MONITORING FACTORS AFFECTING THE SRI LANKAN PEACE PROCESS

CLUSTER REPORT

FIRST QUARTERLY FEBRUARY 2006 œ APRIL 2006

CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES

0 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CLUSTER Page Number PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS CLUSTER...... 2 POLITICAL ENVIRONM ENT CLUSTER...... 13 SECURITY CLUSTER...... 23 LEGAL & CONSTIIUTIONAL CLUSTER...... 46 ECONOM ICS CLUSTER...... 51 RELIEF, REHABILITATION & RECONSTRUCTION CLUSTER...... 61 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS & SOCIAL ATTITUDES CLUSTER...... 70 M EDIA CLUSTER...... 76. ENDNOTES.....… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … ..84

M ETHODOLOGY

The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has conducted the project “Monitoring the Factors Affecting the Peace Process” since 2005. The output of this project is a series of Quarterly Reports. This is the fifth of such reports.

It should be noted that this Quarterly Report covers the months of February, March and April.

Having identified a number of key factors that impact the peace process, they have been monitored observing change or stasis through a range of indicators. These indicators suggest trends for each factor. The factors have been grouped into a series of clusters which reflect critical dimensions of the peace process. The trends will suggest the level of change in each cluster and in sum will indicate how the peace process and its environment have been strengthened or weakened.

This Synthesis Report will highlight the trends that emerge from the monitoring process and analyse them within the context of their respective clusters and between the clusters. This report is drawn from the more comprehensive Cluster Report which examines the various trends, factors and indicators in greater detail.

1 I. NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE TALKS CLUSTER

1.1 Context The decision by the government of (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil (LTTE) in January 2006 to participate in talks on the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) created a new dynamic in the peace process. As noted in the previous quarterly report, the parties had not met for face-to-face negotiations since March 2003, so their willingness to engage in talks is a significant development. However, the fact that the subject of the talks was the CFA (instead of??), demonstrated the crisis in the peace process in that the ‘no war no peace’ situation that underlies the process was itself under threat of unraveling. Furthermore, this consensus emerged out of the most violent period in the peace process so far and violence played a key role in catalysing this process, with the use of claymore mines against the security forces, attacks on security force positions, raids by the Karuna Group against the LTTE, retaliatory and vigilante killings against civilians, abductions etc.

The dominant development in the last quarter was the reaching of a consensus between the GoSL and the LTTE on a venue for talks, and setting the CFA as the sole agenda for talks, with continuing differences regarding emphasis. Reaching this consensus involved significant shifts in both parties’ positions. Arguably, for the LTTE, the main shift was in compromising on the issue of Oslo as the venue for talks which did not necessarily result in a major strategic loss for the LTTE. For the GoSL, reaching this consensus involved a significant number of compromises, especially since the new Government of President Mahinda Rajapakse had come to power on a platform demanding significant changes to the framework of the existing peace process. A key issue the GoSL compromised on was that of venue. The government had to step down from a location in Sri Lanka to Asia, then to a non-European location and finally agreeing to Geneva. President Rajapakse and his Sinhala nationalist allies had also demanded a review of Norway’s role as a facilitator, but with the upsurge in violence re-invited Norway as facilitator. This volte face was also symbolic of another shift within the government; the Government had hoped to encourage greater involvement of Asian countries but faced with scale large scale violence relented and turned to the Donor Co-Chairs.

1.2 Factors, Indicators and Trends 1.2.1 Exclusive focus on CFA while re-affirming it reinforces deadlock in the peace process Over this current quarter, one significant development was that the parties met and reached an agreement on how to deal with some of the critical problems regarding the CFA. This was striking

2 given the differences in the two parties’ positions, made evident during the talks and the crisis within the peace process. Their differences, including divergent interpretations of the agreement, became evident, particularly with regards to the Karuna Group. As a parallel development, the violence that had dropped off in February, also increased with mounting violations of the CFA and the Geneva Agreement, threatening the ‘ceasefire within a ceasefire’ that the parties had been able to bring about in late January following the decision to attend talks in Geneva. The return to violence and its intensification through particular acts, in particular the attempt to assassinate the Army Force Commander, Lt. General , raised serious questions to the commitment of the two parties to the peace process, particularly the LTTE’s. The violence and deterioration in relations led to a postponement of talks, making it unclear whether the second round of talks will actually take place, and whether the process as a whole can be continued any further.

Reaching the Geneva Agreement Between the point when the two sides agreed to meet in late January and the Geneva Talks on February 19-20, the two parties attempted to engage in some confidence-building measures while making clear how divergent their positions on the CFA were. Two critical confidence-building measures were the exchange of prisoners and the sorting out of transport for LTTE delegates to the talks. In mid-February, the Government announced it would be releasing four arrested off Mannar while the LTTE stated that they would be releasing the two of the three policeman from the National Child Protection Agency that had been detained for some six months.1 In addition, the government offered transport to the LTTE delegates to Geneva on air force helicopters from Killinochchi to .2 The Government also sought to demonstrate its good will and pre-empt the LTTE’s demands to reign in the Karuna Group by issuing statements indicating that they would address the issue and accordingly carried out searches in areas where there were supposed to be Karuna Camps.

However, both parties clearly indicated that they would take a tough position at talks, indicating that any consensus would be fraught. In keeping with the position on the CFA articulated in the Mahinda Chinthanaya and by the President’s agreements with the JVP and JHU, the Government argued for amending the CFA. They explained that the need for such an amendment was in order to safeguard national security and prevent the LTTE from seizing advantages that the CFA offered it. Similarly, the GoSL stated the need to focus on the violations by the LTTE and use the SLMM’s count of violations of the CFA as clear evidence of the need to strengthen the CFA. Up to December 2005, 6,742 complaints and 3,529 ruled violations had been made against the LTTE compared to the 1,314 complaints and 164 ruled violations against the Government. The government was clear that it was

3 to overhaul the peace process and made it quite explicit that there were a number of red lines which it would refuse to cross. For instance, the President, in a Reuters interview, ruled out a separate state of and also challenged the underlying principle of a Tamil homeland,3 prompting criticisms from the TNA and LTTE.4 The Government also showed its determination to deal with violence in government-controlled areas carried out by the LTTE; as the President stated “if any group operates in our area, we will stop it. Any group carrying arms will be brought under control, whether it is the so-called Karuna Group or the LTTE.”5

W hile adopting a strong stance on the CFA, the Government also realised the need to demonstrate and convey its willingness to compromise. Hence, when the President met security force commanders, government and political leaders, he put the official stance of the government: a push for major amendments in order to prevent any further threats to national security but one not so hard as to have a negative impact on the peace process.6 The Government appointed a delegation that seemed to bring together a broad mix of personalities; they were given intensive training. The LTTE delegation included some of the old faces from the previous rounds of peace talks 2002-3.

W hile attempting to reciprocate the gestures and statements of goodwill in the lead up to Geneva, the LTTE adopted a central point of focus: “Disarming the paramilitaries, their expulsion and the creation of normalcy in people’s daily life are the essential pre-requisites for the continuation of peace talks but Sri Lanka is unlikely to agree.”7

Given the differences the Geneva Talks seemed fraught with difficulties. The talks ran into a series of roadblocks and controversies, ranging from confusion over how many delegates each side could have, to the release of a statement by the LTTE to the public before its presentation to the Government. Apart from these issues of protocol, the content of the talks also proved contentious, with both sides making charges and counter-charges. The LTTE submitted three documents – ‘CFA: words and deeds,’ ‘the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and Paramilitaries,’ and ‘High Security Zones’ – highlighting key areas of concern. The issue of paramilitaries almost caused an end to talks as the very term was contested by the Government, which also denied any association with the paramilitaries while the LTTE presented its evidence.8 The Government raised the issue of child recruitment which led to more acrimony as the LTTE contested the figures, and blamed Karuna for recruitment; the SLMM got involved as the LTTE contested the claim that it had recruited children.9

By the 20th, however, the overall environment had shifted, and both sides seemed more willing to discuss and negotiate. (By the second day, the LTTE also agreed to halt killings of security forces.10)

4 Issue Govt. Official Position LTTE Official Geneva position Agreement CFA • Govt claims a threat • LTTE states CFA • Parties “committed to national security signed between to respecting and and sovereignty, plus Govt. and LTTE so upholding” CFA no legal status has validity • Has to be amended • No amendments • No explicit amendment. Geneva Agreement creates new modalities to strengthen CFA “Paramilitary • Paramilitary term • 5 Paramilitary • ‘Armed Groups’ used groups/Armed contested Groups active as identifying term groups” • Karuna Group part of • Karuna Group the • Karuna Group Issue wider problem of most critical issue addressed and other violence, human rights • Karuna Group is a issues including abuses and attacks paramilitary and violence, human against security forces, Govt. needs to rights violations etc other violations disarm it addressed • Karuna Group is an • Art. 1.8 not • Govt. will take “all internal problem of implemented and necessary measures… LTTE needs to be to ensure that no • Art 1.8 of CFA time • Govt and military armed group or specific (only 30 days assistance and person” other than from signing of CFA) protection of security forces “will • Currently no state paramilitary needs carry arms or patronage or to end conduct armed assistance to such operations” groups • Govt. commits to taking “all necessary measures in accordance with CFA [implicit reference to article 1.8] • No explicit reference to relationship but Govt commits to take “all necessary measures” Killing of • LTTE carrying out • Civilian Self • LTTE will take “all Security Forces attacks including Defence Groups necessary measures claymore mines on carrying out attacks, to ensure… no acts military personnel LTTE only of violence against providing training security forces and for such groups police. No mention of civilian group Killings, • LTTE engaged in • Government forces • Both sides commit to abductions and multiple forms of and paramilitaries taking “all necessary intimidation violence responsible for measures” to prevent violence intimidation, acts of

5 violence, abductions or killings. Child • LTTE actively • Children voluntarily • Discussion of Issue no Recruitment recruiting underage try to join LTTE specific commitments minors LTTE releases such cases High Security • Military issue • Humanitarian Issue • Reference to issue and Zones • Recognizes • Given military presentation of dossier by humanitarian implications willing LTTE implications to see phased • Has to be part of an approach overall • Has to be urgently demilitarization addressed but process involving cannot be linked to LTTE disarming disarming LTTE

Given the gulf between their stated positions and the direction talks had taken the previous day, the fact that the parties did come to an agreement was remarkable. The parties were presented with a Norwegian-drafted agreement mainly based on discussions from the second day of talks, which both sides signed despite their reservations. Thus, a key success of Geneva was that despite significant differences, both parties realised the importance of coming to agreement in order to save the peace process.

The very fact that there was an agreement and an explicit re-commitment to the CFA represented a re-affirmation of the peace process. This was particularly crucial as the current government had questioned its validity. The LTTE’s engagement in violence also raised serious doubts to its commitment to the CFA and the underlying ‘no war, no peace’ situation. Thus, even though delegates of the Government team claimed the agreement had been amended, the net result of Geneva was a re-commitment by the parties to it.

The decision to meet in two months time also marked a critical achievement. The interim period represented a testing period for both sides to prove their commitment to implementing the agreement. The very fact that there was an agreement to have a second meeting created a dynamic for pushing the peace process further: “It means that the process will continue and as long as there is a continuation, violence will be limited.”11 As the LTTE stated “the declaration words should be translated into action” as “the two months is amply sufficient [for the government] to demonstrate its sincerity.”12

6 An overall criticism of the Geneva Agreement is that while it did create a consensus and momentum to move the process forward, thereby presenting an opportunity to address problems in the CFA gradually and that the parties reaffirmed their commitment to the CFA, it lacked explicit terms to operationalise these commitments. Actual steps to be taken were arguably implicit and general principles rather than explicit. Looking at how they came to an agreement on the Karuna Group is illustrative, it demonstrates how the parties compromised in order to secure certain specific gains, but the tool for compromise – the lack of a detailed implementation plan in favour of a broad principle for action passed the problems onto the implementation stage.

As noted the Karuna Group was clearly the most central issue of Geneva, at least for the LTTE. The Karuna Group in essence posed the single biggest threat to the LTTE and represented how the CFA had weakened the LTTE’s position. From the LTTE perspective, the Government had utilized the Karuna Group to launch attacks on the LTTE and provided them protection and support for the Group, including financial, military and logistical support. Through Geneva, the LTTE hoped to ensure that the Karuna Group would be disarmed and the Government forced to take responsibility for it. For the Government, the LTTE-Karuna split provided a critical advantage, especially in the context of killings of military intelligence personnel. W hile the government sought to deny any official protection and support, circumstantial evidence suggests there is support for the Karuna Group and a critical state interest in sustaining the group. The government thus, sought to avoid having to act against the Karuna Group, in particular having to disarm the group, stating that this was an internal LTTE issue.

In Geneva, both sides put forward their official positions on the Karuna Group and traded insults, with the LTTE presenting its dossier on a nexus between the state and the group. Following the Geneva Agreement both sides tried to present the decision regarding the Karuna Group to be a success and a victory for their position. The parties avoided explicit reference to disarming the Group, let alone making a specific mention of it. The very terminology paramilitary was dropped. The Government presented this was not just clever use of semantics but reflected the very heart of the problem. By its very definition paramilitary involves patronage of the state, the term armed group is more neutral, containing no implications of a relationship to the state, and more ambiguous, as the LTTE could also be presented as an armed group. Thus, the solution itself, that of preventing any armed group functioning in government controlled areas, was a strategic gain for the government delegation as they sought to present the violence per se as a law and order problem. The Geneva Agreement empowered the government law and order system. It should be noted that the SLMM

7 and the Norwegian facilitators had adopted the term armed group before the Geneva Peace Talks thus offering the parties an alternative to contesting definitions.

The LTTE, by contrast stated that they had succeeded in dealing with the Karuna issue through the agreement, provided of course, that the government implemented it. As the chief negotiator stated, there was no need for the term paramilitary, as they are dealt with in an “undefined form.” He also stressed that according to the agreement, such groups would not be able to function.13 Interestingly, the LTTE also stated that they had succeeded in getting the Government to agree to disarm the Karuna Group. According to their argument, the Government consented to do this as they agreed to implement article 1.8 of the CFA. The LTTE was also able to claim that it had been able to get the Government to commit to the existing CFA and thereby defeat the government’s efforts at having the CFA amended.

W hile one cannot know why exactly both sides decided to sign the CFA, there were a series of critical factors that their doing so. Firstly, the President’s brother and advisor Basil Rajapakse was secretly in Geneva and helped convince the government delegation to agree to the statement.14 Secondly, the direct phone link between the government delegates and the President and his advisors in Temple Trees ensured that there was constant communication so the Government could take full responsibility. Thirdly, there was Norwegian facilitation/mediation. From the outset the Norwegians tried to push the discussions in a particular direction to prevent the collapse of the talks. For instance, Eric Solheim stated that the agenda of the talks was the “strengthening of the implementation of the ceasefire on the basis that every human being lost is one too many.”15 Furthermore, they were responsible for the drafting of the agreement and ensure that the language was agreed to by both parties.

A question that arises is why did the Geneva Talks end up being a success, and in particular why did the parties compromise on their stated positions. An optimistic perspective would be that the parties realized that if they failed to come to an agreement, it would basically call into question the continuation of the peace process. Hence, this was a life-saving measure for the floundering process, with parties involved pledging an interest and commitment to a negotiated solution. A more pessimistic opinion would be that it was a time-buying measure, for neither party is quite ready to go to war and each was playing to the international gallery to demonstrate their commitment and relieve some culpability in light of a decision to return to war. The agreement may have in fact offered the parties a way of testing each other’s commitment and branded both short-term relief and potential long-term opportunities for peace making. The activation of the international community in

8 December and January may have proved a decisive factor, especially in the case of compelling the LTTE to attend talks and to come to an agreement, even if it was only a temporary measure.

The success of Geneva could in no way, however disguise the fact that the peace process is in crisis: Boasting of success now is premature… The very fact that Geneva talks became necessary and required both sides to reiterate their commitment to what was agreed four years ago is by itself proof that mere agreements are worthless as the paper they are written on unless and until they are adhered to faithfully.16

New Norwegian Special Envoy and Head of SLM M A critical issue outside the Geneva Process was the appointment of a new head for the SLMM – Ulf Henricsoon, a Swedish General, and a new Norwegian Special Envoy Hanssen Bauer. Interestingly changes in both the leadership of the SLMM to having a non-Norwegian and Solheim to be replaced by a new Special Envoy had been demanded by the Government. These changes however, were not due solely to effective government pressuring, but were also due to the LTTE’s apprehensions of Hauland and Solheim being made a Minister and therefore not having the time to focus on Sri Lanka as much.

Implementing the Geneva Agreement The possibility for the Geneva Agreement to be a real success lay in whether it would be implemented. W hile seemingly coming to agreement on the language and resulting implications of the Geneva Agreement, actually implementing the agreement proved to be a critical challenge. It raised a key question as to whether the agreement arose out of a need to come to a consensus rather than out of a willingness to actually abide by the terms. As a commentator noted “each side is expecting the other to demonstrate bona fides on the ground. It is a testing period during which they will watch how agreements reached in Geneva are implemented. A lot will depend on what happens during the next two months.”17 As the LTTE stated, the possibility of a follow up meeting was made contingent on the implementation of the agreement.

The Geneva Agreement and the lull in the violence created an almost stable environment to further the process. As discussed in the Security Cluster a series of incidents in the first weeks questioned the ability of the two parties to fully control the violence. In March, the Karuna Group carried out 2 Operations in LTTE controlled Batticaloa. W ith each attack, the LTTE threatened to pull out of talks.18

9 This issue that had been the focus of the LTTE at Geneva was also the prime issue for testing the government’s commitment. In the weeks following Geneva, the Karuna Group continued to strike within LTTE controlled areas and also strengthened its position in and around Batticaloa Town; they set up a TMVP political office in town and attempting to mobilize the public addition to the attacks. W hile these latter actions were not necessarily in contravention of the Geneva Agreement, they demonstrated the freedom with which the group operates. There were also reports that series of abductions and killings were the work of the group within Government-controlled areas. W hile the government carried out search operations for Karuna Camps (they found no such camps), the developments in Batticaloa seemed to reveal a more open collaboration between the military and the Karuna Group. The LTTE pointing to an increased activation of the Karuna Group in Batticaloa, demanded that the government “should act fast” before April 19th and the group should be “removed from the East.”19 A heated dispute ensued between the SLMM and the Government over the Karuna Group. The Government claimed that there were no armed groups operating in Government-controlled areas and challenged the SLMM to present evidence to the contrary, while the SLMM maintained that its monitoring activities and experience on the ground suggested otherwise. The SLMM issued a letter to Defence Secretary Gothabaya Rajapakse stating their position and providing evidence. The President responded by saying the SLMM was making “misleading” and “defamatory” inferences.20 A documentary by Australian Special Broadcasting Service showing video footage of a training camp in Government controlled Batticaloa for the Karuna Group, juxtaposed with an interview of Gothabaya Rajapakse denying any knowledge of the group, only added to the controversy.21

There were increasing signs of the LTTE committing violations of the CFA and the Geneva Agreement. The incidents of child recruitment since Geneva with those escaping laying blame on the LTTE questioned the LTTE’s commitment to not “abduct.” Other incidents of killings were also blamed on the LTTE. Incidents at Sea with the LTTE blowing up its own boat in Mannar and firing between the two sides in also put additional strain on the implementation process.

It became obvious that the April meeting would be highly acrimonious, and the SLMM report card would not reflect too positively on the implementation process. Irrespective of the problems in implementation, that the LTTE was expected to bring up High Security Zones and the Government would also reiterate its concerns on child recruitment, only made it clear that this next round would be rocky. Both sides seemed, however to be preparing for talks. The President, while initially stating the need for a change in the composition of the delegations, went ahead with preparatory meetings

10 for the existing team Geneva and went ahead. The Norwegians met the LTTE, including Balasingham in London to discuss the second round of talks.

In addition to the violence, relations between the two parties became increasingly acrimonious as the issue of transport between LTTE-controlled areas became a source of contention. Prior to the transport issue, the Government had already raised issues of the LTTE delegation’s conduct – its fundraising in Switzerland and Norway, and the reception provided by the Norwegians to the LTTE delegation.22 The Government even searched the LTTE delegates’ luggage and found an arms catalogue. A member of the Government delegation also provoked a public debate on whether the CFA was amended or not, with the Government called to clarify its position by the opposition party and with the LTTE stating unequivocally that the Geneva Agreement represents a commitment to the CFA.23 The violence and political machinations on the ground only seemed to worsen relations. A key confidence building measure that had been put forward by the Government had been that the LTTE should re-open its political offices in Government-controlled areas, but LTTE postponed re- opening the offices due to the pre-conditions of the Government, including that their political work should be guided by the Government.24

In the lead-up to the April talks, the LTTE requested safe passage, which their participation would be dependent on. Balasingham later asked Solheim for a sea plane from Killinochchi to Male if the government could not ensure safe passage through Bandaranaike International Airport.25 W hile the Government and the Norwegians continued to express confidence that the talks would go ahead,26 from early April, the LTTE expressed doubts over attendance. It cited the non-implementation of the agreement, specifically the decision on armed groups, as its main reason. Even as the Norwegian facilitators stepped up their efforts, the new Special Envoy Jan Hansen Bauer was unable to secure the LTTE’s presence at the next round.27 W hile the violence escalated, both sides took harder stands on the transport issue, and the LTTE on its willingness to attend, thereby forcing a postponement of the talks from April 19-20 to April 24-5. Geneva II thus remained and remains in doubt.

An additional demand was made for LTTE leaders from the East to be provided helicopter transport to attend a consultation in Killinochchi regarding whether to attend the Geneva Talks. The President’s refusal to the demand led the LTTE to state that they would travel by sea using their own vessels. The Norwegian facilitators tried to bridge the gap and devised a solution that both parties agreed to with SLMM monitors on board the civilian vessel and the Navy defence crafts accompanying them. On the day, April 15 the LTTE refused to board the crafts stating they did not agree to the Navy presence.28 The language of the two parties also became more accusatory: Palitha

11 Kohona stated “One cannot go to talks in the backdrop of threats and intimidation. If the objective is to intimidate the government at the peace talks, that objective is not going to be achieved.”

W hile the violence picked up over the weeks following Geneva I in April it there was an upsurge. It seemed that both sides seemed to step up their attacks, responding to the situation on the ground without paying any heed to the agreement. April saw a return of claymore attacks and new forms of violence as Trincomalee became a battlefield of ethnic violence and reprisal and terror killings. The peace process hit a new crisis point on April 25th with the suicide attack on the Army Commander, Sarath Fonseka, within the Army Headquarters, and the subsequent retaliatory aerial attacks by the air force against LTTE positions in Sampur. The use of a suicide bomber for many suggested that it was an attack by the LTTE. W hile this peace process has seen many killings, this attack must be, along with the assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirigamar, in the top tier of acts of war. The Government’s response in using the air force to bomb LTTE military targets was another first in this peace process. The attacks themselves were, however limited, especially given that the bombing of Killinochchi was mooted in the hours following the suicide bomb.

In summary, the inability and the unwillingness of the parties to implement the agreement, coupled with the increase in violence, either through the parties’ direct participation in violence or their facilitation of it, raised real questions as to their commitment to the negotiations process as whole. If one is to assume that they are committed to the CFA and the process, then the most obvious implication is that they have lost control of the ground and of the military actors ostensibly under their authority. The failure to implement may also arise out of an unwillingness, as the parties signed up to an agreement only as symbolic gesture to demonstrate their commitment. The upsurge in violence, only provided both sides with an excuse for not taking additional steps to strengthen the implementation process. This was coupled with an acrimonious debate over transport issues and the LTTE increasingly showing a unwillingness to attend. W ith Geneva II it became clear that there is confusion and deep rooted suspicion that makes progress in peace talks highly doubtful, unless there is a fundamental shift in the parties’ approach to the peace process and each other.

12 II POLITICAL CLUSTER

2.1 Context Following the election victory of Mahinda Rajapakse, his administration attempted to balance its political interests in the South against sustaining the peace process. His electoral alliance with the JVP and JHU over the last quarter remained strong, despite the President having to concede some key points of the Mahinda Chinthanaya and his agreements with the JVP and JHU, for the sake of maintaining the peace process. That these compromises were made against the backdrop of an upsurge in violence in the North-East, ensured that the JVP and JHU were willing to give the President carte blanche, at least as a temporary measure. The President was able to build on his electoral promise of developing a southern consensus and thereby making the peace process more inclusive and multipartial, which both strengthened his decision-making power and the process. It is important to note that the All Party Conference (APC) was more an exercise in consensus-building regarding the need for peace talks rather than for making decisions and policy stands on any substantive issues. The President also had to choose between political consolidation and maintaining support for the peace process with regards to the UNP. Opting for the latter, he decided to attempt a form of political consolidation through going for local government elections.

As noted in the last quarterly report, in Tamil politics in the North East, there were significant efforts at political mobilization for the armed struggle. The LTTE and ‘People’s Group’ had sought to mobilize people in the previous quarters, but over the last quarter, the focus of these campaigns turned increasingly towards the need for an armed struggle: with some of the ‘People’s Groups’ planting claymore mines and launching attacks against the security forces and the LTTE providing military training for civilians. There were also efforts at forming a Grand Tamil Alliance of the North Eastern Tamil polity and the Southern Tamil Polity. W hile there were discussions between the TNA, CW C, UPF and W PF to create such a coalition, fears of its consequences and political machinations thwarted such an alliance emerging. The Presidential elections offered the Muslim political groups an opportunity to prove their strength, but given their weakness in the government they were unable to make a breakthrough with regards to securing promise from the government to ensure a right to participate in the peace process as a separate delegation when talks commence. Increasing violence against Muslims raised insecurity levels, creating renewed calls for devising means of securing protection for Muslims.

13 2.2 Factors, Trends and Indicators 2.2.1 President prioritizes consolidation of broad and inclusive power base over clear direction of the peace process Over this current quarter (February – April 2006), President Rajapakse has been able to consolidate his position and that of his party through the local government elections. The JVP’s, and to a lesser extent the JHU’s, decision to contest separately made this election a test of their electoral strength and and by extension support of their position in the peace process. It also provided a means for deciding the leverage of the JVP within this current administration, especially given the former’s increasing criticism of the Government’s choices vis-à-vis the peace process. The UPFA’s victory, winning a landslide majority of local councils, strengthened the President’s hand, seemingly making him less reliant on his Sinhala nationalists allies. Furthermore, the election also provided an opportunity for the UPFA to forge new and vital alliances with the minority parties, particularly the Up-Country Tamil parties. Through this quarter, the President was able to maintain the All Party Conference mechanism to provide a basic minimum consensus for the Government vis-à-vis the peace process.

Following President Rajapakse’s victory at the Presidential Elections, the UPFA Government faced a choice regarding how it should consolidate power. W hile there was some discussion as to whether to hold a snap general election, the leadership opted for local government elections both as a means of wresting control of the local councils from the opposition, the UNP, and of demonstrating its popular mandate. The election commissioner announced elections for March 30, but due to legal challenges regarding the rejection of some nomination lists and security reasons, elections were held in only 266 local bodies, with a postponement in 46 local authorities in the South and 22 bodies in the North East.29 A number of pragmatic and intriguing alliances were formed based on macro- political and local interests of parties: UPFA jointly contested with the CW C and UPF in certain councils, while the two Up-Country Tamil Political Parties allied in some and contested independently in others; the UNP allied with the SLMC in some of the local bodies, while in others, Muslim candidates contested on one list, etc. The most notable break was the decision by the JVP to contest separately from the rest of the UPFA.

The UPFA won a resounding majority of the councils where elections were held, 222 of 266 local bodies. This victory was perceived both by the Government and analysts as a resounding re- affirmation in the Mahinda Chinthanaya and in the leadership of the President. It should be noted that local government elections in the wake of presidential or general elections always lead to the victor in the latter receiving a resounding victory in the former. The primary advantage the victory offered the

14 President was that the results shifted the balance of power within the alliance, strengthening his personal position at the expense of the JVP, thereby relieving pressure on him to accede to their demands, particularly with regards to the peace process. “[The local government polls] allows the President to shed the nationalist garb in full now if he wishes, and embrace a far more moderate stance to which he has been gradually shifting since the November presidential elections.”30 In the afterglow of the election victory, the need for and opportunity of consolidating political power through snap general elections was mooted, but the Government moved fast to squash rumours of such a development.31 The elections also strengthened the President’s hold over the SLFP as the previous President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, who as party leader, was seeking to reassert control of the party.32 At the local level, the President, the Government and the party were boosted by the local polls.

The results have had a significant impact on the JVP, especially given the expectation that it would make significant inroads and thereby strengthen its position within the Government.33 As noted in the previous report, the JVP and the President engaged in negotiations to form an alliance at the local polls but were unable to come to agreement on the share of seats the JVP would receive, as it demanded half of the seats. The JVP staged a high profile campaign on a platform of “Gama Appita” (“Give us the village”) and held some 2,000 meetings.34 As one commentator noted, in the lead up to the polls: “As for the actual campaigning, little is visible. That is apart from the voracious campaigning by the JVP… W ith the aim of optimizing its grass root party machinery, the Marxist party has gone at the polls propaganda all guns blazing and is currently, the only party to invest in television commercials.”35 The JVP also expressed tremendous self confidence declaring that it would expand its power base36 and that it had been responsible for the election of Rajapakse as President.37 The JVP adopted a more strident stand with the Government criticising the compromises made at Geneva and giving an ultimatum to the Government, threatening to withdraw from the Coalition if the Government did not pay heed to the pre-presidential election agreement between Rajapakse and the JVP.38

W hile the JVP tried to play up the results as a “considerable victory,”39 pointing to the increase in the number of councillors from 210 to 366 and its securing 11.99% of the overall national vote, it failed to secure any additional councils to the one it already controlled, Tissamaharama. It did manage to make some headway particularly in urban and suburban settings, even replacing the UNP as the main opposition in Maharagama, Suriyaweva and Anurdhapura UC. In the East, particularly in Trincomalee, it performed dismally and was unable to win any seats, securing just 895 votes in the Trincomalee Urban Council and 828 votes in Trincomaleee Town and Gravets Pradeshya Saba, both

15 which are mainly Tamil but have a significant Sinhala population. The JHU, which also contested the local government elections, did badly and was only able to secure a few council members. Faced with this result, the JHU political leadership did try to claim that they had secured their main objective: to increase the party’s profile.40

The election results were perceived to have significant implications for the peace process because the JVP and the JHU had become increasingly vocal and critical of peace process issues. In particular, the talks on the CFA in Geneva were a key issue of contention between the President and his nationalist allies. In the lead-up to Geneva, the JVP publicly reminded the President and the government delegate team of the Government’s stated position on the CFA as espoused in the agreement between Rajapkase and the JVP, and in the Mahinda Chinthanaya.41 The President attempted to maintain their cooperation through key measures, such as including the JVP in the meetings on the Geneva Talks in Temple Trees during the negotiations. Through this inclusion, the President was able to co-opt the party or at least ensure that they would not take to the streets, and thus avoid a repeat of the P-TOMS political crisis. Interestingly, the JVP did not condemn the outcome of the talks. The statement by the JVP politburo praised the government for the “straightforwardness” of its approach to the Geneva Talks while stating that the Government acted contrary to the MOU with the JVP.42 Over the successive weeks, the JVP and the JHU would publicly adopt a more critical stance. For instance, at the All Party Conference on March 6, the JVP said that it would be better to walk away from talks rather than agree to something detrimental, while the JHU was more direct, stating that it wanted the “mistakes” at the last round amended or it would walk away from the Government and take to the streets.43 The JVP once more took up the issue of Norway as facilitator, calling for its replacement44, while also warning of the LTTE’s preparations for war.45 This seems however, to be more rhetoric, especially in the context of local government elections, rather than a key priority, especially given the present context of violence.

The full implication of the elections with regards to the JVP’s leverage is yet to be seen. The general perception is that the JVP’s inability to gain a substantial victory altered the balance of power within the Government, reducing its leverage with the President.46 The perception of the President being a hard-liner was sometimes attributed to his alliance with the JVP and the JHU, and the agreements and the positions that resulted from them. According to this line of thinking, the pragmatic moves made by the President since November demonstrate a different ideological leaning, that can be strengthened as a result of the local government elections. One commentator, however, noted that this relationship is more than election expediency as the JVP has “ideologically invaded” the SLFP, so its lack of election success is not as bad as it seems.47 Keenly following the specific policies and

16 position taken by the current administration over the coming weeks will better reveal the political orientation of the President and the ideological leanings of the inner circle, that will influence and determine the political trajectory of this government. A counter argument to the one above would be that the weeks since the L.G elections have provided some insight into the ambiguous politics of this Presidency – a mix of pragmatism, political expediency and latent Sinhala nationalism.

The local government elections offered the President an opportunity to forge new alliances and develop understandings with the minority parties. In the lead up to the polls there was increased speculation that the two main Upcountry Tamil political parties – the Ceylon W orkers’ Congress (CW C) and the Upcountry People’s Front (UPF) – and the dominant Muslim party – the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) – would join the government,48 but they both issued statements denying that they were interested in doing so or that they wanted cabinet positions. They did, however, state their intention to support the government and the peace process from outside.49 The CW C and UPF conducted negotiations with the Government to support it in the local government elections. The CW C and UPF devised an arrangement where they would contest under the UPFA betal sign in some councils, whereas in others they would contest as an Up-Country Tamil Alliance and in some on their own. The President was thus able to utilize the polls to also secure a stronger commitment from two parties to the Government and to the peace process. Interestingly, the CW C spokesman claimed on record that the decision to support the SLFP at the local polls resulted only after the Government announced that it would contest independently of the JHU and JVP.50 Thus, the break with the JVP had added benefits, even if short term, to provide space for the President and the minority parties to manoeuvre.51

The local polls also created a space for strengthening a UPFA-UNP understanding. The President reiterated his stand in not allowing UNP MPs into the government.52 In the lead up to the polls, while the UNP confidently stated that it would retain control of a majority of local councils,53 it suffered a series of set backs, with waves of local councilors-including mayors, deputy mayors, chairpersons of pradeshiya sabas and others-joining the UPFA.54 Despite the advantage offered by the JVP contesting independently of the UPFA, the UNP lost control of most of the councils bar 32. The UNP attempted to save face by pointing out that the UPFA had been unable to replicate the UNP’s victory of 2002, and that as a party the UNP had managed to maintain its core support winning some 35.9% of the vote.55 W ith the SLFP ruling out snap general elections, the possibility of a national government was once again mooted, especially in case the JVP-JHU decide to walk out of government due to differences over the peace process.

17 Over this quarter, the President was able to maintain the mechanism of the All Party Conference and ensure a broad consensus for maintaining peace talks despite the discontent from the JVP and JHU. As noted in the previous quarter, the President’s All Party Conference proved useful tool for the President to secure some support for the peace process, in that it reaffirmed his decision-making powers while supporting his choices. Some of the unresolved issues from the previous rounds, such as the lack of support from the SLMC and the concerns of the JVP and the JHU, continued into this quarter. The SLMC even announced that it would boycott future meeting of the APC56 but then expressed willingness to attend. Maintaining the support of the JVP and JHU in the APC proved a challenge, particularly in the wake of the Geneva Talks. There were claims that the first APC after the Geneva Talks was in fact postponed to ensure that the President could ensure its support,57 but they were still fairly critical of the APC. The next APC session saw a renewed sense of urgency as it was on the same day as a claymore attack on Mirusuvil. The JVP warned that it would pull out of the Government unless the situation was brought under control. Broadly though, this session reiterated the urgent need for talks and for determining a specific agenda.58 Thus, the President was able to ensure the mechanism’s continuation in providing a broad and non-specific consensus.

Thus the elections provided an opportunity for the President to widen his power base which he seized accordingly. It also offered a means for him to provide clear direction in the peace process, which he has not necessarily done so. If the peace process continues, over the coming months the President will face a critical choice in terms of political allies, as he may see advantage in calling for snap general elections and turning to new political allies or broadening his coalition.

2.2.2 Continuing LTTE efforts at political mobilization with increasing threats to its political hegemony, particularly in the East During the last quarter, there were significant developments in the North-East which had multiple effects on the Tamil polity. The ‘people’s groups’ had become increasingly active, launching attacks on the army and police. W hile the LTTE sought to present this as a popular uprising and a retaliatory act by civilians in response to the violence and violations carried out against them by the State, this was contested by the State and even the SLMM, with the former indicating that they are just LTTE front organisations. The composition of these groups still continue to be contested, but they have created a critical dynamic in terms of political mobilization, as the violence and the retaliatory violence against Tamil civilians in particular, has generated more sympathy for the use of violence and even a potential return to war. LTTE military training programs for civilians continued and were even expanded in some areas.

18 The local polls were used by the TNA and the LTTE to demonstrate their strength. The TNA had initially opposed the local polls being held in the North East citing security concerns, particularly the activities of the ‘paramilitaries.’59 The TNA subsequently agreed to participate, and the LTTE gave its support to the TNA candidates.60 It is an open question as to why the LTTE decided to allow the local polls to go ahead, given the elections boycott it supported during the Presidential elections and an interest in demonstrating a paralysis in administration in the North East. The elections commissioner announced that elections would be postponed in Batticaloa, due to security reasons and some of the other councils in Digamadulla, due to legal issues.61 Contesting as the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchchi, the TNA won 1 urban council and 5 pradeshiya sabhas in Trincomalee and Digamaddula. In the Trincomalee Urban Council which had been ruled by Central Government following the dissolution of the council in 1999, the TNA won 10 of the 12 seats. The TNA was essentially able to re-emphasize its dominance over the Tamil polity and seemed to carry the Tamil vote in the North East, so that in areas like Tirukovil and Alaiyadivembu it secured all 9 seats.

Over this quarter, there were key developments in the North East with regards to the LTTE-Karuna power struggle. Unlike in the 2004 Parliamentary Elections, where Karuna had tried to endorse certain candidates to demonstrate his support base, he did not try to influence the outcome in this election. The anti-LTTE Tamil political parties were unable to secure a substantial number of votes in the local polls. The EPDP gained control of one PS by default because the TNA list was rejected. The EPDP during this period also suffered an internal split62 and like a number of the other Tamil alternate parties attempted to deny the LTTE’s identification of them as a Tamil paramilitary group and demanded protection from the international community for their members.63 The Karuna Group, was one, if not the most central issue at the Geneva Talks on the CFA, at least from the LTTE perspective. The parties reached a consensus on preventing military action by the Karuna Group and committing to Article 1.8 of the CFA regarding paramilitaries. The Karuna Group responded by stating that they would not disarm and would hold onto its arms until the LTTE itself disarmed.64

Over this quarter, the group continued to launch attacks in LTTE-controlled areas, but also stepped up its political activities in government-controlled areas. Notably, the group set up an office for its political front, the Tamileelam Makaal Viduthalai Pulikal (Tamil Eelam People’s Liberation Tigers) in Batticaloa and commemorated the second year anniversary of the Karuna Rebellion. This marked a significant step in the Karuna Group’s efforts to make the transition to a political party.65 The Karuna Group, for instance, organised a mass meeting at the Pichiya-Amman Temple with civilians from 6 villages in Batticaloa.66 Karuna also attempted to broaden his support among the Muslim

19 community vowing to shoot dead members of the LTTE who did not return properties seized from the Muslim Community in the North in 1990.67 Posters to that effect appeared in Moor Street in which suggests that the group has been able to extend its activities and alliances.68 The Karuna Group reportedly became more active in asserting its control through violence, with allegations of killings, abductions and intimidation. In the East, the political conflict intensified over this quarter as the violence continued, and the Karuna Group became more open in government-controlled areas. This consolidation by the Karuna Group is of critical concern to the LTTE, and hence it is using multiple strategies- military and political- to severely weaken the group. The power struggle and the LTTE’s efforts to regain an uncontested political hegemony will continue and intensify.

2.2.3 Continuing efforts by M uslim political parties to assert demands for representation within the negotiation process but with no breakthrough The issues that dominated Muslim politics in the previous quarter, political consolidation, insecurity and representation at the peace talks- continued to be played out in this quarter, but in a different form. In the previous quarter, the Muslim political groups attempted to use the Presidential elections in order to assert their demands with the main presidential candidates, while consolidating their positions within the Muslim polity. Given that the dominant Muslim political party, the SLMC, which had campaigned on a platform of a separate Muslim delegation, had allied with the candidate who failed to secure the Presidency, there was increasing speculation as to whether the former would seek to realign itself both as a means of strengthening the Muslim position and as a means of securing perks for the party. The political differences between the Government and the SLMC, both from a ideological position and political machinations, as the Government included break-away factions of the SLMC, had a significant impact in thwarting the SLMC from joining government. For instance, the SLMC high command boycotted the All Party Conference for the first few rounds, publicly stating that there was incompatibility between the President’s position and the SLMC’s regarding the separate Muslim delegation, and also confusion as to whether it was a Sinhala consensus, a Southern political party consensus or an APC consensus process.69 In the lead up to local government elections, the differences seemed to mount as the SLMC faced a temporary injunction, and as one of its members took a fundamental rights case to the Court of Appeal that effectively prevented its leadership from functioning. This crisis, as it were, encouraged diplomatic involvement in mediating local politics, with the Pakistan Ambassador, stepping in to create an understanding between the President and Hakeem, whereby the President leant on the SLMC break away group, the All Ceylon Muslim League, to withdraw the case they had sponsored.70 Through this understanding, the SLMC also extended its cooperation at the APC. Yet, it still held back from

20 joining the Government or extending its support for the Government across all the councils where it was seeking election.

The local government elections provided a crucial opportunity for the Muslim polity and political leadership to consolidate their position. Interestingly, where the elections were held in the North East, it was not an outright competition between Muslim political parties, but also involved Muslim parties joining up with a main national party in some councils and contesting independently in others. For instance, in Muttur, the Muslim politicians from the SLMC, NUA, UNP and UPFA all contested as one group in order to secure control of the council and to prevent the main Tamil party, the TNA winning. This coalition succeeded in winning 7 of 11 seats. In others like Kinniya Urban Council, the SLMC contested under the UNP list, winning 4 seats and NUA under UPFA which won 2. The SLMC-UNP joint list also won in Samanthurai and Kuchchaveli.

The issue of Muslim participation at the peace talks became a central issue, with regard to the agreement between the Government and the LTTE concerning the CFA in Geneva. W hile most Muslim parties articulated the need for a separate Muslim delegation, there is a seeming variation in the positions adopted by the parties in their willingness to cooperate and compromise on the issue of representation. In an attempt to assuage the Muslim Community, the Government nominated a Muslim, Faiz Mustapha as a part of the Government’s team. Faced with increasing criticism regarding this choice from the Muslim Community, the Government then called on the Muslim parties to nominate a representative.71 The differences over a separate Muslim delegation coupled with the political differences thwarted the nomination of one candidate, but some of the parties supporting the Government endorsed , leader of the NUA, who was accepted by the President.72 Despite some opposition regarding her nomination as a member of the government delegation,73 Ashraf took up the role representing herself as a member of the team who happened to be a Muslim, rather than to present herself as the Muslim representative at the talks. At Geneva, she was given the task of raising child recruitment and brought up the issue of Muslim security in a separate dialogue session that she had with the LTTE delegates. W ith regards to the Muslim issue, Geneva did not deliver anything concrete in terms of specific guarantees for Muslims in the North East or of representation at the peace talks, but offered new avenues for dialogue between the Muslim political leadership and the LTTE. The LTTE reportedly invited Ashraff for negotiations in Killinochchi. W hile Ashraf had attempted to emphasize the importance of the separate delegation, she stated that the lack of one “does not mean that we must stay out of the process. W e must instead be part of the process and impress upon our needs.”74 There is, however continuing opposition to participation in this form from the Muslim Community, unless a separate delegation is granted. The

21 declaration by the Muslim Council for Sri Lanka at their symposium in Addalachchenai, for instance, stated that no Muslim should participate as a representative of the Government delegation.75

A critical issue that did come up with significant implications for the Muslim community was the charge by LTTE Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham that a Muslim paramilitary group Jihad was in operation in the East. In the report on paramilitaries submitted to the Government, it is stated that the Jihad Group is run by Sinhala officers. This charge was vehemently denied by the Muslim community and politicians who claimed that there was no such group, but also acknowledged that there were Muslim armed youth. This was perceived within the community as an attempt by the LTTE to internationalise the Muslim issue in a negative way, particularly in the context of the W ar Against Terror. Both the SLMM and the Army stated that they had no evidence of such a group functioning.76

The Government announced plans to create a Muslim infantry battalion in the army which would protect Muslim areas and began recruiting for it. Some in the community welcomed it, such as the MULF, while others such as the United Muslim Party of Ulemas said that they had no objection to women also joining the battalion.77 Both NUA and SLMC, however objected to the battalion, voicing concern over the consequences for the community in terms of retaliation and stated that it seemed like the Government was trying to abdicate responsibility for Muslim security.78 The creation of this battalion also drew fire from other political groups, the TNA described it as a part of the Government’s strategy to drive a wedge between the Tamil and Muslim communities79 and the JHU because it opposed an ethnically based regiment.80 The army’s efforts to draw in between 500-800 youth failed, and it announced that it would not create an exclusive Muslim battalion, but that the battalion would include personnel from existing units and communities. The irony of Muslims being granted a special battalion with no change regarding a separate delegation was not lost on commentators: “Muslims who asked for a separate delegation at talks had been given a separate regiment instead. W hat they have been denied at the peace front had been given at the war front on a platter even without asking.”81 Both the claims of a Muslim Armed Group and the suggestion of a Muslim battalion only served to emphasize the potential for the emergence of a Muslim armed group in the face of continuing insecurity. That Muslims were attacked in the riots in Trincomalee and their shops burned, killed in the aerial bombardment in Muttur and in targeted killings during this quarter re-emphasized the community’s vulnerability. Thus, the dynamics of participation in the peace talks and of being a part of the governing coalition will continue to play a key role in deciding whether the Muslim political parties will coalesce with the government in pushing for Muslim rights within the peace process.

22 III. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONM ENT CLUSTER

3.1 Context W hile developments in the international environment were covered under the Negotiations and Peace Talks, and Political Environment clusters in the quarterly reports of 2005, during the second year under review they will be covered as a separate cluster.

The dominant trend from the previous quarterly period was of the international community’s hesitation in dealing with the two parties giving way to active involvement in getting the peace process back on track, including the re-affirmation of the existing framework for the Sri Lankan Peace Process. As noted, both parties seemed to be challenging the international community’s role within the peace process: the new Sri Lankan Government under President Mahinda Rajapakse was seeking to re-design the peace process including the re-organization of countries involved in the peace process, while the LTTE particularly with the assassination of the Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirigamar was testing the limits of the international community’s tolerance for violence.

W hile the Mahinda Rajapakse Government sought to encourage greater involvement of all the main international players including the Donor Co-Chairs and even India seemed to be reiterating the need to re-invite Norway as facilitator, which the government was forced to do as a result both of India’s refusal to commit to a more involved role and the upsurge in violence. This latter development, particularly the use of claymore mines against the security forces created an urgent dynamic within the peace process as the government was forced to turn to the existing international system involved in the process to put pressure on the LTTE. The international community became increasingly agitated that the peace process would unravel, therefore adopted a crisis response to parties, as evidenced by the flurry of visits to by key actors including the Norwegian and Japanese Special Envoys and US Under-Secretary of State. The international community also issued a number of statements critical of both parties and reiterated the need for negotiations and a re- commitment to the peace process. There were also increasing signs of action taken within key W estern countries against fund raising for the LTTE with the issue of proposed ban against the LTE being raised in Canada and the European Union.

3.2 Continuing high level of international involvement while key international actors come to recognize the limits of constructive engagement in Sri Lankan Peace Process The role of the international community continued to be a critical factor in sustaining the ‘no war no

23 peace situation.’ As in the previous quarter the parties continued to appeal to the international community to put pressure on their opposing party and as noted in the Negotiations Cluster it seemed as if the parties to conflict and the peace process were playing to the international gallery to prove their commitment to the peace process. Like in the previous round of talks the Government looked to the international community, particularly Norway and the Co-Chairs to put pressure on the LTTE to attend Geneva II especially when the LTTE began to cite a variety of reasons for its inability to attend including the transport issue.82 The LTTE in turn pointed to the government’s failure to implement specific aspects of the Geneva Agreement and appealed to the international community to put pressure on the Government to do so.

The international community in turn sought to put pressure on the parties to take vital steps to advance the peace process. The international community that had stepped up their involvement in the last quarter continued to impress upon the parties of the need for progress with regards to the CFA. The Co-Chairs to the Peace Process who had played a crucial role in encouraging and compelling the parties forward made a number of statement criticizing both sides for failing to live up to the CFA and also calling on them to commit to the CFA through implementation. As in the previous quarter representatives of the Co-Chairs (bar the US) also called on the LTTE to urge them to engage in talks and demand that they refrain from carrying out violence.83 The level of international involvement in the Sri Lankan Peace Process remained high. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan expressed concern over the upsurge of violence in early April.84 In the House of Representatives in the US a resolution was passed calling for both sides to ensure there was no return to war.85 In the last quarter key international actors had attempted to coordinate and support each other. In this quarter these efforts continued, for instance with the Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran meeting Eric Solheim and endorsing the need to maintain the CFA between the Government and the LTTE.86 W hile supporting the Geneva Process a number of donors, such as the Asian Development Bank have put on record that there will no immediate aid dividends as a result of the Geneva Agreement as significant increases in aid will depend on the parties reaching a final settlement. This issue of aid tied to substantive progress in the peace process that took centre stage at the Tokyo Donor Conference continues to be a source of some contention for donors as some of them have made it quite clear that development should not be held hostage to the peace process.87

W hile the Government urged the international community to put pressure on the LTTE to engage in talks, it seemed that the Government also sought to encourage the international community to take punitive measures against the LTTE. It can be argued that the Government did this so as to force the

24 LTTE to engage in the peace process and give up its use of violence, but it also seems to be a pre- emptive step to weaken the LTTE in the likelihood of an outbreak of hostilities. The President in his interview to Time Magazine in February when asked about the potential role that the international community could play in preventing war stated “Look at September 11. This is the same thing. React like that.”88 An international proscription of the LTTE therefore was clearly on the government’s agenda.

To this effort the Government conducted a significant diplomatic offensive including a flurry of foreign visits and the adoption of key policies. Foreign Minister visited a number of key EU states in the middle of March for two weeks to reiterate the LTTE’s record of assassinations, including that of the previous Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirigamar, and of extortion in EU countries in a preparation for the upcoming discussion in the EU of a proposed ban of the LTTE.89 In its efforts to strengthen the international safety net against the LTTE the Government also complained to and of the Norwegians and Swiss for their reception of the LTTE delegation and demanded that travel restrictions be placed on the LTTE delegates following Geneva II.90

As noted in the previous quarterly reports there seemed to be a hardening in the international community’s relationship to the LTTE, particularly in the wake of the assassination of Foreign Minister Kadirigamar and the attacks on the security forces in December and January. The human rights violations which the LTTE was accused of committing and that was often sidelined in favour of progress in peace talks have became a dominant concern, particularly with the increase in violence and killings over the last year. The Human Rights W atch Report on LTTE extortion of Tamil Diaspora communities that was published during the last quarter continued to have a significant impact in this current quarter particularly given the political debates within the EU and Canada of banning the LTTE. Following the election victory of the Conservative Party and a subsequent cabinet decision on April 8th the Canadian Government officially announced on April 10th that it had added the LTTE to the list of outlawed terrorist organization. This ban had a number of significant symbolic and substantive impacts: including demonstrating the Canadian Governments and by extension the international community’s disapproval of the LTTE’s involvement in violence and policy choices and of limiting its access to funds from Tamil diaspora communities even though front organizations were not listed.91 The Royal Canadian Mounted Police raided the office of the W orld Tamil Movement in Montreal and seized information sources on charges that the LTTE was using Canadian non-profit cultural organizations to raise money and spread propaganda.92 This reportedly led to pro-LTTE material being withdrawn from public circulation in Tamil stores and

25 radio stations.93 The LTTE criticized the move as harming the peace process and characterized it as a biased measure that would increase the distrust of the Tamil community in the international community.94 Anti-LTTE Tamil Diaspora Groups also used the opportunity to highlight the continuing intimidation by the LTTE within the diaspora communities and in Sri Lanka and to launch a coordinated campaign and protests.95 W ithin a number of countries there were also renewed efforts to examine the dynamics of disapora politics and the LTTE’s behaviour, thereby making censure and action against the LTTE more likely over the coming quarter.96 In Australia federal police raided the Tamil Coordinating Committee office to investigate whether fund raising activities had been conducted in contravention of the federal anti-terror laws with police suspecting that more than Aus$ 3 million had been donated to the LTTE.97

Given that the EU would have to decide whether to list the LTTE as a terrorist organization, the Candian ban raised a number of critical issues. The potential ban of the LTTE raised a critical challenge for the international community on one hand, while it offered a tool for the international community to express its disapproval on the other. A ban would however also risk cornering the LTTE and thereby precipitating the conflict. LTTE Political W ing Leader S.P. Thamilchelvam on April 10 stated that the international community was trying to weaken the peace process and that the ban would have the effect of encouraging even greater violence by the state.98 Thus, while the government expects the EU ban to come through and will attempt to present it as a success, ironically the ban may put increased pressure on the international community to be more stringent with the Sri Lankan Government. The inability to effectively implement the Geneva Agreement particularly with regards to the Karuna Group and the reports of human rights abuses by the armed forces have been raised by a number of key international actors as they are also faced with the question as to how committed the government is to human rights, power sharing, a negotiated settlement etc. For instance the 17th Amendment and the human rights violations may become increasing central issues which W estern donors will raise with the government.

The Sri Lankan Government, while focusing on the key W estern actors also tried to use alternate allies in its ‘fight against terrorism.’ For instance the government tried to prevent the sale of weapons to the LTTE with the President sending a special envoy, his brother Basil Rajapakse to Cambodea in late January to Penom Penh to convince the Cambodean leadership to curb sales and to plan a reciprocal visit to Sri Lanka.99 The government also sought to strengthen its defence capabilities. Following the Government’s inability in securing radar equipment from India the government turned to Pakistan and China. The importance of this issue was emphasized by the President visiting Pakistan in March, on his second official visit to a third country, the first being India in December.

26 The critical importance of this visit was not lost on analysts and the media who saw this visit as a means of ensuring better defence ties.100 That the statements by both leaders made reference to fighting terrorism only seemed to emphasize how a new international safety net was being created.101

The visits had significant repercussions for the Government, both positive and negative, as on one hand it was able to strengthen its defence ties but it also had to allay fears of its intentions and the particular alliances it had opted for. For instance the Government was forced to send a delegation to India in the wake of the President’s visit to Pakistan and the Defence Secretary Gothabeya Rajapakse’s visit to China, both which had as a key aim the securing of a radar system. A high level delegation included the Defence Secretary, the Foreign Secretary H.S. Palihakkara and Finance Secretary Dr P.B. Jayasundera.102 The government also issued statements denying that the President’s Pakistan visit was for the purpose of increasing military aid.103 In its efforts to strengthen particular relations the Government faced challenges of offending other allies as seen with Pakistan, China and India, or the US and Iran. W ith regards to the latter the Government attempted to curry US favour by voting against Iran in the resolution at a meeting the International Atomic Energy Agency in February which angered the Iranians.104 W ith regards to Pakistan and India it should be noted that in this quarter the two countries also stepped up their involvement in local politics through mediating understandings between the President and minority parties, the SLMC and the CW C respectively (See Political Cluster for more detail). In another example of Indian involvement in the peace process and domestic politics opposition leader Ranil W ickremasinghe was invited to meet Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi in early April where he was asked to work towards a national consensus with the President.105 W hile this was clearly a step to encourage the peace process and Southern Consensus building it may have also been a way of sending the President a signal that India wanted to see genuine progress made in the form of power sharing and a negotiated settlement.

A key issue that has been thrown into stark relief during the last two quarters is the role of the international community in sustaining the ‘no war no peace’ situation and in effect preventing the low intensity conflict becoming outright war. As to how far the international community can remain engaged particularly given the moves by key international actors to ban the LTTE makes this all the more challenging.

27 IV. SECURITY CLUSTER

4.1 Context The cycle of violence and the deterioration of the human security situation has increased over the last year under review; with the violence hitting an all-time high at least for the ‘no war, no peace’ period during the last quarter. W hile particular patterns of violence and remilitarization continued and intensified, such as the geographical spread of violence, daily killings, training of civilians, there was also an upsurge in ‘new’ forms of violence, particularly the use of claymore attacks against the armed forces. There was a clear crisis in the peace process, suggesting that the ‘proxy war’ or ‘shadow war’ had become a low intensity conflict. There was a parallel deterioration in the human security situation as civilians were not just caught up in the violence but became targets of retaliatory violence, amidst a culture of growing impunity in the North East. In the last week of the final quarter, however, the violence dramatically dropped as the parties agreed to engage in talks on the CFA, thereby demonstrating an ability to significantly contain if not prevent violence.

4.2 Factors, Trends and Indicators In this report three factors have been monitored and analysed, with developments and trends resulting in a change in focus in each section. The military build up section, which looked largely at remilitarization, be it rearmament or recruitment also examines how the parties have attempted to consolidate their military control and the subsequent impact of such efforts. The military confrontations section has been expanded to analyse the link between the politico-military aspects of the proxy war and the human security consequences of the killings and violence. The Human Security Section looks at other human rights violations including abductions and intimidation.

4.2.1 M ilitary build up: Continuing remiltarization in readiness to return to war W hile both sides attempted to respond to the Geneva Talks on the CFA through reducing military activities, they did not necessarily cease remilitarization efforts, be it military training, surveillance operations, or rearmament. The insecurity and constant distrust between the parties that created a security dilemma for the two sides during the ‘no war no peace’ period is reflected in the remilitarization activities of the two parties. Hence, while the parties during this quarter tried to demonstrate their commitment to the CFA through scaling down and containing violence, they did not necessarily seek to halt remilitarization efforts. This contradiction in their commitment to the CFA and remiltarization is epitomized in the statements made by the two sides. For instance, the Army Commander Sarath Fonseka called for buttressing the army head quarters in the while stating the army would abide by the CFA.106 The LTTE Military Leadership at passing out

28 ceremonies for new military recruits stated the need for the Tamil people to be ready for the next Eelam W ar.107

The two sides continued to construct defence structures, often prompting the opposing side to complain to the SLMM. The army complained of the LTTE building bunkers in Omanthai, which the SLMM confirmed. However, the SLMM found the army was also engaged in similar activities in the area.108 LTTE military constructions in Nagarkovil, which has been a point of contention for quite a significant period of the CFA, was once more highlighted with the army alleging that 25 LTTE cadres were working in no man’s land.109 There were also reports of the LTTE constructing bunkers close to the Trincomalee Harbour, particularly in areas between Muttur and Kinniya.110

The government continued to strengthen its defence capabilities: the government recruited more personnel into the STF, received a patrol boat for the navy from the Italian government, and continued to seek ways of improving air surveillance capacity.111 The Indo-Sri Lankan Defence Pact that had been shelved did not materialize in this quarter either. The Sri Lankan and Indian navies did, however formalize coordinated patrolling by agreeing to certain modalities in February.112 Continuing with the sub -trend in the previous quarter, there were controversial changes in the army hierarchy this quarter with the Army Commander approved promotions and transfers being later cancelled by the President.113

The LTTE stepped up military training. More than 150 trained cadres were received into the LTTE’s fighting force in Killinochchi at graduation ceremony where the main message was reported to have been that they must prepare for the final struggle.114 LTTE Naval Commander also reportedly coordinated deep sea operations training for naval cadres, and additional training for naval auxiliary forces.115 Like in the previous quarter, there were reports of the LTTE conducting military training of civilians from both government-controlled and LTTE-controlled areas.116 A cross section of underwent training, including women, elders, government officials, and university student. This military training is presented as a self-defence measure but also seems to prepare civilians to act as auxiliaries to the main LTTE fighting force in the eventuality of a war. The training also provides the LTTE with the means to mobilize the people for a possible return to war.

Over this quarter there were a number of incidents at sea where the Navy detected multi-day trawlers suggesting that the LTTE was trying to smuggle in military supplies: on February 11, a multi-day trawler was detected off Talaimannar; on March 22 a trawler was arrested with a small amount of explosives; another trawler 110m long was reportedly detected off Trincomlaee; on March 25th when

29 the navy stopped and attempted to search a trawler near Kudirimalai Point, Mannar and the personnel aboard the craft blew it up.117 There were also reports of three boats that succeeded in running the gauntlet during this quarter,118 thereby suggesting that the LTTE’s rearmament efforts continued through this quarter.

From the government’s perspective they have tried to take preventive measures through conducting a number of search operations to thwart military action by the LTTE and the “civilian groups” in government-controlled areas. The security forces made a number of arrests of individuals in the North-East, alleged to be involved in violence.119 The operations also recovered explosives including claymore mines, anti-tank mines, and other ordinances. In Jaffna the army recovered a number of explosives, with the largest seizure in Maduwil.120 Through such efforts the forces were able to claim that they had been able to prevent a number of attacks.121 Over this quarter there were intelligence reports that the LTTE had infiltrated government-controlled areas with key targets in mind, such as on April 11 when intelligence sources stated that senior officers were under threat in Jaffna from LTTE snipers.122 As the violence picked up so did cordon and search operations, including in the South. In the wake of the attempted assassination of the Army Commander Sarath Fonseka, these search and arrest operations, particularly in and around Colombo, were increased with round up of Tamils, mainly male youths. At least 97 Tamils were arrested in and around Colombo following search operations on April 26th.123 Over March and April as the violence picked up, the security forces attempted to increase their security presence in an effort to curb the violence but in effect intensified Tamil civilians’ insecurity.

4.2.2 A state of undeclared war: From ‘no war no peace’ to a low intensity conflict and beyond As noted in the previous quarterly report, the number of incidents and the scale of violence dramatically decreased following the agreement between the parties to attend talks on the CFA in Geneva. In particular, the claymore attacks, daily shootings, and abductions that intensified to unprecedented levels during December and January, jeopardizing the peace process virtually ceased. Above all, it demonstrated the ability of the two main parties, the GOSL and the LTTE, to contain, if not control, the violence. As noted above, the reduction in hostilities did not literally translate to a cooling off in military operations. For as one defence correspondent noted: [there] were reports that the LTTE had not slowed down preparations for hostilities in the wake of the upcoming Geneva talks. However, they have resisted from triggering off incidents in the North and East with the Colombo-based Joint Operation Headquarters (JOH) the joint operations of the armed forces and the

30 police all received daily ‘nil’ reports since it was decided to hold talks in Geneva.

It needs to noted that in the lead up to Geneva, there were incidents of violence but direct attacks on the security forces and police ceased. One naval casualty was reported from the armed forces in February when an LTTE boat blasted itself off the coast of Mannar on February 11 and a sailor died as a result of the injuries he sustained in the blast.124 Four LTTE cadres were killed when they blew up their boat to prevent the navy intercepting their boat which was reportedly involved in transferring arms from the high seas.125 There were other incidents of attacks, killings, and abductions suggesting that the armed actors were still looking for ways to strengthen their position on the ground and settle scores. The Karuna Group, over this quarter, continued to stage commando raids into LTTE-controlled areas even on the eve of Geneva, killing one LTTE cadre. (See box below) Demonstrating its autonomy from the on-going process at renewing the CFA on the ground the Karuna Group continued to launch attack on LTTE positions and also reportedly stepped up abductions as well. There were also at least 3 other killings in the North East, non-LTTE members being the prime victims; Marimuthu Mahanedra, an EPDP member, was abducted and killed in Vavuniya on February 4; Manoharan from Sithandy, Batticaloa, believed to be a Karuna Supporter, was attacked on February 6 and subsequently died. In addition, the TELO office in Batticaloa was attacked twice, injuring a candidate for local councils.126 The “mystery killings”, with disputed motives for murder and contestations over the political identity of victims, continued with the shooting of a young Muslim Muhaideen Jarool in Meerankery, Eravur on February 22. During this period there were also a series of abductions including of children, particularly in Batticaloa District.

As the Negotiations Cluster noted, the Geneva Agreement provided a significant opportunity for the Government and the LTTE to develop the means to address the series of violations and violence on the ground, in addition to restoring mutual confidence. W hile the Geneva Agreement did not explicitly or comprehensively address all the violations and violence, it critically provided a temporary stepping stone for the parties to contain and take control of the situation on the ground and create a ‘ceasefire within the ceasefire.’ Looking at the situation, it seemed, however that the agreement did not transform the ground situation from that of February; there was a ‘normal’ rate of violence and violations. The announcement of talks on the CFA had a remarkable impact on the ground situation, but there was no similar dramatic change between the period of the announcement of talks, the Geneva Talks, and the period immediately following the talks. The existing pattern of violence- attacks by the Karuna Group, internecine killings by the LTTE and the Karuna Group, the ‘mystery’ killings, abductions etc all continued, albeit at a much lower level than December and January. The monthly figure for killings dropping to single digits, a phenomenon only observed in January for the

31 year 2005 and for the pre-Karuna split period should be seen as a positive and significant development. It needs to be noted, however that this development took place in the context of talks on the CFA and that the two month period between the two rounds of talks in Geneva was in effect a test of the parties’ commitment to the CFA.

Over the two month period, the parties demonstrated a seeming incapacity to control all forms of violence and/or alternatively, an unwillingness to fully implement the Geneva Agreement. For instance, in the first two weeks of March, the Karuna Group launched two attacks on LTTE controlled Batticaloa. On March 4, the group attacked Vavunathivu Sentry points, killing 2 cadres, and on March 10, the group attacked Kadmurippu; the LTTE claimed that the security forces had backed the group in the first attack and joined forces in the second.127 These attacks by the Karuna Group suggested either that the government is unable to control the group, or at best is unwilling to contain the group. W hile the government has claimed that the Karuna Group does not operate in government-controlled areas, and denies assisting the group, there is circumstantial evidence of cooperation and support from the military to the group. In these two weeks, three people were shot and killed in the Batticaloa district, one Muslim youth in Valaichennia, one Muslim man in Eravur and a Tamil youth in Eravur.128 W hile in this last killing, where two civilians were also injured, there were allegations that the assailant was a Karuna cadre, but as most of these killings the real motive for the murder and the identity of the killer/s remain a mystery. There is even the possibility that at least some of these killings are a part of ‘normal and everyday’ crime where personal vendettas are being settled in a climate of extreme fear and violence. There were a series of abductions, children and men in the second week of March, with reports implicating both the LTTE and Karuna Group.

Over the latter period of the quarterly, the violence steadily intensified. The unraveling of the Geneva Agreement could thus be seen as a result of ‘tit for tat’ violence coupled with an incapacity and unwillingness on the part of both parties to assert and contain violence on the ground. The individual killings and abductions increased; there were also a number of confrontations between the armed forces and the LTTE, particularly at sea. On March 25, in the seas off Kalpitiya, Puttalam the LTTE blasted their own boat as a naval craft drew close to inspect it, killing the 6 LTTE cadres on board and 8 of the 19 naval personnel. There were also a series of confrontations in Trincomalee between March 18 and March 20, with the Navy insisting that the LTTE had attacked it from Norway Point and claimed it had fired back in self-defense; the LTTE claiming that the Navy was firing at coastal villages in the Sampur area.129 The LTTE also fired at security force positions in Eluthumadduval, on the Jaffna Forward Defence Line on March 19 and at Selvanagar, Trincomalee on April 8, killing one soldier and injuring another in the latter incident.130 The military action of the LTTE over this period

32 has questioned its commitment to peace, yet the violence also highlighted critical gaps in the CFA regarding remilitarization and movement at sea. The issue of sea movement for the LTTE has been a constant issue throughout much of the CFA period with the LTTE constantly asserting its rights.131 A critical theme of this quarter has been the continuation and arguable intensification of violence by the Karuna Group (See Box Below).

Karuna Group Stepping up its Activities As if in preparation for Geneva, the Government attempted to demonstrate their innocence with regards to colluding with the Karuna Group. Security forces for instance carried out search operations in the W elikanda area and confirmed that there were no paramilitary groups.132 The SLMM by contrast, charged that there were armed elements operating in the East although they stated that there was no evidence of military backing. The SLMM began to make a critical distinction with regards to the Karuna Group stating that paramilitaries work with military assistance while armed groups are those operating independently.133 This distinction and terminology was also taken up by the Norwegian mediators and the Government. This was subsequently accepted by the LTTE in the Geneva Agreement. The Karuna Group asserted its unwillingness to disarm in the lead up to Geneva, a position it reiterated following the agreement between the Government and LTTE in Geneva. The violence picked up in March with a re-emergence of patterns of violence seen in the months preceding the agreement to go for talks in Geneva. Attacks by the Karuna Group that had at best reduced intensified. Some of the main attacks attributed to the Karuna Group included:

February 21 Clash within LTTE-controlled Batticaloa, 1 LTTE auxiliary force cadre reportedly killed March 4 2 LTTE reportedly cadres killed in Vavunathivu, Batticaloa April 5 10 LTTE reportedly cadres killed and 3 others injured in attack in Kadjuwatte April 8 8 LTTE reportedly cadres killed and 5 injured in an attack in LTTE-controlled Sampur

As the list makes clear the scale and spread of the attacks attributed to the group, demonstrating the expansion of its operations. In an effort to make a political transition the political wing of the group, the TMNV established an office in Batticaloa Town and also organized a mass meeting. The group also reported to be involved in a number of killings and abductions around Batticaloa and

33 Valichennai. That the Group continues to be so active suggests that the Government’s efforts to restrain it have proved ineffective or that it is unwilling to do so. W hile taking action to constrain the group’s movements and operations is a critical step alternate policies are required to deal with the Karuan Issue that has become more intractable. In this effort multiple tools including incentives are needed to address the problems the Karuna Group poses and symbolizes.

By the end of March it was clear that most, if not all of the Geneva Agreement had been violated to some degree. In April as the violence further escalated, there was a return of some of the practices that become central to the violence during December and January. Claymore attacks picked up. The first claymore since Geneva against the security forces, exploded on April 10, killing 6 soldiers and 2 NGO personnel in Mirusuvil, Jaffna which the LTTE blamed on the ‘People’s Force’. This claymore explosion was followed by a spate of such attacks (See box). As in the previous quarter, where responsibility for the attacks had been claimed by civilian groups, these groups issued warnings in late March that they were re-launching attacks on security forces in self-defence. The Upsurging People’s Brigade issued a statement in Batticaloa in late March stating that “W e are forced to resume activities recently stopped by us” as “the Military and the paramilitary groups have resumed their atrocities again.”134 Other groups, such as the Tamil Resurgence Force, also made announcements in late March along similar lines. Interestingly, many of these groups issued their declaration in Batticaloa as if to demonstrate that they had expanded their operations.135 The LTTE continued to issue disclaimers: following the claymore on April 11 in Thambalagamuwa, Trincomalee in which 11 were killed, Trincomalee Political W ing Leader Elilan stated “W e have no connection with this or with other attacks. W e have no reason to carry out attacks especially when the talks are about to begin.”136 As the attacks on the security forces picked up the military expressed its disappointment in the SLMM for failing to condemn the LTTE for planting claymores.137

Claymore Attacks against Security Forces April 8 1 soldier and a bystander injured in Neerveli, Jaffna April 10 5 soldiers and 2 NGO workers killed in Mirusuvil April 11 10 navy personnel and a civilian driver killed and 11 others injured in Thambalagamuwa, Trincomalee April 12 2 policemen killed and 2 others injured in Trincomalee April 15 5 soldiers killed and 10 injured in Vavuniya April 16 2 soldiers injured at Madduvil April 17 1 policeman killed and 2 others injured in Poonthoddam, Vavuniya

34 4 soldiers killed in another explosion in Vavuniya 5 air force officers injured in Sandhiveli, Batticaloa April 20 7 soldiers injured in two separate attacks in Onththachchi and Pillayarady in Batticaloa April 21 2 policemen killed, 2 injured in Thanganagar, Seruvila, Trincomalee April 22 Officer and three soldiers killed by claymore in W elikanda, Polonaruwa 1 soldier killed and another sustains injuries in Thevapuram, Vavuniya April 23 2 soldiers injured near Maduru Oya April 24 1 soldier killed and another wounded in Thenmaradchi, Jaffna April 27 2 STF personnel injured in Mannar April 28 3 soldiers killed and 6 wounded in two separate attacks in Mannar and Kyts April 30 2 naval officers injured in Allipity, Jaffna

Over April there were a number of critical developments which radically altered the nature of violence in this peace process and “signaled a new phase in the conflict,”138 tilting the ‘no war no peace’ balance more towards war. The violence in Trincomalee during and after the Sinhala and Tamil New Year Period; the attempt to kill the Army Force commander in Army Headquarters in Colombo using a suicide bomber and the use of aerial bombardment as retaliation have all dramatically altered the ground situation and the strategic outlook for the peace process, and intensified human suffering. (See box).

Violence in April As noted in the previous quarterly reports, Trincomalee has become a site of increased tension and violence. From April 2005, tension rose sharply, particularly around the issue of the Buddha Statute being placed in the middle of the town; violence increased with attacks on security forces, police and civilians. In this quarter, violence picked up gradually following the Geneva Agreement, with clashes between the Navy and Sea Tigers, and accusations of attacks on naval crafts from the shore, and counter claims of the navy shelling villages in Sampur.

A critical turning point was the assassination of the Tamil Peoples’ Forum president, Vanniasingham Vigneswaran, on April 7, who was shot dead in the heart of town by an unknown gunman traveling by three wheeler.139 W hile the government condemned the assassination and appointed a special investigation team, protests mounted, with a hartal in Trincomalee and demonstrations in parliament by the TNA. Vigneswaran had played a prominent role in local politics in articulating the demands of the local Tamil population, and was even seen as a potential TNA

35 candidate. The next day, there were two attacks: one involving the LTTE and army firing mortars and exchanging gun fire at Selva Nagar killing one soldier and one LTTE cadre,140 and another on Tiger-controlled Sampur, reportedly by the Karuna Group, the media claiming that 8 LTTE cadres were killed.141

The dynamics of violence was radically altered over the Sinhala and Tamil New Year by one incident which set off a whole wave of retaliations and counter-retaliations that are still being played, causing tremendous human suffering. A bomb explosion in the Trincomalee Vegetable Market on April 12 2006 led to a riot, as an enraged Sinhala mob set about targeting Tamil persons and their property within a few minutes of the explosion. It is reported that 19 people were killed in the violence. In the bomb, individuals from all three communities were killed, including one child but the rioters targeted 20 Tamil shops and also 2 Muslim shops, burning both communities’ businesses.142 Three bodies, reportedly of Tamil, burnt inside a three wheeler were found in Liyanagar, a suburb of Trincomalee but had to be positively identified.143 W hile the government responded with measures, such as sending a top level delegation to survey the economic damage and requesting more security, there were serious questions of the armed forces’ complicity or at least negligence in taking action against the rioters.

Over the following days, the ethnic violence continued; it seemed the civilian population was involved in the retaliation itself; for instance, on the 14th, the body of a young Sinhala man, Nissanka turned up in Mahindapura. The local Sinhala villagers went on a rampage, setting fire to more than 40 homes in the neighbouring Tamil village of Nadesapura.144 The kovil was also set on fire and there were unsubstantiated reports of a female devotee, Somasunderam Maheshwari, chopped to death by the gang. The brutal nature of this type of retaliatory violence was replicated over the coming days; responsibility for the violence was negated by contradictory reports of the LTTE, the Security Forces, Home Guards and ‘civilians’ engaging in brutal acts of violence and revenge. 6 Sinhala farmers were killed in Kallampaththuwa, Gomarankadawala reportedly by the LTTE which led to an immediate rise in tension in the area as neighbouring Tamil villagers feared retaliation. The continuation of incidents of violence has generated huge levels of fear polarizing the ethnic communities and accelerating large-scale displacement.145 The aerial bombardment of Sampoor in the wake of the attempted assassination of the Army Commander only compounded problems on the ground. In the Bharathipuram area for instance 8,760 people, from both the Tamil and Muslim Community were living in displacement due to the violence. According to the DS of Mutur, M.A.M Niyas a further 274 people were living with friends and relatives in the Sampur area. Following the aerial attack he claimed that 43,158 had been displaced.146 The accuracy of these figures can be and

36 were contested, but as fact-finding reports and reports from actors on the ground indicated that a large scale displacement was in motion.

The incidents raised a number of critical issues including the targeting of civilians; the apathy or even collusion of the armed forces in the riots; the lack of accountability and law and order mechanism, and communal violence. Other critical points such as the scale of displacement, the slow reaction to the humanitarian crisis and the contestation of figures have been raised in the Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Cluster. The massacres, riots, and the violence created an overwhelming climate of violence, forcing people into various form of displacement, be it make-shift camps (usually in public buildings), a friends’ or relatives’ houses, or ‘night time’ displacement where multiple families would sleep in one house or sleep in the jungle. This obviously had an impact on livelihoods and normal day-to-day life but the relief system to respond to this situation and the displacement that followed the aerial bombing in Sampur was slow, due security concerns for officials, lack of co- ordination and restrictions on movements into LTTE-controlled areas.147 A verification mission by the government and UN agencies responsible for displacement took place on the 29th.148 W ith each major displacement in Trincomalee, there has been a contestation of numbers, with the national government denying claims made by local government officials, which has further complicated the response to the displacement. As one fact finding report put it, this contestation of numbers “reflect the manner in which political considerations have over-ridden humanitarian concerns yet again in Sri Lanka.”149 The violence created a crisis in security with far reaching implications for communities in the area with seemingly little or no substantive efforts to address the crisis and or the conditions of fear, insecurity and human suffering it has created.

The sheer number of and type of activities engaged in by the various armed actors seems to have increased. In the last quarterly reports, it was noted that in addition to the security forces, the LTTE and the Karuna Group, there were a number of other armed actors. For instance, other Tamil political groups such as the EPDP and PLOTE or individuals linked to these groups had reportedly become more active. As one human rights group commenting on the EPDP noted, “many feared that the organization was becoming increasingly comfortable using the general environment of LTTE terror as a tool to resolve its own internal problems, or targeting others who might undermine its desire to be the ‘sole alternative.’”150 In addition, there seemed to be a trend towards strengthening self-defense civilian militia or at least presenting armed actors as being civilian in nature. In addition to armed Tamil people’s groups, there are the Sinhala and Muslim Home Guards (although part of the state’s security apparatus have more significant linkages to the communities they are defending)

37 and alleged Muslim Armed Groups. W ith the resurgence of violence and increasing attacks on civilians, this trend only seemed to intensify as ‘civilian-on-civilian’ violence intensified. Yet, as one commentator noted, “Killings by all sides intensified, and the perpetrators – both state and non-state – were increasingly difficult to identify as actors cried wolf, shifting blame and enlisted a variety of agents to do their dirty work,”151 thus making the overall security climate more complex and murkier.

Attempted Assassination of Security Force Commander and Retaliation On April 25th, a suicide bomber having penetrated the Army Headquarters in Colombo exploded herself as the army commander’s convoy passed by. Eleven members of his personal security staff and people in the vicinity were killed; the commander survived and was rushed into the intensive care unit. The attack had all hallmarks of the LTTE but investigations are still continuing, trying to establish the identity of the assailant, and her contact person within the army headquarters. The assailant was reportedly pregnant but this fact is still being verified through DNA sampling. Using a pregnant woman or even the cover of a pregnant woman has further challenged the concept of non- combatants used in international humanitarian law during armed conflict, as well as other key fundamental norms.

The Government was thrown into a deep crisis regarding how it should respond to condemn the incident. The precedent of the assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirigamar where the Government at the time resorted to diplomatic means offered one possible response. The use of military force, however provided to President Rajapakse a means of sending a hard message to the LTTE that it was not weak. A targeted and limited attack would provide some cover for the government to retaliate without declaring outright war. Initial discussions covered a number of possible targets for air force bombing but Sampur was chosen. The security forces launched a coordinated attack with the air force Kfir jets and artillery attacks from the Sri Lankan navy on military targets in Muttur East.

The suicide attack, beyond demonstrating the striking capabilities of the LTTE’s penetration units, also raised a critical question as to whether the LTTE was seeking to push the Government to go to war or to use force to pressure the government to compromise. Over the last quarter the level of violence, in particular the series of claymore mines, raised serious concerns regarding the LTTE’s interests, let alone commitment to the peace process. W hile some analysts see the violence as a tool for negotiations others see it as a way for the LTTE to force the Government to declare war. The attempted assassination of the army commander, like the assassination of the Foreign Minister

38 Kadirigamar, could be seen as an act of war. Therefore it is also interesting that the Government chose to rely on a limited use of force to demonstrate that it would not be cowed down.

Yet, a number of civilians were killed in the attacks including 13 men women and children, 25 were injured and more than 1,000 civilians fled. The loss of civilian life raised serious question of the choice of target, accuracy and the government’s response to the suicide attack. The human cost of the suicide blast and the aerial attack highlighted the human suffering involved as the two sides use force to re-assert their strategic positions and demonstrate their strength.

As noted above, over the current quarterly period the violence rapidly escalated. The estimated numbers of people killed provides some indication of the scale of violence with February and March seeing double digits (13 and 23 respectively), and April a three figure total (INFORM estimates that at least 188 people were killed, while CPA estimates are 234).152

Looking at the two perspectives, it is possible to infer causality between the various incidents to the escalation of violence and the responses: for the LTTE the continuing and increasing attacks by the Karuna Group, despite the Geneva Agreement, accompanied by state military action without seeming regard for protecting Tamil civilians, and for the Government, the attacks on the navy followed by the claymore lines. Thus, it is possible to identify a cause and response in the escalation of violence. Yet, as the scale and nature of the violence demonstrates, the cycle of violence has expanded with the response and retaliation being both local and macro. In sum, the developments over the last quarter seemed to demonstrate the parties’ ability to absorb significantly high levels of violence, and a willingness on their part to engage in armed conflict through a variety of means, while ostensibly committed to the CFA. Thus, a key question is what will it take for the parties to return to war?

4.2.3 Human Security: Civilians increasingly becoming victims of undeclared war and targets of retributive violence Over this quarterly period, the overall human security situation that seemed to improve with the announcement of the Geneva Talks, swiftly deteriorated, relapsing to previous and new patterns of violence that increasingly placed civilians at the forefront of violence. As noted in the previous quarterly report, “civilians are not just caught in the crossfire, but have become the targets of violence.” Looking at the forms of militarization, the patterns of violence, and the targets of attack over this last quarter seems to be the case more and more. Over this quarter it seems the distinction between combatants and civilians has shrunk as the LTTE has tried to make clear that the violence is

39 generated by the people and the Armed Forces have sought to minimize the LTTE’s military strength through taking concerted action, be it prevention or retaliatory, against civilians. This quarter has also seen an increase in the number of abductions and disappearances with particular areas such as Batticaloa, W elikanda, Jaffna and even the South experiencing an upsurge of such incidents. Civilians have also had to experiences sustained periods of violence as one incident leads to a response creating a surge of violence, intensifying fear and prompting whole communities into displacement. Trincomalee suffered multiple forms and incidents of violence that polarized ethnic communities and generated waves of displacement. Thus, it would not be an exaggeration to state that the human security situation in this present quarter is a replication of those periods during the war years.

Both the armed forces and the LTTE have seriously challenged the concept of non-combatants. The LTTE has increasingly tried to minimize the distinction between itself and the Tamil civilian population by not trying to avoid attacks in civilian populated areas and by presenting the civilians as being responsible for particular attacks, particularly claymore mines. As one journalist noted, “Government security forces were faced with an enemy that appeared from within the civil population. W hen the army said that it had killed suspected attackers, the Tigers said they were innocent civilians.”153 As noted over previous reports, there were contradictory reports after an attack on a security check point, with forces retaliating by killing the suspected attackers. While civilians have got caught in this crossfire, the suspected assailant would also be identified by the LTTE and by Tamil media as a civilian while the state media and the forces would describe him/her as a “Tiger/LTTEer.” Thus it has become a propaganda war with civilians increasingly having to suffer the brunt of it. The LTTE has in fact tried to publicly disassociate itself from particular forms of violence like claymore mines by stating that it is civilian groups who are responsible. Simultaneously it is providing military training for civilians as if to prove the fact that it is civilians who are engaging in violence and that they are potential culprits for future violence. Furthermore, the military training of vulnerable groups such as senior citizens and children by the LTTE has intensified the challenge to distinctions between combatants and non-combatants. On April 17, while reportedly laying a claymore mine a 16-year old teenager was killed when it exploded prematurely. This led to renewed calls for the LTTE to end the use of underage combatants.154

Violence against Tamil civilians be it retaliation in the immediate aftermath of violence or as a means of intimidating the Tamil population, has led to increased killings and abductions. There seems to be an increasing tolerance at best or willingness by the state to target civilians as a means of contain the LTTE’s network and military apparatus. One defence columnist claimed that “the armed forces have

40 not yet been able to counter the LTTE’s use of claymore attacks which have emerged as the Tigers’ weapon of choice in all types of land attacks in urban and semi-urban areas.”155 However, it seemed that the state turned to the use of violence and intimidation against the civilian population, be it through killings, disappearance, abductions or harassment as a counter-strategy. In sum, Tamil civilians in particular face increasing problems as a result of both sides’ actions.

As discussed above two new patterns of violence emerged which had a significant impact on human security in the North East, including the aerial bombardment such as in Muttur and civilian-on- civilian killing. W ith regards to the latter, during the CFA period, there were a number of incidents of civilian-on-civilian killings particularly in the East between the Tamil and Muslim Communities. Over this current quarter in Trincomalee, there were a spate of incidents where civilians were brutally killed as seen with the riots during the April New Year Holiday. In addition, there were a number of massacres where men, women and children were targeted and ruthlessly killed as described in the Situation in Trincomalee.

The impact of violence on all three communities has been multiple: individuals being killed, others subject to various forms of violence and injuries, increased levels of fear and trauma, loss livelihoods, multiple forms of displacement. In addition to these direct impacts there have been other effects on normal day-to-day life in the North East: the rising cost of goods produced outside the district, businesses and offices closing well before dusk or restricted transport facilities. Thus, over this quarter large portions of the North East have endured continuing crises of insecurity.

The type of killings of civilians seen in the previous quarter where young males in particular were targeted intensified over this current quarter. There was a steady increase in abductions with bodies appearing a day or two later. Abductions spread to Jaffna, Batticaloa, Vavuniya, Trincomalee.: the police found two men’s bodies in Maha Arambagulam, Vavuniya on April 18.156 Bodies also began appearing on beaches: the bodies of three fishermen who had been missing for five days were washed ashore on April 17; an unidentified body appeared on Kallady Beach, Batticaloa on April 21.157 It is likely that these abductions are punitive measures and a lesson for the rest of the population to terrorize them into submission. In Vavuniya two bodies were found with multiple gun and knife injuries and in this incident a note was placed by the bodies warning those giving information to the LTTE.158 Male youth were frequently targeted for this pattern of violence. In Jaffna, on April 19 3, bodies were found in a three wheeler in Atchuveli; another 5 bodies were found by the army camp at Tharavai.159 The suspected involvement of the security forces in such abductions and killings have raised serious questions regarding state impunity, complicity, and

41 participation in the abuse of fundamental human rights. One human rights group claimed that “elements in the armed forces that favour vigilante actions to promote Sinhalese claims appear to be in a stronger position in the state apparatus since the election.”160

Bodies also began to appear in the South: a body of an unidentified youth in Preethipura, W attala on April 5, 3 beheaded bodies on the Thunmodara Puwakpitiya Road and 2 more near W arakatenna Estate, Dehiowita on April 11; a headless nude body of a young man in Mulleriyawa on April 28. As a local human rights organization stated, the appearance of these bodies, some of which were nude and had their hands tied behind their backs “brought back memories of the ‘reign of terror’ of the late 1980s.”161 W hile the police sought to present some of these killings as the work of the underworld, Tamil politicians and rights groups called for thorough investigations. Coupled with the culture of killings and violence in the North East they seemed to indicate a steadily worsening culture of impunity throughout the island. Arrests and detention also increased with Tamil youth becoming frequent targets, especially in the wake of particular incidents. For instance, in the wake of the suicide attack against the army commander, 97 Tamils were arrested in Colombo. There are also reports of Tamil youth disappearing after being detained or stopped for questioning by the armed forces. Five Tamil youth who came to Kantale from Muttur were stopped and questioned by the armed forces according to local villagers in Poddankadu on April 22. The bodies’ of two of these youth were found with gunshot wounds the next day.162

Abductions for recruitment purposes by the LTTE continued in this quarter. A few days following the Geneva Agreement, 2 men from Umnichchi, Batticaloa were abducted on February 28 and taken to a LTTE camp which they escapade from and sought refuge in a police station.163 There were a number of reports of the LTTE forcing adults to attend military training, intensifying people’s insecurity as well as their ability to conduct their daily life. Civilians in government-controlled areas harbored fears that they would get noted by the security forces for attending the LTTE training. Civilians have little choice but to attend these training sessions.164 Farmers who were trying to engage in cultivation for instance, had to leave their fields and engage in day-long training sessions every week. There were also reports of individuals fleeing their homes to stay with relatives and friends in other areas in the North-East in order to avoid military training. Twenty families fled their village seeking army protection because 50 LTTE cadres had insisted on training them.

A high profile case which the government and media used to highlight the LTTE’s continuing practice of child recruitment was the case of 17 year old Sivanathasundaram Chandrakumar and 15 year old K. Vinoharan who were abducted by the LTTE, taken to Camp Three Two Base in

42 Trincomalee for military training, and later escaped. The incident highlighted a wave of alleged abductions taking place around Trincomalee Town’s suburbs and environs, particularly in China Bay and Ambulawilpuram.165 This incident also raised concern over the state’s handling of the children, in particular their failure to protect the children’s identity.

Abductions of adults and children by men in white vans particularly in the East became a more frequent occurrence. This practice was used throughout the conflict during certain periods, but over the CFA period, this practice seemed to have ended until recently. Over this current quarter, white van abductions intensified in government-controlled Batticaloa targetting school children and youth.166 W hite van abductions were also reported from the W elikanda area. The involvement of the Karuna Group in abductions particularly in Batticaloa Town and in W elikanda seemed to have increased, in the post-Geneva period. One INGO was even asked to accompany school children to and from school as an army officer confessed that they were incapable of ensuring security within the town.167

Violence and the threat of violence strengthened the climate of fear and intimidation. One high profile case was the appointment of Professor Ratnajeevan Hoole as Vice Chancellor of the Jaffna University. The appointment was opposed by the LTTE and by student organizations which led to Professor Hoole deciding to function from Colombo due to threats on his life. In the South Eastern University, the re-appointment of Professor Hussein Ismail as Vice Chancellor led to protests and on April 27, his car was shot at in Oluvil. W hile the attackers have not been positively identified it seems that the attackers were from within the Muslim community. As noted in the Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Cluster humanitarian workers found it increasingly difficult to function and also became the victims of violence. In April, a campaign against local women working in INGOs picked up in the Batticaloa and Amparai District, in both the Tamil and Muslim Communities against the backdrop of an alleged surge in abortion figures; this rapidly became politicized. W ith the appearance of leaflets calling on families not to allow their women folk to go to work, some local NGOs tried to counter, demanding that women’s rights to work be defended and that measures should be adopted to prevent the abuse of women in the workplace. Intimidation of a wide cross section of people by a number of armed groups has been reported, including “senseless attempts being made to intimidate internally displaced persons who are taking sanctuary in government run welfare centres.”168

Deterioration in the human security situation in the North-East in particular, created a number of challenges including the right of humanitarian agencies to work, the protection of and neutrality of civilians in armed conflicts, state impunity and accountability, and non-state actors and their

43 willingness to function under key humanitarian norms. For instance, as in previous quarters, civilians continued to get caught in the cross fire. In the claymore explosion in Mirusuvil in April 2 NGO personnel working for HUDEC were killed; this suggests no real effort was made to prevent civilian casualties in the detonation of the claymore.

W ithin the quarter, the issue of state accountability and impunity became a dominant concern. The role of security agencies in particular acts of violence and intimidation was repeatedly highlighted but there seemed to be an inability and unwillingness on the part of the state to take concerted action. The state would most often condemn particular acts, announcing an investigation but the follow processes would most often get delayed. A high profile case was the investigation into the killing of the five students in Trincomalee Town in January where the STF were the prime suspects. In April the Government Analyst’s Department concluded that none of the bullets found in the bodies of the victims were fired by guns issued to the personnel so they were cleared of the charges.169 The violence and overall climate placed tremendous stress on government accountability and law and order mechanisms, but the lack of political will further debilitated existing structures. The Human Rights Commission ceased to be effective due to the political wrangling over appointments to the Constitutional Council. Key actors, including the former head of the HRC Radhika Coomaraswamy, Amnesty International, and local civil society groups called for immediate steps to be taken to ensure the HRC’s continuity. As a human rights groups put it “W here, a state is unwilling or unable to bring the culprits to justice; and where the identity of the perpetrators is difficult to pin down due to lack of control or capacity in the state apparatus, or because the main protagonists see a vested interest in maintaining an environment of uncertainty and terror; the challenges to human rights monitoring and investigating are profound.”170 In addition, as the level of violence and insecurity has increased some of the key agencies that promote civilian security such as the police, UN agencies, INGOs and NGOs have found it increasingly difficult to operate in vulnerable areas so that protection, investigation and basic humanitarian assistance to victims (or potential victims) of violence has become increasingly difficult.

Over this current quarterly period, it seems that that the overall human security situation saw a rapid improvement followed by a steady increase of violations in the form of a surge of killings, massacres, and abductions. as the various armed groups and even civilians became involved in tit for tat and retaliatory violence. As the SLMM head warned “Retaliation will not make the situation better. It will kill more people. There can be no military victory in this war. If there was, we would have already seen it.”171 The qualitative and quantitative shift in violence led to a replication of patterns of

44 violence seen in the conflict over the last 20 years, making a mockery of the CFA and the parties’ constant assertion of their commitment to it.

45 V. CONSTITUTIONAL & LEGAL CLUSTER 5.1 Context The previous quarter was relatively quiet in terms of concrete constitutional and legal developments that were foreseen to impact the peace process. Nevertheless, the issue of the Supreme Court’s impartiality and independence remained at the forefront as the Court revisited a number of significant cases tracked through prior quarterly periods, including the P-TOMS and Helping Hambantota cases, as well as some new issues coming before the Court, including the implementation of UN Human Rights Committee opinions against the Sri Lankan State. In addition, the broader repercussions of the Sri Lankan Government’s failure to reconstitute the Constitutional Council and other currently-defunct constitutionally mandated independent commissions were addressed during the previous quarterly period.

5.2 Factors, Trends and Indicators By contrast, the present quarterly period is marked by several developments which have highlighted the critical challenges to democratic governance and the independence of the judiciary. In particular, the issue surrounding the reconstitution of the Constitutional Council and the other constitutionally- mandated independent commissions has turned into a full-blown crisis which has yet to be resolved.

5.2.1 Growing crisis with regards to the independence of the judiciary and of democratic governance The repercussions of the Government’s failure to reconstitute the Constitutional Council in accordance with the 17th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution reached a tipping point during this quarterly period. By the terms of the 17th Amendment, one of the ten members to the Constitutional Council is to be appointed by the collective agreement of the smaller political parties and/or independent groups in Parliament not belonging to the respective political parties of the Government or the Leader of the Opposition.172 This last member has yet to be nominated as the result of disagreement among the various political parties as to which parties are in fact eligible to participate in the nomination process. In particular, the TNA and the JVP are in disagreement as to whether the JVP should be treated as a smaller party outside of the Government for purposes of appointing this “smaller party” representative to the Constitutional Council; the TNA argument is that, having won its seats to the Parliament on the basis of its coalition with the PA, the JVP should be treated as part of the Government and not as a separate party. Meanwhile, the JHU has entered the fray by arguing that neither the TNA, Up-Country Tamils parties, nor the SLMC should be allowed to determine the smaller party member of the Constitutional Council, on the grounds that their respective constituencies have already been represented through other appointments.

46 Meanwhile, as of early April 2006, President Rajapakse has unilaterally appointed members to both the National Police Commission and Public Services Commission whilst the Constitutional Council has not been constituted. This effectively circumvents the constitutional process of appointing the nominees of the Constitutional Council to independent commissions and amounts to subversion of the authority of the Constitutional Council and the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution which provides for it.173

In addition to challenging the constitution, the President’s appointments also have repercussions for the peace process. As noted by the Centre for Policy Alternatives in its recent press release concerning the controversy: Embarking on a course of action which is in flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of the Constitution while at the same time taking a strict, legalistic approach to constitutional interpretation in its negotiations with the LTTE on issues such as the constitutionality of the Cease-Fire Agreement and the P-TOMS mechanism, is particularly unfortunate, as it demonstrates inconsistency and double standards. The LTTE and Tamil nationalists will be able to argue, with justification, that the Rule of Law and fidelity to the Constitution become relevant only when dealing with the exercise of power by governments of Sri Lanka and their leaders.174

The crisis in governance and rule of law caused by the Constitutional Council/17th Amendment controversy has been further exacerbated by the sudden and unexpected resignations of two senior Supreme Court Judges from the three-member Judicial Services Commission (JSC), chaired by the Chief Justice, in early February 2006.175 The failure to reconstitute the Constitutional Council now also paralyzes the JSC since appointments to vacancies on the JSC must also be approved by the Constitutional Council. In March 2006, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court submitted nominations of two other Supreme Court Judges to the President to fill the vacancies on the JSC. The prospect that the President might unilaterally fill the vacancies to the JSC in circumvention of the constitutional process and the requirement that any such appointments be approved by the Constitutional Council, as he has done with respect to the National Police Commission and the Public Services Commission, would again call into question the Government’s commitment to the rule of law, democratic governance and an independent judiciary.176

More importantly, the circumstances under which the two Supreme Court Judges resigned from the JSC further highlights the erosion in the independence of the judiciary. The Judges have reportedly

47 indicated that they resigned on grounds that they were “unable to work according to their conscience”177 and reportedly indicated their willingness to fully state their reasons for resigning only before a parliamentary select committee established to inquire into the JSC crisis.178 However, no such investigatory committee has been established to date. The response by the Chief Justice179 raised serious questions about his conduct and reflected the present challenge of dealing with a highly politicized judiciary.

The Anti-Conversion Bill has resurfaced on the legislative agenda during this quarterly period. A nineteen-member “legislative standing committee on the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion Bill” was appointed in April 2006 to review the revised draft anti-conversion legislation before it goes to the Parliament for a final vote.180 The draft bill, which was amended following an August 2004 Supreme Court ruling that certain provisions of the original bill were incompatible with Article 10 of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of religion, criminalizes religious conversions by imposing prison terms and/or severe monetary fines as penalties for violations. The enactment of such a bill could further institutionalize communal cleavages and thereby harm the socio-political environment surrounding the peace process.

The issue of Electoral System Reform has also resurfaced on the legislative agenda during this quarterly period. A nineteen-member parliamentary select committee has been established to act on the recommendations of a previous parliamentary select committee. The earlier committee had recommended the reform of the present electoral system towards a German-model mixed-member system incorporating elements of both proportional representation and first-past-post electoral systems. The newly-established committee is to issue an interim report by 31 July, 2006. There appears to be a broad agreement among the political establishment that reform of the present electoral system is required and, moreover, that a mixed system would be the most viable electoral system to accommodate the country’s multi-ethnic socio-political needs. If this apparent broad consensus in principle is accompanied by a genuine commitment or desire to push the reform process from committees and reports to actual implementation, successful electoral reform could serve as a catalyst towards peaceful communal co-existence. On the other hand, however, the debate surrounding electoral reform is itself integrally intertwined with the larger debate surrounding constitutional reform and devolution of power as a solution to the ethnic conflict generally. As such, it is more likely that reform of the electoral system will be an outcome of, rather than a catalyst for, the peaceful settlement of the ethnic conflict, and that this current renewed attention on the idea of electoral reform will be short-lived.

48 The local government elections, conducted nationwide on 30 March 2006, were postponed in several districts for various legal and security reasons. Several local government elections in the south and east were postponed until 20 May 2006. The election of the Colombo Municipal Council was postponed as a result of a petition challenging the rejection of the nomination list of the . The Court of Appeal rejected the UNP list on the grounds that it included a candidate who had not attained the legally prescribed age to stand as a candidate (18 years) as of 1st June 2004, the date of commencement of the revision of the operative electoral register. The Court had restrained the elections officer from taking steps towards conducting the election until the matter was resolved. The nomination list for the People’s Alliance was rejected on similar grounds for the Municipal Council. Elections for both local government bodies eventually took place on 20 May 2006. Elections for three local institutions in Batticaloa, including the Kathankudy Urban Council and the Eravur Pradeshiya Sabha, were conducted on 20 May 2006. In Ampara, elections for six local authorities, including the Kalmunai Municipal Council, Navithanveli Pradeshiya Sabha, Akkaraipattu Pradeshiya Sabha, Pottuvil Pradeshiya Sabha, Ninthavur Pradeshiya Sabha and Addalaichchenai Pradeshiya Sabha, were postponed to 20 May 2006. Including these above, elections for a total of twenty local government institutions were conducted on 20 May 2006 – four Municipal Councils (Colombo, Galle, Gampaha and Kalmunai), three Urban Councils (Gampoha, W attegama and Kathankudy) and thirteen Pradeshiya Sabhas (Seethawaka, Patha Hevaheta, Udapalata, Elpitiya, Korale Pattu W est, Eravur, Navithanveli, Pottuvil, Addalaichchenai, Akkaraipattu, Ninthavur, Kobegane and Balangoda).

Local government elections have been postponed until 30 September 2006 in the five northern districts of Jaffna, Killinochchi, Mullaitivu, Vavuniya and Mannar, as well as those remaining local authorities in Batticaloa district which were not elected on 20 May 2006, on the grounds that the security situation in the LTTE-controlled and High Security Zone areas in those districts was not conducive to conducting the elections.181 Given the escalating violence in the north and east, it is foreseeable that the security situation will not be any more conducive to conducting the polls in these districts in September 2006, as is proposed. The continued postponement of local elections would result in the effective disenfranchisement of a significant portion of the population in LTTE- controlled and High Security Zone areas of the country.

The issue of a NGO select committee that appeared in the previous quarters re-emerged in this quarter. The Select Committee to Investigate the Operations and Impact of Non Governmental Organizations was established during the last quarterly period by the government of the newly elected President Rajapakse. In April 2006, the Select Committee placed a newspaper advertisement

49 calling for representations from the public in respect of the Committee’s terms of reference.182 W hile the Committee has yet to report on its findings, the apparent political motivations behind the establishment of the Committee itself, as reflected by its mandate under its terms of reference,183 suggests an attempt to weaken civil society and serves as another blow to democratic governance in Sri Lanka.

The Emergency Regulations that went into effect nationwide immediately after the assassination of Foreign Minister Kadirgamar were again extended on 21 March, 2006. This latest extension passed through Parliament without a vote, as most parliamentarians were away from Colombo campaigning ahead of the March 2006 local elections. As has been noted in prior reports, the regulations continue to raise concerns surrounding their discriminatory impact inasmuch as they give the police and state security apparatus expansive powers of search, arrest, detention, and seizure of property, while simultaneously suspending various concomitant due-procedural safeguards, designed to protect individual rights and liberties. The continued enforcement of the emergency regulations will continue to place a strain on public sentiment among the community at the receiving end – the Tamils. It is foreseeable, also, that the emergency regulations will continue to be renewed and extended, unaltered, by the Parliament indefinitely.

50 VI. ECONOM IC CLUSTER

6.1 Context Despite the political turbulence in the previous quarter macro-economic stability has been maintained ensuring that annual growth rate remains relatively high. All statistical data in Section 1 is derived from the Central Bank of Sri Lanka184 and hence much of the data and analysis will be on the first quarterly period, January-March, using more current information where available. Section 2 is derived from secondary sources and collected in the field in the North and East region by the Point Pedro Institute of Development (PPID).

6.2 Factors, Trends and Indicators 6.2.1 M acro Economy of Sri Lanka: Continuing economic growth despite violence and expectations of war, suggesting relative insulation of key sectors of economy from conflict and the security situation The macro-economy seems to have performed well during the first quarter of this year despite deteriorating security situation in the North-East. As long as the heightened violence in the conflict region does not spill over to the W estern Province the macro-economy of Sri Lanka is quite safe. Thus the economic indicators suggest that growth can be sustained irrespective of the security situation but the impact of violence on economic targets or massive violence with significant economic repercussions could become a key concern if violence continues in earnest in the forthcoming period.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Sri Lanka grew by 6% (in real terms) in 2005, which was a remarkable achievement given the negative impacts of the tsunami on the economy and the rise in world oil price. The industrial and services sectors contributed the most to this growth while agriculture sector’s contribution was marginal. Thus, the industrial sector grew by 8.3% (up from 5.2% growth in 2004) and the services sector grew by 6.4% (down from 7.6% in 2004) while the agricultural sector grew by only 1.5% in 2005 having recorded negative growth in the first two quarters (up from 0.3% growth in 2004 due to severe drought).

The services sector contributed almost 60%, industrial sector 36%, and agriculture sector just over 4% to the overall growth rate of the GDP in 2005. Overall, the services sector growth in 2005 (6.4%) was lower than in 2004 (7.6%).185 Domestic trade, post and telecommunications, and financial services sub-sectors largely contributed to this.186 However, port, wholesale & retail trade, and hotel & restaurant services decelerated during the last quarter of 2005.

51 Industrial sector growth was primarily boosted by the growth in the construction sub-sector as a result of massive reconstruction activities in the aftermath of the tsunami. Despite the phasing out of the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) Sri Lanka’s principal industrial export, viz. readymade garments, increased both in terms of volume and value with a decline in volume and value in the European market offset by gain in the USA.187 Services sector growth was mainly contributed by port, telecommunications, and financial services sub-sectors.

Agriculture sector growth was hampered by drastic drop in the fisheries sub-sector as a result of the tsunami (43% decline in output). However, agricultural growth in 2005 was better than in 2004 when it recorded negative growth as a result of drought. Paddy and tea crops were the primary contributors to the agricultural growth in 2005 and output hitting record levels.188

The first quarter GDP growth rate is still not available. However, it is expected to be over 6% in real terms as a result of increased agricultural output, industrial production, and services sector output. Services sector growth figures for the first quarter 2006 are still not available. Industrial exports (in value terms) declined dramatically by 36% in January 2006 to USD 325 million (compared to USD 507 million in the previous month). It was also lower by 14% compared to January 2005, which recorded USD 378 million worth of industrial exports. However, industrial exports in value picked up in February 2006 to USD 425 million, which was 9% higher than recorded in February 2005 (USD 390 million). March figures are not yet available. Industrial production during the first two months of this year was on the rise both in the private and public sector.189

In the agricultural sector favourable weather condition has boosted outputs of all major crops, viz. paddy, tea, rubber, and coconut during the first quarter of this year. Agriculture sector has come a long way since the dismal performance in 2004 (-0.3%) and the first two quarters of 2005 (-1.6% & - 2.7% respectively). Tea production during the first quarter (January-March) of 2006 recorded 77.5 million kilograms, which was higher than the preceding quarter and corresponding quarter of last year.190 It is anticipated that demand for Ceylon tea will increase,191 yet auction prices that rose in January dropped to a low, last seen in July 2005.192 Compared to the previous quarter, rubber production increased considerably but coconut production dropped during the first quarter of 2006.193

Inflation, in terms of the Sri Lanka Consumer Price Index (SLCPI), was declining in the first two months of this year but increased in March. The point-to-point rate of inflation194 dropped to 3.2% in January (from 3.6% in December 2005), but increased to 3.5% in February and 6.4% in March.

52 The annual average rate of inflation dropped to 9.4% in January (from 10.6% in December 2005) and further to 8.3% in February. However, it increased to 9.6% in March 2006. The point-to-point change in the rates of inflation during the months in the first quarter this year was significantly lower than in the corresponding period last year. Similarly, the annual average rate of inflation in February and March was considerably lower than in the corresponding months last year though almost the same in January. The annual average rate of inflation, in terms of the Colombo Consumer Price Index (CCPI), was considerably higher in January (11.1%) and February (10.3%) than in terms of the SLCPI, but remained the same in March (9.6%).

Interest rates generally remained static or began to decline during the quarter under review. As the inflation started decelerating in recent months interest rates also started declining or remained unchanged. The weighted average prime lending rate increased negligibly to 12.28% by end-January 2006, declined by 0.3 percentile points, remaining more or less static in March.195 The Treasury bill (12-months) rate remained more or less constant during the first quarter of 2006.196 Further, both the repo and reverse repo rates197 remained static at 8.75% and 10.25% respectively throughout the quarter under review, same as in end-December. However, all the foregoing interest rates during the quarter under review were higher than in the corresponding quarter last year. Interest rates are likely to gradually drop because the inflation has started to decelerate.

In International Trade the trade deficit in January 2006 dropped but rose in February due to a rise in exports and despite an increase in imports from the previous month. Exports dropped by 30% in value terms in January (USD 440 million) compared to the previous month (USD 625.4 million) while imports dropped by 10%.198 Hence, the trade deficit increased by 85% to USD (-) 240 million in January from USD (-) 130 million in December. Trade deficit in January 2006 was four times higher than that was in January 2005 (USD -62 million) because exports declined by 15% and imports increased by 17%. However, exports increased by 22% to USD 538 million in February 2006 from USD 440 million in the previous month. Similarly, imports increased by 10% in February 2006 to USD 748 million compared to USD 680 million in January. Therefore, trade deficit dropped by 12.5% to USD (-) 210 million in February compared to January 2006. However, trade deficit in February 2006 was 76% higher than in February 2005 (USD -119 million).

In Balance-of-Payments the gross official reserve of foreign currencies dropped marginally (by 2.5%) to USD 2,667 million by end of January 2006 (from USD 2,735 million by the end of December 2005), but increased by 8% to USD 2,879 million by end-February. Furthermore, the gross official reserve by the end of January and February this year were significantly higher than the

53 corresponding period last year; i.e. 41% higher (compared to USD 1,896 million by end-January 2005) and 43% higher (compared to USD 2,014 million by end-February 2005) respectively. Despite significantly higher trade deficit during the first two months of this year (USD -450 million) compared to the first two months of last year (USD -181 million) gross official reserves during the first two months of this year were significantly higher compared to the same period last year because of higher net private remittances received and tourism earnings earned in the first two months of this year compared to last year and the previous quarter.199

Capital M arkets were generally buoyant during the quarter under review, with the stock market showing resilience, despite dropping at times because of surge in violence in the North-East. Stock market performance, which was quite upbeat throughout 2005 until October, started to decline since November 2005 because of political uncertainty and the fragility of the ceasefire. The All Share Price Index200 improved to 2,130 points by the last week of January (from 1,887 points in December end), to 2,237 points by the last week of February, and to 2,263 points by the last week of March. Similarly, the Milanka Price Index201 increased by end of January to 2,733 points (from 2,436 points by end December), and to 2,839 and 2,876 points by end-February and end-March respectively. Both price indices were significantly higher than in the corresponding period last year. However, the average daily turnover in the Colombo Stock Exchange during the last weeks of February and March were significantly lower than the corresponding period last year.

The Economic Outlook of the new administration Although the newly elected President is from the same party as the previous president the style and substance of governance including economic policies did undergo changes as with any personality change in politics. This was demonstrated when the new President scrapped the original Budget 2006 and submitted a new Budget 2006 on December 08th.

Although on the public expenditure side total budget allocation did not change there were some changes in certain ministerial allocations. On the public revenue side most critical proposal was the reintroduction of stamp duty on a variety of transactions. The Value Added Tax (VAT) rates were also upwardly revised. These additional revenue-raising measures are necessary to fund the 30% rise in total public expenditure compared to 2005 budget allocation. However, whether these new revenues are realizable or not is a moot question.

The new President has shelved privatisation of public enterprises, and hiked and widened the

54 coverage of subsidies on fertiliser and fuel. These subsidies, though cushioning the impact of the rise in world oil price and promoting greater use of fertiliser in paddy cultivation in the short-term, is a huge burden on the economy in the medium and long-terms because of rise in public debt and taxes. In 2005 fuel subsidy cost LKR 26 billion and fertiliser subsidy cost almost LKR 7 billion. Thus, total expenditure on these subsidies (USD 33 million) was higher than the total public expenditure on education (LKR 26 billion earmarked) or health (LKR 30 billion earmarked) last year.

Though donors seem to be skeptical about the new economic regime gradually they are seen to be accommodating the populist policies of the new President (at least for the time being) in the larger interest of politico economic stability. Immediately after assuming office in late-November 2005 the new President was confronted by the unleashing of violence. This has in fact helped the new President to deflect the attention of the donor community from economic reforms to maintaining the stability of the economy and polity at a time of heightened violence.

Besides, the new President did not require any urgent assistance from the donor community as external reserves of the government soared to a record high during the last quarter of 2005 and the first quarter of this year (see section on balance-of-payments) despite rising oil price in the world market (thereby increasing the cost of imports), thanks to the one-year debt moratorium given by major donors in the aftermath of the tsunami. As to how long this position can be maintained is a debatable.

6.2.2 Economy of the North-East: Violence compounding cost of living and retarding limited growth It appears that the economy of the North-East, especially the North, is sliding back to the pre- ceasefire times. Although there was a lull in violence between end-January and end-March the overall economic environment did not change much since December last year when a fresh round of civil war erupted. The violence in turn has led to a rise in cost of living continue unabated and loss of livelihoods continue to rise.

The precipice that the economy of the North-East faces is quite evident. Some of the salient features of the civil war economy are heightened transaction costs and shortage of commodities resulting in spiraling prices, dramatic drop in prices of locally produced perishable commodities such as vegetables, fruits, and fish which cannot be marketed outside the immediate areas of production, frequent strikes and population displacements resulting in loss of livelihood opportunities, hoarding by unscrupulous merchants creating artificial shortages, and growing dependence on welfare

55 handouts by the government and donor agencies. The climate of fear and insecurity coupled with population displacement has severely impacted livelihood opportunities. These losses of livelihoods in turn have dampened demand for goods and services, which in turn reduces supply. Thus, there is a vicious cycle of supply and demand induced economic decline in the North-East, particularly in Jaffna and Trincomalee districts.

Current economic precipice has both supply and demand side contributions. On the supply side, shortages (real or contrived) due to impediments to movements of goods from rest of the country, non-marketability of perishable goods on time, and frequent shutout of markets negatively impacts on the North-East economy. On the demand side, loss of livelihoods due to general insecurity, scaling down of economic activities both in the private and public sector, restrictions on certain occupations due to security considerations, and population displacements would reduce demand for goods and services and thereby negatively impacts on the North-East economy.

Loss of livelihoods as a result of the resumption of civil war is threefold: one is due to displacement as a result of violence, fear and intimidation by the various armed actors in the North East, including from government-controlled areas to LTTE-held territories or vice versa, or from vulnerable areas to welfare centers, homes of friends and relatives etc.. Second is due to restrictions imposed on certain occupations such as fishing for security reasons. Third is due to curtailment of socio economic activities as a result of frequent strikes and general insecurity, which deprives the livelihoods of daily wage earners who are the majority in the North-East

Thousands202 of people living around forward defence lines between the government security forces and the LTTE in Vadamarachchi East in Jaffna district and Muthur in Trincomalee district have been fleeing the areas due to frequent skirmishes and in anticipation of trouble in the near future. In addition there has been large scale displacement in Trincomalee as a result of the attacks by armed groups and the ethnic violence. In other areas killings and attacks have prompted communities to flee homes and seek shelter in public buildings and more secure temporary shelters. As war clouds loom there are reports of a concerted effort to induce/coerce these returnees to move to rebel-held territories again as they could provide vital human shield to the rebels at times of war.203 They have all had to leave behind their farms and fishing hamlets, and thereby abandon their livelihoods in order to relocate to safer places of living.

Similarly thousands of fisherpersons have fully or partially lost their livelihoods because of re- imposition of restrictions on fishing in and around Trincomalee harbour, in the coast off Mannar,

56 and in Jaffna peninsula in December last. However, these restrictions were somewhat relaxed in early-February as a result of the impending peace talks in Geneva. Later it was re-imposed in March after a naval craft was blown off the northwestern coast. It was further tightened in April in Trincomalee and in Jaffna in May. At present (mid-May) fishing along the Vadamarachchi coast (Kankesanthurai to Vettrilaikerni) in Jaffna peninsula is totally banned.

General climate of resumption of war has made several mobile and rapid liquidity businesses wind up in the past few months in the North, particularly in Jaffna and Vavuniya, and Trincomalee in the East. Further, many donor funded rehabilitation and reconstruction projects have also suspended or curtailed its operations in the past few months, particularly in Jaffna and Trincomalee. This suspension intensified with the killing of two humanitarian workers in Jaffna in March204. Reconstruction of homes for the tsunami affected has also come to a standstill in Jaffna, which has deprived jobs mainly to skilled and semi-skilled construction workers. Moreover, frequent politically motivated strikes have also severely affected the casual/daily labour market both in the East and North. Hence, anecdotal evidence suggests that the overall political and economic uncertainty has caused thousands of livelihood losses though numbers are hard to determine.

Government welfare programmes, at least to a limited extent, look after the immediate needs of people who have moved to welfare camps etc but not to the categories of people whose livelihoods have been affected who have been left to fend for themselves though they form the majority of the livelihood losses.

Economic losses due to ethnic riots in Trincomalee

In the aftermath of a bomb explosion in the Trincomalee public market on April 12 there was a series of organized arson and looting of businesses and homes of Tamils and Muslims in Trincomalee town. The Chamber of Commerce and Industries of Trincomalee District (CCITD) has compiled a list of individual losses with names, addresses, and monetary value of losses incurred. Nearly 50 business premises, rented buildings, vehicles, and private homes were fully or partially damaged in the ethnic disturbances205. The total value of direct losses due to these disturbances is estimated to be little over LKR 150 million. In addition to these direct losses there would be indirect losses as a result of loss of business until the re-establishment of these affected businesses. The government has given assurance that it would pay compensation to the victims.

The Cost of Living,206 which began to accelerate in the last quarter of 2005, continued to increase

57 during the first quarter of this year. However, there are two differences. During last year, prices in Jaffna used to be the highest followed by Ampara/Batticaloa, and the least cost was Vavuniya. However, during the first three months of this year Jaffna remained the costliest place followed by Vavuniya, and the least cost place was Ampara/Batticaloa (see graph below). Secondly, during the first quarter 2006 the gap between Jaffna prices and other places were widening (see graph below). The economic consequences of the violence and the LTTE taxation are key factors influencing these trends.

There is also a clear division in the prices of locally produced goods (such as vegetables & rice) and the prices of goods brought from elsewhere in the island (or abroad) (see Tables 2.1-2.4). In fact, prices of vegetables and rice in the North-East are generally lower than in Colombo because they are by and large locally produced, and therefore tax incidences are low. Thus, price differences between the North-East and the rest of the country are due to higher prices of commodities flowing from rest of the country to the North-East. In fact, prices of vegetables have been declining between January and March in all the places where prices were collected (see Tables 2.1-2.4). For instance, in price of rice (-17%) and vegetables have been declining while price of wheat (10%), sugar (14%) and LP gas (7%) has been increasing between January and March 2006 (see Table 2.1). In Jaffna district rice (66%), wheat (6%), sugar (17%), bread (9%), and LP gas (9%) prices have been rising while vegetable and cement (-8%) prices have been dropping (see Table 2.3).207 Cement price drop is due to suspension of construction works as a result of insecurity. W heat and Sugar price increases have multiplier effects as prices of wheat-based and sugar-based products also shoot up. Price rise of wheat, bread, sugar, and LP gas in the North-East is higher than at the national level and therefore not entirely due to national rate of inflation.

58 Total of Selected Commodity Prices January - March 2006

2,500 2,457 2,424 2,400 2,370 2,300

2,200 2,169 2,142 2,100 2,1021 2,069 2,04319 2,000 1,975 1,900 January February March

Ampara Batticaloa Jaffna Vavuniya

Source: Derived from Tables 1.1-1.3

In fact, price rises are much more severe than depicted by the numbers in the following tables, particularly in Jaffna and Vanni, as the price collection is restricted to a limited number of commodities. Furthermore, prices in Jaffna and Vanni were also higher due to prohibition of certain goods due to shortage (real or contrived) of goods due to closure of A9, taxation etc.

In the final quarter of last year LTTE hiked its tax rates due to the impending “final war”. This has resulted in certain distributors discontinuing supply of goods to the Vanni and Jaffna. For example, Uniliver (toiletries, personal healthcare products, packed food items, etc) and New Zealand Foods (Anchor milk powder, butter, etc) have suspended supply of its products to the Vanni and Jaffna. Similarly temporary closure of A9 after the attempt on the life of the Army Commander also resulted in dramatic increase in prices due to shortage of fuel and essential commodities in the peninsula and Vanni. In fact, soon after the closure of the A 9 on 25th April the shops in the LTTE-controlled Vanni, which are (almost entirely) directly or indirectly owned by the LTTE, began hoarding goods, with a significant impact on prices. Shortages are also artificially created through spreading of false rumors.

Because of the rise in essential goods prices daily labour charges have also been hiked which in turn fuels inflation. Thus, there is a vicious cycle of rise in cost of living in the conflict region, particularly in the North

59 Economic gloom in Jaffna Jaffna peninsula, economic hub of the North, seems to be one of the worst affected, economically due to the resurgence of sustained violence in the past six months. In Jaffna markets do not function regularly due to the prevailing insecurity. Besides, schools, offices, and businesses close early. Public transport services (public & private bus services and auto rickshaws) run only a skeleton service. According to the Northern Region Transport Board, earnings had dropped by 60% in January 2006.208 Further, due to non-marketability, prices of vegetables have dropped drastically in the peninsula. Although this price drop is favourable to consumers it hurts the farmers who produce them. The first quarter is a peak season for vegetable production and therefore local markets were flooded with variety of vegetables. However, due to the transport problem of moving produce outside the district farmers were unable to get the best price for their produce and compelled to sell at very low prices209. LTTE had also doubled the tax rate on fish catch in the first quarter of this year210 throughout the North-East including Jaffna. However, retail price of fish has not increased much in the peninsula due to transport problems hampering marketability of fish in the inland. It is reported that eight NGOs/INGOs have suspended their operations in the aftermath of the killing of humanitarian workers of HUDEC in the peninsula in March.211

The economic outlook for the North-East is gloomy as there is no end in sight for the spiral of violence. There is also no ray of hope for the resumption of peace talks between the GoSL and he LTTE in the near future. It appears that the conflict affected region would increasingly become dependent on welfare handouts give by the government and donors. Hence, the North-East is in real danger of becoming a welfare-driven economy.

60 VII. RELIEF, REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

7.1 Context This quarter witnessed an escalation of violence in the North East, which had a dramatic impact in the relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. This quarter saw large scale displacement as a result of the outbreak of violence, with increasing numbers of people fleeing as refugees to India. The violence placed tremendous strain on the various actors involved in humanitarian work, even forcing some agencies to suspend their work in conflict-affected areas. The interest in the tsunami affected, in general, has been waning but with the outbreak of violence the issue is in danger of being downplayed and sidelined. The displacement in Trincomalee demonstrated the slow response by the various actors in the area, resulting in slow delivery of assistance and highlighting the weaknesses in the system that is meant to provide immediate aid. A critical issue that has arisen is the effectiveness of disaster preparedness and whether there has been a fundamental change since the tsunami.

7.2.1 The upsurge in violence creating new displacements and exposing limited RRR capacities of key actors The recent escalation of violence in the North East has witnessed large scale displacement within Sri Lanka as well as migration of refugees to south India.212 In the climate of hostilities between the Armed Forces, the LTTE and other armed actors, it is the civilians who are the most affected, suffering the loss of lives, livelihoods, land and property. Conflict and the resulting displacement further affect ties within the community, devastating social and community relationships. What is of significance is that the media coverage on this large-scale displacement has been limited, with little mention of the day-to-day conditions they are presently facing.

Like in the previous quarter, there has been movement of civilians from the government controlled areas in the North to LTTE controlled areas.213 Officials in the Jaffna Kachcheri state that the number of civilians leaving government controlled areas over these months have been lower than in December 2005. The Government Agent in Killinochchi did not confirm places where civilians were moving to but reports have mentioned that the Government Agent in Jaffna is one of the few actors in Jaffna providing assistance.214 The increasing role of the military and the LTTE with relation to humanitarian issues was demonstrated in Vavunathivu in Batticaloa, when both the SLA and LTTE asked people to move to safer areas.215

61 W hile there has been movement of civilians to LTTE controlled areas, there has also been movement from LTTE controlled areas. For example, around 230 fisher families have been displaced from Kokilai and are presently residing in .216 Though they have been provided with dry rations, there is no space to prepare meals, an obvious oversight by the authorities. There have also been reports of displacement of about 400 people in Kebithigollewa Division in Anuradhapura.217 In addition, there have been incidents where people have been trapped in a place with no way of returning home and no place to take refuge for the night due to a sudden closure of the A9 road by the military. This happened for example in Vavuniya almost immediately after the suicide bomb attack in Colombo on the 25th of April.218

Modalities looking into compensation have been addressed in certain cases though there is no comprehensive plan as yet. For example, the government has taken action to provide relief and compensate those affected by the military attacks in Sampoor on the 25th of April. Funeral expenses will be provided to the next of kin of all identified bodies, so far 10 with a further 3 unidentified. W hile compensation for the 53 houses damaged is being looked into, there is uncertainty as to when people will be compensated. Damage to two schools will be restored “in due course” by the NEPC.219 40 rupees worth of dry rations per day have been provided to the displaced for one week.220 The issue of compensation demonstrates that there is no plan in place to deal with a situation of man made disaster or natural disaster, ambiguity and uncertainty in what has been promised by the Government and what will actually be given. It also is a very specific responding to a particular incident and not the overall situation, with multiple killings, lootings and displacements.

Issues arising from the situation in Trincomalee Following the bomb attack on the 12th of April in Trincomalee town, there was an escalation of violence in the surrounding areas. Targeting of people and communities purely based on ethnicity became evident. For instance, as a result of the body of a Sinhala man appearing in Mahindapura on the 14th of April, Sinhala villagers in Mahindapura went on a rampage of the Tamil village of Nadespura, destroying over 40 houses. The violence has paralysed normal civilian life and increased the fear and insecurity among the people in the area, creating distrust and hostility between the ethnic groups. The direct violence by the armed forces, the LTTE and other armed groups, and the fear it generates have forced many people into displacement as they seek safety in numbers and away from vulnerable areas.

Examining the trends of displacement, it is evident that people are leaving their homes and moving

62 to schools and other public buildings out of fear. Further, as a result of the fear and insecurity, others have moved to the houses of their family and friends. There are also people who move to public building or relative’s homes at night, creating a group of ‘night time displaced.’ As a result of the different patterns of displacement, an exact figure of those displaced is difficult to ascertain.

However, this does not contradict the fact that there are large numbers of displaced persons in the Trincomalee district. Rather, it demonstrates that displacement takes many forms. Sadly, the last few weeks witnessed many actors disputing the numbers of displaced in Mutur area. Prior to the aerial bombing of Sampoor, the Divisional Secretary for Mutur stated that there had been 8,760 displaced due to violence in Bharatipuram. Following the aerial bombing the Divisional Secretary of Mutur issued the number of displaced at 43,158. This was contested by sections of the Government in particular and some international agencies, claiming that the figure was much lower.221 Several days were spent contesting these figures, resulting in revised figures and the delay in the delivery of assistance. UNOCHA on the 1st of May issued figures at 21,554 totally displaced in the Trincomalee district since the 11th of April.222

Several issues have been highlighted in this incident. The responsibility of assessing displaced figures is one of them. Though there may have been inaccuracies in the numbers issues by the Divisional Secretary in Mutur, it must be kept in mind that he is the key government official responsible for providing with information in the area. Further, as a result of the conflict a census has not been undertaken in this area and therefore it is not possible to give exact numbers of households. In addition, as discussed above there are multiple forms of displacement. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is difficult to give exact figures of the displaced. W hat was evident from the incident is that though the various parties may disagree on the numbers of displaced, all admitted that there was large-scale displacement that needed to be addressed. It was unfortunate the disagreement of numbers, resulted in delays of providing humanitarian assistance rather than expedite it.

The violence following the bomb blast on April 12, displaced as many as 2673 people who were housed in five camps in Bharathi Tamil Vidiyalayam, Kalaimahal Tamil Vidiyalayam, 4th Square Church Anpuvelipuram, Kappalthurai Tamil Vidiyalayam and Lovelane Stores. There were Tamils and Muslims among those displaced and seeking refuge in schools and in public places. Many others of all three ethnic communities are also said to be “night time displaced” who are not included in the official estimate of 2673. The security situation and the destruction of property means that return is highly problematic for the displaced communities and families.

63 The response by the Government actors as well as international and national agencies was slow. W hile taking on board prevailing security issues in the area, it is not clear why assistance took so long to reach the displaced. For example, the camp in Varothiayanagar Bharati Vidiyalayam consisting of 299 men and 287 female (155 families) who were displaced since the 14th of April, had received no Government assistance even three days later. W hile they had received limited assistance from international agencies, it was a few local organisations that were most active in providing immediate health and food assistance.

As noted above the Trincomalee situation raises critical questions as to whether there has been a fundamental change since the tsunami, where authorities and agencies are prepared for and able to speedily respond to man made or natural disasters. The tsunami devastation witnessed an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, resulting in many international and national agencies providing assistance and creating several committees and networks to respond to man made and natural disasters. Government actors in the areas have been working with international actors in the relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction phases, with attention focused on setting up an early warning system and an improved disaster preparedness system. The events in the recent weeks question whether anything has changed since the tsunami. In addition, this country has faced 20 plus years of conflict and multiple displacements, so has faced similar situations. Sadly, the response by the actors demonstrates that much more needs to be done to ensure humanitarian assistance reaches people efficiently and effectively. The situation in Trincomalee demonstrates, that although there are many actors (be it government, international or national agencies) in the ground, humanitarian assistance took several days to reach the affected people. Therefore, though there was a response, it was slow and not immediate. As to what is required to improve the response: capacity, response systems and networks or will is an issue that needs to be urgently addressed.

The recent events highlight the need for improvement in many spheres. Since the tsunami many structures have been put in place to deal with disaster management and disaster preparedness but there still more work needs to be done in the areas. W hile attention needs to be on the well being of the displaced in welfare camps, it is essential that attention is not only limited to welfare camps, but consideration also needs to be given to people who are staying with family and friends. In general a more effective system for ensuring that affected people have access to basic supplies is fundamental. The principle of equity was highlighted and used to design programs in the tsunami recovery effort in order to ensure no discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, gender or the mode of displacement. W hile concerns were raised following the tsunami of the conflict affected being side lined in the

64 provision of assistance, attention needs to be paid to the new displaced, so as to ensure that all three sets of affected people are addressed in an equally efficient and effective manner.

An impediment to humanitarian work has been the threats faced by employers of aid agencies working in the North East. For example, 2 employees with HUDEC were killed in Jaffna as a result of a claymore bomb explosion on April 10th.223 In Trincomalee, soon after the bomb attack on the April 12, a vehicle of the Non Violence Peace Force was attacked by mobs, damaging the vehicle and injuring one person in the vehicle.224 W omen have been targeted in Batticaloa and Ampara where hand bills were circulated asking women working in international and national agencies to stop working, creating a fear among the women in the areas and restricting their movement. There were also reports of the military requesting aid agencies to leave the Jaffna area.225 Similarly, there have been cases where the military has restricted movement of aid agencies attempting to enter LTTE controlled areas for the provision of aid.226 In the prevailing climate 10 prominent tsunami agencies temporarily pulled out of Batticaloa at the latter part of April,227 resulting in delays in reconstruction and rebuilding work. Overall, the security of humanitarian workers is under threat making it dangerous for staff thereby complicating, delaying and preventing programs from functioning thereby increasing the vulnerability of affected communities.

7.2.2 Tsuanmi recovery continuing, but at slow pace The status at present with regard to the reconstruction process is that a majority of people are continuing to live in temporary shelters as progress on permanent housing remains slow. Of those living in temporary shelters in Galle, 6.3% have been resettled in permanent housing, in Matara, Ampara and Jaffna 0% have been resettled, in Trincomalee 1.5% have been resettled, in Batticaloa 5.1% have been resettled and in Hambantota 28.3% have been resettled.228 The percentile levels across all the districts clearly show a low rate of resettlement, with particularly slow rates in the North East districts.

As reflected in the resettlement figures, progress in permanent housing is slow. Figures released by the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA) reveal that 5,959 houses have been completed under the donor driven housing programme, clearly lagging behind the owner driven programme with some 22,174 houses having been completed.229 Examining the district breakdown of the donor driven housing construction status, of the total 5959 houses, 2234 houses are in Hambantota, 629 houses in Ampara, 348 houses in Batticaloa, 283 houses in Jaffna, 143 in Kilinochchi, 345 in Trincomalee, 1311 in Galle, 183 in Matara, 41 in Colombo, 384 in Kalutara and 58 in Gampaha.230 Thus, it reveals that 37% of all the permanent housing completed so far have been

65 built in Hambantota, while only 10% of the permanent housing completed so far have been built in Ampara, the district worst affected by the tsunami. This raises the question as to how much longer the people would have to live in temporary shelters? W ill they face the same fate as some of the conflict affected who have been residing in welfare centres for over ten- fifteen years?

M arathamunai : Delay in Housing Progress in tsunami housing in Ampara is slow, despite the pressures of a large population of tsunami affected people. Scarcity of available land, uncertainty on buffer zone regulations as well as security concerns have hampered building efforts, with most people still living in transitional shelters. Some of the communities have mobilized and organized protests to highlight their situation and demand action. Protests in Kalmunai in February 2006 by tsunami affected persons resulted in President Mahinda Rajapakse intervening and assuring the people that 779 houses would be constructed within 3 months.231 Though pledges were made and a committee was formed232 to monitor the progress of construction, not much progress has taken place in housing construction in the Ampara district. In Marthamunai, 362 people whose houses were within the 65 meter set back zone, are yet to receive houses.233 Although the Ampara District Secretary had requested donors to start on construction immediately,234 it has been reported that no money has been released by the Treasury for the reconstruction of houses under the donor driven programme.235

Similar delays in housing construction was evident with people who did not fall within the 65 meter set back zone in Marthamunai. Faced with a 200m Buffer Zone that has now been replaced by the 65m set back zone around 350 people who were within the former 200 meters buffer zone had purchased their own land, land which were formerly used for paddy cultivation. They were unable to build as neither the Government nor international/national agencies were willing to fill the land.236 This has created much hardship as the people are either living in transitional shelters or with relatives. Many complained that there were space issues and problems related with privacy. Further, people living in transitional shelters in Thornkerni faced further hardship during the rainy season as many of the transitional shelters would get flooded.237 W ith regards to both issues there was uncertainty among people, including government officials, when the housing would be constructed. Such poor living conditions raises the question as to whether the role played by the Government and donors has been effective and whether the needs of the affected people have been adequately addressed. Questions are raised whether there is adherence to the slogan ‘building back better’ given that even ‘building back’ has not happened and whether it is a promise that was made and may never be fulfilled.

66 There are a number of outstanding infrastructure issues. Another problem recently highlighted in the media is that thousands of wells remain contaminated and unusable almost one and a half years after the tsunami. Attempts at pumping out seawater from 40,000 contaminated wells have so far failed.238 Thus, in times of drought, as recently experienced in the East,239 the tsunami affected are more likely to suffer severe shortages of water. Other issues like the construction of public building like hospitals and schools also remain. For example, Shams Center College in Marthamunai which was affected by the tsunami and had to be relocated inland is still not completed, with the classes conducted in a temporary building which was constructed with tin sheeting.240 That construction of a permanent school has not progressed and the use of tin sheets which exacerbates the intense heat in these areas for the temporary buildings raises serious questions regarding progress.

W ith regard to the North East Housing Reconstruction Programme (NEHRP) for the conflict affected 78 houses were handed over recently in Trincomalee under the second phase of the programme. 31,000 houses were completed in 8 districts in the first phase and 22,000 houses are expected to be completed in the second phase.241 Delays have been experienced due to labour shortages and due to de-mining required. 242 The W orld Bank and the Asian Development Bank have both announced plans for housing for conflict affected.243 For those who are not entitled to the UAS scheme additional activities will be carried out and furthermore community based activities will provide support to all those displaced in order to avoid tension between recipients and others.244 As of 31st March 2006 there are 776 persons in welfare centres in Vavuniya, 3752 persons in Kilinochchi, 2376 persons in Mullaitivu, 307 persons in Mannar and 1009 persons in Jaffna.245 One of the major concerns as of late were reports of intimidation by masked men of IDPs in government run welfare centers in Vavuniya and other conflict affected areas. This has resulted in speculation that this would lead to a second wave of displacement if the violence and intimidation intensifies.246

7.2.3 Efforts to improve clarity in tsunami governance but yet to materialize on ground The present quarter witnessed few activities related to governance in the relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction cluster. A key development was the unveiling by RADA of the new housing policy.247 A significant feature in the policy is the creation of two zones, namely Zone 1 which includes land in the set back areas inside any Government Reservation, and Zone 2 which is outside of Zone 1. Further, the policy states that the ‘affected shelter’ could be livable or unlivable, and beneficiaries of house could be legal owners or encroachers on Government or Private land. A noteworthy development in the policy is prioritizing owners on vulnerability basis, and therefore giving due consideration to female headed households and other groups that are considered ‘vulnerable’.248 Though this is a welcome addition, the policy document has not stipulated what would be considered vulnerable, creating

67 ambiguity in the document. It was also stated that the Government would introduce joint ownership, and to facilitate this would amend existing legislation on ownership of land.249 W hile this is a welcome development, it must be kept in mind that introducing a similar amendment has been discussed for many years (culminating in a draft amendment being presented to cabinet) but no change has yet taken place. Therefore it is hoped that such amendments would be introduced speedily without any delay.

The new policy has a number of positive features responding to various issues such as creating several beneficiary categories,250 dealing with specific problems in areas where land is in shortage,251 establishing preconditions for obtaining assistance252 and minimum standards for housing,253 ensuring land ownership staying with legal owners, encouraging community participation and the inclusion of conflict affected,254 providing for a greater range of choices in terms of resettlement255 and allowing extended families to pool entitlements etc. W hile the policy covers both tsunami affected and conflict affected, is does not mention whether it will cover situations of displacement due to other natural disasters. Though housing construction in the areas will be implemented at the District and the Divisional levels, policy will be provided by RADA, thereby to some extent centralizing the exercise. Further, housing construction would be ‘managed and monitored’ by RADA in Colombo.256 In addition, a grievance mechanism would be in place which in effect would bypass local Government officials such as the District Secretary, with parties being able to go directly to RADA.

W hile the policy is a positive measure, the process of formulation needs to be questioned. Though RADA officials assured that consultation had take place with stakeholders and government actors in the areas, it is of interest to ascertain who was selected to be consulted and to what degree they participated and were consulted. Further, though the policy encompasses several vital areas and RADA officials have promised amending old legislation, essential components have been left out, such as aspects on disaster reduction and disaster mitigation. W ith the tsunami, several studies and projects were conducted on disaster reduction and disaster mitigation and related issues, culminating in the establishment of the ministry focusing on human rights and disaster management. Therefore it is perplexing why such a component has not been taken on board. It also raises the question as to the involvement of other line ministries as well as experts in the formulation of this policy.

W hile, observing this, it is also interesting to note that probes into corruption have slowed in the country after the Auditor General was publicly chastised in March this year after exposure of corruption involving the distribution of tsunami funds.257

68 69 VIII. PUBLIC PERCETPIONS AND ATTITUDES CLUSTER

8.1 Rationale This section examines the trends in public opinion regarding issues related to the peace process. The analyses herein are primarily based on the Peace Confidence Index (PCI), an island-wide household survey conducted amongst approximately 1200 individuals using a semi-structured questionnaire during the period from May 17th to May 29th 2006. It is important to note that this particular wave of the PCI does not cover the opinion of all the communities in the North and East and the Tamil community outside the Up-Country Tamil community due to the security situation during the last few months.

8.2.1 Overview of Southern Public Opinion Related to the Peace Process: Continuing Support for Peace Process high but reduced faith in the parties’ commitment to a negotiated settlement as well as increasing expectations of a return to war amongst the Sinhala Community The recent PCI seems to indicate that there continues to a high level of support for the peace process and a negotiated settlement. Yet, compared to the previous quarter there seems to be a loss of faith within the Sinhala community in the parties’ commitment and capability to reach a final settlement through negotiations. There also appears to be an increase in expectations of a return to war, particularly among the Up Country Tamil and Muslim Communities who see war as very likely while the Sinhala Community sees it as somewhat likely. Despite the deterioration in violence there continues to be faith in a negotiated settlement, hence while an overwhelming majority in the Sinhala Community supported the retaliation for the attempted assassination of the army force commander they supported the government going to Geneva II.

Important Issues: W hen asked to rate five national issues Ref:1 Degree of importance of five national issues according to their order of 12.8 importance, the economy 24.8 Muslim 16.9 The Tsunami Recovery (27.9%) and the peace process 17.4 (27.1%) was rated the highest by 28.1 The peace process in Sri Lanka 10.7 the Sinhala community. The Up- Conflict betw een different Up-country 29.3 17.9 ethnic groups Tamil Country Tamil community gives 17.5 Law and Order high priority to the peace process 24.6 The Economy (29.3%) followed by the 10 27.1 economy (24.6%). The Muslim Sinhala 14.1 20.9 community gives high priority to 27.9

the economy (28.1%) followed 0 10 20 30 40 by the peace process (24.8%). % Ref: 1. A majority of the Sinhala (93.9%), Up-Country Tamil (95.4%) and Muslim (100%) communities believe that the cost of living has increased compared to the situation a year ago.

Solutions: A majority of the Sinhala Ref 2: Support for a Negotiated Settlement (75%), Up-Country Tamil (78.1%) and 120

Continuation of this situation is Muslim (96.6%) communities support 96.6 100 95 better than pursuing a final 90.6 solution the idea of a permanent peace 84.7 78.1 settlement through negotiations. W hen 80 75.0 Continuation of this situation is compared to the February ‘06 PCI bad and therefore, the % 60 Government and the LTTE findings, this is a significant decrease in should go for a permanent the opinion of the Sinhala (February- solution through negotiations 40 Continuation of this situation is bad and therefore, the Government and the LTTE 20 13.5 should go for a permanent 10.9 9 8.7 7.8 6.6 solution through w ar 3.7 6 1.4 3.3 2.4 3.1 2.7 3.4 0.4 0.4 0 0 No response/ No opinion 70 0 Feb '06 May '06 Feb '06 May '06 Feb '06 May '06

Sinhala Up-Country Tamil Muslim 95%) and Up-Country Tamil (Up-Country Tamil- 90.6%) communities. On the contrary, the Muslim (February- 84.7%) opinion has witnessed a significant increase. Ref: 2.

Interestingly, the support for a permanent peace settlement through war has increased amongst the Sinhala (February- 3.7%, May- 13.5%) and Up-Country Tamil (February- 0.4%, May- 3.1%) communities when compared to the February ‘06 PCI findings. Nevertheless, the Muslim (February- 6%, May- 3.4%) support for a peace settlement through war has decreased.

Capability and Commitment of Parties to the Peace Process: W hen asked about the Government’s commitment to the

peace process, a majority of Sinhala Ref 3: I think the Government is commited to find peace through (73.2%) and Muslim (58.6%) talks

communities agree that the 90 Government is committed to find 80 80 73.2 peace through talks. This is a 70 62.1 58.6 Agree decrease of opinion when compared 60 49.2 Disagree 50 to the February ’06 PCI findings Don't know /Not sure % 39.378.1 40 (February: Sinhala- 80%, Muslim- 32.3 30 62.1%). Interestingly, the 22.2 24.1 19.7 18.5 18.2 17.2 20 15 15.9 disagreement amongst the Sinhala 10.9 (Disagree: February- 5.9%, May- 10 5.9 10.9%) and Muslim (Disagree: 0 Feb '06 May '06 Feb '06 May '06 Feb '06 May '06

February- 18.2%, May- 24.1%) Sinhala Up-Country Tamil Muslim communities has also witnessed an increase. Ref: 3. The Up-Country Tamil community also shows a similar pattern seems to have a mixed opinion in this regard (Agree- 39.7%, Disagree-38.1%, Don’t Know/ Not sure- 22.2%). W hen compared to the February ‘06 PCI findings those who agree (February- 49.2%) amongst the Up- Country Tamil community has decreased while those who disagree (February- 18.5%) has increased.

A majority of Sinhala (55.7%) and Muslim (72.4%) communities agree that the Government is capable in finding peace through talks. W hen compared to the February ‘06 PCI findings, those who agree (February- 65%, May- 55.7%) amongst the Sinhala community have decreased while those who disagree (February- 10.6%, May- 17.1%) have increased. Interestingly, amongst the Muslim community, those who agree (February- 64.2%, May- 72.4%) have increased while those who disagree (February- 16.4%, May- 13.8%) have decreased. A majority of Up-Country Tamil (43.5%) communities disagree that the Government is capable in finding peace through talks. However, when compared to the February ‘06 PCI findings, those who agree (February- 46.8%, May- 30.6%) amongst the Up-Country Tamil community have decreased while those who disagree (February- 16.1%, May- 43.5%) have increased.

W hen asked about the commitment of Ref 4: I think the LTTE is committed to find peace through talks the LTTE to the peace process, a majority 80 75

70 of the Sinhala (75%) and Muslim (45.6%) 63.5

communities disagree that the LTTE is 60 56.1 Agree 50 Disagree committed to find peace through talks. A 50 45.6 40.9 Don't know /Not sure majority of Up-Country Tamil (50%) % 38.6 40 36.6 34.8 30.6 communities agree that the LTTE is 28.6 30 23.8 24.2 committed to find peace through talks. 19.4 20 15.8 W hen compared to the February ‘06 PCI 7.9 10 7.3 findings, the level of disagreement 1.3 0 (February- 56.1%, May- 75%) amongst Feb '06 May '06 Feb '06 May '06 Feb '06 May '06

the Sinhala community have increased Sinhala Up-Country Tamil Muslim

71 while those who agree (February- 7.3%, May- 1.3%) has decreased. W ith regard to the Muslim and Up-Country Tamil communities, those who agree (Muslim: February- 40.9%, May- 15.8% / Up- Country Tamil: February- 63.5%, May- 50%) have decreased while those who disagree (Muslim: February- 24.2%, May- 45.6% / Up-Country Tamil: February- 7.9%, May- 30.6%) have witnessed a significant increase. Ref: 4

A majority of the Sinhala (49%) community disagree that the LTTE is capable of finding peace through talks. A majority of the Up-Country Tamil (42.6%) and the Muslim (53.6%) communities agree that the LTTE is capable of finding peace through talks. W hen compared to the February ‘06 PCI findings, those who disagree (February- 34.8%, May- 49%) amongst the Sinhala community have increased while those who agree (February- 25.2%, May- 17.6%) have witnessed a downfall. W ith regard to the Muslim community, those who agree (February- 41.8%, May- 53.6%) have increased while those who disagree (February- 25.4%, May- 25%) have decreased. Amongst the Up- Country Tamil community, those who agree (February- 59.3%, May- 42.6%) have decreased while those who disagree (February- 8.5%, May- 34.4%) have increased.

A majority of the Sinhala (43.4%), Up-Country Tamil (51.7%) and Muslim (40.7%) communities state, that when compared to the situation of the peace process a year ago, the country at present is not at all close in approaching a permanent settlement to the ethnic conflict. However, according to the September ‘05 PCI findings, a majority of the Sinhala (39.8%) community think that it is ‘not close at all’ while the Up-Country Tamil (40.8%) community thinks it is ‘close’. The Muslim community has a divided opinion (close- 35%, Not close at all- 35%).

W hen asked who should be involved in negotiations, a majority of the Sinhala (33.2%) and the Up- Country Tamil (31.3%) communities state that only the Government and the LTTE should be involved in negotiations. However, a majority of the Muslim (79.7%) community states that the Government, opposition, LTTE, Tamil and Muslim parties and an international third party should be involved in negotiations.

Likelihood of W ar: A majority of the Sinhala (45.6%) community believes that it is somewhat likely a war will resume. A majority of the Up-Country Tamil (39.1%) and the Muslim (44.1%) believe that it is very likely a war will resume. According to the February ‘06 PCI findings, a majority of the Muslim (38.8%) community think that it is somewhat likely a war will resume. A majority of the Up- country Tamil (30.8%) community doesn’t know or are not sure of an answer.

A majority of the Sinhala (44.3%) community believe only the LTTE is responsible for the escalation of violence. A majority of the Up-Country Tamil (42.9%) and Muslim (46.6%) communities don’t know or not sure.

Ceasefire Agreement (CFA): Of Ref 5: Changes of opinion of Sinhala, Up-Country Tamil and Muslim communities those who are aware of the CFA, a

majority of Sinhala (45.8%), Up- 100 94.7 88.1 Country Tamil (65.4%) and Muslim 90 (88.1%) communities believe that the 80 75.9 Yes, they have benefited 67.3 65.4 70 No, they have not benefited CFA has benefited the ordinary 60 Don't know /Not sure citizen. This is a decrease of opinion % 50 45.8 40 35.8 when compared to February ’06 PCI 26.9 30 22.4 findings (February: Sinhala-67.3%, 18.4 16.7 20 10.3 7.7 7.4 7.1 Up-Country Tamil- 94.7%, Muslim- 10 5.3 4.8 0 75.9%). Ref: 5. 0 Feb '06 May '06 Feb '06 May '06 Feb '06 May '06

Sinhala Up-Country Tamil Muslim Of those who think that the CFA has

72 benefited the ordinary citizen, a majority think the peaceful environment in the country is the most important benefit if the CFA. Of those who think that the CFA has not benefited the ordinary citizen, a majority of the Sinhala (57.6%) community believes that the LTTE strengthening itself in Government controlled areas is the main reason.

W hen asked about their satisfaction in Government’s commitment to the CFA, a majority of Sinhala (51.7%) and Muslim (66.7%) communities are somewhat satisfied. The Up-Country Tamil community has a divided opinion (Somewhat satisfied- 37%, Not satisfied- 37%). W hen compared to the February ‘06 PCI findings, those who are somewhat satisfied (February- 44.8%) amongst the Sinhala community have increased.

W hen asked about their satisfaction in LTTE’s commitment to the CFA, a majority of Sinhala (59.9%) community is not satisfied at all. W hile a majority of the Up-Country Tamil (42.3%) community is somewhat satisfied, a majority of the Muslim community is not satisfied.

Sri Lanka M onitoring M ission (SLM M ): Of those who are aware of the involvement of foreign monitors, a majority of Sinhala (53.3%), Up-Country Tamil (90.5%) and Muslim (97.4%) communities think that it is essential

to have a monitoring mission for the Ref 6: Changes of opinion of the Sinhala, Up-Country Tamil and CFA to succeed. It is noteworthy that Muslim communities

percentage of the Sinhala community 120

who believe that an international 97.4 100 90.5 third party is essential is lower than 86.7 Is essential 74.4 the percentages among the Up- 80 69.3 Not essential Country Tamil and Muslim % 60 53.3 Don't know /Not sure communities. W hen compared to the 40 32.9 February ‘06 PCI findings, those who 22.2 18.6 20 13.7 think it is essential have decreased 8.5 6.76.7 9.5 7 0.0 0.02.6 amongst the Sinhala (February- 0 69.3%, May- 53.3%) community. Feb '06 May '06 Feb '06 May '06 Feb '06 May '06 However, those who think that it is Sinhala Up-Country Tamil Muslim essential to have a monitoring mission amongst the Up-Country Tamil (February- 86.7%, May- 97.4%) and Muslim (February- 74.4%, May- 90.5%) communities have increased. Ref: 6.

A majority of the Sinhala (58.1%) community disagree with the statement that the SLMM is impartial in its monitoring of the ceasefire agreement. A majority of Up-Country Tamil (72.2%) and Muslim (50%) communities agree with the statement that the SLMM is impartial in its monitoring of the ceasefire agreement. W hen compared to the February ‘06 PCI findings, the percentage of Muslim (February- 45.5%, May- 50%) community who agree have increased while the percentage of Up- Country Tamil (February- 90%, May- 72.2%) community who agree has decreased.

A majority of the Sinhala (56.1%) community disagree with the statement that the SLMM is effective in its monitoring of the ceasefire agreement. A majority of Up-Country Tamil (50%) and Muslim (45.9%) communities agree with the statement that the SLMM is effective in its monitoring of the ceasefire agreement. W hen compared to the February ‘06 PCI findings, the percentage of Muslim (February- 48.5%, May- 45.9%) and of Up-Country Tamil (February- 89.5%, May- 50%) communities who agree has decreased.

Foreign Involvement: A majority of the Sinhala (35.8%), Up-Country Tamil (73.8%) and Muslim (76.7%) communities believe that an international third party is essential and will have a positive impact on the peace process. It is noteworthy that percentage of the Sinhala community who believe

73 that an international third party is essential and will have a positive impact on the peace process is lower compared to the Up-Country Tamil and Muslim communities. W hen compared to the February ‘06 PCI findings, those who believe that it is essential and will have a positive impact have decreased amongst the Sinhala (February- 52.8%, May- 35.8%) community while it has decreased amongst the Up-Country Tamil (February- 56.7%, May- 73.8%) and Muslim (February- 64.2%, May- 76.7%) communities.

W hen asked about the level of satisfaction with the Norwegian role as facilitator, a majority of Up- Country Tamil (48.3%) and Muslim (51.7%) communities are somewhat satisfied. The Sinhala community has a mixed opinion in this regard (Very satisfied- 1.3%, Somewhat Satisfied- 29%, Not satisfied at all- 35.6%, Don’t know/Not sure- 34.2%). W hen asked if they approve or disapprove of Norway continuing to facilitate the peace process, a majority of the Sinhala (41%) community disapproves. A majority of the Up-Country Tamil (69.1%) and Muslim (60.4%) communities approve. Of those who are aware of the JVP & Patriotic National Movement’s strong calls for removing Norway from the Sri Lankan peace process, a majority of the Sinhala (52.4%) community approve of Norway being removed from the peace process. A majority of the Up-Country Tamil (84%) and the Muslim (69.2%) communities disapprove of Norway being removed from the peace process.

Asked as to the most suitable country to play the role of facilitator to the peace process, a majority of the Sinhala (45.1%) thinks India is the most suitable country to play the role of facilitator. A majority of the Up-Country Tamil (49%) community thinks Norway is the most suitable country to play the role of facilitator. The Muslim community has a mixed opinion (Japan- 28.2%, Norway- 25.6%, USA- 20.5%). W hen asked about the need for India’s involvement in the peace process, a majority of the Sinhala (34.2%) community don’t know or not sure. A majority of the up-Country Tamil (76.9%) and Muslim (52.5%) communities believe that it is essential and will have a positive impact on the peace process. W hen compared to the February ‘06 PCI findings, the Sinhala (February- 41.7%, May- 32%) community who believe that it is essential and will have a positive impact have witnessed a significant decrease.

Geneva Talks: Of those who are aware that the Government and the LTTE held talks in Geneva on the 22nd & 23rd of February 2006, a majority of the Up-Country Tamil (56.7%) and the Muslim (46.2%) communities are somewhat satisfied with the outcome of the talks. A majority of the Sinhala (46.9%) community don’t know or not sure. W hen asked as to which party benefited most in the last round of talks, a majority of the Sinhala (43.9%) community don’t know or not sure. A majority of the up-Country Tamil (39.3%) community believes neither the Government nor the LTTE benefited from the talks. The Muslim (35%) community believes that both parties benefited from the peace talks.

W hen asked about their level of satisfaction with regard to the Government’s commitment to the pledges it made at the Geneva talks, a majority of the Sinhala (44.8%) community has no opinion. W hile a majority of the Up-Country Tamil (41.4%) community is not satisfied at all, a majority of the Muslim (58.5%) community is somewhat satisfied. W hen asked about their level of satisfaction with regard to the LTTE’s commitment to the pledges it made at the Geneva talks, a majority of the Sinhala (51.8%), Up-Country Tamil (36.7%) and Muslim (31.7%) communities are not satisfied at all.

LTTE ban in Canada: Of those who are aware that the Canadian Government’s ban of the LTTE as a terrorist group under the Anti terrorism act, a majority of the Sinhala (76.4%) and Muslim (44.4%) communities think that this ban will have a positive impact on the peace process. A majority of the Up-Country Tamil (47.1%) community thinks that it will have no impact on the peace process.

74 JVP and JHU role in preserving peace: W hen asked about their satisfaction with the JVP’s role in preserving peace in Sri Lanka, a majority of the Sinhala (39.7%) community don’t know or not sure. A majority of the Up-Country Tamil (76.9%) and the Muslim (67.8%) communities are not satisfied.

W hen asked about their satisfaction with the JHU’s role in preserving peace in Sri Lanka, a majority of the Sinhala (42.8%) community don’t know or not sure. A majority of the Up-Country Tamil (75.8%) and the Muslim (65%) communities are not satisfied.

Karuna Group: Of those who are aware of the LTTE’s breakaway Karuna faction, a majority of the Sinhala (36.8%) community thinks that the Karuna faction should not be disarmed. A majority of the Up-Country Tamil (44.1%) community thinks that the Karuna faction should be disarmed. The Muslim community has a mixed opinion (Karuna faction should be disarmed- 32.7%, Karuna faction should not be disarmed- 30.6%, Don’t know/Not sure- 32.7%).

Current Security condition: A majority of the Sinhala (68.7%), Up-Country Tamil (79.7%) and Muslim (88.3%) communities believe that the security condition in the country has worsened compared to the situation a year ago.

Despite the attempted assassination on the army chief Lt. General Sarath Fonseka, a majority of the Sinhala (63.1%), Up-Country Tamil (65.5%) and Muslim (87.9%) communities think that the Government should go for talks in Geneva. Of those who are aware of the of the retaliatory attacks by the Government on the LTTE in the aftermath of the bombing, a majority of the Sinhala (80.3%) community approve of the retaliatory attacks. When asked about the effectiveness of these retaliatory attacks, the Sinhala community had mixed reactions (Effective- 44.8%, Not effective- 10.8%, Don’t know/ Not sure- 44.4%).

75 VIII. M EDIA CLUSTER

8.1 Context The last report looks at this relationship between the president and the LTTE and Norway’s role in the peace process in terms of the media’s reflection and perhaps prompting of the peoples’ passions. It also examined reaction and actions of the media in reporting on key incidents of the fourth quarter - such as Prabhakan’s heroes day speech (27th November), the intensification of the tensions in the north-east including the killing (which rose in number and frequency), the consistent attacks on the army/navy, the president’s trip to India, Eric Solheim’s visit and final declaration of the venue/date of the ‘peace’ talks - which provide an indication of the general direction and intentions/allegiances of the media institutions in Sri Lanka (within and without its divisions of language, publishing house and their status as a private or state paper). In this report the media cluster looks at the issues of child soldiers, reactions to the Local Government Elections, ban of LTTE in Canada, clashes in Trincomalee and the suicide attack against the Army Force Commander Sarath Fonseka.

8.2.1 The Issue of Child Soldiers Child recruitment, a frequent issue raised by the Government delegation, re-emerged in the wake of the Geneva Talks. Child recruitment being one of many focal points in the international community, was given considerable coverage by the Sinhalese and English press gave considerable coverage to this issue, seemingly to highlight the LTTE’s track record. An incident surrounding two child soldier escapees from the LTTE provided an opportunity for the Sinhalese and English press to showcase the issue. The coverage of this incident revealed that the media was willing to test ethical limits in the pursuit of their own agendas. As demonstrated in this instance, the English and Sinhala media coverage tended to convey the human tragedy of the issue, sometimes at a cost of accuracy, in such cases reinforcing the Government’s standpoint. In general, the Tamil media tended to downplay the issue and provide a context in which recruitment takes place, thereby demonstrating an unwillingness to criticize the LTTE. Coverage of this issue clearly indicated ethnic alliances.

The government organised a ‘see and meet’ press conference on the 8th of March, where the press interviewed the two child soldiers who escaped from the LTTE. As the media photographed, the former child soldiers explained their experiences with the LTTE and demonstrated their military training by handling and dismantling a T-56 assault rifle. In covering and photographing the former LTTE child soldiers handling the assault rifle, the media opted to sensationalize the issue, overlooking key ethical standards regarding media coverage of children. Photographs in the print media were uncensored, showing a side profile of the children, leaving their identity unconcealed. In stories highlighting the abuse of children, normally a black band is superimposed on the photographs to conceal their identity. Encouragingly, the private electronic media censored the photographs by covering the children’s faces in order to safeguard their identity; the SLRC made no such attempt.

The manner in which the state and the private media handled the child abductees came under scrutiny by a number of concerned organizations, particularly UNICEF. Criticisms regarding how the children were exposed via the media mounted against the government. It also raised serious concerns regarding the media’s ethics in covering stories relating to children was also highlighted. Interestingly, an editorial on 10/3 in the Island critically accused the government of mishandling the incident. However, this article also denied involvement by the media minister for organizing the controversial press briefing. On 13/3, contradicting previous statements without explicitly saying so, regarding the child soldiers military training, the Island quoted the UNICEF investigation team: “the children had denied their previous claims of receiving military training and had claimed to have only received physical training.” This UNICEF press release accusing the local media of unethical behaviour evoked a negative reaction from the English press. Editorials on 13/3 in both the and

76 the Island responded by accusing the UN agency of inaction on the issue and questioned the motives of international child protection institutions regarding children currently under LTTE custody.

In covering this incident, the trilingual media revealed their ethnic alliances. The Sinhala and English papers provided extensive coverage of the 9/3 interviews, compared to the Tamil papers, which either downplayed or ignored the incident. On 9/3, the headline of the lead story on the newspaper read Tigers provide military training for 170 children. The accompanied its headline, Child suicide cadres tell horrifying tale, with a large colour photograph revealing the identities of the two children. and the Daily Mirror featured this issue on its cover page with photos from the press briefing. In Tamil media, other than the government owned newspaper, , which published a story and a photo of the two children on the cover page on 9/3, the Tamil newspapers did not cover the incident on that day. Veerakesari and Thinakural reproduced the articles that were published in Lankadeepa, a strategy commonly used throughout the Tamil press when an issue critical of the LTTE is raised.

On 9/3, the LTTE’s version was given marginal coverage in Lankadeepa, which published an article quoting Mr. Thamilselvan, head of the political wing of the LTTE. In his declaration, Mr. Thamilselvan denied LTTE responsibility regarding accusations as reported by the child soldiers; he also denied accusations implicating the Karuna faction for such abductions.

The child abductees both claimed they were trained in a camp with other children who had also been recruited. Despite attending the same press conference, interestingly, each newspaper published different figures for the number of children in each of the LTTE camps; in each case the newspapers stated that the information was disclosed by these two children. The newspapers provided the following numbers for child recruits within LTTE camps as reported by the two child soldiers: Island: 70, Daily News: around 100, Daily Mirror: more than 100, Lakbima: 170. To explain the discrepancy in reportage across the trilingual media regarding the numbers, it is possible that the relevant papers combined figures disclosed by children, police, and other sources, to publish a large figure to sensationalize the issue

In terms of follow up there was interesting variation as, the private and government media bar Tamils took up this issue assertively. W hile there was variation in terms of follow up of the issue, while the Tamil press opted to minimize coverage on the issue, both the Sinhala and English media provided significant space to cover the issue and highlight the LTTE’s human rights violations, sometimes at the cost of accuracy. The , which placed the story on their cover page, however did not follow up on the issue. On 12/3, The Island reported in depth on the issue, placing it on their cover page, and stating the whereabouts of the LTTE leader’s children. On 12/3, the weekend papers, the , the Lankadeepa, and the Lakbima ran the issue as a feature article analyzing the incident and providing details of the two child soldiers, such as their identities and the educational background.

The Tamil press responded to this issue by covering stories that showed a different side to the LTTE’s practice of recruiting children to serve as combatants. Following the initial press conference, on 15/3, the Verakesari’s cover page published a statement from the LTTE claiming that the two children were above the age of 18 and accusing the Navy of misleading the public regarding the children’s ages. On 27/3, the Thinukual countered the Verakesari article by highlighting an incident where two children who wanted to join the LTTE were returned to their parents. It also needs to be noted that the Tamil press print media were more engaged in clarifying the discrepancies, while the Sinhala media seemed to avoid doing so at this time.

The numerous articles and extensive coverage on this matter initially gives an impression that the media was acting partially to safeguard the children from the clutches of the LTTE, in the guise of

77 being infringed by an act of child abuse when truly trying to politicise the issue. The effects of the media coverage demonstrate an insensitivity and lack of understanding on part of the local media. 8.2.2 Post Election Reactions on media

The pre election campaign did not generate much enthusiasm among the voter population or in the media; however the results revealed some similar perspectives of the results which crossed the language barrier. The victory by the ruling party was highlighted as a personal victory for the president. The Sinhalese and the English media hailed the victory as a personal mandate for the president both in terms of his alliance with the JVP and JHU and as leader the SLFP party. Contrastingly, the Tamil media presented the victory as a renewed mandate to carry forward the peace process.

All political parties approached the elections with a mix of great interest and apprehension as it provided the means of asserting their position in the political arena. Even though the elections were not held in 67 local government bodies including the North and East, out of a total of 333, it was seen as a crucial election. The election was a test for president Rajapaksa, who assumed office five months ago with the support of JVP and JHU. The electronic media on March 31st highlighted the results as a great victory for the UPFA; state owned TV stations ITN and Rupavahini proclaimed the results as a resounding victory for the President and “Mahinda Chintanaya.” For instance they aired voice cuts of ministers stating that the policies brought forward by the president were accepted and supported by the people. The Sinhala press took up a similar stand declaring the results as a personal victory for the president and a mandate to take forward the peace process.

Irrespective of their political allegiances the media pointed to the president’s victory and focussed on the defeats of the UNP and JVP. The majority of Sinhala headlines were on similar lines: “Villages for Mahinda whilst UNP losses strongholds; JVP holds on to one”. The English press took up the story in their headlines, but also gave prominence to the president’s visit to Pakistan (Daily News 1/4 Headline-Sweeping victory for UPFA- with a large photo of the president with the Pakistani premier) The English press tended to focus more on factually-oriented analysis of the election. For instance, (2/4) analysed the polls within the context of election violence, women representation issues of Tsunami voters, setbacks made by the JVP; this gave a more analytical focus to their coverage. The Tamil press hailed the victory as a mandate to continue the peace process. (2/4) covered this issue on their 9th page with a headline that read, Local government results: Approved the peace process.

The media also noted the impact of the election on the competition for SLPF leadership between the President and the previous president. The victory in the absence of the party leader Ms. Chindrika Bandaranayake during the elections campaign, was seen as a personal victory for the President. 2/04 Lankadeepa with its headline of President Battles without a party leader: Victory for Mahinda carried a large photograph of the President. Sinhala and the English press highlighted the victory to press forward Mahinda’s candidacy as the rightful leader of the SLFP.

In highlighting the election results of other parties, there was a difference in emphasis between the Sinhala and Tamil press. The Tamil press highlighted the victories of TNA in Trincomalee and Ampara; reported on the lines of a mandate for a Tamil homeland. The victory in Talawakelle by an independent Tamil group was also given prominence in the Tamil Press. This news was seemingly downplayed by the Sinhala press. Sinhala press showcased the victory as one against the JVP and JHU. Claims of victory made by the JVP and UNP were given some prominence in the Sinhala press which did not pay as much attention to carrying the statement’s of the JHU. The Tamil press took the opportunity to attack the JVP and JHU on their defeat, giving voice to the negative perception against these Sinhala nationalist political parties.

78 8.2.3 Trincomalee Communal Clashes On 12/4, amidst continuing attacks on security forces, almost daily killings, and continuing violations of human rights in the North and East, a critical incident in Trincomalee set off a wave of violence. An explosion occurred in the Trincomalee vegetable market, triggering a series of violent incidents destabilizing the Trincomalee town and its environs. The coverage of this explosion, occurring during the Sinhala and Tamil New Year, is symptomatic of larger trends in the local media. Analyzed and reported through seemingly polarized communal angles, this incident as reported by the media reveals ethnic allegiances in coverage.

The initial coverage demonstrated the various biases in operation, mainly along the lines of language. In the initial coverage the key differences in focus was that the Sinhala Press were less inclined to discuss the impact of the communal violence, looking more positively at the state response to the incident and its aftermath. The Sinhala and English press highlighted the riots that followed the explosion in their headlines. On 12/4, the incident was first reported in electronic media alongside photographs of the desctroyed market. On 13/04, in the articles that appeared in Lankadeepa (A conflict between two groups), Lakbima/ Divina (riots that followed the blast), the Island (sporadic riots), Daily News (an angry group retaliated against the LTTE action), and the Daily Mirror (angry mob armed with clubs attacked shops and vehicles), ethnic aspects of the violence were not included in coverage of the issue. Compared to the English and Tamil press, the Sinhala press downplayed the condition of communal unrest on the ground. . The Tamil media was more emotive, expressing outrage at the Trincomalee incident, as reflected in Thinakural’s headline “Violence against Tamils in Trinco”. The articles in the Tamil papers state the bombing was caused by communal unrest, emphasising incidents of violence against the Tamil community. On 13/4, accused the army of inaction, thus allowing for the escalation of violence. Also on 13/04, the Thinakkural published two articles stating the LTTE’s complaints to the SLMM regarding the bombing and the SLMM’s response or lack there of.

Amidst other violence in the North, the Trincomalee incident was frontpage headline news for all Sinhala papers. ’ article Attack on a Trincomalee security point and Lakbima’s article 13 dead in Trincomalee explosion. Situation was brought under control by the armed forces both reported on the issue. All of the trilingual press mentioned that a police curfew was imposed and that the government has taken efforts to control the situation. In their reporting, the Island, Daily News, and the Daily Mirror gave prominence to the market bombing, including a reference to the phone call made by the Indian premier expressing his concern on the escalating violence in the country. On 13/04, this market bombing was the main story of all the news bulletins that carried visuals of Trincomalee. Among the bulletins, while state media reported that the situation was under control, other reports drew attention to the compensation approved by the government to be paid to the relatives of the deceased. ITN reported the incident and the unrest created by mobs in the town emphasising on the government delegation that was sent to the area by the President to assess the situation. Efforts taken by the government in sending a delegation to assess the situation was reported only in the 10th page of Virakesari on 13/04. The Tamil press downplayed efforts taken by the government to ease the tension in the region.

Speculations differed as to which party was responsible, with the Sinhala and state media placing responsibility on the LTTE for causing the violence, while the Tamil media attempted to show that Tamils were the primary victims of the riots as a result of Government inaction. State owned SLRC reported the attack was linked to the LTTE. The state media highlighted a statement made by the Media Minister accusing the LTTE of attempting to create ethnic unrest in the country. On 13/04, Sirasa was the only electronic media that carried a statement made by an LTTE leader condemning

79 attacks against Tamils while also denouncing the accusations made by the government against the LTTE.

The government-owned Thinakaran’s article Media Minister- Trinco violence was planed by the LTTE accused the LTTE of provoking ethnic and communal unrest in the country. However overall, the Tamil press continued reporting on the story, emphasising the damage caused to the property and businesses belonging to the Tamil community. On 17/04, Virakesari and Sudar Oli carried a statement made by the Chamber of Commerce holding the government responsible for the incidents. On 25/03, the Chamber of Commerce responded with the following statement: “the financial impact of the violence on the Tamil business community was given prominence in Sudar Oli and Virakesari, further the two papers published full page articles with photos of destroyed property and lives in Trincomalee”, giving added legitimacy as it were to the claims of international silence against Tamils because it quote an independent group. The Tamil press continuously reported on the communal unrest and the accountability of the government and other parties for the market bombing. On 21/04, Thinakkural carried a statement made by a TNA Member of Parliament accusing the Army, JVP and the JHU as responsible for the unrest. On 29/04 Sudar Oli drew comparisons between the Trincomalee incident and the ethnic riots of 1983.

Amidst new incidents of violence, coverage of the market bombing in Tamil media continued after the new-year break. On 16/04, Thinakkural and Virakesari published news features with color photographs; other papers allocated several pages to cover devastation and communal unrest within the Tamil community during the new-year holidays. The Sinhala press focused on investigations being carried out by the Government, Lakbima published a colour photo of the deserted clock tower in Trincomalee which was the site of the bomb blast, with the following title: “Investigations Begins”. The press also chose to focus on government subsidies promised to the victims. However, continuous violence and killings from the Trincomalee town to the village, quickly drew attention back to the violence. On 20/4, the Dinamina and the Lankadeepa reported that the Trincomalee town was gradually stabilizing; this subject was analyzed in depth in feature articles. On 23/04, the Divaina’s article Trinco: Elam bells ringing and the Lankadeepa’s article the Trinco bomb that destroyed the New Years joy both analyzed the violence in a manner that blamed the LTTE.

After the initial reporting, the English press did not follow the story as closely as the Sinhala and Tamil press. The English press was limited in its follow up with the state media focussing on the steady improvements in the security situation (Daily News’ ‘Trinco Peace comities reactivated’ on 21/04) and the Daily Mirror pointing to continuing impact of the violence: the Daily Mirror’s ‘Trinco limping back to normalcy’ on 19/04 and the Daily Mirror’s 2000 displaced by Trinco riots, which quotes the number of people who were displaced due to recent unrest as assessed by the UNHCR.

8.2.4 The Ban of LTTE in Canada The ban imposed on the LTTE by the recently elected Conservative Government in Canada was seen as an important development affecting the peace process. The Sinhala and English media jumped on the issue of the ban and gave it prominence. The proposal for banning the LTTE that had become an issue during the Canadian parliamentary election campaign,.was given significant coverage in the Sri Lankan media. The English print media were the first to cover the story, even before an official declaration had been made by the Candian Government. On 09/4, The Sunday Observer’s front page article Canada bans LTTE and the Island’s front page article Canada outlaws Tigers were the first to reveal the speculated ban on the LTTE by the Canadian government. Both articles quoted the “National Post” as their source, listing a summary of restrictions imposed as a result of the ban, while also listing penalties for non-compliance On 09/4, the electronic media featured the issue while and ITN showcased the story in their headlines; SLRC placed the news at the fourth slot, with the interest of de-emphasising the issue. It is important to note the electronic media quoted the same source as the press. The Sinhala print media followed. On 10/04, the

80 Canadian ban was the lead story in the following papers: Lankadeepa (Canada bans LTTE: a stop to the fountain of funds), Lakbima (LTTE classified as a terrorist organisation. Tigers banded in Canada: 200 million rupees lost annually) and Dinamina (Doors closed for the LTTE: Fundraising and campaigning made illegal).

Even though the Tamil and Sinhala papers quoted the same source as the English papers, reporting on the issue reflected respective ethno-political allegiances, thus creating a Sinhala-Tamil chasm in the coverage. The Sinhala press chose to highlight the financial losses of the LTTE, which in Rupees, was estimated at two hundred Million approx. per annum by some papers. However, this economic setback for the LTTE is byno means an allusion to the fact, that ‘suport’ dopes not end ideologically or financially as a result. Other than this, information reported in the English and Sinhala press was similar. Interestingly, except for the Island, other papers failed to report that the Canadian government did not extend the ban to cover organisations linked with the LTTE. On 10/4, The Daily News editorial recognized Minister Mangala Samaraweera for his efforts in discrediting the LTTE in the international community which, eventually led to the ban on the LTTE by Canada.

The behaviour of the Tamil press demonstrated their apprehension in reporting issues critical of the LTTE. For instance, Tamil print coverage was delayed compared to their English and Sinhala counterparts. On 10/4, while Thinakkural quoted the National Post and published the news on the speculated ban, other Tamil papers reported the LTTE ban only after the official declaration was made on the 10th of April by the Canadian government, with Thinakaran reporting the ban on the 11th. The re-production of articles appearing in the Enlgish and Sinhala print was also used by the Tamil press in this instance, highlighting the sensationalism of the English and Sinhala press and their differences from the Tamil press in waiting for official word before printing. This can be played up by them as a justification for the professionalism of the Tamil press versus the biases of the English and Sinhala press. On 12/04, in Thinakkural’s article LTTE ban in Canada: officially announced yesterday, Thinakkural reproduced the 11/4 Divaina article Tiger funds were raised through, three Canadian Elam organisations in its inner pages, referring to the exposure of three front organisations who were fundraising on behalf of the LTTE. On 12/4, Sudar Oli published a TNA parliamentarian’s statement condemning the ban on LTTE in Canada. On 16/4, Thinakkural published a front page article reporting Tamil canadian refugees condemning the ban.

The effectiveness of the ban in limiting the LTTE’s fund raising capacity was a key issue that was taken up by the Sinhala and English print media. On 12/4, the Daily Mirror‘s article Canadian ban- futile if fronts are allowed to function initiated a debate in the local media on the effectiveness of the ban; the debate focused attention on the details of the ban, including front organizations allegedly raising funds for the LTTE. The issue was followed up by the Island’s article, Canada ban wont affect LTTE materially. On 18/4, the Sinhala reported a Canadian government raid on the W orld Tamil Movement office in Montreal This was reflected in Dinamina’s lead story, Officers and business which supports Tigers are being raided by the Canadian government: W orld Tamil Movement offices raided; sporadic attacks made against the Government armed forces by unidentified cadres in the North and East were also reported, alongside reportage on the ban.

8.2.5 Assassination attempt on the Army Commander by a suicide bomber

Arguably the most significant incident in this quarter, for a country tethered between war and peace, was the suicide attack against the Army Commander Lt. General Sarath Fonseka on 25/4 in the highly fortified army head quarters in Colombo. The local media coverage of the events following the attack reported at times at the cost of accuracy and impartiality. The suicide attack dominated newspaper and TV news coverage by the trilingual media for weeks to come.

In hourly news bulletins, Sirasa TV was first to report on the explosion that occurred in the army head quarters, providing details of casualties and injuries that were inflicted upon the army

81 commander. Other channels including the state media provided trilingual accounts of the breaking news. Since the media was not allowed in to the high security zone, they shifted focus from the army HQ to the national hospital where the injured were treated. Sirasa TV news coverage included video footage of victims being brought in to the hospital. TV news media provided periodic updates on the commander’s condition, employing audio clips and video footage of his attending doctors. All TV stations devoted significant portions of their bulletins to cover events related to the suicide attack. The overall pattern of coverage on the issue, showing images without commentary, and at times airing repetitive commentary, seemed to be targeted at creating anxiety, anger, and outrage in the civil society.

In issuing responsibility for the attacks the most media suggested the LTTE as the culprit. On 25/04, the mainstream TV news bulletins covered the incident with visuals of the injured. ITN, TNL and Swarnawahini stated the attack was made by an LTTE suicide cadre. Employing slightly different verbiage, SLRC and Sirasa quoted an army spokesperson who suspected that the suicide bomber is an LTTE cadre.

On 26/04, the news on the issue was the lead story in every newspaper in the country. The English papers reported the suicide bomber as a “suspected LTTE cadre”. : headline read, suicide bomber suspected to be a LTTE cadre. The Daily Mirror headline read: suspected LTTE suicide bomber. Contrastingly, the Sinhala news papers directly stated in their head lines that it was a LTTE suicide bomber, drawing specific attention the suicide bomber’s pregnant state. Lankadeepa’s headline ran as: Tiger female suicide carder attacks the army commander’s vehicle, while the Lakbima and the Divaina had photo feature articles on the issue. All the papers carried statements made by various parties condemning the attack. Most of the papers prioritized the issue by allocating space on the cover page to report on related information concerning the attack and by publishing photographs of the commander. However, the English press reportred less on the story than the Sinhala press.

The Tamil press refrained from implicating the LTTE in regards to the attack, questioning other parties that may have been responsible instead. The “pregnancy” issue was stated in Tamil media, but was not emphasised in comparison to the Sinhala newspapers. On 26/4, Sudar Oli in its lead story, reported on a sudden search operation conducted in the vicinity of the attack where Tamil civilians were harassed by the government authorities involved. W hen comparing the Sinhala and Tamil papers regarding coverage of the attack, the Tamils papers had only a modest number of articles.

The trilingual media showed some interesting variation in their coverage of the efforts to identify the suicide bomber. The Sinhala media tended to be more definite in their claims, even at a cost of accuracy. Dinamina on 28/4 stated that the suicide bomber was identified. Headlines of cover stories in the local press concerning the identification of the bomber read as follows: Lankadeepa: the female tiger carder came to Colombo from Vavuniya she was 21, Divaina: investigation continues: suicide bomber was pregnant. parts of the mobile phone discovered. On 28/4, some of the headlines in the main papers read as follows: Thinakaran suicide attacker was a woman from Vavuniya, Sudar Oli: the suicide bomber was identified yesterday, Dinamina : Anoja who exploded the bomb was a LTTE carder from Vavuniya. the.

The topic of the suicide bomber continued to make headlines in the local media, focusing on updates in the investigation. Dinamina’s front page on 02/5 read: Secret police after the suicide bombers phone, Lakbima: Suicide bomber arrived as a wife of an officer, -Source senior officials at the secret police) On 04/5, a Lakbima headline stated that the suicide bomber’s DNA to be tested: to confirm the pregnancy. On 6/05 Lankadeepa: who was the major that spoke and stroke the head of the suicide bomber. 07/5 Divaina: particles found similar to the vest that was used to assassinate Rajeev Gandhi: many secrets revealed from the bomb that exploded in the army head quarters. Lankadeepa carried a full-page feature article on the investigation “this is how the investigation progresses”. 15/05 Lankadeepa lead story was related to the suicide bomber investigation ‘accomplish to the bomber worked in the army hospital’. On 15/5 Lankadeepa headline reported

82 that information related to a worker in the hospital was revealed. All the above mentioned articles had attention grabbing head lines, but were not followed by any penetrative analysis. Most of the articles did not contain new information. It is interesting to note that some of the articles that were published did not carry any reliable sources to support their headlines or their reporting of the issue.

A photograph of the suicide bomber’s reconstructed face was published in most of the newspapers. On 27/4, the Lankadeepa published a large colour photograph of the suicide bomber, reporting that the Lodge owner who gave refuge to the bomber had been taken in to custody; Thinakkural ran a similar article. The arrest of the lodge owner who gave refuge to the suicide bomber was combined with information on a previous suicide attacker who resided in the same lodge. They said that the previous attacker had attempted to assassinate Mr. Douglas Devanada. Contesting her identity, Virakesari (27/4) ran an article which published a photo of the suicide bomber, disclosed information with regard to her Sinhalese identity, and provided information on her travel to the camp by quoting an unnamed army source.

On the 13/5, the CID published a sketch of the suicide bomber, requesting information on her whereabouts. The Island was the only paper to carry the news on its front page. Ignored by the Sinhala press, the news contradicted some of the previous claims made by the newspapers on the identity of the suicide bomber. Lankadeepa published the sketch in its 6th page while Dinamina published the news in its 13th page. On 14/5, Lakbima carried a full feature article on the suicide bomber and disclosed the fact that the suicide bomber’s name and identity that was previously published was actually a woman presently living in Vavuniya.

The Sinhala and English press also ran a number of human interest stories. The Sinhala papers continuously featured news on the commanders improving health condition. On 17/5, in the Divaina article -my life was saved due to the dedication of my body guards- included a statement made by an army commander to his relatives. “The Tamil press did not follow the commander’s recovery as closely as the Sinhala press.” There were also a number of stories in the Sinhala and English media of the individuals who died in the blast and their families. On 27/04, Divaina published a photo of a victim’s wife, drawing focus to the human tragedy associated with the attack. Lankadeepa, Lakbima, Dinamina all carried emotional feature articles on the victims and their families.

The coverage reflected an increasing climate of insecurity and polarization. Coverage of the arrest of a Tamil doctor in the premises of the national hospital indicated ethno-political allegiances in the press during crisis situations. On 27/04, Divaina’s cover page reported the arrest of a Tamil doctor near the commander’s ward, and his subsequent release. On 27/4, Dinamina’s cover page read: Tamil female posing as a doctor of the Jaffna hospital was arrested while attempting to enter the ICU where the commander was treated. Virakesari on 27/04 published the same story, but with a detailed description of the women who was arrested near the ICU. The article disclosed information such as her name, age, and other personal details. A slightly contradictory statement was published in Thinakkural stating that the woman who was arrested near the entrance to the hospital was a young woman; all the other news papers depicted the woman to be middle aged. On 28/4, Thinakaran reported the release of the arrested women, where as the Sinhala and English media ignored her release.

83 ENDNOTES

1 The LTTE cadres included S. Shanmugaratanm, R. Aravindran, S.S.Jayakumar and R. Jayakumar (Sunday Leader, “Government-LTTE swap prisoners,” February 19 2006, page 1; Daily Mirror, Sunil Jayasirir, “Sea Tigers release as goodwill gesture,” February 18 2006, page 12) 2 Daily Mirror, Easwaran Rutnam, “Geneva Talks: LTTE wants ceasefire agreement strengthened,” February 18 2006, page 3 3 Daily News, “President says no to separatism,” February 14 2006, page 1 4 The LTTE responded to the President’s statement on the Tamil Homeland saying “If the Mahinda regime adopts a political stand ruling out the Tamil homeland concept and insists on a resolution of the racial conflict within the unitary constitution, the LTTE would be left with no alternative other than to endeavour hard to respond effectively to the Tamil call for self-rule.” (Island, “LTTE responds to Mahinda,” February 16 2006 5 Daily News, “President says no to separation,” February 14 2006, page 1 6 Statements reportedly made by President at meeting on February 7 2006 (Daily Mirror, “Government to take soft line in Geneva,” February 8 2006, page 1) 7 Sunday Leader, Suranimala, “Peace team get tuition as SLFP and JVP part ways,” February 12 2006, page 11 8 Sunday Times, Shimali Senanayake, “Swiss talks: Expectations and anxious moments,” February 26 2006, page 5 9 Sunday Times, Shimali Senanayake, “Swiss talks: Expectations and anxious moments,” February 26 2006, page 5 10 Sunday Times, , Shimali Senanayake, “Swiss talks: Expectations and anxious moments,” February 26 2006, page 5 11 Farah Mihlar Ahamed, Daily Mirror, “Hostile stares to handshake: Another chance for peace,” February 25 2006, page 9 12 S.P. Thamilchelvam in Daily Mirror, Tigers put government on notice after Swiss talks, February 27 2006, page 1 13 Sunday Leader, “Government accepts CFA in toto and agrees to disarm paramilitary groups – Bala,”February 26 2006, page 17 14 Sunday Leader, “Mahinda’s secret emissaries in Geneva,” March 5 2006, page 8 15 Daily Mirror, “Govt. plan to amend ceasefire sidelined,” February 23 2006, page 1 16 Sunday Leader, D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “The Geneva conclave and Sri Lankan ground realities,” March 5 2006, page 15 17 P. Saravanamuttu in Sunday Island, Namini Wijedasa, “Post-mortem of talks: Analysts look at outcome,” February 26 2006, page 1 18 For instance following the attack on March 7th the LTTE said it would have adverse effects on the next round. On the 13th the LTTE warned on the 13th that it would pull out of talks, which was reiterated by Balasingham on the 19th. (Morning Leader, Arthur Wamanan, “Talks in the balance warns LTTE,” March 8 2006, page 1; Island, “Tigers threaten to pull out of peace talks,” March 14 2006, page 1) 19 Daya Mohan even called for the Group to be integrated into into army and removed from the East (Daily Mirror, Easwaran Rutnam, “Disband Karuna Faction before April 19, LTTE tells Government” March 10 2006, page 4; Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, “Document bares Tiger claws in key places,” March 5 2006, page 11 20 In its 2-page letter the SLMM claimed that Armed Groups were operating and that they had encountered 10-15 armed men in civilian clothing who said they were from the Karuna Group. They also stated that they had several sightings of armed men claiming to be from the Group and had suspicions of armed groups working in Vavuniya. The Defence Secretary responded stating that this was “not conclusive evidence.” (Sunday Times, Shimali Senanayake, “Govt., SLMM clash over Karuna Group,” April 2 2006, page 1) 21 Daily Mirror, “Aussie TV shows Karuna Group in Government-controlled area,” April 21 2006, page 1 22 Sunday Times, Shimali Senanayake, “Govt. alerts Swiss authorities on LTTE fundraiser,” February 26 2006, page 1 23

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24 Daily Mirror, Shakunthala Perera, “ ‘No evidence that army is backing Paramilitaries’- Haukland,” page 3 25 Daily Mirror, “LTTE demands ‘safe passage’ at BIA,”March 31 2006, page 1; Morning Leader, “LTTE wants seaplane exit from Wanni for talks,” April 5 2006, page 1) 26 Chief negotiator Nimal Siripala De Siva said in early April that the government had taken positive steps to fulfil the decisions reached in Geneva while Solheim also stated that the talks would go ahead (Daily News, “Govt. to fulfil decisions arrived at Norway talks,” April 5 2006, page 4; Daily News, “Truce talks will go ahead – Solheim,” April 8 2006, page 1) 27 Island, Dinasena Ratugamage, “LTTE demands sea plane for 2nd round of talks,”April 6 2006, page 1 28 Daily Mirror, “SLMM fears more violence, blames both sides,” April 17 2006, page 3; Daily Mirror, Easwarran Rutnam and Shakunthala Perera, “Government, SLMM in frantic talks,” April 17 2006, page 1 29 Elections for some areas will be held over the coming months: Colombo Municipality Council and a number of other bodies in the districts to be held in May, with some councils facing elections on September 30

Political Cluster 30 Daily Mirror, Dharisha Bastians “A vote for moderates indicating that government can do without JVP,” April 1 2006, page 8 31 There was significant speculation in the media that the President and the Coalition were planning on holding elections (See Sunday Times, Political Editor, “SLFP reins for roaring Rajapakse,” April 2 2006, page 10; Sunday Leader, “President ponders general election,” April 2 2006, page 1). But at a media conference SLFP General Secretary ruled out snap general elections and expressing confidence in the UPFA Alliance with the JVP and JHU and that the elections was an “unprecedented vote for Mahinda Chinthanaya (Island, “SLFP rules out snap general election,” April 3, page 1) 32 In early February the CBK-Rajapakse power tussle continued with renewed vigour as the ex-President claimed that her life was under threat due a reduction in her security and they both attempted to reassert control over the party. (Sunday Leader, “CBK says her life under threat from Govt, February 12 2006, page 1; Sunday Times, Political Editor, “JVP, JHU mount pressure on Mahinda,” March 5 2006, page 10) 33 As JVP General Secretary, Tilvin Silva noted “Voting us into power is as good as voting for the government. We believe that the President would give an ear to what we say even if he fails to listen to others.” (Daily Mirror, Gagani Weerakoon, “JVP insists on more power for itself,” March 21 2006, page 1) 34 35 Daily Mirror, Dharisha Bastians, “Finally to be at peace with Tiger Time,” March 11 2006, page 8 36 as quoted in the Sunday Observor, Deepal Warnakulasuriya, “Mini polls: Expanding power base JVP aim,” February 12 2006, page 3. 37 Wimal Weerawansa at an election rally in Gampaha (Daily Mirror, “JVP should take credit for President’s Victory – Wimal,” March 6 2006, page 4 38 Statement of Wimal Weerawansa made on March 28 at the Patriotic National Movement on March 28. He was also reported to have said that he would call for a march of 200,000 people demanding that Norway withdraw from the Sri Lankan Peace Process (Sunday Leader, Suranimala, “Indo-Pak politics in Sri Lanka and peace talks after local polls,” April 2 2006, page 11 39 JVP General Secretary, Tilvin Silva (Daily Mirror, Kelum Bandara and Yohan Perera, “ ‘Gam Peraliya’ for Mahinda,” April 1 2006, page 1) 40 Venerable Ellawala Medananda Thero said the objective of the party at the local government elections was not to get its members elections but to spread its philiosophy (Daily Mirror, Kelum Bandara and Yohan Perera, “ ‘Gam Peraliya’ for Mahinda,” April 1 2006, page 1) 41 For instance at a press conference on Fenruary 14 the JVP stated that “the negotiators from the government side must position themselves as the representatives of the government and so should be made aware of the Mahinda Chinthanaya position. They should defence these positions and should argue only from this perspective.” (Island, Ilfam Nizam, “JVP wants Tigers to sheath their claws,” February 15 2006, page 1) 42 Daily Mirror, JVP denounced Govt. contradicting their mou,” February 27 2006, page 4 43 Daily Mirror, “President faces fire but firm on peace,” March 7 2006, page 1 44 On the 35th anniversary of the JVP’s 1971 rebellion the JVP demanded major amendments to the CFA and called for Norway to be removed form its role as facilitator (Daily Mirror, JVP sends tough message to

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MAhinda,” (DATE?). Reportedly the JVP also called for a meeting with the President to set a date for Norway’s ouster (Morning Leader, “JVP to issue ultimatums to Mahinda,” April 5 2006, page 1) 45 Daily Mirror, Shakunthala Perera, Interview with Wimal Weerawansa, April 5 2006, page 9 46 Daily Mirror, Dharisha Bastians, “A vote for moderates indicating that the Government can do without JVP,” April 1 2006, page 8 47 According to Malinda Seneviratne the JVP may not have been able to capture the SLFP’s vote base but it has gained ideological control of the party as the Mahinda Chinthanaya is “more an articulation of JVP- JHU agenda, than a condensation of the SLFP political thinking.” (Daily Mirror, Malinda Seneviratne, “The fate of ‘extremism’ in the post-election political landscape,” April 6 2006, page 9) 48 There was even discussion of which cabinet positions would go to the CWC and UPF leaders. (Sunday Times, Chris Kamalendran, “Three minority parties joining the Government, March 5 2006, page 3) 49 Island, Dasun Edirisinghe, “SLMC, CWC will only support not join Govt.” March 15 2006, page 4 50 Daily News, Rasomi Silva, “CWC backs Govt. peace bid,” February 15 2006, page 3 51 For instance UPF announced that it would support the Government on the national question once it had ascertained the position of the JVP and JHU on the national question, (Island, “UPF wants to know standpoint of JVP to support Govt.” February 8 2006, page 3) implying that the power brokers were these two parties. The UPFA split thus offered some space for dialogue at least for the minority parties. 52 It was reported that the President conveyed this deputy UNP leader Karu Jayasuirya in a meeting between the two on March 6 (Morning Leader, “Government: Door shut for UNP MPs,” March 8 2006, page 1) 53 The UNP even “leaked” to the press that it was planning to take control of the government after local government elections. (Morning Leader, “UNP discloses plans to take control of Government, March 8 2006, page 1) 54 For instance in Kandy 25 key local members including the Kandy Mayor and Deputy Mayor switched over while according to the state media more than a 1,000 UNP activists in the South and UVA joined the UPFA. The UNP was ths forced to expel some 22 chairpersons and deputy chairpersons as they were contesting under the UPFA ticket (Daily Mirror, Lal Jayasinghe, “Local bodies should work hand in hand with Govt. – President,” March 7 2006, page 2; Daily News, Pradeep Kumara Dharmaratne, “Over 1000 UNPers join UPFA,” February 13 2006, page 3) 55 At the local level the UNP suffered some serious defeats losing some councils for the first time in its history and polling third in others. The UNP counted that they had fared better than UPFA 4 councils in 2002 (Sunday Times, Political Editor, “SLFP reins for roaring Rajapakse,” April 2 2006, page 10) 56 Sunday Times, Chris Kamalendran, “Three minority parties joining the Government,” March 5 2006, page 3 57 Sunday Leader, Suranimala, “Govt.’s own goal on the CFA and Basil’s internal clash in Geneva,” March 5 2006, page 11; 58 Morning Leader, “Party leaders want proper talks agenda,” March 12 2006, page 2 59 Sunday Leader, Jamila Najmuddin, “TNA lashes out at Govt. for holding polls in NE,” February 19 2006, page 3 60 Island, Norman Pallihawadana, “LTTE backing for TNA at LG polls,” March 20 2006, page 2 61 Elections were held in 12 of the 18 councils in Digamaddula and 12 of the 13 councils in Trincomalee 62 K. Vigneswaran who had acted as spokesman for the EPDP split, forming the Akhila Ilankai Tamil United Front (AITUK) which was recognized by the election commissioner. (Weekend Standard, Munza Mushtaq, “New moderate Tamil party recognized,” March 11 2006, page 2) 63 Island, “Halt continuing oppression of alternate Tamil opinion – EPRLF,” March 9 2006, page 4 64 Karuna Group on February 26 state that they will not disarm – “we have our resolve and moral right to hold onto our arms.” (Daily Mirror, “Karuna refuses to give up arms,” February 27 2006, page 1). The group also stated that they would not disarm until the main faction did, especially because “it will only give us legitimacy for the LTTE to extend writ to kill us.” (Reuters, “Tiger renegades won’t disarm yet,” February 20 2006) 65 On April 11 the TMVPP Office was opened on Govinda Road, Batticaloa with the TMVP flag hoisted by Commander Markan, Political Secretary of TMVP. The TMVP also commemorated the ‘Verugal Slaughter’ in April (Daily Mirror, “Thaileela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal opens office in Batticaloa Town,” April 12 2006, page 3; Morning Leader, “ Karuna Group opens political office in Batticaloa,” April 12 2006, page 4)

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66 The villages from Kannan, Kiramam, Vinayagpuram, Kanniakipruam, Pethalai and Puthukudiyiruppu were summoned by the Karuna Group to inform them of the group’s policies (Sunday Leader, Amanthe Perera, “Importance of the battle of Algiers,” April 2 2006, page 10) 67 Karuna stated that “our military wing will killanyone occupying the homes and businesses of Muslims who the Tigers forced to flee Jaffna if they don’t vacate within a month” (Daily Mirror, “Karuna booms out for Muslims,” April 4 2006, page 1) 68 Sunday Leader, Amanthe Perera, “Verbal posturing continues,” April 9 2006, page 10) 69 Morning Leader, “President-Rauf hold talks on joint action,” March 8 2006, page 1 70 71 The President met Muslim Political Parties on February 10th 2006 and urged the parties to nominate a representative. (Sunday Observer, Thava Sajitharan, “Muslim parties urged to nominate representative,” February 12 2006, page 3 72 Daily Mirror, “SLMC reiterates demand for separate Muslim delegation,” February 12 2006, page 1 73 The SLMC claimed that Ashraf lacked a mandate from the Muslim Community (Morning Leader, “Ferial has no mandate charges SLMC,” February 22 2006, page 2). The Alliance on South East Muslim Organizations (ASEMO) while not publicly criticizing Ashraf however staged a hartal on February 22 demanding a separate delegation, thereby sending a clear message to the political high command (Island, Zacki Jabber, “Kalmunai comes to a standstill,” February 23 2006, page 1) 74 Weekend Standard, Munza Mustapha, “Ferial to insist on separate Muslim delegation,” February 18 2006, page 4 75 This meeting was attended by more than 240 trustees and theologians of mosques, heads of organizations, intellectuals, politicians and youth leaders in the Eastern Province (Weekend Standard, “Fatwa on Muslims joining govt. delegation,” April 22 2006, page 2) 76 Weekend Standard, Munza Mushtaq, “Jihad organizations an LTTE canard,” March 11 2006, page 2 77 Daily Mirror, “Form separate regiment when recruiting Muslims to army,” March 29 2006, page 8; Island, Jayantha De Silva, “Muslim clergy gives women go ahead to join army,” April 3 2006, page 13 78 Sunday Island, Namini Wijedasa, “Muslim regiment for the East a short sighted move,” April 2 2006, page 13 79 Daily Mirror, “TNA fires at muslim brigade,” March 31 2006, page 7 80 Daily Mirror, Damitha Hemachandra, “Muslim regiment to the Sri Lankan Army,” March 29 2006, page 8 81 Daily Mirror, Champika Liyanaarachchi, “Muslim regiment to the Sri Lankan Army,” March 29 2006, page 8

International Environment Cluster 82 Island, Shamindra Fernando, “Govt. wants Co-Chairs to ensure Tiger participation,” April 6 2006, page 1 83 Morning Leader, “Co-chairs urge govt and LTTE to honour commitment,” April 12 2006, page 1 84 Daily News, “Annan concerned over rising violence,” April 14 2006, page 1 85 Daily Mirror, Easwaran Rutnam, “No return to war in Lanka: US urges Govt., LTTE,” February 13 2006, page 3 86 Morning Leader, “Ranil to meet Indian PM on Sunday,” March 29 2006, page 1 87 For instance the Japanese Ambassador Cakio Suda in responding to a question as to whether aid was tied to the peace process responded that Japan believes in continuous development both at a national and regional level (Daily Mirror, Poorna Rodrigo, “N-E Development should continue, urges Japanese envoy,” March 20 2006, page 1 88 See Daily Mirror, “My priority is peace: President tells Time,” February 15 2006, page 4 89 Daily Mirror, Dharisha Bastians, “A vote for moderates indicating that Government can do without JVP,” April 1 2006, page 8; Daily News, “Britain reiterates support to Govt’s peace effort,” April 14 2006, page1 90 Sunday Times, “Restrict Tiger travels after April talks, Govt. tells Swiss,” April 2 2006, page 3; Daily Mirror, Dharisha Bastians, “A vote for moderates indicating that Government can do without JVP,” April 1 2006, page 8 91 Sunday Times, Stewart Bell, “Canada bans LTTE: major blow in biggest base,” April 9 2006, page 1 92 Daily Mirror, “Tigers use Canadian charities as ‘fronts’ say reports,” April 20 2006, page 4 93 Daily Mirror, “Canadian police raid World Tamil Movement office in Montreal,” April 17 2006, page 1

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94 Daily Mirror, Sunil Jayasiri, Easwaran Ratnam, Kelum Bandara and Gagani Weerakoon, “Peace vs. war clash before avurudhu,” April 11 2006, p age1; Morning Leader, Jamila Najmuddin, “Canadian ban unnecessary – TNA,” April 12 2006, page 2 95 The Pan European Tamil Democratic Congress accused the LTTE of using the CFA to “extend its authoritain rule under cover of the legitimacy it had gained by signing the agreement.” In the UK six Tamil Organizations came together to form the Tamil Peace Forum. Anti-LTTE Tamil Groups also organized protests in London on February 19 2006 (Sunday Times, Neville de Silva, “Tamils for peace gather against LTTE,” February 12 2006, page 3) 96 For instance Danish State TV reported on prime time news on March 12 that LTTE front organizations in were involved in the harraessment of 11,000 Tamil families (Daily News, Manjula Fernando, “Danish TV exposes LTTE harassment of Tamils,” March 14 2006, page 3 97 Island, “Charity suspends donations over terror laws,” April 20 2006, page 1 98 Morning Leader, “Canadian decision one-sided, charges LTTE,” April 12 2006, page 3 99 Sunday times, Iqbal Athas, “Geneva: How far can the two sides go?” February 19 2006 100 Sunday Times, Shimali Senanayake, “President visiting Pakistan to strengthen ties,” April 3 2006, page 1 101 Daily News, Badula Jayasekera, “Sri Lanka and Pakistan must overcome terrorism and extremism – Musharaf,” April 1 2006, page 1 102 Sunday Times, Shimali Senanayake, “Lanka to assure India over China, Pakistan ties,” April 2 2006, page 3 103 Sunday Observer, “Govt denies AP report,” April 2 2006, page 1 104 Sunday Times, “Iran unhappy over Lanka’s pro US vote,” February 12 2006, page1 105 Sunday Observer, “Work towards peace, consensus, India urges Ranil,” April 2 2006, page 1

Security Cluster 106 Island, Shamindra Fernando, “Army Chief calls for strengthening army,” March 3 2006, page 1 107 Daily Mirror, “Tigers’ next target: Attacking small detachments in North, East,” April 21 2006, page 9 108 Weekend Standard, “SLMM slams LTTE, Army,” March 4 2006, page 4 109 Daily Mirror, “Military complains LTTE active in no man’s land,” April 7 2006, page 3 110 There were reports of bunkers being constructed at Kalkuli, Navaladdy and Kinnayadi (Island, “LTTE bunkers in front of Trinco Harbour,” April 4 2006, page 2) 111 The government was seeking 2 radars and 2 day and night camera to strengthen air surveillance capacity (Sunday Island, “Govt to top up air air surveillance capacity,” April 16 2006, page 1; Daily Mirror, Sarath Malasekera, “STF recruits 342 personnel,” April 3 2006, page 3; Island, Gamini Perera, “The STF passing out parade,” April 12 2006, page 2) 112 Officers from the two navies met on February 23 to work out arrangements following six months of experimental cooperation (Sunday Island, “Coordinated naval patrolling formalized,” February 26 2006, page 2 113 The Defence Secretary Gothabaya Rajapakse in a letter to the army commander stated that all promotions should not be made without the President’s directive. (Daily Mirror, “Transfers galore during the New Year season,” April 21 2006, page 9; Daily Mirror, “President revokes recent army transfers, promotions,” April 8 2006, page 1 114 Daily Mirror, “Tigers’ next target: Attacking small detachments in North, East,” April 21 2006, page 9 115 Morning Leader, “Soosai fires warning on paramilitaries,” March 15 2006, page 1 116 Sunday Times, “Farmers flee conscription – leae harvest behind them,” April 23 2006, page 3) 117 Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, “Geneva: how far can the two sides go?” February 19 2006, page 11; Daily Mirror, Kurulu Kariyakarawana, “Navy arrests two dinghy boats,”; Daily Mirror, “Full story of the Kalpitiya Sea blasts, March 31 2006, page 9; Sunday Times, “Haukland’s parting salvo draws Rajapakse’s ire,” April 2 2006, page 11;) 118 The Sunday Island Defence Correspondent claimed that three boats made it through to the LTTE: one off Wilpattu, another between Kalpitiya and Mannar and a third between LTTE-controlled Trincomalee and Batticaloa (Sunday Island, Defence Correspondent, “LTTE receives arms shipment under the noses of the armed forces,” April 2 2006, page 10) 119 For instance a 15 year old youth was arrested in Urani, Batticaloa on February 11 2006. In Trincomalee three men were arrested on March 7 for holding meeting against the Sinhala community and 2 school boys

88 with 9mm pistols were arrested in Selvanayagampuram on March 19 (Daily News, “LTTE teenager with weapon arrested,” February 13 2006, page 1; Morning Leader, Jamila Najmuddin, “Three trinco men arrested, March 8 2006, page 4; Daily Mirror, “Alleged members of LTTE pistol gang arrested, April 5 2006, page 3) 120 Island, “Explosives found,” February 13 2006, page 1; Daily Mirror, Sunil Jayasiri, “Security forces unearth large explosive haul,” April 22 2006, page 1 121 For instance In other instances the forces had narrow escapes such as on April 20 when 20 soldiers on foot patrol on the Padaviya-Kebilithigollewa Road narrowly escape a claymore attack (Daily Mirror, Senaka De Silva, “Narrow escape for Padaviya soldiers,” April21 2006, page 4) 122 Island, LTTE snipers creep into cleared areas,” April 13 2006, page 4 123 Tamilnet, “97 Tamils arrested in Colombo suburbs,” April 27 2006 124 H.G.F. Premakumara of Passara died a day following the LTTE blast (Daily Mirror, Sunil Jayasiri, “Talaimannar blast: sailor dies,” February 13 2006, page 1) 125 Daily Mirror, Sunil Jayasiri, “Talaimannar blast: sailor dies,” February 13 2006, page 1; Sunday Times, Dilmini Samaranayake, “Four killed in boat blast off Mannar,” February 12 2006, page 1 126 The TELO Office was attacked in Batticaloa on February 13 where the TELO candidate Nathan was injured and on February 17. (Daily News, “Five grenades lobbed at TELO office,” February 15 2006, page 2; Thinakural, February 14 2006, page 1; Thinakaran, February 14 2006, page1) 127 Daily Mirror, “Two die in the first attack after Geneva Talks,” March 5 2006, page 1; Daily Mirror, Easwaran Rutnam and Dharisha Bastians, “Doubts cast over next round of talks,” March 6 2006, page 1 128 March 5 Mohamed Nawaz in early twenties shot dead by gunmen on a motorcycle in Valaichchennai March 6 Mohamed Jowfar 31 shot by unknown gang in Eravur March 9 Kovinthasamy Wijeyrajah 21 shot dead at Urani Junction, Batticaloa while traveling on a bus. Ponnuchamy Manikkam 55 and Thambimuttu Arumaithurai 46 were both injured (TK, March 62006, page 1; Veerakesari, March 6 2006, page 1; Daily Mirror, “personal grudge believed cause for killing,” March 7 2006, page 2 ;TKK, March 10 2006, page 1) 129 The Navy claim that 15 LTTE cadres at fired at a navy craft from Norway Point, Trincomalee on March 18. The LTTE stated that the navy had fired at the coatal villages of Sampoor, Soodaikuda, Koonitivu and Kadatkaraichchenia in LTTE-controlled Muttur on March 20. The navy claimed it had been fired at from the coast when it moved in to identify two suspicious vessels so had responded in self defence. (Daily Mirror, “Navy firing at coastal villages say LTTE,” March 20 2006, page 1 CHECK) 130Daily Mirror, “Tigers fire at Jaffna FDL,” March 21 2006; Sunday Times, “Violence erupts again: one soldier killed, two injured,” April 9 2006, page 1 131 1Political Wing Leader S.P. Thamilchelvam for instance stated in April “Our Navy is stronger and we have access to a large area of the sea.” (Morning Leader, “LTTE claims stronger navy,” April 12 2006, page) 132 The army and police carried out searches in Karapola, Mutugala, Wadumunai and Thiruchchena in mid- February and found no evidence of paramilitary groups (Daily News, “No paramilitary groups in areas under Govt control, says ministry” February 14 2006, page 1) 133 Daily Mirror, Easwaran Rutnam, “ ‘Armed elements’ operating in East says monitoring mission,” February 16 2006, page 4 134 Daily Mirror, “LTTE front warns of resumption of attacks,” March 28 2006, page 4 135 Sunday Leader, “TRF threatens to attack army,” March 29 2006, page 2; Sunday Leader, Amanthe Perera, “Importance of the battle of Algiers,” April 2 2006, page 10 136 Island, Harischandra Gunaratna and Norman Palihawadana, “Govt remains unprovoked, takes precautions, reaffirms commitment to peace,”April 12 2006, page 1 137 Island, Shamindra Fernando, “Forces’ ire directed at Nordic truce monitors,” April 13 2006, page 1 138 INFORM, Situation Report: April 2006, page 1 139 Daily Mirror, Gihan De Chikera, Sunil Jayasiri and Kelum Bandara, April 8 2006, page 1 140 The army stated that the LTTE had launched an attack on an army observation point at 2 pm while the LTTE claimed that the security forces had attacked and fled. (Morning Leader, Arthur Wamanan, “One soldier, one Tiger dead in Trinco clash,” April9 2006, page 1) 141 According to the Daily Mirror at least 8 Karuna Cadres were killed, 5 others were injured and 3 of the Karuna Group were injured (Daily Mirror, “At least 8 Wanni cadres killed,” April 10 2006, page 1)

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142 INFORM, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Law and Society Trust, Free Media Movement and Devasarana Development Centre, Fact-Finding Report Trincomalee, April 16-17 2006; Akhila Ilankai Tamil United Front, Trincomalee Situation Report 143 Tamilnet, “Death toll in trinco rises to 19, 15 identified,” April 13 2006 144 INFORM, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Law and Society Trust, Free Media Movement and Devasarana Development Centre, Fact-Finding Report Trincomalee, April 16-17 2006 145 INFORM, Devasaranara Development Centre, Citizen’s Commission for the Right to Life of Border Villagers, Trust, Centrre for People’s Dialogue, Saadhu Jana , Report of Fact- Finding Mission to Gomarankadawela and Mutur, April 26-27 2006 146 INFORM, Devasaranara Development Centre, Citizen’s Commission for the Right to Life of Border Villagers, Neelan Tiruchelvam Trust, Centrre for People’s Dialogue, Saadhu Jana Ravaya, Report of Fact- Finding Mission to Gomarankadawela and Mutur, April 26-27 2006, page 5 147 INFORM, Devasaranara Development Centre, Citizen’s Commission for the Right to Life of Border Villagers, Neelan Tiruchelvam Trust, Centrre for People’s Dialogue, Saadhu Jana Ravaya, Report of Fact- Finding Mission to Gomarankadawela and Mutur, April 26-27 2006, page 6 148 INFORM, Devasaranara Development Centre, Citizen’s Commission for the Right to Life of Border Villagers, Neelan Tiruchelvam Trust, Centrre for People’s Dialogue, Saadhu Jana Ravaya, Report of Fact- Finding Mission to Gomarankadawela and Mutur, April 26-27 2006, page 7 149 INFORM, Devasaranara Development Centre, Citizen’s Commission for the Right to Life of Border Villagers, Neelan Tiruchelvam Trust, Centrre for People’s Dialogue, Saadhu Jana Ravaya, Report of Fact- Finding Mission to Gomarankadawela and Mutur, April 26-27 2006, page 5 150 University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), “Terrorism, counterterrorism and Challenges to Human Rights Advocacy,” Special Report No: 20, April 2 2006 151 University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), “Terrorism, counterterrorism and Challenges to Human Rights Advocacy,” Special Report No: 20, April 2 2006 152 INFORM, Situation Report: April 206, page 1 153 Sunday Leader, Amanthe Perera, “Importance of the battle of Algiers,” April 2 2006, page 10 154 Daily Mirror, Easwaran Rutnam and Sunil Jayasiri, “More violence amid doubts over talks,” April 18 2006, page 1 155 Sunday Island, Defence Correspondent, “LTTE campaign of violence undermines next round of peace talks,”April 16 2006, page 10 156 Daily Mirror, Senaka De Silva, “Businessman shot dead,” April 21 2006, page 2 157 158 Thinakural, april 21 2006 159 Daily Mirror, “Bodies found at two places,”April 20 2006, page 3 160 University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), “Terrorism, counterterrorism and Challenges to Human Rights Advocacy,” Special Report No: 20, April 2 2006 161 INFORM, Situation Report: April 2006, page 4 162 Tamilnet, Three Tamil youth killed in Trinco, April 23 2006 163 Island, “Abducted men escape from LTTE camp,” April 3 2006, page 2 164 Sunday Times, “Farmers flee conscription- leave harvest behind them,” April 24 2006, page 3 165 Daily Mirror, Amadoru Amrajeewa, “Tiger recruitment alleged in Trinco,” March 21 2006, page 3 166 14 year old Ravindran Aishwaran abducted at around 5 pm on March 13 in Batticaloa Town and a 25 year old was abducted within Batticaloa (Daily Mirror, Navaratne Samaratunge, “Two more abductions reported from Batticaloa,” March 16 2006, page 4; Daily News, “boy escapes from LTTE camp,” March 18 2006, page 3) 167 Based on interviews with personnel of local NGOs based in the East 168 UNHCR Spokesperson quoted in INFORM, Situation Report: April 2006, page 3 169 Weekend Standard, “Government clears STF,” April 22 2006, page 1 170 University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), “Terrorism, counterterrorism and Challenges to Human Rights Advocacy,” Special Report No: 20, April 2 2006 171 Daily Mirror, “SLMM fears more violence, blames both sides,” April 17 2006, page 3

Legal Cluster

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172 The 17th Amendment also mandates that five of the ten members to the Constitutional Council are to be appointed upon the joint nomination of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. In early February 2006, the five joint nominations of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition had finally been sent to the President, after pending for over eight months since the term of the previous Constitutional Council expired in 2005. 173 As was noted in the report of the previous quarterly period, the failure to reconstitute the Constitutional Council has had the domino effect of delaying the reconstitution of other important independent commissions mandated by the 17th Amendment. 174 CPA Press Release: “President Violates 17th Amendment to the Constitution – CPA”, dated 12 April 2006. 175 The Judicial Services Commission is a 17th Amendment-created independent commission comprised of the Chief Justice, as chairperson, and the two most senior sitting judges of the Supreme Court, and is vested with powers of appointment, transfer and disciplinary authority over the minor judiciary and in some cases the Supreme Court as well. 176 The members of the Public Services Commission include Justice Priyantha Perera (chairperson), Gunapala Wickremaratne, Prof. M.S. Mookiah, Ms. Srima Wijeratne, W.P.S. Wijewardene, Prof. Mendis Rohanadeera, Dr Bernard soyza, Palitha M. Kumarasinghe, Prof. Dayasiri Fernando. The members of the National Police Commission include Neville Piyadigama, Ven, Elle Gunawansa, Justice Dharmadasa Nanayakkara, Nimal Punchihewa, R. sivaram, Charmanie Madurusinghe, Javid Yusuf 177 Daily Mirror, “SC Judges may testify before Select Committee: Civic action groups call parliament to probe crisis in JSC”, 9 February 2006; TamilNet, “Abuse of political power led to Judges resignations, says State Bar”, 9 February 2006. 178 Daily Mirror, “SC Judges may testify before Select Committee: Civic action groups call parliament to probe crisis in JSC”, 9 February 2006. 179 The Chief Justice responded by issuing a press statement of his own, in which he made various negative personal attacks against the two Judges (See Daily News, “JSC will continue to serve despite Judges’ resignations”, 6 February 2006.) 180 The committee appears to be relatively balanced ethnically and politically, being comprised of the following members: Ministers Wijedasa Rajapakse (Chairperson), Ferial Ashraff, D.E.W. Gunasekera, Maithripala Sirisena, , Jeyeraj Fernandopulle, , , , , , P. Chandrasekeram, , , Gajan Ponnambalam, , Wimal Weerawansa, Mavai Senthirajah and . See Daily Mirror, “Speaker names committee to study Anti-Conversion Bill”, 6 April 2006. 181 Elections to twelve local authorities in Trincomalee district were conducted for the first time in twelve years. Meanwhile, elections to the Verugal Pradeshiya Sabha in Trincomalee district and Puthukudiruppu Pradeshiya Sabha in , both in LTTE controlled areas, were not conducted as the ITAK and EPDP parties were returned uncontested to these local authorities, respectively, since the nomination lists of the other parties contesting the elections were rejected in both cases. See Sunday Times, “No polls in LTTE areas”, 19 March 2006; TamilNet, “Local elections in Trincomalee, Amparai to be held”, 20 March 2006; TamilNet, “Sri Lankans go to local polls Thursday”, 29 March 2006. 182 Chaired by Minister Nandana Gunathilake, the Select Committee has been mandated to investigate the following matters: (1) the functioning of foreign-funded NGOs in Sri Lanka; (2) transparency of financial activities of NGOs; (3) the manner in which the functioning of NGOs has impinged on the sovereignty and national defence of Sri Lanka; (4) the manner in which the activities of NGOs have adversely affected the national and social well-being of the country; and (5) the manner in which the GOSL is required to act in respect of those NGOs. See advertisement in Sunday Observer, 23 April 2006. 183 See id.

ECONOMIC CLUSTER

Table 1.1 Commodity Prices January 2006

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Commodity Ampara Batticaloa Jaffna Vavuniya

Rice Rs/kg 30 29 32 30 Wheat flour Rs/kg 31 33 32 29 Mysore dhal Rs/kg 70 76 80 76 Sugar Rs/kg 49 48 52 47 Milk powder Rs/400g 151 152 157 154 Bread Rs/450g 18 17 23 17 LP gas Rs/12.5 kg 950 950 1150 910 Kerosene Rs/litre 31 31 36 31 Diesel Rs/litre 51 50 57 50 Petrol Rs/litre 81 80 91 81 Cement Rs/bag 569 563 660 550 TOTAL 2,041 2,039 2,370 1,975

Table 1.2 Commodity Prices February 2006 Commodity Ampara Batticaloa Jaffna Vavuniya

Rice Rs/kg 28 28 36 29 Wheat flour Rs/kg 31 33 33 29 Mysore dhal Rs/kg 61 69 83 79 Sugar Rs/kg 55 55 57 52 Milk powder Rs/400g 147 149 160 154 Bread Rs/450g 18 17 23 17 LP gas Rs/12.5 kg 986 980 1246 1055 Kerosene Rs/litre 31 31 34 31 Diesel Rs/litre 51 50 56 50 Petrol Rs/litre 81 80 90 81 Cement Rs/bag 570 567 606 565 TOTAL 2,069 2,069 2,424 2,142

Table 1.3 Commodity Prices March 2006 Commodity Ampara Batticaloa Jaffna Vavuniya

Rice Rs/kg 25 27 53 28 Wheat flour Rs/kg 34 34 34 29 Mysore dhal Rs/kg 68 68 81 78 Sugar Rs/kg 56 55 61 56 Milk powder Rs/400g 150 150 158 154 Bread Rs/450g 18 18 25 17

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LP gas Rs/12.5 kg 1018 1008 1255 1065 Kerosene Rs/litre 31 31 35 31 Diesel Rs/litre 51 50 56 50 Petrol Rs/litre 81 80 93 81 Cement Rs/bag 570 570 606 580 TOTAL 2,102 2,101 2,457 2,169

Table 2.1 Commodity Prices in Ampara January - March 2006 Commodity January February March

Rice Rs/kg 30 28 25 Wheat flour Rs/kg 31 31 34 Mysore dhal Rs/kg 70 61 68 Sugar Rs/kg 49 55 56 Milk powder Rs/400g 151 147 150 Coconut Rs 22 21 18 Potato Rs/kg 94 84 76 Onions Rs/kg 90 81 57 Chillies Rs/kg 77 66 60 Cabbage Rs/kg 54 51 41 Carrot Rs/kg 81 86 80 Aubergine (Brinjal) 63 68 58 Pumpkin Rs/kg 35 35 35 Drumstick Rs/kg - - - Coconut oil Rs/litre 86 77 67 Bread Rs/450g 18 18 18 SUB TOTAL 951 909 843 LP gas Rs/12.5 kg 950 986 1018 Kerosene Rs/litre 31 31 31 Diesel Rs/litre 51 51 51 Petrol Rs/litre 81 81 81 Cement Rs/bag 569 570 570 TOTAL 2,633 2,628 2,594

Table 2.2 Commodity Prices in Batticaloa January – March 2006 Commodity January February March

Rice Rs/kg 29 28 27 Wheat flour Rs/kg 33 33 34

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Mysore dhal Rs/kg 76 69 68 Sugar Rs/kg 48 55 55 Milk powder Rs/400g 152 149 150 Coconut Rs 21 19 18 Potato Rs/kg 94 90 74 Onions Rs/kg 74 78 60 Chillies Rs/kg 80 104 70 Cabbage Rs/kg 58 66 41 Carrot Rs/kg 72 87 80 Aubergine (Brinjal) 82 70 56 Pumpkin Rs/kg 23 27 28 Drumstick Rs/kg - - - Coconut oil Rs/litre 79 78 65 Bread Rs/450g 17 17 18 SUB TOTAL 938 970 844 LP gas Rs/12.5 kg 950 980 1008 Kerosene Rs/litre 31 31 31 Diesel Rs/litre 50 50 50 Petrol Rs/litre 80 80 80 Cement Rs/bag 563 567 570 TOTAL 2,612 2,678 2,583

Table 2.3 Commodity Prices in Jaffna January – March 2006 Commodity January February March

Rice Rs/kg 32 36 53 Wheat flour Rs/kg 32 33 34 Mysore dhal Rs/kg 80 83 81 Sugar Rs/kg 52 57 61 Milk powder Rs/400g 157 160 158 Coconut Rs 17 18 20 Potato Rs/kg 94 61 59 Onions Rs/kg 77 43 33 Chillies Rs/kg 97 81 32 Cabbage Rs/kg 57 45 28 Carrot Rs/kg 60 47 53 Aubergine (Brinjal) 79 70 39 Pumpkin Rs/kg 34 30 27 Drumstick Rs/kg - - - Coconut oil Rs/litre 98 103 109

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Bread Rs/450g 23 23 25 SUB TOTAL 989 890 812 LP gas Rs/12.5 kg 1150 1246 1255 Kerosene Rs/litre 36 34 35 Diesel Rs/litre 57 56 56 Petrol Rs/litre 91 90 93 Cement Rs/bag 660 606 606 TOTAL 2,983 2,922 2,857

Table 2.4 Commodity Prices in Vavuniya January – March 2006 Commodity January February March

Rice Rs/kg 30 29 28 Wheat flour Rs/kg 29 29 29 Mysore dhal Rs/kg 76 79 78 Sugar Rs/kg 47 52 56 Milk powder Rs/400g 154 154 154 Coconut Rs 17 16 16 Potato Rs/kg 73 63 60 Onions Rs/kg 68 51 36 Chillies Rs/kg 79 56 43 Cabbage Rs/kg 42 36 32 Carrot Rs/kg 109 70 70 Aubergine (Brinjal) 44 21 29 Pumpkin Rs/kg 30 24 20 Drumstick Rs/kg - - - Coconut oil Rs/litre 78 80 80 Bread Rs/450g 17 17 17 SUB TOTAL 893 777 748 LP gas Rs/12.5 kg 910 1055 1065 Kerosene Rs/litre 31 31 31 Diesel Rs/litre 50 50 50 Petrol Rs/litre 81 81 81 Cement Rs/bag 550 565 580 TOTAL 2,515 2,559 2,555

184 http://www. centralbanklanka.org/socio_econ_ind.html

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185 During the last quarter of 2005 services sector grew by almost 6% in real terms, which was marginally lower than the corresponding quarter in 2004 (6.2%). 186 Post and telecommunications services expanded by 25% during the fourth quarter 2005 while financial services grew by almost 10% compared to just over 1% in the corresponding quarter in 2004. 187 Though exports to European market declined in volume (-3.8%) and value (-6.2%), increase in exports to USA in terms of both volume (12.1%) and value (11.5%) more than compensated for the loss in the European market. 188 Paddy production reached a record (since independence) 3.25 million metric tons while tea production topped a record 317,000 metric tons in 2005. Total paddy output was even higher than the demand in 2005. Paddy production was almost 1% greater than the total domestic demand in 2005. 189 Private sector industrial production index increased consecutively in the months between December and January. Private sector industrial production index (1997=100) increased to 155 points in January 2006 (from 149 points in December 2005) and further to 159 points in February 2006. The public sector industrial production index rose in January and dropped marginally in February. The public sector industrial production index (1997=100) increased to 104.5 points in January 2006 from 93 points in the preceding month. However, it dropped to 92 points in February 2006. Both indices for January for 2006 were higher than the corresponding month in 2005, but for February 2006 the public index was lower than in 2005 while the private was higher. The private sector industrial production index in January and February 2006 were higher than in the corresponding months last year (151 and 150 points respectively). The public sector industrial production index in January 2006 (104.5 points) was higher than in the corresponding month last year (102 points), but in February 2006 (92 points) it was lower than in the corresponding month last year (94 points). While the public sector industrial production index rose in January and dropped marginally in February. 190 Production during this quarter was 3% and 7% higher than the preceding quarter (75.5 million kgs) and the corresponding quarter of 2005 respectively (72.7 million kgs). 191 Sri Lanka’s competitors on tea production and exports are Kenya and India. Apparently, in Kenya tea output is hampered by a severe drought in the past few months, and therefore it is anticipated that demand for Ceylon tea would rise and perhaps the price as well during 2006. 192 Tea auction price increased to USD 1.89 per kg in January and then dropped to USD 1.66 per kg in February. Auction price in January was marginally higher than the preceding month (USD 1.85 per kg) but lower than the price in January 2005 (almost USD 2 per kg). However, February 2006 auction price was one of the lowest after July 2004. 193 Rubber production, during the quarter under review, also increased considerably to 29 million kgs from 26 million kgs in the preceding quarter and 25 million kgs in the first quarter 2005. Coconut output, on the other hand, dropped by almost 2% to 625 million nuts in the first quarter 2006 from 636 million nuts in the previous quarter. But, compared to the corresponding quarter in 2005 (544 million nuts) coconut output increased considerably to 625 million nuts (15%) in the first quarter of this year. Paddy production data on a monthly or quarterly basis is unavailable because it is a seasonal crop. 194 Point-to-point inflation rate is the change in the SLCPI of a particular month in comparison to the SLCPI of the same month in the previous year. 195 The weighted average prime lending rate increased negligibly (compared to 12.24% in December 2005) but declined to 11.96% by end-February and remained at 11.97% by end-March. 196 The Treasury bill (12-months) rate remained more or less at 10.37% by end-January (same as in December end) and negligibly increased to 10.38% by end-February and remained at that level by end-March. 197 The repo rate is the interest rate at which commercial banks and primary dealers can invest their surplus funds in treasury bills and bonds held by the Central Bank. The reverse repo rate is the interest rate at which commercial banks and primary dealers can obtain funds from the Central Bank against the collateral of treasury bills and bonds. 198 From USD 755 million in December 2005 to USD 680 million in January 2006

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199 Both remittances and tourism earnings were higher, 10% and 26% during this quarter respectively compared to the last quarter. Net private remittance received during the first quarter of this year (USD 549 million) was 10% higher than received in the preceding quarter (USD 500 million) and 26% higher than that received in the first quarter of last year (USD 436 million). Similarly, earning from tourism during the first quarter this year (USD 116 million) was 36% higher than the preceding quarter (USD 85 million) and 27% higher than the same quarter last year (USD 91 million). Both remittances and tourism earnings were higher, 10% and 26% during this quarter respectively compared to the last quarter 200 ASPI, 1985=100 201 MPI, 31-12-1998=100 202 It is very difficult to verify the numbers because it is shrouded in mystery as such displacements serve a vital propaganda arsenal. 203 Most of the victims of this induced displacement are family members of LTTE cadres & martyrs, and supporters/sympathizers of the LTTE. These induced displacements are taking place in Jaffna, Trincomalee, Mannar, and Vavuniya districts. 204 Ceylon Daily News, 27-04-2006: 3. 205 Two-thirds are those of the Tamils and one-third is of the Muslims. 206 For the purpose of this report essential commodity prices were collected regularly in Kalmunai (Ampara district), Batticaloa town (Batticaloa district), Jaffna town & Point Pedro town (Jaffna district), and Vavuniya town (). Twice every week prices are collected in each of these markets and then the average for the month is worked out. 207 In Batticaloa district wheat (3%), bread (6%), and LP gas (6%) prices have been rising while rice (-7%) and vegetable prices have been declining between January and March 2006 (see Table 2.2). In Vavuniya district sugar (19%), LP gas (17%), and cement (5%) prices have been increasing while rice (-7%) and vegetable prices have been declining (see Table 2.4). 208 Virakesari, 06-02-2006: 19. 209 Virakesari, 04-03-2006: 2; Virakesari, 21-03-2006: 7. 210 Ceylon Daily News, 12-04-2006: 4. 211 Ceylon Daily News, 27-04-2006: 3

Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Cluster 212 Daily Mirror, 16th May 2006 213 Morning Leader 26th April 2006 214 CHA discussion 4th May 2006 215 CHA discussion 4th May 2006 216 Sunday Times, 7th May 2006 217 www.lankatruth.com on 6th May 2006 218 Information from the Vavuniya Kachcheri, 26th April. 219 “ (Sampoor relief) completes assessment”, 2nd May 2006 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/VBOL-6PFHS2?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=lka 220 27th April-3rd May 2006, OCHA situation report 221 UNHCR estimated the displaced at 15,000 while the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) estimated the number at 30,000- Sunday Leader 30th April 2006. The Government Agent came on record saying that only 4200 lived in refugee camps- www.lankatruth.com on 28th April 2006 222 These figures of people residing in welfare camps. 223 TamilNet 10th April 2006 224 Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Trincomalee, 16-17th April 2006 225 CHA discussion 4th May 2006 226 Briefing of Fact Finding Mission to Mutur on 26-27th April 227 21st April CHA operational meeting 228 RADA www.tafren.gov.lk 229 RADA- www.tafren.gov.lk 230 Ibid. 231 Daily Mirror, 2nd March 2006

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232 The committee consists of 3 representatives from the displaced community and 2 officials appointed by the President was set up 233 CPA field trip 22-23rd April 2006 234 This reuquest was made at the Construction Task Force Meeting on March 15th (11-23rd March 2006 OCHA situation report) 235 CPA field trip 22-23rd April 2006 236 CPA field trip 22-23rd April 2006 237 CPA field trip 22-23rd April 2006 238 “Some Sri Lanka coastal water unusable” Associated Press, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/1104AP_Sri_Lanka_Tsunami.html May 9, 2006. 239 “Drought in the East” Morning Leader, 26th April 2006. 240 CPA field trip 22-23rd April 2006 241 24-30th March 2006, OCHA situation report 242 Ibid. 243 The W orld Bank will be providing assistance to 30,000 families with housing from this year. It is reported that the Asian Development Bank has also approved a housing project for the conflict affected “Financial assistance for IDPs to settle down” Morning Leader, 26th April 2006. 244 Ibid. 245 Vavuniya Kachcheri, 31st March 2006. 246 28th April 2006. UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/country?iso=lka “increasing intimidation exacerbates displacement in Sri Lanka” 247 Presented by Mr. Saliya Wickramasuriya, CEO RADA on 21st April 2006, CHA 248 Presented by Mr. Saliya Wickramasuriya, CEO RADA on 21st April 2006, CHA 249 Presented by Mr. Saliya Wickramasuriya, CEO RADA on 21st April 2006, CHA 250 The eligibility of the beneficiary is dependent on four options contained in the policy. The four options are- Government land and donor built house under the Donor Assisted Housing Program; Government land and Government cash grant of Rs. 250,000 to construct a house; Government cash grant of Rs. 150,000 to purchase land and Government cash grant of Rs. 250,000 to construct a house. This option is only available to urban areas or areas with a shortage of land such as Colombo and Amparai. The final option is housing reconstruction grant of Rs.250,000 for fully damaged house or Rs.150,000 for partially damaged house. 251 For example, Colombo and Ampara 252 They are classified as to whether a beneficiary falls within Zone 1 or Zone 2. For example, legal owner requiring assistance in Zone 1 must submit their existing structures for demolition or obtain CCD permit to rebuild. Land ownership will remain with the legal owner. Within Zone 2, encroachers must submit the structures to the legal owner for demolition. The policy further states that all relocated homeowners in Zone 2 must be on a documented voluntary basis. 253 For example, minimum 500 square foot floor area, atleast one lockable room and provision for internal or external kitchen and toilet facilities. 254 As presented by RADA, the housing policy would encourage community involvement in the implementation of the policy and will cover both conflict and tsunami affected communities. 255 The policy also states that movement across districts will be permitted, which will provide options to the affected communities on places of residence and not unduly restrict them 256 Presented by Mr. Saliya Wickramasuriya, CEO RADA on 21st April 2006, CHA 257 24-30th March 2006, OCHA situation report

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