CONSCIOUS AND NON-CONSCIOUS BASES OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT: MINDSET AND IMPLICIT ATTITUDES IN THE PERCEPTION OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT
by
Susan D. Sullivan
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of
The Charles E. Schmidt College of Science
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Florida Atlantic University
Boca Raton, FL
May 2013
CONSCIOUS AND NON-CONSCIOUS BASES OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT: MIND SET AND IMPLICIT ATTITUDES IN THE PERCEPTION OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT
by
Susan D. Sullivan
This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the candidate's dissertation advisor, Dr. Robin R. Vallacher, Department of Psychology, and has been approved by the members of her supervision committee. It was submitted to the faculty of the Charles E. Schmidt College of Science and was accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
R. Vallacher, Dissertation Advisor
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College of Science
Barry T. R son, Ph.D. Dean, Graduate College
11
ABSTRACT
Author: Susan D. Sullivan
Title: Conscious and Non-conscious Bases of Social Judgment: Mindset and Implicit Attitudes in the Perception of Intergroup Conflict
Institution: Florida Atlantic University
Dissertation Advisor: Dr. Robin R. Vallacher
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
Year: 2013
Research on social judgment typically emphasizes one of three processes that enable unequivocal understanding of events with ambiguous causality. In the social influence perspective, people are susceptible to the interpretations offered by others. In the explicit attitudes perspective, people interpret events in line with their consciously held attitudes and values. In the implicit attitudes perspective, people interpret events in line with unconscious biases. The model investigated in the present study assumes that these processes vary in salience depending on people’s mindset. When an event is encoded in high-level terms (i.e., its consequences), people’s judgments reflect their explicit attitudes. When encoded in low-level terms (i.e., its details), however, such attitudes are less accessible, rendering people susceptible to social influence. In the absence of social influence, people with a lower-level mindset form judgments that reflect their relevant implicit attitudes. These hypotheses were tested in the context of
iii an altercation between an African-American and a White male for which responsibility could reasonably be allocated to either party. Participants with low versus high implicit racial bias toward Blacks read a narrative concerning this altercation under either a low- level or a high-level mindset and then read a summary that blamed one of the parties or they did not read a summary. As predicted, low-level participants allocated responsibility to the African-American if they had a high implicit racial bias and to the
White if they had a low implicit racial bias, regardless of the summary manipulation.
Contrary to prediction, however, high-level participants’ allocation of responsibility did not reflect their explicit prejudicial attitudes. Instead, they corrected for their implicit biases in their trait inferences and affective reactions, in line with research suggesting that a high-level mindset promotes self-regulatory processes in social judgment.
iv
CONSCIOUS AND NON-CONSCIOUS BASES OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT: MINDSET AND IMPLICIT ATTITUDES IN THE PERCEPTION OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT
List of Figures ...... vii
Introduction ...... 8
Background and Theoretical Rationale ...... 9
Action Identification...... 9
Implicit Attitudes ...... 15
Implicit Attitudes and the Intrinsic Dynamics of Action Identification ...... 18
Experimental Test of the Proposed Integration ...... 21
Method ...... 25
Participants ...... 25
Materials and Procedure ...... 25
Session 1 Procedure ...... 26
Session 1 Materials ...... 26
Session 2 Procedure ...... 26
Dependent Measures...... 31
Results ...... 33
Preliminary Analyses ...... 33 v Tests of Hypotheses ...... 34
Allocation of Responsibility ...... 34
Personality Impression ...... 38
Affective Reaction ...... 40
Discussion ...... 43
Theoretical Significance ...... 43
Interplay between Attitudes and Action Identification ...... 44
Emergence in Social Judgment ...... 50
Self-regulation in Social Judgment ...... 51
Implications for Social Issues ...... 53
Caveats and Future Research ...... 56
Conclusion ...... 59
Appendices ...... 61
Appendix 1: Session 1 Materials ...... 61
Appendix 2: Session 2 Materials ...... 67
References ...... 83
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Allocation of responsibility to Black and White defendants as a function of implicit racial bias and instructional set...... 37
Figure 2. Personality impressions of Black and White defendants as a function of implicit racial bias and instructional set...... 40
Figure 3. Affective reaction to Black and White defendants as a function of implicit racial bias and instructional set...... 41
vii
INTRODUCTION
Social life is often ambiguous. Even the simplest action in an interpersonal encounter is open to different interpretations. A smile can signify warmth or condescension; a critical comment can be viewed as constructive or hostile, and expressed agreement with a statement can be seen as sincere or as manipulative. In most everyday contexts, the open-ended nature of action does not pose serious problems for social judgment. People may differ in how they identify a particular action, but these differences are usually resolved through communication or clarified through further actions. In some contexts, though, the inherent ambiguity of action and the manner in which such ambiguity is resolved can have major consequences. Particularly when the action in question is framed in terms of morality or criminality, the progression from observation to judgment may have enormous implications. In an encounter that escalates to confrontation and violence, for instance, how the key actions are identified and evaluated dictates the immediate judgments of both parties involved. These judgments can have long-term reputational consequences for one or the other party and perhaps determine his or her fate in the criminal justice system.
The identification of action and the relevance of this process for issues of social judgment have been major topics in psychology for many years (Fiske & Taylor, 1991;
Hastorf, Schneider, & Polefka, 1970; Heider, 1958; Kunda, 1999; Tagiuri & Petrullo,
1958; Vallacher &Wegner, 1987; Wegner & Vallacher, 1977). Despite the intense
8 interest and sustained research attention concerning this topic, however, very basic questions have yet to be answered. To what extent do judgments of interpersonal behavior represent rational or deliberative processes versus non-rational or automatic processes? Do people’s judgments occur largely through basic mechanisms of mind or are they shaped primarily by social influence? Under what conditions do unconscious attitudes and biases shape the outcome of social judgment? How, and to what extent, can non-conscious biases be controlled or corrected for by executive cognitive processes? The present research is not designed to resolve all these issues, but it does examine them with respect to a pressing social problem: the allocation of responsibility for behavior that escalates to confrontation in an interracial encounter.
Background and Theoretical Rationale
The theoretical rationale for this endeavor represents an integration of principles of action identification with recent insights into the nature and operation of unconscious attitudes. To set the stage for this rationale, relevant literature concerning the processes involved in the identification and evaluation of action is presented, followed by an overview of theory and research on unconscious (“implicit”) attitudes. These two lines of research are then considered together, with the aim of understanding how action identification processes and the operation of unconscious attitudes function together to reduced the ambiguity of actions in an interracial conflict.
Action identification. When thinking about the ambiguity of action, notions of vagueness and abstraction are likely to come to mind. In considering an interpersonal altercation, for example, people presumably experience hesitation in allocating blame because it is unclear what really happened in concrete terms. The assumption that
9 ambiguity reflects inattention to detail is basic to the criminal justice system. Jurors are reminded to focus only “on the facts” and not get carried away with speculations about the intentions and motives of the relevant parties (e.g., the defendant and victim in an assault case). This point of view implies that people’s uncertainty regarding responsibility is reduced if they can focus on the specific acts comprising the event in question.
Action identification theory (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, 2012) challenges this intuition about the source of ambiguity. According to the theory, it is when people are focused on the concrete features of an action that they are most likely to experience uncertainty about the action’s larger meaning—including responsibility for the action.
To understand why, consider the open-ended nature of action identification. Anything a person does has a wide array of plausible “act identities.” For example, “driving a car” could be identified as “pressing pedals” and “turning a steering wheel,” but it could just as appropriately be identified as “getting to a destination” or “using gas.” Likewise, a fight between two people could be identified as “pushing,” “exchanging words,” or
“clenching fists,” but it could also be identified or as “defending oneself,” “losing control,” or “attempting to hurt someone” (e.g., Duncan, 1976).
Although the plausible identities for an action clearly differ a great deal in their content, they all can be scaled with respect to their position in an act identity hierarchy. low-level identities in this example represent the molecular or movement-defined features of the action. For example, “pressing pedals” is a low-level identity for
“driving,” and “clenching fists” represents a low-level identity for “fighting.” In contrast, higher-level identities provide increasingly comprehensive and meaningful depictions
10 that emphasize the action’s goals, consequences, and evaluative implications with respect to competence, morality, and other abstract considerations. The theory specifies several factors that constrain the level of identification that assumes prepotency for a person (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Low-level identities tend to become prepotent when the action in question is unfamiliar, difficult to enact, or complex (e.g., Vallacher
& Wegner, 1989; Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, & Arps, 1984). Even a familiar and simple action can be identified in relatively low-level terms if the person is instructed to focus on its details or on the precise sequence of subacts (e.g., Vallacher &
Selz, 1991; Wegner, Vallacher, Kiersted, & Dizadji, 1986).
Action identification is a process that unfolds over time. The dynamic nature of action identification is especially evident if a person initially identifies the action in lower-level terms. A central principle of action identification theory is that people prefer to understand action in high-level terms. Lower-level identities tend to be transient and give way to new representations that provide greater meaning and comprehensive understanding. For example, a person might focus on “pushing pedals” and “turning the steering wheel” when driving, but these identities tend to be maintained only out of necessity to deal with stop signs, other cars, and the like. When asked to describe this act without these constraints, a person is likely to emphasize the goals or consequences of driving (e.g., “getting to a destination” or “using gas”).
In contrast, if a person identifies an action in relatively high-level terms, he or she is resistant to new identities that would give the action a different meaning. With the press for higher-level understanding satisfied, the person does not feel a need to embrace alternative interpretations of the action. Change can occur, however, if the person is
11 induced to focus on the action’s lower-level details rather than the action’s overall meaning (consequences, effects, or implications). Because of the press for higher-level understanding, a person entrenched in the action’s lower-level details or subacts is sensitive to new meanings of the action that are made salient in some fashion. This scenario of change—an induction of low-level identification followed by cues to higher- level understanding—is termed the emergence process (Vallacher & Wegner, 1985).
The emergence process is relevant to a variety of topics, including skill acquisition, adaptation to new social environments, breaking habits, self-concept formation and change, and social judgment (see review by Vallacher & Wegner, 2012).
The emergence process has clear relevance for the allocation of responsibility in an interracial altercation. For example, assume that people are asked to read a detailed and lengthy narrative concerning such an altercation. In the narrative, an African-
American and a White male get into an intense argument that escalates to mutual pushing and concludes with one of them knocking the other person to the floor. The
“victim”—the one knocked to the floor—hits his head on the side of a table, producing a gash and some bleeding. The victim later reports the incident to an authority figure, who must decide whether the alleged perpetrator should be held responsible or whether the self-proclaimed victim bears greater responsibility for the escalation that resulted in him being knocked down.
In line with the emergence process, people who read the narrative in a detailed fashion should use the authority figure’s decision as an avenue of emergence, embracing his or her conclusion as a way of imposing coherence on their fragmented view of the altercation. If he or she concludes that the alleged perpetrator was primarily responsible,
12 people in a low-level mindset should blame this person, regardless of his race. If he or she concludes instead that the self-proclaimed victim was responsible for what happened, people with a low-level mindset should follow suit and blame this person as well—again, regardless of his race. In contrast, those who read the narrative with a high-level orientation are likely to form their own understanding of the altercation and be less likely to embrace the conclusion reached by the authority figure. Their personal attitudes and values (e.g., about race) are likely to determine how responsibility is allocated.
An experiment by Vallacher and Selz (1991) provides support for this reasoning.
They tested the emergence process in the context of an alleged rape incident. Participants read a detailed account of events involving a male and a female college student, which culminated in him forcing himself on her after she lets him enter her apartment. The account began with a series of events in a classroom, each of which could be interpreted as evidence of sexual attraction by one or both parties. For example, the female drops her pencil, and when she bends over to pick it up, the buttons on her skirt pop, exposing her inner thighs to the male, who is seated nearby. The pencil rolls toward the male, who smiles at her, which could be seen as communicating humor over the unintended action or as signaling sexual interest. She then smiles in return, which could be seen as embarrassment or as signaling receptivity to his interest.
The account proceeds with a series of other events that are open to interpretation.
For example, upon completion of the class, the female walks briskly to her bicycle and rides at a very rapid rate to her apartment, all the while looking over her shoulder at the male, who is following at a close distance on his bike. She smiles when she looks at him, which could again signal embarrassment or receptivity. When she reaches her door, she
13 fumbles for her keys, which could be seen as a sign of anxiety or a signal that she is waiting for him. She opens the door and starts to close it, but the male holds the door ajar and asks if he can come in and “return her pencil.” She smiles nervously, which could signify anxiety or anticipation, and says, “Yes, but just for a minute.” After a few awkward exchanges, the male proceeds to force himself on her. She objects, but not too forcefully, which could signify reluctant willingness or fear that he might harm her if she fought back.
After the incident, the male departs and the female calls the police to report that she had been sexually assaulted. The police apprehend the male and bring him to the
Police station. Both the male and the female are questioned extensively about the incident. Each account provides essentially the same details, but with differing interpretations that are consistent with their respective perspectives. After considering both accounts, the arresting officer decides either that the male should be prosecuted for alleged rape or that there are insufficient grounds to do so. Participants read this narrative either under a low-level set, focusing on all the details as they unfolded, or under a high-level set, in which they were encouraged to form a judgment as they progressed through the account. After reading the narrative, participants were asked to allocate responsibility to either the male or the female.
In line with the emergence process, participants who read the narrative with a focus on the lower-level identities tended to allocate responsibility in line with the arresting officer’s conclusion. If the officer felt the male should be prosecuted, the low- level participants—females as well as males—allocated responsibility to the male and indicated that his actions constituted acquaintance rape. But if the officer concluded that
14 the event did not qualify as rape and thus that the male should not be prosecuted, the participants—again, females as well as males—allocated greater responsibility to the female than to the male for the incident. Participants who read the narrative with a focus on meaning rather than detail were not influenced by the arresting officer in their allocation of responsibility. High-level participants tended to allocate greater responsibility to the male, and a sizable number of participants, both—female and male, allocated greater responsibility to the female. Presumably, high-level participants allocated responsibility in line with their relevant attitudes or values, although these characteristics were not assessed.
It may seem ironic that when people focus on “the facts” in a case with moral or legal overtones, they become vulnerable to social influence in their judgments and thus can be led to believe contradictory interpretations of the same event. But this influence demonstrates people’s press for higher-level understanding when they are induced to think about an action in terms of its fragmented, lower-level identities. Since the introduction of the emergence process to social psychology, the dynamic scenario it represents has been incorporated into theories of attitude change, social influence, and mental dynamics (e.g., Knowles & Linn, 2004; Vallacher, Nowak, Markus, & Strauss,
1998; Vallacher, Nowak, & Miller, 2003).
Implicit attitudes. Contemporary social psychology has come to recognize the existence of non-conscious mental processes that can play important roles in conscious thought, judgment, decision-making, and action (cf. Hassin, Uleman, & Bargh, 2005;
Dijksterhuis, 2004; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Fazio, 1990; Wegner, 1994; Wegner &
Vallacher, 1977; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Theory and research focusing on
15 the “new unconscious” (Hassin et al., 2005) has documented phenomena such as the adaptive role of unconscious thinking when making decisions involving complex information (Dijksterhuis, 2004), the intrusion of suppressed thoughts into consciousness when under cognitive load (Wegner, 1994), the psychological and physical benefits of becoming conscious of traumatic events that have been repressed (Neiderhoffer &
Pennebaker, 2009), and the disruption of romantic relationships when the partners consciously focus on relationship-relevant factors that are normally out of awareness
(Wilson & Kraft, 1993).
The idea that mental processing occurs unconsciously makes sense in light of neuroscience research that has established the parallel processing of information that occurs in different brain regions and neural networks (e.g., Roser & Gazzaniga, 2004).
Consciousness, in fact, is considered a special state that arises under specific circumstances, such as the sudden synchronization of lower-level perceptual processes or the disruption of an ongoing process due to novelty or disruption. A more surprising idea is that people have fully formed unconscious attitudes and beliefs concerning abstract categories that would seem to require conscious attention and elaboration to be formed and maintained. The idea that one can have an emotionally charged and personally relevant attitude, and not know that one has it, seems paradoxical. For this reason, and because of its potential implications for such topics as prejudice, political behavior, and aggression, the concept of implicit attitude (Bargh, Chen & Burrows,
1996; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) has emerged as one of the most frequently investigated manifestation of the unconscious mind (cf. Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007).
16 Although many paradigms have been used to assess implicit attitudes, the
Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998) is the most widely used (Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). The IAT is a computerized double-categorization procedure that measures the strength of association between two concepts (e.g.,
“Black”/”White”) and two evaluative attributes (e.g., “Good”/”Bad”). Each target concept is paired with an evaluative attribute (e.g., “Black/Good” and “White/Bad”) for a series of discrimination trials. The speed with which participants can correctly categorize the concept-attribute pairings reflects the strength of the evaluative association between the pairings. For example, a faster average response time for the
“Black/Good, White /Bad” pairings as compared to the “Black/Bad, White/Good” pairings suggests a stronger association for “Black” with “Good” and “White” with
“Bad”, than for the reverse pairings, thus reflecting a positive implicit bias toward
Blacks relative to Whites.
The IAT has been used in hundreds of studies examining implicit attitudes on a diverse range of topics, including self-esteem (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), prejudice
(Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000), racial stereotypes (Amodio & Devine,
2006), moral and political stereotypes (Graham, Nosek & Haidt, 2011), smoking
(Swanson, Rudman & Greenwald 2001), consumer attitudes (Maison, Greenwald, &
Bruin, 2001), and homosexuality (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001). Studies have generally shown good internal consistency and predictive validity (For reviews see, Nosek,
Greenwald & Banaji, 2007; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann & Banaji, 2009; Nosek, et al., 2007).
17 However, despite the considerable theoretical and research attention devoted to the existence, measurement, and function of implicit attitudes, a coherent account has yet to be established (cf. Hassin, Uleman, Bargh, 2005; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). For example, research has shown that people’s implicit attitudes can conflict with their explicit attitudes, but it is unclear how such conflicts are decided (e.g., Gawronski, 2009;
Nosek, 2009). What factors determine whether a person acts in accordance with a consciously held attitude versus a contradictory attitude that is not consciously recognized? Is it simply a matter of which attitude is stronger or more coherent? Or are there principles at work that dictate when one or the other is likely to be salient in subsequent thought and action?
Answering these questions is critical to understanding the relevance of implicit attitudes generally, and identifying the conditions under which they are likely to be expressed at the expense of attitudes that are consciously maintained. It is tempting to suggest that implicit prejudicial attitudes toward African-Americans bias people’s judgment of responsibility in interracial conflicts, for instance, but the evidence is mixed on this point (Brown, 2010). What is needed is a theoretical basis for predicting when, and to what degree, implicit attitudes override consciously held beliefs, attitudes, and values in shaping judgments and decisions.
Implicit attitudes and the intrinsic dynamics of action identification. The conscious control of thought and action described by action identification theory seems inconsistent with the power of unconscious attitudes to shape decision-making and behavior. It could be argued that conscious and unconscious processes are simply different forces that sometimes work in harmony and sometimes work at cross-purposes
18 in shaping the output of mind and giving direction to behavior (e.g., Fazio, 1990; Strack
& Deutsch, 2004; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). In this interactive model, an implicit attitude represents a factor that may or may not be expressed, depending on the respective strength of other factors (e.g., the coherence or salience of a contradictory act identity). In learning about an interracial conflict, for example, a person might forge an act identity for the African American’s role that is benign (e.g., “he didn’t initiate the fight”) but hold an implicit attitude that biases him or her to blame the African American
(e.g., “Blacks precipitate violence”). Whether the African American would be held responsible for the altercation would depend on whether the conscious act identity or the implicit attitude is more strongly activated.
The emergence scenario of action identification theory provides a different perspective on the relation between conscious and unconscious processes. Because of the press for higher-level identification, when people are induced to think about an action in relatively low-level terms, they are susceptible to factors that provide cues to comprehensive meaning. In its original formulation, action identification theory focused only on external factors such as social influence or new information that provide higher- level meaning. When focusing on the details of an interracial altercation, for instance, a person could allocate responsibility to either person, depending on the opinion offered by a credible communicator. Although there is considerable evidence in support of such guided emergence, it should be emphasized that the principle at work is not influence per se, but rather the integration of lower-level information. Social influence may be a common source of emergence, but this may say more about the nature of social life than about the dynamics of action identification.
19 An alternative to guided emergence is the self-organization of lower-level act identities into a coherent higher-level state (Vallacher & Wegner, 2012). This possibility follows from recent applications of nonlinear dynamical systems to social psychological processes (e.g., Nowak & Vallacher, 1998; Vallacher & Nowak, 1994). In many biological and physical systems, emergent order develops as the elements comprising the system influence one another over time until a common state is achieved with properties that characterize the system as a whole. For example, in self-concept formation, a random set of self-relevant thoughts become progressively integrated into higher-level self-aspects, including traits, roles, and competencies (Nowak, Vallacher, Tesser, &
Borkowski, 2000). The same dynamics of self-organization are at work in the emergence of social norms, values, beliefs, customs, and clothing styles in a social system (Nowak, Szamrej, & Latane, 1990). Through local social interactions, individuals influence one another to adopt the same higher-level state (e.g., norm, belief, custom), so that over time the system is characterized by “clusters” of like-minded people.
Self-organization is a feature of systems throughout nature and at all levels of psychological reality, from brains to societies. Therefore, it may play a role in the emergence of higher-level action understanding as well. The potential for emergence exists when people are thinking about an action in relatively low-level terms. It is in this state that implicit attitudes are likely to play a role, assuming such attitudes are relevant to the action at issue. Thus, if a person has a high implicit racial bias, his or her lower- level identities for an interracial altercation may become progressively integrated with respect to a global judgment regarding the altercation, such that the African-American is
20 seen as primarily responsible. Similarly, if the person has a low implicit racial bias, he or she may show emergence to a higher-level judgment such that the White party is held responsible for the altercation.
The dynamics at work are likely to be very different when the person is induced to think about the action in high-level terms. Research has shown that high-level identification shields the person from social influence, enabling him or her to express and maintain a comprehensive understanding of what has happened. The high-level orientation enables the expression of a person’s traits, attitudes, and values (Vallacher &
Wegner, 1985). So if the person has an explicit (consciously-held) attitude that conflicts with his or her implicit attitude, the former should be expressed rather than the latter.
In sum, the interplay between action identification and implicit attitudes conforms to a simple interaction. When a person identifies an action in lower-level terms, his or her implicit attitudes are likely to be expressed. Conversely, explicit attitudes are likely to be expressed when an action is identified in higher-level terms.
Experimental Test of the Proposed Integration
The present research was designed to investigate the process of emergence in the context of an interracial conflict. According to action identification theory, if the judgment system is disassembled into lower-level elements, it should create the conditions for emergence to a higher-level understanding. There are two ways that the progression from a lower-level state to judgmental coherence can take place: (1) external cues may provide a means to a high-level meaning (e,g., an interpretation offered by a credible person; Vallacher & Selz, 1991); or (2) by self-organization of the judgment
21 system as lower-level thoughts are shaped by intrinsic dynamics becoming progressively integrated into a coherent understanding.
To examine the emergence of social judgment in an interracial conflict situation, the present study adapted the rape paradigm developed by Vallacher and Selz (1991). A
3-way between-subjects design was employed: 2 (Action identification level: High,
Low) x 2 (Defendant race: Black, White) x 3 (Summary memorandum: Guilty, Not
Guilty, No Summary). First, high- or low-level action identification was induced with written instructions following the procedure used by Vallacher and Selz (1991). Half of the participants were instructed to focus on the details of the narrative (low-level) and half were instructed to think about the motives and intentions of the parties (high-level).
Next, participants read a lengthy narrative describing an altercation between two college roommates in which one of the parties incurred physical injuries (victim) and subsequently pressed charges against the other party (defendant). The narrative is detailed but ambiguous with regard to the motives and intentions of the parties, allowing for multiple interpretations. Defendant race (Black or White) was manipulated by altering the names of the defendant and victim (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).
Half of the participants read a narrative in which the defendant had a typical White name
(Adam) and the victim had a typical Black name (Darnell) and half read a narrative in which the defendant had the Black name (Darnell) and the victim had the White name
(Adam).
After reading the narrative, participants read a memorandum from the Dean of
Student affairs recommending that the defendant be held accountable (guilty) or not accountable (not guilty) for the altercation. One-third of the participants did not read a
22 summary memorandum (no summary). After reading the conflict documents, participants’ judgment was assessed. In particular, participants judged the defendant’s level of responsibility for the conflict, and reported their impressions of the defendant’s personality and their emotional reaction to the defendant.
The first goal of the present research was to provide empirical support for guided emergence as proposed by action identification theory and as found by Vallacher and
Selz (1991). According to the theory, people have an inherent press for higher-level meaning. Because of this press for coherence, when induced to think about an action in low-level terms, people become susceptible to external cues that will provide higher- level meaning. Therefore, it is hypothesized that individuals induced to think about the conflict narrative in low-level terms will allocate responsibility to the defendant in line with the summary argument (i.e., those who read the guilty summary argument will allocate more blame to the defendant than those who read the not guilty summary argument).
The second goal of the present research was to extend the empirical evidence on the emergence process by investigating the emergence of social judgments via self- organization. Of specific interest were the conditions in which implicit racial attitudes would influence participants’ emergent judgments concerning the defendant’s responsibility for the conflict. In order to investigate this question, individual differences in implicit racial attitudes (Race IAT; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz,
1998, Nosek, et al., 2007) and in Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), a widely used explicit measure of general prejudice (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), were assessed. According to action identification theory, implicit attitudes are most likely to
23 play a role in the judgment process when thinking about the conflict actions in low-level terms, and in the absence of any external cues. Therefore, it is hypothesized that when induced to think about the narrative in low-level, relatively disassembled terms, in the absence of a summary argument, participants’ emergent higher-level judgment will reflect self-organization dynamics shaped by implicit racial attitudes (i.e., those with a high implicit racial bias toward Blacks will assign more blame to the Black defendant and those with a low implicit racial bias should assign more blame to the White defendant). Conversely, it is hypothesized that when induced to think about the narrative in high-level terms, and in the absence of a summary argument, participants’ judgments concerning allocation of responsibility will be shaped by explicitly held attitudes concerning group inequality.
24
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 327 undergraduates who volunteered in exchange for partial fulfillment of their General Psychology course research requirement. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 58 (M = 20.6). The sample was ethnically diverse (White, 52.3%, N =
171; Hispanic, 20.5%, N = 67; Black, 15.9%, N = 52; Asian, 7.6%, N = 25; and other,
3.7%, N = 12). A majority of participants were women (76.1%, N = 249), and a majority identified as being American (62.4%, N = 204). Seventeen participants were excluded from analysis because they did not complete session 2.
Materials and Procedure
The study was conducted in two sessions. In the first session, students completed a series of individual differences measures including the Race Implicit Association Test
(IAT), the Social Dominance Orientation scale (SDO), and the Behavior Identification
Form (BIF). Students returned to the lab approximately one week later to complete the experimental portion of the study, which involved reading a narrative describing an interracial conflict, followed by a memorandum from a credible source regarding accountability for the altercation. Three variables were manipulated in the experiment:
(1) Action identification level (Instructional set: high-level, low-level), (2) Defendant race (Black/White), and (3) Summary memorandum (guilty, not guilty, no summary).
After reading the experimental materials, participants completed four dependent
25 measures, which included judging the defendant’s level of responsibility (Allocation of
Responsibility), forming impressions of the defendant’s personality (Personality
Impressions) and conveying their feelings toward the defendant (Affective Reaction).
Materials used in session1 and session 2 can be found in the appendices.
Session 1 procedure. Upon arriving at the lab, participants were told they would be participating in a “personality and attitudes” study in which they would complete a computer-based sorting task followed by a packet of personality and attitude questionnaires. After signing a consent form, participants were escorted to private lab rooms where they individually completed the Race IAT (Greenwald, McGhee &
Schwartz, 1998; Nosek, et al., 2007) followed by a series of self-report measures including the Social Dominance Orientation scale (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, &
Malle, 1994), the Behavioral Identification Form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), and demographics. After completing the personality measures, participants scheduled a time
(approximately one week later) to return to the lab to complete session 2, and were thanked and excused.
Session 1 materials.
Implicit racial bias. Evaluative associations toward Blacks and Whites were measured using the Implicit Association Test (IAT), a computer-based response latency task that measures the relative strength of association between pairs of related concepts
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The present research utilized the picture version of the Race IAT (Greenwald, et al., Nosek, et al., 2007), in which the target categories were “African American” and “White American”, and the evaluative categories are “Good” and “Bad”. Stimuli for the target concepts included twelve black-
26 and-white pictures of African American and White American male and female faces.
Stimuli for the evaluative concepts consisted of the following sixteen words: marvelous, superb, pleasure, beautiful, joyful, glorious, lovely, wonderful, tragic, horrible, agony, painful, terrible, awful, humiliate, nasty.
Participants were seated at a computer in a private lab room and were instructed to complete the IAT by following the instructions presented on the computer monitor. As per the recommended procedure (Nosek et al., 2007), each target concept was paired with each evaluative category for a block of 20 practice trials followed by 40 critical trials (i.e., African American/Good, White American/Bad; and African American/Bad,
White American/Good). Concept and attribute exemplars (e.g., pictures of black and white faces, and pleasant and unpleasant words) were presented one at a time in the center of the computer screen. Participants’ task was to categorize the exemplars into the correct pairings on either the left or right side of the computer screen, working as quickly and accurately as possible. After completing the first block of 60 trials, the pairings ware reversed (e.g., “Black/Bad” and “White/Good”) and another series of trials was completed. The order of the target/evaluative concept pairings was counterbalanced across participants. The difference in average response latency between the two blocks of concept-attribute pairings is believed to indicate the relative strength of the association between the two pairings.
Opposition to equality. Commonly used measures of explicit prejudice such as the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) and the Blatant and Subtle Prejudice
Scale (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) were not suitable for the present study because the
27 sample included Black participants. Therefore, explicit prejudice was assessed with the
Social Dominance Orientation scale (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), a widely used measure of general prejudice. Social dominance orientation has been linked with anti-Black racism (Pratto, et al., 1994), ingroup favoritism (Levin, Federico,
Sidanius, Rabinowitz, 2002), and derogatory views of subordinate groups by members of dominant groups (Overbeck, Jost, Mosso, & Flizik, 2004), and by members of subordinate groups (Ashburn-Nardo, Knowles & Monteith, 2003). The present study utilized the Opposition to Equality (OEQ) subfactor of the SDO as a measure of explicit prejudice rather than the overall SDO scale because the two factors comprising the SDO
(i.e., Group Based Dominance and Opposition to Equality) have been shown to be differentially related to each other, particularly for minority group members (Jost &
Thompson, 2000). Additionally, research findings suggest the OEQ factor may be a better predictor of racial attitudes (Jost & Thompson, 2000) and humanitarianism- egalitarianism (Kugler, Cooper, & Nosek, 2010).
The eight OEQ items included statements such as “It would be good if all groups could be equal,” “No one group should dominate in society,” and “We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.” Instructions were as follows: “Please use the following rating scale to indicate your reaction to each of the statements below.” The
7-point response scale was anchored with 1 = very negative and 7 = very positive.
Level of personal agency. Individual differences in action identification level were assessed using the Behavioral Identification Form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner,
1989). The BIF consists of 25 act identities (e.g., “paying the rent”) along with two alternative identities, one high-level (e.g., “maintaining a place to live”) and one low-
28 level (e.g., “writing a check”). For each of the 25 behaviors, participants were instructed to “Choose the response that best describes the behavior to you”. This measure was included in light of previous research showing effects for individual differences in action identification level that parallel effects for manipulation of action identification level.
No specific hypotheses were offered for this personality measure, however, because this individual difference dimension is associated with other tendencies that are independent of influence susceptibility (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989).
Session 2 procedure. Approximately one week after completing session 1, participants returned to the lab to complete the experimental portion of the study.
Participants were told that the University was considering implementing a peer mediation program and had asked several University research labs to help gather information concerning how FAU college students typically respond to interpersonal conflict. The experimenter explained that they would read a transcript describing a conflict between two college roommates, after which they would answer some questions about the conflict. Finally, they were told that their responses would be anonymous and confidential.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 12 conditions in a 3-way between- subjects design: 2 (Instructions: high-level, low-level) x 2 (defendant race: Black,
White) x 3 (summary argument: guilty, not guilty, no summary). Participants received a packet of materials that included an instruction sheet, conflict documents, and dependent measure questionnaires. Participants were then escorted to private lab rooms where they individually completed their study packets.
29 Prior to reading the narrative, students read instructions in which action identification level was manipulated. Half the students were instructed to pay attention to the details of the event (low-level Instructions) and half were instructed to focus on the motives and intentions of the individuals (high-level Instructions). Participants then read a lengthy transcript describing a heated discussion between two male college roommates that resulted in one of the men incurring injuries. Assault charges were file by the injured male (victim) against the other male (defendant). The transcript depicted the events and details of the conflict from the defendant’s perspective as told to a university authority (Dean of Student Affairs). The narrative was detailed but ambiguous with regard to the motives and intentions of the parties, allowing for multiple interpretations. (see Vallacher & Selz, 1991). Stereotypical Black and White names
(Darnell and Adam) were used for the defendant and victim and were counterbalanced manipulate Defendant race (Black, White). Half of the participants read a transcript narrative in which the defendant had a typical Black name (Darnell) and the victim had a typical White name (Adam) and half the participants read a narrative in which the names of the defendant and victim were reversed. Two-thirds of the participants then read an official memorandum (summary argument) from the Dean of Student Affairs recommending that the defendant be held accountable (guilty) or not accountable (not guilty) for the altercation.
After reading the defendant’s account of the incident and the summary memorandum (or no summary), participants completed a series of questionnaires from which several dependent measures were derived. In particular, participants were asked to judge the defendant’s level of responsibility for the conflict (Allocation of
30 Responsibility), to form impressions of the defendant’s personality (Personality
Impressions), and to convey their feelings and reactions toward the defendant (Affective
Reaction). Lastly, to assess whether the defendant race manipulation was successful, participants reported their perceptions of the ethnicity of the defendant and the victim.
Participants were then debriefed, thanked, and excused.
Dependent measures.
Allocation of responsibility. Immediately after reading the conflict documents, participants’ emergent global judgment concerning the defendant’s responsibility was measured using a single item (Vallacher & Selz, 1991). Participants were asked to judge the defendant’s overall degree of responsibility for the incident: “In thinking about what happened, how would you assign responsibility to Darnell/Adam?” Participants indicated their response using a 7-point Likert scale (anchored with 1 = not at all responsible and 7 = very responsible). Next, participants were asked to indicate how certain they were of their responsibility rating using a 7-point response scale anchored with 1 = not at all certain and 7 = very certain.
Personality Impressions. To capture participants’ emergent impressions of the defendant’s personality, they were asked to rate the defendant on nine traits previously shown to be associated with outgroup members (e.g., Stephan & Stephan, 1993). The traits were as follows: honest, friendly, reliable, disciplined, aggressive, respectful, intelligent, proud, and cliquish. Participants read the following instructions, “What are your impressions of Darnell/Adam’s personality? After providing your impression for each trait, please indicate how certain you are of your answer.” For each of the traits, participants were asked, “Is Darnell/Adam ______?” (e.g., reliable). The 7-point
31 response scale was anchored with 1 = not at all and 7 = very much. A 7-point scale for the certainty measure followed each personality trait (anchored with 1 = not at all certain and 7 = very certain). Responses for positive traits were reverse scored so that higher scores represented greater negative impression of the defendant’s personality. Six of the traits (honest, friendly, respectful, intelligent, aggressive, and proud) were highly correlated and were averaged to create an index for personality impression (α = .81).
Affective reaction. Finally, to measure their feelings about the defendant, participants responded to ten items from a scale designed to capture feelings toward an outgroup (Negative Racial Attitudes Scale; Stephan & Stephan, 1993). The ten items used for the present study included acceptance, admiration, affection, approval, dislike, hostility, rejection, superiority, sympathy, and warmth. Instructions were as follows:
“Please indicate the degree to which you feel the following reactions toward
Darnell/Adam. After each response, please indicate how certain you are of your answer.” The following statement preceded the list of items, “When I think about
Darnell/Adam, I have the following reaction toward him:” Reactions were measured with a 7-point response scale (anchored with 1 = not at all and 7 = very much). A 7- point scale for the certainty measure followed each item (anchored with 1 = not at all certain and 7 = very certain). Responses for positive items were reverse scored so that higher scores represented stronger negative feelings toward the defendant. Seven of the items (acceptance, admiration, approval, sympathy, warmth, hostility, and rejection were highly correlated and were averaged to create an index for affective reaction (α = .83).
32
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Opposition to equality. Responses were reverse scored so that higher scores represented stronger anti-egalitarian attitudes. OEQ scores were calculated as the average of the eight items (M = 2.07, SD = .98, range 1.00 to 6.38). Egalitarian (M =
1.37, SD = .32, N = 174, range 1.00 to 1.88) and anti-egalitarian (M = 2.86, SD = .86, N
= 153, range 2.00 to 6.38) groups were computed based on a median split of the OEQ scores.
Level of personal agency. Level of personal agency was computed as the sum of the high-level identities chosen across the 25 items. High (M = 20.36, SD = 2.35) and low (M = 11.83, SD = .3.53) personal agency groups were created based on a median split of the BIF scores.
Implicit race attitude. The IAT D statistic scoring algorithm was used to compute the IAT score in accordance with the most recent recommendations (Lane,
Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007). The difference in average response latency between the two blocks of concept-attribute pairings is believed to indicate the relative strength of the association between the two pairings. The IAT D score is calculated as a function of the difference between the average response times for the two pairings, and is scored such that higher IAT scores reflect a stronger evaluative association between the
“White/Good, African American/Bad” pairings as compared to the “African American
33 Good, White Bad” pairings. High implicit racial bias (M =.63, SD = 0.21, range .32 to
1.434) and low implicit racial bias (M =.04, SD =.23, range -1.074 to .32) groups were computed based on a median split of the IAT scores. Implicit race attitude was not correlated with opposition to equality.
Manipulation check for defendant race. To assess whether the defendant race manipulation was successful, participants were asked to indicate the ethnicity of the two parties involved in the conflict. Results of a chi-square test revealed that names
“Darnell” and “Adam” were effective in establishing defendant race as Black or White.
A significant percentage of participants correctly identified Darnell’s race as African
American (77.5%) and Adam’s race as White (84.5%), Χ2 (8, N = 327) = 188.69, p
< .001.
Participant sex and ethnicity. To assess the influence of group variables (sex, and ethnic group), a 6-way ANOVA (sex x participant ethnic group x implicit prejudice x opposition to equality x instructional set x defendant race) was conducted on each of the dependent variables (allocation of responsibility, personality impression, affective reaction). There were no reliable main effects or interaction terms relevant to the present study (see Tests of Hypotheses below) for sex, F’s(1,232) ≤ 1.30, p’s > .26, or for participant ethnic group, F’s(3,232) ≤ 1.85, p’s > .14.
Tests of Hypotheses
Allocation of responsibility. A 5-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted on Allocation of Responsibility: 2 (instructional set: low-level, high-level) by
3 (summary argument: guilty, not guilty, no summary) by 2 (defendant race: Black,
White) by 2 (implicit racial bias: high, low) by 2 (opposition to equality: egalitarian,
34 anti-egalitarian). It was hypothesized that inducing people to think about a conflict event in low-level terms would provide an opening for external cues to influence their judgments and impressions (Vallacher & Selz, 1991). Thus, it was predicted that individuals in the low-level instruction condition would allocate responsibility to the defendant in line with external cue provided by the summary judgment (guilty, not guilty). A review of the two-way interaction between instructional set and summary argument was not significant, F(2,285) = 0.96, p = .38. However, results of the ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of summary argument, F(1,285) = 7.26, p = .001, partial
η2= .05, suggesting that summary argument influenced participants allocation of responsibility. An examination of pairwise comparisons revealed that, as expected, significantly less responsibility was allocated to the defendant by those in the not guilty condition (M = 3.18, SD = 1.22) than by those in the guilty (M = 3.81, SD = 1.12) and no summary (M = 3.59, SD = 1.26) conditions.
The highly reliable effect of summary argument suggests that this manipulation may have been too successful. In order for mental dynamics to play a role in allocation of responsibility, it is necessary that the cues to emergent understanding be subtle, not definitive conclusions (Vallacher & Wegner, 1985). This interpretation is supported by the lack of any reliable predicted interactions of summary with instructional set: the instructions by summary by defendant race by implicit racial bias interaction was not significant, F(2,285) = 0.20, p = .82, nor was the instructions by summary by defendant race by opposition to equality interaction, F(2,285) = 0.27, p = .76. These results imply that despite evidence from previous research on the guided emergence process, all participants—those induced to read the narrative in high- as well as low-level terms—
35 were strongly influenced in their allocation of responsibility by the conclusion reached by the authoritative figure.
Although guided emergence was not observed, presumably because of the strength of the summary provided by the authoritative figure, the strength of the summary is less likely to impede emergence via self-organization. It was anticipated that participants’ implicit attitudes concerning race and explicit attitudes concerning group equality would influence allocation of responsibility differentially under low- versus high-level instructional set. Specifically, when induced to think about the narrative in low-level, relatively disassembled terms, participants were expected to show emergence of a higher-level judgment in line with their implicit racial biases. Conversely, when induced to think about the narrative in high-level, abstract terms, it was predicted that participants’ judgments concerning allocation of responsibility would be shaped by explicitly held, global attitudes concerning group inequality. Accordingly, a 4-way factorial ANOVA, 2 (instruction level) x 2 (defendant race) x 2 (implicit racial bias) x 2
(opposition to equality), was conducted on allocation of responsibility.
The results of the ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for instructional set,
F(1,311) = 4.24, p = .04, partial η2 = .01. Participants in the low-level instruction condition assigned more responsibility to the defendant (M = 3.68, SD = 1.18) as compared to participants in the high-level instruction condition (M = 3.37, SD = 1.26).
In line with the predictions concerning self-organization dynamics, this result was qualified by a significant 3-way interaction between instructions, defendant race, and implicit racial bias, F(1,311) = 6.77, p = .01, partial η2 = .02. An analyses of simple interaction effects indicated that the 2-way interaction effect of implicit race bias and
36 defendant race on allocation of responsibility was highly significant in the low-level instruction condition, F(1,311) = 6.86, p = .009, but not in the high-level instruction condition, F(1,311) = 0.89, p = .35.
As can be seen in Figure 1, and as revealed by simple effects analyses, the effect of implicit racial bias and defendant’s race on allocation of responsibility was moderated by instructional set. In the low- but not in the high-level instruction condition, participants assigned responsibility to the defendant in line with their implicit racial biases. Those with a high implicit racial bias assigned more blame to the Black defendant (M = 3.98, SD = 1.30) as compared to the White defendant (M = 3.45, SD =
1.11), F(1,311) = 3.33, p = .07, partial η2 = .01. Conversely, those with a low implicit racial bias assigned more blame to the White defendant (M = 3.85, SD = 1.15) than to the
Black defendant (M = 3.33, SD = 1.05), F(1,311) = 4.25, p = .04, partial η2 = .01.
Figure 1. Allocation of responsibility to Black and White defendants as a function of implicit racial bias and instructional set. 37 These results provide support for the self-organization hypothesis: When presented with an ambiguous interracial conflict scenario under low-level instructional set, individuals allocated responsibility in line with their implicit racial biases. But when presented with the same scenario under high-level instruction set, implicit biases did not appear to influence the judgment process for allocating responsibility.
To test the hypothesis that participants in the high-level condition would allocate responsibility in line with their explicitly-held attitudes concerning group equality, the results of the 3-way interaction between instructional set, opposition to equality, and defendant race for allocation of responsibility were examined. The predicted 3-way interaction effect was not significant, F(1,311) = 1.00, p = .32, suggesting that opposition to equality did not influence participant’s judgments concerning allocation of responsibility.
These results suggest that in the low- but not high-level instruction condition, implicit racial biases, but not explicit attitude about group equality, influenced the judgment process when allocating responsibility in an interracial context. When induced to think about the narrative in low-level terms, participants allocated responsibility to the defendant in line their implicit biases; that is, those with a low implicit racial bias assigned more responsibility to the White defendant as compared to the Black defendant, whereas those with a high implicit racial bias tend to assign more blame to the Black defendant. Opposition to equality did not influence allocation of responsibility under high-level instructional set as expected.
Personality impression. The hypotheses for personality impression were identical to those put forth for allocation of responsibility. Specifically, when induced to
38 read the narrative in low-level, it was hypothesized that implicit attitudes would influence participants’ impressions of the defendant’s personality, such that those with a low implicit racial bias would form a more negative impression of the White defendant, whereas those with a high implicit racial bias would form a more negative impression of the Black defendant. Conversely, when induced to think about the narrative in high-level, abstract terms, it was expected that participants’ judgments would be shaped by explicitly held, global attitudes concerning group equality. Accordingly, personality impression was submitted to a 4-way ANOVA (implicit racial bias x opposition to equality x instructional set x defendant race).
To test the self-organization hypothesis, which stated that implicit racial biases would shape the formation of personality impressions under low- but not high-level instructional set, the results of the 3-way interaction between implicit racial bias, instructional set and defendant race was examined. A marginally significant effect was revealed, F(1,311) = 3.10, p = .08, partial η2 = .01. Analyses of simple interaction effects showed that the interaction of defendant race and implicit racial bias was significant for those in the high-level instruction condition, F(1,311) = 4.33, p = .04, but not for those in the low-level instruction condition, as was predicted, F(1,311) = 0.06, p
= .81. As can be seen in Figure 2, those with a low implicit racial bias in the high-level instruction condition formed a more negative impression of the personality of the Black defendant (M = 3.27, SD = 1.02) as compared to the White defendant (M = 2.87, SD =
0.86), F(1,311) = 3.78, p = .05, partial η2 = .01. These unexpected results suggest that under a high-level mental state, individuals may be correcting for their implicit racial attitudes. However, it is not clear whether inducing a high-level mindset made
39 spontaneous implicit attitudes conscious and salient, compelling individuals to override them with more socially desirable responses, or whether judgments made in a high-level mental state were shaped by competing, explicitly held attitudes.
Figure 2. Personality impressions of Black and White defendants as a function of implicit racial bias and instructional set. To determine whether opposition to equality was influencing participants’ judgments of personality under high-level instructional set, the interaction between opposition to equality, instructional set and defendant race was examined. The predicted
3-way interaction was not significant, F(1,311) = 2.28, p = .13.
Affective reaction. The hypotheses for affective reaction were identical to those put forth for allocation of responsibility and personality impressions. Accordingly, affective reaction was submitted to a 4-way ANOVA (implicit racial bias x opposition to equality x instructional set x defendant race). To test the prediction that implicit racial biases would influence participants’ affective reaction to the defendant under low-level instructional set, the 3-way interaction between implicit racial bias, instructional set, and 40 defendant race was examined. Results yielded a significant interaction, F(1,311) = 4.42, p = .04, partial η2 = .01. Analysis of simple effects revealed a reliable 2-way interaction between defendant race and implicit racial bias for participants in the high-level instruction condition, F(1,311) = 4.81, p = .03, but not for those in the low-level instruction condition as was predicted, F(1,311) = 0.36, p = .58. As illustrated in Figure
3, under high-level instructional set, those with a high implicit racial bias had a less negative affective reaction toward the Black defendant (M = 2.88, SD = 1.00) as compared to White defendant (M = 3.41, SD = 1.24), F(1,311)= 4.70, p = .03, partial η2
= . 02.
Figure 3. Affective reaction to Black and White defendants as a function of implicit racial bias and instructional set.
These results suggest that under high-level instructional set, individuals with a high implicit racial bias were correcting for their implicit attitudes by reacting more favorably toward the Black defendant as compared to the White defendant. This high- 41 level effect is similar to that found for personality impressions, except in this case the correction is being made by those in the high implicit racial bias group.
To examine whether explicit attitudes concerning equality influenced participants’ affective reaction to the defendant, the interaction between opposition to equality, instructional set, and defendant race was examined. The predicted 3-way interaction effect was not significant, F(1,311) = 1.81, p = .18, suggesting that explicit attitudes did not influence participants’ affective reaction toward the defendant.
42
DISCUSSION
The results of this experiment provide new insight into how the ambiguity of social life is reduced by means of basic psychological processes. The manner in which these processes were manifested suggests a new way to frame the interplay of conscious mental states and unconscious mental dynamics in the formation of social judgments. In addition to their theoretical value, the results have implications for contemporary social issues involving criminal justice, social inequality, and racial prejudice. The theoretical and applied significance of the results are discussed in turn below. The experimental data are not definitive, but generate new theoretical and applied issues that call for additional investigation. These issues are addressed in a concluding section that emphasizes the heuristic nature of the present research.
Theoretical Significance
The fact that the events in daily life are complex in nature and open to interpretation with respect to meaning effectively guarantees a critical role for the human mind in social psychology. A wide range of theories have been developed, but all have in common the assumption that the mind strives for coherence when confronted with the inevitable complexity and ambiguity of personal and social experience (cf. Van Lange,
Kruglanski & Higgins, 2012). Until fairly recently, the focus in social psychology was on higher-order concepts that are accessible to conscious awareness, if not constructed by means of conscious processes. In this view, people form (or come to embrace)
43 attitudes, beliefs, and values that provide a basis for perceiving events and giving these events meaning. Knowing a person’s beliefs and attitudes regarding Black Americans, for example, should enable one to predict how the person would allocate responsibility for a conflict involving a Black and a White American, even when the nature of the conflict might appear ambiguous regarding causality and complex as it occurs. If the person has negative beliefs and attitudes towards Blacks, he or she presumably would blame the Black person; if he or she has favorable beliefs and attitudes toward this group, he or she would presumably blame the White participant in the conflict.
Interplay between attitudes and action identification. As reasonable as this model is, it has encountered two significant problems in recent years, both of which provided the rationale and focus of the present research. One problem is the operation of mental processes and structures that are not open to conscious awareness, let alone conscious control. The idea that unconscious processes exist and can work independently, or at cross purposes with, conscious mental states is not a new idea (e.g.,
Fazio, 1990; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wilson, Lindsey & Schooler, 2000), but until the advent of appropriate tools in recent years, it did not provide a testable alternative to accounts based on conscious processes (e.g., Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). The IAT has played an especially important role in challenging the preeminent role of attitudes, beliefs, and values in the disambiguation of social reality. The results of the present research suggest that the presumably unconscious mental structures revealed by the IAT do in fact play a critical role in people’s judgment of events that are open to interpretation. However, the nature of this role goes beyond that envisioned by those who developed the IAT (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, Greenwald, McGhee & Schartz,
44 1998; Nosek, et al., 2007) and investigated its expression in social judgment (e.g.,
Amodio & Devine, 2006; Hawkins & Nosek, 2012; Luguri, Napier, & Dovidio, 2012;
Ziegert & Hanges, 2005).
The results of the present research suggest that the role of implicit attitudes in social judgment is linked to the second problem associated with a sole focus on consciously held attitudes, beliefs, and values. This problem reflects the recognition that consciousness is not restricted to higher-order coherent mental states—attitudes, values, and the like—but also includes levels of representation that are detailed and unintegrated
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, 2012). Research has established that lower-level representations assume salience instead of higher-level representations under a variety of conditions that are commonly experienced in social life. Relatively low-level representations tend to be salient, for example, when the action in question is unfamiliar or complex in nature. To appreciate how the ambiguity of action is resolved requires understanding how people manage to forge higher-level representations when faced with complex and ambiguous events that engage conscious representations that are detailed and lacking in coherence.
Low-level identification, implicit attitudes, and emergence. Prior to the present research, theory and research concerning the progression from lower-level representations to higher-level mental states had focused on avenues of “emergence” provided by external circumstances and social influence (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987).
In this view, a person in a lower-level state is sensitive to the cues that suggest the action’s consequences, unintended effects, self-evaluative and societal implications, etc.
A particularly prominent role was assigned to the interpretations provided by other
45 people who were considered credible or persuasive. When induced to focus on the details of a lengthy and complex narrative concerning an alleged rape incident, for example, people were influenced in their judgments of the alleged perpetrator and victim by the assessment of the arresting officer (Vallacher & Selz, 1991). If the arresting officer felt the incident represented sexual assault, people who had been instructed to read the narrative for detail tended to blame the male perpetrator and feel sympathy for the female victim. But if the arresting officer suggested that the incident did not qualify as sexual assault, people who read for lower-level detail were more likely to find fault with the victim rather than with the alleged perpetrator.
This experimental scenario provided the outline for the present research.
However, the results did not reveal evidence for the socially inspired emergence that was observed in the Vallacher and Selz (1991) study (and in prior studies in which the focus was on the identification of people’s own actions; Vallacher & Wegner, 2012). Though speculative, and pending further research, a likely reason for the absence of guided emergence in the present experiment concerns the level of credibility of the influence agent. In past research on the emergence process, the person providing the higher-level interpretation did not have the same degree of authority as the person providing the interpretation in this research. The arresting officer in the Vallacher and Selz study, for example, offered an immediate interpretation based on his initial interviews with the male and female, not based on an exhaustive analysis of the evidence. In the present research, however, the influence agent was a college administrator who arrived at his conclusions after careful examination of the information relevant to the altercation between Adam and Darnell. In light of the administrator’s credentials and careful
46 review of the incident, it is not surprising that all participants in this study—those in the higher-level as well as the lower-level conditions—were influenced by his conclusions
The failure to find evidence of guided emergence, however, opened the door to a source of emergence that was not anticipated by action identification theory, but which provides insight into the role of implicit attitudes in the progression from lower-level identification to coherent understanding. Participants in the experiment who read the conflict narrative for detail tended to allocate responsibility in a manner that reflected their implicit attitudes toward Black and White Americans. Those with a high implicit racial bias allocated greater responsibility to the Black student (Darnell) than to the
White student (Adam); those with a low implicit racial bias allocated greater responsibility to the White student (Adam). Presumably, higher-order coherence on the part of participants with a detailed, unintegrated view of the conflict was provided by their unconscious biases.
This perspective on the function of implicit attitudes under low-level identification has not been previously advanced (Luguri, Napier, & Dovidio, 2012), but it is consistent with classic accounts of the unconscious mind dating back to Sigmund
Freud (1905) and others in the psychodynamic tradition. In the psychodynamic account, people find “meaning” in ambiguous stimuli that reflects their repressed motives, fears, and memories. People’s interpretation of ambiguous interpersonal scenes presented in the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), for example, are said to reflect personal concerns and desires that are not consciously experienced (Morgan & Murray, 1935). It would be ironic if the advent of advanced computer technology turns out to provide confirmation for an idea that predates electric typewriters. Perhaps the IAT can be
47 looked upon as an updated TAT. It is important to recognize, however, that this role of implicit attitudes is particularly pronounced when people are in a relatively low-level or disassembled mindset.
Additional research is called for to verify and test the generality of the interaction between low-level identification and implicit attitudes revealed in the present research.
However, if the interaction is confirmed, its implications are intriguing to consider. As noted, low-level identification is a relatively frequent state; it is linked to a host of conditions that are experienced on a daily basis. Novelty, incongruity, complexity, and ambiguity can all promote relatively low-level understanding of a topic, action, or person
(Vallacher & Wagner, 1985). If a person induced to think in low-level terms because of these factors also has an implicit bias regarding the target of thought, he or she may forge a higher-level understanding of the target that reflects this bias. The manner in which new contexts, unfamiliar people, or challenging activities are judged, for example, might say more about a person’s relevant implicit attitudes than about his or her conscious judgment processes (e.g., information integration, causal attribution).
High-level identification, implicit attitudes, and self-regulation. The finding that low-level identification sets the stage for emergent understanding does not mean that high-level identification is irrelevant to social judgment. The results of the present experiment suggest that high-level identification plays an important role in making judgments, but not necessarily in the expected manner. When induced to think about a topic or an event in high-level terms, people are presumed to make judgments that reflect their comprehensive values, attitudes, and beliefs, or their awareness of social norms
48 (e.g., Luguri, Napier, & Dovidio, 2012; Torelli & Kaikati, 2009; Vallacher & Wegner,
1985).
The present research suggests that this perspective underestimates the role of high-level mindsets in shaping meaning. The results suggest instead that high-level identification provides a self-regulatory function that prevents unconscious attitudes from driving social judgment. Participants with a high-level mindset did not simply make judgments that were free of their implicit bias—they made judgments that were in opposition to the bias. Those with a high implicit racial bias tended to judge the White student more harshly than then did the Black student; those with a low implicit racial bias tended to judge the Black student more harshly.
This interpretation of high-level identification was not anticipated by action identification theory, but it is compatible with theory and research concerning the nature and function of self-regulation (e.g., Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Mischel,
Shoda, & Peake, 1988). In this view, a basic function of higher-level thought processes is to control impulses, affect-laden concerns, and other automatic processes that operate without conscious control. In particular, higher-level thought monitors these processes and corrects for them by means of suppression (Wegner, 1994) or by bringing to mind contradictory thoughts and considerations (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). The findings of the present experiment are the first to extend this view of high-level thought to the correction of implicit attitudes that are presumably unacceptable to the person.
Because of its novelty, this perspective on the role of high-level identification in social judgment is necessarily speculative pending further research. Beyond confirming its role in judgments of inter-racial conflict, future research could investigate whether the
49 interaction between high-level identification and implicit attitudes observed in the present research can be extended to phenomena such as intergroup conflict, sexism, homophobia, self-esteem maintenance, and dogmatism. The “correction” of implicit attitudes by high-level identification has many implications, which will be discussed in
Implications for Social Issues.
In sum, the results observed in the present research admit to two interpretations— one concerning the mental dynamics associated with low-level identification, the other concerning the self-regulatory function of high-level identification. Although these processes are mutually compatible, they may not be equally salient for all aspects of social judgment. Indeed, the results observed for each of the dependent measures in the experiment—allocation of responsibility, personality impressions, and affective reaction—accentuate one of these processes rather than the other.
Emergence in social judgment. How participants allocated responsibility for the Adam-Darnell conflict was the primary focus of the experiment. It is one thing to feel negatively about someone, but it is quite a different matter to make a judgment that in principle could result in his or her criminal or civil prosecution. So, although how participants felt about the two parties is an interesting issue with implications for everyday social judgment, the most pressing issue was participants’ decision about who should be held accountable for the altercation.
The results for allocation of responsibility provide clear evidence for the presumed interplay between low-level identification and implicit racial attitudes. In particular, there was a reliable 3-way interaction for identification level, implicit attitude, and race of defendant. This interaction was decomposed with simple effects analyses
50 with the data blocked on identification level. In the low-level condition, results revealed a reliable interaction between implicit attitude and race of defendant. Participants with a high implicit racial bias allocated greater blame to Darnell than to Adam, whereas those with a low implicit racial bias allocated greater responsibility to Adam.
It is noteworthy that this effect for implicit attitudes was observed regardless of participants’ race. Black as well as White participants judged responsibility in line with their implicit attitudes toward African Americans and Whites. This suggests that the emergence scenario represents a psychological process rather than a manifestation of ingroup versus outgroup biases (i.e., favorable judgment of one’s ingroup and derogation of the outgroup; e.g., Brewer, 1999). Of course, this conclusion is necessarily tentative pending future research with sufficient power to test the emergence scenario separately for Black and White participants.
Self-regulation in social judgment. The results for allocation of responsibility did not provide reliable support for the presumed self-regulatory function of high-level identification. Evidence in support of high-level self-regulation was observed, however, for the two other aspects of social judgment: personality impressions, and feelings. In judging the defendants’ personality, participants with a low implicit racial bias were harsher in their assessment of Darnell than of Adam (see Figure 3). For affective reaction, the correction pattern was found for those with a high rather than low implicit racial bias. Participants with a high implicit racial bias bias felt more negatively toward
Adam than toward Darnell.
Future research is clearly necessary to clarify why the emergence scenario was observed only for allocation of responsibility, with the self-regulation scenario
51 characterizing judgments of personality impressions and feelings concerning Adam and
Darnell. A plausible interpretation centers on the differential emphasis on the “rational” versus “emotional” aspects of these different judgments. Allocation of responsibility is ostensibly based on a consideration of the relevant facts concerning the event in question.
Accordingly, participants may have been primed to recall the narrative when asked to decide whether Adam or Darnell was more responsible. Those who read the narrative for lower-level detail presumably delved deeper into the narrative and thus experienced a greater press for higher-level understanding—a press that was guided by their implicit attitudes.
The other measures, in contrast, focused on evaluative judgments of Adam and
Darnell, regardless of their assessment of who was to blame. In principle, a person can feel positively toward a perpetrator and negatively toward a victim because of their respective characteristics (e.g., appearance, character, social desirability). Without the allocation of responsibility being the dominant concern, participants’ thoughts apparently centered on their evaluation of the two parties to the conflict. With evaluation rather than responsibility salient, participants in the high-level condition may have engaged self-regulatory mechanisms to control for their evaluative biases. Those with a high implicit racial bias may have corrected for this bias by judging Adam more harshly; those with a low implicit racial bias may have corrected for this bias by judging
Darnell in harsher terms. Self-regulation does not arise as a dominant process in a low- level mindset, so participants were correspondingly less likely to correct for their evaluative biases.
52 Implications for Social Issues
American society has come a long way in overcoming racial prejudice and overt discrimination. Still, in recent years psychologists have raised the possibility that although racial prejudice is widely condemned and no one considers him or herself a racist, racism still exists in disguised form (McConahay, 1986; Pettigrew & Meertens,
1995; Sears & Henry, 2005) often without people being consciously aware of their own biases (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Katz & Hass, 1988).
This idea that racial prejudice has been pushed underground in society and into the unconscious of individuals was the impetus for the development of the Implicit
Association Test (IAT) by Greenwald, Banaji, and their colleagues (Greenwald & Banaji,
1995; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). Research employing the IAT has demonstrated that many people do harbor implicit biases that are sometimes expressed in prejudicial feelings and discriminatory behavior (e.g., Amodio & Devine, 2006; Baron &
Banaji, 2006; Neumann, & Seibt, 2001; Rudman & Ashmore, 2007; Son Hing, Li, &
Zanna, 2002; Ziegert, & Hanges, 2005; for a review, see Nosek et al., 2007). Despite the extensive research conducted on this topic for two decades, there remain open questions as to how, and under what conditions, implicit biases shapes a person’s thoughts, feelings, and actions (Brown, 2010; Dovidio, Kawakami, Smoak, & Gaertner, 2008;
Nosek, 2009; Nosek, et al., 2007).
The findings of this experiment shed light on this issue. When racial issues become salient, as they were in the conflict narrative employed in the experiment, implicit biases can enter into the judgment process in one of two ways. The emergence scenario is observed when people are induced to think about a racially sensitive issue
53 (i.e., such as an altercation between a Black and a White male) with a low-level mindset involving a focus on details as opposed to meaning. From a low-level viewpoint, the person experiences a press for a higher-level interpretation that provides comprehensive and coherent understanding. In many contexts, the emergence of higher-level identification is guided by social influence such as the opinions of other people, or the interpretations provided by those involved in the issue. However, the present findings suggest that even when social influence is salient, the emergence of higher-level understanding can be shaped by implicit biases. This was particularly true when the concern was how to allocate responsibility. The emergence scenario thus makes the ironic prediction that when people focus on the specific aspects of an event with racial overtones, they are especially likely to assign blame in a manner that reflects deep-seated but possibly unacknowledged racial biases.
The second scenario is observed when people have a high-level mindset while viewing or thinking about an event with potential racial overtones. High-level identification has been associated with self-regulation (Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope,
2004; Fujita, Trope, Liberman, et al., 2006; Vallacher & Wegner, 1985), an important psychological process that has been shown to manifest in a variety of ways, including impulse control, resistance to temptation, socially appropriate behavior, and emotional control (e.g., Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). The findings of this experiment add the correction of implicit racial bias to the list. In the same way that people with impulse control issues are sometimes especially vigilant concerning their spontaneous desires and moods, people with suppressed socially undesirable attitudes regarding race are sometimes on guard against the expression of these attitudes. This vigilance and control
54 is manifest when people are in a mindset that emphasizes the meaning and significance of action rather than the mechanistic nature of action. People with the most prejudicial feelings are the least likely to judge people in accordance with these feelings when they are operating in a high-level mindset.
Both scenarios can be envisioned at work in the criminal justice system. On the one hand, the jury in criminal trials is routinely instructed to “attend only to the facts,” lest they prejudge the case before all the evidence has been presented. Assuming jurors follow these instructions (which may be a controversial assumption, e.g., Hastie, 2008), they may reach decisions concerning guilt (synonymous with allocation of responsibility) that reflect their implicit biases. Of course, they are exposed to social influence in the form of the opposing attorneys, and the higher-level interpretations offered by the attorneys provide an avenue of emergence for the jurors. Nevertheless, if the two attorneys provide equally persuasive accounts, neither account may be sufficient to provide an unequivocal, coherent integration of the evidence. In this instance, emergent judgment may be guided by jurors’ implicit attitudes.
On the other hand, dutiful jurors likely have a conscious concern with reaching a just verdict, which would seem to induce a relatively high-level mindset, complete with the self-regulatory mechanisms associated with this way of thinking. To the extent that this high-level mindset is maintained for the duration of a trial, jurors might be especially vigilant regarding their biases and unwanted prejudicial feelings. If so, one might make the ironic prediction that those jurors with the greatest implicit bias would the least likely to vote to convict someone who is the target of their bias. In effect, the implicitly biased juror may “bend over backwards” to make a judgment free of prejudice.
55 The allocation of blame is an important aspect of social judgment, but the other endpoints of social judgment examined in the present research are probably more common. People routinely make inferences about each other’s traits and develop feelings about one another. The results of the experiment suggest that a person’s mindset influences whether these judgments are based on implicit biases. As long as a person maintains a higher-level perspective when thinking about others, he or she may be able to correct for biases in his or her judgments. It is interesting in this regard to consider the “over politeness” bordering on awkwardness that occurs when a White person who is concerned with not being a racist interacts with a Black person (e.g.,
Vrana & Rollock, 1998).
However, maintaining a high-level mindset is not simply a matter of will.
Research on action identification has revealed a variety of factors that dictate whether a person will think about an action in low- versus high-level terms (Vallacher & Wegner,
1987). For example, if the setting is familiar people can observe and identify a person’s actions in comprehensive terms and counter-act any biases they might have. But in unfamiliar contexts, or when the action in question is unusual or complex, people are likely to identify the action in lower-level terms, without the corrective influence of self- regulatory mechanisms that would otherwise correct for their anti-normative feelings and impulses.
Caveats and Future Research
The results of this experiment suggest that implicit prejudice has very different effects on a person’s judgment of a racial altercation, depending on the person’s mindset in viewing the altercation. When this type of incident is viewed in low-level terms in
56 which details are emphasized at the expense of higher-level meaning, social judgment will reflect the racial bias represented in the person’s implicit attitudes. The opposite effect is likely, however, when the incident is viewed in higher-level terms—social judgment will reflect a correction for the bias in the person’s implicit attitudes. This proposed interplay between implicit prejudice and action identification is new to both action identification theory and the research on implicit attitudes, and it provides a fresh perspective on social judgment generally. However, because it does not follow from existing theory and research, and because it is based solely on the results of the present experiment, it must be considered tentative pending future research.
Future studies could explore a variety of other narratives that differ with respect to the events depicted (e.g., verbal vs. physical conflict), the circumstances surrounding the events (e.g., informal vs. formal settings), and the characteristics of the actors (e.g., age, gender, appearance, demographics). Different means of inducing low- versus high- level action identification could also be explored. Participants could be primed with low- versus high-level mindsets prior to reading the narratives (e.g., by answering a series of “how” vs. “why” questions, respectively), for example, or exposed to manipulations that induce states associated with low- versus high-level thinking (e.g., negative vs. positive mood, respectively).
The summary provided at the end of the narrative could also be systematically varied to identify features that promote emergence via social influence. Particularly in light of prior research on the emergence process (e.g., Vallacher & Selz, 1991; Wegner,
Vallacher, Kiersted, & Dizadji, 1987; Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, & Arps,
1984; see also Knowles & Linn, 2004), summaries that are less authoritative than those
57 used in the present experiment might have a differential effect on participants with a low- versus high-level mindset. Perhaps the effects of implicit attitude on social judgment are reduced or eliminated altogether when an avenue of emergence is provided that reflects a different source or intensity of influence.
The results of the present experiment also suggest that various types of social judgment (e.g., allocation of responsibility vs. personality impressions) are differentially responsive to one of the two proposed interactions between identification level and implicit attitude. Whereas allocation of responsibility conformed to the emergence scenario associated with low-level identification, the more affective measures
(personality impressions, feelings) conformed to the self-regulation scenario associated with high-level identification. This pattern of results is also without precedent in prior research on social judgment and thus warrants examination in future research. Apart from verifying this pattern with respect to racial altercations like that examined in the present experiment, subsequent studies could explore its generality to other topics of social judgment (e.g., ingroup vs. outgroup biases, political judgment, close relationships).
It is noteworthy that the results of the present experiment were independent of participants’ race, despite the explicitly racial nature of the narratives employed. This attests to the foundation of these results in basic psychological processes that transcend racial identification. Racial identity, however, is too central a construct in psychology to be dismissed as relevant to social judgment dynamics based on one experiment. The statistical power available in the present experiment made an in-depth investigation of interactions involving race impractical. Future research designed to tests for such
58 interactions is clearly called for. In a related vein, future research could test the present rationale with respect to other social identities, such as gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.
The interpretation offered for the present results invokes the operation of mental dynamics. With this in mind, future research could explore the trajectory of thought associated with each combination of variables investigated in this study. Research to date has identified a small number of trajectories in the “stream of thought” (e.g.,
Vallacher & Nowak, 2007). Thus, the temporal pattern of social judgment can rapidly converge on a stable state, become polarized in evaluation over time (e.g., Tesser, 1976), decay toward a neutral state (e.g., Wilson & Gilbert, 2005), oscillate between two (or more) states over time (e.g., Vallacher, Nowak, Froehlich, & Rockloff, 2002), or display chaotic (seemingly random) changes (e.g., Skarda & Freeman, 1987). Identifying the temporal patterns associated with different combinations of identification level and implicit attitude, for example, might provide insight into whether implicit attitudes represent latent coherent mental states or instead represent sets of fragmented thoughts that are normally unconscious but intrude in the stream of conscious thought under certain conditions. To investigate such issues, the mouse paradigm introduced by
Vallacher and Nowak (1994) could be employed.
Conclusion
Taken together, the results of this experiment offer an intriguing perspective on the nature and role of mental dynamics. The pattern of findings is complex, but it nonetheless paints a fairly coherent picture that holds potential for reframing the nature of action representation, unconscious mental structures, racial prejudice, and different
59 aspects of social judgment. This picture, however, should be considered heuristic rather than conclusive. In giving rise to an interpretation that is unique and has significant implications for both theory and real-world applications, the present experiment represents a template for further work.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1: SESSION 1 MATERIALS
IAT Stimulus Items:
“Good” Attributes “Bad” Attributes
Marvelous Superb Tragic Terrible Pleasure Glorious Horrible Awful Beautiful Lovely Agony Humiliate Joyful Wonderful Painful Nasty 61 Social Dominance Orientation:
Please use the following rating scale to respond to each of the statements listed below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 neither very slightly slightly very negative positive nor positive negative negative positive positive negative
_____ Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
_____ In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
_____ It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
_____ To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
_____ If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
_____ It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.
_____ Inferior groups should stay in their place.
_____ Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
_____ It would be good if all groups could be equal.
_____ Group equality should be our ideal.
_____ All groups should be given an equal chance in life.
_____ We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
_____ Increased social equality.
_____ We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.
_____ We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.
62
Behavioral Identification Form:
Any behavior can be identified in many ways. For example, one person might describe a behavior as "writing a paper," while another might describe it as "pushing keys on the keyboard" and yet another might describe it as "expressing thoughts."
We are interested in your personal preferences for how a number of different behaviors should be described. Below you will find several behaviors listed. After each behavior will be two different ways in which the behavior might be identified. Here is an example: Your task is to choose the identification that best describes the behavior for YOU by circling the letter of your choice. Please mark ONLY ONE alternative for each pair of identifications.
Of course, there are no right or wrong answers. People differ in their preferences for the different behavior descriptions, and we are interested in your personal preferences. Choose the description that YOU PERSONALLY BELIEVE is more appropriate in each pair. Be sure to mark ONE CHOICE FOR EACH BEHAVIOR.
1. Making a list 7. Measuring a room for carpeting a. Getting organized a. Getting ready to remodel b. Writing things down b. Using a yardstick
2. Reading 8. Cleaning the house a. Following lines of print a. Showing one's cleanliness b. Gaining knowledge b. Vacuuming the floor
3. Joining the Army 9. Painting a room a. Helping the nation's defense a. Applying paint in brush strokes b. Signing up b. Making the room look fresh
4. Washing clothes 10. Paying rent a. Removing soil and odors from clothes a. Maintaining a place to live b. Putting clothes in the washing machine b. Writing a check
5. Picking an apple 11. Caring for houseplants a. Getting something to eat a. Watering plants b. Pulling an apple off a branch b. Making the room look nice
6. Chopping down a tree 12. Locking a door a. Wielding an axe a. Putting a key in the lock b. Getting firewood b. Securing the house
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13. Voting a. Influencing the election b. Marking a ballot
14. Climbing a tree a. Getting a good view b. Holding onto branches
15. Filling out a personality test a. Answering questions b. Revealing what you're like
16. Tooth brushing a. Preventing tooth decay b. Moving a brush around in one's mouth
17. Taking a test a. Answering questions b. Showing one's knowledge
18. Greeting someone a. Saying hello b. Showing friendliness
19. Resisting temptation a. Saying no b. Showing moral courage
20. Eating a. Getting nutrition b. Chewing and swallowing
21. Growing a garden a. Planting seeds b. Getting fresh vegetables
22. Traveling by car a. Following a map b. Seeing the countryside
23. Having a cavity filled a. Protecting your teeth b. Going to the dentist
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24. Talking to a child a. Teaching a child something b. Using simple words
25. Pushing a doorbell a. Moving a finger b. Seeing if someone is home
65
Demographics Questionnaire:
Sex: ___Male ___Female Age: ______
Ethnicity: ___Asian ___Native American ___Black/ African Descent ___Pacific Islander ___East Indian ___White/ Caucasian ___Hispanic ___Other ______Middle Eastern
Class Standing: ___Freshman ___Sophomore ___Junior ___Senior
Degree Major: ______
Religion:
___Agnostic ___Atheist ___Buddhist ___Christian – Catholic ___Christian – Non-Catholic ___Hindu ___Jewish ___Mormon ___Muslim ___Protestant ___Taoist ___Other: ______
Nationality: Country of citizenship or country that you most identify with (e.g., American, Haitian, Chinese, etc.): ______
Country of birth: ______
66 APPENDIX 2: SESSION 2 MATERIALS
High-level Instructions
Interpersonal Conflict Survey Instructions
FAU is considering implementing a training program in peer mediation.
In support of this initiative, a special committee has been formed to assess whether such a program would be beneficial to FAU students and the FAU community in general. The purpose of the present study is to gain an understanding of how FAU students typically respond to interpersonal conflict among peers.
On the following pages, you will find a transcript describing a conflict that occurred between two male college roommates. The conflict involved physical violence and damage to University property and resulted in one of the parties filing an official complaint with the University against the other party.
The transcript represents the perspective of one of the two students involved in the conflict as told during an interview with the Dean of Student Affairs.
As you read the interview transcript, focus on what happened in general terms. Don’t concern yourself with the details of what happened. Rather, think about the motives of the people involved, the consequences of the events, and their possible implications. After you finish reading the interview, you will be asked to answer several questions about what happened, with an emphasis on your overall impressions concerning the conflict events.
Remember: As you read the following interview, concentrate on the “big picture” rather than on the details. Try to form a general sense of what happened.
67 Low-level Instructions
Interpersonal Conflict Survey Instructions
FAU is considering implementing a training program in peer mediation.
In support of this initiative, a special committee has been formed to assess whether such a program would be beneficial to FAU students and the FAU community in general. The purpose of the present study is to gain an understanding of how FAU students typically respond to interpersonal conflict among peers.
On the following pages, you will find a transcript describing a conflict that occurred between two male college roommates. The conflict involved physical violence and damage to University property and resulted in one of the parties filing an official complaint with the University against the other party.
The transcript represents the perspective of one of the two students involved in the conflict as told during an interview with the Dean of Student Affairs.
As you read the interview transcript, focus on the specific events described. Don’t concern yourself with the motives of the people involved, the consequences of the events, or their possible implications. Instead, concern yourself with the various details of the event, even those that seem incidental or unimportant. After you finish reading the interview, you will be asked to answer several questions about what happened, with an emphasis on the specific details of the conflict.
68 Remember: As you read the following interview, concentrate on the details rather than the “big picture.” Try to form a detailed sense of what happened.
69 Conflict Narrative (White Defendant):
Adam Connelly is a 19-year old male college student who resides in campus housing. He was involved in a physical dispute in his dormitory lobby with his roommate, Darnell Williams. Darnell is pressing charges against Adam for physical assault and bodily injury. As standard procedure for University
Code of Conduct investigations, Adam was given the opportunity to provide his account of the incident in an interview with the Dean of Student Affairs.
Following is the transcript of his interview with the Dean.
Dean of Student Affairs: “Ok, Adam, just start at the beginning and tell me what you can about the incident.”
Adam: “Well, Friday morning was when it all started. I wanted to have the guys from the team over that night. Usually on Friday nights, Darnell plays basketball with a group of his friends and then they all come over and hang out in our room.
But, this week I wanted to use the room. So, when I saw Darnell on Friday morning, I told him that the guys from the team were coming over so I needed to use the room. We’re supposed to stay in the night before a game, but we wanted to hang out for a while after practice. We figured we would all go to my room because I live on campus, so it’s the easiest place for everyone to get to. Plus, even though my room’s pretty small, it’s bigger than the other guys’ places. So anyway, I told Darnell and he seemed okay with the plans, so I didn’t think much more about it.
70
Then, on Friday afternoon, after my classes were finished, I went back to my room. Darnell came in a little while later. He had been at the store picking up some snacks and drinks, which he usually does on Fridays. I thought it was unusual because he knew I was having people over that night, so I asked him what he was doing. He told me he just went to get some snacks for the guys for after their game. I asked him where they were going after they played ball and he said same place as usual, our room. At that point I was kind of confused, so I asked him if he heard me earlier when I said I was having my friends over and he said yes. Then he said something about it not being a big deal if we were all there. Well, it was a big deal to me. Our room isn’t that big, and there’s no way all of us could fit. So, I told Darnell I didn’t think it was a good idea to try to have everyone over at the same time.
Dean: “Then what happened?”
Adam: “Well, Darnell definitely heard me and although he didn’t actually come and say I could use the room, he seemed okay with it. So, I thought the matter was resolved and I left for practice. It wasn’t until after I got back from practice that I finally realized he wasn’t changing his plans. I came back to the room and he was there getting ready to hang out with his friends. I have to say I was pretty upset with him -- he didn’t need to have people over that night. I don’t have people over a lot, and I don’t make a big deal about him using the room almost
71 every Friday night, so I would think he would’ve shown the same respect for me and changed his plans.
Dean: “Alright, so what happened next?”
Adam: “Well, I was annoyed with Darnell, but there wasn’t much I could say at this point. A little while later, I guess it was about 9:00 o’clock, I went down to the parking lot to wait for my friends. Frankly, I just didn’t feel like being in the room with him anymore. And, anyway, I had to swipe my friends into the dorm.
So, I went downstairs and was I standing around venting to my teammates about what had happened when we heard tires screeching in the parking lot. Two people got out of their cars, slammed their doors and started yelling at each other.
It turned out they were fighting over a parking space because, apparently, it was the only one left in the lot -- probably because there were so many people coming over that night. Anyway, Darnell’s friend was accusing my friend of stealing a parking space that he was waiting for; and, oh yeah, Darnell’s friend was also complaining that my buddy almost hit his car when he pulled in. Personally, I don’t think you can steal a parking spot.
When I asked my friend what happened, he said he didn’t know Darnell’s friend was waiting for the parking spot. Darnell’s friend didn’t have his blinker on, and he wasn’t pulled over anywhere near the spot. So, how could my friend have known the guy was waiting? And, another thing, how could he almost hit
72 the guy’s car if the guy wasn’t even near the spot? It didn’t make any sense. So, my friends and I decided to just blow the whole thing off, and we headed back into the dorm. As we were walking toward the elevator, Darnell’s friend pushed right by us. He turned around and got in my friend’s face, and started accusing him again of almost hitting his car. My friend tried to move aside, but the kid wouldn’t back down.
Then Darnell came out of nowhere and started yelling at my friend. He accused him of being rude and told him to leave. Who was he to tell my friend to leave? He was probably just using that as an excuse because he wanted the room to himself. So, I told Darnell that he couldn’t ask my friend to leave and that maybe he should ask his friend to leave instead. And then I told him that if he had just listened to me in the first place, this incident wouldn’t have even happened. Darnell turned around and started to walk away, ignoring me. I tried getting him to come back over so we could clear up the situation, but he just kept walking away from me. So, I walked up behind him and put my hand on his shoulder to get his attention. But when he turned around, he started shouting at me. And then he punched me! He accused me of attacking him, and then he knocked me into the wall. I didn’t want to hit him, but I had to get him away from me, so I pushed him. Then, he stumbled backwards and tripped over a chair. When he tripped, he fell onto a glass table that was behind him, and then he fell to the floor. He hit the table so hard that it shattered -- there was glass everywhere. At this point I was getting worried because he was just lying on the
73 floor moaning, and he wasn’t moving. And he must have hit the table face first because his face was cut and it was pretty bloody. I admit I pushed him, but only because I had to, to get him off me. And, there’s no way I pushed him hard enough to create the fall he had. He must have tripped or something. Anyway, like I said, he was lying on the floor and he was hurt. So I was trying to help him up, and that’s when campus security arrived.”
74 Summary Argument (Guilty, White Defendant):
MEMORANDUM
TO: JANICE P. WILSON, PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY CONDUCT BOARD FROM: MARVIN D. SOLOMON, DEAN OF STUDENT AFFAIRS SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION FOR STUDENT DISCIPLINARY ACTION RE: DSA INCIDENT NO: 328-2 DATE: 10/21/2008 CC: DARNELL WILLIAMS, ADAM CONNELLY
At approximately 9:33 p.m., on Friday, October 14, 2003, campus security officers were dispatched to Sanderson Residential Hall in response to a report that an altercation was in progress between two men in the first floor lobby of the dormitory. Security officers report that when they arrived at the scene, Darnell Williams was lying on the floor of the residence lobby and Adam Connelly was standing in close proximity to Mr. Williams. According to the report, Mr. Williams had multiple lacerations on his face and head. A glass table near the men was shattered and there was a substantial amount of blood on the carpet surrounding Mr. Connelly and Mr. Williams.
Mr. Williams subsequently filed physical assault and bodily injury charges against Mr. Connelly with the University Department of Student Affairs. A departmental investigation was conducted and, per departmental protocol, each of the parties was given the opportunity to provide their perspective of the incident in a private interview with the Dean of Student Affairs.
Based on the evidence, the Department of Student Affairs concluded that reasonable grounds exist to charge Adam Connelly with committing the following actions, each of which constitutes one or more violations of the University’s Code of Conduct:
1) Physical violence toward a university student. Violation of Items 1, 14, and 24.
2) Damage to university property. Violation of Items 2 and 24
3) Disturbing the peace at the Sanderson Residential Hall. Violation of Item 11.
75 Summary Argument (Not Guilty, White Defendant):
MEMORANDUM
TO: JANICE P. WILSON, PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY CONDUCT BOARD FROM: MARVIN D. SOLOMON, DEAN OF STUDENT AFFAIRS SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE REQUEST FOR STUDENT DISCIPLINARY ACTION RE: DSA INCIDENT NO: 328-2 DATE: 10/21/2008 CC: DARNELL WILLIAMS, ADAM CONNELLY
At approximately 9:33 p.m., on Friday, October 14, 2003, campus security officers were dispatched to Sanderson Residential Hall in response to a report that an altercation was in progress between two men in the first floor lobby of the dormitory. Security officers report that when they arrived at the scene, Darnell Williams was lying on the floor of the residence lobby and Adam Connelly was standing in close proximity to Mr. Williams. According to the report, Mr. Williams had multiple lacerations on his face and head. A glass table near the men was shattered and there was a substantial amount of blood on the carpet surrounding Mr. Connelly and Mr. Williams.
Mr. Williams subsequently filed physical assault and bodily injury charges against Mr. Connelly with the University Department of Student Affairs. A departmental investigation was conducted and, per departmental protocol, each of the parties was given the opportunity to provide their perspective of the incident in a private interview with the Dean of Student Affairs.
The Department of Student Affairs concluded that there is insufficient evidence to charge Adam Connelly with committing the actions as charged by Mr. Williams, and that Mr. Connelly should not be held accountable for Mr. Williams’ injuries.
76 Dependent Measures (White Defendant):
Impression Questionnaires
We are interested in the opinions and impressions you formed after reading the transcribed interview.
Each question is followed by a response scale with the numbers 1 through 7 separating the endpoints of the scale (e.g., 1 = no, not at all; 7 = yes, definitely).
To answer each question, circle the number that best represents your opinion.
For example, if your response to a question is “no, not at all,” you would circle the number 1 as indicated below:
No, not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Yes, definitely
Alternatively, if your response to a question is “yes, definitely”, you would circle the number 7 as indicated below:
No, not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Yes, definitely
If your response to a question is somewhere between the extremes, you would circle a number on the scale that best represents what you think.
We are also interested in how certain you are about your response to each question. Following each question you will find another scale numbered from 1 to 7. This scale represents varying degrees of certainty, with 1 = very uncertain and 7 = very certain. Please circle the number that best represents your degree of certainty in the response you provided.
77 Allocation of Responsibility
In thinking about what happened, how would you assign responsibility to Adam?
Not at all responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very responsible
How certain are you of Adam’s level of responsibility?
Very uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
78 Personality Impressions: What are your impressions of Adam’s personality? After providing your impression for each trait, please indicate how certain you are of your answer.
Is Adam …
HONEST? Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
FRIENDLY? Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
CLIQUISH? Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
RELIABLE? Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
DISCIPLINED? Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
PROUD? Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
AGGRESSIVE? Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
RESPECTFUL? Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
INTELLIGENT? Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
79 Affective Reaction:
Please indicate the degree to which you feel the following reactions toward Adam. After each response, please indicate how certain you are of your answer.
When I think about Adam, I have the following reactions toward him:
ACCEPTANCE: Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
ADMIRATION: Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
AFFECTION: Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
APPROVAL: Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
DISLIKE: Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
HOSTILITY: Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
REJECTION: Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
SUPERIORITY: Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
80
When I think about Adam, I have the following reactions toward him:
SYMPATHY: Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
WARMTH: Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
Very Uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
81
What is Darnell’s ethnicity?
___Asian ___Black/ African Descent ___East Indian ___Hispanic ___Middle Eastern ___Native American ___Pacific Islander ___White/ Caucasian ___Other ______
How certain are you of Darnell’s ethnicity?
Very uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
What is Adam’s ethnicity?
___Asian ___Black/ African Descent ___East Indian ___Hispanic ___Middle Eastern ___Native American ___Pacific Islander ___White/ Caucasian ___Other ______
How certain are you of Adam’s ethnicity?
Very uncertain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain
82
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93