ANNUAL REPORT 2003 REPORT ANNUAL

1 INTRODUCTION In 2003-2004 Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (abbreviated to PET or referred to as the Service) has continued its process of transition that was commenced after the terrorist acts in the United States on 11 September 2001.

At the time of writing, Denmark has not yet been affected by terrorist acts. The Madrid bombings in March 2004 proved, however, that in spite of a high level of security, the European countries are also vulnerable to international terror- ism. On the other hand, the unravelling of a number of terrorist cells confi rms that Europe is not only an attractive support and recruitment place for Islamic terrorist networks but also that cells based in Europe are planning to carry out terrorist acts within European borders. These conditions have emphasised that the generally increased terrorist threat which has existed in the Western world since 11 September 2001 in fact also includes Western Europe.

Furthermore, one of the general security issues is the risk of confl ict escalation which can be connected to extreme single-acts. This was expressed in connec- tion with the murder of the Dutch fi lm director van Gogh and the subsequent reactions to this act including that a number of mosques were exposed to attempts at arson. In this respect it is important to notice that a development seems to be traceable in Western societies, where radical Islamists as well as people of the extreme right-wing are deliberately contemplating facilitating acts and threats that are appropriate for encouraging a confrontation between cultures and religions.

These are some of the various security issues that contribute to the complex and also blurred threatening scene which is part of our reality today.

PET’s reply to the challenges posed by these threats is a general strategy com- posing two crucial elements.

Firstly, the Service is constantly focusing on strengthening its operations and surveillance activities. It goes without saying that the Service is unable to com- ment in detail on these activities.

Secondly, the Service is targeting its contribution on strengthening its external, co-ordinating profi le in order to strengthen the wide-ranging national terror- ist efforts. In this connection, it is important that there is a constant focus on our society’s joint resistance to terrorism. Therefore, in 2003-2004 the Service has set up more co-operation fora and liaisons, under the auspices of awareness programmes, with a wide range of public authorities and private organisations and companies which are active players in the national emergency management scheme against terrorism and thereby assist in increasing the general security and safety level in society. At the same time, in continuing its openness regard- ing tasks and orders of priorities, the Service will seek to include the general public in order to activate society in as many corners as possible and to ensure a high level of awareness.

In the light of the Government’s decision to supply the Service with more resources after the Madrid bombings, it was only natural that the Service made some serious considerations concerning the future structure in order to ensure

2 that the Service’s strategy and solving of tasks will also be supported by the organisation in the best possible way. On 1st January 2005, a new and more simple organisation structure will be implemented offering a more obvious line of management. In addition, the premises have been expanded and thus PET is prepared to welcome the new employees who join the Service as one of the results of the resources allocated.

Chapter 1 of this Annual Report describes the development of the international security political situation and its implications on Denmark. Chapter 2 cov- ers the initiatives introduced by the Service in order to strengthen the external co-ordinating role. Finally, chapter 3 includes a description of the activities and tasks which the Service has been handling in 2003 – and partly also 2004 – in order to comply with a wish to add some issues of topical interest to this An- nual Report.

Enjoy your reading

Lars Findsen Director General

3 CONTENTS

Introduction ...... 2

History ...... 6

1. The international security political situation 2003-2004 ...... 7 The fragmentation of the al-Qaida network ...... 7 Terrorism and cyberspace ...... 9 Terrorism and perspectives ...... 9 Denmark as a terrorist target ...... 10

2. The wide-ranging efforts ...... 12 The Contact Group on Counter-terrorism ...... 13 The Contact Group for Trade Associations ...... 13 The Contact Group for IT-Security ...... 14 Co-operation with ethnic minorities ...... 14 The Danish National Centre for Biological Defence ...... 15 The working group on ammonium nitrate ...... 16 Crises Management Group ...... 16 PET’s role in the vulnerability report ...... 16 DIIS ...... 17 International co-operation ...... 17 The European Union ...... 17 NATO ...... 19

3. The Danish Security Intelligence Service throughout 2003 21 Organisational and administrative issues ...... 21 Increased resources ...... 21 New organisational structure ...... 22 Strategic plan ...... 23 Focus on administration ...... 23 New legislation relevant to the operations and activities of PET ...... 23 Setting up of homepage ...... 25

The operational divisions ...... 25 Counter-terrorism ...... 25 The Danish former prisoner in Cuba ...... 26 The Madrid bombs ...... 27 Other activities ...... 28 Terror fi nancing ...... 29 Crisis Management Exercise – November 2003 ...... 29 Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ...... 30 Export control ...... 31 The general preventive efforts ...... 31

4 CBRN weapons (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear weapons) ...... 31 Co-operation with the aliens and immigration authorities ...... 32 Terror Conference ...... 33 Security and Operations Division in general ...... 34 Personal protection ...... 34 The Royal Wedding on 14 May 2004 ...... 35 Aviation security ...... 36 IT security ...... 37 Maritime security ...... 37 Securing port facilities against terrorist acts ...... 38 Other security assignments ...... 39 Counter-extremism ...... 39 Left-wing extremism ...... 39 Right-wing extremism ...... 40 Counter-espionage ...... 41 Other activities ...... 42 The enquiry commissions ...... 42 The reporting of criminal incidents with potential racial or religious tones ...... 42

Appendix ...... 43

5 HISTORY

At the end of the 1920s, a political department was set up in the Copenhagen Criminal Investigation Department (CID) as the fi rst actual intelligence service in Denmark. In the fi rst years, the department was purely a Copenhagen-based affair, but after a few years, the chief constables all over Denmark were ordered to report some specifi c cases to this department.

In 1939 a national intelligence service was set up under the National Commis- sioner, given the name of Security Police (SIPO). The service was re-established after the Occupation in 1945 in the name of the National Commissioner’s Intelligence Department (Danish abbreviation REA). In 1951 the intelligence department experienced a general restructuring and was given its present name Politiets Efterretningstjeneste, in English the Danish Security Intelligence Service (Danish abbreviation PET). From 1955 to 1958, PET operated as an independent offi ce when in 1958 the service was again placed under the offi ce of the National Commissioner as a police inspectorate, Department G, reporting directly to the Minister of Justice.

Until 1960 the police districts of Copenhagen, Frederiksberg as well as Søndre and Nordre Birk were not included in the otherwise nation-wide competence of the Service, but from 1960 to 1966 the Service assumed the responsibility of the intelligence activities in respect of these four police districts and since then, the Service has been a national service.

6 THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLITICAL 1. SITUATION 2003-2004 This chapter deals with the implications of the intensive efforts against international terrorism over the past few years and also the impact hereof on the al-Qaida network and the threat against the western world. The chapter is also about the impact of the Iraq war on international terrorism and fi nally various perspectives regarding Denmark are mentioned.

THE FRAGMENTATION In recent years, the efforts against the radical Islamic terrorist networks have OF THE AL-QAIDA been given the highest priority on the security political agenda. The Western NETWORK intelligence and security services have intensifi ed their present co-operation, among other things, in respect of the exchange of information and increased participation in joint investigations and operations. At the same time, more stringent anti-terror efforts have been introduced as well as a generally in- creased emergency management in many countries all over the world. In consequence of these efforts, several terrorist acts have been prevented and a number of persons have been arrested in Italy, France, Spain, Great Britain and Germany among other places.

In spite of the intensifi ed efforts, the Islamic terrorist networks still pose a seri- ous threat which the terrorist acts in Istanbul in 2003 and the Madrid bombings in 2004 show. Today the Western world is facing a very complex and blurred threatening scene characterised by unpredictability and major challenges re- garding the identifi cation of the actual enemy and the parameters which are the roots of the alienation and the anti-Western hostility.

It is the overall assessment that al-Qaida as an independent global network has been weakened, among other things, as a result of the increased international attention regarding the movements of the network, the removal of the network base in Afghanistan and the arrests of several leading members.

These efforts have resulted in the al-Qaida network having lost a signifi cant part of its primary organisation, its leaders, tools of action and fi nancial means. Al-Qaida’s possibilities of co-ordinating and carrying out large and highly spectacular terrorist attacks on its own are therefore generally assessed as having been narrowed down. Consequently, Al-Qaida has to a certain extent been forced to adjust its organisation as a result of the international anti-terrorist efforts. As a result, al-Qaida is more fragmented today than pre- viously and it has more limited possibilities of central control with regard to its operations.

Al-Qaida’s diminished possibilities of central operational control have the immediate consequence that local or small networks assumingly no longer can draw on a centrally based logistics support and/or planning capacity. However, this does not preclude that the small networks can still carry out terrorist acts, be it on their own initiative or at the request of the al-Qaida network. The ter- rorist acts will, however, often be of a less sophisticated nature than what has usually characterised the al-Qaida network.

7 PET has previously described how thousands of radical Islamists globally have been trained in al-Qaida’s training camps in Afghanistan while these were still in operation. It has been assessed that it will still be possible for these so-called terrorist experts linked to al-Qaida to offer their assistance to some extent in connection with local groups planning and carrying out terrorist at- tacks.

At the same time, PET assesses that the vaguely worded ideological basis, on which al-Qaida rests, has a governing role today of inspiration and legitimisa- tion of small terrorist groups attempting on the more local level to pursue the global fi ght that al-Qaida has assumed.

Thus Al-Qaida is still able to inspire and contribute to the execution of terror- ist attacks, although it seems to have become more dependent on local terrorist groups on the operational level. In this connection it has been established that the diminished possibilities for al-Qaida to operate and set up actual military training camps have resulted in an increased use of the Internet for the distribu- tion of training material to local groups including information on explosives, recipes for chemical substances and instructions on security measures. Still, it is the assessment that these attempts of training terrorists around the world in Cyberspace cannot replace the practical military training which took place in the former camps.

The development outlined above implies that local terrorist groups inspired by al-Qaida will act more or less autonomously. At the same time, the result of the weakened central control is that future terrorist acts will be characterised by shorter planning horizons and larger degree of unpredictability which makes it more diffi cult for the authorities to intervene in due time. The Madrid terrorist acts in March 2004 are examples of such a development.

In Madrid, a Spanish-based group – without the logistics or any other opera- tional outside support – succeeded in carrying out a number of bombings co-ordinated in time and proximity and directed against the train system and this in a country which is assessed to be well-prepared with regard to the fi ght against terrorism, among other things based on many years of experience from fi ghting ETA.

With several groups operating wholly or partly on their own, the amount of potential targets will increase simultaneously. There is also another reason for this. In line with the increasing security in connection with obvious targets, e.g. military installations, governmental buildings, embassies and airports etc., there will be a tendency that radical extremist networks choose to operate with more simple attacks directed against relatively unprotected targets (soft targets). In other words, these are places where the security measures in a Western society will and must be of a limited nature. Furthermore as mentioned, the networks tend to operate on shorter planning horizons and thus with a higher unpredict- ability than previously.

It is very diffi cult for the Western World effectively to protect itself against this development, as it is not possible – and hardly even desirable – for longer periods of time to maintain strict access control to railway stations, pedestrian streets, shopping centres, public attractions, stadiums etc.

8 This again is important to al-Qaida and its associated groups when choosing countries as targets for their terrorist acts. Concurrently with the fact that the United States and other countries, which the terrorists traditionally have ranked as number one priority for their terrorist acts, have tightened their security drastically in a number of areas, the terrorists will have to spread their terrorist activities to other countries which traditionally have not been the targets of ter- rorist acts. Furthermore, there are many signs that the terrorist groups increas- ingly have learnt from previous mistakes. The Madrid bombings in March 2004 are also examples of this fact since it has turned out that up to the actual attack, the perpetrators had avoided increasing communications between the terrorist group members immediately prior to and after the attack.

Terrorism and cyberspace In recent years, the Internet has come to play an ever-increasing role to the radi- cal Islamic terrorist networks. Today a number of radical Islamic groups are rep- resented on the Internet. For several years, the police and the security services have been interested in terrorist groups’ active use of the Internet in connection with terror fi nancing and as a platform for terrorism in the form of Internet viruses and other efforts meant to create a communications breakdown. Today there is also a great deal of focus on these groups’ use of the Internet as a recruit- ment forum for sympathisers and for collecting funds. Evidently, investigation within this area is, however, hampered by the global character of the Internet.

At the same time, there has been a tendency that through the Internet various known as well as unknown groups and persons issue threats and ultimatums generally or directed towards specifi c countries, e.g. the Iraq Coalition Partners. The increase of this type of threats could be a general expression of the opera- tionally weakened terrorist networks and terrorist groups, as these in stead try to advance threats to create fear in the population, and as such fear is very dif- fi cult and it requires many resources for the authorities to validate.

Some of these groups which operate on the Internet have presumably none or only a very limited operational capacity. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that some of the threats are made by persons who have no connection at all to terrorism. Nevertheless, the threats give rise to worries partly because the threats generate fear, partly because they have the effect that other groups are inspired to carry out terrorist acts against the targeted countries. Furthermore, subsequent but otherwise independent events may give the impression that the threats have been realised. Thereby, this type of terrorism – irrespective of its character and seriousness – will become an effective weapon for terrorists. Additionally, there is a risk that ”copycats” make threats in the name of others, generating fear and requiring that heavy resources are spent on investigating these cases.

Terrorism and perspectives In spite of al-Qaida having been fragmented, it is the assessment that the networks and the more autonomous groups are still able to recruit new sympa- thisers and still pose a major threat. Among other things, this is due to the still unsolved Israeli-Palestinian confl ict, the confl icts in Chechnya, Afghanistan and most recently in Iraq. These confl icts are in themselves encouraging both a local and global recruitment and they may also seem as generally creating a radicali- sation in countries outside the actual confl ict areas.

9 Furthermore, at present there are a number of signs suggesting that the situa- tion in Iraq contributes towards mobilising and creating a gathering point for the so-called Mujahideen or Jihadists precisely as seen in connection with the confl icts in Afghanistan, Chechnya and the former Yugoslavia. During 2003, it became increasingly clear that the resistance, which the Coalition Forces was up against, also included the Jihadists who come to this region from large parts of the world and who consider Iraq as a possible place for waging Jihad against the United States and the West.

It must, therefore, be expected that in Iraq lasting networks will be established between the persons who participate in the fi ght against the Coalition Forces. These are persons who will also be trained and experienced in guerrilla war. In the years to come, one of the major security political challenges may therefore be to track down and neutralise these networks which are presently being set up in Iraq among the Jihadists in particular. The main worry is that some day a number of these Jihadists will return to their respective countries of residence in which they may potentially pose a signifi cant security risk globally in the years to come.

Together with the terrorist networks’ more autonomous and unpredictable nature, the development in Iraq will therefore also mean that it will still be necessary to maintain the international efforts against fundamentalist Islamic terrorism for many years.

Denmark as a terrorist target The development within the international security political situation is obvi- ously important to Denmark. The generally increased level of threat, which has existed in the Western World and in relation to Western interests since 11 September 2001, also applies to Denmark. At the same time, the military attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as a number of terrorist acts – in Turkey in No- vember 2003 and Spain in March 2004 which were the fi rst actual terrorist acts on European soil since 9/11 2001 – have further contributed to underlining and maintaining an increased level of threat.

PET has previously stressed that there are persons and circles in Denmark that sympathise with or have relations to groups and organisations which are in- volved in terrorist activities. Such persons might have the capacity to carry out simple terrorist acts on their own which do not require extensive preparations and planning. Furthermore, these persons and circles may offer logistic support to any terrorist or terrorist group entering the country and who might have the intention to carry out terrorist acts on Danish soil. In addition, terrorist groups or individual terrorists can enter Denmark with the purpose of carrying out terrorist acts on Danish soil without logistic support from persons or circles in Denmark. These conditions mentioned may be a realistic scenario without any advance indication of intelligence or other information.

Additionally, Denmark’s participation in the Iraq War has contributed to an increase of Denmark’s foreign political profi le and it cannot be ruled out that this may affect the risk of attacks on Danish soldiers in Iraq as well as terrorist activities directed towards Danish and foreign targets in Denmark as such. A terrorist act against Denmark may be perceived by terrorists as a natural exten- sion of their fi ght against the international Coalition in Iraq. Furthermore, a

10 number of Danish companies are involved in the reconstruction of Iraq and as such may therefore become the target of terrorist acts in or outside Iraq.

Another issue of vital importance to the assessment of the terrorist threat against Denmark, particularly in the longer run, is the matter of radicalisation. In other words, to what extent groups or persons are likely to use undemocratic or maybe even violent methods in order to reach their goals.

Investigations in this fi eld involve among other things the risk that the radical Islamic supporters who are staying in Denmark succeed in recruiting new mem- bers here. Obviously, the international situation in the Middle East and Iraq plays an important role as any development in these areas may contribute to increasing the number of sympathisers and at the same time have the effect that persons, who were once sympathisers, turn into active terrorists. PET also focuses on these areas of society where there is a tendency to a real opposition to and animosity against integration. The Service believes that there are groups and persons in Denmark who, in their search for an identity and as a reaction against what they consider a unilateral Western fi ght against Mus- lim values, have distanced themselves from the original Muslim values and the Western societies as such. Instead they look for a meaning in a fundamentalist radicalised interpretation of Islam. In these so-called parallel societies which are often characterised by extreme isolation with their own social norms and rules, there is a potential for growth and recruitment of terrorism. In addition, other types of crimes may increase again resulting in an increased risk of stigmatisa- tion which may lead to persons or groups choosing to take more radical routes.

In this connection, a number of observers, including Imams and key persons within Muslim circles, have expressed concern that the intense focus on terror- ism emerging from Islam in recent years may involve a risk that the Western population develops an enemy image/a demonization of the entire Muslim society and, therefore, also of the Muslim circles in the individual Western countries. It is feared that it might contribute to an increased stigmatisation of Muslim groups which are already marked by marginalisation, unemployment, social problems and rootlessness and thus increasing the risk that they will be pushed into the arms of radical forces.

11 2. THE WIDE-RANGING EFFORTS This chapter describes the initiatives that have been taken by PET as part of its wide-ranging efforts and the involvement of new co-operation partners and liaisons in the fi ght against terrorism.

The altered international security political situation has had a signifi cant impact on PET’s modes of operation in recent years. As a supplement to the traditional investigative activities of PET, the Service has started to take new roads con- cerning the counter-terrorism activities in recognition of the fact that in general society must be more involved in the process of ensuring that the Danish soci- ety is safe and secure. The Service therefore assesses that wide-ranging efforts are required in order to prevent and prepare Denmark effi ciently against terror- ist attacks. This ambition is expressed in the general strategy of the Service. The strategy rests on two legs:

One of the main missions of the Service is to strengthen its external and co- ordinating role in order thus to strengthen society’s overall robustness and resistance to terrorism. To this effect, the Service has formed and will continue to set up co-operation fora with a number of public authorities and private ac- tors who play a role in the joint preparedness of society. The aim is to establish reliable co-operation relationships and to target the Service’s products for the specifi c needs of the liaisons. As such the co-operation is a sub-element of the wide-ranging efforts of the Service to establish a structured co-operation with authorities, institutions, enterprises and organisations which directly or indi- rectly handle tasks and have qualifi cations or possess knowledge of relevance to the joint efforts within the fi eld of terrorism.

This co-operation also serves the purpose of providing a solid basis for the vari- ous sectors - this applies to both public and private actors – to take the required precautions and measures that are related to security. Therefore in line with the rest of the tasks of the Service, this co-operation must contribute to increasing society’s total resistance to terrorism. This also applies to the general public. Through more openness on the mission of the Service, it is the intention to ensure the highest possible involvement of all of society.

The activities concern: • Information from authorities that are responsible for the adjustment of a sector which may be a potential terrorist target (shipping, air traffi c and the operation of railways, etc.), including particularly the preparation of threat assessments and specifi cation of the preventive measures. • Information from authorities which are holding information on any person who is or – on the basis of information from the authorities in question – will be relevant as an object of investigation, surveillance or for preventive activities.

Furthermore, the wide-ranging efforts must ensure that the specifi c co-opera- tion partners and liaisons and the general public achieve a generally increasing knowledge and understanding of the operations of PET. This refers to obtaining information and gaining impressions that may be of importance to and thus be included in the work of the Service within the fi eld of counter-terrorism. Ad-

12 ditionally, it is also very vital for the Service to be able to exchange views, ideas and knowledge with these co-operation partners in order to sense the fl ows of the various groups and circles in society. Another benefi t of the co-operation is to obtain some feedback and views on and expressions of the profi le and state- ments of the Service – in general as well as more specifi cally.

The issues of primary concern are: • Information from companies manufacturing products which are relevant in connection with terrorism; • Information from associations and organisations, etc. which include or are in contact with persons who are assessed as potential objects in a broad terror- ism perspective.

THE CONTACT GROUP In 2002, PET set up the Contact Group on Counter-terrorism for the public ON COUNTER-TERRORISM sector and today this group constitutes a major element in the joint Danish ter- rorism emergency management.

The Contact Group is a forum for the public authorities which directly or indi- rectly have tasks and qualifi cations of importance to the joint efforts within the area of terrorism. Thus it is the object of the participating authorities to keep the group participants informed of relevant developments within the areas of their respective authorities.

Likewise, it is the responsibility of this group to prepare written material with the aim of improving the co-ordination and communication between the par- ticipating authorities and furthermore to prepare folders, leafl ets etc. of an in- formative nature of benefi t to the general public, including at the political level, in respect of the threat and the emergency management concerning terrorism in Denmark within the areas of responsibility of the participating authorities.

So far three projects have been initiated in the group. One project concerns the establishment of a permanent and reliable communications system between the members of the contact group, the system should also to a certain extent be operational in a crisis situation. The object is to ensure that the relevant persons and authorities can be contacted promptly and timely. Another project is based on a number of existing installations and it examines how to adjust the securing of these installations to the emergency management level applying at any time. This project should result in a catalogue of ideas, which is to be made available for all the members of the contact group. Finally, a project has been initiated which deals with the security concerning hazardous biological substances or materials as well as the potential threat that these pose. The project also serves to assess the actual storing conditions of the biological materials in Denmark. The three projects will probably be completed in 2004. Furthermore within the framework of the contact group for the public sector, a co-operation has been established between DSB/Metro, the Danish state-owned railway company, and PET serving to increase the general alertness level of the employees.

THE CONTACT GROUP In 2003, an initiative was taken to set up a similar contact group for parts of the FOR TRADE ASSOCIA- private sector, the Contact Group for trade Associations. This contact group TIONS held its fi rst meeting on 10 September 2004.

13 The aim of the contact group is, through a structured co-operation with parts of the private sector, to create a forum for a current dialogue on issues which can contribute to strengthening the total emergency level in Denmark in respect of terrorism, etc. In this forum, PET can provide information within the frame- work of the Service’s specifi c fi elds of responsibility, which may be of interest to trade and industry in Denmark.

Similarly, as representatives of Danish trade and industry, the trade associations contribute to improving the general awareness and in specifi c situations on issues within PET’s area of responsibility, e.g. terrorism, espionage, including industrial espionage, extremism and non-proliferation. Furthermore, it is the aim that the contact group can provide the framework of an intensifi ed bilateral co-operation with the individual group participants.

PET is directing and co-ordinating the activities of the contact group and is also the permanent secretariat of the group and any sub-committees of this group. The contact group is to meet once every six months, however, with the option of setting up ad-hoc meetings if required.

THE CONTACT GROUP Public and private institutions are increasingly using the Internet in their work, FOR IT-SECURITY very often there is a direct link from the Internet to the internal networks of the various institutions and as such these are widely exposed. This constitutes a vulnerability that can be exploited by hostile organisations and countries.

It is the assessment that today the public IT systems, which include vital and critical data, are comparatively robust and it is assessed that there is a relatively small risk of these security precautions being penetrated. The risk is higher regarding networks connected with the Internet. It is therefore important that the authorities are constantly aware of which type of information is stored on these networks and consequently request advice on how to protect these networks.

In order to ensure that the Service has the best possible basis for handling this specialised task, and in the light of experience learnt from the other contact groups, the Service has set up a special Contact Group for IT-Security in 2004 as a supplement to the existing bilateral contacts.

The Contact Group for IT-Security must be involved in the Service’s activities on general as well as the specifi c threat and risk assessments within the fi eld of IT. Likewise, the experience of the contact group can be employed benefi cially when the Service prepares recommendations on the implementation of precau- tions and measures of both a general and a specifi c nature.

CO-OPERATION WITH In recent years, PET has hosted a dialogue forum with representatives of vari- ETHNIC MINORITIES ous ethnic minorities in Denmark and in the spring of 2004, the Service set up a forum with a number of imams.

These are two different fora, which have one thing in common: that views and opinions are exchanged on conditions and issues of joint interest and likewise, projects of various kinds are implemented. An example of this co-operation is

14 the leafl et on terror fi nancing which was prepared in the spring of 2003. In the autumn of 2004, it was decided to set up a co-operation between the two fora regarding a project to bring into focus the radicalisation among the young of another ethnic origin.

In more general terms, meetings have been held in both fora at which it has been expressed that many Muslims in Denmark to some extent feel subjected to stigmatisation and also therefore may fi nd it diffi cult to gain a foothold in the Danish society.

This issue is topical in many connections and may contribute to the fact that the groups and individuals may feel marginalised and as such become more vulner- able towards recruitment for more radical groups in Denmark.

The attitude of the authorities, and in this connection particularly some of the media’s generalising presentation and description of Muslims, has been men- tioned as factors contributing to driving particularly young people with other ethnic or religious background into the arms of radical groups.

Several of the participants in the immigrant forum and the Imam circle have also experienced harassment, threats and vandalism with a racist motive and similar cases have been reported against other Muslims. Such incidents involve among other things letters containing threats on some people’s lives, racist graffi tti and other types of racist vandalism, but also fi re bombs as well as physical and verbal assaults.

In both fora it has been expressed that generally the Muslim circles feel a kind of resignation when it comes to reporting such infringements to the authori- ties. It is a widely-held opinion that in many instances, the reports are not taken seriously, that no follow-up is made on the reports and the feeling that they are treated with scepticism when trying to report a crime with a possible racist motive.

PET aims at maintaining and improving both these fora as the initiatives are a natural extension of the Service’s vision of being in current contact with the sur- rounding society and to receive as wide-ranging and varied input as possible for the current assessment of the security situation.

THE DANISH PET is in close co-operation with the Danish NATIONAL CENTRE FOR National Centre for Biological Defence (Danish BIOLOGICAL DEFENCE abbreviation CBB). This co-operation involves emergency situations, i.e. procedures in con- nection with specifi c incidents where biological substances are used or suspected of being used, as well as regarding science and technology in which fi eld CBB and PET exchange informa- tion concerning various biological substances and their use. Under the auspices of the Contact Group for Counter-Terrorism, the CBB and PET are implementing a specifi c project on hazardous biological substances (see also page 13).

15 THE WORKING GROUP For a number of years, ammonium nitrate fertilisers with a high degree of ni- ON AMMONIUM NITRATE trogen have been used as explosives in connection with several terrorist bomb- ings, latest Istanbul in November 2003. The substance is easy to get hold of and it is relatively straightforward to make a bomb with it. In March 2004, British anti-terror police seized more than half a ton of ammonium nitrate fertiliser in West London in connection with the arrest of eight men suspected of preparing terrorist acts.

In 2003, PET took the initiative of setting up a task group with the object of ex- amining how to limit the access of terrorists and other criminals to ammonium nitrate fertilisers with a high degree of nitrogen.

In addition to some PET offi cers, the task group consisted of representatives of the Danish Emergency Management Agency, the Danish Plant Directorate, the Danish Environmental Protection Agency, and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service which are the authorities with the largest expertise within this fi eld.

The task group concluded its work in August 2004 and prepared and submit- ted some recommendations for the Ministry of Justice. One of the recommen- dations is that it should be illegal for private persons to buy this product. It should still be possible for companies to acquire this product though it ought to be made a criminal offence to acquire this product with the object of resel- ling it to private individuals. Likewise, the regulations for storing and handling fertilisers should be tightened up. In line with the more stringent regulations, PET intends to carry out an information campaign aimed at agents and buyers to make them aware of the risks that can be connected with ammonium nitrate with a high degree of nitrogen should this substance fall into the wrong hands.

CRISES MANAGEMENT PET is represented on the central offi cial committee of national crises manage- GROUP ment organisation, which also includes the Crises Management Group set up under the Prime Minister’s department.

The Crises Management Group consists of representatives of a number of central ministries and other authorities all ranking as heads of department or divisions and the primary objective of this group is the general advisory and planning role in terms of the emergency management in connection with na- tional civil crisis situations.

In 2003, the Crises Management Group was involved in the preparation of the national vulnerability report, a new national emergency management plan and it also participated in the national crisis management exercise, KRISØV 2003. This exercise is further described on page 29.

PET’S ROLE IN THE In January 2004, the government’s national vulnerability report was published. VULNERABILITY REPORT The vulnerability report is an analysis of the vulnerability of society and the preparedness of the civil sector.

The report has been prepared by a interdisciplinary committee with the par- ticipation of a wide range of ministries, agencies and other authorities as well as various organisations and associations. PET was not on the committee, how-

16 ever, together with the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) PET has contributed with assessments of the threats posed by international terrorism, including the threat from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. Furthermore, DDIS and PET have contributed with a description of the handling of intelligence threat assessments of the joint defence including the preparedness of the civil sector.

The report includes a number of recommendations among other things to ensure a comprehensive preparedness, co-ordinated monitoring, analysis and assessment of vulnerabilities, risks and interdependency, co-ordinated research & development and analysis as well as focus on the individual sector’s emer- gency management.

PET participates in the further process of implementing the initiatives related to the fi elds of responsibility of the Service. However, parallel to the preparation of this report, the Service has taken a number of initiatives falling in line with the recommendations of the report. This applies e.g. to the close co-operation with DDIS aiming at the preparation of joint assessments of threats from inter- national terrorism brought about by a development in which it is often diffi cult to clearly distinguish between international and national threats to society.

Likewise as mentioned, PET co-operates with a number of authorities which play a role in the fi ght against terrorism in connection with the preventive se- curity measures as well as the actual investigation. Similarly, at its own request, the Service has expanded and formalised this co-operation by setting up the Contact Group for Counter-Terrorism in order to ensure that a targeted and well-founded basis for PET’s threat assessments and possible recommendations for the implementation of emergency measures etc. The contact group con- cept has recently been extended by setting up an experience group consisting of heads of security from various private enterprises as well as a special group within the fi eld of IT security.

A Danish version of the Vulnerability Report is available at the website of the Danish Emergency Management Agency: www.brs.dk.

DIIS For a number of years, PET has co-operated closely with the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) for covering various research initiatives. The aim of this co-operation is among other things to strengthen the strategic analy- sis capacity of the Service but also to contribute towards the establishment of a broad platform of research and know-how within areas of common interest, including among other things in relation to subjects which are discussed in the above-mentioned Vulnerability Report.

The DIIS was a major contributor to the international conference on terrorism hosted by PET in November 2003. This conference is described in more detail on page 33. PET is well into the planning of the next conference to be held in May 2005.

INTERNATIONAL The European Union CO-OPERATION Particularly after 11 September 2001, the European Union has directed a lot of efforts towards improving the actions to be taken against international terror-

17 ism. These efforts have been implemented internally within the EU through the police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters as well as together with non-EU countries through the common foreign and security political co-opera- tion. Additionally, there is the supranational co-operation within the EU 1st column, under which auspices various task forces within a number of policy areas also attempt to limit the terrorists’ scopes for action.

The work has included specifi c initiatives to fi ght terrorism but also to a large degree a discussion of how the EU in terms of structure and organisation can optimise the activities within the fi eld of fi ghting terrorism and planning the relations with other international actors within this fi eld.

EU has thus been working on an update of the action plan which was adopted by the heads of state and government in the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 and the development of the European Security Strategy which was prepared by Javier Solana and adopted at the European Council Meeting in Brussels in December 2003.

The work further intensifi ed after the terrorist attack in Madrid on 11 March 2004 and at a meeting on 25th to 26th March 2004, the heads of state and government adopted a new action plan on EU’s fi ght against terrorism. The plan includes new elements, e.g. the appointment of Gijs de Vries to the post as EU Anti-Terror co-ordinator, and the speeding up of initiatives already taken, including in particular the member states’ national implementation of the rel- evant EU framework resolutions etc. as well as a more rapid implementation of a number of initiatives which have already been taken within the fi eld of police and judicial co-operation.

In addition, there are a number of initiatives directed towards strengthening the existing co-operation including particularly:

• The member states must ensure the most optimal and effi cient use of the available EU bodies, particularly Europol and Eurojust. Under Europol it has been decided to reactivate the Counter Terrorist Task Force. • The review of the national initiatives to fi ght terrorism must be intensifi ed, this also applies to the acceding countries. • A scheme should be implemented to limit the terrorists’ access to fi rearms, explosives, bomb manufacturing equipment and related technology that can be used for effecting terrorist actions. • The member states should improve the co-operation mechanisms between the police, security and intelligence services. • Continuous efforts should be made to establish an intelligence capacity at the Council Secretariat to cover all aspects of a terror threat. At a meeting in June 2004, the European Council adopted Solana’s motion among other things involving a close co-operation between Solana’s present analysis and intelligence unit, the so-called Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), and the CTG (Counter Terrorism Group), in which the EU security and intelligence ser- vices responsible for the national security co-operate on terror-related issues.

EU continues its activities within the fi eld of terrorism e.g. in connection with the so-called Haag-programme the object of which is to further strengthen the fi eld of freedom, security and justice within the EU, for which area the heads of

18 state and government set out guidelines and objectives in 1999 on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty. The Haag programme includes initiatives in a number of areas besides terrorism, including issues of asylum, border control, information exchange and mutual recognition of legal decisions as well as further develop- ment of the potential of Europol and Eurojust.

NATO In its capacity as the national security authority, PET represents Denmark on the NATO Security Committee. The Chairman of the Committee is Director of the NATO Offi ce of Security (NOS). The task of the committee is to advise the North Atlantic Council on issues related to NATO’s security policies. The obligations ensuing from this work have been described in the Prime Minister’s Offi ce Circular No. 204 of 7 December 2001, among other places.

In the past year, the Security Committee has devoted its time to entering into security agreements with non-alliance partners as well as information, indus- trial, personnel, document and physical security.

Furthermore, PET represents Denmark on NATO’s Special Committee. This Committee is an advisory body to the North Atlantic Council on matters of espionage and terrorism or related threats which might affect the Alliance.

All NATO countries are represented on this Committee by the Heads of Secu- rity Services of the member countries and the NATO Offi ce of Security grants staff support. The chairmanship rotates amongst the member nations in an alphabetical order according to the English spelling. The chairmanship period is 12 months following the calendar year. The country holding the chairmanship forms a troika alliance together with the last year’s and succeeding chairman- ship countries. Thus in 2004, the troika alliance comprised the Czech Republic (2003), Denmark (2004) and France (2005).

In 2003, PET commenced preparations for handling the chairmanship when the Service set up an in-house project organisation with the participation of relevant staff and also prepared the work programme for 2004. The Committee then ap- proved this programme in the autumn of 2003 and in January 2004, the Direc- tor General of PET presented the programme to the North Atlantic Council.

The Committee meets on a regular and permanent basis involving task force meetings scheduled in March and October and plenary meetings in May and November. The task force meetings are held at specialist level whereas usually the heads of the security services of the member countries attend the plenary meetings. Thus Mr Lars Findsen, Director General of PET, represents Denmark on this Committee. As a general rule, the meetings are held at the NATO head- quarters in Brussels, however, in order to contribute to mark the expansion of NATO and thus the Committee with seven countries in the spring 2004, PET hosted the spring plenary meeting in Copenhagen.

Furthermore, the Committee has held meetings as part of the NATO Part- nership for Peace (PfP), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and to further develop the relation- ship between NATO and the Ukraine primarily with the overall aim being to strengthen the co-operation including to exchange information on terrorism.

19 In 2004 the Committee prepared a range of classifi ed assessments to the North Atlantic Council concerning terrorism and espionage-related issues. Besides the Committee has been chiefl y occupied with achieving results at the NATO Sum- mit on 28-29 June 2004 in Istanbul when, among other things, it was decided to initiate an investigation into the NATO internal intelligence structures in order to adapt the present structures to the current threats.

Finally, the Service contributed substantially to the Crisis Management Exercise (CMX04) which took place in the NATO Headquarters for almost a week at the beginning of March 2004. The Service contributed to the preparation of the exercise scenario as well as to the actual performance of the exercise in the form of assistance to the Analyst Cell which adapted intelligence during the exercise. In addition as Chairman of the Committee, PET acted as consultative body thus briefi ng the North Atlantic Council during the exercise.

The Service also contributed substantially to the preparation of the basis of the Crisis Management Exercise 2005, CMX05, taking place in January 2005.

20 THE DANISH SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 3. THROUGHOUT 2003 Organisational and administrative issues

INCREASED RESOURCES After the terrorist acts in the United States on 11 September 2001, Danish police including the Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET) had additional resources allocated in order to further strengthen the activities against terrorism in the light of the changes in the security political situation. At the same time a number of initiatives have been taken in Denmark as well as on the internation- al scene with a view to strengthen the fi ght against terrorism and the co-opera- tion in this respect.

As the national security authority, PET undertakes a steadily increasing number of security tasks of diverse nature. The Service has a central external and co- ordinating role in terms of security in relation to other authorities in Denmark and abroad. Furthermore, PET handles an increasing number of surveillance and operational tasks, including in the form of joint operations as part of the continued expansion of the international co-operation.

In consequence of the terrorist acts in Madrid on 11 March 2004, the Danish Government decided to further strengthen PET in order to ensure a contin- ued implementation and further development of the increased efforts against terrorism. As an open society it is not possible to guard oneself 100 per cent against international terrorism. The government, however, assessed that in the light of the development of the general threats, it was relevant and necessary to strengthen Denmark’s national security service.

The decision to strengthen the Service involved: • The appointment of further 60-65 employees, some with an academic, analytic and administrative background in order to particularly strengthen the areas of surveillance, investigation and analysis within the fi eld of ter- rorism. • Procurement of a coherent and up-to-date IT-platform to support PET’s surveillance, operational and analytic operations. • Upgrading of the technical platform in respect of handling the surveillance and investigative tasks within the fi eld of IT and telecommunications.

The total allocation for PET to strengthen the Service amounts to DKK 135 million divided over the multi-annual agreement period. The additional appro- priation will be entered in the Government’s budget for 2005 and 2006 but was already initiated in 2004.

In order to carry out the actual implementation of increasing the number of employees, PET intends to employ approx. 30 policemen, 7 offi ce staff, 14 analysts, 5 IT-specialists as well as 2 legal advisers. The employment of these additional members of staff had, however, to await the completion of a new building adjacent to PET headquarters. Therefore the analysts were employed as at 1 January 2005 and the new policemen will be employed some time in the autumn of 2004 or the spring of 2005.

21 NEW ORGANISATIONAL In continuation of the additional resources in the spring of 2004, a new organi- STRUCTURE sational structure has been implemented. The new structure shall support the general strategy of the Service regarding an intensifi ed focus on the operational and surveillance activities and the external co-ordinating role of the Service.

As will appear from the above organisational chart, the Service is now divided into six divisions.

The object of the structural change has been to set up a more simple and ap- propriate structure to ensure that the Service as focused as possible can handle the wide-ranging demands posed by the complex threats of today’s world. At the same time in relation to the police management structure, which is tradi- tionally divided into demarcations, a more obvious management structure has been established to support the wide composition of staff and to strengthen the Service’s interdisciplinary and project-oriented methods of work.

As indicated, a new division has been set up which is responsible for vari- ous types of preventive security and vulnerability issues in respect of critical infrastructure etc. as well as emergency management questions. The decision to establish this division has been based on the increasing importance of this area for the prevention of terrorism and it aims at strengthening the external and security co-ordinating profi le of the Service through a joint and targeted approach to this fi eld. This new division will be responsible for maritime, avia- tion, personnel, physical and IT-security, civil protection, threat assessments and a newly established situation centre. The division will also handle the daily operation of the public and private contact groups regarding counter-terrorism as well as the Contact Group for IT-Security.

FOCUS ON ADMINISTRATION

22 STRATEGIC PLAN In the autumn of 2003, PET initiated a project on strategic planning to form the backbone of the Service’s concentration on objectives and results. The purpose is to ensure that PET meets the requirements that are made and in addition further develops the quality of the Service’s operations. A mission and a vision have been drawn up for the Service and on this basis, six specifi c focus areas have been advanced:

• Making the investigations more effi cient and consistent; • Strengthen the external and co-ordinating profi le; • Management should be more professionally involved in solving of the tasks; • Increased focus on interdisciplinary co-operation in the solving of tasks; • Increase the effi ciency and quality of the administrative support functions; • Attract and maintain highly qualifi ed staff members.

These focus areas have been made operational and translated into actual action plans for all divisions and sections of the Service. The specifi c initiatives of the action plans are measurable thus making it possible currently to measure to which extent the divisions reach the targets set.

FOCUS ON In the light of the requirements which the Service is facing as a result of the global ADMINISTRATION threats, PET initiated the project ”Focus on administration” in the spring of 2003.

The aim of the project is, among other things, by modernising the IT-applica- tion and communication processes of the Service to ensure that the administra- tive work planning will be more effi cient and updated thus being able to sup- port the operational tasks of the Service in the best possible way. At the same time, an analysis of the IT-structure of the Service demonstrated that the present structure is outdated and the ensuing administrative practice inappropriate.

In connection with the allocation of resources in the spring of 2004, PET had funds supplied to contribute towards the implementation of the project.

The project has been divided into a number of sub-projects of which the fi rst three have already been projected and implemented. The whole project is ex- pected to be complete by the end of 2006 when a new, coherent and up-to-date IT-platform for the Service will be realised.

NEW LEGISLATION On 4 June 2003, the Danish Parliament, the Folketing, passed an act to change RELEVANT TO THE the Danish Penal Code and the Administration of Justice Act to fi ght biker OPERATIONS AND gang member crime and other organised crime. One of the changes made by ACTIVITIES OF PET this act was the stipulation in the Administration of Justice Act governing the suspected/accused and his defence’s right of access to material in the police’s possession. These changes are also of importance to the operations and activities of PET (see Appendix F).

Before these amendments were made, the suspected/accused and his defence’s right of access to documents involved all types of evidence that could be of im- portance to the handling of the suspected/accused’s defence during trial. It was of no importance which part of the police had provided the documents and whether it had been provided for the purpose of the specifi c case of the investigation.

23 Furthermore, it was not important whether the material had actually been made available to the police district carrying out the investigation. Any material ob- tained by another police authority, including PET, to be used for another case might be covered by the suspected/accused’s access to documents.

The rules thus implied a risk that e.g. the police informants or the PET sources – human sources or liaisons – could be compromised, which could endanger the lives of sources and informants but certainly also limit the opportunities of gaining access to other sources.

With the amendments of the Danish Administration of Justice Act, the rules were drawn up anew on the basis of the general principle “that the possibility of the police to obtain information quite essential to effi ciently fi ght biker gang crime and any other organised crime should not be limited more than necessary to safeguard legal security considerations”.

After the amendments, the suspected/accused’s and the defence’s right of ac- cess to documents now only include the material that the investigating police authority has obtained as part of its investigation of the specifi c case.

The material which PET has procured as part of handling its operations and activities is only covered by the suspected/accused’s and the defence’s right of access to documents if PET is the investigating authority in the specifi c crimi- nal case and the material has been obtained as part of the investigation of the specifi c case.

The fact that PET as part of its general monitoring obtain incriminating informa- tion, which might be important to a specifi c criminal case, shall thus not imply that any such information necessarily will be used in the specifi c criminal case.

On the other hand, the defence’s right of access to documents also covers any material which the prosecution has decided to present as evidence in the crimi- nal case, likewise it follows naturally that PET still, like the rest of the police, has an obligation to ensure that no innocent person will be prosecuted.

As something new, the amendment also involves an insertion of a special provision having expanded the considerations which can reason the exclusion of material from the suspected/accused’s and the defence’s right of access to documents. Similarly, the time frame in this respect has been extended hence the exclusion can be extended beyond the trial. Any decision to do so shall be made by the court as according to a special procedure according to which the suspected/accused’s interests will be handled by a counsel appointed specifi cally for this purpose.

The amendments of the suspected/accused’s right of access to documents and the expansion of the possibilities to exclude material, which otherwise would have been included, have resulted in an expansion of the possibilities of PET to pass on information to other police authorities and still at the same time ensuring that other investigations, methods of information retrieval, liaisons, co-operation partners and sources shall not be compromised in connection with a specifi c criminal case and thus unintentionally reduce the possibility of the police and PET to handle their assignments.

24 An example of the application of the new rules is a case against a 47-year old Algerian national from Aarhus. On 22 October 2004, a jury at the Eastern Divi- sion of the High Court sentenced the person in question to four years and six months imprisonment and expulsion from Denmark for life for his complicity in the planning of a robbery of a Jyske Bank branch offi ce in Copenhagen in 2001. It was interceptions made by PET in connection with investigations with- in the fi eld of terrorism that lead to the sentencing of this Algerian national.

SETTING UP OF PET’s homepage was introduced on 11 December 2003. The homepage as well HOMEPAGE as a number of other initiatives shall contribute to ensuring greater insight into the role, methods, operations and activities of the Service. At the homepage, you can read a number of factual information about the Service’s operations and activities as well as investigative methods. Likewise, the latest news, press releases, job vacancies as well as various publications will also be available at the homepage. Furthermore, the citizens can contact PET directly through a special form stating information that they consider of interest to the investigation of the Service.

From 11 December 2003 to 1 November 2004, approx. 41,000 people have visited the homepage.

The operational divisions

COUNTER-TERRORISM For many years, the fi eld of counter-terrorism has been one of the core tasks of PET. The efforts within this fi eld have, however, been strengthened signifi - cantly over the past years as a result of the threat from international terrorism. PET’s investigations within the fi eld of counter-terrorism are based on Section 114 of the Danish Penal Code which deals with a number of serious crimes (e.g. homicide, arson, kidnapping and hijacking of aircraft etc.) that are committed by groups, organisations and individuals with the intent to frighten the popula- tion, destabilise the order of society or seek to force Danish or foreign authori- ties and international organisations to carry out or fail to carry out an act.

Like in many other countries, there are also individuals and circles in Denmark who sympathise with or have relations to persons and organisations that have been involved in terrorist activities. Within the fi eld of investigation, PET’s task is, where required, to monitor such persons and circles in order to see whether they violate the law or are about to do so. The aim is to prevent that terrorist acts will be planned and carried out in Denmark or that Denmark will be used as a basis of support for the planning or implementation of terrorist acts in other places in the world. In this connection, Europe is still considered central in the radical Islamists’ attempts at recruiting sympathisers and setting up logis- tic support points for acts to be committed.

In 2003, PET has further intensifi ed the monitoring of groups and individuals that sympathise with or have relations to international terrorist organisations. For example, the monitoring concerns North African organisations like Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM), Groupe Salafi ste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) or Groupe Islamique Combattant Libyen (GICL), Mid- dle Eastern terrorist groups like Osbat Al Ansar or Takfi r Wal Hijra, spanning

25 from North Africa to the Middle East, as well as organisations like Al Tawhid or Gama’a al-Islamiyya which are focusing on Pakistan, Afghanistan or South East Asia. It is estimated that a number of these groups are affi liated to the Al Qaida network.

It is characteristic of these groups that the persons in question sympathise with one or more of these regionally oriented terrorist groups though at the same time operating across the regional affi liations in personal networks that vary in size and have different objectives. Therefore, PET’s focus is not only directed towards the terrorist organisations and the individuals’ affi liations to these organisations but also to a high degree towards the focus and networks of the individuals.

Recently PET has also further intensifi ed the general efforts within radical circles and persons in Denmark, including radical mosque circles. The focus has fi rst and foremost been on active intelligence activities with the aim of establish- ing and if possible expose the planning or preparation of terrorist activities in Denmark. The investigations within this fi eld, which among other things have been made in co-operation with international liaisons, have also comprised obtaining intelligence in respect of activities which might be suspected of col- lection of funds for the support of terrorism and recruitment of persons for terrorist related activities abroad.

In respect of the latter, the Service has been particularly attentive to the situation in Iraq and whether any person, residing in Denmark, has travelled to Iraq with the object of participating in the resistance against the Coalition in Iraq or has at- tempted to recruit supporters to this task. Among other things, these efforts must be seen in the light that there has been traffi c of persons from Europe to Iraq as is well known. In this connection, independent security experts as well as a number of Western intelligence services consider Iraq as a place which attracts persons and groups wishing to join together in the fi ght against Western interests.

Of obvious reasons, among them the protection of sources and co-operation partners and liaisons, the Service cannot describe specifi c operations, persons or organisations which have been investigated by PET during the past years. One case, however, has attracted particular attention by the general public and by the media, which is the case about the Danish national, who was detained at the American Guantanamo base.

The Danish former prisoner in Cuba The Danish national, who was captured in Pakistan and subsequently spent almost two years at the American Guantanamo base in Cuba, was released on 25 February 2004.

Offi cials from the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs together with staff from PET went to Cuba and accompanied the 30-year old man back to Denmark. The Service also assisted him with various practical measures in the fi rst weeks after his return. He was at no point of time charged by the American or Danish authorities in connection with his stay and his activities in Afghanistan, and he returned to Denmark as a free man. He had, however, signed an agreement with the American authorities among other things agreeing that he would not join any terrorist organisation and fi ght their cause.

26 In October 2004, the man was interviewed on the Danish national television, DR, in two programmes in which he advanced statements about members of the Danish Government whom he considered legitimate targets in a war situ- ation. Likewise, he declared that he was willing to go to Chechnya to fi ght the Muslim cause against the Russian forces. These statements made PET act im- mediately and hence he was questioned with a defendant’s rights.

During the questioning, the ex-Guantanamo prisoner expressed that he adhered to the agreement made with the American authorities in connection with the release from the Guantanamo base. He emphasised during the questioning that he had had no real intentions to leave Denmark with the purpose of participat- ing in terrorism or terrorist-related activities.

On the basis of the questioning and the information available in the case, PET assessed that there were no grounds for apprehending the 30-year old with a view to arraignment claiming imprisonment.

It was clear during the questioning that the former Cuba prisoner wanted to let the excitement subside and in order to assist to this effect and as a preven- tive measure, the Service offered to provide temporary premises at his disposal. The former Cuba prisoner accepted this offer and accompanied by PET staff he stayed at selected premises, just as he voluntarily deposited his passport with PET. These measures did not, however, change the fact that the former Cuba prisoner is still a free man with the rights ensuing. All things considered this means that he can demand his passport returned and leave Denmark. Against this, and as the Danish Minister of Justice has emphasised on several occasions, it may be urged that the person in question with his background and history will inevitably also attract the attention of the Service henceforth. Addition- ally should further detrimental information be obtained which requires that the person in question must be suspected of his intention to commit criminal acts in Denmark or abroad as according to the general principles of the Danish Administration of Justice Act there is a legal basis for arresting this person.

The Madrid bombs As we know, a Spanish-based radical Islamic group carried out a series of co-ordinated bombings against the railway service in Madrid on 11 March 2004. Needless to say that these terrorist acts were tragic for the victims, their bereaved families and relations, the Spanish authorities and many more. The terrorist acts also gave rise to great international concern and worry, includ- ing in Denmark. For one thing, the terrorist acts showed that countries, which are generally considered well prepared for handling terrorism, by one stroke, are also vulnerable. The act was actually the fi rst real terrorist act on European soil, when excluding Turkey, since 11 September 2001. These Madrid bombings were, in other words, an expression of yet another step in the development of the current European security scenario.

In connection with the Madrid bombings, there were no specifi c threats against Denmark and therefore the general level of security, which has been elevated since the terrorist acts in the United States on 11 September 2001, was not for- mally increased further. However, PET assessed that seen in the light of the new situation as expressed by the Madrid terrorist acts it was relevant to increase the society’s general level of alertness.

27 As a result, on 18 March 2004, PET requested all Danish police districts to con- tact the sectors and facilitators in their districts who are responsible for some infrastructural junctions, e.g. airports, ports, ferry services, railway stations and premises where usually large crowds gather, like shopping centres, stadiums, amusement parks etc. The aim of this co-operation was to request the persons responsible to instruct relevant groups of staff to be more alert and keep eyes and ears open in connection with suspicious matters.

PET also contacted the Danish Civil Aviation Administration, DSB and Bane- danmark (Rail Net Denmark) among many others with similar recommenda- tions. Likewise, the Service appealed to the public through the media as well as on its own website encouraging the public to be more alert.

Other activities PET has also prepared a number of threat assessments for the relevant authori- ties and interested parties, including the police districts and the members of the Contact Group for Counter-terrorism. Such threat assessments are usually pre- pared on the occasion of events abroad that might affect the national security, e.g. the Madrid bombings in March 2004 and in connection with Denmark’s participation in the Iraq confl ict.

In the early autumn of 2004, two specifi c terrorist threats against Denmark were made on an Islamic website, www.islamic-minbar.com. One of the threats was made by a group demanding Denmark and El Salvador to withdraw their troops from Iraq. In the other example there was a proclamation that “Now it is Denmark’s turn to be punished”, allegedly as a result of Denmark’s involve- ment in Iraq.

Neither PET nor any of the close liaisons of the Service had information of the alleged groups or any other information pointing towards terrorist acts of the nature announced being prepared. It was, therefore, not possible to estab- lish whether the groups had real operational capacity or could be described as so-called “net groups”. For this same reason, the threats did not result in any change of the level of threat, which had already been elevated in general, the Service, however, impressed on the police to maintain the elevated level of alert- ness as established after the Madrid terrorist acts.

PET tracked down the website to Switzerland and notifi ed the Swiss intelli- gence service. The website was subsequently closed down.

Furthermore, PET has carried out a number of so-called “preventive talks” with several persons. Unlike questioning, preventive talks do not have as objective to unravel a specifi c criminal matter but to prevent any future offences. This by instructing the persons in question about the current regulations within a specifi c area to avoid that they “unintentionally” break the law. It could also be by making people aware of it that one of their personal contacts has connections to terrorism.

Preventive talks are also used if the Service has indications that a person or a group is caught in a chain of events that may develop into a threat or a crime. The preventive talk serves to make the persons in question realise that the Ser- vice is aware of their activities which usually is suffi cient to the ceasing of the activities before these develop into actual criminal acts.

28 Terror fi nancing As a result of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the Western intelligence services focused on the expenses which the terrorists must have incurred for logistic support, including the training of pilots.

In order to strengthen the investigations within the fi eld of terror fi nancing, PET has established a close co-operation with the Public Prosecutor for Serious Economic Crime, abbreviated to SØK in Danish. One of the initiatives of this co-operation is that a task group has been set up to analyse the possible terror fi nancing networks in Denmark.

Over the past year or so, the terror fi nancing task group of PET has been ex- panded by e.g. staff who have professional experience from the fi nancial world. The group works closely with the Danish Told&Skat (customs and tax admin- istration), other Danish police authorities, the fi nancial sector, Europol, the National Agency for Enterprise and Housing etc.

The scope of the task group covers obtaining intelligence in respect of the fi nancing of terrorism as preventive activities where the Service directs the attention of relevant authorities and organisations to persons and enterprises who might be breaking the law. Likewise, focus is on transactions that for some reasons seem suspicious.

In a specifi c criminal case, the Service has assisted the Public Prosecutor for Serious Economic Crime with background information about an organisation in the Middle East suspected of being affi liated with terrorism.

Various EU regulations, which in Denmark are distributed via the National Agency for Enterprise and Housing, are issued listing individuals and organisa- tions suspected of having affi liations with terrorism. These lists are distributed through the Danish Bankers Association to all fi nancial actors in Denmark in order to establish whether these persons and organisations have bank accounts in Denmark. All reports submitted in this respect will be examined by PET and the Money Laundering Secretariat under the Public Prosecutor for Serious Economic Crime.

Focus has also been on courier activities with funds collected that are suspected of being allocated to various organisations affi liated to terrorism. The stipula- tions of the Danish Customs Act regarding the import and export of money amounting to a total of EUR 15,000 have provided the basis of some investiga- tive initiatives often in co-operation with the Fraud Section of Copenhagen Police that has investigated cases founded on the seizure of money attempted exported through the Copenhagen International Airport. The stipulations of the Customs Act also apply to money being imported and exported via any other Danish borders, though with the coming into force of the regulations of the Schengen Agreement, it is only natural that most seizures are made at the airports.

Crisis Management Exercise – November 2003 In the light of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the Crisis Management Group carried out a review of the national crisis management planning in the spring of 2002 and in this connection the group pointed out that

29 there was a need for a large national crisis management exercise. Therefore, a task group was set up with the purpose of planning and carrying out a national crisis management exercise (abbreviated to KRISØV 2003) which took place from 3rd to 7th November 2003. PET had a leading role in this exercise.

The exercise focused on procedures in connection with the crisis management measures as well as plans in connection with large natural disasters and for han- dling terrorist acts and threats of terrorism.

During the exercise a number of imaginary scenarios were set up. The exercise commenced by a meeting at which the representatives of all the exercise par- ticipants were given a brief exercise introduction and presentation of the initial position comprising an extraordinary newscast portending a heavy hurricane. Suddenly during one of the features a heavy explosion took place at the Great Belt Bridge which was the starting signal for the exercise. Besides the hurricane and the explosion at the Great Belt Bridge, the participants were compelled to act and take measures in connection with a leak and proliferation of biological material, spread of smallpox virus and warning of snowstorm.

The crisis management group and a wide selection of ministries, central authori- ties and agencies, including naturally PET, participated in the exercise. Fur- thermore, a large number of decentralised authorities were involved in order to assist the exercise participants with technical information.

The general object of the exercise was to practise the national crisis management procedures internally as well as externally with the main emphasis on activating and increasing the preparedness and the press and information services.

The more specifi c aims were primarily to rehearse: • The preparation of staff operations in connection with crisis management, including communication and procedures. • Co-operation at national level in connection with a large natural disaster with particular emphasis on mutual information. • The national co-operation in connection with an imminent terror disaster. • Testing of (draft for) national crisis management plan as well as testing the underlying plan of a set of actions. • Procedures concerning phased establishment of incident forces in connection with an incident portended. • Increase of the preparedness of the Home Guard in respect of the possibility of providing the required guarding forces. • Press and information services.

The next national crisis management exercise is expected to be held in January 2005.

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) The increased worldwide focus on non-proliferation of substances and material that can be used for nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons has affected the work of PET within this fi eld.

The primary task is to retrieve, prepare and analyse the information on coun- tries suspected of wanting to develop weapons of mass destruction and par-

30 ticularly the enterprises and/or organisations – the end-users – who attempt to procure products or machinery that can be used for developing such weapons.

Another core function is the co-operation with other national authorities, agen- cies and governing bodies in order to obtain information on the procedures used by the critical end-users in their efforts to procure sensitive products that can be used to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Many of the products, technologies and the expertise required to construct programmes for weapons of mass destruction can be acquired in Denmark. Certain countries use highly advanced methods to bypass the Danish export control regulations e.g. by establishing front-line companies and using agents to disguise the actual user of the products.

Export control PET pays regular visits to enterprises. These visits serve as a preventative and consultative counsel to enterprises manufacturing machinery or products that can be used for making weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the companies that have received suspicious enquiries are advised on what to do. Likewise, PET offers general counselling on the national and international em- bargo regulations and on matters regarding international weapons trade.

The early warning principle is applied actively in order that the activities of the company do not develop into a potential illegal export of products to be linked up with weapons of mass destruction.

In recent years, there has been a sharp increase in the number of enquiries to PET from Danish authorities, companies and professional and industrial bodies or interest groups concerning potential critical end-users/customers within the export control.

The general preventive efforts As described in the media, among other places, PET has also held a number of information meetings at universities and institutions of higher education at which meetings there was discussion of issues like abuse of research etc. related to the manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction as well as radicalisation in student circles. Some of the large educational institutions in Copenhagen and Aarhus were visited: The Pharmaceutical University, Business Schools, DTU and the Universities.

The reaction from the institutions visited has generally been very positive and the initiative and the efforts of PET within this fi eld have been greatly appreci- ated. Subsequently, PET has received several enquiries from the institutions visited and has offered counselling.

The dialogue with the universities and the institutions of higher education will continue and be extended. In this connection a project day will be held with the participation of the institutions in order to ensure a follow up on the efforts and activities made so far and to extend and carry on the positive dialogue initiated.

CBRN weapons (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear weapons) It is estimated that the risk of a CBRN attack in Denmark is low, though this

31 does by no means imply that the risk cannot increase in the time to come. As you will know at the time of writing there has been no attempt at or no attack using CBRN in a terror-related incident. On the other hand, in connection with the so-called “anthrax letters” in the United States, several false alarms were registered in Denmark on this account.

The so-called ricin case from England where in a fl at in London in January 2003 traces of the toxin ricin were found also indicates that within the Islamic circles in Europe there are experiments with weapons of the CBRN category. Investigations of the case, however, also point towards the fact that the present knowledge of and the operational opportunities in respect of these weapons are relatively modest.

It is the assessment of PET that in the short term the CBRN threat allegedly is from primitive chemical and bacteriological weapons which local terror cells may attempt to develop. At the same time it is assessed that these substances can hardly be used as actual weapons of mass destruction but primarily be effective for minor, simple attacks. However, in the same way as in radiological attacks there will be signifi cant mass psychological impact by the use of such weapons.

Co-operation with the aliens and immigration authorities As part of the Danish anti-terror package, an amendment of the Danish Aliens Act was made among other things to provide the possibility of strengthening the intelligence services’ co-operation with the aliens and immigration authorities. The amendment implies that the aliens and immigration authorities can pass on information to the Danish Security Intelligence Service and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service if the case is assessed as being important to the operations and activities of the two services in terms of security and intelligence related measures.

Among other things, the co-operation within the fi eld of aliens serves to ensure that immigrants who are assumed to pose a threat to the national security will not be granted residence in Denmark.

On the basis of information obtained from the Danish Immigration Service, PET assesses whether the individual in question should be considered to pose a threat to the national security in accordance with the terms of the Danish Aliens Act. If the individual is considered to pose a threat, the Service will inform the Minister of Justice, who then submits a recommendation to the Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. The assessment of the Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs then provides the basis for the decision to be made by the immigration authorities as to whether the individual in question should be denied residence in Denmark. The assessment that the al- ien is considered to pose a threat to the security of the state is fi nal and conclu- sive and as such cannot be referred to any other public administrative authority.

Further regarding the information on which such an assessment is based. For reasons of security, the Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Af- fairs may, on the basis of a recommendation from the Minister of Justice, decide that such information should not be passed to the alien in question, his or her representative or the specifi c immigration authority that shall take the fi nal decision in this case. In this respect there is no requirement for the authority in question to state reasons for the decision taken.

32 The co-operation must also ensure that the Service is informed of individuals who in any other way might be of interest in an intelligence-related context, this could be information that the Service, which is responsible for the national security, should know about, e.g. regarding specifi c individuals staying in the country, or regarding explosive experts, individuals with relations to terrorist organisations or sympathising with such, individuals with affi liations to other countries’ intelligence services etc.

PET’s investigation may in such incidents consist of keeping updated about the friends and acquaintances of the individual in question, his/her behavioural pat- tern etc. It may be a matter of the person in question not directly being consid- ered to pose a threat to the national security but over time may become a threat, hence the residence permit of the individual in question must be withdrawn. Following the changes, PET’s counter-terrorism section has set up a unit to handle cases regarding aliens.

Within the asylum area, the Service received approx. 1,160 asylum cases from 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2003 for consideration. From 1 January 2004 to 1 December 2004, the Service received approx. 500 asylum cases.

The public has no access to information on how many cases have been turned down as a result of the amendment to the act, or in how many incidents in- formation of interest in an intelligence-related context has been found. Once a year, the Government informs the Judicial Control Committee of the cases in connection with which the new rules have been applied.

Terror Conference From 3rd to 4th November 2003, PET had arranged and hosted the conference “Terrorism – Challenges and Possible Consequences”.

The objective of the conference was to contribute to increasing the level of knowledge and information in the fi eld of international terrorism and its con- sequences in Denmark as well as abroad, at the same time contributing towards establishing and developing contacts between individuals and authorities within this fi eld. The conference participants came from many walks of life: politicians, police offi cials, researchers, public servants, offi cials, Danish and foreign intel- ligence and security offi cers as well as journalists.

The speakers at the conference were persons who are directly or indirectly involved in the fi ght against international terrorism and as such represent a high degree of expertise within this fi eld:

• Dr Rohan Gunaratna, Professor and Head of Terrorism Research, Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore. • Dr Magnus Ranstorp, Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. • Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen is a Senior Research Fellow at the Danish Institute for International Studies. • Dr Bruce Hoffman, Director of the think tank RAND Washington D.C. • Dr Mehdi Mozaffari, Professor at the Institute of Political Science, Univer- sity of Aarhus.

33 • Dr Ole Wæver, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. • Chris Bain, Security Adviser at Metropolitan Police.

One of the more general conclusions at the conference was that it is necessary to focus on the risk rather than the vulnerability in order to protect the val- ues of our democratic societies and, at the same time, to continue fi ghting the threat. There was a consensus at the conference that being part of and continu- ing to strengthen an international and interdisciplinary co-operation is a must in the fi ght against international Islamic terrorism. It is therefore necessary to co-operate at intelligence and expert level as well as between various sectors of society. Furthermore, the dialogue with moderate Muslims and democratic forces within totalitarian states and in our own societies must be strengthened and, at the same time, we must continue to be consistent in our actions towards groups which are planning and carrying out terrorist acts.

It was made clear at the conference that the specifi c operational work in terms of preventing terrorist acts is an extremely extensive task which involves many different sectors of society, the reason being that countless potential targets for terrorists exist within our society, e.g. areas of great symbolic value, particular sectors which are important to an effi cient infrastructure, places where many people are gathered in a relatively small space etc.

It is, therefore, crucial that a high degree of awareness is created in society in general and, particularly, in the authorities which play an active role in the fi ght against terrorism or the authorities that protect resources used in connection with the execution of terrorist attacks. By increasing society’s overall resistance to terrorism, it becomes more diffi cult for terrorists to plan their attacks, thus making it more likely that their plans will be revealed during the planning stages.

As far as the co-operation between police and intelligence services is concerned it is important that the police offi cers on the street also benefi t from the knowl- edge, held by the national intelligence services, in their everyday work. This will, again, create an increased awareness concerning matters that are directly or indirectly related to terrorism.

PET intends to hold international conferences with themes of relevance to the operations and activities of the Service. A conference is scheduled to take place in the spring of 2005.

SECURITY AND Personal protection OPERATIONS DIVISION As you might know, the Security and Operations Division of PET is responsi- IN GENERAL ble for personal protection. PET’s personal protection offi cers protect members of the Royal Family and guests of the Royal Family, members of Govern- ment, certain politicians and other leading Danish public fi gures. Furthermore, personal protection is offered to ambassadors and, to some extent, prominent foreign guests.

In the light of evolving threats and as a consequence of a number of actual events, the Service expects that personal protection will become an even more important task for the Service in the future. Further in the light of the general

34 threats – and on the basis of actual incidents – the Service expects that the de- mand for personal protection will increase in the years to come.

The Royal Wedding on 14 May 2004 The wedding of HRH the Crown Prince and Miss Mary Elizabeth Donaldson on 14 May 2004 was an event that entailed great challenges in terms of security. PET was in charge of carrying out the various personal protection assignments relating to the members of the Royal Family and certain guests and the Service co-operated closely with Copenhagen Police in respect of the very extensive planning and co-ordination of all the security measures relating to the wedding. Finally, the Service carried out vetting enquiries of all the persons involved in the wedding from waiters and waitresses to the accredited journalists. Copenha- gen Police were responsible at the operational level, i.e. for the specifi c planning of the security measures and activities.

PET initiated the preparations immediately following the Royal engagement on 8 October 2003 and throughout the period until 14 May 2004, regular analyses were prepared assessing various risks that might affect the performance of a fes- tive and peaceful wedding.

Although in the time up to the wedding, it was the general assessment that the specifi c level of threat in relation to Denmark was low, the Western world had experienced a generally increased threatening scene since 11 September 2001. Additionally, the terror bombings in Madrid in March 2004 and Denmark’s par- ticipation in the US-led Coalition in the war against Iraq etc. were issues that contributed to making the Royal Wedding a potential attractive terrorist target.

At no point of time during the preparations did PET obtain specifi c threats against the Royal Wedding, however, in the light of the above, the following issues were considered carefully when assessing which security measures to be implemented:

• Many prominent wedding guests. • Visit from a number of heads of state, among other places from countries actively participating in the Coalition in Iraq, e.g. Spain and England, or countries that had problems with national terrorism or previously had been targets of terrorist acts. • Major national and international media event. • The date of the Royal Wedding had been known publicly for a long period of time.

It is assessed that all these issues are typically included in the terrorists’ consid- erations for selection of target, i.e. whether:

• the target is accessible (target selection); • the target has a high symbolic value or has the potentiality of claiming many casualties; • a potential terrorist act against the target will attract extensive media coverage; • the terrorists have a relatively favourable planning horizon.

All these conditions were present in varying degrees in connection with the Royal Wedding.

35 Furthermore, when planning security measures, consideration should be given to the fact that activists had announced actions and happenings, among other things “Reclaim the streets actions” that might have disturbed the performance of the wedding. Additionally, PET paid attention to the mentally disordered or mentally disturbed persons who could take advantage of the many public events to get close to the royalties and whose behaviour could be characterised by immense unpredictability.

As mentioned, PET’s task was to handle the personal protection assignments in relation to the many events planned for the whole wedding period, e.g. in con- nection with the Match Race in the port of Copenhagen, the Wedding Banquet at Amalienborg Palace, the youth ball at Vega, the Danish Defence’s Tribute, Rock’n’ Royal in the Park, visit at the Parliament and the Gala Performance at the Royal Theatre etc. Needless to say that the coach rides from Copenhagen Cathedral to Amalienborg Palace and again to Fredensborg Palace on 14 May were the largest challenges in terms of security as these were the moments when the audience would get close to the Crown Prince and Crown Princess. Per- sonal protection offi cers were in charge of and should ensure that no audience could interfere with the various units of the escort and in this way to prevent that anyone could disturb or at worst attack the coach. It has been estimated that more than 100,000 people had taken up positions along the 3.2 kilometre coach ride from Copenhagen Cathedral to Amalienborg Palace.

The planning of the coach ride in Copenhagen and in Fredensborg lasted almost six months in close co-operation with Copenhagen police in order to ensure an effi cient co-ordination between the personal protection task and the other security measures including establishing escape routes, road barriers and sector patrolling etc. All stairways, basements, lofts, attics, roofs, companies, busi- nesses, exits, gates and so on along the entire coach ride had been checked and investigated by the police beforehand.

Some of the guests invited had brought their own personal protection offi cers. As is regular practice, PET had prior to the Wedding held information meetings and tours of reconnaissance for the foreign personal protection offi cers in order to brief on security measures and precautions, escape routes, etc. and to show the routes and premises that their respective VIPs would be frequenting.

As mentioned, PET was also in charge of carrying out vetting enquiries of the persons involved in the wedding and the many events leading up to the wed- ding, i.e. press and media personnel, performers etc. The objective was to ensure that persons who required access to buildings that were protected or guarded did not pose a security risk. In connection with the Royal Wedding a total of 4,365 persons were accredited by PET.

It turned out that the Royal Wedding and the many activities in relation to the Wedding were held peacefully and despite the extensive security measures it became the day of public rejoicing hoped and planned for.

Aviation security During the past year, PET has intensifi ed the co-operation with the aviation authorities regarding the civil aviation security in Denmark. One of PET’s tasks is to currently assess the terror threat against the civil aviation in Denmark.

36 Although there have been no specifi c threats against the aviation in Denmark during the year, the assessment of threat in relation to aviation in Denmark has, on several occasions, been generally affected by events abroad.

For example, several cancellations of fl ight departures at the end of December 2003 from London and Paris to destinations in the United States which made the Americans start to talk about possible demands on a number of countries to bring in armed guards on fl ights to the United States. A number of countries refused, on political grounds, to introduce this concept into the national fl ight security programmes, one of these countries was Denmark. Furthermore, the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004 also gave rise to increasing the level of security in Danish airports.

PET follows the development closely and assesses currently possible new threats against the civil aviation, e.g. the so-called Manpads threat (Man-Port- able Air Defence System) which was made highly topical on 28 November 2002 when an al-Qaida-related terrorist group attempted to shoot down an Israeli charter plane carrying 261 passengers during take-off from Mombasa Airport, Kenya. The same modus was used in the autumn of 2003 against a DHL air freighter during its approach to Baghdad when one of the aircraft’s wings was hit. This issue has also been discussed under the auspices of OSCE (Organisa- tion for Security and Co-operation in Europe) when at the end of January 2004 the organisation held a seminar on the threat against the civil aviation from these weapon systems.

The daily co-operation with the police at the airports and with the airline compa- nies is maintained and extended currently which also applies to the co-operation with the Danish fl ight academies, where the Service presents a current update and briefi ng on the level of threat at the semi-annual meetings at these academies.

IT security As the national security authority, PET must monitor and approve the civil authorities’ IT-systems that produce, process, communicate or store classifi ed information. The Service has set up an IT-security section to handle this task and the section will then on rounds of supervision visit all the authorities that handle classifi ed information electronically. Furthermore, the IT-security sec- tion offers consultancy to authorities and selected private enterprises in respect of securing IT systems. In 2003, the section advised public authorities as well as private enterprises. During 2003 the fi eld of consultancy comprised primarily supporting the increasing demand from the authorities to obtain direct and safe exchange of information between networks.

The IT-security section participates in the Service’s international co-operation concerning the protection of information within NATO and the EU and like- wise there is a close co-operation with foreign intelligence services on risk and threat assessments within the fi eld of IT. In 2003 initiatives have been taken to depict network-based threats against the critical national infrastructure.

Maritime security PET carries out current assessments of threats concerning Danish waters, ports and ships. In case of changes as concerns maritime threats, PET will contact the specifi c maritime authorities and hence recommend, depending on the circum-

37 stances, that changes be made in the level of security. In this connection, the Service has initiated a general co-operation with responsible maritime authori- ties including the Danish Maritime Authority, the Danish Coastal Authority, Admiral Danish Fleet and the Danish Tax Department. This co-operation is expected to be expanded and strengthened in the coming years.

In the recent year, PET has also been involved in activities regarding the imple- mentation of new international regulations of the SOLAS Convention (Safety Of Life At Sea) on preventing and securing ship and port facilities against ter- rorist acts.

Securing port facilities against terrorist acts As a result of the terrorist acts in the United States on 11 September 2001, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) adopted a resolution of Decem- ber 2002 regarding the securing of ship and port facilities and shipping com- panies against terrorist acts as at 1 July 2004. The stringent international re- quirements have been implemented into Danish legislation in executive order no. 144 of 8 March 2004 by the Danish Minister for Transport and Energy in connection with an amendment of the Danish Harbour Act and the Danish Coastal Authority has the overall responsibility of implementing the new regulations.

The new regulations include ports and port facilities (e.g. waiting berths, entrance areas, fac- tory quays and shipyards) serving international shipping, e.g. passenger ships and liners, large cargo vessels and mobile offshore oil rigs. The port administration of the individual ports must prepare an assessment of the vulnerability of the port and a contingency plan describing the plans that the ports intend to implement in order to improve the conditions revealed in the vulnera- bility assessment. The contingency plans must be approved by the Danish Coastal Authority. On the basis of current assessment of the threat against Danish port facilities, a specifi c security level will be announced and the ports must then adjust their security according to this level of security. There are three levels of security: 1 – Normal, 2 – Increased and 3 – Extraordinary. The specifi c level of security will be determined by the Danish Coastal Authority on the basis of recommen- dations from PET.

In connection with securing Danish ports, the police districts must assist the local ports in preparing the vulnerability assessments and contingency plans mentioned above.

In order to assist and support the police districts in this task, PET has prepared extensive guidelines. The guidelines include a description of the new regula- tions, the distribution of responsibility between the different authorities as well as instructions in how to prepare vulnerability assessments and contingency plans. Furthermore, the guidelines include an assessment of the present level of terror threat against maritime interests in Denmark.

38 In the future and as required, PET will prepare current assessments of the terror threat against maritime interests in Denmark. The guidelines are available in Danish only at the website of PET: www.pet.dk.

Furthermore, as part of the handling of the ordinary and day-to-day tasks of an intelligence service, PET assists the police districts, port administrations and public authorities in advising on general security issues, including maritime security.

Other security assignments As at 1 January 2004, PET took over the permanent guarding of the private residence of the Danish Prime Minister. The task was previously handled by Copenhagen Police.

COUNTER-EXTREMISM One of PET’s main tasks is to survey and when necessary to prevent that groups or persons use extremist and undemocratic methods in order to reach political, ideological or religious goals. This could be in the form of using power, e.g. violence, vandalism, threats or any other type of disturbance of the order of society in order to attempt to infl uence public issues. Investigations within this fi eld are made on the basis of Section 114c or Section 114d of the Danish Criminal Code.

In 2003, PET has offered investigative support and assistance to the police in a number of cases where there were indications that right or left wing extremists would attempt to thwart political assemblies, harass public fi gures or carry out activities involving a risk of disturbances. Attention has in this connection been particularly focused on if and to which extent Danish participation in the Iraq war would give rise to disturbances in Denmark.

Left-wing extremism After the Danish EU Presidency there were indications that parts of the left- wing extremist circles which had previously been trend-setting in the anti-glo- balisation movement had experienced declining support and some perplexity. This is perhaps linked with the fact that a number of the actions and activities that had been planned in connection with the Danish EU Presidency were either prevented by the police or only had limited impact because of insuffi cient internal and external backing. The anti-globalisation movement was left in a more or less vacuum with no specifi c joint unifying cause after the Danish EU Presidency.

The resistance against the Iraq-war and Danish participation therein were fac- tors that to a certain extent unifi ed parts of the left-wing extremist circles. In the course of the spring of 2003, individuals and groups on the extreme left wing, including the activist network Global Roots, carried out a number of anti-war actions. One of these actions took place at Naval Base Korsoer where approx. 200 persons participated and almost 10 persons forced their way into the naval base to demonstrate against the departure of the corvette Olfert Fischer to the Gulf. Furthermore, a sit-down happening was held at Naval Station Copen- hagen and the central warehouse of the Danish supermarket chain, Netto, was blocked.

39 The culmination of the actions which subsequently gained extensive symbolic value to the left-wing extremist circles was the attack by throwing red paint on Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller in the Danish Parliament, Folketinget, on 18 March 2003. The two activists had gained access to the Folketing by explaining to the guards that they had an appointment with a Member of Parliament. The Folketing had up until this event been considered a secure and safe area. The activists were arrested for the attack and on 27 May 2003 they were sentenced to three and four months’ unsuspended imprisonment respectively.

The day when the Coalition initiated the war against Iraq on 20 March 2003 was marked by various attacks of harassment in Denmark. The Danish Liberty Memorial was drenched with red paint and attempts were made to block the infrastructure of the S-train networks (the electrifi ed railways of Greater Co- penhagen) and other main transport junctions. Additionally in October 2003 six members of parliament and government were vandalised on politically mo- tivated grounds when on the pavement outside their residences insulting words like “war criminal” had been painted. Subsequently, the Youth Association of the Communist Party of Denmark claimed responsibility for this act in a press release.

Furthermore, Danish activists participated in anti-war demonstrations abroad, among other places in Switzerland, Sweden and Germany.

Right-wing extremism PET has established a continuously increasing level of activity within the right- wing extremist circles in Denmark and the various groups are actively attempt- ing to recruit new members.

The Danish National Socialist Movement (DNSB) has distributed leafl ets in connection with which some leafl ets have been targeted on specifi c areas or topics. According to the website of DNSB more than 21,000 leafl ets were dis- tributed in 2003. Other attempts to recruit new members have been targeted at children and young persons.

In respect of the various groups, e.g. Blood & Honour and Danish Front, it has been established that these groups co-operate in a number of areas and they also meet at concerts and other events. Members of the groups have also participated in the annual recurrent Rudolf Hess March in Wunsiedel, Germany on 16 August. Several of the groups have also visited and received visitors from like-minded groups abroad, e.g. Combat 18 in England.

Increased international contact between right-wing extremist groups has been established as a result of the Internet which makes it possible for the groups to gather spontaneously and without any specifi c reason. It is also the assessment that right-wing extremist groups attempt to take part in politics at EU level, which increases the risk of creating confrontations with the left-wing circles.

In more general terms, it has been established that the groups more or less systematically spread and promote highly racist and insulting messages. At the same time, individuals of non-Danish origin who work towards integra-

40 tion and cultural and religious understanding and tolerance are intimidated and harassed at regular intervals. Such activities may evidently contribute to increased polarisation of society and risk of disturbances between ethnic Danes and ethnic minorities. In this connection, PET is particularly attentive to it that such trends may become a conscious item on the agenda and strategy of various actors, including within the right-wing extremist circles.

COUNTER-ESPIONAGE Foreign intelligence services are still active in Denmark, for example gathering information not publicly available and which must be expected to be of great value to the country carrying out the espionage. However, contrary to what was the case during the Cold War, espionage today concentrates on the gathering of factual information rather than actual subversive activities.

In the course of 2003, PET’s Counter-Espionage Section carried out a number of preventive talks, including a number of enquiries to companies, institutions and public authorities presumed to be a target for espionage or already being the target of foreign intelligence activities.

In an increasing number of instances, the counter-espionage section has been in contact with individuals who have been targets for the foreign intelligence services. PET has had so-called security talks with the purpose of preventing that attempts are made at recruiting these target persons. In many instances the persons who have been contacted have not been aware of what exactly they were about to get involved in and whom they were actually in contact with as the foreign intelligence service often operates “under false colours”. By carrying out these preventive talks, the Service has prevented that a number of cases have developed into specifi c espionage cases.

Furthermore, in November 2003 the section hosted an international security conference at which the espionage threat against companies and their employees was discussed.

Danish companies increasingly contact the counter-espionage section in order to be advised and guided when they believe that the company or the staff have been exposed to espionage activities or attempts at recruitment.

When the Danish police and other public authorities post offi cial representa- tives abroad, PET also prepares these personnel on how to counter and avoid exposing themselves as espionage targets for the foreign powers. In addition, the Service advises on measures and precautions with a view to protecting classifi ed information as best as possible. Danish diplomats who are posted to specifi cally threatened areas also participate in security talks.

Generally speaking, cases concerning industrial espionage are investigated by the uniformed police. If there is any suspicion that a foreign intelligence service is involved in industrial espionage, it becomes a matter within the fi eld of activ- ity of PET. The Service assists Danish companies with advice and guidance on industrial espionage and on how to take precautions against this. In September 2003, a leafl et was published on industrial espionage prepared in co-operation with the Confederation of Danish Industries. The guidelines are available elec- tronically on the website of the Confederation of Danish Industries, www.di.dk.

41 OTHER ACTIVITIES The enquiry commissions In 1999, an act was passed to set up an enquiry commission with the scope of examining and accounting for, among other things, the police intelligence activities in relation to political parties in the period from 1945-1989. In 2000, the Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS (the former DUPI) was assigned with preparing a historical analysis taking the form of a White Paper on Denmark’s security political position during the period from 1945 until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In August 2002, the scope of the analysis was expanded to include an overview of the offi cial Danish security policy and the Danish security political debate with particular attention on the period leading up to the end of the Cold War.

In connection with these investigations, PET set up a secretariat to assist the enquiry commission and the work of the DIIS. It is the task of the secretariat to fi nd the many cases and documents that the committee and the DIIS require in connection with their investigations.

This has proved to be a very comprehensive task and it is estimated that PET has reviewed approx. 45,000 cases in order to assess whether the individual case could be considered covered by the scope of the different commissions.

In this respect it could be mentioned that considerations of the sources and liai- sons of the Service render it necessary that – in the light of any future requests of access – there is a limit to just how wide a circle of outsiders must be given access to the archives and records of the Service.

In 2003, the Minister of Justice set up a commission assigned to examine and account for the complete course of events regarding the co-operation of Danish police with the former biker gang member Dan Lynge in connection with the investigation and fi ghting of biker gang crime as well as in other connections.

In 2004, the scope of the commission was expanded to include the conditions concerning a person who, allegedly with the knowledge of the police and with- out charges being raised, sold weapons to Hells Angels.

In connection with this investigation, PET must also assist in fi nding docu- ments and cases to be used by the commission for its examinations, as the Service had activities within biker gang crime from 1991-1998.

THE REPORTING OF Since the autumn of 1992, PET has received reports from the police districts re- CRIMINAL INCIDENTS garding criminal incidents which may have a racial background and are directed WITH POTENTIAL RACIAL towards aliens. The scheme was changed in 2001 to include all criminal inci- OR RELIGIOUS TONES dents with a potential racial/religious background irrespective of the incident being directed towards an individual or an interest of foreign or Danish origin.

The object of this reporting scheme is primarily to provide the Service with the possibility of assessing whether there are signs of a more organised and system- atic criminal activity emanating from racism and xenophobia. This assessment is made by comparing each reported incident with the rest of the stored informa- tion of the Service regarding the specifi c cases and by comparing the various reported incidents.

42 In 2003, PET received a total of 52 reports from the police districts regarding criminal incidents with a potential racial background. The reports seem to come from all over Denmark. Compared to the 2002 reports, Copenhagen has noted a decrease in number from 34 reports to 18, whereas Aarhus has experienced en increase in number of reports from 5 to 18. It is, nevertheless, not surprising that the incidents seem to be concentrated around large cities, ranking Copen- hagen in the top with 18 reports and Aarhus second with its 12 reports.

It is very uncertain whether these fi gures account for the actual number of racially motivated criminal incidents. On this basis PET intends in 2005 to look into whether there are certain conditions in respect of the administration of this scheme that need to be adjusted so it will be possible to detect any hidden crime.

APPENDIX The appendices referred to in the Annual Report are available on the website of PET: www.pet.dk Gøtze Grafi sk, Herning · 97 22 01 60