MONITORING FACTORS AFFECTING THE SRI LANKAN PEACE PROCESS CLUSTER REPORT FIRST QUARTERLY FEBRUARY 2006 œ APRIL 2006 CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES 0 TABLE OF CONTENTS CLUSTER Page Number PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS CLUSTER.................................................... 2 POLITICAL ENVIRONM ENT CLUSTER.....................................................................13 SECURITY CLUSTER.............................................................................................................23 LEGAL & CONSTIIUTIONAL CLUSTER......................................................................46 ECONOM ICS CLUSTER.........................................................................................................51 RELIEF, REHABILITATION & RECONSTRUCTION CLUSTER......................61 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS & SOCIAL ATTITUDES CLUSTER................................70 M EDIA CLUSTER.......................................................................................................................76. ENDNOTES.....… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … ..84 M ETHODOLOGY The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has conducted the project “Monitoring the Factors Affecting the Peace Process” since 2005. The output of this project is a series of Quarterly Reports. This is the fifth of such reports. It should be noted that this Quarterly Report covers the months of February, March and April. Having identified a number of key factors that impact the peace process, they have been monitored observing change or stasis through a range of indicators. These indicators suggest trends for each factor. The factors have been grouped into a series of clusters which reflect critical dimensions of the peace process. The trends will suggest the level of change in each cluster and in sum will indicate how the peace process and its environment have been strengthened or weakened. This Synthesis Report will highlight the trends that emerge from the monitoring process and analyse them within the context of their respective clusters and between the clusters. This report is drawn from the more comprehensive Cluster Report which examines the various trends, factors and indicators in greater detail. 1 I. NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE TALKS CLUSTER 1.1 Context The decision by the govern.ent of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in January 2006 to participate in talks on the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) created a new dynamic in the peace process. As noted in the previous quarterly report, the parties had not met for face-to-face negotiations since March 2003, so their willingness to engage in talks is a significant development. However, the fact that the subject of the talks was the CFA (instead of??), demonstrated the crisis in the peace process in that the ‘no war no peace’ situation that underlies the process was itself under threat of unraveling. Furthermore, this consensus emerged out of the most violent period in the peace process so far and violence played a key role in catalysing this process, with the use of claymore mines against the security forces, attacks on security force positions, raids by the Karuna Group against the LTTE, retaliatory and vigilante killings against civilians, abductions etc. The dominant development in the last quarter was the reaching of a consensus between the GoSL and the LTTE on a venue for talks, and setting the CFA as the sole agenda for talks, with continuing differences regarding emphasis. Reaching this consensus involved significant shifts in both parties’ positions. Arguably, for the LTTE, the main shift was in compromising on the issue of Oslo as the venue for talks which did not necessarily result in a major strategic loss for the LTTE. For the GoSL, reaching this consensus involved a significant number of compromises, especially since the new Government of President Mahinda Rajapakse had come to power on a platform demanding significant changes to the framework of the existing peace process. A key issue the GoSL compromised on was that of venue. The government had to step down from a location in Sri Lanka to Asia, then to a non-European location and finally agreeing to Geneva. President Rajapakse and his Sinhala nationalist allies had also demanded a review of Norway’s role as a facilitator, but with the upsurge in violence re-invited Norway as facilitator. This volte face was also symbolic of another shift within the government; the Government had hoped to encourage greater involvement of Asian countries but faced with scale large scale violence relented and turned to the Donor Co-Chairs. 1.2 Factors, Indicators and Trends 1.2.1 Exclusive focus on CFA while re-affirming it reinforces deadlock in the peace process Over this current quarter, one significant development was that the parties met and reached an agreement on how to deal with some of the critical problems regarding the CFA. This was striking 2 given the differences in the two parties’ positions, made evident during the talks and the crisis within the peace process. Their differences, including divergent interpretations of the agreement, became evident, particularly with regards to the Karuna Group. As a parallel development, the violence that had dropped off in February, also increased with mounting violations of the CFA and the Geneva Agreement, threatening the ‘ceasefire within a ceasefire’ that the parties had been able to bring about in late January following the decision to attend talks in Geneva. The return to violence and its intensification through particular acts, in particular the attempt to assassinate the Army Force Commander, Lt. General Sarath Fonseka, raised serious questions to the commitment of the two parties to the peace process, particularly the LTTE’s. The violence and deterioration in relations led to a postponement of talks, making it unclear whether the second round of talks will actually take place, and whether the process as a whole can be continued any further. Reaching the Geneva Agreement Between the point when the two sides agreed to meet in late January and the Geneva Talks on February 19-20, the two parties attempted to engage in some confidence-building measures while making clear how divergent their positions on the CFA were. Two critical confidence-building measures were the exchange of prisoners and the sorting out of transport for LTTE delegates to the talks. In mid-February, the Government announced it would be releasing four Sea Tigers arrested off Mannar while the LTTE stated that they would be releasing the two of the three policeman from the National Child Protection Agency that had been detained for some six months.1 In addition, the government offered transport to the LTTE delegates to Geneva on air force helicopters from Killinochchi to Colombo.2 The Government also sought to demonstrate its good will and pre-empt the LTTE’s demands to reign in the Karuna Group by issuing statements indicating that they would address the issue and accordingly carried out searches in areas where there were supposed to be Karuna Camps. However, both parties clearly indicated that they would take a tough position at talks, indicating that any consensus would be fraught. In keeping with the position on the CFA articulated in the Mahinda Chinthanaya and by the President’s agreements with the JVP and JHU, the Government argued for amending the CFA. They explained that the need for such an amendment was in order to safeguard national security and prevent the LTTE from seizing advantages that the CFA offered it. Similarly, the GoSL stated the need to focus on the violations by the LTTE and use the SLMM’s count of violations of the CFA as clear evidence of the need to strengthen the CFA. Up to December 2005, 6,742 complaints and 3,529 ruled violations had been made against the LTTE compared to the 1,314 complaints and 164 ruled violations against the Government. The government was clear that it was 3 to overhaul the peace process and made it quite explicit that there were a number of red lines which it would refuse to cross. For instance, the President, in a Reuters interview, ruled out a separate state of Tamil Eelam and also challenged the underlying principle of a Tamil homeland,3 prompting criticisms from the TNA and LTTE.4 The Government also showed its determination to deal with violence in government-controlled areas carried out by the LTTE; as the President stated “if any group operates in our area, we will stop it. Any group carrying arms will be brought under control, whether it is the so-called Karuna Group or the LTTE.”5 W hile adopting a strong stance on the CFA, the Government also realised the need to demonstrate and convey its willingness to compromise. Hence, when the President met security force commanders, government and political leaders, he put forward the official stance of the government: a push for major amendments in order to prevent any further threats to national security but one not so hard as to have a negative impact on the peace process.6 The Government appointed a delegation that seemed to bring together a broad mix of personalities; they were given intensive training. The LTTE delegation included some of the old faces from the previous rounds of peace talks 2002-3. W hile attempting to reciprocate the gestures and statements of goodwill in the lead up to Geneva, the LTTE adopted a central point of focus: “Disarming the paramilitaries, their expulsion and the creation of normalcy in people’s daily life are the essential pre-requisites for the continuation