Advisory Opinions and the Problem of Legal Authority
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Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 74 Issue 3 April 2021 Article 5 4-2021 Advisory Opinions and the Problem of Legal Authority Christian R. Burset Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Judges Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons Recommended Citation Christian R. Burset, Advisory Opinions and the Problem of Legal Authority, 74 Vanderbilt Law Review 621 (2021) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol74/iss3/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Advisory Opinions and the Problem of Legal Authority Christian R. Burset* The prohibition against advisory opinions is fundamental to our understanding of federal judicial power, but we have misunderstood its origins. Discussions of the doctrine begin not with a constitutional text or even a court case, but a letter in which the Jay Court rejected President Washington’s request for legal advice. Courts and scholars have offered a variety of explanations for the Jay Court’s behavior. But they all depict the earliest Justices as responding to uniquely American concerns about advisory opinions. This Article offers a different explanation. Drawing on previously untapped archival sources, it shows that judges throughout the anglophone world—not only in the United States but also in England and British India— became opposed to advisory opinions in the second half of the eighteenth century. The death of advisory opinions was a global phenomenon, rooted in a period of anxiety about common-law authority. Early modern English judges had routinely advised the Crown. This advisory role was politically fraught but doctrinally unproblematic thanks to a jurisprudential orthodoxy that treated judges’ opinions as evidence of a preexisting common law. Although this declaratory theory survived into the nineteenth century (and beyond), it began to fragment after 1750, as lawyers began to disagree about the nature of precedent. Those disagreements generated new pressure to clarify the weight of different kinds of legal authority. Most lawyers intuited that advisory opinions were less authoritative than decisions arising from litigation. But because bench and bar lacked a common theory of legal authority, they were unable to articulate a shared understanding of what respect was due to judges’ extrajudicial pronouncements. As a result, advisory opinions became dangerous, because the judges who issued them could not * Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School. For their questions and comments at various stages of this project, the author thanks Akhil Amar, Will Baude, A.J. Bellia, Sadie Blanchard, Ben Brady, Sam Bray, Chris Casey, Bill Casto, Christine Chabot, Patrick Corrigan, Barry Cushman, Maria Maciá, Gregory Mark, Marah McLeod, Zvi Rosen, Max Stearns, Jay Tidmarsh, Chas Tyler, David Waddilove, and Lael Weinberger. This Article also benefited from feedback at the Notre Dame Law School faculty workshop and the Chicagoland Junior Scholars Conference. Sophia Aguilar, Natalie Fulk, Thomas Hellenbrand, David Spicer, and Nikolai Stieglitz provided helpful research assistance. Brandy Ellis of the Kresge Law Library masterfully connected me with crucial sources under uniquely challenging conditions. 621 622 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3:621 control how future readers might treat them. In response, judges sought to limit their advisory activity—first in England, then in British-controlled Bengal, and finally in the United States, whose judges inherited Britain’s contested and dynamic understanding of the judicial role. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 622 I. EXPLAINING THE CORRESPONDENCE ................................... 628 II. ADVICE-GIVING UNDER THE CLASSICAL COMMON LAW ...... 631 A. Group Consultation ................................................. 633 B. Advising the Advisors .............................................. 634 C. Avoiding Prejudgment ............................................. 636 D. Avoiding Unnecessary Opinions .............................. 636 III. THE DEMISE OF ADVISORY OPINIONS .................................. 638 A. England ................................................................... 638 B. Bengal ...................................................................... 643 C. United States ........................................................... 650 IV. RECONSIDERING EXISTING EXPLANATIONS ......................... 652 A. Constitutional .......................................................... 652 B. Prudential ................................................................ 655 C. Political .................................................................... 657 V. COMPLETING THE STORY ..................................................... 659 A. The Problem of Legal Authority .............................. 660 B. Rethinking the Refusals ........................................... 666 C. How the Correspondence Was Canonized ................ 671 CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 674 APPENDIX: EXTRAJUDICIAL STRAGGLERS ....................................... 677 INTRODUCTION The rule against advisory opinions has been described as “the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability,”1 but its pedigree is doubtful. Discussions of the doctrine begin not with the Constitution’s text or even a landmark case, but a four-sentence letter from 1793 in which the Jay Court rejected the Washington Administration’s request for advice on questions of international law.2 1. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (quoting CHARLES WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 34 (1963)); accord RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 52 (7th ed. 2015); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1844 (2001). 2. Letter from U.S. Sup. Ct. JJ. to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 5 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 545, 545 (Elizabeth M. Nuxoll ed., 2017) [hereinafter JAY PAPERS]. 2021] ADVISORY OPINIONS & LEGAL AUTHORITY 623 Courts and commentators have conventionally read that letter as declaring advisory opinions to be unconstitutional,3 but some scholars have questioned that understanding.4 The Constitution never mentions advisory opinions, which English judges had routinely issued. Therefore, the revisionists argue, the Jay Court’s refusal to provide the requested opinions reflected prudential or political concerns, not constitutional ones.5 These accounts offer starkly different interpretations of what has become known as the Correspondence of the Justices. But they agree in treating the Jay Court’s letter as a uniquely American event that responded to distinctively American concerns. This Article disagrees. Drawing on previously untapped archival sources, it shows that judges throughout the common-law world—not only in the United States but also in Britain and its empire—turned against advisory opinions during the second half of the eighteenth century. The demise of advisory opinions was a global phenomenon that requires a transnational explanation. This Article supplies one. During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, judges routinely provided legal advice to the Crown. This advisory role was politically fraught but doctrinally unproblematic thanks to a jurisprudential orthodoxy that treated judges’ opinions as evidence of a preexisting law.6 Although this declaratory conception of the law survived into the nineteenth century (and beyond), it began to fragment shortly before the American Revolution, as judges and lawyers started to disagree in subtle ways about the nature of precedent. Those disagreements generated new pressure to clarify the weight of different kinds of legal authority. Lawyers intuited that advisory opinions were less authoritative than opinions accompanying judgments. But because bench and bar lacked a common theory of legal authority, they were unable to articulate a shared understanding of exactly what respect was due to judges’ extrajudicial pronouncements. As a result, judges began to worry that readers might invest advisory opinions with the wrong 3. See, e.g., Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 176 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 781 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 302 (2004); Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189, 191–92 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (per curiam); Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. of D.C. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 647–48 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 354 (1911); United States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297, 301 (1909); infra Section III.C. 4. For overviews of the literature, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 12–14 (1985); and FALLON ET AL., supra note 1, at 52–53. 5. See infra Sections IV.B and IV.C (discussing scholarly views on the rationale for the Jay Court’s refusal to provide advisory opinions). 6. See infra Part II. 624 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3:621 kind of authority. In response, judges sought to limit their advisory activity—first