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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 33 / PCEMI 33 MDS THESIS Airbase Ground Defence: Ad Hoc is Not Good Enough By /par LCol Paul M. Thobo-Carlsen This paper was written by a student La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is exigences du cours. L'étude est un a scholastic document, and thus document qui se rapporte au cours et contains facts and opinions which the contient donc des faits et des opinions author alone considered appropriate que seul l'auteur considère appropriés and correct for the subject. It does not et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète necessarily reflect the policy or the pas nécessairement la politique ou opinion of any agency, including the l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y Government of Canada and the compris le gouvernement du Canada et Canadian Department of National le ministère de la Défense nationale du Defence. This paper may not be Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de released, quoted or copied except with citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans the express permission of the Canadian la permission expresse du ministère de Department of National Defence. la Défense nationale. ii CONTENTS Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................... ii List of Figures ........................................................................................................................... iii List of Tables............................................................................................................................. iv Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... v Chapter 1 – Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 Prologue (Africa, in the Near Future) .................................................................................. 1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 2 Outline .................................................................................................................................. 3 Chapter 2 – The Future Operating Environment and Threats to Airbases ................................. 5 Future Security Challenges .................................................................................................. 5 The Future Operating Environment ..................................................................................... 8 Threats to Airbases ............................................................................................................. 11 Chapter 3 – Canada’s Ad hoc Approach to Airbase Ground Defence ..................................... 22 The Second World War ...................................................................................................... 22 The Cold War ..................................................................................................................... 31 The Gulf War to Present .................................................................................................... 36 Chapter 4 – Allied Persectives on Airbase Ground Defence ................................................... 43 United Kingdom: The Royal Air Force Regiment............................................................. 43 France: Les fusiliers commandos de l’air ......................................................................... 48 Germany: Das Objektschutzregiment der Luftwaffe ......................................................... 50 Australia: RAAF Ground Defence ..................................................................................... 53 The Netherlands: RNLAF Force Protection Organization ............................................... 58 Italy: Battaglione Fucilieri dell’Aria ................................................................................ 61 United States: USAF Security Forces ............................................................................... 63 Chapter 5 – A New Airbase Ground Defence Model for Canada............................................ 68 Current Plans and Problems ............................................................................................... 68 Allied Best Practices .......................................................................................................... 77 A Third Option ................................................................................................................... 81 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 86 Appendix 1 – Comparison of Allied Air Force Security and Ground Defence Forces ........... 89 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 90 iii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1: Airfield Attack Objectives, 1940-1992 ........................................................... 14 Figure 2.2: Airbase Attack Tactics, 1940-1992 .................................................................. 15 Figure 2.3: Stand-off Weapon Footprints ........................................................................... 19 Figure 3.1: Aerodrome Defence troops in Universal Carrier, talking with pilot from 127(F) Squadron, RCAF, Gander, Newfoundland, May 1943 ........................ 26 Figure 4.1: RAF Regiment Field Squadron Organization .................................................. 46 Figure 4.2: Objektschutzregiment der Luftwaffe Organization........................................... 52 Figure 4.3: RAAF Airfield Defence Guards with Bushmaster Infantry Mobility Vehicle ............................................................................................................. 56 Figure 4.4: RAAF Airfield Defence Squadron Organization ............................................. 57 Figure 4.5: 820th SFG Members Patrolling Outside of Balad Air Base, Iraq ..................... 67 Figure 5.1: Notional Base Boundary Including MANPAD Footprint ................................ 79 iv LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1: Deployable Air Force Platforms and Support Elements .................................. 11 Table 2.2: Typical Stand-off Weapons.............................................................................. 17 Table 2.3: Non-State Groups with MANPADS, 1996-2001 ............................................. 18 Table 2.4: AIRCOM Risk Severity Map for FY 06/07 ..................................................... 20 Table 4.1: RAF Regiment Disposition .............................................................................. 47 Table 5.1: Relative Size of Allied Air Force Ground Defence Forces.............................. 82 v ABSTRACT Canadian Forces (CF) air component personnel, assets, and airfields have been placed at unnecessary risk because of the CF’s ad hoc approach to airbase ground defence. Inadequate organic resources, combined with a belief that someone else will do the “heavy lifting,” have produced an Air Force that is unable to adequately defend itself during expeditionary operations. Canada’s Air Force has adopted a number of contrasting and short- lived means to secure and defend its airbases, most often drifting between two poles – an organic Military Police model and an Army combat arms model. Both approaches have serious shortcomings, and Canada is clearly out of step with most of its closest allies regarding airbase ground defence. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, the Netherlands, Italy, and the United States have all created dedicated Air Force security and defence occupations in order to provide robust organic Force Protection during expeditionary operations. This paper demonstrates that an ad hoc approach is no longer good enough and proposes that Canada’s Air Force leadership should advocate for the creation of a full-time ground defence occupation within the CF air component. This occupation should be organised, trained, and equipped as a specialist light infantry force, fully inculcated in air force operations, and capable of operating both inside and outside of the base perimeter against contemporary conventional and asymmetric threats. This new occupation should also serve as