INTRODUCTION

To many analytic philosophers of —philosophical theists or otherwise—the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion is nothing more than a platform for the propagation of fideism, or religious non-realism, or even of insidious crypto-. These charges are bad enough; however, its lot is even worse than being charged with the aforementioned unorthodoxies: It—not to say Wittgenstein’s own thought on religion—is badly misunderstood by notable critics, and even by some sympathetic commentators. It is this misunderstanding that the aforementioned charges are borne of. Certainly the critics do not owe the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion any appreciation; but if they have to pass judgment on it, they owe it fair understanding. From a Wittgenstenian point of view, the appropriate way to deal with the criticisms is to issue clarifications to iron out the misunderstand- ing that had borne them. And with the misunderstanding ironed out, it would not be so difficult to ease the aforementioned charges out. It is noteworthy that Wittgenstein’s religiously relevant remarks are, it so happened, very much in tune with apophatic theology—the theol- ogy of the Eastern (Orthodox) Church and of the thirteenth-century pre-Thomist Thomas Aquinas. In contrast, the critics who make these charges are typically scientistic in cultural orientation, mostly Prot- estant—or at least Western Christian—in theological education, and rigorously rationalistic in disposition. Their background is such that they do not easily see the kind of theological underpinnings of the religiously relevant remark of Wittgenstein and of the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, and they therefore fail to see it as it really is, never mind appreciate it. The critics show no indication whatsoever of being reminded of apophatic theology by Wittgenstein’s religiously relevant remarks. It is most unlikely that this could happen to anyone who understands Wittgenstein’s thought or who possesses a modicum of awareness of apophatic theology. So it is most likely that the critics are either nescient or oblivious of apophatic theology. To a significant extent this nescience or obliviousness accounts for the misunderstand- ing of—never mind the lack of appreciation for—Wittgensteinian phi- losophy of religion. 2 introduction

This work is intended to help clear the misunderstanding of which the aforementioned charges are borne. Though what is herein pre- sented is a defence of the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, it is a defence by exposition, which is in accordance with the classic Witt- gensteinian way of dealing with philosophical problems by showing the philosophical fly (i.e. philosophical , in this particular case) out of the fly-bottle (i.e. philosophy of religion). Or to use another metaphor, this book defends Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion by, so to speak, pulling the rug under the critics’ feet rather than by engaging them in a vigorous duel. It is only apt that the tone of this work is in most parts expositional rather than polemical. From the constellation of remarks Wittgenstein made an attempt is made to limn the religious dimension of his thought which, hopefully, would uncover positions that may have been somehow overlooked or so far left hardly discussed, put into perspective his religiously-significant or theologically-relevant remarks, expose probable misunderstand- ings about them, and lead to a better understanding of his religious perspective. In expounding Wittgenstein’s religiously relevant remarks, this work (a) shows that the main positions of Wittgensteinian philoso- phy of religion strikingly resembles some of the defining positions of apophatic theology; (b) argues that the refusal of Wittgenstein and those following him, like D. Z. Phillips, to engage in some of the usual fare in philosophy of religion, such as proving the existence of or showing that religious belief is rational, is perfectly understandable from the perspective of apophatic theology; and (c) suggests—as if to apply a reductio ad absurdum against the charges of the critics—that if they persist on their aforementioned charges against Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, then they may as well direct similar charges to the apophatic theology of the Eastern Christian Church, of St. Thomas Aquinas, and of other respectable thinkers in Western Christendom. Each chapter in this work tackles an issue regarding either Wittgen- stein’s own religiously-significant or theologically-relevant thought, or else the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion. The issue a chapter tackles may be different from, or may seem to be discontinuous with, the issues in other chapters; but nonetheless the chapters are bound together by a single theme: Wittgenstein’s religious thought (or the- ology) and its off-shoot, the so-called Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, are not too far removed from the Christian theological