SPRING 1967/2017 • NUMBER 7 A JOURNAL OF CHRISTIANITY & AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY “WE HAVE UNITED JERUSALEM, THE DIVIDED CAPITAL OF ISRAEL. WE HAVE RETURNED TO THE HOLIEST OF OUR HOLY PLACES, NEVER TO PART FROM IT AGAIN. To our Arab neighbors, we extend, also at this hour—and with added emphasis at this hour—our hand in peace. And to our Christian and Muslim fellow citizens, we solemnly promise full religious freedom and rights. We did not come to Jerusalem for the sake of other peoples’ holy places, nor to interfere with believers of other faiths, but in order to safeguard its entirety, and ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO HOURS & FIFTY YEARS: A CONVERSATION WITH MICHAEL OREN to live here together with others, in unity.” THE SEVENTH DAY & COUNTING: THE ELUSIVE PEACE OF THE SIX-DAY WAR Moshe Dayan, Israeli Defense Minister JOSHUA MURAVCHIK statement at the Kotel, June 7, 1967 SPRING 2017 • A POPE & A PRESIDENT: JOHN PAUL II, RONALD REAGAN, & THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM PAUL KENGOR LSO OBERT AUFMAN BACKS HOMISTIC OFFENSE HRISTOPHER OLAKOWSKI REMEMBERS NUMBER 7 A : R K T • C K BATAAN • C.S. LEWIS CELEBRATES THE 1ST SERVANT • ALAN DOWD INTERROGATES AMERICAN INTERVENTION • MARK TOOLEY ON AMERICAN INTERESTS • GENERAL MACARTHUR CONSTRUCTS A MAN • MARK COPPENGER OFFERS AIDE TO THOSE SNOWED-IN • GEORGE ELIOT LAUDS A SPOT OF NATIVE LAND & ROBERT NICHOLSON PUTS SIX DAYS IN PROPER CONTEXT PROVIDENCE SPRING 2017 | NUMBER 7 FEATURES ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO 4 HOURS & FIFTY YEARS: A CONVERSATION WITH MICHAEL OREN JOSHUA MURAVCHIK THE SEVENTH DAY & COUNTING: THE ELUSIVE PEACE OF THE SIX-DAY WAR 18 %%%"$%$%&!"%&'!&%)&$%##"&!&$% !!!"(&(##$"&"*#$!!& "+ !%#"!%"$+& "%$"&!&'%' "& "'!&"! PAUL KENGOR $ $ &$$ "$ " IDLWKĆUVWKDQGDQGFRPHIDFHWRIDFHZLWKWKHPRGHUQGD\PLUDFOHWKDWLV,VUDHO8SRQWKHLUUHWXUQSDUWLFLSDQWVZLOO ! #$ " A POPE & A PRESIDENT: ! JOHN PAUL II, RONALD REAGAN, & THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM 28 !&$%&!&$#&" %$&$"'+"'$%"" "$" $ " & &" ! $ ""$# % # Army Chief Chaplain Rabbi Shlomo Goren, sur- " ! ! $ $ rounded by Israeli Defense Force soldiers of the Paratroop Brigade, blows the shofar in front of the .RWHOKD0DĻDUDYLRU:HVWHUQ:DOOGXULQJWKH6L[ 'D\:DU-XQH%XLOWE\+HURGWKH*UHDWWKH &!%#$& Kotel is a segment of a much longer, ancient, lime- stone retaining wall that encased the hill known as #%%%%$"$ WKH 7HPSOH 0RXQW 8QGHU WKH %ULWLVK 0DQGDWH RI Palestine, the blowing of the shofar at the Kotel was FULPLQDOL]HG DQG IURP ZKHQ WKH 2OG &LW\ RI -HUXVDOHP ZDV FRQWUROOHG E\ -RUGDQ -HZV ZHUH GHQLHG DFFHVV WR WKH :DOO HQWLUHO\ 7RGD\ LQ accordance to agreements with Muslim authorities, WKH .RWHO LV WKH KROLHVW SODFH RQ HDUWK ZKHUH -HZV DUHDOORZHGWRSUD\3KRWR&UHGLW'DYLG5XELQJHU *RYHUQPHQW3UHVV2̇FH PUBLISHERS MARK TOOLEY ROBERT NICHOLSON EDITOR MARK TOOLEY MANAGING EDITOR MARC LIVECCHE DEPUTY EDITOR ESSAYS MARK MELTON MARK COPPENGER SENIOR EDITORS KEITH PAVLISCHEK SNOWDENISM: JOSEPH LOCONTE A MORAL ASSESSMENT 37 ASSOCIATE EDITOR SUSANNAH BLACK CHRISTOPHER L. KOLAKOWSKI CONTRIBUTING EDITORS FLICKERING FORLORN HOPE: MARK AMSTUTZ THE BATTLE OF BATAAN 44 FRED BARNES NIGEL BIGGAR MARK TOOLEY J. DARYL CHARLES PAUL COYER AMERICAN INTERESTS MICHAEL CROMARTIE & HUMAN RIGHTS 50 DEAN CURRY ALAN DOWD THOMAS FARR ALAN DOWD MARY HABECK IN THE INTEREST OF HUMANITY 54 REBECCAH HEINRICHS WILL INBODEN JAMES TURNER JOHNSON ROBERT G. KAUFMAN HERB LONDON TIMOTHY MALLARD IN DEFENSE OF AQUINAS: PAUL MARSHALL PREEMPTION, PREVENTION, FAITH MCDONNELL & DECISIVENESS AS JUST WAR STAPLES 64 WALTER RUSSELL MEAD PAUL MILLER JOSHUA MITCHELL LUKE MOON REVIEWS ERIC PATTERSON JONATHAN LEEMAN MACKUBIN THOMAS OWENS AN EXCEPTIONAL CRISIS GREG THORNBURY John Wilsey’s American Exceptionalism and Civil Religion: Reassessing the History of an Idea 71 INTERNS MATTHEW ALLEN GEORGE BARROS JOSHUA CAYETANO BOOKSHELF SAVANNAH HUSMANN JESSICA MEYERS THE QUARTERMASTER’S BOOKSHELF: LOGAN WHITE Recommendations for further reading & a survey of newly available books 75 LAYOUT & DESIGN JOSEPH AVAKIAN PRINTED BY AD ORIENTEM LINEMARK ROBERT NICHOLSON BASIC SUBSCRIPTIONS ARE JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 80 $28 FOR A YEAR, FOUR ISSUES. STUDENT RATES AVAILABLE. FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT: [email protected] SPONSORED BY WEBSITE: PROVIDENCEMAG.COM ISSN 24713511 ESSAY FLICKERING FORLORN HOPE: THE BATTLE OF BATAAN CHRISTOPHER L. KOLAKOWSKI 0DQLOD%XUQVDIWHUDQ$LU5DLG'HFHPEHU6RXUFH0DF$UWKXU0HPRULDO$UFKLYHV hree-quarters of a century dwindling supplies and dim commanded by Lieutenant Tago, in the opening days of prospects for outside help, the General Masaharu Homma, and the Second World War in the garrison held on as long as pos- General Douglas MacArthur’s Pacific, a joint U.S. and Filipino sible and seriously delayed the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (Filamerican) army fought des- Japanese timetable for conquest (USAFFE). The Japanese were perately to defend Manila Bay in the Pacific. In the end, the confident of victory, and gave and the Philippines against a Japanese succeeded in forcing Homma just 50 days to capture Japanese invasion. Much of the largest capitulation in U.S. the Philippines before his troops the campaign (8 December military history. would be transferred elsewhere; 1941–6 May 1942) was waged only the British bastion at on both the Bataan Peninsula The 1941–1942 Philippine Singapore was expected to hold and Corregidor Island in the Campaign was fought be- out longer. Japanese planners mouth of Manila Bay. Despite tween the Japanese 14th Army, expected that MacArthur would make his stand around Manila, the Philippine capital, and once that battle was won the rest of the islands could be occupied at leisure. The campaign began on 8 December 1941 (7 December, Washington time) with air strikes on key air bases on the main island of Luzon, which succeeded in wiping out much of MacArthur’s air force and removing one of the key pil- lars of the Filamerican defense strategy. Small Japanese land- ings on the north of Luzon fol- lowed, but failed to stir a strong Filamerican reaction. MacArthur’s command was di- vided in two: the North Luzon Force under Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright, and the South Luzon Force un- der Major General George M. Parker. On 22 December 1941, the 14th Army’s main body land- ed at Lingayen Gulf; two days later another force landed on the Bicol Peninsula in southeastern Luzon. MacArthur planned to defend the beaches and throw the invaders back into the sea, -RQDWKDQ:DLQZULJKW OHIW ZLWK'RXJODV0DF$UWKXULQ2FWREHU6RXUFH but Wainwright’s counterat- 86$UP\ tacks on the 22nd and 23rd failed due to poor reconnaissance, on Christmas Eve MacArthur from the north. The crux poor coordination, and poor ordered the plan, known as of the problem was the logistics. Many Filipino units WPO-3, put into effect. successful passage of a were untrained or half-trained at the war’s start, and broke at IDPRXVWDFWLFDOGH¿OHWKH WPO-3’s activation meant that first contact with the enemy. bridge at Calumpit, just all of USAFFE’s 80,000 men south of San Fernando had to move from all over Luzon In Manila, MacArthur digested in Pampanga, where to Bataan. Writing after the war, the reports from Lingayen Gulf. Highway No. 3 from MacArthur’s staff summed up He realized the landing repre- northern Luzon to Manila the challenges: sented the main Japanese effort joined with Highway No. with Manila as its objective. 7 leading into Bataan. 7KH GL̇FXOW SUREOHP MacArthur also faced the hard [MacArthur] faced was to The movement of the truth that his plan to defend sideslip his troops west- Southern Luzon Force, the beaches had failed within ward in a series of rapid already complicated the first 24 hours of the main maneuvers and holding through the passage of invasion. Prewar planners had actions to the rocky pen- Manila, was inevitably prepared a scheme for with- insula and to the island canalized at Calumpit, drawing to the Bataan Peninsula forts in Manila Bay before and once across the and Corregidor Island (on the superior forces of the ene- bridge, this force would western end of Manila Bay), and P\FRXOGFXWR̆WKHLUSDWK also have to pass through San Fernando before it was safely on the road to Bataan. As a corollary, the hard-pressed Northern Luzon Force would have to hold the enemy back from San Fernando and the Calumpit bridge no matter what the price until the Southern Luzon Force had cleared the FULWLFDOGH¿OHRU*HQHUDO MacArthur stood to lose nearly half the forces with which he expected to defend Bataan and Corregidor. On top of these risks, the Japanese held air supremacy over WKHEDWWOH¿HOGWKH:32 3 movements would be detected and attacked. WPO-3’s evacuation shocked Manila. Many Filipinos assumed there would be a battle for the capital, and fear swept through 7KH:DUZLWK-DSDQ3KLOLSSLQH&DPSDLJQ0DS-DQXDU\6RXUFH:HVW Manila’s diverse population. 3RLQW$WODVRI$PHULFDQ:DUV On Christmas Eve Philippine President Manuel Quezon, his 1942, the Calumpit Bridge was the eastern half. The Japanese family, and elements of the cab- destroyed. Homma’s forces en- repeatedly attacked the Abucay inet left for Corregidor. Late in tered Manila on 2 January; from position head on, but failed to the day MacArthur sailed to Corregidor Americans watched break through. Assaults west of Corregidor with his senior staff through binoculars as Japanese Abucay bent Parker’s line with and family, who had evacuated flags went up over the Manila fierce fighting. Flanking oper- their residence in the Manila Hotel and other places along ations over Mt. Natib finally Hotel that afternoon on four the waterfront. succeeded