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The Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket: Home Hube’s Great Escape By Jeff Chrisman

Gen. Hube. Gen. Raus.

Note: Soviet units are in plaintext; was one of the few generals Hitler German units are in italics. respected, so when the situation in Stalingrad became bleak in January Background 1943 the dictator insisted the fl y out of the pocket to avoid capture. y April 1944, Hans Valentin Hube felt he would be deserting his Hube was a highly decorated troops if he left the pocket, and he at B leader of the German panzer fi rst refused to go. Hitler then fl ew in force. He’d risen from the rank of agents to bring out Hube, colonel at the beginning of the war to under arrest if that proved necessary, lieutenant general. Lt. Hube had lost but Hube agreed to voluntarily leave his right arm in combat during the with them. He was made commander First World War, and he was the only of First Panzer Army in October 1943, handicapped offi cer to be retained shortly before it was shifted into the in the army afterward. In 1941 he middle of the South Ukraine since mid-summer and and last natural barrier before the German front at the 40-mile land Armored Troops Erhard Raus, was a commanded 16th Panzer (AGS) front in the southern Ukraine. had mostly retreated beyond their Carpathian Mountains. The Germans’ bridge between the Pripyet Marsh decorated panzer leader who’d risen in its advance across the Ukraine By late February 1944 AGS best natural defensive barrier, the main supply line across the area was on the north and the Carpathians to from regimental command through and then to the banks of the at was trying desperately to build a River, in January. The Soviets the double-track railroad from Lvov the south, then exploiting through brigade, division and levels to Stalingrad the next year. Along the solid front diagonally across the were meanwhile consolidating the to Odessa, which bisected the plain it into the heart of Poland. That his army command in just four years. way he earned the Knights Cross and southern Ukraine: from Army Group territory they’d regained and were between the Bug and the Dniester. area was where the north fl ank On AGS’s southern fl ank was the subsequently Oak Leaves to go with it. Center (AGC) near Kovel southeast regrouping for their next offensive. On the AGS north fl ank those of Manstein’s AGS joined AGC. weak Eighth Army, in equally intermit- In September 1942 Hube was to Dubno, Jampol, Shepetovka, The front on the southern fl ank distances became compressed, and Fourth Panzer Army held that tent contact with Army Group A (AGA) promoted to command XIV Panzer Kazatin, north and east of Vinnitsa, of AGS ran about 50 miles west of the that’s where its commander, Field fl ank, but in its depleted state it was west of Kirovograd. Eighth Army Corps, and he became the fi rst corps and just south of Zvenigorodka and Dnieper and 50 miles east of the next Marshal Erich von Manstein, expected able to maintain only intermittent commander, Gen. of Infantry Otto commander to receive Swords to the Shpola, joining Army Group A near natural barrier, the Southern Bug the Soviets would focus their next contact with AGC on its left, at the Woehler, was also in his fi rst army- Knights Cross when Hitler personally Kirovograd. The troops had been River. The Dniester River, another 50 effort. He saw they could achieve the southern edge of the Pripyet Marsh. level command and was also highly bestowed them in December. Hube withdrawing westward through the miles beyond the Bug, was the next greatest success by penetrating the Fourth Panzer’s commander, Gen. of decorated. He had, however, held only

32 WORLD at WAR 35 | APR–MAY 2014 WORLD at WAR 35 | APR–MAY 2014 33 Group North (AGN), or by evacuating Seventeenth Army from the . Hitler expected the spring mud would soon immobilize both sides equally, as it had done in springs past, and that would provide the respite his eastern armies so badly needed. Unfortunately for the Germans, that remained true only for them, as the Soviets were increasingly enjoying superior mobility thanks to their US-built four- and six-wheel drive lend-lease trucks. The Soviets were benefi tting not only from that enhanced operational mobility, but also from the superior logistical effort it was allowing them to make. Even further, though offi cial German policy in their retreat across the Ukraine had called for a total “” withdrawal—with everything and everyone of military value that couldn’t be taken away destroyed in place—it hadn’t worked out that way. In their hectic rush west, it’s estimated they only managed to destroy or evacuate about 20 percent of those resource and manpower totals. In that way, every mile of liber- ated territory yielded thousands A recent photo of modern-day historical reenactors, taking part in a reenactment of the fi nal breakout fi ghting. of conscripts for the Red Army as well as vast acreages of crop land. staff positions through most of the war, All the troops in AGS were exhaust- much more pressure, but Manstein In late January, two infantry corps, Two German infantryman dug in on the perimeter of the newly formed pocket. including serving as Manstein’s chief ed. Infantry divisions were constantly knew he had to reinforce that north one from First Panzer Army (XLII) and of staff at Eleventh Army in 1941. In the falling back for fear of , fl ank. He’d been lobbying Hitler for one from Eighth Army (XI), were sur- middle of AGS was Hube’s First Panzer while the motorized units raced from weeks to bring in another full army in rounded by the Soviets in a pocket near On 27 February, Manstein got • Fourth Panzer Army, with XIII Army, still trying to regroup after the sector to sector trying to blunt enemy order to better cover the gap between the town of Cherkassy on the Dnieper more good news: Fourth Panzer Army’s Infantry and XLVIII Panzer recent encirclement and rescue of two penetrations, seal off gaps or rescue AGS and AGC, whether by pulling back River. Though substantial parts of the XLVIII Panzer Corps, with the 7th and Corps, from Kovel south to corps west of Cherkassy while building units that had become encircled. None to shorten his own south fl ank, or two units were rescued on 17 February, 8th Panzer Divisions, had recaptured near Dubno, then east to a new front in the western Ukraine. of the armies in AGS could withstand transferring in formations from Army in the end the larger engagement still Lutsk, and by the end of the month Shepatovka: a distance of represented another defeat for AGS. the gap on the north fl ank of the approximately 125 miles. On 22 February, III Panzer Corps, army group, between AGC at Kovel the force that had broken through to and XIII Infantry Corps near Dubno, • First Panzer Army, with III the units surrounded at Cherkassy, was fully closed. Unfortunately for Panzer Corps at Proskurov, was dispatched to Proskurov to guard Manstein, there remained a 40-mile LIX Infantry Corps near against a Soviet attack expected gap between the south fl ank of XIII and Shepatovka, XXIV Panzer northwest of there. The 1st SS Panzer LIX Infantry Corps near Shepatovka. Corps south of Berdichev, and Division, another of the units that On 1 March, Manstein shifted all his XLVI Panzer Corps northeast had been involved in the Cherkassy armies’ boundaries north by one corps. of Vinnitsa: a distance of rescue, was also sent northwest, to the So Eighth Army’s LII Infantry Corps was approximately 130 miles. Ternopol area, and assigned to XLVIII transferred to Sixth Army (Sixth Army Panzer Corps with the same mission. had itself been transferred to AGA in • Eighth Army, with VII Infantry The following day Hitler fi nally early February). First Panzer Army’s Corps north of Uman, XLVII sent Manstein a few units to reinforce VII Infantry Corps was transferred Panzer Corps south of Shpola, his northern fl ank. The newly formed to Eighth Army, and Fourth Panzer and XL Panzer Corps south 357th and 359th Infantry Divisions, Army’s LIX Infantry Corps went to First of Kirovograd: a distance of along with the veteran 68th Infantry Panzer Army. That last shift made the approximately 135 miles. Division, were ordered to join Fourth gap west of Shepatovka the shared Panzer Army at Ternopol. That was responsibility of Fourth Panzer and Soviet Attack far short of the entire army for which First Panzer Armies. The overall AGS Manstein had been pleading, but front was then organized as follows. Against that 400-mile front the it was also better than nothing. Soviets were bringing to bear a Lt. Col. Franz Baeke. Soviet Gen. Vatutin. Marshal Konev. massive force. Facing AGS was, from

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understrength 7th Panzer Division, were approaching from the Ternopol area. Home Late in the day on 5 March another vet- eran of the Cherkassy relief operation, the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion, with 13 operational Tigers, was attached to the 7th at Podvolocyska, astride the Ternopol-Proskurov highway and railroad 18 miles southwest of Baziliya. Also on the 5 March the other shoe dropped for AGS when Second Ukrainian Front attacked Eighth Army near Uman. Twenty-Seventh Army, Fifty- and Fourth Guards Army made an assault from near Zvenigorodka. That was followed up by Second Tank Army, Fifth Guards Tank Army and Sixth Tank Army. Fifth and Seventh Guards Armies made subsid- iary attacks from near Kirovograd. The fi ve over-extended infantry divisions Another reenactment photo. of VII Infantry Corps bore the brunt of the attack and were soon scattered. followed their own armor south. regiment, which was reinforced with On 9 March the situation on the a battalion of tanks from 1st Panzer Manstein Reacts AGS southern fl ank became danger- Division and the 509th Heavy Panzer ous when Eighth Army troops were Battalion with 28 operational Tigers. Manstein still considered the First overwhelmed at Uman, leaving wide Breith launched his attack west Ukrainian Front attack in the north open the Soviet path to the Bug River from Proskurov down the highway to Another view of some German infantry on the pocket’s perimeter. to be the greatest threat. The XIII south of there. Manstein had no choice Ternopol at fi rst light on the morning Infantry Corps was under extreme but to order Eighth Army to bend of 16 March in a driving snow storm. pressure at Dubno, while LIX Infantry back its left to avoid encirclement. By midday on the 17th they contacted north to south: First Ukrainian Front attacked toward Staro Konstantinov enemy’s spearhead. The Soviets over- Corps had been dealt a heavy blow As it was, Second Ukrainian Front elements of 1st SS Panzer Division (equivalent to a German army group), from Lyubar, and Sixtieth Army surged ran the leading infantry and unleashed at Shepatovka and was in danger of reached the Bug on a wide front on 15 near Vidva, in that way reestablishing with six combined arms (primarily south from west of Shepatovka. withering fi re that killed many, being encircled. In between, units of March and crossed unopposed. Three contact between First and Fourth infantry) and three tank armies, and The Sixtieth’s advance was virtually including Radtke and the infantry XLVIII Panzer Corps were effectively days later they reached the Dniester Panzer Armies and bringing Zhukov’s Second Ukrainian Front, with fi ve unopposed, allowing the exploitation and artillery commanders with whom turned into islands surrounded by a at Yampol. The right fl ank corps of advance south to a temporary combined arms and three tank armies. force, Fourth Tank and Third Guards he was conferring outside his tank. Soviet fl ood surging south between First Panzer Army, XLVI Panzer, had halt. Zhukov later characterized First Ukrainian Front had a new Tank Armies, to advance almost Hube, realizing the large-scale Staro Konstantinov and Ternopol. been split by that attack from its left the combat at that time as having commander, but he was far from immediately. Fourth Tank Army nature of the enemy attack, had the Manstein visited LIX Infantry Corps fl ank neighbor, so it struggled south been as bitter as any in the war. inexperienced. Nikolai Vatutin had attacked toward Ternopol, while Third commander of LIX Infantry Corps, at Staro Konstantinov and later cred- toward the Dniester without friendly On the north fl ank of Fourth become its commander in October Guards Tank Army’s objective was Lt. Gen. Friedrich Schulz, recall ited its steadfast stand for allowing the contact on its right or left. The other Panzer Army, XIII Infantry Corps was 1943, and he orchestrated the Proskurov. The Soviet offensive fell just the Tiger battalion and attach it successful disengagement and pull- corps of First Panzer Army, and former again being forced out of Dubno and of Kiev in December. In late where Manstein had anticipated, but to 6th Panzer Division, which was back that saved those units from encir- left fl ank neighbor of XLVI Panzer Lutsk, but the infantry reinforcements February 1944, while touring Sixtieth most of his reinforcements, meager as concentrating at Proskurov. clement. (That, and the timely arrival Corps, XXIV Panzer Corps, bent its promised by Hitler had begun arriving Army units behind the front northwest they were, had just begun to arrive. The only one of the reinforcing of the fi rst units of 1st Panzer Division open right fl ank south while trying and were stabilizing the front in the of Shepatovka, his motorcade was With its 28 Tiger tanks, the 509 th units that had arrived and was in Staro Konstantinov on 5 March.) to maintain contact on its left with Ternopol area, allowing the Germans ambushed by anti-Soviet Ukrainian Heavy Panzer Battalion was the ready for action on 4 March was On 6 March, 6th Panzer Division LIX Infantry Corps near Chmelnik. to hold on to that road and rail hub. nationalist insurgents. Vatutin was only armored covering force of LIX 1st SS Panzer Division. It had been joined the combat north of Staro By the second week in March On balance those were encouraging badly wounded and died of infec- Infantry Corps on the north fl ank at diverted from Ternopol to Proskurov, Konstantinov with the attached Tigers the LIX Infantry Corps front north developments for the north fl ank of the tion six weeks later at a hospital Staro Konstantinov. That town was and began arriving there on 29 of the 509th. The LIX Infantry Corps of Proskurov had been stabilized panzer army, but Hube held no illu- in Kiev. His replacement, Marshal about halfway between the main February after a two-day train trip. had 1st and 6th Panzer Divisions to and infantry relieved the armored sions: on the 20th he ordered his main Georgi Zhukov, came straight from German positions at Proskurov and the Late in the afternoon on 4 March, the north and northwest covering units, which then concentrated in supply base at Kamenets-Podolsky to lifting the . Soviets at Shepatovka. The battalion’s 1st SS was ordered to move in force to its withdrawal, as well as 19th Panzer Proskurov for a counterattack into begin evacuating to the south, over Second Ukrainian Front was new commanding offi cer, Capt. the Baziliya area, 30 miles northwest Division withdrawing from Lyubar the fl ank of the First Ukrainian Front the Dniester at Khotin. The pontoon commanded by Marshal Ivan Konev. Heinrich Radtke, had only arrived to of Proskurov, to scout for the enemy and covering the northeast approach. forces pouring south between there bridge built there early in the war He’d led that front since its creation take command a week earlier, and and determine the situation. After Over the next few days the corps and Ternopol. The III Panzer Corps, was the only one standing between in October 1943. He was one of he’d yet to lead his unit in battle. having to push their trucks through withdrew south in phases, consolidat- commanded by Lt. Gen. Hermann Mogilev-Podolsky and Ustsechko. Stalin’s favorites: the dictator admired When the Soviet attack came, some deep mud, the grenadiers ing positions north of Proskurov and Breith, would spearhead the effort. Konev’s ruthlessness (which was a the 509th moved out to meet it with reached Baziliya about noon on 5 east toward Letikov. At the same time Its primary strike force was Heavy Encirclement remarkable perspective given the infantry and artillery support from 96th March, making contact with enemy units of Fourth Panzer Army’s XLVIII Panzer Regiment Baeke (named for dictator’s own lack of compassion). Infantry Division. In a classic meeting armored forces two hours later. Panzer Corps began fi nding some its commander Lt. Col. Franz Baeke) With XLVI Panzer Corps drifting On Saturday, 4 March, Zhukov’s engagement 15 miles north of Staro The other XLVIII Panzer Corps ele- success launching hit-and-run attacks of 6th Panzer Division. Baeke was also south, there was a hole in First Panzer forces struck. First Guards Army Konstantinov near Gritsev, they hit the ments, 68th Infantry Division and the against Soviet infantry units as they the commander of the 6th’s armored Army’s eastern fl ank and it didn’t take

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