ibits. inion tonal
New
Attitudes as Global and
Local Action Guides0
ALISON LEDGERWOOD AND YAACOV THOPE
\Ve often th ink of ou r att itudes ami beliefs as stahle personality chamcteristics wllen asked to describe ourselves, we might cite our love of a particular composer, oor support for a long-preferred political party, or perhaps a deep and ahiding hatred of Oreo cookies. Echoing this assumption, attitudes have historically been consid ered relatively stable individual differences that remain consistent across time and contexts, unless or until an overt persuasion attempt is encountered. However, more recently, a far more malleable pictu re of attitudes has clnerged from research sug gesting that evaluations can shift quite flexibly in response to the immed iate social environment (e.g., Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; Kawakami, Dovidio, & Dijksterhui s. 2003; Ledgerwood & Chaiken, 200i; Lowery, Hardin , & Sinclair, 200j ). In this chapter, we propose that these competing conceptualizations of attitudes as stable versus shifting llIay reflect two difTerent roles that attitudes play in regulat ing evaluative responding. On the one hand, att itudes can funct ion to gU ide action with respect to tile current social context. In order to act efTect ively and efficiently in the here and 1I0W , individuals need quick summaries of pertinent information to gUide their interactions with objects and people in the present situation. On the other hand, att itudes can function to guide action at a distance. \Vhen planning behavior in the distant future or making decisions about a faraway location, indi viduals need to he able to efficient ly abstract across the particularities of any one .. experience to extrac t evaluation-relevant information that is stable across time, con texts, and relationships, \Ve begin thi s chapter by providing some background on how att itudes are typically characterized in the literatu re. Next, we descrihe in more detail our
• Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by a National Sc h-nee Foundatten Craduate Heseurch Fellowship to Alison Ledgerwood and by the Xatlonul lnstttute of MentnlHenlth Grant nOI ~ 1 11.'5903 0 ~ 06A I 10 Yaacov Trop e.
39 40 ALISON LEDGERWOOD AND YAACOV TROPE •
global-local perspective on evaluation, which dist inguishes bet ween two different forms of eva luations that serve two different regulatory fun ct ions. \ Ve propose that distance wiII playa key role in determining which form of evaluation is used to guide responding, and we draw on construa l level theory to delineate th e cog nitive process by wh ich th is could occu r. After describing a series of e mpirical stud ies th at provide support for several of ou r hypotheses, we discuss points of interface with other att itud inal theo ries and highlight some implicati ons of our persp ecti ve for understanding relat ed areas such as att itude-behavior correspondence , ideol ogy. and conformity.
CONCEPTUALIZING ATTITUDES Attitudes have long been assum ed to playa key role in the regulation ofheh avior. One imp ortant function th at they serve is to provide a quick su mma ry of whether an attitude object is positive or negative, in order to facilitate approach or avoidance uf that object (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Fazio, 1986; Gree nwald, 1989; Katz, 1960; Shavitt , 1990; Smith, Brnner, & White, 1956; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2(00). Furthermore, attitudes ca n fun ction to coordinate social acti on and interaction by su mmarizing information from th e social environment, such as other people's opinions, that helps individuals create am i maintain a sha red view of'the world with 1 those around them (Ha n lin & Higgin s. 1996; [ost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin. 2008; i Smith et al., 1956; Williams, Chen, & Wegen er, this volume). Thus, attitudes help I to guide both action ami interaction by providing efficient, valenced summar ies of information that would Simply be too overwhe lming and complex to conside r piece 1 hy piece before each beh avior we undertake in eve ryday life. \\ Although few researchers would dispute that attitudes can be fun ctional, there is far less agree me nt about what they should look like. Traditionally, att itudes have often been conce ptualized as dispositional eva luative tendencies toward a given al att itude object th at remain relatively consistent across situations, unl ess (or until) a " successful persuasion attempt changes the first attitude into a new one (e.g., Ajzcn, at I 1988; Allport, 1935; Campbell, 1950; Krech & C rutchfield , 1948; Tou rangeau & r, Rasioski, 1988). Extensive research on attit ude stability has demonstrated th at individuals often sele ctively attend to, th in k abou t, and reme mber information in ways th at suppo rt their prior att itudes (e.g., Eagly, Kulesa, Che n, & C ha iken, 20tH; ~ Giner-Soro lla & Chaiken, 199i; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 19i9; Pomerantz, Cha iken, wi & Tordesillas, 1995; Sweeney & Gruber, 1984). Meanwhile, research on att itude HI structure suggests th at substantial att itudi nal consistency can be predi cted by re t aspects of intra-atti tud inal st ructu re, such as the con sistency between an overall cJ 1 evaluation and the evaluative meaning of supporting cog nitions or afTect , as well 1\1, as inter-att itud inal structure, such as an attitude 's connected ness to-JJther beliefs 19\ a nd values (see, e.g., Cha iken, Pomerantz, & Gine r-Sorolla, 199.5; Ostrom & Brock, tio\ an( 1968). Consiste ncy pressu res ca n also arise at the interpersonal level: For exa mple, I publicly comm itt ing to an att itud ina l position increases subsequent resistance to an change (Hovland, Ca mpbell, & Brock, 195i). Thus, there is good evide nce to sng & gest that att itude s can be consistent across contexts. & \ •
;ON LEDGERWOOD AN D YAACOV TROPE ATTITUDES AS GLOBAL A ND LOCAL ACTION GUIDES 41
al-Iocal perspective on eva luation, wh ich distinguishes between two different Furthermore , the very idea that one can pred ict a person's behavior from her IS of eva luations that serve two differe nt regul atory functions. \ Ve propose that attitudes rests on the assumption that an attitude measured now will predict a mce will play a key role in determining which form of evaluation is used to later attitude and subsequent behavior. Hesearch suggests this relationship can e respo nding, and we draw 0 11 theory to delin eate the cogn itive construal level sometimes be quite strong (sec, e.g., Schuman & Johnson, 1976; Wallace, Paulson, ess by which this could occur. After describing a series of empirical studies Lord, & Bond, 2005): For instance, atti tudes toward political candidates are excel provide support for several of our hypotheses, we discuss points of Interface lent predictors of voting behavior (e.g., Ca mpbell , Converse, Miller, & Stokes, other attitudinal theories and highlight some implications of our perspective 1960). Evidence of attitudinal stability can even be found in studies of attitude nderstanding related areas such as attitude- behavior co rrespondence , ideol change, when the postmanipulation attitude is measured repeatedly over time and and conformity. shown to be consistent (e.g., Freedm an , 1965; Higgin s & Rholes, 1978; Petersen & Thurstone, 1933; Hokeach, 1975; Rokeach & Cochrane, 1972). CONCEPTUALIZING ATTITUDES Meanwhile, however, other research has painted a far more malleable picture of attitudes, suggesting that they fluidly shift in response to the immed iate social ales have long been assumed to play a key role in the regulation of behavior, context. In line with this view, some oftile ea rliest studies on social influence dem important function that they se rve is to provide a qu ick summary of whether onstrated that people's attitudes and judgments eonform to the views of others .itude object is positive or negative, in orde r to facilitate approach oravoidance (e.g., Asch, 1955; Deu tsch & Gerard, 1955; Sherif, 1935 ; see Eagly & Chaiken, It object (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Fazio, 1986; Gree nwald, 1989; Katz, 1960; 1993; Turner, 1991, for reviews). More recent research has revea led that attit udes tt , 1990; Smith, Bruner, & Whit e, HJ56; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). shift, often outside of awareness, ill response to other people in the local social iermore, attitudes can function to coordinate social action and interaction context, inelud ing salient social categories, significant others, communication Itlmarizing information from the social e nvironment, such as other people's partners, and even complete strangers (Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; Blanchard, Lilly, ms, that helps individuals create and maintain a shared view of the world with & Vaughn, 1991; Cooper, th is volume; Davis & Hushult, 200 1; Higgin s & Rholes, around them (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardi n, 2008; 1978; Kawakam i et aI., 200 3; Ledgerwood & Chaiken, 2007; Lowery et al., 2001). , et al., 1956; Williams, Chcn, & Wegener, th is volume). Thus, att itudes help Even implicit attitudes can shift to align with the presumed attitudes of othe r de both action and inte raction by providing efficient, valenced summaries of people in the local social sitnation (see Blair, 2002, for a review). For .example, nation that would Simply he too overwhelming and complex to consider piece Lowery et a1. (2001) found that when \ Vhite participants were motivated to ge t ce before each behavior we undertake in eve ryday life. along with an expe rimenter, implicit racial hias decreased when the expe rimenter though few researchers would dispute that attitudes can be functional, there was Black (and therefore pre sumably possessed more positive attitudes toward ess agreement about what they should look like. Tradit ionally, attitudes have Blacks) versus Whi te. Likewise,Sinclair, Lowery, Hard in, and Colangelo (2005) been conceptualized as dispositional evaluative tendencies toward a given demonstrated that when participants liked an experimenter, their implicit racial le object that remain relatively co nsistent across situations, unless (or until) a attitudes shifted to align with the presumed attitudes of the expe rimenter. sful pe rsuasion attempt changes the first attitude into a new one (e.g, Ajzen, The grow ing literature on attitude malleability in response to the presumed Allpor t, 1935; Campbell, 1950; Krech & Crutchfield, 1948; Tourangeau & attitudes of others reflects an overall shift in the field of social psychology, as ki, 1988). Extensive research on attitude stability has de monstrated that researchers move beyond classic assumptions of stable, schematic representations luals often selectively attend to, thin k ahout, and remember information in to recognize malleability in a wide range of phenomena (see Blair, 2002; Smith rat sllpport their pr ior at titudes (e.g., Eagly, Kulesa, Chen, & Chaiken, 200l ; & Semin, 2004, 2007, for reviews). For instance, stereotypes have historically Sorolla & Chaiken, 1997; Lord, Boss, & Lepper, 1979; Pomerantz, Chaiken, been conceptualized as stable knowledge structures that are inevitably activated lesillas, 1995; Sweeney & Gru her, 1984). Meanwhile, research on attit ude when a person enco unters a relevant group or group memher (e .g., Devine, 1989; Ire suggests that substantial attitudinal consistency can be predicted by Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Katz & Braly, 1935; Kunda & Oleson, 1995). However, ; of intra-attitudinal structure , such as the consistency between an overall recent research increasingly suggests that stereotypes arc far more malleable and context-depe nde nt than once assumed (e.g., Blair, Ma, & Lenton , 20tH; Garcia ion and the evaluative meaning of suppo rting cog nitions or affect , as well Marques, Santos, & Mackie, 2006 ; Sechrist & Stangor, 2001; Sinclair & Kunda , 42 ALISON LEDGERWOOD AND YAACOV TROPE GLOBAL AND LOCAL ACTION GUIDES Fonner assumpt ions of att itude stability are th us called into question hy a size 1 able hody of recent evide nce e merging from both wit hin and beyond the att itude p domain.Nonetheless. the extensive literature on attitude stability summarized J in the previous paragraphs e mpirically documents that attitudes ca n also at tj Sl least appear to he fairly stable and resistant to momen ta ry contextual influences. . 1 11 \Ve propose th at these seem ingly contrad ictory characterizations reflect two dif 2 ferent forms th at evaluations may take." ~ First, an attitude could ta ke the form ofa local evaluation. Such an evaluation it could provide a relatively flexible guide for action by incorporating information d that is uni que tu a specific situation . It wou ld th erefore be shape d by details of the ! current cont ext. including the presum ed att itudes ofanother person who just hap "t1 pe ns to he in the present situation, as well as other (social or nonsocial) aspec ts of ti the context itself, short-term concerns, and unique de ta ils ofa partic ula r insta ntia f~ tion of the attitude object. I Second, an attitude COllid take tile form of a global evaluation. This type ofeval sl I uatio n cou ld prov ide a relatively stable summary guide for e ngaging with an attitude a, 11.' ohject by ta king into acco unt genera l informatio n from multiple contexts. It would 1 therefore be shaped by what is consistently relevant for action towa rd an attitude t: ,~ object across different situations. including broad principles and values, long-term gc>als, nor mative societal standa rds, the views and values of important relationship ti partners or groups, and ce ntral and enduring features of the att itude object. .. 4 T Fro m a functional perspective, both forms of evaluation cou ld be useful Ii for guid ing action. On the one han d , one ca n argue that a malleable eva luative ! Sl respon se that allows a person to llexihly adapt to the dema nds of his current social . 1 IS e nviron ment should he helpful in f~l ci li t a ting approach or avoidance ofan attitude I object (see, e.g., Schwarz, 2007). Differen t con texts call for differen t responses w , (if someone needs to slice an apple. for example, he might approach a pa ring knife n if it is sitt ing peacefully on the counter, but ju mp away if it slides off an d clatters IT to the Hoor). Moreover, malleable evaluat ive responses facilitate the creation of socially sha red viewpoints, which are a necessary basis ofcommunication. relation "Ie ships, and the regu lat ion of social action (see, e.g., Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark, g HJfJ6; Festi nger, 1\).50; Hardin & Higgins, W96; Isaacs & Clark, 1987; Hokeach & Mczei, 1\)66; Turner, WfJI). From this perspect ive, local evaluations th at flexibly c. tunc to the current situation might he op timal for guiding action. e' • Ours is of course not the first att empt to integrate these co mpeting co nceptualizations. For instance . w ilson's dua l attitudes model suggested that individua ls can possess hoth a stable ami habitual implicit attit ude. as well us one or mor e co ntext-dependent , actively c constructed, explicit attitude s (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler. 20(0). However, in light of 2' accumulating evide nce sllggt'sting that implicit attit udes are at least as malleabl e and context-de pen de nt as their explicit co usins (Dasgcptu & Crecnwald, 200 1; Lowery et al.. tl 200 l; Richeson & Ambady, 2001; \ Vittenbrink,[ udd. & Park, 200 1; see Blair, 2002 ; Fe rguson w & Hargh , 2007; Cawrrmski, Lebel. & Peters , 2007, for reviews]. the implicit-explicit dis a1 tinction seems unlikely to success fully reconcile evidence of stab ility andmalleuhility, d. >I_I ....U. I i..L..U\,JC.KvvuUU I'\J'lU YAAl.:"OV TROPE ATTITUDES AS GLOBA L AN DLOCAL ACT ION GUIDES 43 GLOBAL AND LOCAL ACTION GUIDES On the other hand, local information often see ms irrelevant for evaluative Fortne r assumptions of attitude stability are thus called into question by a size responding. Ifsomeone isvoting for the next president, for instance, it does not see m rble body of recent evidence emerging from both within and beyond the attitude particularly functional for variations in the weather or who happens to be sta ndi ng lomain. Nonetheless, the exte nsive literature on attitud e stability summarized outside the polling station that day to influence her evaluative responses toward II the previous paragraph s elllpirically documents that att itudes can also at the candidates. Furthermore, stable evaluative responses could serve an important east appear to be fairly stahle and resistant to Illolllentary contextua l influences. social function by facilitating the maintenance of existing sha red perspectives with Ve propose that these seemingly contradictory characteri zat ions reHect two dif important relationship partners or groups (see, e.g., Asch, 1952; Hardin & Conley, erent forms that evaluations may take." 2001; nardin & Higgins , 1996; Ledgerwood & Liviatan, in press; McGuire, 19(9). First, all attitude could take the form ofa local eva luation. Such an evaluation For example, ifa group of friends all prefer a particular polit ical candidate, stahil " ould prov ide a relatively flexible gUide for action by ineorporating inform ation ity in th eir eva luative responses across contexts will help protect th e shared view ~ ti o n rat is unique to a speci fic situation. It would th erefore be shaped by details oftbe of reality th at has heen formed within the group. From this perspective, i rrent con text, including the presumed attitudes ofanother person who just hap wou ld ideally be based on a summary guide of whether a person, object , or event ens to he in the presen t situation, as well as other (social or nonsocial) aspects of tends to be positive or negative across situ ation s. Thus, a glohal evaluative response re cont ext itself, short-term concerns, and unique details ofa particular instantia that remains sta ble in the face of contextual fluctuation wou ld seem particularly )Jl ofthe altitude object. functional in some eases. Given that both types of evaluations see m functional, we propose that both Second. an attitud e could take tbe form of a global evalnation. Thi s type ofeva l should exist. In the here and now. people must be able to fleXibly adapt their rti on could provide a relatively stable SlllTl lllary gu ide for engaging with an att itude ect act ions to serve their immediate goals, coo rdinate with others around them , and by taking into acco unt general inf()rmation from lHultiple eontexts. It would 1 interact effectively with their presen t surroundings. Local evaluations can facllt ercf(lre be shaped by what is consiste ntly relevant for act ion toward an attitude tate approach/avoidance responding wit hin th e current situation, beca use they jed across diffe rent situations, indluling broad pnnclples and values, long-term are sensitive to specific contextual information. However, humans are also able to als, normative societa l standa rds, the views and values of important relations hip transcend their imm ed iate situation to plan for the futu re, coord inate action at a rtuers or gro ups, and central and Pllduring features ofthe att itude object, d istance, predict ot her people's behavior, and generate counterfactua l alternatives. Fro m a funct ional perspective, both furms of evaluation could he useful Th us, they must be ahle to regu late their beh avior not only for the he re and now, gUiuing action. On th e one hand, one can argue that a malleable evaluative hut also for the there ami then . Global evaluations can serve to guide action out ponse th at allows a person to f1 exillly adapt to the demamls of IIis current social side ofth e imm ediate situation by drawing on evaluati on-relevant inforniation that lironment should be helpful in fi.lcilitat ing approach or avoidan ce of an attitude is consistent across contexts. ect (see. e.g., Schwa rz, 2(07). Different contexts call fill' d ifferent responses Thi s functional ana lysis suggests that the proximity of an atti tu de object someone need s to slice an apple, for example, he might app roaeh a paring knife will playa critical role in determining which form of evaluation is used to guide . is sitt ing peacefully 011 the counter, but jump away if it slides off and clat ters responding. More specifically, we suspect that information ahout distance sets into he floor). Moreover, malleab le evaluative responses filCilitate the creation of motion a self-reg ulatory evaluative syste m geared toward gui ding action either ially shared Viewpoints, whicll are a n('cessary basis ofcomlllunication, relation within th e current context or outside of it. \ Vhereas proximal objects should tr igge r )s. and the regu lation ofsocial act ion (see, e.g., Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark, local evaluations, tuned to the present context, distal objects should trigger more 6; Festinger. 1950; I1ardin & Higgin s, 1996; Isaacs & Clark, 1987; Rokeach & global evaluations, tuned to what is invariant across contexts, eei, 1966; Turn er. 1991). From thi s perspective, local eva luatious that flexihly How exactly migllt such a process work? In orde r to better delineate both the ~ to the current situation might be optimal for gUiding action. construct of distan ce as well as the cognitive proces s by which it cou ld influence evaluative responding, we turn to construal level theory. rs is of course not the first atte mpt to integrate these comlwt ing "o nceptualizations r instance, \Vilson's dual attitudes model suggeste d that individuals can possess both a CONSTRUAL LEVEL THEORY SIc and habitual implicit attitude. as well as one or more ('o ntext.t lepell dent, actively rstructed , explicit attitudes (\ Vi lson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 20( 0 ). lI owe\'er, in light of Const rual level theory (Liberman & Trope. 2008; Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, uJnulating evide nce suggesting that imp licit attitudes are at least as malleable and 2007; Trope & Liherman , 2003; Trope. Liberman, & Wakslak, 2(07) sugges ts tcxt-dl'pcndent as their explicit cousins (Dusgupta & Gree nwald, 200 1; Lowery et aI., that psychological distan ce plays a critica l role in how we mentally con strue the 11; Riches on & Ambady, 200 1; \Vittenhri llk.]Ulld, & Park, 200 1; see Blair, 2002; Ferguson world around us. Th e concept of psychological distance refers to any di men sion ~ arg h. 2007; Cawron ski, LeBd, & Peters . 2007, for reviews ), the imp licit-explicit dis tiou see ms unl ikely to sllee("ssflilly [('eO/ld le evide nce of stahiiity und IlmJll'ability. along which an object or event can be removed from me, here, and now, and thus dovetails nicely with the cu rre nt perspective. Psychological distance is defined as "'tJS . 44 ALISON LEDGERWOOD AND YAACOV TROPE perceived or expe rience d (rather than actual) distance, and can include various pa\ dim ensions (e.g., time, space, social distance, and hypotheticality), ratl According to construal level theory, we think about objects or events that are Sttl I psychologically removed from us in terms of th eir high-level, abstract, and enduring tha characteristics.TllUS, as psychologicaldistance increases, OIIT mental representations become more coherent and structured; theyextract gist information and scree n out irrelevant details. \Vhen the same objects or events arc psychologically closer to us, we think about them in terms of low-level, detailed , and contextuulized features. tl Th at is, with proximity. our mental representations become more concrete and l o~ the structure th at sepa rates important from peripheral and irrelevant features. The . 1 Considerable evidence for the impact of psychological distance on construal ms . I level exists. For example. research on temporal distance has shown that participants h OI place greater importance Oil an object or event's ce ntral features (e.g., the sound enl quality ofa radio) versus periphera l features (e.g.. the clarity of the radio's clock dis co play) when considering a decision for the d istant future rather than the near future rei (Trope & Liberman, 2000, Study 3). Likewise, people tend to describe distant future stai activities in terms of abstract ends and near future activities in terms of concrete co means (Liberman & Trope, 1998, Study I; see also Vallacher & Wegner, 1985, 1989 ). tiOI Temporal distance has also been shown to influence individua ls' judg ments about resl other people: In one study, participants predicted that a target person would behave fro] more consistently across different situations when imagining the person in the distant (vs. near) future (Nussbaum, Tro pe, & Liber man , 2003, Study 2). In other words , .IInI in the distant future, the target's behaviors were construed more abstractly thjln ill bas I the near fut ure, a nd were thus seen as less con textualized and more stahle. be) Recent research suggests that various di mensions of psychological distance, levi iucluding spatial distance, social distance, and hypothet ieality, all have a similar sell impact on mental representation (e.g., Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman , 2006; Henderson, Fujita,Trope,& Liberman , 2006; Libby& Eibach,2002;Todorov, Goren, & Trope, 2007; Wakslak, Trope, Lihermau, & Alouy, 2006; see Liberman & Trope, 2008, for a review). For example. participants who viewed a cartoon fil m C al I depic tin g a sce ne at a summer camp located in a spatially distant (vs. near) locat ion pr, perceived the film as bei ng com posed of a few large hehavioral chunks, rather than ing many small ones, presumably because they formed more abst ract representations wei of the beh aviors rather than focu slng on each specific action (Henderson et aI., :er. 2006, Study 1). Similarly, research on hypothetieality as a dim ension of psycho m 1 logical distance showed that participants gave relatively greater weight to ahstract atel desirability (vs. concrete feasibility) concerns when choosing to ente r lotteries that atti involved low probabilities (i.e., distant chances) versus high probabilities (i.e., near 46 A LISON LEDGERWOOD AN D YAACOV TROPE dyadic and group relationships (Conover & Feldm an , 1981; Jost et aI., 200 8; Kilt & uoaffected by t Cleicher, 19.50; Major & Townsend, this volume; Stillman, Guthrie, & Becker, 1960). in th e distant I Thus, our perspective suggests that responses to distant (vs. near) att itude objects the two conditi might be more "ideological" in that they could more strongly reflect a person's basic partner, sugges values (see also Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Libe rman , & Chaiken, 20(9). ticipants' affilia Here, we higblight th ree of the studies we conducte d to test these predic near att itl\'lc ol tion s. The first study focused on temporal d istance and examined whether att itude informatio~ ' fro alignment with an incidental stranger would be greate r whe n a political policy ohject s are gllic was to be implemented in the near (vs. distant ) future. In Study 2, we used a more direct man ipulatio n of level of construa l in order to determine whether our Construal Le hypot hesized mechan ism was really respon sible for the d ifferentia l malleability observed in Study 1. Our third study sought to shed add itional light on the lack of A global-Ioeal rr malleability observed ill the previous studies' d istant or high-level construal con of time per se, h ditions, given that the absence of a partner effect on eva luative responding could object is men tal reflect eithe r attit udinal stability or simple apathy. \ Ve therefore examined whet her ably reflect ed a ind ucing participa nts to adopt a high (vs, low) level of construal would decreas e to menta lly rep the extent to which contextua l factors predicted evaluative respond ing, while leav tun-s. which in . ing unchanged -or even increasing-the extent to which participants' evaluations action. O ur nex were consistent with their previously reported ideological values. late level of con an incidental str Temporal Distance and Social Alignment than when they An impor ta Our first study was designedto test the basic notion that evaluative responses towa rd nate, goal-relah psychologically near objec ts would indeed show greater context dependence than means. Adaptin evaluat ive responses toward psychologically distant objects . Based on our theoreti (2004), we mdu cal perspective, we hypothesized that participan ts would align their att itudes with a series of "' \'1 those of an incidental stranger when contemplating an attitude ohject that was crete focus hy ~ temporally d ose, but not one that was temporally distant. Participant s took part in wcll ill school?). an ant icipated interaction parad igm (Chen, Schechter, & Chaiken, 1996), io which antici pated int e they expected to discuss a proposed policy on deporting illegal imm igra nts with suicide. Fin ally, another student in the st udy. They lear ned that the policy would he implemented physician-ussistr eithe r next week (near future condition) or next year (d istant future condition), The results , and that their d iscussion partner was either in favor ofor against deporting illegal uals rel y on 10c <'1 immigrants. Distance to the partner, as well as time until the osten sible conversa object . 'Imt on ! tion , was always held constant; thus, the only d ifference between conditions was att itud e object , whet her the attitude object was dose or dista nt in time. Participants then reported shifted their alt how likely th ey would be to vote for the descri bed policy, as part of a set of pre to think concret discussion questions that they an swered privately (rather than expecting their responses to he shared with their partner). In actuality. this att itude measure was Construal Le our variable of interest, uml no d iscussion took place. The experimenter provide d a Full dehriefing after carefu lly prohing participants for suspicion. Importuntly, ou Consistent with our hypothesis, results showed that participants' voting inten a particular situ tions aligned with those of their discussion partner when the policy was going to time and cont e> be implemented in the near future. \Vhen the partner supported depor ting illegal port for the glol immigrants, pa rticipants were slightly in favor of the policy; when the partner was ' offect in the 48 A LISON LED GERWOOD AND YAACOV TROPE apathy engendered by time discoun ting or the priming of superordinate goals I. (which could perhaps make certa in political issues see m relatively unimport ant ). 1 If evaluative responding at a distance is truly di rected hy glohal action guides that summarize context-independent information, then responses to distant attitude o ohjects should he predicted hy people's overarching. decontextua lized ideologi 1I cal values. Follow-up analyses on a subset of OU f initial study's participants pro ~ vided preli minary support for this prediction. demonstrating that a measure of h individuals' ideological values assessed at the beginning of the se mester precJi.tcd a' their voting intentions toward the distant future (hut not near future) policy. . s( A subsequent study extended these findings to a more genem l manipulation of , ~ construal level. Parti cipants reported their ideological support for the status quo rn (one of the two key components of left-right ideologies; see [ost, Banaji, & Nosek. 2004; [ost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) at the beginn ing of tbe semester a in a mass-testing session and were brought into the lab several weeks later as part of Ul I an ostensibly unrelated study. Once there, they were assigned to either the "Why" or a the "How" mind-set prime used in our second study to promote either an abstract ti l or a concrete processing orientation. Next, participants took part in the anticipated interaction paradigm, learning their partner's attitude (this time toward universal F" health care) and then privately reportiug their own. b \~ij The results showed that when participants were led to think concretely, their att itudes were pred icted by th eir partner's attitude and not by their previously reported ideological values. Individual s' evaluative responses toward changing the ::~(\ health care system were more positive when fheir partner was in favor of rather of than against universal health care, regardless of their previously reported ideologi cal values. However, after being led to think abstract ly. participants' attitudes were ~~i\ predicted hy their ideological values rather th an hy their partners' opinions. The to greater their support was for preserving the socie tal status quo at Time 1. the more bel they opp osed radically revamping the health care system at Time 2, regardl ess of an Thl I incidental stranger'sviews. These results sugges t that when people have heen led to can. focu s on concrete, low-level means and therefore construe an attitude ohject con in cretely, their evaluative response toward an attitude object is context-dependent. However, when they construe the same attitude object abstraetly because they have den been led to focus on high-level, superordinate goals. responding is based on global, Lot decontextualized action guides that reflect previously reported ideological values. be ~ \ ~~J CONNECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS obj The notion that attitudes can be either stahle or malleable depending on a person's endi subjective construal of the att itude object may help to shed light on the frequently of it observed tension between these two characte rizations of evaluative responding and l across multiple domains. In this sect ion. we discuss several ways in which the glob, 1 global-local model of evaluation proposed here builds on existing theory and I research in a number ofareas, including attitude-be havior correspondence . politi tud'1 A,.... l \ cal ideology, con formity, and connectionist models of attitude representation. - - . ... ~ .... '''''''.1 V I rtvt'C, ATTITUDES AS GLOBAL AND LOCAL ACTION GUIDES 49 iathy engendered hy tim e discount ing or the priming of superordinate goals Attitude-Behavior Correspondence -hich could perhaps make certain political issues seem relatively unimportant). evaluative responding at a dista nce is truly directed by global action gUides th at The current model 's distinction between global and local evaluations both comple mmari ze context-indepe nde nt informat ion, then resp onses to distant att itude ments and extends pr ior work on the relat ionship between att itudes and behavior, jects should be pred icted by people's overa rching, decontextualized ideologi which was spurred by criticism of att itudes research in the 1960s over low correla , values. Follow-up analyses on a subset of our initial study's pa rticipants pro tions between atti tudes and action (e.g., DeFleur & Westie, 1958; McGui re, 1969; led preliminary suppo rt for thi s predict ion, de monstrating that a measure of Wicker, 1969). In an attempt to shed light on issues of measurement th at could livlduals' ideological values assessed at the begi nning ofthe semester predicted be obscuring a stronger relationship between att itudes and behavior, Fishbein 'ir voting intent ions toward the distant futu re (but not nea r future) policy. and Ajzen (1974, 1975; Ajze n & Fishbein, 1977) took a psychometric perspective, A subsequent study extended these findings to a more general manipul ation of suggesting th at att itudes and hehaviors can be more or less strongly correlated rs trual level. Participants reported their ideological snpport for the status quo depending on the extent to which an attitude object is speci fied du ring meusi ment. According to Fishhein and Ajzen, an atti tude object can be specified (or nllt) =of the two key components of left-right ideologies; see [ost, Hanaji, & Nosek, with regard to action, target , cont ext, and tim e. Low correlations hetween att itud es '4; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2( 03) at the beginning of the semester and behavior freq uently arise because an attit ude toward a general (i.e., relatively mass-testing session and were brought into the lab several weeks later as part of unspecified) object is used to pred ict a highly specified behavior. For example, -stensthly un related study. O nce there. they were aSSigned to either the "' Vhy" or a person's attitude toward recycling (unspeci fi ed in terms of target, context, and "How" mind-set prim e used in our second study to promote either an abstract time) might be used to predic t a higbly specified behavior, such as whether she concrete processing orientation. Next, participants took part in tile anticipated recycles (action) her water bott le (target) in the lunchroom (context) today (time). 'action paradigm, learning their partner's attitude (this time toward universal Fishbe in and Ajzen suggest tbat such a highly specified behavior is best predicted th care) and then privately reporting their own. by measuring a pe rson's attitude toward an equally specified attitudc ohject, "he results showed that when participant s were led to think concretely, their whereas an att itude toward a more general attitude object will better predict an Ides were predicted by their partner's att itude and not by tbeir previously index comprising many different specific behaviors, rted ideological values. Individuals' evaluative responses toward changing the T hisco11lpo tibility princi ple (Ajzen, 1988) provided key inSight into the problem h care system were more positive when their partn er was in favor of rather of how to increase att itude-be havior correlations by highlighting the import ance against universal health care, regardless of their preViously reported ideologi of measurement techniques and mapping out when different attitude or behavior dues. However, after being led to th ink abstmctIy, partici pants' att itudes were criteria would he most appropr iate. In th is sense, it represent s an importan t"theory cted by their ideological values rath er than by their partners' opinions. The of measurement , rather than a theo ry of psycllological process : It does not speak er their support was for preserving the societal status 'luo at Time I, the more to how or why a more specified att itude now bett er pred icts a highly speci fied 'ppo sed md ically revamping the health care system at Time 2, regardless ofan behavior later (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, PI'. 165-1 66 , for a similar ohservation). ntal stra nger's views. These results suggest that when people have been led to The glohal-Ioeal model of evaluation proposed here is conce rned with process and on concrete, low-level means and therefore construe an attitude object con- can therefore potent ially bell' to refine ami extend the pri nciple of compat ibility " their evaluative response toward an att itude objcct is context-depende nt. in multiple ways. ver, when they construe the same att itude object abstmdly because they have First, a global-local model suggests that an attit ude object is not only objec tively ed to focus on high-level, superordinate goals, respo ud ing is based on global, defined by the researcher, but subjectively construed by tile participa nt (see also extualizcd action gUides that reRect previously repo rte d ideological values. Lord & Lepper, 1999). Thus, even the same, equally specified attitude object can he men tally represented in different ways, and the level of this subjective mental construal enables either a local or global evaluation ofthe attitude object, To ret urn CONNECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS to our previous example, a person might represent the highly specified att itude tion that attitudes can he either stahle or malleable depending on a person's objec t "recycling a water bottle in the lunchroom today" in terms of its abstract ive construa l of the att itude object may help to shed light on the frequently ends and value-related qualities (e.g., promoting environme ntalism) or in terms 'J: tension het ween these two cha racter izations of evaluative respondi ng of its concrete means (e.g.• walking across the lunchroom to the recycling hin), nultiple domains. In th is section, we discuss severa l ways in which the and th is subjective rep resentation should determine whether the individual uses a glohal or local evaluation to guide behavior. ocal model of evaluation proposed here build s on eX isting theory and This analysis suggest s th at measuring attitudes toward a highly specified att i 1 in a nllinber of areas, including attitlltle-hehavior eorrespomlence. po liti tud e object tends to improve predi ction oflater sped fie behaviors because a speci logy, eonformity. and con nectionist models of attitude representation. fl ed attitude object will often include dimen sions of distance that influence level ------~ \ 50 ALISON LEDGERWOOD AND YAACOV TROPE of const rual, as well as impor tant contextua l features that can he incorporated Idee into a local evaluation. Conside r a researcher who measures participants' att itudes The : toward recycling a water bottle in the lunch room today. The specified near point in whe~ time (today) should lead participants to construe the attitude object in a low-level, that I concrete way. and their response should therefore reA cct a local evaluation that Fellh incorpora tes available contextua l information (such as the att itude of a coworker lave who often cats lunch at the same time). Becau se people often focus on the here and I and now, they are likely to also construe the attitude object concretely later th a (e.g., day when they act ually enter the lunch room, and thus will also use a local evalu HJ84 ution (wh ich draws on the same contextua l det ails that influenced the previously can 1 measured attitude) to gilide their recycling beh avior, snggl IIowever, a global-local model of evaluation also suggests situations in which the able principle ofcompatibility might not apply. For instance, a researcher might measure value participants' attitude s toward voting for a par ticu lar presidential candidate in next 1 year's elect ion. The specified distant point ill time (next year) should lead par tici uutiv pants to construe the attitude object in a high-level. abstract way, and their respon se cone should therefore reflect a glohal evaluation of the political candidate. When people logic are act ua lly voting in the here and now, however, they may construe the political (e.g., cand idate concretely and vote based on a local , coutextualized evaluation that does some not match their previously rep orted global evaluation. Conversely, a resea rcher in pe might measure participants' attitudes in a way that elicits a low-leve l construal and (e.g., local evaluation oftile can didate (e.g., by siJecifying a pmxnuul context: participa nts parti will vote in the nearby polling station down the stree t), but aspects of' the actual On t' voting situation may elicit a high-level construal and glohal evaluation (pe rhaps the a pel individual has a conversation with a friend on th e way to the voting booth about pred !clly they prefer a particular cand idate, or per haps it is pa rticularly salient that II the next president will not be sworn in until th e following yea r, which may seem some relatively distant in time). Here again, an incongru ity bet ween measurements with re ller respect to the level at whic h an attitude ohject is subjectiL;d y construed, rathe r than level. the extent to which an att itude object is objectively specified, cou ld lead to inconsis at till tencies bet ween the measu red att itudes and behaviors. reacl A global-local model of evaluation also suggests that instability in attitu dinal abstr responding is not simply an issue of compatibility (in obje ct ive specification of simp the att itude object, or even subjective level of construal). According to the pres view ent perspective, local evaluations of'an att itud e object ten d to shift in response to may ' incidental details of th e current social context. Thi s approach therefore makes pre fere n d ictions about susce ptibility to incidental social influence that lie beyond the scope an at of even a broadly interpreted co mpatibility principle. An evaluation of a highly specified and concret ely construed att itude object in one situation may differ sub Con, stantia lly from an evaluation of the same specific and concretely construed ohject A glc in anothe r situation. For example, participant s' evaluations ofthe same presiden tial w he ~ candidate in two different contexts might differ even when th e measu res are com norm patible in degree ofspeci fi city and when the participant s adopt the same low level I whet of construal, if their local evaluatio ns in the two contexts incorporate incidental t grOll1 details with different evaluative imp lications. ALI SON LEDGERWOOD AND YAACOVTROPE ATTITUDES AS GLOBAL AND LOCAL ACTION GUIDES 51 of construa l, as well as important contextun] feat ures th at can he incorporated Ideology into a local evaluation. Conside r a resea rcher who measures participants' attitudes toward recycling a water hottle in the lunchroom today. TIle specified Il eal' poi nt in The studies described here may also help to shed light on questions ofwhether and tim e (today) should lead participants to eonstrlle the att itude object in a low-level, when ideological values can be expected to gu tde evaluative responding-a question concrete way, and their response sho uld therefore reflect a local evaluation th at that has caused considerable controversy in the literature (see Eagly& Chaiken, 1993; incorpo rates available context ual in f(>nnat ion (such as the attitude of a cowo rker Feldman, 2003; Jost, 2006; McGuire, 198.5 , for reviews), Whereas some researchers who often eats lunch at the same time).Because people often f(>CIIS 0 11 the here have argued that ideological principles often guide evaluative responses to social ,~ and now, they are likely to also construe the atti tudc objcct concretely later that and political issues, and can display considerable stalulfty across tim e and eontexts day when they actually enter th e Jun<:hroom, and thu s will also lise a local evalu (e.g., Jost, 2006; Judd, Krosnick, & Milburn, 1981; Judd & Milburn, 1980; K erJ ~pger, ation (which draws on the same contes tual details that inl/uenced the previously 1984; Stern, Dietz, Kalof, & Guagnano, 199.5 ), others quest ion whether ideologies measured attitude) to gUide their recyd ing hehavior. can be meaningfully said to exist for the majority of the popu lation , citing evide nce However, a global-local model of evaluation also suggests situutions ill which the suggesting that most people's attitudes toward specific policy issues show conside r- princ:iple ofcompatibility might not app ly. For instan ce, a researdler might measure able fluct uation over time and rarely seem to consistently reflect core ideological participant s' attitud es toward voting fix a particular president ial candida te in next values (Campbell et aI., 1960; Co nverse, 1964; Tedin, 1987; Zaller, 1992). year's election. The specified distant point in time (next year) shonld lead partici The present studies suggesl that ideology may be more likely to predict eval pants to construe the attitude object in a high.level, ahstract way, and their response uative responding when an issue or policy is const rued abstractly rather than :hould therefore reAect a global evaluation of the political eamlidatc. When people concretely. Thus, voting behavior may tend to more stro ngly reflect people's ideo Ire actu ally voting in th e here and now, however, they may const rue the political logical values when a policy or issue is psychologically distant rather than proximal - long-standing social norms should often inform global evaluations, because they extend across tim e amI contexts and therefore provide informat ion that is relevant for evaluating an attitude ohject across different situations . However, socia l norms can at times constitute an aspec t of the local socia l situation. For instance. if one were judging the physical length of a line and happened to be in a room with some strangers, the strangers' perceptions of the line's length would he a local (and objectively irrelevant) concern for one's own judgment. In the latt er case, we would predi ct th at conformity to an incorrect and inci dental majority (as in the Asch line paradigm; Asch, 1955) would d e~ea s e as psychological distance increases (for instance, when the lines were projected on a spatially near vs. distant wall). Of course, this pred iction is somewhat counter intuitive: Wh en an object of judgment is close rather th an far away, one should if anything be more certain that one is seeing it clearly and th us be more con fident in the accuracy ofone's own judgment. However, at the same tim e, the proximity ofthe judged ohject should lead people to construe it more coucretely. In turn, this should lead them to rely on local (vs. global) guides, which will be more susceptible to the incidental social in fluence of the incorrect majority in the present situat ion. Distributed Connectionist Network Models Although our global-local perspect ive does not necessarily rely on a specific cogni tive model of memory, it is wort h noting its parti cular congruence with a distri h uted connectionist network model of attitude representation (Conrey & Smith . 2007; Ferguson & Bargh , 2007; Smith & Conrey, 2007). Distributed con nection ist systems view mental representation as patterns of activation that occur across large numbers of processing units in respon se to a range of inputs (rather than as discrete "files" of informut ion that are stored, static, in the mind until they are retrieved), Such models suggest that ma lleability in evaluative responding natu rally arises from variahility in pattern activation in response to att itude objects in vari ous contexts. However, distributed connectionist networks can also easily account for evaluative stability. which should occur whe n th e same pattern is activated in multiple situations. According to Conrey and Smith (2007), this can explain why domain expertise is associated with attitudinal sta bility: given sufficient CXPCri C' IK'Cwit II a domain, someone may learn to activate roughly the same pattern in many different contexts. This is accomplished hy focusing on the key inputs that trigger that particular attractor [i.e.. pattern of activa tion].. .while ignoring other inputs, even highly salient ones, us irrelevant ...and this ability to focus is precisely what constitutes domain expe rtise. (p. 721) For example, wherea s someone who knows litt le about computers might evalu ate a given laptop different ly depending on a range of superficial inputs (e.g., the color, the case. the opinion of another customer), a computer expe rt would be likely to focus on the most important and essential characteristics ofthe computer (inputs th at would not vary with the context). In a similar mann er, level of construal may influence th e range of inputs to which people attend, so th at abstract construals ...... -- ATT ITUDES AS GLOBAL AND LOC AL ACT ION GUIDES 53 52 ALI SON LEDGERWOOD AND YAACOV TROPE scree n out incidental information and facilit ate stability in evaluative respondin g, long-standing socia l norms should often inform global evaluations, becau se they whereas concrete eonstruals include these inputs and facilitate evaluative flexibil extend acro ss time and contexts and therefore provide information that is relevant ity in response to the immediate context. Integrating a distribu ted connect ionist for evaluating an att itude object across di fferent situations. However, social norms approach with a global-local model of evaluation th erefore has th e potential to can at times constitute an aspect of the local social situation. For instance, if one unit e a number of predictors of att itude stability (includ ing expertise, abstraction, were judging the physical length of a line and happened to be in a room with ~, and perhaps also attitude importance) via th eir common impact on the extent to some strangers, th e strangers' perceptions of the line's length would he a local which incidental inputs are included in, or screened out of, one's subjective con- (and objectively irrelevant) concern for one's own judgment. In the latter case , we would predict th at conformity to an incorrect an d inci strual of an attitude object. dental majority (as in the Asch line paradigm; Asch , 1955) would decrease as psychological distance increases (for instance, whe n the lines were projected on CONCLUSION a spatially near V5 . distant wall). Of course. this prediction is somew hat counte r In su mma ry, we have suggested that individuals mu st be able to regulate their int uitive: When an object ofjudgment is close rather th an far away, one should if behavior hoth within and out side the present context. To do so, th ey use two any thing be more ce rtain that one is seeing it clea rly and thus be more con fide nt forms of evaluative action guides. Local evaluations serve to guide hehavior in in the acc uracy of one's own judgment. However, at the same time, the proxim ity the here ami now by incorporating specific details of th e present context; they of the judged object should lead people to construe it more concretely. In turn, this can therefore shift flexibly to align with th e views of incid ental others and tend should lead them to rely on local (vs. global) guides, which will be more susceptible to look relat ively ma lleable. Global evaluations, meanwhile, enable individuals to to the incidental social influen ce of the incorrect majority in the present situation. transcend the here and now to act on the "the re and then." They d raw on what is invariant about an attitude object across contexts, and therefore tend to reflect Distributed Connectionist Network Models people's core values and ideals ami appear relatively stable in the face ofchanging Althoug h our global-local perspective does not necessar ily rely au a specific cogni contextual deta ils. tive mod el of memory, it is wort h noting its particu lar congruence with a distrib uted connect ionist network model of attitude represe ntation (Con rey & Smith, 2007; Ferguson & Bargh, 2007; Smith & Conrey, 2( 07). Distributed connection REFERENCES ist syste ms view mental representation as patterns of activation that occur across Ajzen, I. (1988). Attitudes, persOlwlity, lind behn cior. 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