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Thomas Aquinas On Being and Essence
Prologue Because a small error in the beginning grows enormous at the end, as the Philosopher remarks in Book 1 of On the Heavens and the World,1 and being and essence are the first things to be conceived by our understanding, as Avicenna declares in Book 1 of his Metaphysics,2 in order to avoid falling into error about them, and to reveal their difficulties, we should see what are signified by the names of being and essence, how these are found in various things, and how they are related to the logical intentions3 of genus, species, and difference. And since we need to arrive at the cognition of simple components from the cognition of what they compose, and from those that are posterior to those that are prior, so that the discussion may suitably progress from the easier subjects, we should proceed from the signification of the name of being to the signification of the name of essence.4
1 Aristotle, De Caelo, lb. 1, c. 5, A271; Commentary of St. Thomas, lc. 9. 2 Avicenna, Metaphysica, lb. 1, c. 6. 3 The “logical intentions” are second-order concepts (secundae intentiones) whereby we conceive of first-order concepts [primae intentiones], which in turn are concepts whereby we conceive of things that are not concepts. For example, by means of the first-order concepts of humans and of dogs we con- ceive of human beings and of dogs, which are not concepts. But by means of the second-order con- cept of species we conceive of the first-order, specific concepts of humans, dogs, donkeys, etc., and by means of the second-order concept of genus we conceive of the generic concepts of animals, plants, elements, etc. 4 This passage is a neat expression of Aquinas’s general Aristotelian epistemological stance. We should start with the things with which we are more familiar, namely, the things given in our everyday experi- ence, which are, nevertheless, metaphysically posterior to their simple components. But through the careful conceptual analysis of these things we may arrive at the understanding of their simple meta- physical constituents, which will then enable us to see how these constituents can be found even in things beyond our everyday experience. MP_C30.qxd 11/23/062:36AMPage228
PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 228 Averroës, 8 Study withaReconstruction,” “TheChangingRole of 5 (2002),pp.159–76; Chapter 1.TheMeaningsoftheNamesBeingandEssence “Aquinas’ TheoryoftheCopulaandAnalogyBeing,” Thomas Aquinas’sMetaphysicsofBeing,” analyses ofthisdistinctionalongtheselines,seeG.Klima,“TheSemantic PrinciplesUnderlyingSaint theory ofsignification,assumedherebyAquinas,withoutanypreliminary explanation.Fordetailed if itisreadinitspropercontext,i.e.,the“inherencetheoryof predication” andthecorresponding times alsoreferredtoas“beingtrue”( referred toasthedistinctionbetween“realbeing”( This,initiallypuzzling,distinction betweenthetwomainsensesofterm“being”iswhatoften 7 but ameredistinctionofreasonbetweendifferentwaysconceiving ofthesamething. per se being, assuch,isnotdescribedincoincidentalterms,so,thepersonconsideredthiswayan dental being,an ity (acapacitytoplaymusic).So,thepersonconceivedanddescribedinthiswayisamerelycoinci- described assuch,isamerelycoincidentalbeing,intermsofquantity(height)andqual- tures, onaccountofwhichitwouldbelongtotwodifferentcategories;forexample,atallmusician, being” [ which Aquinasrefers,Aristotlecontrasts“coincidentalbeing”( Aristotle, 6 by thetranslator. Series Philosophica,5:PontificiaUniversitasGregoriana(Rome,1933)).Thechaptertitlesareadded (“Opusculum ThedivisionofthetextintosevenchaptersfollowsBoyeredition,usedforthistranslation 5 the PhilosopherinBook7of sophers changedthenameofessenceinto“quiddity”[ genus orspeciesiswhatwesignifybythedefinitionindicating[ of man,andsoonfortherest.Andbecausethatbywhichathingisconstitutedinitsproper various beingsfallunderthediversegeneraandspecies,asforexamplehumanityisessence “essence” hastosignifysomethingthatiscommonallnaturesonaccountofwhich We shouldknowthat,asthePhilosophersaysinBook5of substance ofthething.” ‘Being’inthefirstsensesignifies why theCommentatorremarksinsamepassage:“ asitisusedinthefirstsense.This as isclearinthecaseofprivations),butfrom“being” sense (forsomethingsaresaidtobebeingsinthisalthoughtheydonothaveanessence, first sense.So,thename“essence”[ which positssomethinginreality. that there tions aresaidtobebeings,forwesaythatanaffirmation can beformed,evenifitpositsnothinginreality;isthiswaythatprivationsandnega- second senseeverythingcanbesaidtoabeingofwhich[true]affirmativeproposition being] signifiesthetruthofaproposition.Anddifferencebetweentwoisthatin called beings]thataresortedintothetencategories;inothersense[callingsomethinga said tobeabeing[ And since,ashasbeensaid,beingsinthissensearesortedintothetencategories; . Obviously,thedistinctionitselfisnotarealbetweentwodifferentsortsofthings, ens perse is Metaphysics In Metaph. De enteetessentia blindness inaneye.Butthefirstsenseonlythatcanbesaidtoabeing ]. Acoincidentalbeingissomethingidentifiedonthebasisofmerelyfea- ens peraccidens ens perse , lb.5,com.14. , Bk.5,c.7,1017a22–3; 8 Synthese , introductioneetnotisauctum,”ed.C.Boyer,TextusDocumenta, ] . Ontheotherhand,samepersonconsideredmerelyasahuman 6 in twodifferentsenses:onesense,[only]thosethings[are Metaphysics 7 96 (1993),pp.25–59. essentia Therefore, blindnessandthelikearenotbeingsin ens utverum Medieval PhilosophyandTheology Entia Rationis ] is not derived from “being” [ ] isnotderivedfrom“being” Commentary often calls“whatsomethingwastobe”[ ens reale )). Thedistinctionwillatoncebelesspuzzling, ) and“beingofreason”( in MedievalPhilosophy:AComparative Logical AnalysisandHistoryofPhilosophy fS.Toa,l.7 Inthepassageto of St.Thomas,lc.7. ens peraccidens is the oppositeofnegation,and quidditas Metaphysics quid ) with“non-coincidental , 5(1996),pp.87–141; ] thisthingis,philo- ], andthisiswhat ens ens rationis 5 ] inthesecond , somethingis ) (some- quod ens , MP_C30.qxd 11/23/062:36AMPage229 claim. thing alonecannotbesaidtoitsessenceeither,evenifsomepeoplewantmakethis genus orspecies,butthatonaccountofwhichitactuallyexists.However,theforma thing, anditisnotonaccountofitsmatterthatathingdeterminedtobeinproper under itsproperspeciesandgenus;butmatterisnottheprincipleofcognition the thingisknowablethroughitsessence,anditonaccountofessencethatfalls essence ofthething.Thatmatteraloneisnotthingclear,because soul andbodyinman.Butitcannotbesaidthatoneofthesealoneshouldcalledthe thing, asAvicennasaysinBook2ofhis that throughwhichandinathinghasitsbeing[ the factthatitissignifiedbydefinition;butcalled“essence”[ is deprivedofitsproperoperation.Thename“quiddity,”ontheotherhand,derivedfrom the essenceofathinginsofarasitisrelatedtothing’sproperoperation,sincenothing that everysubstanceisanature.Butthename“nature”takeninthiswayseemstosignify definition; anditisalsointhissensethatthePhilosopherBook5of hended bytheintellect.Forathingisintelligibleonlyonaccountofitsessenceand namely, inthesensewhichanatureissaidtobethatcananywayappre- “form,” because“form”signifiestheperfectionanddeterminatecharacter[ quid eratesse proceed fromtheeasiersubjects. begin withtheessencesofcompositesubstances,sothatourdiscussionmaymoresuitably simple substance,whichisGod. way ofbeing.Fortheyarethecausecompositeones;atleastthisistruefirst, the simpleonesinamoregenuineandexcellentway,justastheyhave qualification. has anessenceinastrictandtruesense,whileaccidentitonlysomehow,with an accidentisabeingonlysecondarilyand,asitwere,withqualification,substance But becauseasubstanceissaidtobebeingprimarilyandwithoutqualification,whereas Chapter 2.TheEssenceofMaterialSubstances form, butmatteraswell;otherwisenaturaldefinitionswould notdifferfrommathematical is whatitsdefinitionsignifies.Buttheofthingsnaturecontainsnotonly “nature” inthefirstoffoursensesassignedtoitbyBoethiushis Petri Lombardi Avicenna ontheissue.Cf.Aquinas, Inparticular,AverroësandhisfollowersmadethisclaimagainstAvicenna. Aquinassideswith 12 of Nature it isclearfromthehylomorphicanalysisofphysicalchange,provided byAquinasinhis Matterandformaretheobviouslygivenmetaphysicalcomponentsof anymaterialsubstance,as 11 10 Avicenna, 9 In compositesubstances,therefore,formandmatterareknown[components], However, sincetheessencesofthesesubstancesarequitehiddenfromus,weshould Some substancesaresimple,otherscomposite,andbothsortshavetheiressence,but De personaetduabusnaturis 12 . For onthebasisofwhathasbeensaidsofaritisclearthatessenceathing ], thatistosay,onaccountofwhichsomethingwhatitis.Italsocalled ( SN Metaph ) 4,d.44,q.1,a.1b,resp.2. ., 1,6;2,2. , c.1.MignePatrologiaLatina(ML),64,1341. In Metaphysica Metaphysics , lb.7,lc.9,n.1467; . esse 9 It isalsocalled“nature,”taking ]. In QuattuorLibrosSententiarum essentia On TwoNatures certitudo Metaphysics ], becauseitis On thePrinciples ofevery ] 11 as are says , 10 229
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PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 230 definitions. 5Avicenna, 15 its subject.Cf.alson.67below. is necessarilyacurvatureofnose,butinanditselfthe only,havingtohaveanoseas Thispointisdiscussedinmoredetailc.7below,consideringthedefinition of“pugness,”which 14 ies arepearls. layers ofcrystallizedcalciumcarbonateheldtogetherbyconchiolin,whichiswhynotallsphericalbod- of apearl.Butevenifallpearlsareessentiallyspherical(moreorless),theyalsoconsist Forexample,thegeometricaldefinitionofaspherewouldnotdifferfromnatural 13 prises bothwarmthandwetness. is notdenominatedsweetonaccountofitswarmth,butflavor,whichcom- warmth spreadingwetness,andalthoughinthiswaycausessweetness,still,abody comprises both,asisclearinthecaseofflavors:forsweetnesscausedbyaction inated onaccountofonlyonethoseprinciplesthatconstituteit,butwhat can seealsoincasesofotherthingscomposedseveralprinciplesthatthethingisnotdenom- but hastobeboth,althoughitistheformthatcausesthisactofbeinginitsownway.We which thethingisdenominateda“being,”cannotbeformaloneormatteralone, is thatonaccountofwhichthethingsaidtobe.Therefore,essence, neither oftheformalone,normatterbutcompositeitself;andessence being and to anessence.Forbytheform,whichisactualityofmatter,mattermadeintoactual to thething,andthingwouldnotbeknownonaccountofit,nonewhichcanapply or somethingsuperaddedtothese,becausethatwouldnecessarilybeanaccidentextrinsic It isclear,therefore,thatessencecomprisesbothmatterandform. fore theyhavetoreceiveintheirdefinitionsubject,whichisoutsideessence. for thissortofdefinitionispropertoaccidents,whichdonothaveperfectessence,andthere- substance assomethingaddedtoitsessence,orexistingoutsideof ponents, butbythecompositeflavorresultingfrommixture. some rum).Still,apunch-flavoredcakeorscoopoficecreamisnot denominatedbyanyofthecom- by another,morefamiliarexample:punchflavoriscausedmixing variousfruitjuices(andmaybe the fourelements,isnotveryilluminatingtous.Butpoint clear, andcan,infact,beillustrated ies ofmixedbodiescanbederivedfromtheinteractionsimple activeandpassivequalitiesof Theexample,basedonthesomewhatobscureAristoteliandoctrineof howthecompositequalit- 17 Averroës, 16 on theCategories is composedofmatterandform.AndBoethiusagreeswiththispositioninhis acquired, thethingisnotsaidtobegeneratedabsolutelyspeaking,butonlyinsomerespect. accidents do,aswhitenessmakessomethingactuallywhite.So,whenaformofthissortis actual beingtomatterabsolutelyspeaking,butitmakesinsomerespect,justas that is,composedofmatterandform.” nature thatthespeciesofgenerableandcorruptiblethingshaveisacertainintermediary, itself. also saysthatthequiddityofcompositesubstancesiscompositionmatterandform the sameforGreeksas“essence”doesus,hesaysinhis And reasonagreeswiththisaswell,fortheactofbeing[ Nevertheless, itcannotbesaidthat“essence”signifiesarelationbetweenmatterandform, What remains,therefore,isthatthename“essence”incompositesubstancessignifieswhat 15 And evenAverroësdeclaresinhis this 13 And itcannotbesaidthatmatterisincludedinthedefinitionofanatural In Metaph Metaph [particular] thing[ , whenhesaysthat ., 5,5. ., 7,com.27. hoc aliquid 17 ousia 16 signifies somethingcomposite;for ]. Therefore,whateversupervenesdoesnotgive Commentary on Book7ofthe esse ] ofacompositesubstanceis On TwoNatures Metaphysics ousia Commentary . Avicenna signifies : “the 14 MP_C30.qxd 11/23/062:36AMPage231 which arethenon-designatedmatterofman. definition ofmandoesnotincludethisboneorflesh,butbonesandfleshabsolutely, definition. Thedefinitionofman,ontheotherhand,includesnon-designatedmatter;for definition ofmanassuch,butitwouldbeincludedinSocrates’definition,ifSocrateshada matter consideredunderdeterminatedimensions.Thisisnotincludedinthe principle ofindividuation,butonlydesignatedmatteris.Andby an essenceissomethingthatthedefinitionsignifies. universal, fromwhichitwouldfurtherfollowthatuniversalsnothavedefinitions,if follow thattheessence,whichcomprisesbothmatterandform,isonlyparticularnot 9Averroës, 19 absurd. Cf.n.26below. having theessencesignifiedbythisdefinition)oughttohaveSocrates’ fleshandbones,whichisclearly of Socratesas individual), foritisclearthatthedefinitionofman,example, cannotsignifythefleshandbones can besignifiedbythedefinitionofspecies(thethat signifiesthespecificessenceofeach that particularchunkofmatter.Anditisobviousonly matter consideredinthiswaythat disregarding theirindividuatingfeatures,somattercanbe considered generally,notasthisor individual bodiestheyconstitute.Butjustastheindividualscanbe consideredinauniversalmanner, designated matter,i.e.,concretechunksofmatterexistingunder thedeterminatedimensionsof and non-designatedmatterisnotarealdistinction,butdistinction ofreason.Allmatterinrealityis different waysofconsideringthesamekindentity;thatistosay, thedistinctionbetweendesignated is, again,notadifferencebetweentwodifferentkindsofentities,butrather Itisimportanttonoteherethatthedifferencebetweendesignatedandnon-designatedmatter 18 are hisquiddity.” on Book7ofthe ignated andnon-designated,thisiswhytheCommentatordeclaresinhis In thiswayitisclearthattheessenceofmanandSocratesdifferonlyasdes- Chapter 3.TheCompositionofMaterialSubstances not thesameaswholethatisaman,butonlypartofit,then rather, whateverisinthespeciesalsogenusindeterminately.Forifananimalwere anything intheessenceofspeciesthatwouldnowaybegenus; the formofthing. species regardingthegenusoccursthroughaconstitutivedifference,whichistakenfrom takes placethroughmatterdeterminedbydimensions,whereasthedesignationof is differentinthetwocases.Fordesignationofindividualwithrespecttospecies of thespeciesdifferasdesignatedandnon-designated,althoughmannerdesignation predicated of because ithasanatureonaccountofwhichthreedimensionscanbedesignatedinit;while several senses.Forabody,insofarasitisinthegenusofsubstance,saidtobebody in thesensewhichitisanintegralpart.Thename“body,”therefore,canbetaken of ananimal,differsfrom And forthisreasonweshouldknowthatmatterconsideredinjustanywayisnotthe However, sincetheprincipleofindividuationismatter,fromthisitmayappearto But thedeterminationordesignationofspecieswithrespecttogenusisnotthrough We canseehowthishappensifweconsider this In Metaph man Metaphysics particular matterbelongingtoSocrates,forotherwiseallmen(i.e., allindividuals 19 , fornointegralpartispredicatedofitswhole. It isalsointhesamewaythatessenceofgenusand ., 7,c.5,com.20. body : “Socratesisnothingotherthananimalityandrationality,which insofarasitistakentobeagenus;forcannotgenus , 18 body , insofarasitistakentobeapart designated matter animal would notbe Commentary I mean 231
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PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 232 the caseof minate formwithouthavingsomedeterminatematterin its primarynotion,asisclearin perfections. Thedifference,ontheotherhand,isacertaindetermination takenfromadeter- be designatedinit,whichisaperfectionthatrelatedassomething materialtothefurther that somethingissaidtobeabodybecauseithastheperfectionthreedimensionscan proper form;andthegenusistakenfrommatter,althoughitnotmatter.Henceclear as acertaindenominationdeterminingwhatismaterialinthethingwithoutits signifies thewhole,asdoesspecies,butindifferentways.Forgenuswhole only matter. the genusindeterminatelysignifieswholethatisinspecies,foritdoesnotsignify a sensitivesoulonlyorthatisandrationalaswell.Inthisway,therefore, form cangiverisetosensationandmotion,nomatterwhatsortofitis,whetheris way to exclusion that hastheperfectionofsensingandmovingonaccountanintrinsicprinciple body New York:McGraw-Hill;1967–79. And inthiswaytheformof regardless ofwhetheritisanimalityorlapideity[rock-ness]anythingelsethissort. may giverisetosomefurtherperfectionornot.Andinthissense of whichthreedimensionscanbedesignatedinit,whateverthatformmaybe,whetherit constituted fromthesetwo,namely,thesoulandbody,asitsparts. anditwillbesuperaddedtothebodyitself,sothatanimal of thename“body,” an integralandmaterialpartofanimal,forinthiswaythesoulwillbebeyondsignification inthissense.Andsensethebodywillbe is beyondthesignificationof“body” that fromformnofurtherperfectionwouldfollow,butifsomethingisadded,thenit which therefollowsthedesignatabilityofthreedimensionsexclusively,namely,insuchway therefore,cansignifysomethingwhichhasaformfrom thing likethat.Thename“body,” dimensions canbedesignatedinit,afurtherperfectionadded,suchaslife,orsome- tive one.Likewise,totheperfectionofathing’shavingformonaccountwhichthree is obviousinthecaseofman,whohasasensitivenatureandbeyondthatalsoanintellec- But ithappensthatsomethinghassomeperfectionalsoreachesafurtherperfection,as the threedesignateddimensionsthemselvesarebodywhichisingenusofquantity. sis anditshistory,seeD.A.Callus,“Forms,UnicityPlurality of,”in Philosophical Perspectives Soul: Aquinas’sArithmeticofHumanNature,”inB.Davies(ed.), the unityofsubstantialforms.Foradetaileddiscussionthispassage, seeG.Klima,“Man=Body+ ThisisanimportantexpressionofAquinas’sfamous,andinhistime very controversial,thesisof 20 designated; is notanotherformthanthatonaccountofwhichinthingthreedimensionscanbe animal of whichthreedimensionscanbedesignatedinit,thisformwasunderstoodto There isasimilarrelationshipbetween Likewise, thedifferencesignifieswholeandnotonlyform;evendefinition But the name “body” canalsobetakentosignifysomethingthathasaformonaccount But thename“body” animal animal is itsgenus. , because of anyfurtherperfection,thensuperveningperfectionwouldberelated as toapart,andnotimplicitlycontainedinthenotionof 20 animate would notbeagenus.Butit and sowhenitwassaidthatabodyissomethinghasformonaccount animal , namely,somethingthathasasoul[ , Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,pp.257–73.Formorediscussion ofthethe- contains nothingthatisnotcontainedimplicitlyin animal is implicitlycontainedintheformof is man a genusinsofarasitsignifiescertainthingwhose and animal . Forif“animal”onlynamedathing anima ], forthisdoesnotdetermine Thomas Aquinas:Contemporary body New CatholicEncyclopedia animal will beagenusof body body . Forthesoul . Andinthis , insofaras any with the form, , MP_C30.qxd 11/23/062:36AMPage233 of the not partoftheunderstandingattributes[ the genusisnotunderstoodindifferenceasapartofitsessence,justtheirsubject body. Butif stituted bytwothings,neitherofwhichisidenticalwithit.Foramansoulnor of animal, butnotthatmanis but istakenfromtheformassignifyingwhole.Therefore,wesaythatmanarational is notmatter,buttakenfrommatterassignifyingthewhole,anddifferenceform, form, andthecompositeinnature,althoughtheyarenotidenticalwiththem.Forgenus the nameofgenusanddeterminateformdesignatedbydifference. definition andthespeciescompriseboth,namely,determinatematterdesignatedby the difference individual, justasthenatureofgenusiswithrespect to thespecies,therefore,justas ination thatwasthecauseofunitygenus,yieldsessentiallydiversespecies. what sortofthingitis,whetherabodyorsomethingelse.ThisiswhyAvicennasays 1Avicenna, 21 signified. of theremovalallforms,butgenusisoneonaccountcommunityform Commentary matter thatisnumericallyone; other thingsuperveningonit,namely,thedifferencedeterminingasformdetermines what thegenussignifiesissomenumericallyonenatureindiversespecieshaving its indeterminationorindifference.However,thisdoes the samegenusdonothavetoessence;forunityofstemsfrom is thegenusordifference. cannot besaidtoanyoftheconceptsthatconstituteit;forwedonotsaydefinition constituted byotherscannotbesaidtoanyofthosethatconstituteit,soaconcept of thedefinitionorspeciesisconstitutedbythesetwoconcepts.Therefore,justasathing indeterminately signifiedbythegenus. difference; however,this[determinatelyexpressedform]isnothingelsebutwhatwas but notdeterminatelythisorthatform,whichinturnisexpressedbythe the difference of thething,becauseitismaterialwithrespecttoultimateperfection;andconcept concepts. Fortheconceptof thing constitutedbytwootherthings,butratherathirdconcept 2Aristotle, 22 4Averroës, 24 signified bytheproperspecificdifferenceofdogs(whateverthatis). “rational,” andhisdog’sanimalityisnothingelsebut“caninity” (dogginess),whichisdeterminately Socrates’ animalityisnothingelsebuthishumanity,whichdeterminately signifiedbythedifference So,“animal”indeterminatelysignifiestheanimalityofSocratesand animalityofhisdog.But 23 body andsoul.Formanissaidtobecomposedofsoulbody,asathirdthingcon- And fromthisitisclearwhythegenus,difference,andspeciesareanalogoustomatter, And since,ashasbeensaid,thenatureofspeciesisindeterminate withrespecttothe Although thegenussignifiesentireessenceofspecies,still,severalspeciesin Topics 24 So, itisclearthattheadditionofdifference,whichremovesindeterm- man , on Book12ofthe 22 Metaph In Metaph Metaph per se rational except, perhaps,inthewaysubjectispredicatedofattribute.But is somehowsaidtoconsistof ., 3,998b24;St.Thomas’s , asthePhilosopherremarksinBook3of ., 5,6. ., 12,com14. consists inthedeterminationofspecificform;andconcept animal composed of Metaphysics rather does notdeterminethespecificformexpressingnature , thishappensbecausethegenussignifiessomeform, animal andrational,aswesaythatmanis 23 And thisiswhytheCommentatorsaysinhis that primematterissaidtobeoneonaccount passiones Commentary animal ]; andsothegenusisnotpredicatedof and , lc.7; not rational happen insuchamannerthat Topics , thenitwillnotbeathird , 4,2,122b20;6,144a32. Metaphysics and Book4 composed 21 that 233
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PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 234 the genus,insofarasitispredicatedofspecies,contains its understanding includesin the thingsfromwhichamanhasitthatheisman.Since,therefore,“humanity” not thatonaccountofwhichamanisman,andsoitcontainedinanywayamong for “humanity”signifiesthatonaccountofwhichamanisman.Butdesignatedmatter related totheindividualasitspart,andthisishowitsignifiedbyname“humanity”; with theexclusionofdesignatedmatter,whichisprincipleindividuation,thenit therefore, “man”ispredicatedofSocrates.However,ifthenaturespeciessignified indistinctly; andthisishowtheessenceofspeciessignifiedbyname“man”; predicated oftheindividual,hastosignifyeverythingthatisessentiallyinalthough that isdeterminatelyinthespecies,althoughindistinctly,soinsofarasit of forms,whereasthedesignationindividualregardingspeciesisbymeans nevertheless, isnotaman,butithastobereceivedinsomething,whichdesignatedmatter. [substance], althoughthequiddityitselfiscomposite;justashumanity,evenifitcomposite, why Avicennaremarksthatthequiddityofcomposite[substance]isnot ated ofthewhole,thisiswhy“humanity”notpredicatedamanorSocrates. designated matterisexcludedorcutofffromitssignification.Andsinceapartnotpredic- a thirdone,notcoincidingwitheitherofthesetwo,accordingto whichSocrates=body+soul. matter =essence( but only the essencesignifiedbydefinition,aswecouldseeabove,doesnotexcludematteringeneral, and turnsintoacorpse.Therefore,theformsodistinguishedexcludesthismatterfromitsnotion.But to befromit,say,whenhydrogenturnsintoheliuminanuclearfusion,orlivingbeingdies of athingiswhattakesonnewsubstantialformwhentheceasestobe,andcomes same individualaredistinguishedonaccountoftheanalysissubstantialchange:primematter regardless ofwhetherwedistinguishthemornot.)The(prime)matterandsubstantialformthe the tophalfandbottomofabody,itdoesnotmeanthatthesepartsarereallydistinct really distinct:justbecausewecanconceptuallydistinguishthelefthalfandrighthalf,aswell the sameindividual.(Thisdoesnothavetomean,however,thatpartsthusdistinguishedare materiality oftheindividualinquestion.Thesearetwodifferentwaysconceptually“carvingup” the matterandsubstantialformofsameindividual,althoughbothdistinctionsarebasedon essence andthedesignatedmatterofsameindividualisnotasrealdistinctionbetween of thesameindividual,namely,itsdesignatedmatter.Notethatrealdistinctionbetweenspecific its essence,butessenceispartthatreallydistinctbothfromthewholeandother This isanexpressionofAquinas’metaphysicalclaimthatamaterialsubstancecannotbeidenticalwith Thatistosay,thepropositions:“Amanahumanity”and“Socratesarefalse. 26 “continet.” Wegetthistranslationbyamendingthetextwithadditionofobviouslymissingverb 25 material substance,say,Socrates(disregardinghisaccidents)=substantial form( referred tointheotherdivision,distinguishingsubstantialformand primematter.So,anindividual whole” ( matter, whichiswhythisformalcomponent,theessence,also referredtoas“theformofthe and formconsideredingeneral,excludingonlywhatindividuates them,namely,thisdesignated substantial formwhichisreceivedinprimematter,forthisformal componentcomprisesbothmatter designated matterofthissubstance.Butformalcomponent isnotexactlythesameas by thisterm,isaformalcomponentofthewholesubstance,received in,andindividuatedby,the by theabstractformofnamespecies,as“humanity.” So,thisessence,assignified But, ashasbeensaid,thedesignationofspeciesregardinggenusisbymeans this forma totius designated matterinparticular(seen.18above),andonlywhenit issignifiedexclusively, forma totius only ), todistinguishitfrom“theformofthepart”( those thingsfromwhichamanhasitthatheisman,clear ) +designatedmatter.BesidesthesetwodivisionsofSocrates,there is 25 in itssignificationeverything forma partis forma partis ), whichistheform ) +prime 26 This is MP_C30.qxd 11/23/062:36AMPage235 to itspropernotion;andthisisabsoluteconsideration. And inthiswaynothingistrue as itimplicitlyandindistinctlycontainsallthatisintheindividual. to essenceinsofarasitissignifiedawhole,forexample,by thenames“man”or“animal,” the cognitionofthissingular.Therefore,itremainsthatnotiongenusorspeciesapplies something thatisseparatefromhim;andneitherwouldthingbeofanyusein and specieswouldnotbepredicatedofthisindividual;foritcannotsaidthatSocratesis is somethingexistingoutsidethesingulars,asPlatonistsbelieved;forinthiswaygenus Likewise, onecannotsaythatthenotionofgenusorspeciesappliestoessenceinsofarasit Socrates’ essenceisnotSocrates. signifying thatfromwhichthenatureofspeciesistaken, part ofthewhole,asforexamplebodyismaterialman;whilename the exclusion matter; therefore,thenamesignifyingthatfromwhichnatureofgenusistaken 0Avicenna, 30 individuals. referred toas Thisisbecauseaccordingtothe“canonical”definitionsofPorphyryinhis 29 Correctingthetext’s“Socratis”to“Socrates.” 28 it occupiesitslocationinspace,asdistinctfromotherbodies. thingsthatareapttodesignatematter”thedimensionsofmaterialsubstance,whereby “Those 27 individual, which thenotionofgenus,species,ordifferenceappliesispredicatedthisdesignated see howitisrelatedtothenotionsofgenus,species,anddifference.Now,sincethat Having seenwhatissignifiedbythename“essence”inmaterialsubstances,weshould the LogicalIntentions Chapter 4.TheEssenceofMaterialSubstanceand it issaidthatSocrates And forthisreason,thename“essence”issometimesfoundtobepredicatedofathing, man, andexcludesalldesignationofmatter;thereforeitisnotpredicatedindividualhumans. a part,becauseitcontainsinitssignificationonlywhatpertainstomaninsofarasheis the name“man”ispredicatedofindividuals.But“humanity”signifiesitas implicitly andindistinctly,justaswesaidthegenuscontainsdifference.Andthisiswhy a whole,namely,insofarasitdoesnotexcludethedesignationofmatter,butcontains the name“humanity,”butdifferently,ashasbeensaid.For“man”signifiesit ate matter. both matterandform,however,withtheexclusionofthosethingsthatareapttodesign- and aboveitsintegralparts,butratheritisaformthatwhole,namely,comprising above theessentialparts,namely,formandmatter,asofahouseisaddedover to betheformofwhole[ matter, hastosignifytheformalpart.So,humanityissignifiedasasortofform,andsaid difference; And thisiswhyAvicennasaysthatrationalitynotadifference,buttheprincipleof insofar asitissignifiedapart,forexample,bythename“humanity”or“animality.” But anatureoressencesotakencanbeconsideredintwo ways.Inoneway,according In thiswayitisclearthattheessenceofmansignifiedbothbyname“man”and 30 29 27 Praedicabilia and forthesamereason,humanityisnotaspecies,noranimalitygenus. the notionofauniversal,thatis,genusorspecies,cannotapplytoessence of thedeterminateformthatperfectsspecieshastosignifymaterial Metaph ., 5,6. 28 ), alluniversalsare“predicables,”i.e.,itemsthatcanbepredicated ofseveral is acertainessence;andsometimesitnegated,whenwesaythat forma totius ], butnot,asitwere,somethingaddedoverand with theexclusion Isagoge (which wasoften of designated with 235
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PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 236 to amanonaccountofbeingman. a maniswhite,becauseSocratesalthoughthis[i.e.,beingwhite]doesnotpertain to humannatureaccordingitsabsoluteconsideration.Forifcommunitywereunderstood it couldnotbemultipliedinseveralthings. standing, thenSocratesandPlatowouldhave[numerically]onethesamenature, it isoneinsofarasinSocrates.Likewise,ifunitywereincludeditsnotionandunder- to it.Forifpluralitywereincludedinitsunderstanding,thenitcouldneverbeone,although accepted, becausebothareoutsideoftheunderstandinghumanity,andeithercanpertain nature consideredinthiswaycanbesaidtooneormany,neitheralternativeshould does notpertaintoamanonaccountofbeingman.Therefore,ifitisaskedwhetherthis white orblack,however,andanythingelsethatisnotinvolvedinthenotionofhumanity man, itpertainstoberationalandanimalanythingelsethatisinhisdefinition; attributed toit,thentheattributionisfalse.Forexample,aman,onaccountofbeing of itexceptwhatpertainstoonaccountis;therefore,ifanythingelseis way; fortheconceptofuniversalsincludesunityandcommunity, [that havethisnature]. of] manassuch of] never existoutsidethissingular[i.e.,inanothersingular];likewise,ifitpertainedto[thenature to saythatthenatureofmanassuchshouldhaveexistenceinthissingular,forthenitcould its proper,thatisabsolute,consideration,doesnothavetoanyofthese.Foritfalse of existence[ accidents followuponthisnatureonaccountofeach.Andinthesingularsithasseveralacts them. absolutely consideredabstractsfromallexistence,without,however,excludinganyof in thissingularorthatonethesoul.Itisclear,therefore,natureofman manassuchitdoesnotpertainthatshouldexist it istruetosaythat[thenatureof] accidentally [ ing toitsexistenceinthisorthatthing.Andwaysomethingcanbepredicatedofit thing] onecommontomany. Foraccordingtooneformulaicdefinition, 34 according toitsactualconsideration. black orwhite,shorttall,handsomeugly,etc.,anythingthat doesnotpertaintohumannature namely, whateverisinvolvedinbeingamanassuch,butwecertainly donotknowwhetherheis tence istrue,weknowthatSocratesarationalanimal,and heisasensitivelivingbody,etc., tains tothenaturesignifiedbyitaccordingitsabsoluteconsideration. Forknowingthatthissen- Clearly,thepredicateofsentence“Socratesisaman”attributesto Socratesonlywhatper- 33 media, orasactualvibrationsoftheair,i.e.,sounds. or intheactualindividuals,justassamesong,forexample,can beencodedinmagneticoroptical information contentofallthesesingulars,itcanexistencodedindifferent media,whetherinthesoul which iswhyitcanexistinanyappropriatesingularsubjectdifferent ways,i.e.,asthecommon Sothecommonnatureassuchisindifferenttoanyactofbeingandsomodebeing, 32 same geneticinformationismultipliedandreproducedinseveralgenerationsofindividuallivingthings. instances, justasthecommoninformationcontentofabookismultipliedinitsseveralcopies,or sidered absolutely,asthecommoninformationcontentinformingseveralindividualsinits Thisiswhyitusefultothinkofthis“commonnature,”i.e.,theessenceanythingcon- 31 This naturehastwosortsofexistence[ Nevertheless, onecannotsaythatthenotionofuniversalsappliestonaturestakeninthis 32 And itisthenatureconsideredinthiswaythatpredicatedofallindividuals per accidens esse ] accordingtothediversityofsingulars.Butnatureitself, not to existinthissingular,thenitwouldneversingular.But 33 ], onaccountofthethinginwhichitis.Forexample,issaidthat esse universale estunumcommunemultis 31 ]: oneinthesingulars,anothersoul,and In theotherwaynatureisconsideredaccord- 34 but neitheroftheseapplies , auniversalis[some- MP_C30.qxd 11/23/062:36AMPage237 intellect formsthenotionofspeciesandattributestoit, they arehumans.Andsinceithasthissortofrelationtoallindividuals[ofnature],the soul, beingequallyasimilitudeofall,andthusleadingtothecognitioninsofaras ing conditions,whenceitisuniformlyrelatedtoallindividuals[ofthisnature]outsidethe in theintellect.Forhumannatureitselfexistsintellectabstractedfromallindividuat- to all[ofthesamenature],whichnotionofuniversalsrequires. nature doesnothavethesortofunityaccordingtowhichitissomesinglethingpertaining species appliestohumannatureinsofarasitexistsinindividuals;fortheindividuals whatever isinhimindividuated.Similarly,itcannotbesaidthatthenotionofgenusor in whichthereishumanity;butthisfalse,sincenocommunitySocrates, to beimpliedintheconceptofman,thentherewouldhavecommunityanything 6Averroës, 36
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PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 238 name “animal.” rather thattowhichtheintellectattributesintentionofgenus,asitissignifiedby intention ofpredicability(predicatingitsomethingelse),isnotthegenus,but likewise completedbyanactoftheintellect.Still,thattowhichintellectattributes predicability canbeincludedinthedefinitionofintentionthatisgenus,andthis the unityofthose[things]whichoneispredicatedother.Therefore,notion by theactionofjudgment-formingintellect,buthavingsomefoundationinreality,namely a genus insofar asheisamanpredicatedofSocrates.Nevertheless,“tobepredicated”pertainsto it hasinSocrates,oraccordingtoitsabsoluteconsideration,forwhateverpertainsaman But thiscannotbethecase,becausecorporealformitself isactuallyintelligible,justas real form,sincematteriscalledcorporealonlyinsofarasitinformed bythecorporealform. to corporealmatterassuch,thenwouldhavethisfeaturefromthecorpo- by corporealmatter.Forifthisfeature,namely,thatitimpedesintelligibility,pertainedonly with materialforms. neither hasmatterasitspart,nordoesitexistaformimpressedinmatter,isthecase Therefore, anintelligentsubstancehastobeimmunefrommatterineveryway,sothatit the powerofanintelligentsubstance,insofarasitreceivesthemandworksonthem. and its[individuating]conditions,theyarenotrenderedactuallyintelligible,exceptby of thisclaimproceedsfromtheirabilitytounderstand. and provedthemtobewithoutanymatterwhatsoever.Themostpowerfuldemonstration the commonteachingofphilosophers,whocalledthemsubstancesseparatefrommatter, from Avicebron,theauthorofbookcalled composition ofmatterandformintheintelligencessoul.Thispositionoriginates ledges thesimplicityoffirstcause,nevertheless,somepeoplewanttointroduce in theintelligences[i.e.,angels],andfirstcauseGod].Althougheverybodyacknow- Now itremainstobeseenhowessenceisfoundinseparatesubstances,namely,thesoul, Chapter 5.OntheEssenceofImmaterialSubstances of genusordifferenceappliestoit. account oftheexistenceithasinintellect;andisalsosamewaythatnotion soul, suchaswhitenessorblackness,butitisoneofthoseaccidentsthatfollowuponon is itoneofthoseaccidentsthatfollowupononaccounttheexistencehasoutside is notoneofthose[attributes]thatpertaintoitaccordingitsabsoluteconsideration,nor to agenericconcept,suchastheconceptexpressedbyterm “animal.” Cf. that itispredicable,butoftowhichtheterm“genus”(aswell asitsdefinition)applies,namely, is predicable,still,thisdefinitiondoesnotstateitoftheintentiongenus (expressedbytheterm“genus”) Thatistosay,althoughtheabove-mentioneddefinitionofterm“genus” includesthatagenus 39 several specificallydifferentthingsinresponsetothequestion“What isthis?”. ForaccordingtothedefinitionofPorphyry,agenusissomethingthat canbepredicatedof 38 [ 40 “The corporealform”( “The 40 included insection10ofthisvolume. corporeitas And itcannotbesaidthatintelligibilityisimpedednotbyjustanysortofmatter,butonly It isclearthatformsarenotactuallyintelligible,unlesstheyseparatedfrommatter It isclear,therefore,howessencerelatedtothenotionofspecies;forspecies per se ], theformsignifiedbyname“body”( , foritisincludedinitsdefinition. 39 forma corporalis ) Aquinasistalkingaboutheretheformofcorporeity corpus 38 The FountainofLife For predicationissomethingcompleted ). . Butthiscontradicts ST 1 q.85,a.2,ad 40 MP_C30.qxd 11/23/062:36AMPage239 for wecannotsaythatamanishisownquiddity. the essenceofacompositethingisnotpredicatedineverywayitself, or apart,whichresultsfromthedesignationofmatter,ashasbeenexplained.Therefore, And thisgivesrisetotwootherdifferences. comprises bothformandmatter,whereastheessenceofasimplesubstanceisitsonly. posite substanceisthattheessenceofacompositenotonlyform,butit not havetobeotherthantheirformitself. forms ofthissortaretheintelligences;so,essencesorquidditiesthesesubstancesdo without matter,forthewholegenusofformsdoesnotrequireashasbeensaid,and pure actuality.So,thoseformsthataretheclosesttofirstprinciplesubsisting happens tobethecasebecauseoftheirdistancefromfirstprinciple,whichisfirst, have todependonmatter,butifonefindsformsthatcannotexistwithoutthis impossible foraformtoexistwithoutmatter.Forform,insofarasitisdoesnot form givesexistencetomatter;therefore,mattercannotexistwithoutaform,butitisnot other, butnotconversely.Butthisistherelationshipbetweenmatterandform,because that oneofthemisthecauseexistenceother,thencanexistwithout and existence;“form”istakenthereforthequiddityorsimplenatureitself. proposition of position offormandexistence[ to havematterinthesamesensewhichcorporealsubstancesdo.Butthereiscom- there isnocompositionofmatterandforminanyway,sothattheycouldbeunderstood any otherformthatisabstractedfrommatter.Therefore,inthesoulorintelligences 2Avicenna, 42 is anangelityjustaswellittruethatGabrielangel.Compare theendofc.3. while itistruethatSocratesaman,not humanity;butitistruethatGabriel whether itissignifiedbyaconcreteterm(say,“angel”)oran abstractterm(say,“angelity”).So, by meansofaconcreteterm(say,“man”).Buttheessencesimple thingispredicatedofthe of anabstractterm(say,“humanity”),butit Theessenceofthecompositethingisnotpredicateditas it issignifiedexclusively,bymeans 41 which isclearfromthefollowing. in everyway,sothattheywouldbepureactuality,but aremixedwithpotentiality, Avicenna expresslyclaims. individuals inthesamespecies,butthereareasmanyspeciesindividuals, kind ofmultiplication;therefore,inthecasethesesubstances,therecannotbeseveral the essenceofasimplethingisnotreceivedinmatter,theircasetherecannotbethis case ithappensthattherearenumericallydistinctthingsinthesamespecies.However,since in designatedmatter,aremultipliedbythedivisionofwhencetheir ing else[inthesimplesubstance]toreceiveit. says thatthequiddityofasimplesubstanceisitself,fortherenoth- essence ofasimplesubstance,itispredicatedthesubstance.ThiswhyAvicenna so thereisnothingthatcouldreceivetheform.Therefore,nomatterhowweconsider is itsform,canonlybesignifiedasawhole,fortherenothingapartfromthe The firstisthattheessenceofacompositesubstancecanbesignifiedeitheraswhole The difference,therefore,betweentheessenceofasimplesubstanceandthatcom- And itiseasytoseehowthiscanbethecase.Foriftwothingsarerelatedinsuchaway However, thesesubstances,althoughtheyareonlyformswithout matter,arenotsimple The seconddifferenceisthattheessencesofcompositethings,sincetheyarereceived Metaph The BookofCauses ., 5,5. 42 esse it isstatedthatanintelligencesomethinghavingform inthem.Whencethecommentaryonninth ] is predicated ofthethingasitissignifiednon-exclusive, 41 But theessenceofasimplething,which 239
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PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 240 actually existsinthenatureofthings. existence, forIcanunderstandwhatamanorphoenixis,andnotknowwhetherit without itsparts.Buteveryessencecanbeunderstoodeventhinkingabout from outside,enteringintocompositionwiththeessence;fornoessencecanbeunderstood intelligence isformandexistence. the intelligenceshavetoexistencebesidestheirform,whichiswhyitwassaidthatan existence ofthethinghastobeotherthanitsquiddityornatureform.Therefore, that therecanonlybeonethingisitsownexistence.Andso,inanyotherthing,the matter, forthenitwouldalreadybenotsubsistent,butmaterialexistence.Therefore,remains but existenceandsomeformbesides;evenlesswoulditbereceptiveoftheaddition would notreceivetheadditionofadifference,forthenitnolongerbeexistenceonly, only, sothatitwouldbesubsistentexistenceitself[ body] onaccountofitsseparationitself.However,iftherewereathingthatisexistence warmth, thenitwouldbeseparatefromanon-separatewarmth[i.e.,theofwarm separate andtheotherreceivedinsomething;forexample,ifthereweresome is multipliedinseveralindividuals,oronaccountofonethethingsbeing on accountofthereceptionaformindiversepiecesmatter,asnaturespecies by theadditionofsomedifference,asnaturegenusismultipliedinspecies,or would havetobeuniqueandthefirst[being].Forsomethingcanonlymultipliedeither essence, unless,perhaps,thereisathingwhosequiddityitsownexistence.Andthis only; andthisisthefirstcause,whichGod. both formandexistence,thatithasitsexistencefromthefirstbeingis has acauseforitsexistence,asbeensaid.Itisclear,therefore,thatanintelligence wise theseriesofcauseswouldgotoinfinity,sinceeverythingthatisnotexistenceonly something thatisthecauseofexistenceforeverything,sinceitonly.Forother- else [ their existencefromsomethingelse.However,sinceeverythingthatisthrough namely, thosethathavetheirexistenceassomethingdistinctfromnature,to and wouldbringitselfintoexistence,whichisimpossible.Therefore,allsuchthings, quiddity itself(Imean,asbyanefficientcause),forthenathingwouldbeitsowncause, the airiscomingfromsun.Butexistenceofathingcannotbecausedbyitsformor ability tolaughinman,oritcomesthethingfromanexternalsource,aslight everything thatmerely or byextrinsicprinciples.ThisisthereasonwhyGod,who by itsessence.Forofcoursewhatathing “Everythingthatathinghas”isimplicitlycontrastedwith“what athing 44 existing individual. its name),andyetwemaynotknowwhetherrealessenceis presently actualizedinanyactually (and thuswemayknowperfectlywellitsrealessence,asopposed tomerelyknowingthemeaningof phenomenon, muchlikealunareclipseorrainbow,ofwhichwe mayhavethescientificdefinition So,forAquinas,thephoenix israthertheillustrationofareal,yetephemeralnatural pp. 567–80. of fictitious, mythicalbirdbydefinition.Cf.G.Klima,“OnKennyon Aquinas onBeing:ACriticalReview Despitemodernpresumptionstothecontrary,Aquinasdidnottake a phoenixtobemerely 43 Aquinas onBeing Whatever isnotincludedintheunderstandingofanessenceorquidditycomingtoit Now, everythingthatathinghas per aliud ] isreducedtowhatthroughitself[ by AnthonyKenny,”featurereviewin has existence hastohaveit 44 43 is is eithercausedinitbyitsownprinciples,asthe by itsessenceisnot Therefore, itisclearthatexistencedistinctfrom caused International PhilosophicalQuarterly ipsum essesubsistens per se by something. is existence, isabsolutely ] asitsfirstcause,therehastobe caused in thethingeitherbyintrinsic is ], thenthisexistence ,” i.e.,whatathingis uncaused , 44(2004), , whereas MP_C30.qxd 11/23/062:36AMPage241 natural bodies,basedonthevariousproportionsofelements that makethemup. passive qualities(active:hot,cold;passive:wet,dry),whichaccount forthematerialdispositionsofall et Corruptione ThisisanallusiontoAristotle’sdoctrineinhis“OnComingBeandPassingAway”( 51 present day),aswellfrommaterialism. Augustine, medievalAugustinians)andafterhim(Descartes, post-Cartesian philosophyuptothe distinguishing hisphilosophicalanthropologyfromallformsof dualismbothbeforehim(Plato, physical rationaleforhisuncompromisingpositiononthesubstantial unityofbodyandsoul,markedly Besideshisthesisoftheunitysubstantialforms,thisisAquinas’most fundamentalmeta- 50 Aristotle, 49 Averroës, 48 Averroës, 47 Boethius, 46 of thesoul,isnotdependentonbody. single existenceinonecompositething;althoughthatexistence,insofarasitisthe a materialthingtoshareitsexistence,sothatfromthesoulandbodythereresults it hasthegreatestamountofpotentiality,issoclosetomaterialsubstancesthatattracts mentary onBook3of sensible beings)isrelatedtoforms,astheCommentatorremarksinhiscom- intellect isrelatedtointelligibleformsasprimematter(whichatthelowestgradeamong soul, whichisatthelowestgradeamongintellectualsubstances.Therefore,possible actuality andlesspotentiality,soonfortherest.Andthisseriesiscompletedinhuman potentiality andactuality,sothatasuperiorintelligence,whichisclosertothefirst,hasmore Commentator remarksinBook3of of theirmatter,equivocallyapplytointellectualsubstancesandcorporealones,asthe [change], toreceive,beasubject,andthelike,whichappearpertainthingsonaccount the intelligences,althoughnotformandmatter,unlessequivocally.Thus,alsotoundergo the existencereceivedisitsactuality.Andinthiswaytherepotentialityandactuality intelligence hastobeinpotentialitywithrespecttheexistenceitreceivesfromGod,while to whatitreceivesandthelatterisitsactuality.Therefore,quiddityorformthat 5Averroës, 45 cover themultitudeofintelligences. Soul whatsoever. ThisiswhytheCommentatorsaysinhiscommentaryonBook3of can beamultitudeofintelligences,whichwouldimpossibleiftheyhadnopotentiality dispose mattertoreceiveform. operation exceptwhatisdemandedbytheactiveandpassivequalitiesthosethat down totheformsofelementsthatareclosestmatter.Sothesedonotevenhaveany have noexistencewithoutmatter.Butevenamongthesewefindsomeorderanddegrees find otherformsthathaveevenmoreofpotentialityandareclosertomatter,sothey clean slateonwhichnothingiswritten. reason, thesesubstancesaresaidtobecomposedofthat existence receivedfromGodisthatbywhichitsubsistsinthenatureofthings.Forthis of anintelligenceistheitself,itsquiddityoressencewhatitselfis,and that which Everything thatreceivessomethingfromelseisinpotentialitywithrespect And sinceintelligenceshavepotentialityandactuality,itisnotdifficulttoseehowthere that ifwedidnotknowthenatureofpossibleintellect,thencoulddis- is [ ), accordingtowhicheachofthefourelementsischaracterized by apairofactiveand quod est De Anima De hebdom nDeAnima In DeAnima In In DeAnima ], orthatwhichexists[ , 3,c.4,429b31. . ML64,col.1311C. On theSoul , 3,com.14. , 3,com.5. , 3,com.5. 51 . 48 47 On theSoul And forthisreasonthePhilosophercomparesittoa 49 So, theyaredistinguishedbythedifferentdegreesof Therefore, sinceamongotherintellectualsubstances id quodest 50 Therefore, afterthisform,whichisthesoul,we . 45 ] andexistence[ And since,ashasbeensaid,thequiddity from which something is[ esse ], asBoethiusdeclares. ex quoest De Generatione On the and ] 46 241
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PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 242 Logical Intentions Chapter 6.AnOverviewoftheEssencesSubstancesinRelationto And forthisreason,inthecommentaryofninthproposition thing formallyexists. error ofthosewhostatedthatGodisuniversalexistencewherebyeachandevery the genusorspecies,butexistenceisdiverseinthings. or speciesisnotdistinguishedonaccountofthenaturethosethingswhichtheseare genus hastohaveitsessence his existence.Andfromthisitfollowsthatheisnotinagenus.Foreverything God doesnothaveaquiddityoressence,becausehisessenceissomethingotherthan whose essenceishisownexistence;andforthisreasontherearephilosopherswhosaythat substances, therearethreewaysofhavingtheiressence:forissomething,namely,God, Having seenthesepoints,itshouldbeclearhowessenceisfoundinvariousthings.Among is statedthatthefirstcause,whichexistenceonly,individuatedthroughitsownpure be addedtoit;therefore,itisdistinctfromeveryotherexistencebyitsownpurityitself. on accountofsharing tinguished bytheirgenericorspecificnature,sincetheybelongtothesamegenusspeciesprecisely idea isthatifthereareseveralthingsinthesamegenusorspecies,thentheyobviouslynotdis- Thisargumentisstatedinaverycondensedformthetext,soitneedssomeexplication.The 52 3Thiswasthepantheistic erroroftheAmalricians(Lat. 53 body ofthearticle. aration.” ButBoyerfindsthisadditioninauthentic. as iftherewereaseparatecolor,thenitwouldbedistinctfrom non-separatecolorbyitsverysep- managed toestablishasecretsect(allegedlydevotedritualisticorgies, inthenameof Amauricus of AmalricBena(inFrench,AmaurydeBèneorChartres,inLatin, and incomprehensiblebymeansofourfiniteconcepts.Cf. have isseveralpartialcharacterizationsofdivineessence,which,however,ultimatelyinexhaustible not haveaquidditativedefinition(whichwouldtocontainatleastgenericconcept);allwecan divine naturecannotfallunderanyspecificorgenericconcept,whichmeansthatcan- things inthesamegenusorspecies matter ofthedifferentindividualsinsamespecies).So,ifgenericorspecificnatureseveral of thespecificdifferencesdifferentspeciesinsamegenus,anddistinctparcelsdesignated of course,onaccounttherelevantprinciplesspecificationandindividuation,namely, tinct, theyhavetobedistinctonaccountoftheiractsexistence(whichinturnaredistinct, existence ofsomethingis something isinagenusorspecies,thenitsexistencemustbedistinctfromessence,whenceifthe the genericorspecificnatureofthesethingsmustbedistinctfromtheirexistence.Thatistosay,if following: Bibliothèque thomiste,8,J.Vrin(Paris:LeSaulchoir/Kain,1926) – thissentenceiscompletedbythe les manuscritsparisiens.Introduction,notesetétudeshistoriques,” ed.M.D.Roland-Gosselin, InRoland-Gosselin’sedition–“Le 54 Fourth LateranCouncil). when Amalric’sboneswereexhumedandburiedinnon-consecrated ground,andagainin1215,atthe to recant,wereburnedatthestake,andtheirteachingsofficially condemned(in1210inParis, divine), whichwasdiscoveredanderadicatedbytheauthoritiesin 1210.Theirleaders,afterrefusing Nevertheless, ifwesaythatGodisexistenceonly,stilldonothavetofallintothe ), aprofessorattheUniversityofParis,whodiedbetween1204and 1207.TheAmalricians sicut siessetquidamcolorseparatus,exipsasuaseparationealiuda colorenonseparato the same 53 For theexistencethatisGodofsuchaconditionnothingcan not distinct fromitsessence,thenitis generic orspecificnature.Therefore,sincethey besides is not De enteetessentia its existence,sincethequiddityornatureoftheirgenus the reasonwhytheyaredistinct,buttheirexistence Almarici de S.Thomasd’Aquin.Texteétablid’après ST 1 q.3,a.5,thethirdargumentin not , Almariani in agenusorspecies.Therefore, 52 , Amauriani The BookofCauses Almaricus are nevertheless dis- everything ), thefollowers , Amalricus is – “just , then being it 54 , MP_C30.qxd 11/23/062:36AMPage243 Quodlibetales qq. 2and14.Cf. ality ofthesoulelsewhere,forexample,inhis But hedoesprovideseriousmetaphysicalargumentsfortheimmateriality andtheconsequentimmort- Aquinas doesnotprovehere,hemerelyanswersapossibleobjection onthebasisofthisassumption. the assumptionthateachindividuallysurviveslossofitsbody. Tobesure,thisisanassumption soul. Indeed,mergingintoonewouldbepreciselythelossoftheir individualexistence,contraryto they continueexistingafterlosingthebodiesactuallyinform, theydonothavetomergeintoone of thefactthatonethemisformthisbodyandother istheformofthatbody,then,if Obviously,iftherearetwosoulsalreadypossessingtheirindividualacts ofexistenceonaccount 60 59 all thetoolsofatoolboxinhispocket,sodoesGodhaveperfectionsexistence. Another(necessarilyimperfect)analogymightbethatjustashewhohasaSwissarmyknife 58 all perfectionsinhisexistenceitself. qualities, theninthatsimplequalityhewouldhaveallsotoodoesGod were someonewhoonaccountofasimplequalitycouldperformtheoperationsall for thisisthathehasalltheseperfectionsonaccountofhissimpleexistence;justas,ifthere than anyotherthing,forinhimtheyareone,andothersdiverse.Andthereason goodness. Thecommonexistence[ 55 in somematter.Andthisiswhyitstated the capacityofreceivingnature.Buttheirnatureorquiddityissubsistent,notreceived existence isnotsubsistent,butreceived[intheiressence],andsoitfinitedelimitedto is otherthanessence,althoughthatessencetherewithoutmatter.Therefore,their 7Aristotle, 57 example, aperfectloverbutnot-so-perfecthusband,orviceversa. Asopposedtobeingaperfectthisandnot-so-perfectthat,aswecansayofmanthatheis,for 56 is saidtobeperfectabsolutelyspeaking, perfections orexcellences;rather,hehasallofkinds,andforthisreason to exist. no singlethinginwhichsomethingisaddedtothething’sexistencecouldbeunderstood in Book5ofthe addition; forotherwise,[ifsuchanaddition its understandingtheadditionofanything,doesnot the formof once ithasseparateexistence(afteracquiredindividuatedbecausewasmade nevertheless, itdoesnothavetoloseitsindividuationwiththeremovalofbody.For it cannotacquireanindividuatedactofexistence,exceptinthebodythatmakesactual), its individuationistemporarilydependentonthebodywithregardtobeginning(for the caseofhumansoul,onaccountbodywithwhichitisunited.Andalthough there isnomultitudeofindividualsinthesamespecies,ashasbeendeclared,except delimited tothecapacityofsomematterreceivingthem.Andforthisreasonintheircase that theyreceivefromabove,butarenotfinitebelow,fortheirforms infinite frombelowandfiniteabove;fortheyarewithregardtotheirexistence Theol In thesecondway,essenceisfoundincreatedintellectualsubstances,whichexistence Likewise, althoughGodisexistenceonly,thisdoesnotmeanthatheshouldlackother Liber deCausis esse commune ., c.84.ForadetaileddiscussionofAquinas’argumentsforthe immaterialityofthesoul,see ( QDL Metaph this SN – existenceasconceivedbymeansofourcommonconceptexistence. ) X,q.3,a.2; , lc.16.Cf.4and5. Metaphysics body), thatexistencealwaysremainsindividuated. 3, d.5,q.a.2,22,1,1; ., 5,c.16,1021b30;Averroës,com.21; . 57 Summa contraGentiles But hehasalltheseperfectionsinamoreexcellentmanner 58 esse commune 56 as thePhilosopherandCommentatorassert Questions ontheSoul eeexcluded were The BookofCauses SN ], ( 55 ScG 2, d.19,a.1, however, justasitdoesnot ), II. 79–81; ), II.79–81; Commentary exclude from itsunderstanding,then] SN from itsunderstandingany ( 59 Quaestio DisputatadeAnima ST of St.Thomas,lc.21. 4, d.50,q.1,a.1; that theintelligencesare 1, q.75,a.4,6; 60 And thisiswhy include Questiones Comp. in ), 243
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PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 244 difference issaidtobe that itistheprincipleofdifference,ashealsosaysinhis it constitutes.” among thingscomposedofmatterandform,theform“isasimpledifferencethatwhich what isformalinit;thiswhyAvicennasaysthebeginningofhisbook their genusistakenfromwhatmaterialinthething,whereasdifference way inthosesubstancesandsensiblesubstances.Forthecaseofsubstances, or throughaccidentaldifferences. unknown tous;therefore,wecannotsignifytheir[essential]differenceseitherinthemselves be thedifferenceofman.Butproperaccidentsimmaterialsubstancesarealso the essentialones,asacauseissignifiedthroughitseffect,whenbeingbipedaltakento sensible substances,whencewesignifythosethroughaccidentaldifferencesthatstemfrom hidden fromus.Fortheiressentialdifferencesareunknowntouseveninthecaseof whence theyhavegenera,species,anddifferences,althoughtheirproperdifferencesare substances theirquiddityisnotthesameasexistence,theycanbesortedintocategories; as fartheirbeginningisconcerned,butnotwithregardtoend. Avicenna saysthattheindividuationandmultiplicationofsoulsaredependentonbody, to thePhilosopherinhis animals, amongwhichtherearesomeintermediariesbetweenanimalsandplantsaccording or naturesthemselvesdodiversifythespecies;asnatureproceedsstepwisefromplantsto whiteness [todifferentdegrees];butthediversegradesofperfectionamongforms thing lesswhite[donotdifferspecifically]onaccountofparticipatinginthesamenature specifically thesameformdoesnotdiversifyform,assomethingwhiterandsome- perfection, whichdoesnotdiversifyspecies.Forthegradeofperfectioninreceiving differences donothavetobeaccidental,justbecausetheycorrespondgreaterorlesser is takenfromtheirgradeofperfection,which,however,unknowntous.Yet,these as theyareimmaterial,suchtheirintellectualityorsomefeature;butdifference to pureactuality.Therefore,theirgenusistakenfromthatwhichpertainstheminsofar of perfection,inaccordancewiththeirbeingfartherawayfrompotentialityandcloser one separatesubstanceagreeswithanotherinimmateriality;buttheydiffertheirgrade of matterandform.” Soul the wholequiddity.AndthisiswhyAvicennaremarksatbeginningofhisbook case thedifferencecannotbetakenfromapartofquiddity,but[ithastotaken] namely, fromtheform.Since,however,immaterialsubstancesaresimplequiddities,intheir 1Avicenna, 61 respectively.) rejoinder inthesamevolume,pp.29–36and37–44, (SeealsoRobertPasnau’scommentsandmy klima/SMLM/PSMLM1.pdf>, 1(2001),pp.19–28. Proceedings oftheSocietyforMedievalLogicandMetaphysics G. Klima,“Aquinas’ProofsoftheImmaterialityIntellect from theUniversalityofThought,” 3Avicenna, 63 Ibid.,1,1. 62 4Avicenna, 64 5Aristotle, 65 We shouldknow,nevertheless,thatgenusanddifferencecannotbetakeninthesame Likewise, theirgenusistakenfromwholeessence,butinadifferentmanner.For that asimpledifference“pertainsonlytothosespecieswhoseessencesarecomposed Hist. Animal De Anima Metaph. De Anima 62 But notinthesensethatformisdifferenceitself,but , 5,5. 64 , 5,3. , 1,1. simple difference On Animals ., 8,c.1,588b4–6. . 65 Again, intellectualsubstancesdonothavetobeclassified , foritistakenfromwhatapartofthequiddity, , AQUINAS ON BEING AND ESSENCE MP_C30.qxd 11/23/062:36AMPage246 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 246 heat inallhotthings,asstatedBook2ofthe cause ofthosethatdosotoalesserdegree,asfire,whichisultimatelyhot,the [by coincidence]. [ essence norapartofcompleteessence,butjustasitisbeingwithsomequalification from theunionofmatterandform;forthisreasonanaccidentisneitheracomplete on accountofwhichthethingisa cause byitsunionwiththethingthatactofexistenceinwhichsubsists,i.e., naturally precedesthesuperveningaccident.Therefore,accidentdoesnot that isprimarycanbeunderstoodwithoutwhatsecondary. existence, withoutwhichthesubsistingthingcanbeunderstoodtoexist,justasanything there isacertainformwhoseexistence[ the partsofsubstance,someaccidentsprimarilystemfromform,othersmatter.But qualification [ be thecauseofaccidents,whichparticipateinnaturebeingonlysecondarilyandwith the firstinkindofallbeings,andwhichmaximallymosttrulyhasessence,to the formdonotcommunicatewithmatter,suchasthinking,whichdoestakeplacein soul, whereasmatteronlyhasexistencethroughform.Sosomeaccidentsstemmingfrom its subjectdonotyieldsomethingthatisone of existence,e f andg.Sincegaresupposedtobetwodistinctentities,theyhaveacts thesis oftheunitysubstantialforms.Forsupposeasubstanceshastwodistinctforms, separable accidents).ItisalsoworthnotingthatfromthisclaimitveryeasytoproveAquinas’ the thingtoexistwithoutitsaccidentalform(evenifitmay is logicallyimpossibleforathingtoexistwithoutitssubstantialform,butitpossible act ofbeinganaccidentalformisdistinctfromthethingitinforms;therefore, of beingasubstantialformisthesameasactthinginformedbyit,whereas ForAquinas,thisisthefundamentaldifferencebetweensubstantialandaccidentalforms:act 69 lutely speaking( since forSocrates’wisdomtobeisSocrateswise(although itisnotforSocratestobe,abso- primary butsecondaryact.Forthebeingof,say,Socrates’wisdom isnothingbutSocrates’beingwise, cide, insofarastheactofbeingaccidentisalso ofthesubject,althoughnotits Subjectandaccident,havingtwodistinctactsofbeing,areentities,which,however,coin- 70 usually argues. two forms,oneofwhichisasubstantialform,thentheotherhastobeanaccidentalasAquinas then ithastohaveatleastone,whenceexactlyone).Also,equivalently,ifs tial formsofs,thenf=g,foranyandi.e.,scanhaveatmostonesubstantialform(andifexists, if e existence wouldhavetobeidenticalwiththesameactofs,e act ofbeingSocrates,namely,anwithqualification ( all thosethingsthathaveitbyparticipation. this propertymaximallyandmosttrulycauses tobepresentalesserdegreein example, theideaisclear:somethingthathasapropertyessentially, andnotbyparticipation,has is maximallyhot,becauseithotbyitsownnatureandnot participation.Butregardlessofthe of participatingintheheatfireonaccounthavingtheir composition,whereasfireitself of Aristotelianphysics,whereitisassumedthattheheathot thingsotherthanfireistheresult Aristotle, 71 secundum quid However, inanygenus,thatwhichmaximallyandmosttrulyexemplifiesitskindisthe f = e s and e s f Metaph = e secundum quid and e ], sotoo,itonlyhasessencewithsomequalification. simpliciter g 70 , thene g Therefore, fromtheiruniontheredoesnotresultsomeessence,as ., 2, c. 1, 993b24–6. Again,theexampleisilluminatingonlywithassumption ., 2,c.1,993b24–6. . Butifbothfandgaresupposedtobesubstantialformsofs,thentheiracts ), whichiswhytheactofbeingwisdomSocratesonlya secondary f = e ]. Butthishappensinvariousways.Sincematterandformare g , contrarytoourassumption).Therefore,ifbothfandgaresubstan- per se esse being, butitcausesacertainsecondaryactof isnotdependentonmatter,astheintellectual ] per se Metaphysics , butsomethingthatisone naturally ; 71 secundum quid therefore, substance,whichis 69 be impossible,asinthecaseof Therefore, anaccidentand s , whichisimpossible(because )). per accidens MP_C30.qxd 11/23/062:36AMPage247 illuminated, i.e.,lightactuallypassesthroughit. Fortheairisnotactuallytransparent,i.e.,onecannotseethrough it,unlessitisactually 76 of apoliticaljoke(whichcertainlydoesnothappenwithchimpanzees). posed tocomeforthfromasuddenrealizationofsomethinginherently funny,asingettingthepoint as laughterinthesenseintendedhere,whichisspecificallyhuman kindoflaughterthatissup- by Porphyry.AsAquinas’subsequentremarkmakesclear,the“laughter” ofchimpanzeesdoesnotcount Thisisthestockexampleofaspecific,yetnon-essential,characteristic [ 75 body aswelltoalivingbody). with accidentsthatremainunivocally(sincebeingblackorwhite appliesinthesamesensetoadead remain merelyequivocally(sincebeingmaleorfemalecanbesaid ofadeadbodyonlyequivocally) ural processofthecorruptionoldsubstance.ButAquinasmerely contrastedhereaccidentsthat substance, whichdetermineswhatsortofsubstancewithkinds ofaccidentscanresultinanat- specifically can remaininthesensethatnewsubstanceresultingfromcorruptionofanotherwillhave to thissubstance;soif ents cannotremain Tobesure,consistentlywithAquinas’thesisoftheunitysubstantialforms,eventheseaccid- 74 as thetransparencyofair,whichiscompletedbyanexternalshiningbody; sometimes theyarecausedonlyasacertaincapacity,whichiscompletedbyanexternalagent, [i.e., matterandform]inperfectactuality,asheatfire,whichisalwaysactuallyhot,but of the and femininegenderinanimals,whosediversityisreducedtomatter,asstatedBook10 accidents stemfrommatterinrelationtothespecificform,as,forexample,masculine no accidentstemsfrommatterwithoutcommunicatingwiththeform. stemming fromtheform,however,thatdocommunicatewithmatter,suchassensing,but a corporealorgan, 3Aristotle, 73 to mentalimpairment. process itself.Butthisinput its own,relyingonthebrainmerelyforthisinformationinput,butnotcarryingoutthinking sensory informationfortheintellecttoformitsconceptsanddothinkingwiththoseon AccordingtoAquinas,wedonotthinkwithourbrain.Thebrainmerelysupplieshighlyprocessed 72 [ in allindividualsthatsharethenatureofgenusorspecies,asforexampleabilitytolaugh teristic attributes[ the samespeciesdifferfromeachother.Butaccidentsthatstemformarecharac- stem frommatteraretheaccidentsofindividual,accordingtowhichindividuals the constitutionofthing,isseparable,suchasmotionandlike. comes fromanexternalprinciplethatisoutsidetheessenceofthingordoesnotenter case ofsuchaccidents,thecapacityitselfisaninseparableaccident,butitscompletion,which soul, remainsinhimafterdeath. the skincolorofablackman,whichstemsfrommixtureelementsandnot generic form;andso,afterremovingthespecificform,thesestillstaybehindinmatter;as stay behind,exceptequivocally.Others,however,stemfrommatterinrelationtothe risibile We shouldalsoknowthataccidentssometimesarecausedbytheessentialprinciples But amongtheaccidentsstemmingfrommatterthereissomefurtherdiversity.For And sinceeachandevery[material]thingisindividuatedbymatter,theaccidentsthat Metaphysics ], 75 the same,but because laughterstemsfromsomeapprehensionofthehumansoul. De Anima ; therefore,afterremovingtheformofanimal,theseaccidentsdonot propriae passiones numerically 72 this as thePhilosopherprovesinBook3of , 3,c.4,429b4; numerically distinct substance isgone,then is needed forpropermentalfunctioning,whichiswhybraininjurieslead the same(sincethisaccidentis 74 ] ofthegenusorspecies;therefore,theycanbefound Commentary accidents onaccountofthedispositionmatterold this of St.Thomas,lc.7. accident cannotremaineither).However,they this On theSoul accident onaccountofpertaining proprium . 73 There areothers ], asintroduced 76 and inthe 247 AQUINAS ON BEING AND ESSENCE MP_C30.qxd 11/23/062:36AMPage248 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 248 [thing]” [ or speciescouldbeattributed.Therefore,theconcretenamesofaccidents,suchas“white is one a category.However,fromanaccidentanditssubjecttheredoesnotresultsomethingthat form arenotinthiswaycategory,exceptbyreduction,asprinciplessaidtobe category asspeciesandgenera,arethenames“man”“animal.”Butmatter substances, theirconcretenames,whichsignifythecomposite,areproperlysaidtobeinthis is one from thesubstantialformandmatterconjoinedinonenature,thereresultssomethingthat are takeninadifferentmannerfromthecaseofsubstances.Forsubstances, classification ofrelationsinBook5the sions, andquantitiesaretheprinciplesofrelations,thisisbasisPhilosopher’s that apugiscurvednose. stances, inthecaseofwhichnaturegenusistakenfromtheirmatter,aswesay their definitionasgenus;sincethentheywouldbedefinedsimilarlytomaterialsub- around ifitweredefinedintheconcreteform.Forthatcasetheirsubjectisincluded ple, pugnessisdefinedasthecurvatureofanose.Butitwouldhavetobeotherway erly inacategory),theplaceofdifferenceonehastoincludeitssubject,asforexam- in thedefinitionofanaccidentdefinedabstractform(inwhichitisprop- ing them.Andsinceitsproperattributesarecausedbytheprinciplesofsubject, substances, buttheirfirstgenushastobetakenfrommodeofexistence[ taken fromtheirmatteranddifferenceform,asisthecasewithcomposite [ signified bythecorrespondingabstractnames,suchas“whiteness”[ and genera,exceptbyreduction,onlyinsofaras[thespeciesgeneraofaccidents]are Metaphysics is adispositionofsubstance,andsoon,asthePhilosopherexplainedinBook4 [i.e., ofwhatisabeingintheprimarysense],andquality[issaidtobebeing]insofarasit gories, asforexamplequantityissaidtobe[abeing]insofaritameasureofsubstance ispredicatedindifferent,primaryandsecondary,sensesthetencate- insofar as“being” light, causingthevariousspeciesofcolors. gregativum from theireffects,aswhenwetake“concentrative”[ ciples ofaccidentsarenotalwaysobvious,sometimeswetakethedifferences tion, however,that Cf.Aquinas, 80 Aristotle, 79 Aristotle, 78 having thisnaturesignifiedbythesepredicates. icated ofthething,andnotitsnature,althoughtheyarepredicated ofthethingonaccountits stance, insofarasitissignifiedbyallsubstantialpredicatesofthething. Butthosepredicatesarepred- falls intothecategoryofsubstance.Tobesure,natureasubstance isalsointhecategoryofsub- it isthethingthat IamfollowinghereRoland-Gosselin’sreading,notedbyBoyerinhis n.122,accordingtowhich 77 musica We shouldknow,however,thatinthecaseofaccidents,genus,species,anddifference The caseissimilarifoneaccidenttheprincipleofanother,asforexampleactions,pas- Their differences,ontheotherhand,aretakenfromdiversityofprinciplescaus- per se per se ]. Andsinceaccidentsarenotcomposedofmatterandform,theirgenuscannotbe album ] tobethedifferencesofcolors,whicharecausedbyabundanceorpaucity . 78 , whencetheyare whichproperlyfallsintothecategoryofsubstance; , Metaph. Metaph ] or“educated[person]”[ Commentary ontheMetaphysics concentrative ., 5,c.15,1020b26; per se , 4,c.2,1002b5–7; one (andnotitsnature,asBoyer’sreadingwouldhaveit),thatproperly and not dispersive ofsight conjoined inonenaturetowhichtheintentionofgenus Commentary Commentary musicum 80 , lb.10,lc.9,n.11:“Weshouldtakeintoconsidera- Metaphysics of St.Thomas,lc.1.Cf.also ], donotfallunderthecategoriesasspecies are notthetrueconstitutivedifferencesof of St.Thomas,lc.17. congregativum . 79 However, sincetheproperprin- 77 therefore, inthecaseof albedo ] and“dispersive”[ In Meta. and“education” ] modus essendi , Bk.5,lc.9. white dis- ], MP_C30.qxd 11/23/062:36AMPage249 some well-known(indeed,painfullyobvious)effectithas. case also,theunknowndifferenceonaccountofwhichamaterial substanceisarockindicatedby sible) etymologyofthename often usedbyAquinaswithreferencetothe(mistaken,buta barefoot medievalmonkveryplau- by meansofitscharacteristiceffectproducingwaterwhenburned inair.Asimilarillustrationis (meaning “water-maker”)in1783,indicatedtheunknowndifference ofhydrogen(itsatomicnumber) by thesedifferences,aswhenLavoisier,givingCavendish’s“inflammable air”thename“hydrogen” point isclear:onemayindicateunknownessentialdifferencesby meansofknownaccidentscaused whatever theoppositeeffectoflacklightis,butwecanonly guess.However,thetheoretical like thedazzlingofsightbysomebrightwhitelight,and“concentration ofsight,”accordingly,is “dispersion” (or“scattering,”etc.)ofsight.Onemightthinkthat “dispersionofsight”issomething never tellsuswhathemeansbythe“concentration”(or“gathering,” “bringingtogether”)and of sightcomesfromthecontrarycause.”Theproblemwiththisillustration,course,isthatAquinas results fromthevehemenceoflight,abundancewhichcauseswhiteness.Andconcentration tial formsordifferencesaresometimesdesignatedbymeansofaccidents.Forthedispersionsight and this discussion.Amen. definition becauseofitssimplicity,inwhichlettherebetheendandconsummation which thereforethenotionofgenusorspeciesdoesnotapply,andsoneithera intentions arefoundinall,excepttheFirstPrinciple,whichisofinfinitesimplicity,to accidents, howtheyareinthecompositeandsimplesubstances,logical In thisway,therefore,itisclearhowessenceandexistenceareinsubstances black , butrathertheireffects.Butinplaceofdifferences,wecantakesigns,justassubstan- lapis (“rock”) as laedens pedem (“something thathurtsthefoot”).Inthis (“something 249 AQUINAS ON BEING AND ESSENCE