Railway Crashes and Disasters part 1

INTRODUCTION

From the conception of the railways as we know them today, starting with the Stockton to Darlington Railway in 1825, successive governments adopted the “laissez faire” attitude to the railway companies, once they had received their act of parliament to create their railway and their route of the railway approved, they were allowed to run their enterprise as they saw fit. The priority of the railway companies was to provide profits and dividends for the shareholders, anything which threatened to reduce these liquid assets were ignored, and this included safety for passengers and staff. It was only when events caused the public to sit up and take notice that the government acted. This first part covers 4 accidents which need not have happened, due to human error and the operating conditions relevant at that time:

STAPLEHURST, KENT: 9 June 1865

At 3:13 p.m. The Southern Eastern Railway Folkestone to London boat train was derailed while crossing a viaduct, where a length of track had been removed during engineering work, killing 10 passengers and injuring 40. In the Board of Trade report it was found that a man had been placed with a red flag 554 yards (507 metres) away, but regulations required him to be 1000 yards (910 metres) away and train had insufficient time to stop. The driver also had not been given any notification about the track repairs in that area. The train consisted of a rake of 14 units of which 4 were brake vans, these plus the engine were the only way of stopping the train, there was not a continuous braking system - that came later. Charles Dickens was travelling with his mistress, Ellen Ternan and her mother. They all survived the ordeal. He tended the victims, some of whom died, while he was with them, the experience affected greatly he lost his voice for two weeks and afterwards was nervous when travelling by train, using alternate means whenever possible. He died 5 years later to the day after the accident, his son said he had never fully recovered. Dickens refused to attend the resulting inquest, as it would have revealed his liaison with Ellen Ternan, which at that time would have destroyed his reputation. It is said that the Staplehurst accident led to, or at least contributed to the formation of Rule 55, Protection of Train, which is still in use in a much-modified form today. The basic principle is that waiting trains on running lines must remind the signal controller (signaller) of their presence. It applied on British Railways in the 19th and 20th centuries, and was superseded by the Modular Rulebook following privatisation. Staplehurst apart, it was introduced following a spate of

accidents caused by signalmen forgetting that trains were standing on a running line, sometimes within sight of their signalboxes.

TAY BRIDGE DISASTER: 28 December 1879

By the middle of the 1860s, the North British Railway was running main line service to Berwick, Carlisle, Glasgow and Aberdeen, the latter was achieved via the Edinburgh & Northern Railway using ferries across the Rivers Forth and Tay. There was therefore a need to construct bridges across these rivers. Thomas Bouch approached the Edinburgh & Northern Railway in 1854 about bridging the Tay, but money was not available. In 1869 the idea was revived, with North British Railway, heavily investing in the scheme, and Bouch was appointed designer and overseer of the project. His lattice-grid design combined cast- iron and wrought iron, supported on brick piers resting on the bedrock, which trial borings showed to be of no great depth. When it came apparent the Tay was deeper than predicted, Bouch redesigned the bridge, with fewer piers and correspondingly longer span girders. The change in design increased costs and caused delays in completion. The finished bridge consisted of 85 spans and was at that time the longest bridge in the world. The first locomotive crossed the bridge on 26th September 1877 carrying local VIPs and senior railway officials. A Board of trade inspection was carried out over three days in good weather, and was passed for passenger traffic, subject to a speed limit of 25 m.p.h. On 28th December 1879 the east of Scotland was blasted by Beaufort force 10/11 gale. The wind was estimated at times blowing at 81 m.p.h. the single track was limited to one train at a time, by means of a signalling blocking system using a baton as a token. At 7.13 p.m. a six-coach train heading north slowed to pick up the token from the signal cabin, then headed onto the bridge. 200 yds. from the cabin, sparks were seen coming from the wheels, before the train moved into the high girders, there was a sudden flash of light, then total darkness, the tail lights of the train, the sparks and the flash of light vanished. No train exited the bridge, communications with the north bank were lost, as the block instrument were dead. The bridge had taken the full force of the strong side winds, collapsing the “high-girder section of the bridge, taking the train with it. Daybreak showed the entire high-girder section from pier 28 to pier 41 had vanished. It was estimated 74 or 75 people lost their lives, 46 bodies were recovered, while some were never identified. The subsequent inquiry concluded the bridge that the bridge was “badly designed, badly built and badly maintained”. The fall of the bridge was occasioned by insufficiency of

the cross bracing and its fastenings to sustain the force of the gale. Thomas Bouch’s reputation lay in unredeemable tatters. He died a few months after the public inquiry ended, his health having seriously deteriorated. The engine, 1871-built North British 4-4-0 No. 224 was later recovered, rebuilt and returned to service, remaining in service until 1919. Nicknamed “The Diver” superstitious drivers refused to take her over the replacement bridge, which, built of steel was erected by William Arrol & Company under the direction of William Barlow. Work started 6th July 1883, with the bridge opening on 13th July 1887.

ARMAGH: 12 June 1889

A Sunday School Excursion to Warrenpoint had been organised, a distance of 24 miles (38 km.). A Great Northern Railway of Ireland train of 13 coaches with a 2-4-0 locomotive had been assigned to do the journey although 2 more coaches were available if required. Although the train was fitted with continuous braking, operated by the driver from his footplate, it was a non-automatic vacuum type. There were 2 brake vans, one next to the engine and the other located at the rear of the train. The driver had ridden the route on other

excursion trains but he had never driven it. 800 passengers had booked for the trip, but in the end 940 actually travelled, so it was decided to use all the 15 coaches. After the tickets had been checked the passengers were locked into the coaches. The train set off, just outside Armagh station there was an incline, which the train began to ascend at about 10 mph. 200 yards (183 m) short of the summit the engine stalled. The Dundalk Superintendent Clerk, James Elliott was on board, he ordered the train to be divided at the fifth coach, and the front portion taken to Hamiltonsbawn Station, which could only accommodate 5 coaches in its sidings, then the engine return for the rear section of 10

carriages. Dividing the train meant the rear coaches now only had the brake in the brake van to stop them running down the incline. Stones were placed behind some of the wheels as extra precaution. Unfortunately as the front half of the train started off, the coaches slid backwards, bumping the rear ones, crushing the stones and overriding the brake van hand brake. The coaches began to move down the gradient, gaining speed, and crashing into a scheduled express. 80 passengers were killed, and 260 injured, a third of them children. It was the worse railway accident the 19th century, and is still the worst Irish railway accident The government was forced impose safety rules and regulations on the railway companies, which they had been reluctant to implement: Regulation of the Railways Act 1889. The absolute block system and the mandatory fitting of continuous automatic brakes (requests by the Board of Trade which had in the past had all fallen on deaf ears).This legislation is widely considered as the end of the Victorian tradition of government non-interference in private railway company business, and the beginning of the modern era in UK rail safety. Rarely has a railway accident had more resounding repercussions. The driver, the fireman and James Elliott were committed for trial on manslaughter charges, but all were acquitted.

QUINTINSHILL: 22 May 1915

Happening during the First World War, it is the worst railway accident to occur on our railways. Just North of Gretna Green, near the England-Scottish border, Quintinshill was the location of an isolated signal box. There was the double track of the London to Glasgow main line, with a single passing loop on either side. On the day in question, these passing loops each contained a goods trains waiting for a time when they could proceed on their ways. In the Second World War, the government commandeered the running of the railway, giving complete control of train movements, but in the First World War, although the government took over the railways, companies were allowed to run their own timetable. On this particular day, George Meakin was nearing the end of a 10 hour shift, and because express trains from London had priority, he phoned Roger Kirkpatrick at Gretna Junction saying he would halt the local 6:17 a.m. train until the express had arrived. His colleague, signalman James Tinsley was late for work so he cadged a lift on this local train. When it arrived at 6.30 a.m. it was shunted on the down main line. The express to Edinburgh and Aberdeen passed safely through. Eleven minutes later, a southbound troop train bound for Liverpool Docks crashed into the stationary local train, scattering coaches across the main lines, One minute later a Glasgow express ploughed into the wreckage. James Tinsley had started his shift, but forgot about the local train on the up main line, so failed to signal the troop train to stop. The troop train was carrying soldiers - 7th Royal Scots, Territorals a close-knit military unit known colloquially as the Leith Battalion in recognition of the port town of Edinburgh from where many of them were drawn. It had started out from Larbert station near Falkirk at 3;42 a.m. It consisted of fifteen coaches, a motley assortment of ancient (some built 50 years earlier) non-corridor vehicles, a quarter eight-wheeled coaches, the remainder had 6 wheels, all of which borrowed from Great Central Railway. The underframes of these wooden-bodied coaches were built mostly of oak, a form of construction which was obsolete. There was also an assortment Caledonian Railway wagons and van coupled to the rear including a brake van coupled to its rear loaded with military equipment and ammunition. The coaches were lit by gas, the gas cylinders stored in underframes. On impact of the express the wooden coaches caught fire and the gas cylinders exploded. 226 were killed, 246 injured.

James Tinsley and George Meakin were blamed for the accident, although they had been put into an impossible position by the traffic movements prevalent at that time. They had made mistakes, but decisions by the railway authorities ensured a disaster of monumental proportions. Their case went to court, although medical evidence was given James Tinsley was sentenced to 3 years and George Meakin to 18 months, being released at the end of 1916. Their families were looked after by the railway, and they were re-employed by the Caledonian Railway Company on their release, but not as signalmen. They were scapegoats, enabling the railway companies avoiding answers to awkward questions.

If you want to learn more about this accident I can recommend - THE QUINTINSHILL CONSPIRACY by Jack Richards & Adrian Searle.