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Substance Without Attributes: an Objection to Spinoza's Proof

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Substance Without Attributes: an Objection to Spinoza's Proof SUBSTANCE WITHOUT ATTRIBUTES: AN OBJECTION TO SPINOZA’S PROOF FOR SUBSTANCE MONISM1 Abstract Despite the volume of scholarship dedicated to Spinoza’s metaphysics, and particularly the relationship of attribute to substance, I think there is a problem lurking in Spinoza’s proof for substance monism that has been overlooked. In this essay, I argue for the possibility of the existence of a substance, in addition to God, that has no attributes. I aim to demonstrate this possibility through an investigation of Part I and the beginning propositions of Part II of the Ethics with special attention paid to the role of ID4. The position I wish to defend is only that the logical possibility of a substance without attributes is not ruled out by Spinoza’s proof for substance monism. Whether or not such a substance actually exists or may be proven to exist is not the aim of this essay; nor do I think such a substance’s actual existence is relevant. Even the possibility of the existence of another substance is a problem for Spinoza’s substance monism. In the Ethics, Spinoza claims that there can neither be, nor be conceived, any other substance than God. Therefore, the mere conception of another substance is detrimental to Spinoza’s proof for the existence of only one substance. Introduction Much has been written on Spinoza’s metaphysics and particular scholarly attention has been paid to the relationship of the attributes to substance.2 Despite the volume of scholarship dedicated to this theme, I think there is a problem lurking in Spinoza’s proof for substance monism that has been overlooked; a problem that lies in the metaphysics of the Ethics. In this essay, I will argue that an overlooked objection to Spinoza’s substance monism is the possibility 1 I would like to thank Diane Steinberg for her insight and helpful conversation on earlier drafts of this essay. 2 Jonathan Bennett, 1984, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 60-70, 143-9; Michael Della Rocca, 1996, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, New York: Oxford University Press, 3-7, 157-71; Francis S. Haserot, 1972, “Spinoza’s Definition of Attribute,” in Studies in Spinoza: Critical and Interpretive Essays, ed. S. Paul Kashap, Berkeley: University of California Press, 28-42; Harry Austryn Wolfson, 1934, The Philosophy of Spinoza, Volume 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 142-57; Noa Shein, 2009, “The False Dichotomy between Objective and Subjective Interpretations of Spinoza’s Theory of Attributes,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17(3), 505-32; Martin Lin, 2006, “Substance, Attribute, and Mode in Spinoza,” Philosophy Compass 1(2), 144-53; Edwin M. Curley, 1969, Spinoza’s Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 118-53; Valtteri Viljanen, 2009, “Spinoza’s Ontology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics, ed. Olli Koistinen, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 62-71. 1 of the existence of a substance, in addition to God, that has no attributes. I aim to demonstrate this possibility through an investigation of Part I and the beginning propositions of Part II of the Ethics with special attention paid to the role of ID4.3 The first part of this essay consists of an interpretation of ID4 that will serve as a foundation for my argument for the possibility of the existence of a second substance. The second section contains a discussion of the implications of that interpretation of ID4 for the possibility of the existence of a substance with no attributes. In that section, I also take up potential textual obstacles to the idea of a substance with no attributes. The third and final part of the essay lays out a brief proposal on how one might “solve” this problem for Spinoza as well as some questions for the further development of this project. The position I wish to defend is only that the logical possibility of a substance without attributes is not ruled out by Spinoza’s proof for substance monism. Whether or not such a substance actually exists or may be proven to exist is not the aim of this essay; nor do I think such a substance’s actual existence is relevant. Even the possibility of the existence of another substance is a problem for Spinoza’s substance monism. IP14 claims that there can neither be, nor be conceived, any other substance than God. Therefore, the mere conception of another substance is detrimental to Spinoza’s proof for the existence of only one substance. The objection that a substance without attributes is possible may be summarized as follows. IP11dem supposes that if we can conceive of God as a substance consisting of infinite attributes that does not exist, then, by IA7, God’s essence does not involve existence. If God’s 3 References to Spinoza’s Ethics are taken from: Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, and Selected Letters, trans. Samuel Shirley, ed. Seymour Feldman, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1992. References such as IP33sch2 should be read as referring to Ethics Part I, proposition 33, second scholium. I will use the following abbreviations: P=proposition, D=definition, A=axiom, dem=demonstration/proof, cor=corollary, sch=scholium, exp=explication. 2 essence does not involve existence then existence would not belong to the nature of substance which is, by IP7, absurd. What is offered by IP7 is the existence of substance generally but not of one specific substance consisting of infinite attributes. Neither IP7 nor any other premise in Spinoza’s argument for IP14 rules out the possibility that even if God does exist as defined by Spinoza another substance consisting of no attributes could simultaneously exist. Nowhere do we find Spinoza claiming that a substance must necessarily have at least one attribute.4 So, it is at least possible, given what Spinoza offers in his argument for substance monism, that God exists and we perceive his essence to be constituted by the attributes of thought and extension as well as some other substance exists whose essence the intellect is unable to perceive – viz., it has no attributes. I will refer to this possibility as the “substance without attributes (SWA) hypothesis”. The definition of attribute The SWA hypothesis rests upon my interpretation of ID4, which reads as follows: ID4′: by attribute I mean that to which an idea of substance leads the understanding to think of as constituting its existence. ID4′ leans towards confirming, or at least supporting, a subjectivist interpretation of the relationship of attributes and substance. The subjectivist interpretation takes the attributes to be only that which the intellect perceives (either truly or falsely) of as constituting the essence 4 Bennett seems to be the only commentator to address this issue and his discussion is very brief (Bennett 1996, 64). Bennett presumably finds evidence for the impossibility of a substance with no attributes in IP14dem: “if there were any other substance but God, it would have to be explicated through some attribute of God.” Bennett reads “it would have to be explicated through some attribute of God” to mean that a substance must be somehow explicated. I, on the other hand, think it is possible to read this passage to mean that “if another substance were to be explicated, [then] it would have to be explicated through some attribute of God.” The text allows for such an ambiguity which leaves open at least the logical possibility that substances do not have to be expressed or explicated at all. 3 of substance though not actually constituting the essence of substance. The distinction between attribute and substance – as well as the distinction between one attribute and another – is merely a conceptual distinction that does not really exist.5 ID4′ is the result of the disambiguation of the terms “intellect”, “perceives”, and “essence” in ID4. The question that arises from the use of “intellect” in ID4 is whether Spinoza has in mind the finite (i.e., human) intellect or the infinite (i.e., divine) intellect. Several other mentions of “intellect” in the beginning propositions of Part I (IP4, IP8sch2) are of no help in answering this question as they make the same general, ambiguous use of the term as does ID4. IP30-IP32cor2, however, begin to offer some clarity to the meaning of “intellect” when used without the infinite-finite qualification. IP30 and IP31, taken together with IP31dem, explain that, for Spinoza, the intellect, either finite or infinite, is a modification of the attribute thought. Continuing in the scholium to IP31, Shirley interprets Spinoza to equate the intellect with the “very act of understanding, than which nothing is more clearly apprehended by us.”6 IP32dem, IP32cor2, and L64 all provide further clarification that intellect, finite or infinite, is a mode and must be conceived through the attribute of thought. Since each mode must be conceived under some attribute (IIP6), it should make no difference for the meaning of ID4 whether “intellect” is taken to be finite or infinite. Per the synonymy of “intellect” and “understanding” offered by Shirley’s translation of IP31sch, it seems unproblematic to substitute “understanding” for 5 Thomas M. Lennon, 2005, “The Rationalist Conception of Substance,” in A Companion to Rationalism, ed. Alan Nelson, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 20-2. The objectivist interpretation of the attributes, on the other hand, holds that the attributes are really distinct from each other as well as being really distinct from substance. The attributes are not merely conceptual beings, but separate real things. The difficulty for such a position is to explain how entities that are really and conceptually distinct from substance can constitute the essence of that substance.
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