The Principle of Subsidiarity: the Example of ECCAS in the Central African Crisis
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The Principle of Subsidiarity The Example of ECCAS in the Central African Crisis - Bringing a peace process closer to the people - A Joint ECCAS-CMI Publication The Principle of Subsidiarity The Example of ECCAS in the Central African Crisis - Bringing a peace process closer to the people - A Joint ECCAS-CMI Publication 2 The principle of subsidiarity is founded on the idea that sustainable peace is possible if conflict resolution mechanisms are led by actors who are culturally, geopolitically and/or strategically close to the crisis in question. 3 Executive summary Union and various Regional Economic Communities (RECs); and to a lesser extent the United Nations and the Regional Economic Communities directly. The principle of subsidiarity is founded on the While the UN charter does not refer to the principle idea that sustainable peace is possible if conflict of subsidiarity2, within APSA the relationship resolution mechanisms are led by actors who are between the AU and RECs is explicitly addressed in culturally, geopolitically and/or strategically close two documents: the 2002 Protocol relating to the to the crisis in question. In the African context, establishment of the Peace and Security Council, mediation should therefore be directly supported and the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding and, where appropriate, led by Regional Economic on cooperation in the area of peace and security Communities (RECs). The recent intervention of a between the AU and the RECs.3 The principle’s REC, the Economic Community of Central African application is often explained as follows. The first State (ECCAS), in the Central African Republic intervener should be the lowest level, i.e. the REC. If (CAR) offers valuable insights on the extents and this intervention fails, the next level, the AU, would limits of the principle. It is hoped, in the words of take over. Should this also fail, the ultimate level, the one commentator, that development of a shared UN would be in charge.4 The reality is more complex understanding of this principle “would help to however. Despite the fact that one actor would have minimise competition and discord among the peace- the main responsibility, contributions and support making bodies, demarcate responsibilities, expedite from the other levels would still be expected in policy and operational harmonisation and ensure accordance with the principle of complementarity African ownership of peace initiatives.”1 and comparative advantage. We indeed witnessed this in the case of CAR, where the UN and the AU In 2012, when renewed tensions arose in CAR, ECCAS increased their support to ECCAS when the crisis took the lead in resolving the crisis. To support reached a certain degree of complexity. ECCAS in this role, and in consultation with the African Union (AU), a mediation support team was Bearing in mind all of the limitations, the principle of deployed. The team consisted of experts from the subsidiarity was applied in the resolution efforts of Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), a Finnish non- the CAR crisis. In the early phases, ECCAS was able governmental organization specializing in mediation to swiftly take the lead in intervening. In doing so, and dialogue. Building on a fruitful collaboration, it sought to balance the importance of preserving ECCAS and CMI developed a case study on the constitutional order in CAR with the reality on the application of the principle of subsidiarity in CAR. ground. It did this by accommodating the AU’s The intention of the study was to gather lessons concern that no unconstitutional seizure of power from the process and share best practices with should be recognized. ECCAS sought to reach a policy makers, peace practitioners and international compromise by ensuring that the author of the organizations. A key observation that was made is 2013 coup submitted to an election process. With that while the secretariats of RECs are established the crisis reaching new degrees of complexity and by the region, if strengthened they will have the gravity, the mediation was transformed into an potential to mitigate perceptions and realities of regional state interests. For this, the provision of financial resources alone is not enough. Substantial 2 Although the UN Charter Chapter VIII describes regional arrangements for peace and security, and encourages localized technical support in mediation and political agency in conflict resolution, the primacy of the UN Security Council and its decisions is affirmed. backstopping by all relevant actors would allow RECs to fulfil their function more strongly within the African 3 By comparison, examining the principle in the European context where it also holds a significant place can provide a useful Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). insight. According to EU law the principle of subsidiarity “aims at determining the level of intervention that is most relevant in In the African context, three different levels of the areas of competences shared between the EU and the EU relationships are found: between the United Nations countries.” In any case, “the EU may only intervene if it is able to act more effectively than EU countries at their respective national (UN) and the African Union (AU); between the African or local levels.” (Eur-lex, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Aai0017, accessed 21/12/16). Therefore, intervention at the higher level is considered as the exception, whereas action at the lower level should be the rule. 1 Laurie Nathan, “Will the lowest be first? Subsidiarity in peacemaking in Africa”, Presentation Paper, 2016. 4 Nathan, ibid, 2016. 4 International Mediation consisting of the ECCAS Lead Secretariat benefited from a higher level of trust Mediator, with the AU and the UN acting as deputy from CAR stakeholders than other international mediators. All three entities agreed to implement a actors in the mediation. Furthermore, ECCAS’ low- three-phase mediation process: key approach was appreciated. By understanding local sensitivities the ECCAS Secretariat was able 1. A Forum in Brazzaville on National Reconciliation to positively influence the mediation process. For and Political Dialogue where a cessation of example, it understood the need for organizing the hostilities agreement was adopted; popular consultations. And when other actors sought 2. A consultative process/mediation education at to bypass this stage of the process altogether, the level of the prefectures, which was a sizable ECCAS was insistent that it should take place. The undertaking and where the ECCAS Secretariat failure of previous processes was often attributed was considerably involved; to the lack of involvement of populations outside 3. A larger national level forum in Bangui, with a Bangui. ECCAS stressed that a mediation process substantial contribution from ECCAS’ side, both would be in vain without the meaningful participation in planning and in facilitation. of populations concerned. Although peaceful elections followed the conclusion A special word of appreciation is due to ECCAS and of the mediation process, the ECCAS-led efforts CMI colleagues who served as the principal drafters faced considerable difficulties. Two main obstacles and copy editors of the text: Ambassador Adolphe were identified. First, suspicions by CAR and Nahayo, Alexis Symphorien Emvono, Ambassador international actors about some of the ECCAS Corentin Ki Doulaye, Mikko Patokallio, Gabrielle Member states’ interests, and perceptions of bias Priklopilova, and Antero Karvonen. A further word towards some conflict parties limited the extent of of gratitude is extended to Minister of State Marie ECCAS’ influence. Second, there was found to be an Noëlle Koyara for her constructive response to unclear division of labour and roles among the actors the case study. Minister Koyara’s reflection and of the international mediation, e.g. a duplication of an epilogue by Ambassador Nicolas Bwakira are tasks and disagreements on strategy, among the included within this publication. actors/stakeholders of the international mediation, and within ECCAS. We hope this case study serves as a valuable contribution to the field of mediation processes CMI provided assistance to ECCAS’ mediation design, and that it provides insights on the expertise through capacity building, logistical application of the principle of subsidiarity. support, and human resources. CMI’s contribution offers valuable lessons regarding the means by which subsidiarity can be supported. Increasing The 30th of November 2016, secretariats’ access to expertise, and thereby their role in mediation efforts, reduces the probability of Libreville, a conflict of interest without losing the benefit of proximity and legitimacy. In the CAR case however, Ambassador Baudouin Hamuli Kabarhuza, the Secretariat had a constrained ability to shape the Director of Political Affairs and approach decided at the Heads of State level, and of the Early Warning Mechanism a technical imbalance with the other actors in the of Central Africa (MARAC), mediation was present. Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Despite these limitations, ECCAS was still able to lend increased credibility and legitimacy to the Helsinki, CAR mediation, thereby improving its sustainability. Unlike at the member-state level, a REC secretariat Mr. Itonde A. Kakoma, is at times less vulnerable to perceptions of bias Head of Sub-Saharan Africa, and conflict of interest. This was apparent in the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI CAR peace