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C1JWr.C.&N-R mE,u ?ruoaLfe iA,uraeVS. AIKR.o.v,oi! 4Y3oZ FYSQW-f-r p CWERILP A! 774rt CASE:? LLXc%e*wta Get-1e. i9& 7'Kurl{.zLEEir 'in-r^ Mt-YLwfH^.c(.k'7z. F3AUS£cuZb2cF^ic GcP ^^^1 ^uIACS^.LSG (LPl^^ S3 U1d^Ue2Sl^e6lu^:r^K2^sve€J-^a^(^oFt. ^^^aLffi.;R^`^2.Snu"r1^ES'U..aNE '('-A-'H,vY a1.3'iWF,*AJs C1-rmE) S1A`bu`TF1fn a^c^`L,/nj%qYlcxNSU» CLAxS' rna5^-ft!m Qw-'v^!s E^tm'V^Fu^a^oF 4,t'.2 Sr-s, # ArnarJ 4 t C S`^-'^^,CQrB`l.wr:sAIJuchtS^,4aL,A 7k F,^'{^WN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS SUMMIT COUNTY, OHIO V446 @@V 29 Fti 3^ 2l LEVERT K. GRIFFJN.,- CASE NO.: CV 2005-11-6574 JUDGE HUNTER vs. ORDER LAWRENCE R. SMITH Defendant This matter comes before the Court on Motion of Plaintiff Levert K. Griffin to vacate numerous fines, court costs, and restitution in the Cases of CV 2005-10-6398, CV 2005-11- 6574, and apparently an unspecified criminal case(s). As to CV 2005-10-6398 and the unspecified criminal case(s), this Court does not have the authority to vacate said costs and fines. As to the costs relating to the present case, the Court finds Plaintiff's Motion not well taken and it is denied. So Ordered. ,scc^.•^+ t,M.,.^.r^6.i^y.^ , 9T%% a'^Dt12 7` c: Levert K. Griffin, pro se RE 1 EtJ^y f^Y^ Attorney Lawrence R. Smith, pro se. i-leL1J ^N R^tYRN^^ 1 ^ i'lvw^TEu iC Q^e ^ ;L`305:it fRy Pag e Y C^L^i^aA 7kESKi 1 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 2003 FEB =3 PEt 2^ 3 2 DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION SUMMfT COUNTY 3 SUMMIT COUNTY, OHIO CLERK OF CO(jRT^"j 4 5 SHAWNETTE DAVIS, ) CASE NO. 99 08 1975 6 Plaintiff, ) MAGISTRATE GUI 7 8 TRANSCRIPT OF 9 PROCEEDINGS 10 11 LEVERT GRIFFIN, ) JUDGE JOHN QUINN 12 Defendant. 13 On behalf of the Plaintiff: 14 Pro Se; On behalf of the Defendant: 15 LAWRENCE SMITH, Attorney at Law 16 17 BE IT REMEMBERED that this cause came 18 on to be heard before the Honorable Janice 19 Gui, Magistrate, Domestic Relations 20 Division, Court of Common Pleas, Summit 21 County, Ohio, on June 21, 2002, this being 22 a transcript of said proceedings from 23 cassette tape 570. 24 25 Gary A. Maharidge, Registered Professional Reporter Page 2 1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 THE MAGISTRATE: This is Case Number 3 99-08-1975, Shawnette Davis versus Levert 4 Griffin. This case is convened for hearing 5 -- you may sit down.-- on June 21, 2002. 6 Both on the parties are here. Both Attorney Smith, who is representing Mr. 8 Griffin. There is a number of motions 9 filed here. I'm not -- not really sure 10 what Mrs. Davis was served with and what we 11 are going ahead on. I see she was served. 12 Can you help me with this, Mr. Smith? 13 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I -- this is 14 what I believe was served. Your Honor, I 15 know from a letter that I received on May 16 10th from Deborah J. Monaco, judicial 17 attorney, that the motion for attorney's 18 fees, court costs and motion for relief of 19 judgment that Mr. Griffin filed was served 20 on the -- on Ms. Davis. Also that we have 21 filed a copy of the original motion. 22 THE MAGISTRATE: Okay, well, that 23 would be considered by the Judge, wouldn't 24 it? 25 MR. SMITH: What's that, ma'am? Page 3 1 THE MAGISTRATE: Relief from 2 judgment? MR. SMITH: Oh, absolutely, your 4 Honor.
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