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The Philosophy of Physics
The Philosophy of Physics ROBERTO TORRETTI University of Chile PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK www.cup.cam.ac.uk 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA www.cup.org 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014, Madrid, Spain © Roberto Torretti 1999 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1999 Printed in the United States of America Typeface Sabon 10.25/13 pt. System QuarkXPress [BTS] A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available. 0 521 56259 7 hardback 0 521 56571 5 paperback Contents Preface xiii 1 The Transformation of Natural Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century 1 1.1 Mathematics and Experiment 2 1.2 Aristotelian Principles 8 1.3 Modern Matter 13 1.4 Galileo on Motion 20 1.5 Modeling and Measuring 30 1.5.1 Huygens and the Laws of Collision 30 1.5.2 Leibniz and the Conservation of “Force” 33 1.5.3 Rømer and the Speed of Light 36 2 Newton 41 2.1 Mass and Force 42 2.2 Space and Time 50 2.3 Universal Gravitation 57 2.4 Rules of Philosophy 69 2.5 Newtonian Science 75 2.5.1 The Cause of Gravity 75 2.5.2 Central Forces 80 2.5.3 Analytical -
Thomas Aquinas: Soul-Body Connection and the Afterlife Hyde Dawn Krista University of Missouri-St
University of Missouri, St. Louis IRL @ UMSL Theses Graduate Works 4-16-2012 Thomas Aquinas: Soul-Body Connection and the Afterlife Hyde Dawn Krista University of Missouri-St. Louis, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis Recommended Citation Krista, Hyde Dawn, "Thomas Aquinas: Soul-Body Connection and the Afterlife" (2012). Theses. 261. http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis/261 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Works at IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Thomas Aquinas: Soul-Body Connection and the Afterlife Krista Hyde M.L.A., Washington University in St. Louis, 2010 B.A., Philosophy, Southeast Missouri State University – Cape Girardeau, 2003 A Thesis Submitted to The Graduate School at the University of Missouri – St. Louis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in Philosophy April 2012 Advisory Committee Gualtiero Piccinini, Ph.D. Chair Jon McGinnis, Ph.D. John Brunero, Ph.D. Copyright, Krista Hyde, 2012 Abstract Thomas Aquinas nearly succeeds in addressing the persistent problem of the mind-body relationship by redefining the human being as a body-soul (matter-form) composite. This redefinition makes the interaction problem of substance dualism inapplicable, because there is no soul “in” a body. However, he works around the mind- body problem only by sacrificing an immaterial afterlife, as well as the identity and separability of the soul after death. Additionally, Thomistic psychology has difficulty accounting for the transmission of universals, nor does it seem able to overcome the arguments for causal closure. -
Moral Values in Duhem's Philosophy of Science
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of San Francisco The University of San Francisco USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences 2011 The cS ientist as Impartial Judge: Moral Values in Duhem’s Philosophy of Science David J. Stump University of San Francisco, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.usfca.edu/phil Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Stump, David J., "The cS ientist as Impartial Judge: Moral Values in Duhem’s Philosophy of Science" (2011). Philosophy. Paper 13. http://repository.usfca.edu/phil/13 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Scientist as Impartial Judge: Moral Values in Duhem’s Philosophy of Science (Part of a book symposium New Perspectives on Pierre Duhem’s Aim and Structure of Scientific Theory in Metascience (2011) 20(1): 1-25) David J. Stump Department of Philosophy University of San Francisco 2130 Fulton Street San Francisco, CA 94117 [email protected] Rereading Duhem’s classic work in the philosophy of science is a true pleasure that I highly recommend. There is of course more in Duhem’s work than can possibly be covered in a short review, so I will focus on his famous epistemological claims and the solution that Duhem proposes to them. -
Comparativeurban Studies Project
COMPARATIVE URBAN STUDIES PROJECT URBAN UPDATE September 2007 NO. 12 Cities and Fundamentalisms WRITTEN BY: Nezar AlSayyad, Professor of Architecture, Planning, and Urban History & Chair of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of California at Berkeley; Mejgan Massoumi, Program Assistant, Comparative Urban Studies Project (2005-2007); Mrinalini Rajagopalan, Assistant Professor, Draper Faculty Fellow (The City), New York University. With the unanticipated resur- gence of religious and ethnic loy- alties across the world, commu- nities are returning to, reinvigo- rating, and giving new meaning to religions and their common practices. Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism, among others, are experiencing new in- fl uxes of commitments and tra- ditions. These changes have been coupled with the breakdown of order and of state power under the neo-liberal economic para- Top Row, Left to Right: Salwa Ismail, Mrinalini Rajagopalan, Raka Ray, Blair Ruble, Renu Desai, Nezar AlSayyad. Bottom Row, Left to Right: digm of civil society which have Omri Elisha, Emily Gottreich, Mona Harb, Mejgan Massoumi. created vacuums in the provi- sion of social services. Religious groups in many countries around the world are increasingly providing those services left unattended to by state bureaucracies. The once sacred divide between church and COMPARATIVE URBAN STUDIES PROJECT state or the confi nement of religion to the pri- fundamentalisms in several parts of the world. The vate sphere is now being vigorously challenged systematic transformation of the urban landscape as radical religious groups not only gain ground through various strategies of religious funda- within sovereign nation-states but in fact forge mentalism has led to the redefi nition of minority enduring and powerful transnational connections space in many cities. -
Conceptual Analysis and the Essence of Space: Kant's Metaphysical
AGPh 2015; 97(4): 416–457 James Messina* Conceptual Analysis and the Essence of Space: Kant’s Metaphysical Exposition Revisited DOI 10.1515/agph-2015-0017 Abstract: I offer here an account of the methodology, historical context, and content of Kant’s so-called “Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space” (MECS). Drawing on Critical and pre-Critical texts, I first argue that the arguments making up the MECS rest on a kind of conceptual analysis, one that yields (analytic) knowledge of the essence of space. Next, I situate Kant’s MECS in what I take to be its proper historical context: the debate between the Wolffians and Crusius about the correct analysis of the concept of space. Finally, I draw on the results of previous sections to provide a reconstruction of Kant’s so-called “first apriority argument.” On my reconstruction, the key premise of the argument is a claim to the effect that space grounds the possibility of the co-existence of whatever things occupy it. “To investigate the essences of things is the busi- ness and the end of philosophy.” (AA 24:115) 1 Introduction In the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that space is the a priori form of outer intuition (call this the Form Thesis).¹,² Kant’s 1 References to the Critique of Pure Reason are given according to the pagination of the first (A) and second (B) editions. In quotations I have followed Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1998). References to other works by Kant are given by volume and page number of the Berlin Akademie edition (cited as AA). -
Can God's Goodness Save the Divine Command Theory
CAN GOD’S GOODNESS SAVE THE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY FROM EUTHYPHRO? JEREMY KOONS Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar Abstract. Recent defenders of the divine command theory like Adams and Alston have confronted the Euthyphro dilemma by arguing that although God’s commands make right actions right, God is morally perfect and hence would never issue unjust or immoral commandments. On their view, God’s nature is the standard of moral goodness, and God’s commands are the source of all obligation. I argue that this view of divine goodness fails because it strips God’s nature of any features that would make His goodness intelligible. An adequate solution to the Euthyphro dilemma may require that God be constrained by a standard of goodness that is external to Himself – itself a problematic proposal for many theists. The Euthyphro dilemma is often thought to present a fatal problem for the divine command theory (aka theological voluntarism). Are right acts commanded by God because they are right, or are they right because they are commanded by God? If the former, then there is a standard of right and wrong independent of God’s commands; God’s commands are not relevant in determining the content of morality. This option seems to compromise God’s sovereignty in an important way. But the second horn of the dilemma presents seemingly insurmountable problems, as well. First, if God’s commands make right actions right, and there is no standard of morality independent of God’s commands, then that seems to make morality arbitrary. Thus, murder is not wrong because it harms someone unjustly, but merely because God forbids it; there is (it seems) no good connection between reason and the wrongness of murder. -
1 Beginning the Conversation
NOTES 1 Beginning the Conversation 1. Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times (New York: Schocken, 1969). 2. John Micklethwait, “In God’s Name: A Special Report on Religion and Public Life,” The Economist, London November 3–9, 2007. 3. Mark Lila, “Earthly Powers,” NYT, April 2, 2006. 4. When we mention the clash of civilizations, we think of either the Spengler battle, or a more benign interplay between cultures in individual lives. For the Spengler battle, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). For a more benign interplay in individual lives, see Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999). 5. Micklethwait, “In God’s Name.” 6. Robert Wuthnow, America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). “Interview with Robert Wuthnow” Religion and Ethics Newsweekly April 26, 2002. Episode no. 534 http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/week534/ rwuthnow.html 7. Wuthnow, America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity, 291. 8. Eric Sharpe, “Dialogue,” in Mircea Eliade and Charles J. Adams, The Encyclopedia of Religion, first edition, volume 4 (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 345–8. 9. Archbishop Michael L. Fitzgerald and John Borelli, Interfaith Dialogue: A Catholic View (London: SPCK, 2006). 10. Lily Edelman, Face to Face: A Primer in Dialogue (Washington, DC: B’nai B’rith, Adult Jewish Education, 1967). 11. Ben Zion Bokser, Judaism and the Christian Predicament (New York: Knopf, 1967), 5, 11. 12. Ibid., 375. -
Aquinas' Principle of Individuation
Aquinas' Principle of Individuation Patrick W. Hughes Denison University Saint Thomas Aquinas, the Thirteenth Century Catholic theologian and philosopher was one of the first Medieval philosophers to attempt to reconcile the newly re-introduced Aristotelian system with the Catholic religious thought ofthe day. Aquinas' numerous commentaries on Aristotle and his adoption of the Aristotelian thought form the basis for the whole of Aquinian metaphysics (as well as the basic Aristotileanism which pervades Aquinas' whole systematic philosophy), In this paper I will deal with a specific yet fundamental principle ofAquinianmetaphysics-the principle of individuation. On first reading of the Aquinian texts, the principle of individuation appears to be stated succinctly, yet further investigation into the concept of individuation reveals problems and ambiguities. As it is necessary for an understanding of the problem of individuation in the Aquinian system, I will start off with the basic ontology ofAquinas and then will proceed with one interpretation of the ambiguities which exist in the texts regarding the principle of individuation. I will then give a counter interpretation that Aquinas might level against my interpretation and the problems ofmy interpretation; finally, I will analyze any problems that arise from the Aquinian response. 1. Primary Substance in Aristotle and Aquinas The difficulty in dealing with systematic philosophy is that it is difficult to know where to begin, since each concept is built upon previous concepts and all of the concepts are fundamentally interrelated. Neverthe less, I shall start by explicating Aquinas' fundamental ontology. Aquinas, following Aristotle, points out that the world is made up of individual things-or what Aquinas calls "primary substances", Socrates, Rover, and the pine tree in my yard are all existing individual primary substances in the world. -
Dossier Pierre Duhem Pierre Duhem's Philosophy and History of Science
Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science , 2 (201 7) 03 -06 ISSN 2526 -2270 www.historiographyofscience.org © The Author s 201 7 — This is an open access article Dossier Pierre Duhem Pierre Duhem’s Philos ophy and History of Science Introduction Fábio Rodrigo Leite 1 Jean-François Stoffel 2 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.24117/2526-2270.2017.i2.02 _____________________________________________________________________________ We are pleased to present in this issue a tribute to the thought of Pierre Duhem, on the occasion of the centenary of his death that occurred in 2016. Among articles and book reviews, the dossier contains 14 contributions of scholars from different places across the world, from Europe (Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Sweden) to the Americas (Brazil, Canada, Mexico and the United States). And this is something that attests to the increasing scope of influence exerted by the French physicist, philosopher and 3 historian. It is quite true that since his passing, Duhem has been remembered in the writings of many of those who knew him directly. However, with very few exceptions (Manville et al. 1927), the comments devoted to him exhibited clear biographical and hagiographic characteristics of a generalist nature (see Jordan 1917; Picard 1921; Mentré 1922a; 1922b; Humbert 1932; Pierre-Duhem 1936; Ocagne et al. 1937). From the 1950s onwards, when the studies on his philosophical work resumed, the thought of the Professor from Bordeaux acquired an irrevocable importance, so that references to La théorie physique: Son objet et sa structure became a common place in the literature of the area. As we know, this recovery was a consequence of the prominence attributed, firstly, to the notorious Duhem-Quine thesis in the English- speaking world, and secondly to the sparse and biased comments made by Popper that generated an avalanche of revaluations of the Popperian “instrumentalist interpretation”. -
Tanya Sources.Pdf
The Way to the Tree of Life Jewish practice entails fulfilling many laws. Our diet is limited, our days to work are defined, and every aspect of life has governing directives. Is observance of all the laws easy? Is a perfectly righteous life close to our heart and near to our limbs? A righteous life seems to be an impossible goal! However, in the Torah, our great teacher Moshe, Moses, declared that perfect fulfillment of all religious law is very near and easy for each of us. Every word of the Torah rings true in every generation. Lesson one explores how the Tanya resolved these questions. It will shine a light on the infinite strength that is latent in each Jewish soul. When that unending holy desire emerges, observance becomes easy. Lesson One: The Infinite Strength of the Jewish Soul The title page of the Tanya states: A Collection of Teachings ספר PART ONE לקוטי אמרים חלק ראשון Titled הנקרא בשם The Book of the Beinonim ספר של בינונים Compiled from sacred books and Heavenly מלוקט מפי ספרים ומפי סופרים קדושי עליון נ״ע teachers, whose souls are in paradise; based מיוסד על פסוק כי קרוב אליך הדבר מאד בפיך ובלבבך לעשותו upon the verse, “For this matter is very near to לבאר היטב איך הוא קרוב מאד בדרך ארוכה וקצרה ”;you, it is in your mouth and heart to fulfill it בעזה״י and explaining clearly how, in both a long and short way, it is exceedingly near, with the aid of the Holy One, blessed be He. "1 of "393 The Way to the Tree of Life From the outset of his work therefore Rav Shneur Zalman made plain that the Tanya is a guide for those he called “beinonim.” Beinonim, derived from the Hebrew bein, which means “between,” are individuals who are in the middle, neither paragons of virtue, tzadikim, nor sinners, rishoim. -
The Concept Of'nature'in Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes
doi: 10.1590/0100-512X2015n13103cb THE CONCEPT OF ‘NATURE’ IN ARISTOTLE, AVICENNA AND AVERROES* Catarina Belo** [email protected] RESUMO O presente artigo trata da ‘natureza’ enquanto objeto da física, ou da ciência natural, tal como descrita por Aristóteles na “Física”. Também trata das definições da natureza, especificamente a natureza física, fornecidas por Avicena (m. 1037) e Averróis (m. 1198) nos seus comentários à “Física” de Aristóteles. Avicena e Averróis partilham da conceção da natureza de Aristóteles enquanto princípio de movimento e repouso. Enquanto para Aristóteles o objeto da física parece ser a natureza, ou aquilo que existe por natureza, Avicena defende que é o corpo natural, e Averróis afirma que o objeto da física, ou ciência natural, consiste nas coisas naturais, apresentando uma ênfase algo diferente. Palavras-chave Natureza, física, substância, Aristóteles, Avicena, Averróis. ABSTRACT This study is concerned with ‘nature’ specifically as the subject-matter of physics, or natural science, as described by Aristotle in his “Physics”. It also discusses the definitions of nature, and more specifically physical nature, provided by Avicenna (d. 1037) and Averroes (d. 1198) in their commentaries on Aristotle’s “Physics”. Avicenna and Averroes share Aristotle’s conception of nature as a principle of motion and rest. While according to Aristotle the subject matter of physics appears to be nature, * An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Medieval Congress 2008, University of Leeds, United Kingdom, 7-10 July 2008. I am grateful for the comments on my paper by the other congress participants. ** Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy – The American University in Cairo. -
Form, Essence, Soul: Distinguishing Principles of Thomistic Metaphysics
FORM, ESSENCE, SOUL: DISTINGUISHING PRINCIPLES OF THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS JOSHUA P. HOCHSCHILD I. INTRODUCTION What is the difference between the substantial form, the essence, and the soul of a living material substance? Each of these three items would normally be considered in a course in Thomistic philosophy. In my experience, there reaches a point where students begin to wonder how these terms are related and even whether it is necessary to de scribe the metaphysical principles of things in so many different ways. I have found it useful, for my own understanding and my teaching, to exploit, even to foster, some potential confusions precisely in order to focus on them, and in the process illuminate certain distinctions and insights in Thomistic philosophy. II. CONFUSIONS Presentations of Thomistic metaphysics can tend to present the substantial form, essence, and soul as if they are basically the same thing. Aquinas himself, after all, sometimes treats "form" as syn onymous with "essence,"1 and they seem to serve the same basic metaphysical task: both are causes not only of a thing's being the kind of thing it is, but of its just being.2 And, as causes, the causality exercised by both the essence and the form is formal, not material or efficient.3 As for the soul, Aquinas of course adopts its Aristotelian 1 Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, ch. 1: "Dicitur etiam forma secundum quod per formam significatur certitudo uniuscuiusque rei, ut <licit Avicenna in II Metaphysicae suae." 2 Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, ch. 1: "Et hoc est quod Philosophus frequenter nominat quod quid erat esse, id est hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid." De Principiis Naturae, ch.