Short Dialogues of Plato
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The Roles of Solon in Plato's Dialogues
The Roles of Solon in Plato’s Dialogues Dissertation Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Samuel Ortencio Flores, M.A. Graduate Program in Greek and Latin The Ohio State University 2013 Dissertation Committee: Bruce Heiden, Advisor Anthony Kaldellis Richard Fletcher Greg Anderson Copyrighy by Samuel Ortencio Flores 2013 Abstract This dissertation is a study of Plato’s use and adaptation of an earlier model and tradition of wisdom based on the thought and legacy of the sixth-century archon, legislator, and poet Solon. Solon is cited and/or quoted thirty-four times in Plato’s dialogues, and alluded to many more times. My study shows that these references and allusions have deeper meaning when contextualized within the reception of Solon in the classical period. For Plato, Solon is a rhetorically powerful figure in advancing the relatively new practice of philosophy in Athens. While Solon himself did not adequately establish justice in the city, his legacy provided a model upon which Platonic philosophy could improve. Chapter One surveys the passing references to Solon in the dialogues as an introduction to my chapters on the dialogues in which Solon is a very prominent figure, Timaeus- Critias, Republic, and Laws. Chapter Two examines Critias’ use of his ancestor Solon to establish his own philosophic credentials. Chapter Three suggests that Socrates re- appropriates the aims and themes of Solon’s political poetry for Socratic philosophy. Chapter Four suggests that Solon provides a legislative model which Plato reconstructs in the Laws for the philosopher to supplant the role of legislator in Greek thought. -
The Ostensible Author of Ps.-Aeschines Letter 10 Reconsidered
Journal of Hellenic Studies 139 (2019) 210–221 doi:10.1017/S0075426919000703 © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 2019 THE OSTENSIBLE AUTHOR OF PS.-AESCHINES LETTER 10 RECONSIDERED ZILONG GUO Northeast Normal University* Abstract: This article examines the alleged author, or first-person narrator, of the tenth pseudonymous letter in the Corpus Aeschineum. It argues that the forger, in a short epistolary novel that describes the seduction of a certain Callirhoe in Troy, uses puns (αἰσχύνειν, ἀναισχυντία, etc.) on the name of the fourth-century BC orator Aeschines. It notes that αἰσχρός-words recur in ancient works and, as a rhetorical device, are attested in Demosthenes. The forger’s aims are, first, to serialize the ‘Aeschinean’ letters as a whole by relating them to the same author and, second, to create an ‘aischro- logic’ counterpart of the Callirhoe, which is attributed to Chariton (Χαρίτων/‘The Graceful’). Thus there is less likelihood of suggesting other figures such as the eponymous Aeschines Socraticus. Keywords: pseudonymous letters, authorship, Aeschines, Chariton, pun In the manuscript tradition of Aeschines we find a collection of 12 letters that purport to describe the orator’s exile from Athens after the ‘crown trial’ in 330 BC. These letters are called ‘pseudony- mous’ because of their questionable authenticity: Letters 2, 3, 7, 11 and 12 imitate the letters of Demosthenes and are reminiscent of the historical declamations and progymnasmata familiar from Hellenistic times onward; Letters 1, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 reconstruct a fictitious narrative of Aeschines’ exile, and have traditionally been accepted as products of the so-called Second Sophistic. -
Citations in Classics and Ancient History
Citations in Classics and Ancient History The most common style in use in the field of Classical Studies is the author-date style, also known as Chicago 2, but MLA is also quite common and perfectly acceptable. Quick guides for each of MLA and Chicago 2 are readily available as PDF downloads. The Chicago Manual of Style Online offers a guide on their web-page: http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html The Modern Language Association (MLA) does not, but many educational institutions post an MLA guide for free access. While a specific citation style should be followed carefully, none take into account the specific practices of Classical Studies. They are all (Chicago, MLA and others) perfectly suitable for citing most resources, but should not be followed for citing ancient Greek and Latin primary source material, including primary sources in translation. Citing Primary Sources: Every ancient text has its own unique system for locating content by numbers. For example, Homer's Iliad is divided into 24 Books (what we might now call chapters) and the lines of each Book are numbered from line 1. Herodotus' Histories is divided into nine Books and each of these Books is divided into Chapters and each chapter into line numbers. The purpose of such a system is that the Iliad, or any primary source, can be cited in any language and from any publication and always refer to the same passage. That is why we do not cite Herodotus page 66. Page 66 in what publication, in what edition? Very early in your textbook, Apodexis Historia, a passage from Herodotus is reproduced. -
On the Arrangement of the Platonic Dialogues
Ryan C. Fowler 25th Hour On the Arrangement of the Platonic Dialogues I. Thrasyllus a. Diogenes Laertius (D.L.), Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 3.56: “But, just as long ago in tragedy the chorus was the only actor, and afterwards, in order to give the chorus breathing space, Thespis devised a single actor, Aeschylus a second, Sophocles a third, and thus tragedy was completed, so too with philosophy: in early times it discoursed on one subject only, namely physics, then Socrates added the second subject, ethics, and Plato the third, dialectics, and so brought philosophy to perfection. Thrasyllus says that he [Plato] published his dialogues in tetralogies, like those of the tragic poets. Thus they contended with four plays at the Dionysia, the Lenaea, the Panathenaea and the festival of Chytri. Of the four plays the last was a satiric drama; and the four together were called a tetralogy.” b. Characters or types of dialogues (D.L. 3.49): 1. instructive (ὑφηγητικός) A. theoretical (θεωρηµατικόν) a. physical (φυσικόν) b. logical (λογικόν) B. practical (πρακτικόν) a. ethical (ἠθικόν) b. political (πολιτικόν) 2. investigative (ζητητικός) A. training the mind (γυµναστικός) a. obstetrical (µαιευτικός) b. tentative (πειραστικός) B. victory in controversy (ἀγωνιστικός) a. critical (ἐνδεικτικός) b. subversive (ἀνατρεπτικός) c. Thrasyllan categories of the dialogues (D.L. 3.50-1): Physics: Timaeus Logic: Statesman, Cratylus, Parmenides, and Sophist Ethics: Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium, Menexenus, Clitophon, the Letters, Philebus, Hipparchus, Rivals Politics: Republic, the Laws, Minos, Epinomis, Atlantis Obstetrics: Alcibiades 1 and 2, Theages, Lysis, Laches Tentative: Euthyphro, Meno, Io, Charmides and Theaetetus Critical: Protagoras Subversive: Euthydemus, Gorgias, and Hippias 1 and 2 :1 d. -
Rethinking Athenian Democracy.Pdf
Rethinking Athenian Democracy A dissertation presented by Daniela Louise Cammack to The Department of Government in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Political Science Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts January 2013 © 2013 Daniela Cammack All rights reserved. Professor Richard Tuck Daniela Cammack Abstract Conventional accounts of classical Athenian democracy represent the assembly as the primary democratic institution in the Athenian political system. This looks reasonable in the light of modern democracy, which has typically developed through the democratization of legislative assemblies. Yet it conflicts with the evidence at our disposal. Our ancient sources suggest that the most significant and distinctively democratic institution in Athens was the courts, where decisions were made by large panels of randomly selected ordinary citizens with no possibility of appeal. This dissertation reinterprets Athenian democracy as “dikastic democracy” (from the Greek dikastēs, “judge”), defined as a mode of government in which ordinary citizens rule principally through their control of the administration of justice. It begins by casting doubt on two major planks in the modern interpretation of Athenian democracy: first, that it rested on a conception of the “wisdom of the multitude” akin to that advanced by epistemic democrats today, and second that it was “deliberative,” meaning that mass discussion of political matters played a defining role. The first plank rests largely on an argument made by Aristotle in support of mass political participation, which I show has been comprehensively misunderstood. The second rests on the interpretation of the verb “bouleuomai” as indicating speech, but I suggest that it meant internal reflection in both the courts and the assembly. -
Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues Author(S): R
Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues Author(s): R. E. Allen Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 69, No. 2, (Apr., 1960), pp. 147-164 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183501 Accessed: 10/08/2008 14:32 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=duke. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. http://www.jstor.org PARTICIPATION AND PREDICATION IN PLATO'S MIDDLE DIALOGUES* I PROPOSE in this paper to examine three closely related issues in the interpretation of Plato's middle dialogues: the nature of Forms, of participation, and of predication. -
The Regime of Demetrius of Phalerum in Athens, 317–307
Th e Regime of Demetrius of Phalerum in Athens, 317–307 BCE Mnemosyne Supplements History and Archaeology of Classical Antiquity Edited by Susan E. Alcock, Brown University Th omas Harrison, Liverpool Willem M. Jongman, Groningen H.S. Versnel, Leiden VOLUME 318 Th e Regime of Demetrius of Phalerum in Athens, 317–307 BCE A Philosopher in Politics By Lara O’Sullivan LEIDEN • BOSTON 2009 On the cover: Detail of the Parthenon. Photo: Author. Th is book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data O’Sullivan, Lara. Th e rule of Demetrius of Phalerum in Athens, 317-307 B.C. : a philosopher in politics / by Lara O’Sullivan. p. cm. — (Mnemosyne supplements. History and archaeology of classical antiquity, ISSN 0169-8958 ; v. 318) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-17888-5 (hbk. : alk. paper) 1. Demetrius, of Phaleron, b. ca. 350 B.C. 2. Demetrius, of Phaleron, b. ca. 350 B.C.—Political and social views. 3. Governors—Greece—Athens—Biography. 4. Statesmen—Greece—Athens— Biography. 5. Orators—Greece—Athens—Biography. 6. Philosophers, Ancient— Biography. 7. Athens (Greece)—Politics and government. 8. Philosophy, Ancient. 9. Athens (Greece)—Relations—Macedonia. 10. Macedonia—Relations—Greece— Athens. I. Title. II. Series. DF235.48.D455O87 2009 938’.508092—dc22 [B] 2009033560 ISSN 0169-8958 ISBN 978 90 04 17888 5 Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, Th e Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. -
Self-Knowledge, Elenchus and Authority in Early Plato
Phronesis 65 (2020) 247-280 brill.com/phro Self-Knowledge, Elenchus and Authority in Early Plato Fiona Leigh University College, London [email protected] Abstract In some of Plato’s early dialogues we find a concern with correctly ascertaining the contents of a particular kind of one’s own psychological states, cognitive states. Indeed, one of the achievements of the elenctic method is to facilitate cognitive self- knowledge. In the Alcibiades, moreover, Plato interprets the Delphic injunction, ‘know yourself’, as crucially requiring cognitive self-knowledge, and ending in knowing one- self as subject to particular epistemic norms. Epistemic authority for self-knowledge is, for Plato, conferred on the basis of correct application of norms to cognitive self- ascriptions, and not confined to the first-personal perspective. This implies first- personal plural epistemic authority for self-knowledge. Keywords self-knowledge – elenchus – epistemic authority – dialogue – Alcibiades – Apology – Laches – Gorgias 1 Introduction In contemporary discussions of the topic that has become known as ‘self- knowledge’, philosophers not infrequently ask whether knowing the contents of one’s own thought is like perception or something more distinctive and spe- cial, or worry about privileged access to one’s own states.1 By contrast, scholarly 1 See for example, Ryle 1949, ch. 6, Evans 1982, Boghossian 1989, Shoemaker 1994, Cassam 1994, O’Brien 2007, Gertler 2015. © Fiona Leigh, 2020 | doi:10.1163/15685284-bja10020 This is an open access article distributed -
PLATO's LYSIS: APORIA and DIALECTIC LOGOI FRIENDSHIP «REALIZED» ALL THROUGHOUT the DIALOGUE* Antoni BOSCH-VECIANA
RCatT XXIIII1 (1998) 109-118 O Facultat de Teologia de Catalunya PLATO'S LYSIS: APORIA AND DIALECTIC LOGOI FRIENDSHIP «REALIZED» ALL THROUGHOUT THE DIALOGUE* Antoni BOSCH-VECIANA The last words in the Lysis are eloquent enough and induce us, at first, to feel disappointed: «what a friend is, we have not yet succeeded in discover- ingni (O6nco 6E 0.61 íktiv Ó cpiho~oioi te Eyevóyeea EEeug~iv:223b7-8). Just before these words, after Socrates' summary of what had been said in that part of the dialogue (a summary like those that orators used to pronounce be- fore tribunals), we hear from Socrates' own mouth, and in just as conclusive a way: «If none of these is a friend, 1 am at a loss for anything further to say» (ei pq6Ev to6tov rpihov Eatív, Eyh pEv oGniti Exco ti AÉyco: 222e6-7). The fail- ure of the quest seems evident enough. Accordingly, many scholars have reached a definitive conclusion: the Lysis is a dialogue without an outcome. The aporia, to which we have been led by the different examinations to which the question about friendship asked to Menexenus has been subjected, is finally witnessed in 223b7-8. At the beginning of his conversation with Menexenus, when the latter was on his way back after having helped in a religious cere- mony, Socrates asked him this question following Lysis' request: «When one person loves another, which of the two becomes a friend of the other, the lov- ing of the loved, or the loved of the loving? Or is there no difference?» (EnaiGav ti5 tiva cp~hq,nótego5 not6gou cpihoc yiyvetct~,Ó q~A6vtoU cpihoupivou $ Ó cpihoUp~v05toV cpihof~vto~oO6Ev G~acpÉ~ai;212a8-bl). -
Athenian Homicide Rhetoric in Context
ATHENIAN HOMICIDE RHETORIC IN CONTEXT BY CHRISTINE C. PLASTOW Thesis submitted to University College London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy DEPARTMENT OF GREEK AND LATIN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON 1 DECLARATION I, Christine C. Plastow, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. Signed: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 ABSTRACT Homicide is a potent crime in any society, and classical Athens was no exception. The Athenians implemented legal methods for dealing with homicide that were set apart from the rest of their legal system, including separate courts, long-established laws, and rigorous procedures. We have, however, limited extant sources on these issues, including only five speeches from trials for homicide. This has fomented debate regarding aspects of law and procedure, and rhetoric as it relates specifically to homicide has not been examined in detail. Here, I intend to examine how the nature of homicide and its prosecution at Athens may have affected rhetoric when discussing homicide in forensic oratory. First, I will establish what I will call the ideology of homicide at Athens: the set of beliefs and perceptions that are most commonly attached to homicide and its prosecution. Then, I will examine homicide rhetoric from three angles: religious pollution, which was believed to adhere to those who committed homicide; relevance, as speakers in the homicide courts were subject to particular restrictions in this regard; and motive and intent, related issues that appear frequently in rhetoric and, in some cases, define the nature of a homicide charge. -
The Ascent from Nominalism Philosophical Studies Series
THE ASCENT FROM NOMINALISM PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES Editors: WILFRID SELLARS, University of Pittsburgh KEITH LEHRER, University of Arizona Board of Consulting Editors: J ON A THAN BENNETT, Syracuse University ALLAN GIBBARD, University of Michigan ROBERT STALNAKER, Cornell University ROBERT G. TURNBULL, Ohio State University VOLUME 37 TERR Y PENNER Department of Philosophy, The University of Wisconsin at Madison, U.S.A. THE ASCENT FROM NOMINALISM Some Existence Arguments in Plato's Middle Dialogues D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY ~~ A MEMBER OF THE KLUWER . ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS GROUP DORDRECHTj BOSTONj LANCASTERjTOKYO Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Penner, Terry, 1936- The ascent from nominalism. (Philosophical studies series; v. 37) Bibliography: p. Includes indexes. 1. Plato. 2. Aristotle. 3. Metaphysics-History. 4. Nominalism-History. I. Title. II. Series. B395.P347 1987 111'.2'0924 86·31641 ISBN-13: 978-94-010-8186-3 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-3791-8 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-3791-8 Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland. Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada by Kluwer Academic Publishers, 101 Philip Drive, Assinippi Park, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A. In all other countries, sold and distributed by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, Holland. All Rights Reserved © 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland Softcover reprint of the hardcover I 5t edition 1987 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical induding photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Much of this work was conceived and executed between 1971 and 1975, though some of it was done much earlier, and a few bits are quite recent. -
The Arousal of Emotion in Plato's Dialogues Author(S): David L. Blank Source: the Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol
The Arousal of Emotion in Plato's Dialogues Author(s): David L. Blank Source: The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 43, No. 2, (1993), pp. 428-439 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/639181 Accessed: 10/08/2008 13:36 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. http://www.jstor.org Classical Quarterly 43 (ii) 428-439 (1993) Printed in Great Britain 428 THE AROUSAL OF EMOTION IN PLATO'S DIALOGUES In Aeschines' dialogue Alcibiades, Socrates sees his brilliant young partner's haughty attitude towards the great Themistocles.