to the emergence of generalized a dual process perspective, one could argue that the dual process theories, social cognition researchers process of determining the subjective relevance of realized that many behaviors that had been presumed accessible information is functionally equivalent to refl ect automatic processes are not process pure, to the process of propositional validation, whereas but instead confl ate the joint contributions of auto- accessibility is determined by the similarity matching matic and controlled processes. In addition, many principles of associative processes. researchers became concerned about method-related Another, more fundamental criticism is that confounds between processes and tasks, for example, generalized dual process theories have a tendency when automatic processes are assessed with one type to create lists of process characteristics that may of task (e.g., implicit measures) and controlled pro- not necessarily overlap (Keren & Schul, 2009). cesses with another (e.g., explicit measures). Th ese Th is criticism has been raised in particular against concerns have led researchers to adopt mathemati- dual system theories, which describe the proposed cal modeling procedures from cognitive psychology systems by means of several features that may not to quantify the joint contributions of automatic and covary. For example, describing one system as aff ec- controlled processes to behavioral responses within tive, automatic, holistic, and associative and the a single task. other one as cognitive, controlled, analytic, and logical (e.g., Epstein & Pacini, 1999) raises ques- Control-Dominating Process tions about whether cognitive processes cannot be Dissociation Model automatic, holistic, or associative. Th is criticism Th e most prominent of these modeling tech- resembles earlier concerns about the confl ation niques is Jacoby’s (1991) process dissociation (PD) of diff erent features of automaticity, stating that model. Th e basic idea of PD models is that auto- a given process rarely meets all of the four crite- matic and controlled processes sometimes work in ria (i.e., unintentional, effi cient, uncontrollable, concert to produce a behavioral response, while unconscious; see Bargh, 1994). at other times automatic and controlled processes Related to this argument, generalized dual pro- work in opposition to each other (for reviews, see cess theories have been criticized for lacking concep- Payne, 2008; Payne & Bishara, 2009). For example, tual precision, which makes it diffi cult to identify many implicit measures—such as the implicit asso- empirical evidence that could disprove them. In ciation test (Greenwald et al., 1998) or evaluative fact, it has been argued that these theories provide priming (Fazio et al., 1995)—involve one class of no more than nominal lists of defi nitions instead of trials that is described as compatible and another empirically testable predictions. For example, Keren class of trials that is described as incompatible (see and Schul (2009) raised concerns that dual system Gawronski, Deutsch, LeBel, & Peters, 2008). Th e theories in particular can accommodate virtually basic idea is that both automatic and controlled
Gawronski, Creighton 301
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 330101 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:12:29:12 PPMM processes will lead to the correct response on com- block, but an incorrect response in the incompat- patible trials (thereby facilitating fast and accurate ible block. responses). On incompatible trials, however, only Th ese infl uences can be depicted graphically as controlled processes will lead to the correct response, processing trees that describe how automatic and whereas automatic processes will lead to the incor- controlled processes may interactively determine rect response (thereby inhibiting fast and accurate correct versus incorrect responses on a given task. responses). For example, in an implicit associa- In Jacoby’s (1991) PD model, controlled processes tion test designed to measure automatic racial bias are assumed to dominate, in that automatic pro- (Greenwald et al., 1998), controlled identifi cation cesses infl uence the behavioral outcome only if of a black or white face will produce an accurate controlled processes fail (Figure 14.5a). If con- key response in both the compatible and the incom- trolled processes succeed (depicted as C in Figure patible block. In contrast, automatic racial bias will 14.5a), participants will show the correct response produce an accurate key response in the compatible on both compatible and incompatible trials. If,
(a)
Compatible Incompatible
Controlled Process Correct Correct C Succeeds
Stimulus Automatic Process Correct Incorrect Succeeds 1 - C A Controlled Process Fails 1 - A Automatic Process Incorrect Correct Fails
(b)
Compatible Incompatible
Automatic Process Correct Incorrect Succeeds A
Stimulus Controlled Process Correct Correct 1 - A C Succeeds Automatic Process Fails 1 - C Controlled Process Incorrect Incorrect Fails
Figure 14.5 Two variants of process dissociation models of automatic and controlled processing. Panel (a) depicts a model in which controlled processes are assumed to dominate; panel (b) depicts a model in which automatic processes are assumed to dominate. (Adapted from Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005. Reprinted with permission.)
302 Dual Process Theories
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 330202 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:12:29:12 PPMM however, controlled processes fail (depicted as probability of a correct response on incompatible tri- 1 – C in Figure 14.5a), the behavioral outcome als can be described as: depends on the operation of automatic processes. If automatic processes drive the response (depicted as p(correct | incompatible) = C + (1 – C) × (1 – A) A in Figure 14.5a), participants will show the cor- rect response on compatible trials but the incorrect Th rough the use of linear algebra, these equations response on incompatible trials. Yet, if automatic can be solved for C and A , which allows researchers processes fail (depicted as 1 – A in Figure 14.5a), to quantify the relative impact of automatic and the model assumes a bias in the opposite direc- controlled processes. Without going into the details tion, such that participants will show the incor- of the mathematical conversion, the controlled pro- rect response on compatible trials but the correct cess can be quantifi ed algebraically as: response on incompatible trials. Th e advantage of formalized dual process mod- C = p(correct | compatible) – p(incorrect | els is that they provide mathematical equations that incompatible) can be used to quantify the relative contributions of distinct processes to performance on tasks in which Using the specifi c number that has been com- automatic and controlled processes can work in puted for C , the automatic process can then be cal- concert or in opposition. Th e basic idea is to derive culated as: two equations from the proposed structure in the processing tree, one for the probability of correct A = p(incorrect | incompatible)/(1 – C) responses on compatible trials and one for the prob- ability of correct responses on incompatible trials. In For example, if the empirically observed prob- Jacoby’s (1991) PD model, these equations include ability of correct responses on compatible trials two parameters as unknowns: C, which is supposed is 74 and the probability of correct responses on to capture the impact of controlled processes; and incompatible trials is 46, the resulting estimate for A, which is supposed to capture the impact of auto- C is 20 and the estimate for A is 675.1 Such esti- matic processes. Using the empirically observed mates can be calculated for each participant in a probabilities of correct responses on compatible and given sample, allowing the use of these estimates incompatible trials in a given data set, the particular as dependent variables in experimental designs or values of these unknowns can be calculated through as independent variables in individual diff erence simple algebra. designs. For example, using the graphical depiction of Jacoby’s (1991) model in Figure 14.5a, the prob- Automaticity-Dominating Process ability of a correct response on compatible trials Dissociation Model should be equal to all processing paths from left to Even though Jacoby’s (1991) PD model has right that lead to a correct response in the “compat- been successfully applied to various tasks in the ible” column. Th e two paths that produce such a social-cognitive literature (for a review, see Payne response are Controlled Process Succeeds, which can & Bishara, 2009), the model’s premise that auto- be depicted as C , and Controlled Process Fails in con- matic processes operate only when controlled pro- junction with Automatic Process Succeeds , which can cesses fail does not seem applicable to tasks in which be depicted as (1 – C) × A . Th us, in statistical terms, automatic processes play a dominant role despite the probability of a correct response on compatible the potential operation of controlled processes. For trials can be described as: example, in the Stroop task, automatic word read- ing may elicit a tendency to respond on the basis of p(correct | compatible) = C + (1 – C) × A the semantic meaning of a colored word, which has to be overcome by controlled processes if the word Th e same logic can be applied to the prob- meaning does not match the ink color in which the ability of a correct response on incompatible trials. word is presented. To address this problem, Lindsay Th e two paths that produce such a response are and Jacoby (1994) presented a modifi ed variant Controlled Process Succeeds , which is again depicted of Jacoby’s (1991) PD model, in which automatic as C , and Controlled Process Fails in conjunction with processes are assumed to dominate, such that con- Automatic Process Fails, which is depicted as (1 – C) × trolled processes drive responses only if automatic (1 – A). On the basis of these processing paths, the processes fail. Th is model can again be depicted as
Gawronski, Creighton 303
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 330303 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:13:29:13 PPMM a processing tree (see Figure 14.5b). Even though Quadruple-Process Model the positions of automatic and controlled processes A shared assumption of the two PD models is that are reversed in Lindsay and Jacoby’s (1994) model, one of the two processes operates only to the extent the underlying logic remains the same. If automatic that the other one fails. For example, in Jacoby’s processes drive the response (depicted as A in Figure (1991) model, automatic processes are assumed to 14.5b), participants will show the correct response operate only if controlled processes fail (see Figure on compatible trials but the incorrect response on 14.5a). Conversely, in Lindsay and Jacoby’s (1994) incompatible trials. If, however, automatic processes model, controlled processes are assumed to operate fail (depicted as 1 – A in Figure 14.5b), the fi nal only if automatic processes fail (see Figure 14.5b). response depends on the operation of controlled Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, and processes. If controlled processes succeed (depicted Groom (2005) argued that these assumptions make as C in Figure 14.5b), participants will show the cor- the two PD models less suitable to capture situa- rect response on both compatible and incompatible tions in which automatic and controlled processes trials. However, if controlled processes fail (depicted operate simultaneously, as is the case when one as 1 – C in Figure 14.5b), the model assumes incor- process overrides the impact of another process (see rect responses on both compatible and incompat- also Sherman et al., 2008). To address this limita- ible trials. Using the algebraic logic outlined for tion, Conrey et al. proposed their quadruple pro- Jacoby’s (1991) PD model, the probability of a cor- cess model (quad model), which includes statistical rect response on compatible trials can be formalized parameters for four (instead of two) qualitatively as follows: distinct processes: (1) the likelihood that an auto- matic association is activated (described as associa- p(correct | compatible) = A + (1 – A) × C tion activation or AC ); (2) the likelihood that the correct response to the stimulus can be determined Conversely, the probability of a correct response (described as discriminability or D); (3) the likeli- on incompatible trials can be formalized as follows: hood that an automatic association is successfully overcome in favor of the correct response (described p(correct | incompatible) = (1 – A) × C as overcoming bias or OB ); and (4) the likelihood that a general response bias (e.g., right-hand bias) On the basis of these equations, the automatic drives the response (described as guessing or G ). process can be quantifi ed algebraically as follows: Th e proposed interplay of these processes in the quad model can again be depicted as a processing A = p(correct | compatible) – p(correct | tree that specifi es how their joint operation can incompatible) lead to correct or incorrect responses on compat- ible and incompatible trials (Figure 14.6). Th e most Using the quantitative estimates for A , the con- signifi cant component of the model is the assump- trolled process can then be calculated as follows: tion that activated associations (refl ected in the AC parameter) and correct identifi cation of the correct C = p(correct | incompatible)/(1 – A) response (refl ected in the D parameter) can produce two response tendencies that may be congruent or Although applications of PD have mostly used incongruent with each other. If they are incongru- Jacoby’s (1991) original formulation instead of ent, inhibitory control has to be engaged to suppress Lindsay and Jacoby’s (1994) modifi ed version, the the response tendency elicited by activated associa- data analytic strategy of PD has been successfully tions in favor of the correct response (refl ected in applied to a wide range of questions in social psy- the OB parameter). For example, in an Implicit chology (for a review, see Payne & Bishara, 2009). Association Test designed to measure automatic Examples of such applications include racial bias preferences for whites over blacks, automatic stereo- in weapon identifi cation (e.g., Payne, 2001), ste- typic associations may elicit a tendency to press the reotypic biases in memory (e.g., Sherman, Groom, “negative” key in response to a black face. In the Ehrenberg, & Klauer, 2003), the use of heuristics so-called incongruent block, this tendency has to be in social judgment (e.g., Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, inhibited in favor of the correct “black” response. In Sherman, & Sherman, 2006), and mood eff ects on this case, the quad model’s AC parameter refl ects the automatic evaluations (e.g., Huntsinger, Sinclair, & strength of automatic stereotypic associations; the Clore, 2009). D parameter refl ects participants’ ability to identify
304 Dual Process Theories
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 330404 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:13:29:13 PPMM Compatible Incompatible Left Right Left Right
Association + + + + OB Overcome Stimulus D Discriminable Association 1 - OB + + − − Association Not Overcome Activated AC 1 - D Stimulus Not + + − − Discriminable Stimulus Stimulus + + + + Discriminable 1 - AC D Association Not Activated Guess Consistent − + − + G with Bias 1 - D Stimulus Not Discriminable Guess 1 - G Inconsistent + − + − with Bias
Figure 14.6 Th e quadruple process model of automatic and controlled processing. (Adapted from Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005. Reprinted with permission.)
the correct response; and the OB parameter refl ects likelihood statistics to identify parameter estimates participants’ success in inhibiting automatic stereo- that minimize the discrepancy between the empiri- typic associations in favor of the correct response. In cally observed probabilities of correct and incorrect addition, the quad model’s G parameter refl ects the responses and the corresponding probabilities that strength of general response tendencies, such as the are predicted through the equations of the model tendency to show a right-hand response. (for more details regarding the statistics underlying Although the higher number of processes the quad model, see Conrey et al., 2005). increases the complexity of the mathematical equa- Even though the conceptual relation between tions in the quad model, the derivation of these the quad model’s parameters to the parameters of equations is equivalent to the two PD models. For the two PD models is still under debate (Payne & example, if the correct response for incompatible Bishara, 2009; Sherman, Klauer, & Allen, 2010), trials in a given task is defi ned as the right key, the the quad model’s integration of multiple distinct three paths that lead to a correct response in the processes provides a more fi ne-grained analysis quad model’s processing tree (see Figure 14.6) pro- compared with traditional dual process theories duce the following equation: (Sherman, 2006). In a technical sense, the quad model is thus better described as a multiple process p (correct | incompatible-right) = [AC × D × OB] model rather than a dual process model, although it + [(1 – AC) × D] + [(1 – AC) × (1 – D) × G] retains the emphasis on automatic and controlled processes. So far, the quad model has demonstrated Th e same logic applies to the derivation of the its potential mostly in the analysis of data obtained equations for the observed probabilities of correct with implicit measures, which often remain ambig- responses on the other types of trials. Yet, an impor- uous as to whether a given eff ect is driven by dif- tant diff erence between the quad model and PD ferences in automatic associations or by any of models is that the latter produce two equations with the other three processes proposed by the model. two unknowns that can be solved through linear Whereas in some cases, previous interpretations algebra. In contrast, the quad model entails more turned out to be accurate, interpretations of other equations than unknowns. Consequently, parameter fi ndings had to be revised, such that eff ects that values cannot be calculated directly through linear have been attributed to diff erences in automatic algebra, but have to be estimated through alternative associations turned out to be driven by other pro- procedures. Th e procedure employed by the quad cesses, such as diff erences in overcoming the biasing model is multinomial modeling (for a review, see infl uence of automatic associations (for a review, see Batchelder & Riefer, 1999), which uses maximum Sherman et al., 2008).
Gawronski, Creighton 305
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 330505 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:13:29:13 PPMM Criticism of Formalized Dual Th e common result is that harmless objects were Process Th eories more frequently misidentifi ed as guns when the face Compared with phenomenon-specifi c and gen- prime was black than when it was white, whereas eralized dual process theories, formalized models guns were more frequently misidentifi ed as harmless have a unique advantage, in that they provide math- objects when the face prime was white than when ematical implementations that allow researchers to it was black (for a review, see Payne, 2006). Using quantify the relative contributions of the proposed Jacoby’s (1991) PD model, Payne (2001) calculated processes to a given task. At the same time, there separate estimates refl ecting participants’ ability have been controversies surrounding the proper to identify guns and harmless objects (refl ected in interpretation of the obtained parameter estimates the model’s C parameter) and stereotypic biases in (Payne & Bishara, 2009; Sherman et al., 2010). guessing the nature of the target stimulus if partici- An important issue—which applies equally to the pants were unable to identify the stimulus (refl ected two PD models as well as the quad model—is in the model’s A parameter). Importantly, whether that formalized models are often assumed to pro- or not the two processes—identifi cation of the tar- vide direct access to automatic and controlled pro- get object and stereotypic bias in guessing the nature cesses through the nature of their algebraic logic. of the target—operate unintentionally, effi ciently, For example, researchers using Jacoby’s (1991) PD unconsciously, and uncontrollably is an empirical model often assume that the two processes captured question about the conditions under which the two by the model are defi ned as automatic or controlled processes operate; it is not an inherent feature of the through the basic logic of the model. In part, this two processes per se. assumption has its roots in misleading depictions Addressing this concern, Payne and Bishara of the parameter estimates as automatic (using the (2009) have argued that applications of PD mod- acronym A ) and controlled (using the acronym C ). els to particular tasks usually involve one feature of Such depictions are problematic for at least two automaticity by defi nition, whereas claims about reasons. First, as outlined in the initial sections of other features represent empirical hypotheses that this chapter, the diff erent features of automaticity have to be tested as such. With regard to weapon and control do not necessarily covary (Bargh, 1994; identifi cation, for example, Payne and Bishara have Moors & De Houwer, 2006), which makes generic argued that C depicts an intentional process and descriptions of parameters as automatic or con- A an unintentional process, with their (un)inten- trolled misleading, as long as it is not specifi ed in tionality being defi ned a priori through the basic which particular sense the captured process is sup- structure of the task. However, this conceptualiza- posed to be automatic or controlled. Second, and tion stands in contrast to research showing that more seriously, generic descriptions of parameters estimated values of A increased when participants as automatic and controlled confl ate the nature of a were instructed to intentionally use race as a cue in given process (i.e., what is the process doing?) with identifying the target object (Payne, Lambert, & its operating conditions (i.e., under which condi- Jacoby, 2002). Applied to Payne and Bishara’s argu- tions does the process operate?). After all, any claims ment, this result leads to the paradoxical conclusion about the conditions under which a process is oper- that a process that is defi ned as unintentional can be ating represent empirical assumptions that have to intentional. Describing the process captured by the be tested as such, and this empirical work cannot A parameter as stereotypic bias without reference be delegated to the application of a mathematical to intentionality (or other features of automatic- procedure. ity) avoids this problem because stereotypic biases To illustrate this issue, consider Payne’s (2001) can operate either intentionally or unintentionally. application of Jacoby’s (1991) PD model to a Similar considerations apply to the interpretation of sequential priming task designed to investigate ste- the C parameter. In the weapon identifi cation task, reotypic biases in weapon identifi cation. On each this parameter refl ects the identifi cation of the tar- trial of the task, participants are briefl y presented get object, which may or may not be intentional, with either a black or a white face prime, which is conscious, resource dependent, and controllable. immediately followed by a target picture showing Th e bottom line is that formalized dual process either a gun or a harmless object. Th e target picture (and multiple process) theories are very well suited is quickly replaced by a black-and-white pattern to quantifying the contribution of qualitatively dis- mask, and participants’ task is to indicate whether tinct processes (e.g., identifi cation of target object, the target picture showed a gun or a harmless object. stereotypic bias). However, any claims about the
306 Dual Process Theories
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 330606 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:13:29:13 PPMM operating conditions of these processes are empiri- closer to the notion of model. To be sure, formalized cal assumptions that have to be tested as such. Th e models are extremely valuable in providing quantifi - mere application of mathematical procedures can- cations of qualitatively distinct processes. However, not replace this empirical work. these models usually do not include any if–then con- ditionals about these processes that could be tested Outlook empirically. Of course, it is entirely possible to use Dual process theories play a central role in social formalized models to conduct more stringent tests psychology, and the amount of research that has of predictions made by other theories that include been stimulated by these theories is simply enor- if–then conditionals. Yet, any such predictions are mous. In addition to reviewing the core assump- extrinsic to these models, in that they are not logi- tions of the most prominent theories, we have tried cally derived from their core assumptions. to provide a historical perspective by describing the Th ese considerations have important implica- development of dual process theorizing from the tions for dual process theorizing. During the past emergence of phenomenon-specifi c theories in the decade, generalized dual process models have clearly 1980s to the recent advances made by generalized proved their usefulness as integrative frameworks by and formalized dual process theories. An interest- providing conceptual links between phenomena and ing question is where dual process theorizing will research fi ndings that have not been related before. go from here. In the fi nal sections of this chapter, Similarly, formalized dual process models provide a we off er some conceptual considerations regard- powerful tool, not only to disentangle, but also to ing the current state of theorizing and discuss how quantify the contributions of qualitatively distinct some limitations of current theories could possibly processes to overt behavioral responses. Yet, what is be overcome. still missing in both kinds of models is a concep- tual integration of the empirically confi rmed if–then Models Versus Th eories conditionals that have contributed to the rise of In line with the common usage of terminol- phenomenon-specifi c dual process theories in 1980s ogy in social psychology, we have used the terms and 1990s. In addition, it seems desirable to for- theory and model interchangeably. Yet, many phi- mulate new if–then conditionals that allow research- losophers of science consider theories and models as ers to derive novel predictions. Th us, an important conceptually distinct. Whereas theories are usually task for future theorizing is to combine the unique regarded as sets of well-specifi ed if–then condition- characteristics of the three dual process approaches: als that link two or more concepts in a particular (1) the predictive power of phenomenon-specifi c manner, models are regarded as nominal descrip- dual process theories, (2) the integrative capacity of tions that provide a conceptual frame of reference. generalized dual process models, and (3) the meth- Even though the boundaries between theories and odological advantages of formalized dual process models may become somewhat blurry when the dis- models. tinction is applied to theorizing in social psychol- ogy, it seems useful to keep the distinction in mind How Many Processes Are Th ere? when comparing diff erent types of dual process the- A fi nal question that deserves attention in a chap- ories. For example, phenomenon-specifi c dual pro- ter on dual process theories is: How many processes cess theories seem closer to the notion of theory , in are there? During the past decade, this question has that they include specifi c if–then conditionals about sparked controversial debates, with some theorists links between psychological concepts. In contrast, arguing for the classic dual process distinction (e.g., many (though not all) of the reviewed generalized Deutsch & Strack, 2006) and others endorsing either dual process theories seem closer to the notion single process (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2006) or mul- of model , in that they primarily include nominal tiple process alternatives (e.g., Sherman, 2006). In descriptions. To the extent that these models lack evaluating the arguments that have been raised in clearly specifi ed if–then conditionals, their descrip- these debates, it is important to note that existence tive classifi cations do not imply any predictions claims—such as claims about the existence of one, two, that could be confi rmed or disconfi rmed. Instead, or multiple processes—are ontological in nature. In their functional value lies in their integrative capac- the philosophy of science, ontological claims fall into ity as frames of reference to describe observed phe- the realm of metaphysics, which means that they can- nomena. Similar considerations can be applied to not be tested empirically (e.g., Popper, 1934; Quine, formalized dual process theories, which also seem 1960). In other words, we cannot test empirically
Gawronski, Creighton 307
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 330707 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:14:29:14 PPMM if there are one, two, or multiple processes. Still, Conclusion researchers can make decisions about the usefulness During the past three decades, dual process of ontological claims by empirically testing assump- theorizing has exerted an overwhelming impact on tions about the proposed processes. To the extent that research in social psychology. Despite the reviewed the predictions implied by a particular class of theories criticism of dual process theorizing, it seems highly are confi rmed, their underlying ontological claims are unlikely that this infl uence will dissipate in the near typically regarded as justifi ed. Yet, if these predictions future. After all, the enormous body of research that are continuously disconfi rmed, it seems likely that has been inspired by dual process theories speaks researchers will at some point reject the underlying for itself, and it is diffi cult to imagine how a poste- ontological claims. Note, however, that in these cases riori explanations of alternative accounts could lead it is not the existence claim itself that is confi rmed to a full replacement of the dual process idea. Yet, or disconfi rmed, but the assumptions that are made many of the concerns that have been raised against about the proposed entities. dual process theories seem justifi ed on conceptual Evaluated from this point of view, dual process grounds. To the extent that dual process theorists theories have fared very well, which explains their take these concerns seriously, theorizing in social dominant role in social psychology. At the same psychology can only become stronger. time, it is essential to reiterate the quest for novel predictions, which still represent the hallmark of Author Note theory evaluation. As noted in our earlier discussion Preparation of this chapter has been supported of generality–specifi city trade-off s, theories with a by the Canada Research Chairs Program and the high degree of generality are certainly functional in Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council their capacity to explain a wide range of phenomena of Canada. We are grateful to Jeff Sherman for valu- with a parsimonious set of basic principles. At the able comments on an earlier version of this chapter. same time, highly integrative theories often come Please address correspondence to at the cost of specifi city, which is essential for the Bertram Gawronski, Ph.D., Department of derivation of novel predictions (Quine & Ullian, Psychology, Th e University of Western Ontario, 1978). Even though this concern has been raised Social Science Centre, London, Ontario N6A 5C2 in particular against generalized dual process theo- Canada; e-mail: [email protected]. ries (e.g., Keren & Schul, 2009), it is important to note that it equally applies to their single process Notes alternatives, whose high levels of generality make 1 . Note that p(correct | compatible) = 1 – p(incorrect | compat- them capable of explaining almost any observable ible). Correspondingly, p(correct | incompatible) = 1 – p(incorrect | outcome in a post hoc fashion. Yet, their capacity incompatible). for making predictions often seems rather weak, in that it is diffi cult to specify in an a priori fashion References Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1980). Understanding attitudes and pre- what outcome one would expect for a particular set dicting social behavior . Englewood Cliff s, NJ : Prentice-Hall . of conditions. Th us, what seems essential to evalu- Asch, S. E., & Zuckier, H. (1984). Th inking about persons . ate any type of ontological premise—be it in single Journal of Personality and Social Psychology . 46 , 1230–1240 . process, dual process, or multiple process theoriz- Back, M. D., Schmukle, S. C., & Egloff , B. (2009). Predicting actual ing—is the formulation of precise if–then condi- behavior from the explicit and implicit self-concept of personal- ity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 533–548 . tionals that generate novel predictions. Ideally, such Banse, R., Gawronski, B., Rebetez, C., Gutt, H., & Morton, J. B. if–then conditionals should be formulated in a man- (2010). Th e development of spontaneous gender stereotyp- ner that specifi es not only which events are implied ing in childhood: Relations to stereotype knowledge and ste- by the theory but also which events should not hap- reotype fl exibility. Developmental Science , 13 , 298–306 . pen according to the theory. After all, the informa- Bargh, J. A. (1992). Th e ecology of automaticity: Toward estab- lishing the conditions needed to produce automatic process- tive value of a scientifi c theory increases with the ing eff ects. American Journal of Psychology , 105 , 181–199 . number of observations that are “prohibited” by the Bargh, J. A. (1994). Th e four horsemen of automaticity: theory, not with the number of observations that Awareness, intention, effi ciency, and control in social cogni- are “allowed” (Popper, 1934). Th us, an important tion. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social task for the refi nement of dual process theorizing cognition (pp. 1–40 ). Hillsdale, NJ : Erlbaum . Bargh, J. A. (1997). Th e automaticity of everyday life. In is the simultaneous consideration of generality and R. S. Wyer, Jr. (Ed.), Advances in social cognition (Vol. 10 , specifi city to maximize both their explanatory and pp. 1–61 ). Mahwah, NJ : Erlbaum . their predictive power.
308 Dual Process Theories
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 330808 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:14:29:14 PPMM Batchelder, W. H., & Riefer, D. M. (1999). Th eoretical and Epstein, S. (1973). Th e self-concept revisited. Or a theory of a empirical review of multinomial process tree modeling. theory . American Psychologist , 28 , 404–416 . Psychonomic Bulletin and Review , 6 , 57–86 . Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and the psycho- Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual process model of impression for- dynamic unconscious . American Psychologist , 49 , 709–724 . mation. In T. K. Srull & R. S. Wyer (Eds.), Advances in social Epstein, S., & Pacini, R. (1999). Some basic issues regarding cognition (Vol. 1 , pp. 1–36 ). Hillsdale, NJ : Erlbaum . dual-process theories from the perspective of Cognitive- Brewer, M. B., & Harasty-Feinstein, A. S. (1999). Dual processes Experiential Self-Th eory. In S. Chaiken, & Y. Trope (Eds.), in the representation of persons and social categories. In Dual-process theories in social psychology (pp. 462–482 ). New S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-process theories in social York : Guilford Press . psychology (pp. 255–270 ). New York : Guilford Press . Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Carruthers, P. (2009). An architecture for dual reasoning. In J. Individual diff erences in intuitive-experiential and St. B. T. Evans & K. Frankish (Eds.), In two minds: Dual analytical-rational thinking styles . Journal of Personality and processes and beyond (pp. 109–127 ). New York : Oxford Social Psychology , 71 , 390–405 . University Press . Erb, H. P., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., Spiegel, S., & Kruglanski, Chaiken, S. (1987). Th e heuristic model of persuasion. In M. A. W. (2007). Biased processing of persuasive evidence: On P. Zanna, J. M. Olson, & C. P. Herman (Eds.), Social infl u- the functional equivalence of cues and message arguments. ence: Th e Ontario Symposium (Vol. 5 , pp. 3–39 ). Hillsdale, European Journal of Social Psychology , 37 , 1057–1075 . NJ : Erlbaum . Fazio, R. H. (1990). Multiple processes by which attitudes guide Chaiken, S., Liberman, A., & Eagly, A. H. (1989). Heuristic behavior: Th e MODE model as an integrative framework. and systematic processing within and beyond the persuasion Advances in Experimental Social Psychology , 23 , 75–109 . context. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended Fazio, R. H. (1995). Attitudes as object-evaluation associations: thought (pp. 212–252 ). New York : Guilford Press . Determinants, consequences, and correlates of attitude Chaiken, S., & Maheswaran, D. (1994). Heuristic processing can accessibility. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude bias systematic processing: Eff ects of source credibility, argu- strength (pp. 247–282 ). Mahwah, NJ : Erlbaum . ment ambiguity, and task importance on attitude judgment. Fazio, R. H. (2007). Attitudes as object-evaluation associations Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 66 , 460–473 . of varying strength . Social Cognition , 25 , 603–637 . Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual-process theories in Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C., & Williams, C. J. social psychology . New York : Guilford Press . (1995). Variability in automatic activation as an unobtrusive Chen, S., & Chaiken, S. (1999). Th e Heuristic-Systematic measure of racial attitudes: A bona fi de pipeline? Journal of Model in its broader context. In S. Chaiken, & Y. Trope Personality and Social Psychology , 69 , 1013–1027 . (Eds.), Dual-process theories in social psychology (pp. 73–96 ). Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social New York : Guilford Press . cognition research: Th eir meaning and use. Annual Review of Chun, W. Y., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2006). Th e role of task Psychology , 54 , 297–327 . demands and processing resources in the use of base-rate and Fazio, R. H., Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Powell, M. C., & Kardes, F. R. individuating information. Journal of Personality and Social (1986). On the automatic activation of attitudes . Journal of Psychology , 91 , 205–217 . Personality and Social Psychology , 50 , 229–238 . Chun, W. Y., Spiegel, S., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2002). Assimilative Ferreira, M. B., Garcia-Marques, L., Sherman, S. J., & Sherman, behavior identifi cation can also be resource dependent: A J. W. (2006). A dual-process approach to judgment under unimodel perspective on personal-attribution phases . Journal uncertainty . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 91 , of Personality and Social Psychology , 83 , 542–555 . 797–813 . Conrey, F. R., Sherman, J. W., Gawronski, B., Hugenberg, K., & Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance . Evanston, Groom, C. (2005). Separating multiple processes in implicit IL : Row Peterson . social cognition: Th e Quad-Model of implicit task performance . Fiske, S. T., Lin, M., & Neuberg, S. L. (1999). Th e continuum Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 89 , 469–487 . model: Ten years later. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), D’Agostino, P. R., & Fincher-Kiefer, R. (1992). Need for cog- Dual-process theories in social psychology (pp. 231–254 ). New nition and the correspondence bias. Social Cognition , 10 , York : Guilford Press . 151–163 . Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of impression Deutsch, R., Gawronski, B., & Strack, F. (2006). At the boundar- formation, from category-based to individuating processes: ies of automaticity: Negation as refl ective operation . Journal Infl uences of information and motivation on attention and of Personality and Social Psychology , 91 , 385–405 . interpretation . Advances in Experimental Social Psychology , Deutsch, R., & Strack, F. (2006). Duality models in social 23 , 1–74 . psychology: From dual processes to interacting systems . Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (1986). Th e aversive form of Psychological Inquiry , 17 , 166–172 . racism. In J. F. Dovidio, & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Th eir automatic discrimination, and racism (pp. 61–89 ). Orlando, FL : and controlled components . Journal of Personality and Social Academic Press . Psychology , 56 , 5–18 . Gawronski, B. (2004). Th eory-based bias correction in disposi- Duncan, B. L. (1976). Diff erential perception and attribution tional inference: Th e fundamental attribution error is dead, of intergroup violence: Testing the lower limits of stereotyp- long live the correspondence bias . European Review of Social ing of Blacks . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 34 , Psychology , 15 , 183–217 . 590–598 . Gawronski, B., Alshut, E., Grafe, J., Nespethal, J., Ruhmland, Dunton, B. C., & Fazio, R. H. (1997). An individual diff er- A., & Schulz, L. (2002). Prozesse der Urteilsbildung ü ber ence measure of motivation to control prejudiced reactions . bekannte und unbekannte Personen: Wie der erste Eindruck Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 23 , 316–326 . die Verarbeitung neuer Informationen beeinfl usst [Processes
Gawronski, Creighton 309
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 330909 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:14:29:14 PPMM of judging known and unknown persons: How the fi rst Gilbert, D. T., Pelham, B. W., & Krull, D. S. (1988). On impression infl uences the processing of new information] . cognitive busyness: When person perceivers meet persons Zeitschrift f ü r Sozialpsychologie , 33 , 25–34 . perceived . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 54 , Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006a). Associative and 733–740 . propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review Gilovich, T., Griffi n, D., & Kahneman, D. (Eds.). (2002). of implicit and explicit attitude change. Psychological Bulletin , Heuristics and biases: Th e psychology of intuitive judgment . 132 , 692–731 . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press . Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006b). Associative and Greeley, A. M., & Sheatsley, P. B. (1971). Attitudes toward racial propositional processes in evaluation: Conceptual, empirical, integration . Scientifi c American , 225 , 13–19 . and meta-theoretical issues. Reply to Albarrací n, Hart, and Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cog- McCulloch (2006), Kruglanski and Dechesne (2006), and Petty nition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes . Psychological and Bri ñ ol (2006) . Psychological Bulletin , 132 , 745–750 . Review , 102 , 4–27 . Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2007). Unraveling the Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. K. L. (1998). processes underlying evaluation: Attitudes from the perspec- Measuring individual diff erences in implicit cognition: Th e tive of the APE Model . Social Cognition , 25 , 687–717 . Implicit Association Test . Journal of Personality and Social Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2009). Operating prin- Psychology , 74 , 1464–1480 . ciples versus operating conditions in the distinction between Gregg, A. P., Seibt, B., & Banaji, M. R. (2006). Easier done than associative and propositional processes. Behavioral and Brain undone: Asymmetry in the malleability of implicit prefer- Sciences , 32 , 207–208 . ences . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90 , 1–20 . Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2011). Th e Grumm, M., Nestler, S., & von Collani, G. (2009). Changing associative-propositional evaluation model: Th eory, evi- explicit and implicit attitudes: Th e case of self-esteem. Journal dence, and open questions. Advances in Experimental Social of Experimental Social Psychology , 45 , 327–335 . Psychology , 44 , 59–127 . Higgins, E. T. (1996). Knowledge activation: Accessibility, appli- Gawronski, B., Deutsch, R., LeBel, E. P., & Peters, K. R. (2008). cability, and salience. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski Response interference as a mechanism underlying implicit (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. measures: Some traps and gaps in the assessment of mental 133–168 ). New York : Guilford Press . associations with experimental paradigms . European Journal Hoefl ing, A., Likowski, K. U., Deutsch, R., Hä fner, M., Seibt, of Psychological Assessment , 24 , 218–225 . B., M ü hlberger, A., Weyers, P., & Strack, F. (2009). When Gawronski, B., Geschke, D., & Banse, R. (2003). Implicit bias hunger fi nds no fault with moldy corn: Food deprivation in impression formation: Associations infl uence the con- reduces food-related disgust . Emotion , 9 , 50–58 . strual of individuating information . European Journal of Hofmann, W., Rauch, W., & Gawronski, B. (2007). And Social Psychology , 33 , 573–589 . deplete us not into temptation: Automatic attitudes, dietary Gawronski, B., & LeBel, E. P. (2008). Understanding patterns restraint, and self-regulatory resources as determinants of eat- of attitude change: When implicit measures show change, ing behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 43 , but explicit measures do not. Journal of Experimental Social 497–504 . Psychology , 44 , 1355–1361 . Hugenberg, K., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2003). Facing preju- Gawronski, B., LeBel, E. P., & Peters, K. R. (2007). What do dice: Implicit prejudice and the perception of facial threat. implicit measures tell us? Scrutinizing the validity of three Psychological Science , 14 , 640–643 . common assumptions . Perspectives on Psychological Science , 2 , Hugenberg, K., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2004). Ambiguity in 181–193 . social categorization: Th e role of prejudice and facial aff ect in Gawronski, B., Peters, K. R., & LeBel, E. P. (2008). What makes racial categorization . Psychological Science , 15 , 342–345 . mental associations personal or extra-personal? Conceptual Huntsinger, J. R., Sinclair, S., & Clore, G. L. (2009). Aff ective issues in the methodological debate about implicit atti- regulation of implicitly measures stereotypes and attitudes: tude measures . Social and Personality Psychology Compass , 2 , Automatic and controlled processes. Journal of Experimental 1002–1023 . Social Psychology , 45 , 560–566 . Gawronski, B., & Sritharan, R. (2010). Formation, change, and Jacoby, L. L. (1991). A process-dissociation framework: contextualization of mental associations: Determinants and Separating automatic from intentional uses of memory. principles of variations in implicit measures. In B. Gawronski, Journal of Memory & Language , 30 , 513–541 . & B. K. Payne (Eds.), Handbook of implicit social cognition: Jones, E. E. (1990). Interpersonal perception. New York: Freeman . Measurement, theory, and applications (pp. 216–240 ). New Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. E. (1965). From acts to dispositions: York : Guilford Press . Th e attribution process in person perception . Advances in Gawronski, B., & Strack, F. (2004). On the propositional nature Experimental Social Psychology , 2 , 219–266 . of cognitive consistency: Dissonance changes explicit, but not Jones, E. E., & Harris, V. A. (1967). Th e attribution of attitudes. implicit attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 3 , 1–24 . 40 , 535–542 . Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Gilbert, D. T. (1989). Th inking lightly about others: Automatic Mapping bounded rationality. American Psychologist , 58 , components of the social inference process. In J. S. Uleman 697–720 . & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 189–211 ). Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment New York : Guilford Press . under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases . Cambridge, UK : Gilbert, D. T. (1991). How mental systems believe. American Cambridge University Press . Psychologist, 46, 107–119. Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychol- Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). Th e correspondence bias . ogy. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation Psychological Bulletin , 117 , 21–38 . (pp. 192–240 ). Lincoln, NE : University of Nebraska Press .
310 Dual Process Theories
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 331010 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:15:29:15 PPMM Kelley, H. H. (1972). Causal schemata and the attribution expectancy confi rmation on consumer judgments. Journal of process. In E. E. Jones, D. E. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Consumer Psychology , 1 , 317–336 . Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving McClelland, J. L., McNaughton, B. L., & O’Reilly, R. C. (1995). the causes of behavior (pp. 151–174 ). Morristown, NJ : Why there are complementary learning systems in the hip- General Learning Press . pocampus and neocortex? Insights from the successes and Keren, G., & Schul, Y. (2009). Two is not always better than one: failures of connectionist models of learning and memory . A critical evaluation of two-systems theories. Perspectives on Psychological Review , 102 , 419–457 . Psychological Science , 4 , 533–550 . McConahay, J. B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the Kruglanski, A. W., & Ajzen, I. (1983). Bias and error in human modern racism scale. In J. D. Dovidio, & S. L. Gaertner judgment . European Journal of Social Psychology , 13 , 1–44 . (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism (pp. 91–125 ). Kruglanski, A. W., & Dechesne, M. (2006). Are associative and Orlando, FL : Academic Press . propositional processes qualitatively distinct? Comment on Metcalfe, J., & Mischel, W. (1999). A hot/cool-system analysis Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006). Psychological Bulletin , of delay of gratifi cation. Dynamics of willpower. Psychological 132 , 736–739 . Review , 106 , 3–19 . Kruglanski, A. W., Erb, H. P., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., & Chun, Moors, A., & De Houwer, J. (2006). Automaticity: A conceptual W. Y. (2006). On parametric continuities in the world of and theoretical analysis . Psychological Bulletin , 132 , 297–326 . binary either ors . Psychological Inquiry , 17 , 153–165 . Neumann, R., Fö rster, J., & Strack, F. (2003). Motor compat- Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., Erb, H. P., & Chun, ibility: Th e bidirectional link between behavior and emo- W. Y. (2007). On the parameters of human judgment . tion. In J. Musch & K. C. Klauer (Eds.), Th e psychology of Advances in Experimental Social Psychology , 39 , 255–303 . evaluation: Aff ective processes in cognition and emotion (pp. Kruglanski, A. W., & Th ompson, E. P. (1999). Persuasion by a 371–391 ). Mahwah, NJ : Erlbaum . single route: A view from the unimodel. Psychological Inquiry , Norman, D. A., & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to action: Willed 10 , 83–109 . and automatic control of behavior. In R. J. Davidson, G. E. Krull, D. S. (1993). Does the grist change the mill? Th e eff ect Schwartz, & D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation: of the perceiver’s inferential goal on the process of social Advances in research (pp. 1–18 ). New York : Plenum . inference . Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 19 , Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2004). Reducing the infl uence 340–348 . of extra-personal associations on the Implicit Association Krull, D. S., & Dill, J. C. (1996). On thinking fi rst and respond- Test: Personalizing the IAT. Journal of Personality and Social ing fast: Flexibility in the social inference process . Personality Psychology , 86 , 653–667 . and Social Psychology Bulletin , 22 , 949–959 . Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2006). Reducing automati- Krull, D. S., & Erickson, D. J. (1995). Judging situations: On cally activated racial prejudice through implicit evaluative the eff ortful process of taking dispositional information into conditioning . Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 32 , account . Social Cognition , 13 , 417–438 . 421–433 . Kunda, Z., Miller, D. T., & Claire, T. (1990). Combining social Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2009). Implicit and explicit mea- concepts: Th e role of causal reasoning . Cognitive Science , 14 , sures of attitudes: Th e perspective of the MODE model. In 551–577 . R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. Briñ ol (Eds.), Attitudes: Insights Kunda, Z., & Sherman-Williams, B. (1993). Stereotypes and the from the new implicit measures (pp. 19–63 ). New York : construal of individuating information . Personality and Social Psychology Press . Psychology Bulletin , 19 , 90–99 . Payne, B. K. (2001). Prejudice and perception: Th e role of auto- Leyens, J. P., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (1992). Th e ingroup overexclusion matic and controlled processes in misperceiving a weapon. eff ect: Th e impact of valence and confi rmation on information Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 81 , 181–192 . search . European Journal of Social Psychology , 22 , 549–569 . Payne, B. K. (2006). Weapon bias: Split second decisions and Lieberman, M. D. (2003). Refl ective and refl exive judgment unintended stereotyping . Current Directions in Psychological processes: A social cognitive neuroscience approach. In J. P. Science , 15 , 287–291 . Forgas, K. R. Williams, & W. von Hippel (Eds.), Social judg- Payne, B. K. (2008). What mistakes disclose: A process disso- ments: Implicit and explicit processes (pp. 44–67 ). New York : ciation approach to automatic and controlled processes in Cambridge University Press . social psychology . Social and Personality Psychology Compass , Lieberman, M. D. (2007). Social cognitive neuroscience: A review 2 , 1073–1092 . of core processes . Annual Review of Psychology , 58 , 259–289 . Payne, B. K., & Bishara, A. J. (2009). An integrative review of Lieberman, M. D., Gaunt, R., Gilbert, D. T., & Trope, Y. (2002). process dissociation and related models in social cognition. Refl ection and refl exion: A social cognitive neuroscience European Review of Social Psychology , 20 , 272–314 . approach to attributional inference . Advances in Experimental Payne, B. K., Lambert, A. J., & Jacoby, L. L. (2002). Best laid Social Psychology , 34 , 199–249 . plans: Eff ects of goals on accessibility bias and cognitive Lindsay, D. S., & Jacoby, L. L. (1994). Stroop process-dissociations: control in race-based misperceptions of weapons. Journal of Th e relationship between facilitation and interference. Journal Experimental Social Psychology , 38 , 384–396 . of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance , Peters, K. R., & Gawronski, B. (2011). Mutual infl uences 20 , 219–234 . between the implicit and explicit self-concepts: Th e role Maheswaran, D., & Chaiken, S. (1991). Promoting systematic of memory activation and motivated reasoning . Journal of processing in low-motivation settings: Eff ects of incongru- Experimental Social Psychology , 47 , 436–442 . ent information on processing and judgment. Journal of Petty, R. E., Bri ñ ol, P., & DeMarree, K. G. (2007). Th e Personality and Social Psychology , 61 , 13–25 . meta-cognitive model (MCM) of attitudes: Implications Maheswaran, D., Mackie, D. M., & Chaiken, S. (1992). Brand for attitude measurement, change, and strength . Social name as an heuristic cue: Th e eff ects of task importance and Cognition , 25 , 657–686 .
Gawronski, Creighton 311
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 331111 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:15:29:15 PPMM Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1984). Source factors and the implicit social cognition: Measurement, theory, and applications elaboration likelihood model of persuasion . Advances in (pp. 156–175 ). New York : Guilford Press . Consumer Research , 11 , 668–672 . Shiff rin, R., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). Th e Elaboration human information processing: II. Perceptual learning, auto- Likelihood Model of persuasion. Advances in Experimental matic attending and a general theory. Psychological Review , Social Psychology , 19 , 123–205 . 84 , 127–190 . Petty, R. E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Schumann, D. W. (1983). Sloman, S. A. (1996). Th e empirical case for two systems of rea- Central and peripheral routes to advertising eff ectiveness: soning . Psychological Bulletin , 119 , 3–22 . Th e moderating role of involvement . Journal of Consumer Smith, E. R., & DeCoster, J. (2000). Dual-process models in Research , 10 , 135–146 . social and cognitive psychology: Conceptual integration and Petty, R. E., & Wegener, D. T. (1999). Th e Elaboration links to underlying memory systems . Personality and Social Likelihood Model: Current status and controversies. In S. Psychology Review , 4 , 108–131 . Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual process theories in social psy- Snyder, M. L., & Frankel, A. (1976). Observer bias: A stringent chology (pp. 41–72 ). New York : Guilford Press . test of behavior engulfi ng the fi eld. Journal of Personality and Popper, K. R. (1934). Logic of scientifi c discovery . New York : Basic Social Psychology , 34 , 857–864 . Books . Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual diff erences in Posner, M. I., & Snyder, C. R. R. (1975). Attention and cogni- reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? Behavioral tive control. In R. L. Solso (Ed.), Information processing and and Brain Sciences , 23 , 645–726 . cognition: Th e Loyola Symposium . Hillsdale, NJ : Lawrence Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Refl ective and impulsive deter- Erlbaum Associates Inc . minants of social behavior . Personality and Social Psychology Quattrone, G. A. (1982). Overattribution and unit formation: Review , 8 , 220–247 . When behavior engulfs the person . Journal of Personality and Taylor, D. G., Sheatsley, P. B., & Greeley, A. M. (1978). Attitudes Social Psychology , 42 , 593–607 . toward racial integration . Scientifi c American , 238 , 42–49 . Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and object . Cambridge MA : MIT Trope, Y. (1986). Identifi cation and inferential processes in dis- Press . positional attribution. Psychological Review , 93 , 239–257 . Quine, W. V. O., & Ullian, J. S. (1978). Th e web of belief (2nd Trope, Y., & Alfi eri, T. (1997). Eff ortfulness and fl exibility of ed.). New York : McGraw-Hill . dispositional judgment processes . Journal of Personality and Richards, Z., & Hewstone, M. (2001). Subtyping and subgroup- Social Psychology , 73 , 662–674 . ing: Processes for the prevention and promotion of stereotype Trope, Y., & Cohen, O. (1989). Perceptual and inferential deter- change . Personality and Social Psychology Review , 5 , 52–73 . minants of behavior-correspondent attributions. Journal of Ross, L. D. (1977). Th e intuitive psychologist and his short- Experimental Social Psychology , 25 , 142–158 . comings: Distortions in the attribution process . Advances in Trope, Y., Cohen, O., & Alfi eri, T. (1991). Behavior identifi - Experimental Social Psychology , 10 , 173–220 . cation as a mediator of dispositional inference. Journal of Ross, L. D., Amabile, T. M., & Steinmetz, J. L. (1977). Social Personality and Social Psychology , 61 , 873–883 . roles, social control, and biases in social-perception processes. Trope, Y., Cohen, O., & Maoz, Y. (1988). Th e perceptual and Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 35 , 485–494 . inferential eff ects of situational inducements on dispositional Sagar, H. A., & Schofi eld, J. W. (1980). Racial and behavioral attribution . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 55 , cues in black and white children’s perceptions of ambiguously 165–177 . aggressive acts . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , Trope, Y., & Gaunt, R. (1999). A dual-process model of over- 39 , 590–598 . confi dent attributional inferences. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope Samuels, R. (2009). Th e magical number two, plus or minus: (Eds.), Dual-process theories in social psychology (pp. 161– Dual-process theory as a theory of cognitive kinds. In J. 178 ). New York : Guilford Press . St. B. T. Evans & K. Frankish (Eds.), In two minds: Dual Trope, Y., & Gaunt, R. (2000). Processing alternative expla- processes and beyond (pp. 129–146 ). New York : Oxford nations of behavior: Correction or integration? Journal of University Press . Personality and Social Psychology , 79 , 344–354 . Sears, D. O. (1988). Symbolic racism. In P. A. Katz, & D. A. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional vs. intuitive Taylor (Eds.), Eliminating racism: Profi les in controversy (pp. reasoning: Th e conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. 53–84 ). New York : Plenum . Psychological Review , 90 , 293–315 . Sherman, J. W. (2006). On building a better process model: It’s Vonk, R. (1999). Eff ects of outcome dependency on correspon- not only how many, but which ones and by which means . dence bias . Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 25 , Psychological Inquiry , 17 , 173–184 . 382–389 . Sherman, J. W., Gawronski, B., Gonsalkorale, K., Hugenberg, K., Webster, D. M. (1993). Motivated augmentation and reduction Allen, T. J., & Groom, C. J. (2008). Th e self-regulation of of the overattribution bias . Journal of Personality and Social automatic associations and behavioral impulses . Psychological Psychology , 65 , 261–271 . Review , 115 , 314–335 . Whitfi eld, M., & Jordan, C. H. (2009). Mutual infl uences of Sherman, J. W., Groom, C., Ehrenberg, K., & Klauer, K. C. explicit and implicit attitudes . Journal of Experimental Social (2003). Bearing false witness under pressure: Implicit and Psychology , 45 , 748–759 . explicit components of stereotype-driven memory bias . Wicker, A. W. (1969). Attitudes versus actions: Th e relationship Social Cognition , 21 , 213–246 . of verbal and overt behavioral responses to attitude objects . Sherman, J. W., Klauer, K. C., & Allen, T. J. (2010). Mathematical Journal of Social Issues , 25 , 41–78 . modeling of implicit social cognition: Th e machine in the Wilson, T. D., Lindsey, S. & Schooler, T. Y. (2000). A model of ghost. In B. Gawronski & B. K. Payne (Eds.), Handbook of dual attitudes . Psychological Review , 107 , 101–126 .
312 Dual Process Theories
114_Carlston_Ch14.indd4_Carlston_Ch14.indd 331212 44/9/2013/9/2013 11:29:16:29:16 PPMM