3. Maya, the Cause of Creation
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
61 3. MAYA, THE CAUSE OF CREATION (ANIRVACA n I yA MAYA) "Intellect feels shy to fathom the depths of Maya".' Creation causes a sense of wonder which prompts a philosophy to deal with the origin of the universe. Nothing comes out of nothing - in conformity with this axiom, the cause of the universe in Vedanta is termed as maya. Mere substance cannot produce an effect, thus a power is in- ferred. Maya is the power or sakti of the substance. Brahman. Therefore, the world is a manifestation or objectification of the power existed on Brahman. This was the ontological study o\' maya considered in the last chapter. Here an epistemological study oi' maya is attempted where the relation of the cause (Brahman) and the effect (universe) forms an im portant topic. / 3.1. is inferred The power of an entity is not an object of perception. It is always established through inference, because before the effect appears, the power behind the effect is not exjierienced by anywhere else. For example, the burning power of fire is understood only when it burns an object. Simi larly the power of creation is inferred' from the effects. Sri *4ankara says that it is "karyanumeya”. Vidyaranya also supports it-. As the power of I creating a pot in the clay pulentially exists and; is known by inference ,so also the power of creation existing potentially in Brahman is inferred^ 62 3.2. k a k ti, different from the k a k tim a n The sole difference between the Vedanta philosophy and that of the ^aiva lies in maintaining power different"* from and identical with the substance respectivily.. T he Vedantin uses the following arguments to prove the non-identity of power with the substratum: (I) Power of burning is different from fire. When fire does exist, its burning power is obstructed by jewel, spell or medicine’. If the power to burn etc. is not different iVom the fire etc., asks the Vedantin, whose is this obstruction?^ (II) Power, it is said, belongs to something. If it is not different from the power holder, then how it can b’elong to someone else. (III) Before production, the power potentially exists in the substratum; for, power and its possessor have different epithets. Power of burrving, people say, is not fire. (IV) Cause and effect, for example, charcoal and blister, or clay and pot, are'perceived; whereas the power inside is not and can never be perceived, but it is only inferred.’ (V) Before the creation of the product, power is not known, whereas the substance is always known. (VI) A power has neither the property of the effect nor that of the cause. The pot, an effect of the clay, is round, gross etc. The cause, clay has the property of smell, touch, test, look and sound. But its power has neither the property of touch nor the property of grossness etc. This clearly and conclusively proves the non-identity of the power with the substratum". An objection arises, “if power is different from the power holder, then mSjvo which is the power of creation in the Brahman, will also be a 63 separate entity resulting in a doctrine of dualism for the Advaitins". There fore, Advaitin’s treatment ol'/«2/v« or power assumes a marvellous form. They say that sakti again is not different from iaktiman. 3.3. h a k ti, not different from the ia k tim lin (I) An Advailin holds that power, though nonidentical with the sub stance, yet it is not a second entity. The simple reason is that it never exists apart from the possessor and always seen along with the possessor. “The ability of a person is not counted a second to him”*^. Vidylrajiya asks; such being the case, liow can one even doubt any duality?” dvitiyam sankyate kalham/ / Before creation, there is nothing to be called a second, and "‘‘Sakti is never counted separately” sakriinalrasya na prthagganana kvacil/'" Therefore it leads to say that power has no existence. (II) Had power been independently existent, it would have been couhted as a separate entity different from the power-bolder. An ob - jection is raised; “The increase of a man’s power leads to the prolongation of his life. The longevity, being a product, must have come out from the existent power of the person. So power h&s independent existence. Vidyaranya answers, “The application of power in agriculture, war etc. gives food, leisure etc., which are the causje of longevity, but not the power”'". There comes a superimposition of the substance, say sat, on I power which causes to say “power is existent”. This existence of power is an appearance. Power is based on existence, i.e., it is existing. “But existence is not exhausted in the wielding of power. A conscious man 64 when does not exercise his will, which is power, is still conscious. There fore the glory of power is a borrowed glory". Power is not self-existent, but its existence is known by its effects. This is the problem as Swatni Chinmayananda writes, of "HAS” existence arid “IS” existence. Power xs^Brahman, but not of "11'". Such power, being neither different from, nor identical with^its holder, becomes indeterminate. The following are the arguments to hold power as indeterminate. 3.4. Power as indeterminate and indescribable (I) Power or maya is not describable in itself nor with reference to I Brahman, for the first, the mind, the explainijig criterion is a part of it; and for the second, no relation between them is possible'-. (II) World, the effect of maya, is not real, for, it is sublatedand not unreal; for, it is manifested and apprehended'^. (III) Maya is both svatantra, for it binds the unattached; and asvatahtra, for it does not exist apart from the consciousness. (iv) Maya is neither sunya (absolute void); for it is the cause of the sunya (i.e., name and form ),nor is it sat, foir it stays on (v) Power is neither dilTerent from its possessor, for their non-sepa ra tio n is ever seen (tadvat dresteh) nor idenjtical (na cabhida), for there is the possibility of an obstruction of one'*. (vi) Power has neither the property of its effect, like grossness of pot, nor the quality of the cause of the effect^likie the smell of the earth.'*■ (vii) Its effects are both existent and nonexistent (in sleep) i.e., effects also are indescribable. 65 Further, mayci or power is indeterm inable due to its unapproachability by logic. The reasons for beyond-logic are as follow. (1) There is a mutual dependence between cause and effects. So, possession leads to contradiction'^. This mutual dependence is a "logical pitfall"” . (ii) Causation leads to ignorance, because the learned can move up to the ultimate of unknowability. The learned cannot say why water has fluidity or fire has hotness. His limitation is not to ask the cause of physi cal property. In the starting of explanation, ignorance must enter, {ajnhnah puratah tesam.) (iii) Even logicians give j topsy-turvey view (vyatyaya) when they say that sat which produces ether, is attributed as a property of ether. So, it is an opposite of dharma-dharmi-bhava.'* (iv) Maya is durghata and intelligence can hot penetrate into it. It is the seed of unthinkable crcaiive power {acinlya racanasakti-vijay'^. Maya is incomprehensible when we find a tiny seed of banayana grows to a big tree and semen brings consciousness. If a person puts question after questions like this, man automatically takes siurrender of the feeling.«<3 ^ > janami kimapyetadityeva suranam tava/-” The same conclusion of the Vedantin &lso echoes in the modern man's intelligence when he writes : "Recent researches in the field of Quantum Mechanics have es tablished that error is germane in the very structure of empirical knowl edge....... The structure of Nature is extremely complex.... Error is neces sarily in empirical knowledge".-' This proves that the world is a thankleiss task.-- Even by mind it is ! unthinkable, {acintya manasa api khalu)-^ Hence no cannon of logic can 5 6G enter into the creation. It is incapable of standing the test of intellectual reflection. "Contradiction", as C. Sharma puts ityis the essence of all appearance, because non-contradiction is the nature of reality".-'* Maya iltself being questionable no question on it could be put.-'* "Without in anyway affecting the real nature of atman, maya creates the world. It makes the impossible possible {durghata)-^. How astonishingly powerful maya is. Like the magic of a magician^it is wonderful and inex plicable. Therefore, it is undermined like its effect. In explaining the durghatatva of maya by rcl'iiting Deussen's comments, Radhakrsnan writes ; "they (Upanisads) give no information, because no information is pos sible. It is true no explanation is possible of the rise of the bewildering force of avidya".-’’ The defying of logic for m aya is sweetly described in the Naiskarmyasiddhi. Maya cannot receive the ray of logic just as darkness is opposed to light. seyam bhranti niralamba sarvanyayavirodhini/ sahate na vicara ya tamo yadvat divakaram//-^ Suryapurana says na sadrupa nasadrupa maya naiva ubhayatmik^/ sadasadbhyam anirvacya mithyabhuta sariatani//-^ This is how the Vedantins establish the incomprehensibility of maya or power (s^akti) which again is visible like a magicians feat. So, con cludes the Vedantin, this inconceivability-cum-visibility (vispasta) is the definition of ma^y'a.^" 6 G7 3.5. A devlopment of sa k ti The Vedantic definition of sakti^' as a term of maya, is definitely an epistemological development of the notion of sakti of the Saivites,;at least from the logical point of view.