Getting to Pluralism: Luralism in the Arab World Has Not Yet Matured Into Functional Democratic Politics

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Getting to Pluralism: luralism in the Arab world has not yet matured into functional democratic politics. While ruling establishments, Islamist movements, Pand secular parties have introduced a much greater degree of pluralism into Arab societies, the imbalance of power and interdependence among these actors limits both the degree of political diversity and its effectiveness at bringing about reforms. The Arab world is likely to grapple with political apathy, low voter turnout, dwindling membership in registered parties, and shrinking constituencies for the foreseeable future. Even the Islamists, who demonstrated great ability to organize and gain followers in the past, have begun showing signs of decreasing popularity. Political Actors in the Arab World

Getting to Pluralism: Political Actors in the Arab World explores the balance of power between the disparate political forces of the Arab world. The essays in this volume examine the characteristics of the major political actors in great detail and assess the weaknesses of the secular parties. They also illustrate the complexities of Islamist participation in the political processes of several Arab countries—pointing out both similarities and Getting to differences. Finally, the authors evaluate how incumbent Arab regimes have been able to maintain their grip on power in spite of their claims that they support political and social reform. Pluralism Marina Ottaway is a senior associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Program and director of the Carnegie Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Political Actors in the Arab World

Amr Hamzawy is a senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, Lebanon. Ottaway • Hamzawy

Marina Ottaway Amr Hamzawy Editors Getting to Pluralism Political Actors in the Arab World

Marina Ottaway Amr Hamzawy Editors

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Getting to pluralism : political actors in the Arab world / Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy, editors. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-87003-244-8 (pbk.) -- ISBN 978-0-87003-245-5 (cloth) 1. Arab countries--Politics and government--1945- 2. Islam and politics--Arab countries. 3. Political parties--Arab countries. I. Ottaway, Marina. II. Hamzawy, Amr. III. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. IV. Title.

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Pluralism6x9 rev2.indd 2 6/19/09 4:50:27 PM CONTENTS

Acknowledgments v Foreword vii

Introduction: Pluralist Politics in Undemocratic Political Systems 1 Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy

1. Incumbent Regimes and the “King’s Dilemma” in the Arab World: Promise and Threat of Managed Reform 13 Michele Dunne and Marina Ottaway

2. Fighting on Two Fronts: Secular Parties in the Arab World 41 Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy

3. Islamists in Politics: The Dynamics of Participation 69 aMr Hamzawy and Marina Ottaway

Pluralism6x9 rev2.indd 3 6/19/09 4:50:27 PM Conclusion: Old Actors and New Arenas 97 Amr Hamzawy and Marina Ottaway

Index 109 Contributors 117 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 119

Pluralism6x9 rev2.indd 4 6/19/09 4:50:27 PM Acknowledgments

his volume is the outcome of several years of research, including analysis of documents, research trips involving doz- ens of conversations, and several structured conferences organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International TPeace in the Middle East, in Europe, and in the United States. In the process, we have accumulated a large debt of gratitude to innumerable individuals who have given generously of their time to answer our questions and share their views with us. We hope that this book will convince them that the time they devoted to helping us was not wasted. We would also like to express out thanks to our colleague Nathan J. Brown, who partnered with us in the research on Islamist movements before returning to his positions as professor of political sci- ence and international affairs and director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University. Nathan remains a valued partner and a member of the greater Carnegie family.

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Thomas Carothers, as vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, provided support and encour- agement for the project all along. Many Carnegie junior fellows have contributed to the research over the years. Dina Bishara, Mohammed Herzallah, and Adriana Qubaia in Washington and Bassam Moussa in Beirut deserve special thanks for their efforts, as do the members of the publications department, who ensured a smooth and for us painless production process. Finally, we want to express our gratitude to Saad Mehio and his assistant, Rony Abdelnour, who supervised the translation of the book into Arabic and edited the text. Their efforts have made it possible for us to achieve the goal of simultaneous publication of this volume in both English and Arabic.

Amr Hamzawy Carnegie Middle East Center Beirut

Marina Ottaway Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington

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ince its founding half a dozen years ago, the Carnegie Endow- ment’s Middle East Program has made political change in the Arab world the central focus of its work. As though turning a microscope lens to higher and higher magnification, scholars Sin Washington, D.C., and at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, Lebanon, focused first on political change and democracy promotion in historical and broadly comparative terms, examining conditions and trends in the Middle East as compared to the rest of the world. They then analyzed the implications for governments outside the region that wish to support political liberalization. More recently, and in progressively greater detail, this extraordinarily productive team of Arab, American, and European scholars has zeroed in on identifying the key political actors in the region (including those one would expect to be important but aren’t), analyzing the balance of power among them and describing the prospects for future change. Uncharted Journey (2005) examined the full range of actors in Arab society, from moderate Islamists and governing regimes, to civil society and women’s movements, and then offered recommendations outsiders

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willing to be involved for the long term might follow to achieve constructive change. The team then tested its conclusions through a country-by- country analysis across the Middle East, covering the Gulf states, the Maghreb, and the heart of the Arab world. The results were published in Beyond the Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World (2008). The authors found cosmetic change, orchestrated from the top but strictly limited to prevent any meaningful redistribution of power away from the ruling regimes. Notwithstanding the high-flown democratic change rhetoric of the middle years of this decade, they found no fundamental political progress in any of the ten countries they examined in depth. This volume turns back to a focus on the important political actors, which authors Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy believe are only three: ruling establishments, liberal or leftist secular political parties, and moderate Islamist groups (those that have renounced violence in favor of participation in their country’s politics). Right away this list contains a powerful conclusion: that civil society is not now, and is not likely soon to be, a key player in the Arab world. This includes both politically active NGOs and the much ballyhooed Arab street, which, they point out, “has not been a major political actor … since the end of the colonial period.” The key reason for the political stagnation that characterizes the region is not, they believe, Arab cultural exceptionalism or the result of pervasive conflicts that plague the Middle East, but an entrenched imbalance of power among these three that none of them is strong enough, or motivated enough, to break. A first-rate think tank should produce work whose conclusions are directly useful to policy makers with insights equally valuable to scholars. This volume more than meets that test. If political stalemate is the central issue, then foreign efforts to promote change through development assistance or cultural exchanges or education or the various tools of programs collectively known as democracy assistance are not going to work. And, if Ottaway and Hamzawy’s conclusions are correct, their work will refocus that of many inside and outside the Arab world in seeking to understand the causes and possible fixes of the pervasive failures of governance there.

Jessica T. Mathews President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

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Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy

he political process in Arab countries where there is a legal political life is dominated by three sets of political actors: the incumbent regimes or ruling establishments; the secular parties, that is, parties that do not find their ideological inspira- tionT in Islam but embrace liberal or leftist ideas; and the Islamist movements that have renounced violence and decided to participate in the legal politics of their respective countries. The balance of power among these parties and the dynamics of their relationship have determined the trajectory of political change in the Arab world over the past two decades. The fact that political reforms have been few and mostly cosmetic during a time in which many countries globally experienced far-reaching transformations of their political systems is a consequence of the imbalance of power among these actors. Put

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simply, incumbent regimes are very powerful and the opposition is both weak and divided: Secular parties oppose the government but in the end would rather side with an adversary they know than face the challenge of dealing with one they do not know or understand, and thus fear. Islamists, for their part, have faced wide-ranging regime restrictions in some countries or remained embattled in other countries with internal struggles between hardliners and softliners. This imbalance has led to political stagnation.

Uneven Playing Fields

Not only are incumbent regimes much more powerful than the opposition, but they also have access to different means of generating power. Incumbency is a powerful tool in countries where institutions are weak, allowing leaders to take full advantage of everything the state controls to keep themselves in power. There are no legal niceties to prevent incumbent Arab leaders from using state funds or government control to ensure their own reelections and the continued hegemony of their political party, or to use the courts to reject challenges to their position. In addition to incumbency, regimes have many other tools at their dis- posal to retain power. Because Arab countries are not democratic—even those that have an open, official political process are at best semiauthoritarian—power is not generated simply at the ballot box. For one, security forces play a central role. While there can be endless debate and speculation about the exact balance of power between civilian and security personnel in any one Arab regime, there is no disputing that security forces are important. Regime security is as much a part of the mandate of Arab security forces as state security. In most cases, incumbent regimes are in charge of the electoral process, because elections are usually organized and controlled by the Ministry of Interior rather than by a truly nonpartisan election commission. They also control many print and broadcast media, although satellite television and the Internet have eroded the monopoly they enjoyed in the past. And although popular support is not the most important source of their power—far from it—incumbents are free to organize, hold rallies, dis- seminate their ideas, and broadcast their supposed accomplishments.

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Opposition parties’ access to tools that spread their message and build their organizations is much more limited. With the rare exceptions of Islamist movements such as Hamas and Hizbollah that have an armed wing (not discussed in this volume), opposition parties cannot use force to win elections in the way incumbent regimes do when they arrest candidates or keep voters in opposition strongholds from reaching polling stations. They cannot prevent the government from registering its own candidates. If they choose to participate in the political process, they have to compete democratically because they cannot do otherwise. They rarely have the resources to buy votes in large numbers or intimidate voters. They cannot stuff ballot boxes because they do not control polling stations. They cannot dangle in front of would-be supporters the promise of patronage jobs. Like their counterparts in democratic countries, Arab opposition groups can woo voters only by relying on their message and organization. How- ever, in most countries they encounter obstacles in spreading their message and building their organizations. These limits put all opposition parties at a great disadvantage vis-à-vis regimes for which winning hearts and minds is only one among many tools. Even when many political parties are present, Arab countries do not function as truly pluralistic systems.

The Challenge of Participation

For liberal and leftist parties, participating in the political process is an easy decision. Parties are machines designed to gain political support in an election process. While violence is theoretically an alternative—some communist parties in the past have upheld revolution as an ideal even while taking part in electoral politics—liberal parties that uphold democracy not as a means but as an end have no alternative to participation. Revolutionary ideals have been abandoned by all but the most radical fringe in leftist organizations. For Islamist movements, however, the decision to participate in electoral politics has been momentous and much debated. That is because Islamists do not need to participate in legal politics to survive. They can concentrate on da’wa (proselytizing) and fostering a society that lives by the tenets

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of Islam, even if the state remains unreformed. They can choose jihad, or holy war, as some have done. Participating in the politics of countries that are not governed by Islamic rules is a difficult decision, and this will be discussed in some detail in the essay on “Islamists in Politics” in this volume. Yet many have chosen participation. For all parties, participation requires developing a message and an organization to deliver it and to get out the vote. Incumbent regimes have a great advantage in both areas, because incumbency sends a powerful message in itself, while control over institutions, laws, and resources does the rest. Opposition parties face the far more difficult task of needing to develop both an effective message to persuade voters to turn away from the regime and its promises, and an effective machine to deliver it. In general, Islamists have succeeded in developing strong machinery, but they have had more trouble fashioning a clear message—“Islam is the solution” may be a powerful slogan for one or two election cycles, but in the long run voters seek concrete change. Liberal and leftist parties by and large have failed organizationally in Arab countries and have no effective message. Liberal parties face the challenge of making their message about democracy, civil freedoms, and human rights concrete enough to be relevant to broad constituencies—a perennial challenge all liberal parties face in poor countries. Furthermore, most liberal parties, which are typically led by somewhat intellectual, often Western-educated, leaders, have put little effort into organizing, making it even more difficult for them to build strong constituencies. Leftist parties, which in the 1960s held sway in many Arab countries, started losing their influence after the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970 and have more recently lost their traditional message of social justice to the well-organized Islamist movements. Like other left- oriented parties in the past twenty years, they were damaged by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of China. Constit- uency-building has also become a problem for Arab leftist parties, which traditionally have looked for, and often found, followers among the workers of the industrial suburbs and the labor unions. They continue to struggle to redefine their target population and their outreach strategies in light of the economic and social changes affecting the Arab world. They believe in organization but are not sure whom they

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should be aiming to organize. Islamists also strongly believe in the importance of organization and pursue it diligently, but they have even less freedom to operate than do other political parties. One way or another, opposition political parties have a difficult time competing through the legal political process in the Arab world today. Islamist movements are organizationally the strongest among Arab opposition parties because they have devoted much systematic effort to building up their political structures as well as networks of social wel- fare organizations that help them establish a presence beyond the strictly political arena. But they face a delicate balancing act in fashioning their message: Islamists cannot establish democratic credibility and reach out to broader constituencies without showing flexibility on ideological issues—even their most moderate stances arouse much suspicion among the more secular segments of Arab societies. At the same time, showing too much flexibility and pragmatism risks losing followers who support them because they are religious-inspired movements and adhere to absolute principles. The result is strong debates within Islamist movements as well as a lack of clarity on some issues as Islamists try to balance conflicting demands and points of view. Relations between secular parties and Islamist movements further contribute to the plight of the opposition in Arab countries. Secular parties are suspicious of Islamists, at least in part because the parties are so weak and are, as an essay in this volume stresses, fighting on two fronts: against regimes and against Islamists. To some extent, the en- mity between secular and Islamist opposition groups is the result of ideological differences. In part, it is because of secular parties’ suspicion that Islamists are not committed to democracy and that they choose participation only for instrumental reasons to win power, after which they would immediately abrogate democracy. But in part it is also because of the Islamists’ uncertainty about collaborating with the secular opposition. Thus, secular-Islamist collaboration, although not unheard of, is rare. There is collaboration between the two in Yemen; in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, which is neither recognized as an association nor allowed to form a political party, has been forced on occasion to enter into a temporary alliance with secular parties and run its candidates under their umbrella. In addition, Islamists and leftist parties sometimes work together on specific legislation in Morocco and

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seem to be moving to build alliances at the municipal level. But in general, Islamist movements have been wary of alliances, partly because of their ideological uncertainty about the limits of acceptable pluralism and partly because of the hubris they displayed when they felt they were gaining influence.

Power Imbalance and Political Stagnation

The weaknesses of opposition groups in the Arab world, coupled with the power of governments, which is often as rooted in the strength of the security services as it is in the political process, go a long way toward explaining why Arab countries have not been reforming politically. The Arab world remains politically stagnant, apparently cut off from the trend toward political reform or even democratization that has been evident in other parts of the world. A variety of arguments has been set forth to explain this apparent anomaly. Most focus on some form of Arab exceptionalism: cultural factors—a supposed value chasm dividing the Arab world and the West; religion—a presumed incompatibility of Islam and democracy; economics—including the supposed incapacity of people living pre- cariously to appreciate the advantages of democracy; or regional conflicts—most significantly the negative impacts of the Arab–Israeli conflict on governance in the Arab world, or, at the other extreme, the perverse effect of oil revenue on representative government. The explanation for this anomaly, the essays in this volume suggest, must be sought not in some type of Arab exceptionalism but in politics, spe- cifically the imbalance of power that allows Arab regimes to stay in power virtually unchallenged except occasionally by violent groups. That imbalance of power prevents opposition groups from developing into sophisticated organizations capable of exerting real pressure on the governments. Such a conclusion is important for two reasons. First, it refocuses efforts to understand the dynamics of political reform—or of its absence—in the Arab world. Second, it explains why Western attempts to promote democracy, most of which focus on cultural exchanges, education, or development assistance, are unlikely to have much impact.

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Such efforts fail to address the fundamental issue of power distribution. Politics, in other words, is the central issue behind the political stagnation of the Arab world. It stands to reason that attempts by the international community to encourage political reform while failing to address the fundamental issue of power are bound to fail. This is both good news and bad news. It is good news because the fact that political reform is essentially a political process—a change in power relations among political actors—means that Arab countries can reform politically without shedding their culture or religion. But it is bad news because opposition forces in Arab countries are weak, and so politics is slanted in favor of the ruling establishments and the status quo. Most political parties in the region are feckless organizations with weak structures and generally old, even sclerotic, leadership. In some countries, furthermore, parties are banned— there are no political parties of any kind, for example, in Saudi Ara- bia, Libya, or Qatar. Other countries have fairly strong government parties—often, as in Egypt, the legacy of an earlier single-party system—but the opposition parties are weak. Some countries, like Bah- rain, ban all parties but allow political societies. Morocco has arguably the most balanced political party system in the Arab world, although many of the parties, being completely aligned with the monarchy, hardly constitute a countervailing power. The weakness of political parties cannot easily be remedied by the intervention of external actors. U.S. and European governments have put some pressure on Arab regimes to open up the political process. International nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been working diligently for years to improve the parties’ capacity to organize, develop their message, campaign, and get out the vote. Results, however, have been limited. First, it is extraordinarily difficult for Western governments, which have major and immediate security and economic interests in this troubled region, to let their policy choices be guided by a somewhat nebulous long-term interest in democratic transformation. Furthermore, Western governments have little lever- age over countries that are not aid-dependent, such as the oil producers, or countries from which the West wants something—such as cooperation in tracking down terrorist networks or access for military facilities. As a result, Arab governments receive, at best, mixed

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messages. Finally, even under the most favorable circumstances, outside pressure can create some space for opposition groups by keeping the government from crushing them, but in the end it is the groups themselves that have to provide the leadership and vision to become viable organizations. Technical assistance and training can help parties that are already viable, but they do not on their own breathe life into weak organizations. Democratization is essentially a domestic political process, the result of the balance of power between ruling establishments and their opponents, and of the two sides’ ability to effectively play the cards they have.

The Issue of Civil Society

This volume on political actors that control and influence the political process in Arab countries does not include a section on civil society. This is not a careless omission, but a deliberate decision. Our research has led us to conclude that, under present circumstances, civil society organizations are not major political players in the Arab world. This downplaying of the role of civil society goes against what has become conventional wisdom among democracy advocates. Not only do they see an active civil society as crucial to the functioning of a democratic system, but many even consider civil society and civil society assistance to be the solution of last resort for furthering democratization in countries where transformation is difficult and governments are openly hostile to organized political activity. The idea that an active civil society is crucial to democratization is certainly correct, but it is also tautological: Democracy is a political system that requires citizen participation; hence, civil society is crucial to democracy. However, the claim that in a contested transition to democracy, civil society organizations can be effective in the face of government repression and its opposition to all forms of power sharing is true only when civil society organizations take the form of mass movements rather than of the small, professional NGOs preferred by democracy advocates. The problem is that mass movements rarely bring about democratic transitions—instead, most insurrections are repressed or lead to the formation of regimes that are hardly moderate.

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In the Arab world today, civil society is not particularly effective. Arab citizens—that is, civil society in the broadest sense of the term— have amply demonstrated in recent years that they would like to have some influence over their governments and control over their rulers. Data from public opinion surveys conducted by a variety of organizations show that the majority of Arabs believe that democracy would be good for their countries. This stated preference, however, does not translate into concrete action. In most countries where elections are held, voter participation is extraordinarily low. This is not necessarily a sign of apathy; it may also imply disgust over rigged elections or even rejection of the entire political system. But neither are citizens part of mass movements trying to change the system, either. The so-called Arab street has not been a major political actor, at least not since the end of the colonial period. Large-scale demonstrations in the Arab world are much more likely to be government-engineered than spontaneous, or linked to regional issues such as the Arab–Israeli conflict instead of domestic demands. When spontaneous initiatives occur, they usually have not lasted or built up into more coherent movements capable of sustaining themselves over the long term. Arab governments, most of which are dysfunctional when it comes to good administration, sound economic policy, and delivery of services, are generally effective when it comes to security. And in any case, governments are often able to restore threatened order by reversing unpopular decisions without granting major political concessions. Riots in Egypt in 1977 were brought under control simply by canceling the increase in the price of basic commodities that had caused the crisis. Even more thoughtful and somewhat more organized political grassroots actions, such as the Kifaya movement for change in Egypt in 2004 and 2005, have so far been unable to become catalysts for meaningful political transformation. Of course, the possibility that a bottom-up, civil society movement could trigger a real process of political change in an Arab country— particularly one with a large population, high unemployment rate, and intractable socioeconomic problems—cannot be completely ruled out. Arab governments certainly do not dismiss that possibility, and security services are forever vigilant about any activity that could escalate out of control. Similarly, as shown in the essay on “the king’s dilemma,”

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governments are very conscious of the possibility that any reforms they envisaged as limited and controlled might trigger an uncontrolled process of change. That is what happened when the perestroika reforms introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s led, through a cas- cade of unintended consequences, to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism. So far, however, mass movements have not developed, nor do they appear likely to develop. Organized civil society in the Arab world at present consists of NGOs rather than mass movements. While NGOs in some countries such as Morocco and Jordan have multiplied recently, in part as a result of funds provided by the United States and Europe, they have not emerged as instruments of political change or even of liberalization. The world of NGOs is carefully controlled by governments that impose restrictions on the type of organizations that are allowed to register, operate, and receive external funds. As a result, most NGOs in the Arab world are service-oriented or charitable organizations, providing health or educational services to underserved populations or helping to support people in need. These are the kinds of organizations all governments like, because they populate the universe of NGOs without creating un- due political risk for the regime. In most countries, women’s organizations also are tolerated as benign and nonthreatening. Some governments even see women’s organizations as useful allies in gaining international approval. The Moroccan government worked with women’s organizations in the writing of a new family status code and the Egyptian government did so in the formulation of a new divorce law, receiving international praise for their efforts. Such alliances have brought about useful, concrete reforms but have in no way imposed limits on government power. NGOs with goals that more clearly target government action—in particular, civil liberties and human rights organizations—work under severe restrictions and as a result have little impact on policy. The courage and determination of their leaders and members is not matched by their effectiveness. For all the reasons discussed above, we do not believe that civil society will be a major actor in triggering a process of political transformation in the Arab world. Obviously, when—and if—Arab countries become more democratic, civil society organizations would also gain in importance. Under the present circumstances, though, it appears

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likely that the major impetus for change will come from political actors rather than civil society.

The Stalemate

The political future of the Arab world will be determined in the short and probably medium run by incumbent regimes, secular parties, and Islamist movements. At present, these actors are in a stalemate that none of them appears able to break. Incumbent regimes are powerful and their security apparatuses are generally strong, but being uncertain of their own popularity and support, they remain fearful of all opponents. The Egyptian government’s repression of the small demonstrations organized by the Kifaya movement in 2005 or by the April 6 Movement in 2008 and 2009, for example, connotes a government that feels insecure of its support despite the strength of its security apparatus. Although most Arab regimes today fear the opposition and the instability it may provoke, they are unwilling to completely crush the opposition, eliminate political parties, and put an end to multiparty elections. Such measures are simply not an option for regimes that want to maintain international credibility as modern and reformist. This helps ensure the survival of the opposition—as long as it remains weak. But opposition parties have not proven themselves able to capitalize on the regimes’ need to burnish their democratic credentials to wrest concessions or enlarge the political space within which they are allowed to operate. Liberal and leftist parties are weak and also feel threatened by the Islamists. Islamist movements, which in the middle of the decade were making electoral inroads and feeling positive about future prospects, face a more difficult situation at the moment. After experiencing real electoral gains in the middle of the decade, they have been losing ground in recent elections. Most important, even Islamist movements do not appear capable of shaking Arab voters out of their apathy or their conviction that elections cannot really affect the distribution of power and thus bring about change. The most significant result of the 2007 parliamentary elections in Morocco, for example, was not that the Party for Justice and Development received the second-

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largest number of votes, or that it received fewer votes than in the previous election, but that only about one-third of eligible voters went to the polls, and that about one-third of them deliberately spoiled their ballot in protest. In most countries, neither the ruling establishment nor the Islamist movements appear able to win the approval of the electorate. The general rejection, or at least the deep skepticism, of the official political process thus creates a mutual interdependence among Islamists and ruling establishments. Unless the government restores the credibility of politics, Islamist movements can make only limited inroads themselves. The presence of ruling establishments, secular parties, and Islamist movements has introduced a much greater degree of pluralism into Arab politics than was the case in the past. Yet the interdependence among these actors, and the imbalance of power among them, limits the degree of pluralism and above all its effectiveness. Pluralist politics in the Arab world is not yet democratic politics. The essays in this volume, which explore the characteristics of major political actors, help explain why this is the case.

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Incumbent Regimes and the “King’s Dilemma” in the Arab World Promise and Threat of Managed Reform

Michele Dunne and Marina Ottaway

ncumbent regimes in the Arab world, monarchical and republican alike, have weathered the period of intense, worldwide political change that has followed the end of the Cold War without giving up much of their power. Though not completely untouched by Ievents that have shaken the rest of the world, most Arab regimes have survived relatively intact the wave of political transformation that has engulfed the rest of the world. Many regimes have carried out reforms, but the reforms have been directed at modernizing the economy and addressing social issues rather than redistributing power in the political system. Indeed, most regimes that talk of political reform are in reality avoiding it. To be sure, there have been some political changes: For example, more political parties exist today in most Arab countries than fifteen years ago, and more countries hold elections of varying

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quality. Access to information and the quality of political debate have increased in many countries as well. Power, however, remains firmly where it was: in the hands of kings and presidents. Even the names of most incumbents are those long familiar to analysts of the Arab world. In countries where a long-standing leader has died, a son is likely to have replaced him. Hosni Mubarak has been in power in Egypt since 1981, and when he dies another Mubarak will likely succeed him. Muammar al-Qaddafi has been at the helm in Libya for almost four decades, with a son waiting in the wings. Presi- dent Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali remains in power in Tunisia and Presi- dent Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen. The royal houses of the Gulf countries are still firmly in place, although the vast number of their members makes it somewhat difficult to predict precisely who the next incumbent will be. Algeria, after ten years of a particularly nasty civil war, managed to stabilize by resurrecting Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the country’s first postindependence foreign minister, who was- re elected for a third term in April 2009. In Morocco and Jordan, sons have succeeded their fathers, as could be expected, but so has Bashar al-Assad in republican Syria. Indeed, Arab kings and presidents alike still die in office, particularly now that coups d’état have gone somewhat out of fashion. Despite their continuity, even their apparent immobility, incumbent Arab regimes are ultimately likely to emerge as important actors in processes of political reform in Arab countries, if and when it takes place. They have power and they have control. They can introduce reforms and they can prevent them. True, regimes are not likely to introduce reforms that will undermine their own power if they can avoid it and may not introduce any reform at all unless some pressure is brought to bear on them. But in all countries, there are people within the ruling establishment who see the need for change. Reform- ers within the ruling establishments can be important agents of political change—and particularly of carefully managed reform. There are reform advocates in all Arab regimes. Even the most conservative among them are conscious of the fact that the world is changing rapidly politically and economically, and that their countries have to adapt, embracing ideas and adopting policies more in line with dominant trends in the world. The ideologies with which

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republican Arab governments sought to justify their rejection of democracy have lost their luster. Instead, embracing the ideal of liberal democracy is now perceived as a necessity even by governments that have no intention of abiding by it. No regime talks of a specific Arab brand of democracy today (except to some extent that of al-Qaddafi in Libya), although many argue that each country must get to democracy in its own way and its own time. Monarchical regimes also feel the pressure to demonstrate the new vitality and continued relevance of their rule. Even the monarchs who control power most firmly in their own hands—at best sharing it within the family—want to be viewed as constitutional monarchs. Although even the most open- minded and reformist among them have no intention of ruling without governing, they all rewrite and amend their countries’ constitutions with surprising frequency—without transferring any real power to the new institutions. Amending constitutions has turned into a veritable industry. Par- liaments and local governments are prime targets for reform, finding their prerogatives and duties constantly modified. In Egypt and Alge- ria, constitutional amendments have also targeted the presidency, forcing incumbents to compete with other candidates in elections, rather than being chosen by a tame parliament and anointed in a popular referendum. Laws that regulate political competition and contestation—election laws, laws on the registration of political parties, even laws on press freedom—are being revised, often repeatedly, in most countries. Indeed, the institutional architecture is being modified throughout the Arab world, and electoral contestation, while not necessarily leading to greater democracy, is at least giving many countries a veneer of modernity. Even the new rules are generally so restrictive, however, that incumbents are in no danger of losing elections any time soon. Such reforms have mostly been driven by the monarchy or the ruling party—occasionally, but not often, as a result of pressure coming from below. Although there are indications in all Arab countries of a growing demand for more open political systems, the organizations through which the demand is channeled are weak, and the pressure on governments far from overwhelming. Pressure from the United States and Europe has also helped convince some regimes to intro-

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duce change, but that pressure has not been particularly strong or consistent. This has allowed most regimes to introduce as much or as little reform as they want, preserving their power even as they try to give their countries at least a veneer of political openness. Because reform has been introduced mostly from the top, the goal has not been democratization but modernization, both as a genuine attempt to improve the quality and efficiency of governance and as a cosmetic device to make the system look better and thus be more acceptable domestically and internationally. This introduces a great deal of confusion in discussions about reform. As used by regime reformers, the concept of modernization has come to embrace neoliberal economic policies and administrative efficiency. This is a far cry from the socialist-oriented approach to modernization accepted in the past by Arab nationalists, who rejected the idea that modernization was synonymous with Westernization, advocating instead a different path to development and a different approach to political participation. To- day, the idea of modernization has gained new acceptance, particularly among incumbent regimes that reject democracy yet perceive the need for greater efficiency both in the administration and in the economy, although it is called “reform.” With the possible exception of the United Arab Emirates, no Arab country, not even major oil producers, feels complacent about its economic position. Until the oil price increases triggered by the U.S. invasion of Iraq, most oil-producing countries were feeling the economic pinch brought about by falling oil prices and a growing population. Oil was no longer the inexhaustible source of revenue capable of satisfying all economic requirements and giving governments an infinite capacity to manipulate and buy consensus. Saudi Arabia was beginning to feel the necessity to budget and make choices— giving the royal family a strong incentive to share some power over economic decisions with the Shura Council. Kuwait worried about the possibility that current oil revenues would no longer cover the budget. Oil price increases between 2003 and 2007 gave producers a respite from mounting economic pressure, but all governments were acutely aware that oil alone cannot provide eternal security to countries with rapidly growing populations facing the competitive environment of the world economy. The fall in oil prices, following the

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global economic crisis, has only given this awareness more urgency. For non–oil-producing countries, the imperative of developing a viable economic niche is even stronger. For them, the price of failure is not having to cut back on generous services and allowances to the population and curbing marginally the lavish spending of huge ruling families. Rather, the price of failure for these countries is seeing the further impoverishment of an already poor population, possibly leading to political unrest. Furthermore, there is growing awareness in the Arab world as there is elsewhere that developing viable, competitive economies requires a host of reforms, especially as the global economic crisis continues. Banking systems, contract laws, courts that adjudicate commercial cases, and the way in which bureaucrats deal with foreign investors all need to be overhauled, as does the education system in many cases. Although reforms are always partial in all countries and none usually achieve the textbook perfection suggested by international financial institutions and foreign experts, Arab countries know that with few exceptions they have a very long way to go before attaining competitiveness. There is no agreement, however, about the role of political reform in modernization and economic revitalization. Some incumbent regimes view democratization as an obstacle to the development of a more dynamic economy and a more efficient administration—and of course as a threat to their own power. Many in the Kuwaiti government and ruling family, for example, complain that Kuwait’s parliament is an obstacle to the development of a vibrant economy and the administrative and legal reform capable of supporting it. The Moroc- can regime, committed to a vigorous reform program in the realm of human rights and, increasingly, economic development, has given no sign that it perceives the need to build stronger political institutions at the same time. The drive toward modernization is likely to accelerate in the coming years. Many Arab countries have just experienced a generational transition or are on the verge of one. In Jordan, Syria, and Morocco the generational transition has taken place with a transfer of power from father to son, even in republican Syria. A generational transition—probably also from father to son—is likely to take place soon in

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Egypt and Libya. And in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will also face the same problem as the advanced age of the present generation of rulers will soon make impossible the brother-to-brother power transmission that has kept power in the hands of an aging group. The idea that the rise to power of a young ruler might provide the spark needed for real transformation in the Arab world became popular when in a short period of time five sons succeeded their fathers: Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani in Qatar in 1995; King Muhammad VI in Morocco, King Abdullah II in Jordan, King Hamad bin Isa al- Khalifa in Bahrain in 1999; and President Bashar al-Assad in Syria in 2000. All five came to power talking of reform and raising hopes both at home and abroad that they would pursue a vigorous agenda of economic and political transformation, as Juan Carlos had done in Spain. The hopes proved unfounded, however. All five, like the sons who may yet succeed their fathers in Egypt and Libya, undoubtedly saw themselves as modernizers, but none pursued a transformational political reform agenda. Nonetheless, the drive toward modernity is likely to accelerate with the next generation. Although young heads of state and their supporters may lack the vision and courage to drive toward democratization, they will feel more keenly the need to be seen as modernizers, and their actions will be subject to greater public scrutiny due to the changed information environment. This means that Arab countries will soon face even more starkly than they do now what many years ago Samuel Huntington has called “the king’s dilemma”: that is, limited reforms introduced from the top often increase rather than de- crease bottom-up demand for more radical change.1 The unintended consequence of even cautious reforms may be an out-of-control change that wipes out the very ruling elite who initiated the reform. The fate of the shah of Iran is a prime example of the unintended consequences of top-down reforms. He promoted a “white revolution” to modernize the country but was eventually deposed by a religion-based movement that developed at least in part in response to the dislocation resulting from the white revolution. Similarly, Gor- bachev’s perestroika led to a series of catastrophic (from his point of view) events culminating in his downfall, confirming that the king’s dilemma is a peril to which all reformers are exposed—no matter the

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kind of political system in which they operate. There are of course also examples of countries where the regime succeeds in maintaining firm political control in the midst of a rapid modernization—China has done so for several decades. Although the outcome is not certain, it is nevertheless clear that even reform managed from the top can set in motion uncontrolled change. Incumbent regimes in the Arab world are as acutely aware of the dangers of runaway reform as they are of the necessity for change. Different regimes are following different approaches in an attempt to control the process of change, making sure that it will go as far as the rules want but will not gain unstoppable momentum.

Models of Managed Reform

Each Arab country has dealt with the domestic and international expectation that reform needs to take place in its own unique manner, depending on the character of the regime, the views of the leaders, the intensity of the political opposition, the degree of external pressure, and other factors. It is nevertheless possible to recognize three main patterns of managed reform. One consists of reforming political institutions in a way that projects an image of change but does not entail a significant degree of power redistribution—what many Arabs in the Gulf refer to as the “Bahrain model,” but which is also discernible, in a different form, in Egypt. A second pattern involves a degree of reform relating to social issues, particularly concerning personal status and occasionally individual rights, but does not address the reform of political institutions in a meaningful way. Morocco is the best example of this second pattern, and Saudi Arabia may well follow that path, but much more slowly. A variant of this model, seen most clearly in the United Arab Emirates and Tunisia, entails an aggressive policy of economic development and some administrative modernization, with virtually no political reform or even a modest degree of liberalization. Such a model is proving increasingly attractive to young rulers, such as Bashar al-Assad in Syria and most probably Muammar al-Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, who is being groomed to succeed his father.

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The third pattern of managed reform includes a degree of acceptance of the inevitability, and even the legitimacy, of an opposition, coupled with attempts to contain that opposition and reduce its role. Yemen provides an example of this pattern, as does Algeria. To be sure, no country fits one model perfectly. In most, managed reform from the top includes features that belong to more than one model. Nevertheless, there are dominant trends in each country, and the models help explain what is happening in each. All attempts at managed reform share one common characteristic: They represent efforts to stimulate and limit a process of change simultaneously. This means that all these attempts are highly problematic and marked by tensions and conflicts, with each approach having its own type of dominant tensions and conflicts.

Institutional Reform Without Power-Sharing Among current approaches to political reform, steps taken by various regimes to introduce formal institutional reform without actually transferring real power to the new institutions may be an attempt to appease either internal or external forces calling for change. Internal opponents may be lured into playing a political game where the odds are stacked against them, in the hopes of gaining strength and being able to exert greater pressure on the regime in time. Outsiders are more easily satisfied, particularly if they have little vested interest in the domestic politics of the so-called reforming country but need to show instead that their policy is working.

Bahrain. Bahrain is an example of institutional reform that does not entail a transfer of power. It has been so successful, in fact, that other countries in the Gulf would like to emulate “the Bahraini model” of political reform. In 1999, King Hamad ascended the throne following five years of violent unrest by the economically and politically under- privileged Shi’a, who constitute some 70 percent of Bahrain’s population. Eager to stabilize the country and to build a power base independent of his influential uncle, the long-serving prime minister, Hamad promised broad reforms. He showed goodwill by releasing political prisoners and welcoming home political exiles and won extensive public support in a 2001 referendum on a vaguely worded

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“National Charter” that promised to restore parliamentary life, which had been suspended since 1975. When the promised new constitution was issued in 2002, however, it gave the elected lower house of parliament fewer legislative powers than it had enjoyed under the old constitution and at the same time created an appointed upper house with greater powers. In response, the principal political societies (Bahrain does not per- mit parties) boycotted the 2002 legislative elections. Al-Wefaq, the largest Shi’i political society, decided after much soul-searching to participate in the 2005 municipal elections and then in the 2006 legislative elections in the belief that it would surely capture a majority in the lower house. But through a combination of district gerrymandering and targeted campaigns to defeat al-Wefaq’s few Sunni allies, the regime managed to deprive al-Wefaq of a majority. The United States, which had applauded Hamad’s National Charter initiative and other steps to reconcile with the opposition, ignored the emptiness of the reforms, even after the Bahraini government oust- ed the U.S.-funded National Democratic Institute (NDI)—after NDI had helped persuade al-Wefaq to participate in the 2006 elections but before it could monitor the polling. More serious than the gerrymandering of electoral districts, which could be easily reversed, is the fact that the king is trying to permanently change the composition of the population by giving citizenship to Sunni Arab workers from Syria and Jordan, and even to Sunna from the subcontinent, in an attempt to turn the Shi’a into a minority. From the point of view of the regime, Bahrain’s institutional reforms have been extremely successful, strengthening its position in several important respects. Although the Shi’i opposition remains dissatisfied, civil unrest is much less than it was in the 1990s, partly because al-Wefaq has decided to play the political game by the government’s rules and partly because of undeniable improvements in human rights practices and civil liberties. The opposition has been fragmented due to disagreements over whether or not to participate in elections; al-Wefaq now faces competition from a new popular movement, al-Haqq. Instead of being isolated and facing a united Shi’i opposition, the Bahraini regime has managed to position itself in the comfortable political center between the Sunni Islamist

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societies, which hold a majority in parliament, and a divided Shi’i opposition. Bahrain also need not worry about any serious pressure to reform from the United States; even if the United States were not bogged down with the global economic crisis and its presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, Bahrain hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet and has already been granted a free trade agreement. From the point of view of progress toward a more open political system, Bahrain’s reforms do not amount to much. Furthermore, the first, largely cosmetic step toward institutional reform from the top does not appear to be the prelude to more substantive reform. The ruling establishment has not given any sign of wanting to follow up, and the situation that has developed in the region would make it particularly difficult for it to embark on a slow process of power transfer. The confessional tensions triggered in the entire Gulf region by the war in Iraq and the perceived threat to Sunni regimes by a rising Iran are making an already cautious regime even more cautious. So while the palace has effectively outflanked the opposition for the present, this story is far from over because the Shi’i majority will continue to press for greater rights.

Egypt. The case of Egypt highlights more strongly the true downside of institutional reform from the top—its reversibility. Egypt has had what could be considered a modern political system for most of the twentieth century. After a reasonably liberal period beginning in the 1920s, Egypt’s political system returned to authoritarianism under Gamal Abdel Nasser after the 1952 Free Officers’ coup, before returning to a limited multipartyism under his successor, President Anwar al-Sadat. Hosni Mubarak, who succeeded Sadat after the latter’s as- sassination at the hands of militant Islamist groups in 1981, has been in power ever since, and the system has wavered between relative openness and repression for nearly three deacdes. More recently, with Hosni Mubarak approaching the inevitable end of his natural life and the problem of succession after a twenty-seven-year reign looming, the country has entered a tense transitional phase combining more free-wheeling political debate with self-serving reforms and harsh treatment of the opposition. Institutional reform is a central component of this repressive phase. It is also the newest. The other major

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component, repression by the security services, has never been far below the surface in Egypt. Under pressure to open up the political system from the United States and the domestic opposition, including an Islamist opposition that has embraced the democratic creed, the Egyptian government has responded by welcoming the idea of reform, but then twisting it around, closing the system further rather than opening it. At the center of the maneuver has been the issue of constitutional reform. Like all Arab constitutions, the Egyptian one creates an imbalanced system. On paper, the powers are separated, although certainly not equal, with the executive holding disproportionate sway. In practice, the situation is worse, because the already weak parliament is controlled by the president’s party and emergency laws have allowed the government to bypass the relatively independent regular courts to try political cases in the military courts. Demands of the opposition thus have concentrated on constitutional reform, and Mubarak appeared to accept the idea. A first constitutional reform was implemented before the 2005 presidential elections. The new article provided for direct, universal suffrage election of the president, replacing the old system in which the parliament chose the president and the populace confirmed the choice in a referendum. Though ostensibly more democratic, the new constitutional provision introduced many restrictions on presidential candidates to guarantee that no viable opposition personality would be able to challenge the incumbent or his designated successor in the foreseeable future. A new series of constitutional amendments was approved by the parliament in early 2007 and overwhelmingly approved in a referendum for which voter turnout was probably well under 5 percent (even the official estimate was only 25 percent). Presented as democratic reforms, the thirty-four constitutional amendments gave the president the power to disband the parliament, removed elections from the judicial supervision that had prevented complete manipulation by the government, gave the president wide discretion to move trials to military courts, and barred any party with a religious orientation from registering. The latter amendment was a blatant attempt to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood. In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood, an illegal organization,

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had nevertheless captured 20 percent of parliamentary seats by presenting its candidates as independents. Constitutional amendments also cleared the way for the planned change to a mixed system in which most seats are elected through a party list system, yet another way to disadvantage the Brotherhood. Institutional reform introduced from the top, as the Egyptian experience shows, can lead to quick change, quicker in fact than if the reforms were seriously discussed in a parliament where the opposition is well represented, where they would be the object of lengthy hag- gling and difficult compromises. This is of course an advantage when reforms facilitate participation and lead to a more open political system. It is a serious problem when they close the political space. Both the Bahraini and Egyptian examples show that institutional reform introduced from the top by a government under only moderate domestic pressure or no pressure at all is extremely unlikely to affect the core power of the ruling establishment. For that reason, regimes embarking on institutional reform from the top refuse to recognize a legitimate role for the opposition. Opponents are repressed in Egypt, where even centrist opposition parties are treated as threats by the government. Bahrain does not even allow the formation of political parties, only that of political societies. In reality, however, the Bahraini opposition enjoys strong public support and has more ability to put pressure on the government than in most Arab countries. Outright repression of regime opponents, combined with constitutional and institutional maneuvering, has so far preserved these regimes’ monopoly over power. But they have not been able to quell the widespread discontent in the society that stems from lack of economic opportunities and deteriorating social conditions. Bahrain has a history of periodic upheavals. Egypt continues to experience waves of strikes and protests that even the powerful security apparatus cannot prevent. Though too uncoordinated and unorganized to put real pressure on the government, spontaneous unrest nevertheless constitutes a troublesome and difficult-to-control phenomenon for the regime.

Substantive Change Without Institutional Reform Reform introduced from the top does not always start with institutions. In fact, one of the most promising examples of managed reform

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in the Arab region comes from Morocco, where the king has put much more emphasis on substantive reform in areas that affect citizens most immediately—human rights, personal freedoms, and more recently economic reform, while leaving the country’s institutional architecture largely untouched. To the extent that Saudi Arabia embarks on a reform process in the foreseeable future, it is more likely to start in the realm of socioeconomic issues than in the political realm.

Morocco. Beginning in the 1990s, Morocco has undergone a steady process of reform, first under King Hassan II and then under his son Muhammad VI. Slowly, the initiatives taken by the king have improved the country’s human rights record, thrown light on the repression of the first decades of independence and compensated most of the victims, enacted a significantly liberal reform of the personal status and family code, allowed freer though by no means completely free elections, and allowed an Islamist party to register and compete in elections. During this entire period, the reform process has been managed tightly from the top. The king has maintained the initiative throughout, monopo- lized the reform process, and limited the role of the parliament. Changes in Morocco cannot be dismissed as purely cosmetic. The country is without doubt more open, and the government less repressive, than it was in the past. Nor is there any sign that this process of managed reform has run its course and can go no further. The king has been targeting economic reform and development as the next important steps. In the run-up to the 2007 parliamentary elections, there was also much speculation that the country was about to reach an important political milestone, with a poll showing the main Islamist party, the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) receiving the largest number of votes. In reality, however, the PJD received the second-largest number of votes (fewer than in the previous elections) and was not invited to join the new coalition government led by the Istiqlal Party. Despite these changes, power in Morocco is still where it has always been, firmly in the hands of the king or, more broadly, the palace. The reform process in Morocco is not meant to lead to democracy but only to a more liberal environment and better governance, and to some extent it is succeeding. Morocco thus illustrates both the possibilities and the limits of managed substantive reform.

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Saudi Arabia. The example of Morocco has some relevance in inter- preting trends emerging in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi kingdom has undergone very little visible reform. The politics of the country is particularly opaque, because so much unfolds inside the royal family and is tied to the issue of succession and the relationship between the royal family and the religious establishment. The only reform of political institutions so far has been the relaunching, after a long hiatus, of elected municipal councils. The councils have limited power, have not been particularly assertive so far in using whatever power they have, and have not elicited much long-term interest on the part of Saudi citizens. Other reforms that appeared possible when oil prices were low before the Iraq war, particularly the possibility that the Shura Council be given some oversight role over the budget, lost urgency as oil prices skyrocketed, easing budgetary pressures and thus reducing the necessity to share responsibility for difficult choices and unpopular cuts. The need and demand for substantive reforms continue, however. Oil price increases in recent years did not ease the tensions that came from the fundamental dissonance in the society between the changes that have been taking place as the population becomes urbanized, the economy develops, and young people get an education, and the un- changing, strict social and moral codes that regulate the lives of individuals. This dissonance is to some extent a problem in all Gulf countries, where oil revenue has brought new opportunities and lifestyles that conflict with tradition and moral codes, but the tension is particularly high in Saudi Arabia. The list of tensions is almost endless. Young men and women spend long years in school but remain unemployed because they are not prepared for the available jobs, which continue to be filled by foreign- ers. The position of women and the personal status codes that regulate the rights of individuals and family relations are unchanged, but Saudi women are educated, including a high percentage at the ter- tiary level, and go into business. Young Saudis of both genders spend years studying abroad or at least are exposed to a different world of ideas and debates through the mass media. At the same time, the society remains deeply religious, and Islamic extremism, though controlled, is a strong presence in the society. There is no predictable,

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inevitable resolution of these tensions—certainly, there is no reason to believe that the spread of education will lead inexorably to the Westernization of the society or to democracy nor, conversely, that an explosion of social discontent is inevitable. However, the considerable areas of dissonance that exist in Saudi Arabia suggest that the government is likely to introduce reforms in areas such as education, women’s rights, or individual rights in general. There has already been considerable debate on some of these issues, particularly concerning education. There has also been some relaxing of rules concerning organizations of civil society and professional syndicates, as well as some efforts to improve the functioning of the judicial system. The process of managed reform in Morocco started by addressing social and human rights issues, and it seems probable that Saudi Ara- bia will also address social issues first. In Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates, however, reformers have chosen economic transformation as the way to move the country forward. Both countries have been extremely successful, despite the quite different characteristics of their economies. Strikingly, both countries have been able to manage the social transformation entailed in such rapid growth without opening themselves to pressure for political change. The new economy has not as yet created demands for change in the political system.

Coming to Terms With the Opposition Only a few Arab states where the reform process is strictly controlled from the top have been willing to come to terms with the existence and indeed with the legitimacy of opposition forces. This does not mean that the ruling establishment does not seek to curb the opposition indeed, the governments in all these countries would like to limit the influence of the opposition. Rather, it means that the governments are resigned to its existence. Not all countries that have accepted the existence of multiple parties also truly accept the existence of an opposition. Staying with previous examples, Morocco tries to co-opt all opposition parties and to appropriate their reform plans, whereas the Egyptian regime immediately intervenes to discredit or destroy any political party whose role threatens to become significant. Countries that were forced to accept the existence of an opposition when faced with unfavorable

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circumstances still seek to free themselves from it when conditions improve. In Kuwait, for example, the ruling family was forced to ac- knowledge the power of merchant families and thus an elected parliament in the past, but not all its members have abandoned the dream of getting rid of the parliament. In fact, the ruling establishment of Kuwait regards Bahrain and Dubai with a degree of envy. Bahrain has set up a tame, closely controlled, only partially elected parliament; in Dubai, the emir rules unfettered. Kuwait itself has to deal with a parliament determined to exercise real power, proposing legislation and holding hearings in which government ministers are exposed to harsh questioning and censure by the parliament even if they are members of the ruling family. In a similar vein, many regimes still refuse to recognize the legitimacy of political parties. With the exception of Yemen, no country on the Arabian Peninsula allows parties, nor does Libya. Syria allows no party other than those affiliated with the ruling Baath Party. Other countries allow political parties but make the registration process extremely difficult. Egypt, for example, does not allow political parties whose programs have religious overtones and also refuses to register any new political party whose program is deemed insufficiently different from that of already registered organizations, leaving aspiring parties with a very small margin for maneuver. There are, nevertheless, some countries where the ruling establishment tries to control closely any political reform but at the same time has resigned itself to the existence of an opposition. Two interesting cases in this respect are Yemen and Algeria. For different reasons, the governments of these countries, while essentially authoritarian, appear to have concluded that they must tolerate opposition parties. In neither case does the acceptance of opposition parties denote a particular openness of the regime or the willingness to accept true democratic participation. Rather, special circumstances have led to this anomalous situation.

Yemen. In Yemen, the government was forced to come to terms with the existence of an opposition to prevent the recently reunified and rather shaky country from splitting apart again. The Republic of Ye- men was formed in 1990, when the northern Arab Republic of Yemen

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and the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen decided to unify. Unification was difficult, because the two republics were very different. For years, the more conservative north had been propped up by the West, and the supposedly Marxist-oriented south by the Soviet Union. Both countries had single party systems, however, and reunification was swiftly carried out when the northern General Peo- ple’s Congress (GPC) and the southern Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) entered into a power-sharing agreement, dividing up posts on a fifty- fifty basis. Because of the way reunification took place, the existence of at least two political parties became entrenched and irrevocable. A few months after unification, former members of the GPC formed the Islamist Islah Party in an attempt to win away votes from the YSP by appealing to religious conservatism. True unification of north and south proved quite difficult, however, with competing northern and southern elites remaining jealous of their power and prerogatives and little inclined to share. In 1994, tension flared into a brief period of civil war. Inevitably, the much more populous north emerged as the dominant section of the country. The YSP, which had reneged on its commitment to unity, lost its clout in the cabinet and the parity of posts with the GPC. The northern- dominated military took control of the southern territory, and the GPC took control of the government and the parliament. The GPC share of the parliament increased relentlessly from about half the parliamentary seats before the civil war in 1993, to almost two-thirds in 1997, to well over two-thirds in 2003. Yet despite the setback, the YSP was allowed to survive. The government could ill afford to eliminate the last vestige of southern power. The existence of an opposition has thus remained entrenched in the political system of Yemen. It was strengthened by the 1997 decision by Islah to leave the government and become a loyal opposition and by the 2003 decision by Islah and the YSP, together with some smaller parties, to enter into a coalition. It can be argued that the GPC can well afford to improve its democratic credentials by tolerating an opposition, even an unusual alliance of leftist and Islamist parties, because it still controls a large majority in parliament and has all the tools of control and manipulation an overwhelming majority provides. Indeed, it less dangerous for the regime to accept the existence

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of the opposition than to try to crush it, given the weakness of the state and the fact that Islah is a movement with deep tribal roots. The regime, in other words, has concluded that closely managed reform from the top is compatible with tolerance of an opposition.

Algeria. The case of Algeria has some striking parallels to that of Ye- men. There, too, tolerance of an opposition in a system that can at best be defined as semiauthoritarian evolved as a result of the need for reconciliation after civil war rather than out of a desire for democracy. As a result, as in Yemen, the recognition of the legitimacy of the opposition has not been accompanied by real power-sharing or a substantive process of democratization. A perfect model of centralized state authority in a single party system under military tutelage from independence in 1962 until the late 1980s, Algeria embarked on a poorly planned electoral process in an attempt to quell popular discontent. With little preparation, in 1989 Algeria put an end to the monopoly over power by the National Lib- eration Front (FLN), the independence movement that had dominated the country until then. Parties were allowed to form, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The FIS participated in the 1990 municipal elections on a radical platform calling for an Islamic state and emerged as the strongest party. It entered the first round of the parliamentary elections in December 1991 on the same platform, winning a plurality although not the absolute majority of votes. The likelihood that the FIS would win the second election round sched- uled in early 1992 prompted the army, which still retained ultimate power, to intervene directly, deposing the president and halting the electoral process. The outcome was a brutal civil war that ravaged the country until 1999 in which both Islamist groups and the military committed mas- sacres of civilians. Because the Algerian government to this day has not been willing to open an investigation into the events of this period or to set up a truth and reconciliation commission, information about the events of the civil war remains murky though sufficiently clear to conclude that all sides had committed heinous acts of brutality. Politically, the years of the civil war were marked by a tug-of-war between a series of weak presidents and the generals in the army and

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secret services. It was only with the election of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 1999 that power started moving back into civilian hands, although even now the military looms as a heavy presence in the politics of Algeria, the 800-pound gorilla that could reappear at any time. An important factor in the military’s acquiescence to pull back was the desperate need for Algeria to emerge from the international isola- tion in which it had fallen during the war. This required not only curbing the violence and restoring a degree of stability but also im- proving the image of the country. The outward restoration of civilian power helped in this respect. It is against this background that the pluralist politics of Algeria under Bouteflika needs to be understood. The real contention for power is between the civilian establishment around the president and the military. No matter what the constitution and laws say, the president is not chosen solely by the voters but by the security services, which play a determinant role. In the 1999 presidential elections, all contenders dropped out of the race at the last moment at the instiga- tion of the military, leaving the field open for the election of Boutefli- ka. In the 2009 elections, four contenders ran against the president, but Bouteflika still landed a sweeping victory, officially with 92 percent of the votes. The competition for parliamentary seats is real, however, as shown by the change in the fortunes of various parties between 1997 (the first elections after the 1992 cancellation) and the present. Many parties compete, including three Islamist parties. But major political forces in the country remain outside the electoral competition, particularly the military and the FIS. Party politics and electoral competition are part of the process of recovery from civil war, of refurbishing the image of the country, and of convincing citizens that times have changed. As in Yemen, party politics has less to do with power allocation than with keeping the country at peace.

Politics of Managed Reform

Not one of the models of managed reform we have discussed—institutional change without power-sharing, substantive improvements in citizens’ rights without institutional reform, and accepting the

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presence of an opposition—has affected how political power is actually acquired and used. These limited reform processes have provided some benefits to the population in some countries, but managed reform has remained just that, a carefully controlled process to introduce change only where and when it suits the goals of the ruling establishment. Saying that change is carefully managed, however, does not imply that regimes are free agents when it comes to implementing reforms. Any step toward reform, no matter how limited, has its supporters and detractors, triggering a battle between the old guard and the new guard and forcing the latter to accept compromises and make concessions. And reform is also driven from the outside, both by the imper- sonal pressure of globalization and by direct demand from the United States and European countries, which have their own ideas about how a reform process should unfold. Such external pressures can change the balance of power in favor of reform but can also lead to the enactment of measures the regime does not believe in and which are promptly voided by other steps. Reformers themselves tend to be somewhat ambivalent about their goals, to some extent because they want something that may be impossible. Driven by what many perceive to be the imperative of economic reform and modernization, they want real change in the economic and administrative arena but without any spillover into the political realm. And although regime reformers could benefit from having allies among opposition groups and civil society organizations in their battle against the old guard, they are afraid to give these groups a role, fearing that this would both embitter the battle between reformers and hardliners and undermine the reformers’ own power. The tensions and dilemmas typical of managed reform processes need to be understood because they determine how effective reform from the top can be, and thus the chances that it will make a real difference in the character of Arab governance.

Old Guard and Reformers: Hardliners and Softliners In their discussion of transitions from authoritarian rule in Latin America and southern Europe, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C.

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Schmitter point out that all transitions lead to, indeed are made possible by, a split between hardliners and softliners in the regime.2 Hard- liners may be opportunists who oppose democratization merely because they want to hold onto power and perquisites, or they may oppose it on principle. Softliners generally believe that the regime will require some degree or some form of electoral legitimation in the future and therefore advocate undertaking reforms while the regime still can control the process. It is important to keep in mind that softliners or reformers are not necessarily liberals, although some may be. Rather, they are individuals who understand that a country cannot remain static and that some degree of adaptation is necessary. Some softliners, argue O’Donnell and Schmitter, hope to carry out only a limited liberalization that keeps the ruling elite in power, while others favor a true democratic transition and aspire to elected positions in a future democratic system. In the Arab countries, softliners usually belong to the first category, and the liberalization they seek is more economic than political. In Arab countries over the last decade, the division between hardliners and softliners has been linked to the transition of power from one generation to another. In Syria, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, and Qatar, young leaders have come to power promising—and, to a limited and often temporary extent, delivering—a political and economic opening. In Egypt, Yemen, and Libya, regime reformers frustrated by the old guard are rallying around the sons of leaders who have spent more than a quarter-century in office. In all of these countries, young leaders or pretenders have surrounded themselves with entourages of reformists who have broken taboos by criticizing the ancien régime and have proclaimed the need for economic, educational, administrative, and even political reform. It remains to be seen how far these reformers would be willing to push change if they came to power. In countries where the generational transition has taken place and even in some others, reformists have been appointed to many important positions in cabinets, royal courts, and parliaments, but they have yet to attain control of the real levers of power—that is, military, internal security, and intelligence apparatuses—in most countries. The old guard (hardliners) still dominate such institutions, with a few notable exceptions. In Morocco, for example, the powerful interior

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minister, Driss Basri, emblem of the old guard’s repressive policies, was dismissed in 1999. Leaders still rely on defense and interior ministers, as well as directors of intelligence, to ensure stability, their grip on power, and their personal safety. In addition, the old guard still holds certain key political positions that are often tightly linked to the security apparatus (for example, the prime ministership in Bahrain, the foreign ministry in Syria, and the secretary generalship of the ruling National Democratic Party in Egypt). Thus reformists, while rising in prominence in many Arab countries, face ongoing struggles within the ruling elite. Such struggles sometimes focus on specific reform issues such as the revision of laws or constitutions to enhance human or civil rights and sometimes on broader concepts such as openness versus security or change versus continuity. But they are just as often pure power struggles between ambitious people in their 30s or 40s trying to access authority and those in their 60s or 70s trying to hold on to it for as long as possible. In many cases the reformists have latched onto the issue of change partly out of conviction but also partly because they believe it will help them gain popular or foreign support. This generational transition and the accompanying struggle are taking place in Arab countries not only within ruling elites but also within opposition movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and parties such as the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) in Morocco.

Globalization, Modernization, and Economic Reform A common thread among regime reformists in Arab countries is that they are motivated primarily by economic concerns related to globalization, and even more so now with the global economic crisis. Study- ing or working abroad has given many young members of the elite a perspective on the outside world that the older generation lacked, leaving them intensely aware that the global economy is changing and worried that their countries are being left behind. Satellite television and Internet connectivity highlight daily the growing gap that separates Arab countries from the high-performing, dynamic economies around the world. A major concern of regime reformers is thus how to modernize economic, legal, and educational systems to benefit from economic

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globalization. In countries with relatively large populations and significant unemployment—such as Egypt, Morocco, and Syria—leaders have focused on the need to generate jobs by stimulating the private sector and increasing domestic and foreign investment. Younger leaders, for example, Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif and others in Gamal Mubarak’s coterie, have championed extensive changes to banking, taxation, and customs policies to facilitate investment. In Algeria and Bahrain, leaders have undertaken reforms to develop more professional judicial establishments capable of handling commercial and other economic disputes. Leaders in most Arab countries have expressed concern about the need to improve education to pre- pare students for employment in the global economy, although only a few countries—such as Tunisia and Qatar, which have small populations and relatively thriving economies—have had both the political will and the resources necessary to mount serious educational reform campaigns so far. Occasionally, ruling establishment reformists have also called for explicitly political reforms. Their goal, however, has been to promote the improved governance and international image supposed to contribute to economic growth rather than democratic participation. For example, the Moroccan royal court has tried to modernize parliamentary operations—the ministry of finance has offered to train parliamentary staff in the software needed to scrutinize the government’s budget—to increase the legislative body’s domestic and international credibility. It has not, however, agreed to give the parliament more extensive powers, reducing those of the king accordingly, as demanded by the opposition. President Mubarak of Egypt has championed a host of constitutional amendments calling for direct popular election of the president and instituting a technically independent electoral commission, but the amendments also close off avenues to the political opposition, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. There are also several Arab countries in which ruling establishments have specific motivations for political reform—for example, Bahraini King Hamad’s need to quell violent unrest and consolidate his power base, or Gamal Mubarak’s quest to build domestic and foreign support for his bid to succeed his father in the presidency. Such young leaders want to modernize their countries’ polities just as they

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want to modernize their economies—but not to the extent of opening up true competition for political power.

Uncorking the Bottle and Controlling the Genie: Opposition and Civil Society Ruling establishment reformists shrink from opening their political systems to unfettered competition so they can preserve power for themselves and their associates. But reformists also seek to justify the limits they impose on competition by arguing that opposition forces are irresponsible, backward, and weak. This is often a thinly disguised excuse for repression; the weakness of the opposition in particular should be a factor facilitating its incorporation into the system in a nonthreatening way, rather than a reason for banning it. In one respect, however, the contention contains an element of truth. Reform- ists within ruling establishments are sometimes more socially liberal than some of the opposition groups, particularly Islamist ones, or even the society at large. Women would not have obtained the vote in Kuwait, for example, nor would personal status laws in Morocco have been revised, if rulers had not strong-armed some Islamist groups. Opposition groups with no prospect of ever coming to power often take extreme positions on issues to capture public attention, and many are as undemocratic in their internal practices as the ruling establishments they oppose, are controlled by a small clique for many years, and are unable to renew themselves. Ruling party reformists cannot dismiss opposition groups altogether, however. First, they would find it difficult to maintain their reformist credentials if they showed the same propensity for repression as the old guard. Second, reformists realize that some civil society organizations can be useful allies in pursuing a reform agenda. Reformists in Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, and other countries have sought to include civil society activists in quasigovernmental institutions, attempting to marshal the credibility and networks of opposition and civil society groups behind a government-driven reform agenda. The Egyptian government invited credible leaders of human rights organizations to join the National Council on Human Rights, for example, and the Moroccan palace pressed civil society and opposition groups to endorse its Reconciliation and Equity

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Tribunal exploring past human rights abuses, as well as changes in its family law (Mudawwana). Trust is often lacking in these fragile partnerships, however, because opposition groups in many cases have endured decades of regime attempts to co-opt, corrupt, intimidate, undermine, or even destroy them. For their part, the old guard within regimes is often strongly suspicious of cooperating with op- positionists, deriding them as purely out for their own interests— further demonstrating the old guard’s failure to accept diversity and competition as constructive. Thus ruling party reformists find themselves with a conundrum when it comes to opposition and civil society. They want an opposition to exist because they realize that regime-directed reform efforts ring hollow without a diversity of views and inputs from the society. Some reformists even complain—unconvincingly—that they wish opposition and civil society groups were more credible and effective. But at the same time, reformists share the old guard’s fear of the implications of a truly strong opposition, and so they participate in efforts to cut the opposition down to size, resulting in Bahrain’s constitution that deprives the parliament of powers, Egypt’s tortured regulations for eligibility for presidential elections, Jordan’s history of extensive electoral gerrymandering, and Morocco’s electoral laws that prevent any party from controlling a majority of seats.

Dealing With External Expectations The United States and European countries also put pressure on Arab regimes to introduce reforms. Exercised inconsistently and in a rather piecemeal fashion, such pressure has been both a blessing and a curse to ruling party reformers at different times. The young monarchs of Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Qatar, for example, became darlings of the U.S. administration after 2001 in part because of their reformist credentials and benefited from free trade agree- ments, assistance packages, and enhanced military cooperation. Similarly, reform advocates in Egypt have used U.S. pressure for financial and other kinds of economic reform to help overcome the objections to change by regime hardliners. The sometimes exaggerated praise with which reforms have been greeted, however, has also sent a signal to regime reformers that external expectations are not

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very high. Praising constitutional reform in Bahrain that created a parliament constructed in such a way that the regime would always dominate it, or heaping praise on the Moroccan reform of the personal status code while ignoring the nondemocratic implications of the new election law, sends a signal that external actors are easily appeased. Ruling party reformists, furthermore, are not sure what they want from external actors, complaining at times that external pressure is too strong; at others that it is not strong enough. Most regime reformists in the Arab world saw the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative agreed on at the 2004 G8 summit as the kiss of death for their own efforts—fearing that if they pursued a reform agenda they would be seen in the region as agents of the former colonial powers and of the new regional hegemon. At the same time, Arab reformists often complain privately that multilateral initiatives, whether G8 or European Union, are too watered down to be effective and cannot help them fight corruption and other internal problems.

Conclusions

Top-down reform, closely managed by ruling elites, has so far brought extremely limited results in the Arab world, particularly concerning political reform. Even when regime reformers have talked of political change, in reality they have taken at best timid steps, which are usually cancelled out by contradictory measures. With few exceptions even economic and social reforms have been limited. As we look to the future, two main questions arise. First, will a process managed from the top bring more than limited, technical institutional reforms and a modest degree of liberalization to Arab countries? Second, if establishment reformers decide to implement more meaningful change under domestic or international pressure, can they avoid the king’s dilemma, that is, can they avoid triggering an ultimately uncontrollable process that can cost them their power? Extrapolating from present trends, the most likely scenario for most countries appears to be continued political stagnation, with limited change, rather than an uncontrolled slide into an uncertain

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future. Softliners still have limited impact, their own goals are modest at best, and the old guard remains strong everywhere. Regime reformers have generally failed to convince the population that they are serious about change. In most countries, the image of the young reformers has become tarnished. The “Damascus spring” is a distant memory in Syria, where Bashar has now succeeded in replacing most members of his father’s old guard with his own supporters, who have rejected political change and liberalization in favor of measures directed at promoting modernization. For different reasons, the reforming impetus has also ground to a halt in Jordan, where the king is fearful that events in the region will undermine the stability of his country. The dashed hopes of these managed reform processes have engendered a greater degree of cynicism in the region. The climate of optimism that prevailed a few years ago has faded. Other young leaders waiting in the wings, like Egypt’s Gamal Mubarak and Libya’s Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, will probably be greeted with much more skepticism from the outset if they succeed their fathers. This limited success of regime reformers gives some plausibility to the king’s dilemma scenario. To succeed, regime reformers need allies, and to find allies—in civil society or moderate political parties— they would need to make some concessions. Some reformers could decide that their own political future would be brighter in a more openly competitive political environment and thus break with hardliners. This could transform a process managed from the top into one that is much more participatory and thus unpredictable. Such a scenario is plausible but not the most likely, however. In seeking to promote political reform in the Arab world, the Unit- ed States and Europe have favored a process of managed reform. This is hardly surprising given the unpredictability of change triggered by strong and possibly radical opposition forces—the downfall of the shah and the rise of a theocratic regime in Iran offer a cautionary tale, for example. The European and American preference for top-down reform by Arab governments has been strengthened by the election of Hamas in Palestine in January 2006. The new trend is for outside donors to emphasize institutional and moderate civil society development more than risky elections, which is very much to the liking of reformists in Arab ruling establishments who want to improve

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governance but avoid competition. Yet the evidence so far is that the top-down process is having very little effect, making at best a marginal difference on specific issues but not leading to the redistribution of power that a true process of democratization and even liberalization would entail. For domestic advocates of managed reform and for outsiders seeking to promote change alike, the lesson appears to be that political reform can never be risk free: Too much close manage- ment perpetuates authoritarianism, and unmanaged processes have unpredictable outcomes.

Notes

1. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968). 2. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authori- tarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Balti- more, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 15–7.

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Fighting on Two Fronts Secular Parties in the Arab World

Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy

The Crisis of Secular Parties

ecular parties in the Arab world—a broad range of political organizations that vary in their political orientation from liberal positions to vaguely socialist programs—are facing a crisis. Caught between regimes that allow little legal space for freeS political activity on one side and popular Islamist movements that are clearly in the ascendancy throughout the Arab world on the other, they are struggling for influence and relevance, and in some cases even for survival. Results of recent elections across the region have exposed the weaknesses of secular parties and thus created a new sense of urgency among their leaders and members. They no longer hide—from

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themselves or others—the depth of the crisis they are facing, but they have no ready solutions. They know that they have stagnant or even dwindling constituencies, whereas the Islamists have growing and increasingly well-organized ones. And most admit that, at present, they do not have a strategy on how to regain the ground they have lost in countries such as Morocco and Egypt or to take advantage of new opportunities in countries such as Yemen and Kuwait. There is often a plaintive tone to the arguments set forth by secular parties in the Arab world. They feel victimized by authoritarian governments that thwart their activities. They feel disadvantaged by the competition of Islamist movements that use mosques for proselytizing and charitable institutions to build constituencies. They feel, in other words, caught in the middle and as if they are fighting on two fronts. Indeed, conditions in most Arab countries are quite difficult for secular parties, just as they are for any political organization seeking to act independently of a government or even more to challenge a government. But the crisis of secular parties is also in part of their own making. With few exceptions, they have not focused on the organizational imperative required to participate successfully in political systems that are election-based, although not truly democratic. The weakness of organization and outreach activities by secular parties has allowed constituencies that were once secular, such as industrial workers in Egypt or urban intellectuals in Morocco, to drift toward Islamist movements or to seek the protection of the government. This is not an inevitable outcome of the authoritarian or semiauthoritarian nature of the state. Islamist movements have worked assiduously for years to develop political machines in spite of systematic regime repression and exclusion. Secular parties are more inclined to take constituencies for granted and engage instead in intellectual discussions. It is symptomatic of the problems faced by secular parties that many among them even have problems clearly defining their identity. The term secular parties we have chosen to use after much discussion is not one most parties accept, fearing it implies a rejection of Islamic culture and values, which they in fact accept. Indeed, it is true that these parties are not militantly secular, à la Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, or ideologically committed to a French-style laïcité. They simply do not embrace a political platform inspired by religious ide-

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als. And that is why we refer to them as secular rather than secular- ist. Secular parties are quick to define what they are not—they are not anti-Islamic, they do not reject the authentic culture of their countries—but they have trouble clarifying what they are. The term democratic, which many of them prefer, is misleading because today most political groups in the region, from mainstream Islamist movements to authoritarian ruling establishments, ostensibly embrace democracy. There is in fact no clear indication that most secular parties are any more committed to democracy than other actors. Liberal, another term many favor, is equally confusing: does it mean liberal in the Eu- ropean or in the American sense? Or does it stand for the revival of the liberal tradition in Arab politics that flourished in Egypt and the Levant from the 1920s to the 1940s? And how does it apply to parties that still have the word socialist in their name or that not so long ago embraced Arab nationalism? The ambiguity of many secular parties has greatly diminished their ability to develop coherent programs and to fashion political messages that are distinct from those of ruling establishments and Islamists. In fairness to secular parties, Arab societies, always conservative in their social and religious attitudes, have become increasingly more so over the last decades, thus limiting the space available for the articu- lation of secular ideas in politics. To some extent, the ambiguity of many secular parties represents an adaptation to a social milieu that is not receptive to political programs not inspired by religious ideals. As recent elections have shown, however, this lack of clarity has been counterproductive. It has driven away traditional constituencies without attracting new potential voters, who see very little reason to support parties that are not substantially different from ruling establishments or Islamist movements but cannot dispense either the patronage government parties control or the social services Islamist movements offer. In today’s Arab politics, secular parties have become for the most part second-tier actors that cannot compete successfully for voter support. Ambiguity is not a viable strategy. The crisis of secular parties is emerging as a major obstacle to democratic transformation in the Arab world. At a time when political debate is quite broad and active in most countries and when mass

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media expose Arab citizens to a wider range of ideas than in the past, the spectrum of viable political organizations is quite narrow. More countries are holding competitive elections than before, but few real parties, and even fewer real secular parties, contest such elections. Above all, the weakness of secular parties is leading to a curious blurring of the lines between governments and opposition, with many secular parties looking to governments for protection against the rise of Islamists, even as they try to curb the power of those governments. Secular parties in Egypt, for example, suffer at the hand of the government. Their activities are curtailed, their meetings disrupted, and their leaders sometimes arrested, but at least they know what to expect. They know what the restrictions are, and although they do not like them, they usually learn to live with them. But they do not know what to expect from potential Islamist parties. The prospect of an Islamist electoral victory is truly threatening to secular parties in these countries because it could entail not only new and less predictable political restrictions, but also the danger of new social and cultural restrictions being imposed on the country. Caught between a predictable adversary and an unpredictable one, secular parties often respond by moving closer to the incumbent government. As a result, attempts to build cross-ideological opposition fronts, including secular and Islamist movements with the objective of better challenging the incumbent regime, rarely succeed. Such attempts are usually initiated by Islamist movements before elections but meet with only a cautious reaction by secular parties, which do not trust the Islamists and prefer to safe- guard their relations with the regime. The only noteworthy exception to this pattern is the Yemeni opposition front, which includes the Ye- meni Socialist Party and the Islamist Islah (Reform) Party. Despite their weakness, secular parties are seen in the West as the organizations that could bring democracy to the Arab world. Western governments know well that Arab regimes are not interested in true democratic reform. They also mistrust Islamist movements, fearing their participation in elections could lead to a new wave of religion- based authoritarian regimes rather than to democracy. Although secular parties often suffer from old leadership, ossified cadres, and lack of internal democracy, they have become by default the organizations that the West counts on to promote democracy in the Arab world.

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Such parties are often headed by individuals who were educated in the West or at least have been exposed to the West. They talk the international language of democracy with greater fluency and more credibility than Islamist politicians, even though many of them started their careers as Arab socialists and Arab nationalists. We also believe that strengthening secular parties is crucial to the democratic transformation of the Arab world. But our conclusion is not based on fear of Islamists, disenchantment with ruling establishments, or admiration for the democratic commitment of secular politicians. Rather, it is based on the fact that, in the absence of viable secular parties, political competition in the Arab world is reduced to a dangerous bipolar confrontation between rulers and Islamists. A political center, crucial to the development of democracy, is either missing or remains very limited in most Arab countries at present. Secular parties in the Arab world could help change this situation, but to do so they must change themselves first.

Secular Parties in Four Countries

The analysis of secular parties that follows is based on in-depth research in four countries and on discussions with representatives of many secular parties across the region. We start with factual background about secular parties in Morocco, Egypt, Yemen, and Kuwait and proceed to a broader analysis of the uncertain future of secular parties in the Arab world.

Morocco More than any other country in the Arab world, Morocco has a long, continuous history of political parties, including secular parties and those considered to be Islamic well before the concept of Islamist parties became common. Although Morocco was an authoritarian, repressive country from independence in 1956 until the mid-1990s, the monarchy never succumbed to the temptation of banning political parties or proclaiming a single party system. As a result of this long tradition, some Moroccan secular political parties continue to display a degree of structure and organization that is unusual in the Arab

Pluralism6x9 rev2.indd 45 6/19/09 4:50:30 PM 46 GETTING TO PLURALISM world. This does not mean that they are strong, flourishing parties at present or that they do not feel threatened by the stiff competition from Islamist parties and movements. Compared with other countries in the region, however, Moroccan secular political parties stand out as real organizations. There are over two dozen political parties in Morocco today, and most are simply cliques gathered around a hopeful leader trying to launch a political career. The significant political organizations that can be called secular, though with even more caveats than in other countries, are significantly fewer. They are the two parties that developed during the struggle to put an end to the French protectorate, namely the Istiqlal (Independence) and the USFP (Socialist Union of Popular Forces, originally the UNFP—National Union of Popular Forces); the so-called royalist parties; and the Berber parties, which overlap to some extent with the royalists. Calling the USFP a secular party is not problematic, given its socialist antecedents. The case of the Istiqlal is more complex, because during the struggle for independence, the Istiqlal, founded by a religious scholar and embodying tradition, was the party of the conservative, religious element of society. But that was several decades before today’s Islamist movements came into existence. In the contemporary political spectrum, the Istiqlal has aligned itself firmly with the USFP, not with the Islamist Party for Justice and Development (PJD). Indeed, both parties represent the core of the so-called kutla, or bloc, of parties that were once in the opposition but are now aligned with the monarchy. Apart from the Istiqlal and the USFP, there are the so-called royalist parties and the Berber parties, which overlap to some extent with the royalists. They are also far from being militantly secular. They appeal to a conservative, traditional element of the rural population, religious by definition, but they do not organize under the banner of political Islam. Rather they are patronage organizations, rooted in clientelism and opposed to Islamist parties—hence, we consider them “secular” for the purposes of this discussion. Like the Islamist PJD, the Istiqlal and the USFP are conventional political parties, with a substantial party headquarters in the capital and a network of branch offices throughout the country. Indeed, the Istiqlal prides itself with having over a thousand such offices, a Fighting on Two Fronts 47 number the USFP admits to being unable to match. Many of these local offices are not functioning actively, officials from both parties concede. Nevertheless, there are true structures to both organizations. The two parties have been drawing closer to the monarchy in recent years, a position that risks further weakening them, at least in the eyes of people dissatisfied with the status quo. The Istiqlal and the USFP have come to view themselves as “government” rather than “opposition” parties and view the PJD as an opposition party. How the USFP and the Istiqlal turned from being the core of the opposition into government parties is a story that reveals much, both about the political ability of Morocco’s monarchy and the dilemmas faced by secular parties today. The transformation started with the decision by Hassan II to make the 1997 elections competitive. He gave more political space for the old parties to organize but also allowed for the first time an Islamist movement to enter the political fray legally. Initially, Islamists took over an existing political party (Mouvement Populaire Democratique et Constitutionnel, MPDC), but soon they launched a new organization, the PJD. The USFP obtained the largest number of votes in the 1997 elections, and the king named its leader, Abdul Rahman Youssoufi, prime minister. The Is- tiqlal also joined the government. The alternance, as this transition was called, was a historic turning point. The opposition parties had not simply been out of the government but they had been treated as enemies, their leaders and members subject to arrest. With the alternance, they came in from the cold. Both parties saw the change as permanent. Not only could they not envisage returning to the status of parties at best on the margins of legitimacy and at worst persecuted as a threat, but they could not even envisage being in the opposition again. This may appear as a strange idea in established democracies, where being in or out of power is seen as a temporary situation unlikely to last through many election cycles. But in a country that has only experienced one alternance in half a century of independence, the idea that being a government party is permanent should not be surprising. The USFP’s and Istiqlal’s insistence that they are now government parties also reflects their fear of the growing influence of the PJD and of an even more popular Islamist movement, al-’Adl wa’l-Ihsan 48 GETTING TO PLURALISM

(Justice and Charity). The USFP and the Istiqlal do not trust their capacity to compete. They are timeworn organizations, and the ac- complishment that originally gave them their legitimacy and aura, their contribution to the independence struggle, is long in the past. In government, they have not achieved much. In part their successes are limited because the monarchy has laid claim to all positive political developments of the last ten years; but the parties themselves have not shown much dynamism nor have they pursued a vigorous reform agenda, as some members admit. Under the circumstances, closeness to the monarchy is a prudent policy. Indeed, the current efforts to integrate the PJD into mainstream politics are taking place at the initiative of the palace, but secular political parties and many NGOs show much greater skepticism. As a result, the secular parties are caught in a vicious circle. They have become parties of the status quo, closely aligned with the monarchy, and they do not dare go beyond what the king wants. Although they argue that parliament should be given more power and that the prerogatives of the executive should be curbed, they expect the initiative to come from the monarchy. With few accomplishments to show to the public after almost ten years in the government, they need the monarchy’s protection against the rise of the Islamists. Battling on two fronts, secular parties have decided to eliminate one by siding with the monarchy.

Egypt In contrast to Morocco, secular parties in Egypt have a long history of ruptures and discontinuity. Egypt had an elected parliament and legal parties under the monarchy between 1923 and 1952. The Free Offi- cers’ Movement, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, took power and declared the republic in 1952, banning parties and proclaiming a socialist- oriented single-party system in 1954. In 1976, President Anwar al- Sadat reintroduced a degree of pluralism by legalizing a small number of opposition parties. The multiparty system expanded gradually. By 2006, it included more than twenty legal parties, most of which can be classified as secular. Despite its growing diversity, Egypt’s multiparty system suffers from two serious deficiencies. The first is the transformation of the former

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single party into a new hegemonic party, headed by the president. The second is the plethora of legal and political restrictions imposed by the government to limit the role of liberal and leftist opposition parties. Although Egyptian party laws ban only religious parties—a ban that was enshrined in the constitution in 2007—even secular political groups encounter severe restrictions when they seek to register as legal parties. In January 2007, the government-controlled Political Parties’ Court rejected the demands for legalization filed by twelve groups, elev- en of which have secular programs. Furthermore, even the legally registered parties are not permitted to organize and campaign freely. The government uses outright repression and manipulation to ensure that the opposition will get few votes in elections. Thus, secular parties do not really compete for power with the ruling party. Rather, they compete among themselves—and with the Muslim Brotherhood, which runs independent candidates in legislative elections—over the leftovers to achieve a small margin of representation in parliament and local councils. Egypt’s multiparty system produces and sustains a weak opposition unable to challenge the authoritarian ruling establishment. Yet secular parties also contribute to their own weakness. Even with all its structural limitations, Egypt’s political system offers some space for action and chances to compete that secular parties have not been capable of using. Indeed, a comparison between them and the banned—and severely repressed—Muslim Brotherhood quickly reveals that secular parties have not made a large investment in building up their organizations, reaching out to potential constituencies, or devising convincing electoral platforms.1 Secular opposition parties in Egypt are divided across the ideological spectrum into liberal and leftist organizations. When Presi- dent Sadat reintroduced limited pluralism in 1976, he deliberately promoted the formation of liberal and leftist parties, placing his own National Democratic Party in the center. There are now more than twenty opposition parties, all falling into those two categories because Islamist parties have not been allowed to register. Most of the opposition parties, however, are politically insignificant. Only four opposition parties are currently represented in the Peo- ple’s Assembly—the lower house of the Egyptian parliament. Typi- cally, two are liberal—the new al-Wafd (Delegation) Party and the

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al-Ghad (Tomorrow) Party—and two leftist—al-Tajamu’ (Unionist) and the Arabi al-Nasri (Arab Nasserite) Party. Together, they won a meager 5 percent of the seats in the 2005 parliamentary elections. In contrast, candidates of the Muslim Brotherhood managed to claim almost 20 percent of the seats, emerging as the strongest opposition bloc even though the organization is banned and hundreds of its members are in jail. The secular parties’ performance in Egypt’s first ever presidential elections, also held in 2005, was equally dismal. Al- Tajamu’ and the Arab Nasserite Party boycotted the elections, but al- Wafd and al-Ghad fielded candidates. Nu’man Juma’a (al-Wafd) and Ayman Nour (al-Ghad) together convinced less than 15 percent of the electorate to vote for them. President Hosni Mubarak, in power since 1981, had no trouble getting reelected. Different factors contribute to the weakness of secular parties in Egypt. One is their incapacity to transform their considerable historical legacy into present-day political capital. Liberals and leftists played important roles in Egyptian politics before and after 1952, respectively, but they have not built on those roles. The most striking example is offered by the new al-Wafd Party. The “old” al-Wafd was the party of the national independence movement and of secular Egyptian nationalism that advocated equal rights for the Muslim majority and the Christian Coptic minority. In the 1923–1952 liberal period, al-Wafd was the majority party and frequently formed the government, sharing power with the monarchy and the British administration authori- ties. Al-Wafd’s previous popularity helped the new al-Wafd get off to a strong start, but then it foundered. Although it appointed as its first chairman Fuaad Serag al-Din, a well-known al-Wafd leader before 1952, to show continuity, it conveyed more a sense of fatigue than one of dynamic revival of an old liberal tradition. Then the new al-Wafd turned against its legacy of secular nationalism and forged an election alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s. Later, it fashioned a party program based solely on economic liberalization. Its messages today do not resonate with broad segments of the population and are hardly distinct from the newly adopted liberal policies of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Leftist parties have also found it difficult to build on their Arab nationalist legacy, particularly since the government has laid claim to

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much of it. Most of these parties have their origins in the Nasser period (1952–1970), which at the same time represents the high point of Egypt’s influence in the Arab world and the low point of single-party politics in Egypt. From 1954 to 1976, Egypt’s rulers justified the single- party system using different ideological mixes of socialism and Arab nationalism. Especially under Nasser and with the establishment in 1961 of the Arab Socialist Union—an organization styled after Marx- ist–Leninist parties in the Soviet bloc—socialism was declared the ideology of the state and Arab nationalism became its Egyptian brand, Nasserism. Policies in this period included the nationalization of major enterprises, the imposition of strict limits on land holdings, state- led industrialization, and state-financed educational and healthcare systems. Although a slow process of economic liberalization was undertaken by Sadat and continues to this day, the leftist heritage of the regime remains strong in some areas. Socialism remains enshrined in the constitution as the state ideology. The constitution also grants “workers and peasants” 50 percent of the seats in the parliament and local legislative councils. Public education and healthcare systems are still in place, although they are deteriorating. This allows the government to present itself as the real heir to the Nasserite legacy, and leftist opposition parties have not succeeded since their establishment in re- claiming that legacy and ideology and using it to develop their own distinctive party programs. The Egyptian government today adopts increasingly liberal policies in the economic and social sectors but continues to justify them using the inherited leftist rhetoric, making it difficult for the leftist opposition to develop a clear identity. Decaying structures and aging leadership also undermine secular parties. Although the ruling NDP has embarked on a deliberate effort to integrate the next generation into the party under the influence of President Mubarak’s son, Gamal, and the Muslim Brotherhood has made a determined effort to appeal to the conservative segments among Egypt’s youth, parties such as al-Wafd and al-Tajamu’ remain stagnant. And although secular parties on paper are democratically organized entities, democratic procedures are hardly respected in their inner workings. Differences over policy choices or leadership changes regularly lead to internal conflicts that weaken the parties. In

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the spring of 2006, al-Wafd was shaken by a confrontation between two rival factions that included several days of sporadic violent clash- es at the party headquarters in Cairo. The confrontation came to an end with the expulsion of Chairman Nu’man Juma’a and the selection of his rival Mahmud Abaza as his successor. The devastating impact of this violence on the image of an opposition party that in theory advocates democracy will last for some time. Similar developments took place in 2007 and 2008 in the Arab Nasserite Party, when a mid- career lawyer, Sameh ’Ashur, tried to oust incumbent chairman Dia’a al-Din Dawud. The latter is over 70 years old and has been in office since the legalization of the party in 1992. The failure to identify potential new constituencies and to bring them into the organization is the greatest weakness of the secular parties. Despite their weak performance in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2005, they continue to do very little in terms of constituency-building and grassroots mobilization. Leaders and members blame their poor performance on the regime, claiming that its authoritarian measures—especially under the provisions of the Emergency Law—prevent them from reaching out to the voters. Con- fronted with the ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to build stable constituencies, liberal and leftist parties frequently compare the limitations imposed on their political participation with the Islamists’ al- legedly unlimited access to broad segments of the population through the mosque. These arguments overlook both the extent of government repression against Islamist movements, all of which are banned, and the passivity of the secular parties themselves. They also overlook the fact that in Egypt there is still a huge number of uncommitted voters. Less than 25 percent of eligible Egyptian voters participated in the 2005 elections. A large segment of the electorate is still up for grabs in Egypt. As liberal parties, al-Wafd and al-Ghad naturally appeal to secular intellectuals and civil society activists who fear Islamists and do not trust the ruling establishment. But they have not made a concerted effort to reach out to other potential supporters, including those segments of the business community that are not co-opted by the regime, nor committed to Islamist movements. Leftist parties are probably in a more difficult position. Since Nasser rose to power in 1952, the

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government has co-opted the classical supporters of leftist parties, industrial workers and peasants. The government controls the national labor and peasants’ unions and uses them in elections to mobilize voters for the ruling NDP. However, the continued deterioration of the living conditions of widening segments of the population and the ac- celerated pace of economic liberalization, which increases job insecu- rity, have resulted in growing discontent among workers and peasants. Al-Tajamu’ and the Arab Nasserite Party have failed to penetrate the unions in any meaningful way, leaving the field open for the Muslim Brotherhood to step in and take advantage of the growing discontent. Egyptian Copts, about 15 percent of the population, represent an additional significant constituency that secular parties have done little to mobilize. Copts, regardless of their economic and political differences, have real and understandable fears about the rise of Islamist movements. The ruling NDP has been able to exploit these fears to gain the support of Coptic voters. It has also been able to take advantage of its partial control of the official Coptic Church and has- in cluded a small number of prominent Copts, mostly university professors and wealthy businessmen, in top executive positions. Copts, however, remain underrepresented in Egyptian politics, and the majority of them have yet to become interested in elections. This situation offers a chance for both liberal and leftist parties, most of which have Coptic figures in their leadership circles, to build- net works of support inside the community. Liberal and leftist parties have weakly capitalized on the deficiencies and shortcomings of their rivals to garner popular support. In- stead of highlighting the ruling establishment’s lack of commitment to true democratic reform and its failure to bridge the widening gap between rich and poor in Egyptian society, secular parties have in general become more acquiescent to the regime, hoping to avoid outright repression. The Muslim Brotherhood sustains a great deal of ambiguity in its positions on equal political rights for Muslims and Copts as well as on issues pertaining to cultural and social freedoms. But attempts by secular parties to tap into the discontent of Copts and other segments of the population in the face of a rising Muslim Broth- erhood have been rather unsystematic and less guided by clear constituency-building strategies. Apart from al-Ghad, whose founder,

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Ayman Nour, was imprisoned between 2005 and 2009 on flimsy charges and has therefore not been on good terms with the ruling establishment, secular parties in today’s Egypt are a domesticated opposition that hardly challenges the regime’s semiauthoritarianism. They have come to depend on the regime’s consent to secure their minimal political gains and to protect the narrow political space in which they are operating. In a country where only 25 percent of voters bother to cast their ballots, there is a vast reservoir of citizens who do not appear committed to any political party or ideology. Islamists have strategies for reaching out to more of them—through social services, the mosques, and good, old-fashioned political organizing work that would be familiar to ward captains of any traditional political party. The ruling NDP appears to have a strategy that combines promises of patronage, threats of reprisals in the form of reduced services, and a certain amount of political chicanery. Secular parties are still looking for a strategy that might work. There has been some innovation on the part of leftist parties, namely the formation of the Kifaya (Enough) movement, but it has yielded scant results so far. Established in 2004 by leftist politicians as a broad opposition alliance, Kifaya emerged before the 2005 elections as an unconventional protest movement that came to symbolize democratic dynamism in Egypt. Loosely structured as a network of individuals and small groups rather than a traditional political party, the movement rediscovered the street as an arena of political action and fashioned a pro-democracy secular message. During the elections, it focused on mobilizing citizens against the reelection of President Mubarak and denouncing the ruling establishment’s efforts to position his son, Gamal, to become his successor. Kifaya also represented an ideological innovation in the secular spectrum. It openly opposed the regime, distanced itself from established secular opposition parties, and was open to liberal and Islamist politicians alike. Organi- zationally, it relied on networks and focused on direct action—demonstrations and popular rallies—rather than voting. But Kifaya did not last; by the end of 2005, it had lost its effectiveness. President Muba- rak, whose defeat was the common goal of all opposition movements, had been reelected. Parties competing in the parliamentary elections

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were more interested in winning seats for themselves than joining forces against the regime. The public stopped paying attention to the movement’s activities, and street protests and demonstrations first dwindled and then stopped. Starting in 2006, Kifaya failed to renew its pro-democracy secular platform and degenerated into an arena of frivolous ideological conflicts among competing factions. The secular opposition’s first attempt at renewal had failed.

Yemen Multiparty politics was introduced in Yemen after unification in 1990. Until then, both the Arab Republic of Yemen (the North) and the Peo- ple’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (the South) were controlled by single parties. In the North, President Ali Abdullah Saleh established in 1982 the General People’s Congress (GPC) as a governing umbrella movement with a vague socialist orientation, and the government banned political parties. In South Yemen, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), formed in 1978 and modeled after Marxist–Leninist parties in the Soviet bloc, maintained absolute power until 1990. With the proc- lamation of the new unified Arab Republic of Yemen, Saleh remained president and YSP Secretary General Ali Salem al-Baydh was appointed vice president. The GPC and YSP joined forces in the 1990– 1993 transitional government and agreed to legalize political parties and hold competitive elections. Several new parties emerged, most notably the Yemeni Islah Party (YIP), representing the Islamist end of the spectrum, and different leftist organizations—Baathist and Nas- serite—that grew out of the GPC umbrella. The first multiparty parliamentary elections took place in 1993. The GPC finished first with 41 percent of the vote, followed by the Islah Party and the Socialist Party with 20.6 percent and 18.6 percent, respectively. Five Baathist and Nasserite parties together gained less than 20 percent. Although the three major parties formed a coalition government based on their representation in the Yemeni House of Representatives, unified Yemen remained unstable. A power struggle between the GPC and YSP culminated in 1994 in a brief North–South civil war, which ended with the defeat of the South and the disintegra- tion of the YSP. Following the civil war, the North-based GPC and Is- lah formed a new coalition government that excluded the YSP. The

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YSP, however, was allowed to keep its registration and to operate as a legal opposition organization. With the ousting of the YSP from the government, the political spectrum in Yemen has broken into three components: the ruling GPC; the Islamist Yemeni Islah Party, which joined the GPC in the government until 1997; and the secular parties of the left, which have been in the opposition since 1994. Yemen evolved into a semiauthoritarian country with characteristics similar to those discussed in rela- tion to Morocco and Egypt: overly strong executives with great capacity for political manipulation, weak parliaments, and limited political space for the opposition. The regime of President Saleh tol- erates a degree of pluralism provided that it does not threaten the regime’s hegemony over society. Various legal and political constraints are imposed on opposition parties, ensuring that they will operate on the margins of the political system. And while competitive presidential and parliamentary elections take place, the regime uses state institutions, in particular the security services, to ensure that President Saleh and the ruling GPC enjoy comfortable majorities.2 As in other Arab countries, secular opposition parties in Yemen are chronically weak. In the last parliamentary elections of 2003, the YSP gained less than 3 percent of the vote, down from 18.6 percent in 1993 (the party boycotted the 1997 elections). Two other leftist parties, the Nasserite Unionist People’s Organization and the Arab Socialist Baath Party, obtained 1 and 0.7 percent, respectively. More than ten leftist and liberal organizations did not receive enough votes to gain seats in the House of Representatives. In contrast, the Islamist Islah won 15 percent of the vote, finishing a distant second behind the ruling GPC, which obtained 79 percent of the vote. As in Morocco and Egypt, Islamists in Yemen appear better equipped to deal with the constraints imposed by a semiauthoritarian government than secular parties, which tend to degenerate into marginal actors with decaying structures. The dramatic decline of the YSP since the 1990s was due to a mix- ture of obstacles the party faced after the civil war and of self-inflicted blows. The party emerged from the civil war in a weakened condition. Many of its leaders fled the country. In the North in particular, the YSP was seen by many as a separatist movement willing to risk

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Yemeni lives for its own political objectives. The political environment was restrictive, but the YSP was not outlawed. Instead, it was allowed to maintain its regional branches and to participate in elections. The alliance between the GPC and Islah provided the YSP with an opportunity to establish itself as the leading opposition force, an advantage not enjoyed by most secular parties that must battle the government and the Islamists simultaneously. Furthermore, the socialists also retained some popularity as a progressive force among the groups that had lost out during unification, including members of the former state bureaucracy in South Yemen, secular intellectuals, and educated women. But instead of building on these assets to revitalize its organization and engage in grassroots mobilization, the YSP exhausted itself in endless discussions about whether it should participate in elections or boycott them. It finally decided to boycott the 1997 parliamentary elections, claiming government fraud in voter registration. As a result, its then–secretary general, Ali Saleh Ubad, failed to obtain the endorsement of 10 percent of the members of the House of Represen- tatives he needed to be a candidate in the 1999 presidential elections. The party also failed to renew its message to the population. It chose to stick to a victimization narrative, stressing the repression it suffered at the hands of the government, rather than nurturing the image of a viable opposition party capable of challenging the incumbent regime. Moreover, its message to the voters, unchanged from the pre- unification era of the single party system, focused on social justice and redistribution of wealth without including new issues of increasing importance to the voters, such as democracy, human rights, and women’s rights. Not until the buildup to the parliamentary elections in 2003 did the YSP embark on a serious effort to reinvent itself as an opposition party. The party fashioned a pro-democracy platform prioritizing gradual political reforms and advocated stronger coordination between secular parties and Islamists to challenge the regime. Issues such as human rights, good governance, the fight against corruption, and public service reform found their way into the party’s platform. To a limited extent the YSP attracted underrepresented constituencies such as women. Although the party only won eight seats in the

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parliament, it managed to get back into the legislature and to reestab- lish its viability. Before rejoining the parliament, the YSP was also able to take part in an attempt to build a coalition of opposition parties, overcome fragmentation, and become more effective in checking the power of the regime. Starting in 1999, several secular parties have coordinated their political activities, including presenting joint election lists for the municipal elections in 2001 through an umbrella organization, the Supreme Coordination Council of the Yemeni Opposition. The most significant development, however, took place in 2003 with the establishment of an enlarged opposition coalition that also included the Islamist Islah Party as well as some minor organizations. The Joint Meeting Parties, as the new coalition came to be known, pro- duced a combined list of 172 candidates in Yemen’s 301 districts to compete in the April 2003 parliamentary elections. The new cross-ideological opposition alliance has substantially expanded opportunities for secular parties in Yemen. The Islah Party was more viable than the YSP, controlling 46 seats in the House of Representatives (15 percent). Most of its support came from powerful tribal and conservative constituencies, but the alliance with secular parties allowed the opposition to broaden its appeal and to become more competitive. The Joint Meeting Parties coalition was also able to field a candidate, Faisal ibn Shamlan, in the 2006 presidential elections. Although he lost to President Saleh, he obtained almost 20 percent of the vote—a significant step forward in the Arab context where presidents usually run unopposed and stay in power for life. The Joint Meeting Parties, furthermore, continued to cooperate after the elections, announcing the formation of a shadow government and agree- ing to coordinate their election lists in the next parliamentary elections expected to take place in 2011. Like other secular parties in the Arab world, secular parties in Ye- men operate in a tough environment. The sectarian and tribal nature of the social fabric limits the outreach of their messages. The recent political history of Yemen has also put constraints on some of them, especially the YSP. And the competition from the Islamists is strong. Although the obstacles faced by secular parties in Yemen are similar to those facing their counterparts elsewhere in the Arab world, their

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response has been highly unusual. Rather than seeking to pull closer to the regime to secure their minimal gains in the political process, they have decided to join forces with the Islamist parties. The policy has paid off by strengthening opposition forces in general. It is not clear yet whether secular parties can establish themselves as equal partners with the Islamists within the opposition.

Kuwait A small oil monarchy in a part of the world not known for democracy, Kuwait has had an active elected parliament since its independence in 1963. This anomaly—to this day no other Gulf country has a completely elected parliament—is explained by the social and economic structure of Kuwait. Before the discovery of oil, Kuwait’s main economic activity was trade across the Persian Gulf. This trade was dominated by a small number of wealthy merchant families, of which the al-Sabbah, now the ruling family, was one. Like the English barons with the British crown, the merchant families imposed on al-Sabbah the formation of an elected parliament, which they were confident they would dominate. The ruling family had little choice but to accept this deal initially. But after the large oil price increases that followed the 1973 Arab– Israeli war, the ruling family, flush with new revenue, made a power grab and disbanded the parliament several times in the 1970s and 1980s. The parliament was only reinstated in the wake of the 1991 Gulf war, in part at the insistence of the U.S. government, which did not want to be accused of having fought a war to restore the power of the al-Sabbah family. The parliament that reopened after the war was inevitably quite different from the original one. The country, once essentially a city- state surrounded by open country inhabited by Bedouin tribes, had urbanized. Citizenship had been extended in successive steps from the old urban core to the entire population—even now there are different classes of citizens. Economic change meant that the original big families were no longer as central as they once were because new players were added to the mix. And, as in the rest of the Arab world, Islamist movements had emerged as important new players, organizing systematically and reaching out to the less affluent segment of the

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population (poor is a relative term that does not apply well to Ku- wait). This segment was composed mostly of the recently urbanized Kuwaitis, in other words, the former Bedouins. As for Kuwait’s Islamist movements, which are not discussed here, suffice it to say that they are numerous and diverse, with Sunni and Shi’i groups as well as moderate and Salafi ones. The fragmentation of the Islamist spectrum could make it easier for secular politicians to compete, if they were not even less organized than is normally the case in the region.3 Secular politicians in Kuwait—who prefer to call themselves “liberals,” a true misnomer as will be argued below—compete largely as individuals, rather than as part of political organizations or associations (political parties are banned in Kuwait). Until recently, the electoral system encouraged extreme individualism. Despite the small number of registered voters (about 140,000 before women received the right to vote in 2005), the country was divided into 25 electoral districts, with candidates only needing a plurality of the vote to get elected. As a result, candidates had more incentive to run on their own, soliciting votes from family and friends (and buying additional ones if needed) than in joining others in creating a political machine. As long as districts remained small, the system worked well for the individualistic, unorganized secular candidates. In 2006, however, things changed suddenly and, from the point of view of secular candidates, for the worse. First, in April the government finally decided to push through legislation giving women the right to vote. The government had favored the legislation for years and submitted it to parliament repeatedly, but it had been blocked by the Islamist vote. The enactment of the legislation doubled the number of voters. Second, in a showdown between reformist MPs advocating a change of the election law and the government, the emir dissolved the parliament in May and called for new elections. The new parliament immediately adopted an election law that reduced the number of electoral districts from twenty-five to five—a reform long advocated by the opposition. Suddenly, secular politicians, many of whom had supported the change, were confronted with a new, more hostile political terrain that favored the Islamists, with their superior organizations, over the individualistic secular politicians.

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Secular politicians in Kuwait are acutely aware that in the new situation they need to organize in a different fashion—the number of voters per district has increased ten times, and the number of candidates has increased from two to ten per district. The new situation greatly reduces the effectiveness of family and personal contacts as the main method for attracting votes and gives an advantage to organizations that can present lists of candidates and mount a professional campaign. Although the law limits the number of candidates on a list to four to prevent any one organization from sweeping a district, organized groups have a much better chance of winning seats. Already, two secular organizations have formed as a result, separated not by ideology and programs, but by personalities. Even those who are involved in these efforts are not overly optimistic about success. Secular politicians in Kuwait are an individualistic lot—many are successful businessmen, often scions of the original merchant families; others are intellectuals, a surprising number of whom write articles and opinion columns in newspapers, gaining recognition and publicizing their ideas. This is not how strong party organizations are built. Indeed, the idea that a political organization needs professional organizers, which has become part of the Islamist movements’ mo- dus operandi, still remains foreign to the secular politicians. In a recent series of interviews, one of the authors was repeatedly told that Islamists in Kuwait enjoy an unfair advantage over secular politicians because they can hire professional, full-time organizers. Such com- plaints denote more of a difference of political culture between secular and Islamist politicians than a difference in financial means. Creating organizations with full-time staff is certainly not beyond the financial reach of people who are, for the most part, members of the business and professional class of an affluent society. In this situation, many secular politicians are looking with hope to the rise of what can be best described as postmodern politics in Ku- wait, that is, to the direct intervention in politics by members of civil society organizations that seek to pressure the government by demonstrations and other forms of street actions to further a political agenda. During the confrontation between the parliament and the government over the electoral law in 2006, students played an important part by staging demonstrations in favor of reform, camping out

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in front of the parliament at night in a style that was part political action and part youth festival with music and fun. The protest was successful, leading among other factors to the dissolution of the old parliament and to the election of a new one that promptly voted to reduce the number of districts. A surprising number of secular politicians have come to look on this style of direct intervention as a form of political action that could help secular groups increase their influence against the rise of the Is- lamists. The students who organized the demonstrations belonged to secular groups and fought back attempts by Islamists to claim credit for their success. Given the fickleness of student politics in general and the difficulty that student groups in all countries have in sustaining political activity beyond short, heady episodes, the importance secular politicians place on this style of politics appears to be greatly exaggerated. It is not based on a realistic assessment but on the hope that somehow secular politicians could erase the organizational advantage of the Islamists not by creating even stronger organizations than theirs, but by leapfrogging over the process of organizing political machines and plunging into direct action.

Uncertain Future of Secular Parties in the Arab World

The “secular” parties discussed here are crucial to a democratic transformation in the Arab world, not because they necessarily constitute the true democrats in these countries, but because without their presence the political spectrum would remain extremely narrow, and political competition would be reduced to head-on confrontation between incumbent governments and Islamist movements. A more pluralistic arena, with a broad spectrum of political actors, would make politics less confrontational, although it would certainly not eliminate all obstacles to democratic transformation. To become competitive, however, secular parties and organizations in the Arab world would first have to undergo internal transformation. In particular, they need considerable change in three areas: their vision for society; the specific political message they transmit to their potential constituencies; and the way in which they organize.

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Vision Secular parties in the Arab world have been unable to project a vision for their countries for almost thirty years. The first vision for secular Arab parties was that of independence—the Moroccan Istiqlal and the Egyptian Wafd all started as nationalist, pro-independence parties. The second vision was the “socialist” one represented by single- party systems such as the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt and the Baathist parties of Syria and Iraq. More than socialist, it was a state capitalist vision of rapid economic growth and social transformation under the direction of the ruling regimes. It did not leave much space for individual freedom or initiative, but it promised growth and modernization and, at least for a while, it delivered. Competing with these successive secular visions from the 1920s on, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its sister organizations across the Arab world set forth a vision of a just Islamic society. As long as regimes were able to deliver a better life, or at least the hope of the better life, the Islamist vision did not become dominant. Dur- ing the 1970s, the popular appeal of nationalist and socialist ruling regimes was greatly diminished by a series of Arab defeats in the struggle against Israel and by growing socioeconomic hardship as regimes could no longer deliver even the most basic services. Reli- gious ideas became increasingly attractive, and Islamist movements began to command support among ever-widening segments of the population. In the countries where secular parties were allowed to operate, secular opposition parties also suffered. For example, liberal and leftist parties in Morocco and Egypt were trapped between failing authoritarian regimes and Islamist ideologies that promised easy solutions to all problems. Thus far, secular parties have been unable to provide a new vision of their own. Like other leftist parties around the world after the demise of the Soviet Union, the Arab left has gradually embraced democracy and economic liberalism. Liberal parties have become more interested in the civil society arena and pushed—with varying degrees of success—for its autonomous organization. Yet those are less visions of a good society than open-ended processes that supposedly lead to a good society but may not. Citizens in many countries under- going democratic transformations have discovered that democracy

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rarely pays a dividend in the short run, and economic reforms can truly hurt for a period. Furthermore, the vision of the democratic society with an open economy is one now shared too broadly, at least in theory, for any party to claim it as its own. Many autocratic governments in the Arab world claim to be working toward democracy and a market economy, even when their actions belie their words. And many Islamist movements now accept democracy and advocate human rights. The democratic vision has become a crowded field that gives no party a special advantage. Why secular opposition parties have so much difficulty in developing a vision is not clear. In part, it may be a loss of confidence in themselves—what is the point of preparing elaborate platforms if you will not get enough votes? In part, the competition from Islamists—as well as the less common pattern of secular–Islamist collaboration— compels secular parties to state that they, too, adhere to Islamic values, further watering down their positions on issues such as social and cultural freedoms. In other cases, siding with incumbent regimes against Islamists limits their ability to articulate sound alternatives to government policies. Whatever the explanation, it is clear that the failure of secular parties to project a clear vision of what they stand for is undermining their appeal. To the dismay of secular opposition parties, the clearest secular vision being proposed in the Arab world today comes from modernizing ruling establishments in the Gulf and a few other countries. This is the vision of a society rapidly transformed by the power of sustained economic growth—what some used to call “the Dubai model” before the global economic crisis. Even in a country with a large population and scarce revenue such as Egypt, the dream of rapid modernization is pushed by heir apparent Gamal Mubarak and the people around him as their vision for the future. By and large, however, this is a vision coming from the government rather than the opposition side.

Message Political parties competing in elections do not always have to have a vision, but they need at least a message about what they will do if they win the elections. In authoritarian and semiauthoritarian settings in the Arab world, incumbent regimes have an extremely simple and

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concrete message: Vote for us because we control the purse strings and can deliver. The message is becoming less convincing where the government’s capacity to deliver has eroded to a great extent as in Morocco, Egypt, and Yemen. In the 1990s, even oil producers were finding it difficult to deliver at the same level as in the preceding three decades until oil prices skyrocketed again during the Iraq war. Still, incumbent regimes have more to offer and more to withhold than the opposition. Patronage is not a sophisticated message, but it is a clear and effective one. The Islamist message is vague. “Islam is the solution” is definitely not a concrete message, yet as a slogan it appeals to emotion, tradition, and piety. Furthermore, Islamist movements have masterfully used their charity networks at the grassroots level to generate social trust and political capital. In many Arab countries today, Islamist- controlled patronage systems exist next to government-sponsored ones. Islamists have benefited from the mounting religiosity of Arab societies since the 1970s and built on it to garner popular support. But they have always coupled the religious appeal with social services for their constituencies, never taking them for granted. Secular parties, without a distinctive vision, for the most part do not have a specific message. They have failed to strategically identify spaces, issues, and constituencies distinct from those dominated by incumbent regimes or Islamist movements and to tailor messages geared to them. But secular parties have also been less effective in challenging regimes and Islamists on mainstream issues or in pene- trating their stable constituencies. And they have little to offer in terms of either financial incentives or social services. Thus, they can neither attract the more thoughtful or self-interested voters who seek a party that will represent their interests, nor do they have a simple slogan to which people respond emotionally. The results are evident at the polls.

Organization We have already discussed the organizational weaknesses of secular parties, a problem of which they are acutely aware and know they must remedy. But these parties are uncertain about how they should organize. Should they compete against the Islamists in grassroots

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mobilization, embracing a classic style of organizing that many analysts consider anachronistic today but which is serving Islamist movements extremely well? Should they privilege civil society organizations over parties? If so, how does civil society organizing ultimately translate into votes and political power? These are extremely difficult questions for secular parties in the Arab world that face a number of contradictory realities. Tradition- ally organized mass parties, which thrived in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, are in decline everywhere. Lack of ideological fervor and more affluent and individualistic lifestyles have seriously undermined such parties in most countries. In the Arab world, however, Islamist movements are showing convincingly that party- like structures are not only possible but also highly effective. Whether this means that Arab countries are at a different stage of political development or that political parties need a strong ideology to thrive is not clear. Regardless of the reason behind it, conventional political parties are doing much better in the Arab world than elsewhere. The second reality, however, sends a different message. Secular parties at present do not have any competitive advantage when it comes to organizing strong party structures. They are coming from behind, having neglected grassroots mobilization and constituency-building for a long time, while Islamists systematically worked to develop party structures and networks of supporting organizations. Secular parties do not have a strong ideology and a vision of society, nor do they have emotionally appealing, simple political slogans. And, in many countries, they have not developed the funding methods to sustain the staff required to carry out systematic organizing work. There is no reason to believe the problems are insurmountable—lack of funding in particular appears to be little more than an excuse in most cases—but right now secular parties are caught in a vicious circle. The third reality is that the difference between secular parties and Islamist movements is not only one of strength but also of political style. Secular parties are not simply a paler, less successful version of Islamist ones. They represent a different type of political organization, a different style of politics. With few exceptions, secular parties in the Arab world go back to a style and tradition that precede the days of mass participation; when they depart from that tradition, secular

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parties fast forward to a style of politics that could be defined as postmodern, where direct action by civil society supersedes the role of parties. Arab citizens who in the past would have gravitated toward secular political parties have turned to civil society since the 1990s. This was in part for ideological reasons—the debates about democracy and democratization taking place around the world after the end of the Cold War emphasized the importance of civil society. In part, the new popularity of civil society organizations was also pragmatic. Po- litical parties with their aging leadership did not offer many outlets for motivated, dynamic younger people anxious to see real reform in their countries. Parties appeared old and tired, civil society organizations young and promising. Furthermore, with funding for civil society organizations available from foreign donors, particularly from Europe- an countries, launching new nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) became a feasible project—and certainly less daunting than organizing a new political party or trying to breathe new life into an old, sclerotic one. However, despite the increased attention given to civil society organizations, they have not succeeded in pushing for democratic reform in the Arab world and have remained in most cases elitist organizations that are not embedded in the wider social fabric. The situation of secular parties is highly uncertain at present. They are weak in terms of vision, message, and organization. They cannot compete with the Islamists in developing conventional political parties. But secular intellectuals and activists have greatly influenced public debates on social and cultural freedoms, whereas even the most liberal Islamists remain ambivalent on such issues. In some Arab countries, secular opposition parties have a comparative advantage when it comes to addressing issues such as human rights, women’s rights, and minority rights―issues that continue to hold some importance for the public. In other countries, cross-ideological alliances with Islamist movements offer secular parties a chance to move beyond the limitations of weak organizations and unstable constituencies. Most important of all, secular parties have opportunities to increase their influence: Political participation in Arab countries remains low, indicating that there are new constituencies that can po- tentially be captured and brought into the political process. Fighting on two fronts—against incumbent regimes and Islamist movements—

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secular parties in the Arab world have not yet clearly identified a political style that will allow them to become successful. In today’s Arab politics, secular parties and organizations occupy a marginal position—a situation unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Western strategies that count on secular Arab parties to push for greater freedom and participation are bound to be unsuccessful. Secular parties are too weak to change the nature of politics in their countries or to influence policy making in a meaningful, sustainable way. The conventional party assistance methods employed by various U.S. and European political party foundations cooperating with secular parties in the Arab world are designed to help parties overcome organizational weaknesses and to mount more effective election campaigns. They are not designed to address the problems of political organizations uncertain of their identity, unsure of their ability to reach constituencies, and pessimistic about their future. The crisis of secular parties requires deeper reconsideration and reflection by these parties themselves.

Notes

1. For more information on the Muslim Brotherhood’s election campaign in 2005, see Nathan Brown and Amr Hamzawy, “Can Egypt’s Troubled Elec- tions Produce a More Democratic Future?” Policy Outlook no. 24 (Wash- ington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). 2. For more information on the Yemeni political system, see Sarah Phillips, Evaluating Political Reform in Yemen, Carnegie Paper no. 80 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007). 3. For more information on Islamist movements in Kuwait, see Nathan Brown, Pushing Toward Party Politics? Kuwait’s Islamic Constitutional Movement, Carnegie Paper no. 79 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace, 2007).

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Islamists in Politics The Dynamics of Participation

Amr Hamzawy and Marina Ottaway

slamist political parties and movements that have made the strategic choice to participate in the legal political process of their countries are, together with the ruling establishments, the most important political actors in Arab countries. These parties Iand movements, to which we will refer in the rest of this essay as participating Islamists, are also extremely complex. This complexity is due to their ongoing transformation in response to internal power struggles and to shifts in the manner in which they are allowed to participate. The conclusions of this essay are based mainly on an examination of participating Islamist parties in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Yemen, and Kuwait. This essay also discusses briefly political participation by armed Islamist parties in Lebanon and Palestine.

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With the notable exception of al-Wefaq Society in Bahrain, all participating parties or movements derive their ideas from and are loosely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. This is not accidental. It is the parties rooted in the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood that over the years have undergone the ideological transformation that justifies their participation in the legal politics of their respective countries. First, they have accepted the legitimacy of the individual modern Arab states; thus implicitly renouncing, or at least pushing back to an undetermined future, the goal of creating an Islamic state representing the entire Muslim community, the umma. Second, they have accepted the idea that participation in the political space available in their countries is an acceptable means of fighting for their goals. And third, they have accepted, albeit with hesitation and resistance by many, that in order to participate they have to accept the right to participation of parties and movements with different ideological commitments and goals. Sunni organizations that do not derive from the Muslim Brotherhood have not undergone a similar transformation. Except in Kuwait and Bahrain, Salafi groups remain aloof from political participation; they focus instead primarily on da’wa (proselytizing) activities and to a lesser degree on social services provision. The political participation of Islamist parties and movements has given rise to two major concerns both in the Arab world and in the West. The first is whether these participating Islamists are truly democratic. The second is whether participation itself would consolidate their commitment to democratic norms and procedures. The questions of course could and should be asked of any other Arab political party: beginning with the ruling parties or, more generally, with any political party that enters the political fray in countries where democracy is not a consolidated political system. It could even be asked about some parties in consolidated democracies. Nevertheless, it is an important question to ask of Islamists, for whom acceptance of democracy entails ideological conundrums, not just strategic decisions. Questions about the participating Islamists’ commitment to democracy and about the impact that participation will have on them are also particularly important because these parties and movements are major political players in Arab politics now and will remain so for

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the foreseeable future. They carry weight because their message reso- nates well with populations that are both deeply religious and socially conservative, but also because for decades they have made a systematic investment in organization and constituency-building that greatly surpasses that of liberal and leftist opposition movements. Furthermore, the political structures of Islamists are underpinned by religious and charitable organizations as well as social service providing agencies that have been instrumental in creating and sustaining networks of Islamist activists and sympathizers. Questions about the democratic credentials of participating Islam- ists have been heightened by the assumption, largely unfounded, that Islamist parties and movements would likely sweep elections if they were allowed to participate freely. According to this view, the likelihood of electoral victories makes these parties truly dangerous, because once in power they could abrogate the democratic system and impose a theocracy. The idea has a lot of currency in the Arab world, and it is deliberately promoted by governments that want to contain Islamist parties and movements and to rally the secular opposition to their side against them. In reality, election returns suggest that participating Islamists, far from winning sweeping victories, are struggling at present to maintain even the modest gains they made earlier. Recent elections in Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait have seen Islamists lose ground in legislative councils and among their electoral constituencies; thus these are triggering internal debates about the costs and benefits of participation in legal politics. It is true that some of the elections we refer to here were far from free and that Islamists might have done somewhat better in a more open contestation. Nevertheless the down- ward trend revealed by recent elections does not support the assumption that Islamists could easily sweep to landslide victories. There has been only one country where Islamists were poised to win an election if the process had been allowed to continue—Algeria in 1991; and there has been one case of an Islamist electoral victory— Hamas in Palestine in 2006. Both elections took place under exceptional circumstances. Algeria had been dominated by the National Liberation Front (FLN) since independence in 1962. That party was widely seen as corrupt and incapable of delivering, and other opposition forces were in disarray. Voters determined to be rid of the FLN

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had little choice but to vote for the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). And in the 2006 elections in Palestine, Hamas won, but just barely, also against a ruling party perceived as corrupt and incapable of reforming itself and in the absence of other serious contenders. There is no evidence at this point that in more normal situations, for example in Morocco and Kuwait, where an array of active political parties with different orientations exists, Islamist parties can command strategic majorities or win landslide victories.

Are Islamic Parties Committed to Democracy?

Reams have been written on the issue of whether Islam is compatible with democracy. This is a futile question because the answer depends on how the fundamental principles of Islam are interpret- ed, and by whom. The real question is whether political parties and movements that call themselves Islamist—and in some cases campaign with slogans such as “Islam is the solution” or “The Koran is our constitution”—can accept democracy completely, either ideologically or strategically.

The Ideological Conundrum On the ideological level, there is a fundamental tension in Islamist parties and movements between the notion that law must be based on God’s word, thus conforming to Islamic law, or Sharia, and the idea that in a democratic political system laws are made on the basis of majority rule by parliaments freely elected by the people. A party cannot call itself Islamist and retain the support of devoutly Muslim followers if it renounces Sharia as the basis of legislation. Most Arab constitutions tiptoe around the issue by stating at least that Sharia is a source, rather than the source, of legislation. At the same time a party cannot call itself democratic, struggle to elect its candidates to parliament, and push together with other members of the opposition for a more open political system without accepting the logic of pluralism and recognizing majority rule as binding. The tension between the Islamist and the democratic views has not been resolved completely by any one party or movement. The result is that the political

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thought of participating Islamists contains a number of gray zones; and a constant ideological and political struggle continues within all parties and movements―between hardliners, who are constantly trying to expand the space assigned to Sharia in the legal and judicial systems of their respective countries, and moderates, who favor a more liberal interpretation of what a state based on Sharia means. The struggle between tendencies and interpretations is real, and this is what creates the difficulty in answering the question of whether any Islamist party or movement is committed to democracy. There is no doubt that there are individuals among all participating Islam- ists, including in high leadership positions, whose acceptance of democracy is genuine and who believe that it does not need to clash with religious ideas and ideals. There is no doubt, either, that this is not true of all leaders and members of Islamist parties and movements. Whether any Islamist actor is and above all will remain committed to democracy depends on the outcome of internal power struggles—each deeply influenced by the political environment in which Islamists operate. The evidence, however, does not support the idea that the choice of political participation by Islamist parties and movements is simply a ruse—a plan to exploit the potential of the democratic process to reach positions of power and then immediately abolish the democratic process altogether and impose a theocratic state. It is true that this was in part the thinking within the FIS in Algeria, which was dominated by a Salafi leadership that considered the modern Algeri- an state—not just its government—as illegitimate, and did not hide its intention to set up a religious state instead. But this does not appear to have been the case with Hamas, which participated in the elections without any expectation of winning. Nor is it the case for the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco, which competes under an election law guaranteeing that no party can win a majority of seats, and thus knows full well that its participation cannot lead to a change in the nature of the state. In fact the PJD, alongside most participating Islamists, either have never opted to establish a religious state or dropped it as an objective in the context of participation in legal politics. Not only do most Islamist parties and movements participate without assuming they can win, but many even deliberately refrain

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from fielding a large number of candidates in national and local elections so that governments do not feel threatened. Ideologically, participating Islamists do not have problems accepting the mechanics of democracy: the election of leaders, the limits imposed on the executive by the parliament and the judiciary, and even the idea that leaders can be replaced by new elections. And participating Islamist parties and movements, it is worth repeating, have de facto accepted the legitimacy of the modern nation-state. This is an issue that does not receive as much attention in the West as it de- serves. Acceptance of the modern nation-state draws a sharp line between participating Islamists and radical groups. The latter still focus on the Islamic community as a whole; they consider modern states, not just their governments, as illegitimate; and they want, at least in theory, to revive the caliphate. Paradoxically, while radicals’ statements about reviving the caliphate receive much attention and create much alarm—although the chances of this happening are about as good as those of the revival of the Holy Roman Empire—the large- scale embrace of the nation-state by participating Islamists tends to go unnoticed. But even participating Islamist parties and movements that do not question the political mechanics of democratic systems and the legitimacy of the nation-state have problems accepting fully all values that are associated with democracy in the West. Furthermore, even when they do not contest basic concepts such as those of human rights and women’s rights, their interpretations are more in line with what was common in the West in the first half of the twentieth century than with contemporary views. The more important problems are those emanating from a clash of Islamist and democratic principles rather than from the social conservatism of most participating Islamists. In particular, Islamist parties and movements in the Arab world still struggle with the separation of religion and politics, and thus with the place of Sharia in the legal system. They accept the idea of political pluralism, but are fighting over its limits; they do not dispute that the principle of universal citizenship is crucial to democracy, but in practice are divided about equality between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens and between men and women.

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In addition, participating Islamists exhibit some ambiguities that do not stem from their dual character as religious/political movements but from their views on the politics of the region. For example, they reject the use of violence in the political process but have trouble rejecting in principle the use of violence when it comes to the Pales- tinian cause. This is true even for Islamists that are not armed and could not use violence even if they decided to. At the center of the ambiguities that remain in the ideas and values embraced by participating Islamists is their dual nature as both religious and political actors. As religious actors, they must accept the primacy of Sharia over that of laws enacted by parliaments and have to base their electoral programs and public policy prescriptions on religious views. As political actors, they need flexibility. Some parties and movements are addressing the problem by replacing the idea of strict adherence to Sharia with the requirement that laws and policies be compatible with an Islamic frame of reference (marji’ya). Thus the PJD in Morocco argues that it must accept laws that fall within an Islamic frame of reference and have been approved democratically, even if they do not conform strictly to Sharia. It is on that basis that the PJD accepted in 2004 a reform of the family law (Mudawwana). This flexibility, crucial to the PJD’s ability to function as a normal party in parliament, is not accepted readily by all its followers. Political as well as ideological considerations influence the way in which participating Islamists deal with the inherent conflict of their identity as both political and religious actors. Most parties and movements try to overcome the problem by setting up a political party separate from the religious movement, so that the religious movement can continue to deal with absolute values while the party plung- es into the pragmatic world of political compromise. In Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait there are now Islamic parties (or political societies in the latter two) separate from the religious movements. In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, setting up a political party has never been a realistic alternative due to the Egyptian government’s constant refusal to legalize the Brotherhood, which remains a banned organization. Separating the religious and political components helps Islamist parties and movements to some extent, but it is not enough because

Pluralism6x9 rev2.indd 75 6/19/09 4:50:31 PM 76 GETTING TO PLURALISM the party can lose the support of religious members if it strays too far. Worse, members’ allegiance can be transferred to other religious movements that do not dirty their hands with political participation. This is a serious problem for the PJD in Morocco. The PJD is affiliated with a religious movement called al-Tawhid wal Islah (unity and reform). As a religious movement, al-Tawhid competes with another religious movement, al-’Adl wa’l-Ihsan (Justice and Charity), estimat- ed to have a much larger popular base. Politically, the PJD has no competition; the rival religious movement al-’Adl wa’l-Ihsan does not recognize the legitimacy of the Moroccan state and monarchy and stays aloof from politics; other participating Islamist parties (such as the Party for the Civilizational Alternative) are marginal at best. If the PJD remains close to its religious roots, it can keep the support of al- Tawhid members and even receive votes from members of al-’Adl, although the leadership of the group encourages them not to participate. But if the PJD strays too far from doctrine to gain political re- spectability with a broader public and makes the political compromises any party with parliamentary representation must accept, it will not get support from al-’Adl members. In fact, it may even see some of its own turn to the more strict religious movements that boycott politics. This is a major dilemma Acceptance of political pluralism is another issue with which even participating Islamist parties and movements continue to struggle. As late as the 1980s, Islamists upheld a model of politics and society different from the Western one. They rejected the notion of individual rights and emphasized the primacy of communal rights. Like all movements that put the community ahead of the individual, they thus rejected pluralism and put forward a notion of politics and society aimed at making their interpretation of Islam universally binding. Many among the participating Islamists rejected the legitimacy of secular forces and were rather intolerant of opposing views. During the 1990s, participating parties and movements reevaluated their position. They gradually reached out to the secular opposition, and some of them even tried their hand at building cross-ideological alliances against repressive regimes. This meant that Islamists had to recognize the legitimacy of secular actors and to fashion a more toler- ant rhetoric on secular views of politics and society. As part of the new Islamists in Politics 77

stance, Islamists embraced the terminology of democratic politics, including the language of pluralism. The issue remains fraught with complexities, however. It is difficult for a religion-based party or movement to recognize the legitimacy of all points of view. Throughout the last two decades, participating Islam- ists have gone a long way in accepting the diversity of views in the political arena. But with regard to moral, social, and cultural issues, they still lag behind. The difficulty is one familiar to all situations where actors operating with a clear ideological or religious outlook— Christian Democratic parties, socialist and communist parties—have entered pluralistic political systems. The pluralism issue is usually not resolved once and for all in theory. Rather, it is resolved in practice by the balance of political forces: ideological parties accept pluralism when they are not strong enough to impose their beliefs but are likely to become more intolerant when they can impose their way. The question asked at the beginning of this section—whether participating Islamists are truly committed to democracy—cannot be answered with a clear yes. There is no doubt that the political parties and movements that have chosen to participate in the legal political process have come a long way from positions most Islamists occu- pied in the past. Nevertheless, participating Islamists still find it hard to reconcile beliefs rooted in Islam with commitment to democracy, and thus to participate while remaining faithful to their religious roots. All participating parties and movements are divided on these issues. The existence of the divisions within the leadership, as well as the fear of losing supporters to other more conservative religious organizations, create the ambiguities—the gray zones—in the thinking of Islamists mentioned earlier.1 As a result, the thinking of participating Islamist parties and movements remains in flux, depending on which faction prevails. The internal struggle for power, in turn, is influenced by external factors. The most important are the conditions under which Islamists participate politically in their own countries.

Tactical Dilemmas Even Islamist parties and movements in the Arab world that have bit- ten the ideological bullet initially and decided to participate in the

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legal political process are forced for tactical reasons to reexamine their commitment periodically. They operate in countries where the governments themselves are not truly committed to democracy but use every possible expedient to ensure that the opposition does not prevail. Like all other opposition parties, participating Islamists thus have to decide whether to take part in an election even if the playing field is decidedly slanted; and they must judge when the slant has become such that electoral contestation is no longer a viable option. The problem is compounded for Islamists because governments are more fearful of them than they are of liberal and leftist opponents, often throwing additional obstacles in the way of the Islamists. The decision to participate in a specific election involves tactical considerations. By participating under conditions that ensure poor results, Islamist parties and movements risk undermining their standing because results will project an image of weakness. They also risk alienating further those supporters who are already skeptical about participation on ideological grounds and who find in the obstacles further proof that participation is a losing strategy. On the other hand, by participating despite the obstacles put in their way, Islamists can show they are truly committed to democratic procedures and processes, and that they are not just fair-weather democrats who only play when they can win. The refusal by Islamists to participate in a specific election also has complex effects: it reassures those followers who are critical of participation, but it confuses the rest. It also opens the parties or movements to accusations that they are not truly committed to democracy; governments are particularly prone to make such accusations. Furthermore, boycotting elections condemns Islam- ists to powerlessness: a party that has renounced violence but refuses to take part in the political process has no means to exercise direct political influence. The example of Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF) is illustrative of the dilemmas facing Islamist parties. The IAF was formed in 1992 in response to a new, more liberal political party law and for the specific purpose of competing in the fall 1993 elections. The late King Hussein immediately changed the rules of the political game by pushing through an amendment to the electoral law that favored the conservative tribal element and put the IAF at a disadvantage. In 1997, the IAF

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joined with other opposition parties to demand a change in the electoral law. It threatened a boycott if the law were not amended and made good on the threat when it was not. In 2003, it again reversed its position, realizing that it would achieve nothing by sitting on the side- lines. The IAF participated, although the playing field remained slanted. In 2007, faced with a new wave of government-imposed restrictions on its electoral participation, it boycotted the municipal elections in July before fielding candidates in the parliamentary elections in No- vember, but won only six seats, down from seventeen in 2003. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has faced similar dilemmas. The problem is complicated in its case by the fact that Egyptian laws ban the Brotherhood; therefore it cannot participate in elections as a movement, but must either negotiate with legal political parties and run its own candidates under their banner or field its candidates as independents. The record is telling. The Muslim Brotherhood participated in the 1984 elections in alliance with the liberal Wafd Party, winning a modest six seats. It participated again in 1987 as part of an alliance with the Socialist Labor Party, and 37 of its members were elected to parliament. The government responded with additional restrictive legal measures, and as a result in 1990, the Brotherhood boycotted the election alongside other opposition parties. In 1995, the Muslim Broth- erhood again changed tactics and participated by fielding independent candidates. Although the government cracked down on the movement with a heavy hand, the Brotherhood managed to get one member into parliament. In 2000, the Muslim Brotherhood again participated, and seventeen of its members (running as independents) were elected. In 2005, the Brotherhood made an all-out effort and scored a major victory when its independent candidates won 88 seats (20 percent of the total) in the Egyptian People’s Assembly (lower chamber of the parliament), becoming the largest opposition bloc in a half century. But in the 2007 elections for the Shura Council (upper chamber of the parliament), in which the Muslim Brotherhood participated, a fearful government used its heavy hand to prevent Brotherhood candidates from winning any seats. Later, in the 2008 municipal elections, the government refused to register almost all Muslim Brotherhood candidates and also unleashed a wave of arrests. This caused the movement to boycott the elections at the last moment.

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Another tactical dilemma faced by participating Islamists concerns the number of candidates they should present for elections. Like all parties, Islamists would like to win as many seats as possible. Unlike most parties, however, they cannot afford to win too many seats—and can even less afford to win the elections for fear that the government will take drastic action against them. Algeria in 1991 and Palestine in 2006 provide cautionary examples of what can happen when Islam- ists are too successful. In Algeria, the predicted victory of the FIS led to the cancellation of elections and a military takeover. In Palestine, Hamas’ surprise victory triggered a chain reaction of negative reper- cussions culminating in an ongoing confrontation between Fatah and Hamas. As a result, participating Islamists have become quite cautious, deliberately limiting the number of candidates. For example, in Jordan the IAF presented only 36 candidates for 80 parliamentary seats in 1993, 30 for 110 seats in 2003, and 22 for 110 seats in 2007. In Morocco, the PJD in 2002 only ran candidates in just over half of the 91 election districts before fielding candidates in 94 districts out of 95 in the 2007 elections. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood also limited the number of its candidates in the 2005 parliamentary elections. It ran independent candidates in 144 out of 444 districts. In the Shura Council elections in 2007, the Brotherhood competed but fielded only nineteen candidates for 88 seats. It is not clear that such self- imposed limits by Islamist parties and movements in fact have the desired effect of calming fears of a possible Islamist takeover. Their adversaries are sophisticated enough to look not only at the total number of seats won by Islamists but also at the percentage of victories in those districts where they presented candidates. As a result, the self-restraint can increase fears rather than cause them to abate because parties and movements that run only a limited number of candidates for obvious reasons choose the districts where they have the best chances of winning. They thus end up winning in a significantly higher percentage of districts than they probably would if they competed everywhere. Indeed, the fact that the IAF, the Muslim Brother- hood, and the PJD exercised self-restraint in the past did not keep the respective governments from increasing obstacles to their participation in subsequent elections. As a result, the Moroccan PJD did not limit the number of its candidates in the last parliamentary elections

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in 2007. It fielded candidates in 94 out of 95 electoral districts. How- ever, its gains were minimal: it added only four seats to its parliamentary bloc, raising the total number to 46 as opposed to 42 in the 2002–2007 parliament.

Impact of Participation

There has been much speculation about the impact of participation on Islamist parties and movements. Would they be forced to moderate their positions and become less ideological and more pragmatic— read less religious—if they were allowed to participate? Would they be forced to accept the logic of pluralistic politics and thus the necessity to form alliances across the ideological spectrum and to reach compromises? Or, conversely, would they become even more doctri- naire and intolerant in order to reassure their hardcore constituency that they are not betraying their beliefs but remain truly committed to Islam even after entering the world of pluralistic politics? An examination of the participating Islamist parties and movements in the seven countries that are at the core of our discussion shows evidence of both outcomes. In some countries, participation leads to moderation; in others it does not. Furthermore, movements in the same country can switch back and forth between more moderate and more hardline positions. Evidence suggests that the outcome depends to a large extent on the political environment and on the conditions under which Islamists participate. Briefly, the more “normal” the conditions are under which an Islamist actor participates, the more likely it is that the reformists will prevail in the leadership, the more flexible and willing to compromise the party or movement will become, and the more it will focus on the nuts-and-bolts issues on which parliaments make decisions and issue laws—more narrow, specific public policy issues rather than broad questions with far- reaching ideological implications. The other side of the coin, however, is that parties and movements that show a great deal of flexibility and pragmatism are also likely to lose support in the later elections; this can lead the pendulum to swing back. Islamists whose participation is constantly hampered by the government and whose leaders and

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members are thrown in jail are more likely to revert to hardline positions and continue to be preoccupied with broad ideological issues. Participation of Islamist parties and movements with an armed wing constitutes a different case altogether. The environment is so important not only because it can provide incentives or erect obstacles to participation but also because most Islamist parties and movements are quite divided internally. Thus, external circumstances easily alter the internal balance of power between reformist and hardline factions. The internal shift that led many Islamists to choose participation in legal politics as a strategy was not uncontested. In the majority of participating Islamist movements, a part of the leadership remained skeptical about the value of participation; they feared that it would lead them to make excessive concessions and thus to dilute their religious identities without achieving concrete results. These skeptical voices are usually more silent when Islamist parties and movements are successful, with elections leading to increased presence in the parliament and expanded space for their activism. Poor election returns or increases in government repression tend to have the opposite effect, strengthening the hand of those who question the value of participation. Furthermore, external events can also have a major impact.

Participation Under “Normal” Conditions In the context of Arab countries, participation under normal conditions does not mean participation under democratic conditions. Kings govern as well as rule. Presidents are as irremovable as kings and, increasingly, prone to found dynasties. With the exception of Kuwait, parliaments in Arab countries have limited oversight powers—and even the Kuwaiti parliament risks dissolution every time it seriously stands up to the ruling family. In many countries, independent candidates campaigning on the basis of personal and tribal ties play a more important role than political parties and movements, regardless of their ideological background. Operating under “normal conditions” thus does not mean operating under normal democratic conditions but under the same conditions that affect all opposition actors in that country. It means operating without constant threat of arrest of the leadership and members, without police disrupting

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meetings, and with reasonable certainty that elected candidates will be seated in parliament. Normal also implies that the Islamist party or movement will not immediately be punished for obtaining good results and that it will be allowed to participate in future elections. Such conditions prevail at present in Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, and to a lesser extent in Bahrain. The country with the most favorable conditions is Morocco. The PJD’s participation resulted from the convergence of choices made by both the Islamists and the king. In the early 1980s, a breakaway faction of the radical Islamic Youth Movement formed a new group, originally called al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya. From the outset it aimed at becoming a recognized, legitimate participant in Moroccan politics. The group went through successive reorganizations and name changes but never deviated from the goal of political participation. In 1997 then King Hassan, intent on opening up the political system sufficiently to ensure a smooth succession for his son, allowed the Islamists to take over a weak existing party and to participate in elections in that guise. Eventually, the party became the PJD. The party played its hand skillfully, careful not to frighten the ruling establishment by winning too many seats initially. The new king, Muhammad VI, for his part did not reverse his father’s decision to allow Islamists in the political process; nevertheless, he sought to contain them by enacting an election law engineered to prevent any party from winning a majority of parliamentary seats. At the same time, the king, alongside liberal and leftist political parties, made sure that the PJD would not be included in the governing coalition or even in alliances with other parties. In parliament the PJD worked like a normal political party, focusing on public policy prescriptions without an obvious religious agenda. It even voted in favor of the new, not exclusively Sharia-based personal status code on the grounds that it was discussed democratically and the party accepted the concept of majority rule. It tried, like other parties, to lobby for constitutional and political reform to increase the oversight powers of the parliament. In other words, it played the role of the loyal opposition in a democratic system and, in the end, it paid a price for doing so. In the parliamentary elections of 2007, in which it had expected to win at least 70 seats, it only secured 46. While still winning second place, it received fewer votes than in

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2002 as disillusioned voters stayed away from the polls. In the case of the PJD, participation in legal politics thus engendered moderation— a moderation for which the party paid in electoral votes. Algeria’s Movement for the Society of Peace (MSP) had a very similar experience. A relatively small Islamist party that embraced participation and moderation in a climate where many Islamists had chosen violent resistance, it became a partner in the governing coalition under President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. In Algeria, becoming a partner in the government coalition means accepting the role of a small cog in a machine dominated by a struggle for power between the president and the military-security establishment. In the 1997 election, the MSP won 71 seats but plummeted to 38 in the 2002 elections, having few achievements to show for its participation in the government. It recovered somewhat in the 2007 elections with 52 seats but still remained considerably below the initial success. The party maintained a moderate stance despite the setback, but it failed to achieve any success to inspire and attract voters. In Bahrain and Kuwait the position of participating Islamist political societies—formal parties do not exist in either—is complicated by the existence of several religious groups embodying different trends and agendas. In Bahrain, a Sunni-ruled kingdom with a majority Shi’i population, al-Wefaq Society is an opposition group representing the Shi’a, while the Sunni Muslim Brothers organized in different groups support the ruling Khalifa family. The real issue in the politics of Bahrain is not the Islamization of the state but the distribution of power between Sunna and Shi’a. In this respect, the Shi’i community is at a great disadvantage, despite its majority status. The response of al-Wefaq has been to work for coexistence and gradual reform rather than confrontation. The leadership of the group has repeatedly contributed to defusing sectarian tensions and has sought to convey its allegiance to the state. Participation has indeed been a moderating factor. However, the limited outcome of al-Wefaq’s participation in politics and the continued discrimination against the Shi’i community in Bahrain have resulted in the group’s losing ground within the community to more confrontationist movements. The situation in Kuwait is somewhat different. Kuwait’s Islamists are even more fragmented. The best-organized group is the Islamic

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Constitutional Movement (ICM), a Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated group with moderate ideological stances. But, anomalously, Salafi movements also participate in the legal political process in Kuwait, although they refuse to do so in other countries. Despite their willingness to participate, Salafis take uncompromising positions on moral and social issues, with a clear project to expand the space sanctioned by religion in society. Salafis have spearheaded the long battle to prevent the extension of the franchise to women; they have demanded and obtained the reintroduction of gender segregation in the univer- sities. They have also battled against the modern dress codes and westernized lifestyles favored by young people, and in the process put a lot of pressure on the ICM to embrace socially conservative positions. While there is no evidence at this point that the ICM is rethinking its commitment to moderate political stances, it is also clear that the competition with Salafi groups is driving the ICM toward socially conservative positions. Participation under normal conditions, therefore, appears to strengthen Islamists’ determination to be part of the legal political process of their countries. Participation also forces Islamist parties and movements to focus less on ideological issues and more on the practical challenges of sustaining their constituencies. Once in parliament, Islamists are forced to focus on the issues with which parliament is seized. In a country like Kuwait, where the life of parliament revolves around moral and social issues and the relations with the ruling family, this is what Islamists also focus on. In Morocco and Algeria, where all parties are trying to display some initiative on economic issues, education, poverty, or political reform, participating Islamists also focus on those issues. In other words, normal conditions, or what can be considered normal in these countries, force Is- lamists to focus on the issues that consume the rest of the political class, while ideology plays a secondary role.

Participation Under “Siege” Conditions Participating Islamists in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen have faced particularly difficult situations. In Egypt and Jordan, where they represent the only truly organized opposition force, Islamists have been deliberate targets of government repression. In Yemen, the Islah

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Party has been caught in the process of state collapse as the old divisions between the North and South, tribal divisions, and a faltering economy with growing food and water shortages are beginning to overwhelm the fragile state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood provides a particularly interesting case of how thwarted participation can lead to ideological re- gression. As discussed earlier, the Brotherhood leadership was influenced in the early part of this decade by the views of reformers who pushed for a liberal interpretation on all the issues we defined as the gray zones in the thinking of participating Islamists. In the 2005 election, the reformers’ strategy of participation in legal politics appeared to pay off when the Brotherhood secured 20 percent of parliamentary seats, although it has remained a banned organization. This was the largest opposition bloc to have been present in the Egyptian parliament since 1952. The Mubarak regime perceived it as a threat to its power, particularly at a delicate time when the country was moving inevitably toward presidential succession. The regime worked to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from scoring similar successes in the future. Using its mighty security apparatus, the regime thus started a systematic campaign of arrests of Brotherhood members and of the movement’s financial supporters. It also introduced several constitutional amendments engineered to make participation by the Brotherhood more difficult. In the 2008 municipal elections it went further by rejecting all Muslim Brotherhood candidates until the movement decided to boycott the election in protest. The unintended consequence of the government’s efforts to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood was a change in the movement’s internal balance of power. The reformers were discredited, and the influence of the hardliners increased. The Brotherhood did not give up on the idea of participation; on the contrary, it drafted a program for the political party it aspired to form, following the example of the Islamists in Mo- rocco and Jordan who had created a political arm separate from the religious movement. But the draft platform made public in the sum- mer of 2007 showed that the Brotherhood was retreating to old positions. Two elements were particularly revealing. The first was the attempt by the Brotherhood to clarify how it would implement its stated goal of ensuring that all laws would conform to Sharia. The Muslim

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Brotherhood had often been pressed to clarify this point. The answer provided by the platform was to call for the formation of a council of religious scholars—to be elected by all religious scholars in the country—with the binding authority to judge the conformity of both laws and executive acts with Sharia. The proposal to place a council elected only by religious scholars above the parliament elected by universal suffrage caused a storm within the Muslim Brotherhood. Reformers were appalled; many believed that the proposed body of religious scholars was illegitimate, privileging some interpretations of Sharia over others. Furthermore, some pointed out, the formation of such a council was not based on any established Brotherhood position. The second controversial element in the draft platform was the exclusion of women and non-Muslims from positions of high office in the movement. This clause was a triumph of ideology over pragmatism: the Muslim Brotherhood was willing to create enormous con- troversy to ban something that was unlikely to happen in any case, given Egyptian society’s conservatism and the relatively small size of its Coptic population—not to mention other religious minorities. In addition, some Brothers pointed out that the exclusion was based on outmoded and unnecessary legal reasoning, and that it caused a politically damaging distraction.2 The two clauses in an otherwise unexceptional party program revealed the ascendancy of a particularly conservative faction of the leadership, but they were also met with a lot of resistance. This showed that the reformist trend still had some strength. In fact, speculation was rife throughout 2008 that the two controversial clauses might be dropped from the final party program. Nevertheless the draft party platform leads to the inescapable conclusion that thwarted participation strengthens hardliners and discredits reformers. The same conclusion is also strengthened by the fact that in June 2008 the Muslim Brotherhood elected new members to its central bureau (the Guidance Office), most of them considered hardliners. The Shura Council elections within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood—the religious movement behind the IAF—in March 2008 confirmed the same pattern. In a moment of rising tensions with the regime and facing repressive measures, hardliners were voted in to replace more moderate leaders in both the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF.

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Most Islamist movements are structurally biased against the moderate and reform camps within them; this accounts for their relative marginality and limited influence. As a rule, a clear majority within the hierarchies and memberships of such movements are drawn to more rigid or conservative stances and are often repelled by appeals to flexibility or reform. They regard flexibility as an unacceptable compromise on principles that have over time become im- printed in the collective consciousness of Islamists as immutable tenets. Only moments of rapid transition in the political environment—when new opportunities or challenges present themselves to religious movements—are capable of altering the marginal status of moderates, enabling them to attain a degree of parity with hardliners. Jordan passed through an extended phase of this sort from 1989 to 2005, and Egypt experienced a similar, albeit shorter, window of opportunity from 2004 to 2005. In both cases, moderates and reformists gradually broadened their scope of influence and succeeded in translating this into a series of policies and practices that prioritized participation in the political process and consensus making with political forces in society. Unfortunately, in the last two years the Jordanian and Egyptian regimes reverted to authoritarian policies and to security clampdowns, which seemed to target moderates with as much vehemence as they did hardliners. This repression convinced supporters of both organizations that participation and compromise did not pay off, strengthening the hand of hardliners. In other words, the demise of the reformers in the Jordanian and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is integrally related to the restrictive political environment in the two countries. The context also explains why the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has been particularly quick to reject participation as a waste of time and effort that distracts the organization from its true goal. The dynamics of competition between moderate and hardline leaders in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is complicated by the struggle for influence between Palestinians and Transjordanians over setting the movement’s priorities: advancing the Palestinian cause versus working for political and social change in Jordan. Nevertheless, as far as participation in the legal political process is concerned, the ideological struggle within the Jordanian Brotherhood is similar to that in its

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Egyptian counterpart. Hardliners in both organizations are skeptical of the value of political participation, and government repression makes them even more reluctant to adopt compromise positions that might alienate their popular base; moderates continue to emphasize the need for political participation as a key means of promoting reform, even if the rules of the game are unfair and the returns poor. Thus, in both movements hardliners tend to swing back and forth between rejecting political participation and grudgingly accepting it when conditions are favorable. Moderates, meanwhile, continue to cling to the principle of unconditional engagement in the legal political process, but they cannot bring the entire organization with them.

Participation by Armed Movements The most complex participating Islamist parties and movements are those that maintain an armed wing alongside the political organization. Such actors at present play a dominant role in Lebanon, Pales- tine, and Iraq. In all three cases, political participation takes place under highly unstable conditions; that is why the parties maintain an armed wing in the first place. The existence of the armed wings, furthermore, makes a normalization of conditions extremely unlikely, creating instead a vicious circle. The outcome is that the armed wings created to address an abnormal situation—Israeli occupation in Southern Lebanon, the unresolved Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and the rule of Saddam Hussein first and the American occupation later—eventually turn into tools used by Islamist parties and movements to increase their influence in the domestic struggle for power. It is important to note that in situations where Islamists maintain an armed wing, so do non-Islamist political actors. In Palestine, Fatah also has its militias; in Iraq, the Awakening Councils (non- religious Sunni militias first created to combat al-Qaeda) are entering the political fray. In Lebanon, all political groups at times have formed armed organizations. This discussion will focus only on Hiz- bollah and Hamas, however. Hizbollah and Hamas are Islamist movements, and both participate in the legal political process of their countries—at least when there is one. The two movements, however, are driven more by a political rather than a religious agenda. For Hamas, the problem is

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Israel, and the solution is not Islam but wresting control of Palestine back from Israel. The movement does not recognize the state of Is- rael and certainly considers the use of violence to be a legitimate tool to resist the Israeli occupation. Hizbollah also sees Israel as the major justification for the existence of its armed wing. It was formed to serve as an agent of representation for the Lebanese Shi’i community, and it was armed in the 1980s to drive the Israelis out of southern Lebanon, not to bring the Lebanese back to Islam. It continues to justify the existence of its armed wing by asserting that its weapons are those of the “resistance” and are thus needed until all Israelis are driven out of Lebanon—Israelis still occupy an area known as Shebaa Farms adjacent to the Syrian Golan Heights, which both Lebanon and Syria agree is Lebanese territory—and the Palestinian problem is solved. Neither Hamas nor Hizbollah has, to this day, used its weapons to influence elections. The January 2006 elections in Palestine, in which Hamas emerged as the winner, were judged clean by all observers, and violence was not involved. Elections in Lebanon are too complicated ever to be judged free and fair—the problem starts with the electoral law—but Hizbollah did not use violence to obtain its votes. However, both organizations have since used the weapons supposedly devoted to the “resistance” to fight and win political battles inside the respective countries. In June 2007 Hamas seized control of Gaza. The action was dubbed by many in the West and the Arab world a coup d’état; it was a somewhat perplexing label since Hamas had been in control of a legally constituted government on the basis of an election victory and a subsequent power-sharing deal with Fatah, the Mecca agreement. It was President Mahmoud Abbas that dissolved the government in a move of doubtful constitutionality. Whether the name “coup” is accurate, the fact remains that once the government was dissolved, Hamas weapons became a political instrument inside the country. In 2008, Hizbollah also openly used its weapons for a domestic political purpose, something it had vowed not to do. In May 2008 it engaged in a show of force with the government, quickly demonstrating its military superiority by taking over downtown Beirut, then returning seized buildings and public space to the Lebanese military. The showdown, followed by negotiations in Doha under region-

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al and international mediation, allowed Hizbollah and its allies to gain control of one third plus one ministerial post—thus veto power over major decisions in a newly formed government of national unity. The cases of Palestine and Lebanon demonstrate that the existence of an armed wing within an Islamist party or movement in unstable conditions inevitably become a domestic political tool. This is true even if the party or the movement is theoretically committed to non-violence in the domestic political process and claims the weapons are only directed at an external enemy. No matter why the militias exist, their presence affects the balance of power within the country. This, in turn, ensures that there will not be a normal political process and blocks any process of moderation. The question is whether the continuous inclusion of these movements in the political process would encourage them to gradually abandon their armed wings. The experiences of Hamas and Hizbollah are not very promising in this regard, but they also demonstrate that the exclusion of these armed Islamists from the political process is not a realistic option either, given the tremendous support they enjoy on the popular level. The only reasonable compromise, it seems, is for the countries in question to develop strong institutional frameworks that can guarantee that no one or combination of political actors can gain enough power to dominate the system.

Post-Participation Debates With the exception of the armed movements, the highly feared participating Islamists have had limited impacts on their countries. While everywhere they are the strongest component of the overall weak opposition, they have struggled to exert political influence; in the end they have had little say in the formulation of new policies. For many participating Islamist parties and movements, this reality is leading to a crisis of sorts or at least to active debate. Islamists have made important ideological changes and compromises and the continued existence of gray zones should not obscure the significance of the ideological transformation they have undergone. Islamists have also made a large investment in creating and strengthening their organizational structures, but the payoff has been limited thus far. Most

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important, parties that saw themselves as a rising force four or five years ago are now coming to terms with a decline in their election results and a continuing struggle for influence. Islamists hoped that through participation they could break through the barriers of restricted political pluralism and bring about true reform and the redistribution of power between ruling establishments and opposition movements, but they failed. They pushed for constitutional and legislative amendments intended to increase the powers of parliaments vis-à-vis the executive and to institute effective systems of checks and balances, but they failed in this effort as well. Some sought—again unsuccessfully—to overcome a history of conflict with secular elites and form flexible alliances across the ideological spectrum; others remained captive to black-and-white, good-versus- evil ideological approaches to politics. Participating Islamists also wanted to expand the scope of religion in the public sphere and to establish a link between the Islamization of society and their political participation. The consequence of this was that ruling establishments severed their connection with Islamic proselytizing and charity activities that form the backbone of the Islamist social role and the mainstay of their popular and electoral bases. It simultaneously led to attacks from less participation-friendly Islamists that accused them of pragmatism with the implied charge of straying from the true faith and Sharia. The poor payback of political participation presents Islamists with three major challenges, which are already being discussed in some of their parties and movements. The response to these challenges will determine the future course of participating Islamists. The first major challenge for participating Islamists is to formulate new arguments to convince their popular bases that participation in politics is an indispensable long-term strategy in spite of poor pay- backs in the short run. An analysis of recent interviews with and statements by prominent leaders of Islamist parties and movements shows that two main sets of arguments are being developed. The first stresses the value of even the minimal benefits derived from the participation in legal politics: parliamentary and legislative activity allows them to counter to some extent the maneuvers of governments as well as to preserve the cohesion and sustain the impetus of

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their popular base through the regular public broadcast of their demands. The second set of arguments reveals a more ambitious, maximalist agenda: Islamists must participate in order to prove themselves responsible political actors, committed to participation in legal politics under all circumstances, including successive set- backs, and dedicated to the advocacy of peaceful change and incre- mental reform. Such clear commitment would put an end to criticisms and suspicions of Islamist motives and designs harbored by ruling establishments and secular opposition movements. Islam- ist movements facing the more precarious situations, for example the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhoods, tend toward the minimalist argument. Movements that enjoy a more relaxed relationship with their governments, for example the ICM in Kuwait and the PJD in Morocco, tend toward the maximalist position. The second challenge participating Islamists face is finding a sustainable and practical balance between the requirements of participation and the demands of ideological commitment. As we argued before, the realities of restricted pluralism and the domination of ruling establishments over the political system compel Islamists to adopt compromise positions on major social issues. However, Islam- ists are torn between this need and their ideological convictions; this is in addition to the very real fear of sacrificing the distinction of their political rhetoric and programs and the danger of alienating broad and influential segments of their supporters. The task of striking a balance between pragmatism and ideological commitment is becoming increasingly difficult, if not impossible, because participation in legal politics has led to unsatisfactory results. Participating Islamists are reacting in two opposite fashions: one is to retract earlier compromises and revert to hardline stances. The Egyptian Mus- lim Brotherhood did this in its party platform, which called for the creation of a religious body with legislative functions and which excluded, on the basis of Islamic jurisprudence, the possibility of a Copt or a woman serving as head of state. The other course, followed by the PJD in Morocco and the ICM in Kuwait, is to engage in a debate on the essential political component of Islamist movements, the relative weight of political pragmatism with respect to ideology or the Islamic frame of reference, and the priorities of political

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participation. As interesting as such extensive debates are to observers, they create an environment of strategic ambivalence and uncertainty that could cost participating Islamists much support. The third challenge facing participating Islamists is to rethink the relationship between their religious and political components and, accordingly, to devise the best possible structures for organizing them institutionally. The opening up of opportunities for participation in legal politics during the past few decades has led some Islamist movements to introduce a functional separation between religion and politics, as demonstrated in the creation of political parties, fronts, and associations that are institutionally autonomous from the religious movements. Such separation has allowed participating Islamists to pursue political goals more freely. As opportunities for political participation narrow, however, it is no longer so clear that the separation of political from religious activities is an advantage rather than a disadvantage. This critical reassessment of the pros and cons of separating religious from political activities in Islamist movements coincides with another important development. The call for abandoning politics altogether and for focusing exclusively on proselytizing and charitable work is being heard with increasing frequency and strength. This is an echo from the past, harkening back to the position of the Muslim Brotherhood’s founder, Hassan al-Banna. If the call were heeded on a large scale, it would be the end of political participation by Islamists, with unpredictable consequences.

Evolving Movements

There are no easy answers to the questions always asked about participating Islamist parties and movements: “Are they truly committed to democracy? Will participation increase their commitments?” The evidence leads to a very unsatisfactory, “It depends.” Commitment to democracy by Islamist parties and their evolution as a result of participation are the outcome of a dynamic political process. Many leaders and members of the Islamist parties and movements are truly and probably irreversibly committed to democracy on an

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individual basis, but many are more skeptical about the benefits of participation, and some even question its acceptability. It is the balance of power among these different groups—determined by the politics of the country as well as the internal politics of the organization—that will decide whether a party or movement will remain committed to democratic participation. The impact of participation is also a function of the political process. The decision by Islamist parties and movements to participate in the legal politics of their countries triggers a set of complicated processes: within the leadership of the parties and movements involved; between them and their followers; and of course between the participating Islamists and the ruling establishments and secular opposition parties of their countries. It is the outcome of these three different sets of processes that will determine the future trajectory of participating Islamists. That trajectory, evidence shows, is likely to differ from country to country and actor to actor. Political participation under normal conditions indeed appears to favor moderation and strengthen the commitment to the democratic process. Unfortunately, politics in most Arab countries cannot be characterized as normal. While the outcome of participation is not invariably a process of further democratization and moderation, it is also clear that non- participation—either enforced by governments or chosen by the leadership of Islamist parties and movements—is a guarantee that a process of moderation will not take place. This is a sobering thought for those governments and their international backers that would like to set the bar for participation by Islamists extremely high. The choice is not between allowing the somewhat risky participation by Islamists in politics and their disappearance from the political scene. It is between allowing their participation despite the existence of gray zones with the possibility that a moderating process will unfold, and exclud- ing them from the legal political process—thus ensuring the growing influence of hardliners inside those movements and the continued existence of gray zones.

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Notes

1. See Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy, and Marina Ottaway, Islamist Move- ments and the Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones, Carnegie Paper no. 67 (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). 2. See Nathan J. Brown and Amr Hamzawy, The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Carnegie Paper no. 89 (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008). CONCLUSION Old Actors and New Arenas

Amr Hamzawy and Marina Ottaway

he interplay of authoritarian ruling establishments, secular parties, and Islamist movements has dominated Arab politics throughout most of the past four decades. In countries such as Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Bah- Train, and Kuwait, the monarchical and republican ruling establishments have kept a firm grip over politics and systematically aborted the possibility of a more balanced distribution of power between them and Islamist and secular opposition groups. Increas- ingly since the 1990s, the majority of Islamist movements have joined secular parties in committing to participation in legal politics, depending primarily on electoral contestation at the national and local levels to advance their agendas. Their roles and influence, however, have been systematically contained by legal and

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political restrictions imposed by the ruling establishments, as well as by outright repression. As the essays in this volume demonstrate, the internal organizational and strategic deficits of the Isla- mist and secular opposition have also contributed to their general weakness. In other countries, such as Libya, Syria, and Saudi Ara- bia, where political activities are banned, the opposition has been denied any form of legal existence and is forced to operate in a clandestine way or to take the route to exile. The outcome has been continuing authoritarian stagnation and rising political apathy among Arab citizens. The fact that constitutional and legal reforms have been introduced in some countries in recent years and that the majority of ruling establishments across the Arab world are now speaking a reform-friendly language has not significantly altered the reality of continued Arab authoritarianism. Most of the reforms that have been introduced have aimed at super- imposing a veneer of liberalism and above all modernity on the existing regimes. A few, like those introduced in Morocco since the mid-1990s, have greatly decreased violations of human rights and allowed more pluralism but still have fallen short of balancing the distribution of power. In a few cases, as in Egypt since 2004, so- called reforms have actually allowed a tightening of the regime’s grip over the country’s political life. And so it comes as no surprise that opposition parties and the public alike greet with skepticism the official claims that Arab countries are moving, albeit slowly, toward democracy. A clear sign of the lack of trust in the so-called reforms Arab ruling establishments claim to be carrying out is the unprecedented level of political apathy among citizens. Voter turnout has not ex- ceeded 20 percent in recent parliamentary and municipal elections in Egypt and Jordan. Registered political parties, ruling and opposition parties alike, have been suffering from dwindling membership and shrinking constituencies. Even the Islamists, who in the past have demonstrated great ability to gain followers and organize constituencies, have been showing the first signs of a de- crease in popularity.

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Reform From the Top as an Instrument of Power

In recent years, the Arab ruling establishments have succeeded in using seeming reform policies as instruments to sustain the status quo. Morocco, Bahrain, and Egypt, for example, have excelled at this game. As a result, all three have received some international praise for their efforts (although Egypt has lost much of this reputation in the past few years). Beneath the façade of reformism, however, there has been little or no redistribution of power. Morocco, for example, has more than thirty political parties, most of them splinters of old, larger opposition parties founded by individuals who were courted by the monarchy and were turned into supporters of the status quo. More than twenty of these parties are represented in parliament. This splintering might be an amusing political phenomenon in a different context, but in Morocco it has serious consequences: King Muhammad VI, the ultimate leader, is seldom presented with a meaningful challenge to his authority and eminence. The king’s strategy of fostering divisions among his political rivals has been quite successful. As a result, he retains the majority of the government’s executive prerogatives, appoints the prime minister without being bound by election results, and gets the parliament to pass laws to his liking with little if any political resistance. Meanwhile, initiatives originating in the parliament most often languish in the labyrinth of whims and rivalries that characterize the Moroccan political scene. All the while, citizen disillusionment with the democratic process grows. Less than 37 percent of eligible Moroccan voters cast their votes in the legislative elections in 2007, a historic low. Yet Morocco is often touted in the West as a successful reforming country. In Egypt, the ruling establishment in the 2003–2005 period used political reforms to defuse rising socioeconomic tensions. The unprecedented political openings of those years were a direct result of the economic difficulties the country was experiencing after floating its currency in 2003, a decision that caused the Egyptian pound to depreciate significantly. Among the political reforms introduced in this period was easing control over opposition activities, amending the constitution to allow for the country’s first-ever multicandidate

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presidential elections, and tolerating an increased level of political participation by the Muslim Brotherhood, the major Islamist opposition movement. Political reforms succeeded in easing tensions, but they also led to results the government considered unacceptable, causing it to back away from change. The Muslim Brotherhood’s strong showing in the 2005 parliamentary elections, when Brotherhood candidates won 20 percent of the seats in the People’s Assembly (the lower chamber of the Egyptian parliament), tested the regime’s grip on power and compelled it to reverse course. In 2006, the government postponed local elections, extended the state of emergency for two years, and cracked down on popular protests. It also suppressed efforts by the country’s judiciary to accrue some mea- sure of independence. In 2007, the ruling National Democratic Party used its control of parliament to deal a serious blow to political reform efforts in Egypt by ratifying amendments to thirty- four articles of the constitution. The most significant amendment replaced judicial oversight of elections with oversight by a new supreme supervisory committee whose members would be appointed by the president. This amendment effectively overruled the 2000 Constitutional Court decision that mandated direct judicial oversight of elections. Another amendment banned the pursuit of any political activity or the establishment of any political parties that cast their program in a religious frame of reference. This ban was aimed at preventing the Muslim Brotherhood, or any other political group with an Islamic orientation, from establishing a party. The amendments also introduced a mixed electoral system based primarily on proportional representation, which favored parties able to present lists and left only a small, unspecified margin for independent candidates. As a banned movement prohibited from establishing a political party, the Muslim Brotherhood gained its eighty-eight seats in the lower house in 2005 by fielding independent candidates. In all likelihood, this change in the election law will diminish the Brotherhood’s electoral prospects and conse- quently its representation in parliament. Taken together, the Egyptian regime’s policies in the past two years have put an end to the political movement the country briefly

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experienced between 2003 and 2005, restoring the immobility of the 1980s and 1990s. The space in which the opposition, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, can operate has been greatly restricted, resulting in widespread, severe discontent among citizens who see no legal way to change the situation. The Bahraini royal family has been following a path similar to that of Morocco and Egypt. Early in 2002, the ruler of Bahrain held a national referendum on a new, purportedly more democratic constitution that, among other things, restored the elected Council of Representatives and gave women the right to vote. Lost among all the hype and excitement with which this development was received internationally was the fact that the newly minted king—the constitution changed Bahrain from an emirate to a monarchy—also had the power to appoint an equal number of representatives to the upper house of parliament, the Shura Council. This ensured that the king’s supporters would dominate the legislative branch. Also lost in the chorus of approval was the fact that the Bahraini royal family, Sunni by religious affiliation, has historically discriminated against Shi’i citizens, who constitute the majority of the Bahraini population and also the majority of the opposition. Understandably, the façade of reform served to blunt international criticism. Many exiled Shi’i political leaders were allowed to return to the country and participate in the elections—although the system was engineered in such fashion that they could not possibly win. Not only did the so-called reforms give the regime a degree of international legitimacy, but they also served to weaken the opposition by introducing a fatal divide. The main question for regime opponents became whether to participate in the regime’s reform en- terprise or continue the struggle in the streets and abroad. The outcome has been good for the ruler. Shi’i opposition groups now constantly clash with each other. The representative institutions have remained devoid of any meaningful authority. The ruling family still governs effectively by decree, controls the security services and the army, and is immune from questioning and accountability. Human rights violations have not stopped; political opponents are still targets of intimidation and even torture; and discrimination against the Shi’a persists.

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Weakness of the Secular Opposition

The stagnation of Arab political systems is not due entirely to the ad- mittedly able maneuvering of ruling establishments. The weakness of the opposition and its inability to challenge the ruling establishments have also contributed to the stagnation. And that weakness is to some extent self-inflicted. Secular parties in general have failed to develop dynamic organizational structures and fashion convincing political programs. The result has been a decline in the constituencies of the secular opposition and a great loss in its political significance. In most Arab countries, the ruling establishments no longer see the secular opposition as representing a real challenge to their power. In some cases, they have even come to see it as a useful ally against Islamist movements, one that lends a veneer of pluralism to the regime without threatening it. Analysts tend to interpret the weakness of the secular opposition as the consequence of social structures and prevailing cultural norms that obstruct the growth of liberal and leftist ideas, while facilitating the growing popularity and influence of the Islamists. That idea seems plausible under the current conditions, but in a broader historical context it is not. The same Arab societies that appear so ready to accept religion in politics and turn their backs on secular parties embraced with enthusiasm the secular Arab nationalism and Arab socialism of Gamal Abdel Nasser and other radical leaders in the 1960s. Indeed, the rise of Islamist movements was encouraged in the 1970s by the Egyptian government and others bent on exorcising the appeal of Nasserism and more broadly of leftist ideas. And liberal ideas as well proved attractive in earlier periods. Even today, Arab liberals and leftists do not lack the social openings and political space needed to build grassroots support around visions of society capable of challenging those of the ruling establishments and Islamists alike. With the exception of a few small, oil-rich Gulf emirates, Arab countries are gripped with severe economic and social problems, notably widespread poverty, high unemployment, and illegal immigra- tion; deteriorating educational, health, and other primary social services; and crumbling social security networks. Moreover, the neoliberal economic policies adopted by most Arab governments since CONCLUSIOn 103

the 1990s have exacerbated these problems, although they led to higher rates of GDP growth. The reforms have driven entire sectors of the lower class and even the middle class into severe hardship. These are the conditions under which leftist parties usually thrive, but this has not been the case in the Arab countries. On the contrary, it is the Islamist movements that have capitalized on the social distress that has been growing since the 1980s. By constructing and expanding networks in education, health, and other social services, they have partially supplanted the ineffective government agencies officially charged with these responsibilities. For the most part, however, the Islamists do not have clear perceptions of how to deal with deficiencies in people’s economic and social rights. In their publicized statements and programs, they continue to swing back and forth between an economic liberal tendency that regards the market and the private sector as the engines of growth and a quasi-leftist tendency that advocates a return to the powerful, centralized, paternalistic state. The Arab left and liberal groups thus still have a genuine opportunity to formulate an alternative vision of how to deal with unemployment, the absence of social safety networks, and the gross disparities in economic and social rights—in other words, with the issues of social justice and greater equality. Furthermore, the deficits in political, civil, and individual freedoms represent an opening for the secular opposition to build grassroots support. As the essays in this volume demonstrate, all the talk of democratic reform and political liberalization over the past few years has not been translated into a qualitative shift in that direction in any Arab country. Little has changed or seriously improved in such vital matters as rule of law, separation of powers, checks and balances in the political system, and broadening popular participation in public life. Nor has the growing political influence and activity of Islamist movements brought a tangible and lasting expansion of political competition. Islamists have failed to force ruling establishments to implement democratic reform. Indeed, in some countries, such as Algeria and Kuwait, they have even joined the government and are now paying a heavy price in terms of declining popularity. The poor and stagnant levels of political, civil, and individual liberties and the declining credibility of the reformist credentials of governments and of some

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Islamist movements offer leftist and liberal actors new opportunities. They could home in on such issues as freedom of association, including that of forming political parties and professional syndicates; freedom of opinion and expression; the right to worship; and the need to eliminate all forms of discrimination in these areas. The secular opposition in the Arab world does not lack openings for activism and spaces to build grassroots support; the continued internal weakness of secular parties and movements has prevented their revival. Undoubtedly, legal restrictions on political activity and repressive measures have contributed to the weakness of secular parties and movements. Yet under the same circumstances, Islamist movements have succeeded in maintaining, and even strengthening, their presence, at least for a time.

The Islamist Conundrum

Throughout the past four decades, Islamist parties and movements that have chosen nonviolence have become the Arab world’s strongest opposition, greatly surpassing in influence not only the secular parties but also the violent Islamist organizations that capture the headlines. Characterized by broad grassroots support, powerful organizational structures, and religious-based political programs, Islamist movements have gradually committed to political participation as their main strategy for reform. However, as the essay on “Islamists in Politics” shows, their participation has been limited in its scope and outcome. Islamist movements had hoped that by means of participation they could break through the barriers of restricted political pluralism and bring about true reform and a more balanced distribution of power in their countries. But so far, they have failed. They have pushed for constitutional and legislative amendments intended to increase the powers of legislative institutions and to institute effective systems of checks and balances, but in this, too, they have failed. Some sought— again unsuccessfully—to overcome a history of conflict with the secular opposition and form flexible alliances with its parties; others remained captive to black-and-white, good-versus-evil ideological

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approaches to politics. Islamists also wanted to expand the scope of religion in the public sphere and to Islamize politics. This made it easier for ruling establishments to place obstacles in the way of their political activity in the name of protecting the country against Islam- ization. Many governments have also sought to curb the religious proselytizing and charitable activities that help Islamists build their political support. The poor payback for their efforts has presented Islamists with new challenges. The first is devising new arguments to convince their constituencies that participation in the political system remains an indispensable long-term strategy despite poor returns in the short run. The second challenge is striking a sustainable balance between the pragmatic requirements of political participation and the demands of ideological commitment. The realities of restricted pluralism and the domination of ruling establishments over the political system strategically and tactically compel Islamists to adopt pragmatic positions on major social issues. Islamists are thus torn between this need for pragmatism and their ideological convictions. They also are fearful that the ideological and programmatic compromises that political participation requires will alienate broad and influential segments of their supporters. The third challenge facing Islamist movements is that of rethinking the relationship between their political activity and their religious proselytizing. Such rethinking entails decisions about the organizational structures that would best allow them to pursue both activities. A few years ago, Islamist parties were on an upswing, to the point that many observers in the Arab world and in the West worried about a future dominated by Islamist parties. Those fears have not subsided, but the reality today is very different. Islamist parties have found it hard to have an impact; they face major, difficult choices; and, as often happens in parties facing political difficulties, they are experiencing internal struggles between hardliners, who want to return to more pure ideological positions and concentrate on da’wa, and softliners, who want to continue political activity and are willing to pay the price of pragmatism. Islamist parties remain central political actors in the Arab world and will maintain that role for the foreseeable future. They are not an irresistible wave sweeping

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New Arenas The analysis of the main formal political actors in the Arab world suggests that it is highly improbable that in the near future electoral politics will bring about significant political reform, let alone true democratization. The imbalance between ruling establishments and opposition parties is too great, and the repressive tools and the room for maneuver that governments control are too strong to make change through elections likely. The formal political scene is stagnant. This is in stark contrast to the new dynamism that is becoming apparent at the social level. Faced with deteriorating social and economic conditions and living standards, growing segments of Arab populations—with the exception, so far, of most Gulf countries—are beginning to protest. Labor sit-ins, strikes, demonstrations, and the presentation of petitions have become routine occurrences in Mo- rocco, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and Bahrain. Almost no day passes in these countries without a protest by a professional association, an NGO, or simply a group of citizens venting their anger. The partici- pants in these protests make social or economic demands on government agencies. In other words, in countries that remain basically authoritarian but tolerate a degree of freedom of expression and association, citizens have given up on formal, legal politics and operate in spaces outside it. The question is whether this informal protest activity, which at present does not seem to be coordinated, could become the catalyst to shake Arab countries out of their political stagnation. Some initial evidence suggests that the increase in protest activities is the result of greater political awareness among citizens and that it is accompanied by improved capacity to organize for collective purposes both at the local and national levels. A growing array of electronic and print media has exposed interested citizens to independent assessments of their governments’ performance, linking the deteriorating living conditions to large-scale corruption and the lack of democracy. Although, apart from Lebanon, no Arab country accepts the complete independence of the media, the emergence of CONCLUSIOn 107

pan-Arab newspapers and of national dailies that are not completely government-controlled as well as the proliferation of satellite TV channels have created an unprecedented and relatively uncensored outlet for information. In recent years, new technologies have been utilized by interested citizens and activists to add to the existing media diversity. Blogs, web-based publications, and the use of cell phone technologies to share information have helped enlarge the space of relative freedom and have increased Arab citizen interest in public matters. Simultaneously, networks of activists have emerged at the local and national levels, most based on small-scale initiatives and linked to social and economic demands. One striking feature of these new networks, such as the April 6 group in Egypt, is their cross-ideological nature. Islamist and secular activists are both part of the networks and stage protests jointly. The new activism is not linked to formal politics and, most important, it has so far not injected a new dynamism into it. Nor have protest movements been important enough to scare governments into making concessions or changing the balance of power between the staunch defenders of the status quo in the ruling establishments and the advocates of cautious reform. For the time being, the picture that emerges is that of a vibrant society that spurns stagnant formal politics in favor of direct activism that lacks an overall goal or a vision for the future. Ruling establishments have not succeeded in suppressing this social activism; nor has it been captured and directed by either Islamists or secular opposition parties. Link- ages between social activism and formal politics, if and when they materialize, could revive Arab politics in a way that ruling establishments and opposition parties have failed to do.

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Abbas, Mahmoud, 90 Arab Socialist Union, 51 Abdullah II, king of Jordan, 18 Arab street, 9 al-’Adl wa’l-Ihsan (Justice and Charity), al-Assad, Bashar, 14, 18, 19 47–48, 76 Atatürk, Mustapha Kemal, 42 Algeria authoritarianism, 22, 40, 98. Bouteflika election of 2009, 14 See also incumbent regimes civil war, 30 Awakening Councils, 89 constitutional amendments, 15 elections, presidential and Baath Party, 28, 56 parliamentary, 31, 71, 80 Bahrain FIS and, 72, 73 constitutional referendum (2002), 101 Islamist participation in, 85 distribution of power in, 84 judicial reform and, 35 generational transition in, 33 managed reform in, 20, 28, 30–31 human rights violations, 101 Movement for the Society of Peace, 84 Islamist political societies, 84 alternance, 47 judicial reform and, 35 apathy, political, 98 managed reform in, 20–22 April 6 Movement (Egypt), 11, 107 parliament in, 28, 37 Arab governments, and political political parties banned in, 7, 24 process, 9 political unrest in, 24, 106 Arabi al-Nasri (Arab Nasserite) Party, royal domination of legislative 50, 53 branch, 101 Arab–Israeli conflict, 6, 89–90 United States and, 22, 37 Arab Republic of Yemen, 28, 55 “Bahrain model,” 19, 20 Arab Socialist Baath Party, 56 al-Banna, Hassan, 94 109

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Basri, Driss, 34 economic modernization efforts, 35 al-Baydh, Ali Salem, 55 elections in, 100 Ben Ali, Zine al-Abidine, 14 generational transition in, 18, 33 Berber parties, 46 Kifaya movement for change in, 9, 11, Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 14, 31, 84 54–55 broadcast media. See media leftist heritage of, 51 Broader Middle East and North Africa managed reform in, 22–24 Initiative, 38 Muslim Brotherhood in, 23–24, 35, 86–89, 100–101 caliphate, revival of, 74 opposition forces in, 7, 27 civil society, 8–11, 36, 67 political parties in, 28, 44, 48–55, 100 communism, collapse of, 10 political reform in, 99–101 conservatism, 43 political unrest in, 106 constitutional amendments, 15. presidential control of parliament in, See also under specific country 23, 100 Coptic Church, 53 secular-Islamist issues in, 5, 44, 64 social and political unrest in, 24, 53, da’wa, 3, 70, 105 99, 100 democracy socialism and, 51 civil society and, 8 U.S. pressure for reform in, 37 crisis of secular parties as obstacle to, voter apathy in, 54, 98 43–44 women’s organizations in, 10 as domestic political process, 8 elections, 13–14. See also under specific Islamist parties and concerns for, country 72–81 electoral contestation, 15 presumed incompatibility with Islam, European pressure for reform, 15–16, 32, 6 37, 39 Western attempts to promote, 6–7 Dubai, 28 Free Officers Movement, 48 “Dubai model,” 64 Front of National Liberation (FLN), 30, 71–72 economic reform/modernization, 13, 63–64 General People’s Congress (GPC), 29, 55 globalization and, 34–35 generational transition, 17–18, 33–34 perception of democracy and, 6 Ghad (Tomorrow) Party, 49–50, 52, role of political reform in, 17 53–54 without political reform, 32 globalization economy economic concerns related to, 34–35 of non oil-producing countries, 17 reform and, 32 oil revenue and, 16–17 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 10, 18 widespread problems in Arab grassroots actions, 9 countries, 102–103 educational reform, 35 Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, 18, 20–21 Egypt Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, 18 civil society advocates in, 36–37 Hamas, 71–72, 80, 89–91 constitutional amendments in, 15, al-Haqq, 21 23–24, 35, 49, 99, 100 hardliners, 32–34 Copts’ fear of Islamist movements in, Hassan II, king of Morocco, 25, 47, 83 53 Hizbollah, 89–91 deliberate repression of Islamists in, holy war (jihad), 4 85, 86

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human rights decreased popularity of, 98, 103 in Egypt, 36 democratic credibility and ideological in Morocco, 25, 37 issues, 5 violations of, 98, 101 dual nature of, 75–76 Huntington, Samuel, 18 effectiveness of party-like structures Hussein, Saddam, 89 in, 66 evolving movements, 94–95 ideological differences, 5, 72–77, 93, ideological conundrum, 72–77, 93, 104–107 104–107 incumbent regimes, 2, 13–40, 97. impact of participation, 81–94 See also specific country or ruler by armed movements, 89–91 external expectations of, 37–38 under “normal” conditions, 82–85 ideal of liberal democracy in, 15 under “siege” conditions, 85–89 imbalance of power and, 6–8, 106 message of, 65 justifications for limits imposed on organization of political structure, 5, opposition, 36–37 42, 91 managed reform and, 19–31 participation in political process, 3–4, modernization reforms, 13 95, 104–105 opposition and, 27–28 as political actors, 1–2 participation in political process, 4 political pluralism and, 76–77 as political actors, 1–2 post-participation debates, 91–94 pressure by U.S./Europe for political relations between secular parties reform, 15–16 and, 5 reform advocates in, 14–15, 36 restrictions imposed by ruling stalemate with opposition groups, 11 establishments, 97 institutional reform social distress and growth of, 103 in Bahrain, 20–22 struggles in accepting separation of in Egypt, 22–24 religion/politics, 74, 94 substantive change without, 24–27 tactical dilemmas, 77–81 without power-sharing, 20–24 violence and, 75 Iraq, 89 weakness of secular opposition and, Islah Party, 29–30, 44, 85–86 102 Islam Israeli–Palestinian conflict, 89–90 Islamic extremism, in Saudi Arabia, Istiqlal Party, 25, 46–48, 63 26 presumed incompatibility with al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, 83 democracy, 6 jihad, 4 Islamic Action Front (IAF), 78–79 Joint Meeting Parties, 58 Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), Jordan 85 civil society advocates in, 36 Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), 72, 73 electoral gerrymandering, 37 Islamic Youth Movement, 83 generational transition in, 17, 33 Islamist movements and parties, 69–95. incumbent regime of, 14, 39 See also specific parties Islamic Action Front (IAF), 78–79 al-’Adl wa’l-Ihasan, 47–48, 76 Islamic candidates in, 80 armed movements, 89–91 Muslim Brotherhood in, 87–88 candidates for election, issues political unrest in, 106 concerning, 80 United States and, 37 challenges, 92–94 voter apathy in, 98 concerns regarding democracy and, Juma’a, Nu’man, 50 70–71

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Kifaya movement, 9, 11, 54–55 in Saudi Arabia, 26–27 “king’s dilemma,” 18 and split between hardliners/ kutla, 46 softliners, 32–34 Kuwait substantive change without institu- generational transition in, 18 tional reform, 24–27 Islamist political societies, 84–85 in Yemen, 28–30 oil revenues and, 16, 59 marji’ya, 75 opposition forces in, 28 mass movements, civil society parliament, 17, 82 organizations and, 8 secular parties in, 59–62 media student demonstrations in, 61–62 control of, by incumbent regimes, 2 women suffrage in, 60 exposure, and political activism, 106–107 laïcité, 42 modernization Lebanon, Hizbollah and Hamas of economic/legal/educational movements in, 89–90 systems, 13, 34–36 leftist parties. See also liberal and leftist electoral contestation, 15 parties; specific party generational transition and, 17–19 constituency-building problems, 4–5 as goal of reform, 16 in Egypt, 51 incumbent regimes and, 19 grassroots support of, 102 reforms aimed at, 98 loss of influence of, 4 role of political reform in, 17 social distress and, 103 vision of, 63, 64 legislation, revisions of, 15 monarchical regimes, 15. liberal, defining, 43 See also incumbent regimes liberal and leftist parties. See also leftist monarchist parties, 46 parties; specific party Morocco. See also Party for Justice and in Egypt, 50 Development (PJD) failure to organize in Arab countries, 4 civil society advocates in, 36–37 liberal parties, 4, 63 electoral laws, 37 loss of ground in recent elections, 11 generational transition in, 17, 33 as political actors, 1, 3 hardliner control of, 33–34 liberalism, veneer of, 98 incumbent regime of, 14 liberal parties. See liberal and leftist Islamist candidates in, 80, 85 parties managed reform in, 19, 25 Libya modernization of parliamentary generational transition in, 18, 33 operations, 35 political parties banned in, 7, 28 opposition forces in, 27 personal status law revisions, 36 managed reform, 19–31 political parties in, 7, 99 in Algeria, 30–31 political unrest in, 106 in Bahrain, 20–22 reforms in, 17 in Egypt, 22–24 royalist parties in, 46 globalization, modernization, and secular-Islamist collaboration in, 5–6 economic reform, 34–36 secular parties in, 45–48 institutional reform without power- United States and, 37 sharing, 20–24 voter apathy and protest in, 11–12, 99 in Morocco, 25 women’s organizations in, 10 opposition forces and, 27–31 Movement for the Society of Peace, 84 patterns of, 19–20 Mubarak, Gamal, 35, 39, 51, 54, 64 politics of, 31–38

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Mubarak, Hosni, 14, 22, 35, 50, 54 opposition parties. See also Islamist Mudawwana, 37, 75 movements; liberal and leftist parties Muhammad VI, king of Morocco, 18, 25, communication difficulties/limitations 99 of, 3, 4 multilateral initiatives, 38 ineffectiveness of, 11–12 Muslim Brotherhood, 23–24, 35, 100–101 justifications for limits imposed on, affiliations of, 70, 85 36–37 alliances and elections, 79, 80 ambiguity and, 53 Palestine controversial elements of, 87, 93–94 elections of 2006, 80 deliberate repression of, 86–87 Fatah militias, 89 generational transition issues, 34 Israeli–Palestine conflict, 89–90 growing discontent among workers Party for Justice and Development (PJD), and, 53 46–48, 80, 93 in Jordan, 87–89 affiliation with al-Tawhid wal Islah, 76 refusal of Egypt to legalize, 75 democracy and, 75 secular-Islamist collaboration in, 5 expectations of, 73 and secular parties compared, 49 origins of, 83–84 vision of, 63 votes for, 11–12, 25 patronage, 65 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 22, 48, 51, 102 People’s Assembly (Egypt), 100 Nasserism, 51 People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Nasserite Unionist People’s Organization, 29, 55 56 perestroika reforms, 10, 18 “National Charter” (Bahrain), 21 political apathy, 98 National Council on Human Rights political parties. See also Islamist (Egypt), 36 movements and parties; specific National Democratic Institute (Bahrain), party 21 banned in certain countries, 7 National Democratic Party (Egypt), 49, dwindling membership in, 98 51, 54, 100 Political Parties’ Court (Egypt), 49 National Liberation Front (FLN), 30 political process Nazif, Ahmad, 35 challenge of participation, 3–6 New al-Wafd (Delegation) Party, 49–51 dysfunction of, in Arab governments, 9 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) rejection or skepticism of, 12 as civil society, 10 political reform, 6 efforts of, on behalf of political parties, 7 for economic rather than democratic funding and, 67 purposes, 35 service-oriented or charitable limited results in, 38 organizations, 10 specific motivations for, 35–36 targeting government action, 10 unintended consequences of, 10 Nour, Ayman, 50, 54 political stagnation, 6–8, 98, 102–104 political unrest, 17, 106 O’Donnell, Guillermo, 32–33 poverty, 17 oil revenue power effect of, on representative imbalance of, 6–8, 106 government, 6 reform from top as instrument of, falling prices and economy of 99–101 Arab countries, 16–17 print media, and incumbent regimes, 2 in Saudi Arabia, 26 proselytizing, 3, 70, 105

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Qaddafi, Saif al-Islam, 19, 39 expectations of, 44–45 al-Qaddafi, Muammar, 14, 15 in Kuwait, 59–62 Qatar message of, 64–65 educational reform in, 35 monarchy ties to, 48 generational transition in, 33 in Morocco, 45–48 lack of political parties in, 7 organizational issues, 42, 65–68, 102 United States and, 37 restrictions imposed by ruling establishments, 97–98 Reconciliation and Equity Tribunal, self-definition of, 42–43 36–37 uncertain future of, 62–68 reform. See also managed reform; vision for, 63–64 political reform weakness of, 56, 65–68, 102–104 economic modernization, 13 in Yemen, 55–59 educational, 35 security forces, in incumbent regimes, 2 external expectations for, 37–38 Serag al-Din, Fuaad, 50 as instrument of power, 99–101 Shamlan, Faisal ibn, 58 social issues and, 19 Sharia, 72–74 socioeconomic, 25 Shebaa Farms, 90 top-down process of, 18, 39–40, Shi’i, 20–22, 101 99–101 Shura Council, 16, 26, 101 unintended consequences of, 18 social activism, 106–107 without power redistribution Socialist Labor Party, 79 (“Bahrain model”), 19 Socialist Party (Yemen), 44 regime security, 2 Socialist Union of Popular Forces revolutionary ideals, abandonment of, 3 (USFP), 34, 46–48 royal houses, 14 socioeconomic reform, in Morocco, 25 ruling establishments. See incumbent softliners, 32–34, 39 regimes southern Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), 29 al-Sabbah family, 59 Soviet Union collapse al-Sadat, Anwar, 22, 48, 49 effect of, on leftist organizations, 4 Salafi groups, 70, 85 reforms leading to, 10 Saleh, Ali Abdullah, 14, 55, 56 stagnation, political. See political Saudi Arabia stagnation dissonance in, 26–27 Sunni Muslim Brothers, 84 economic pressure in, 16 Sunni organizations, 70 elected municipal councils in, 26 Supreme Coordination Council of the generational transition in, 18 Yemeni Opposition, 58 lack of political parties in, 7 Syria managed reform in, 19, 26–27 Baath Party in, 28 social issues in, 27 generational transition in, 17, 33, 39 unemployment in, 26 leadership of, 14 Schmitter, Philippe C., 32–33 secular parties. See also liberal and leftist al-Tajamu’ (Unionist) Party, 50, 51 parties al-Tawhid wal Islah, 76 ambiguity of, 43 Tunisia crisis/weaknesses of, 41–45, 49, 50–52, economic transformation in, 27 102–104 educational reform in, 35 in Egypt, 48–55 managed reform in, 19

Pluralism6x9 rev2.indd 114 6/19/09 4:50:33 PM INDEX 115

Ubad, Ali Saleh, 57 “white revolution” (Iran), 18 umma, 70 women unemployment in Bahrain, 101 economic modernization and, 35 in Kuwait, 36, 60 in Saudi Arabia, 26 Muslim Brotherhood and, 87 United Arab Emirates organizations of, 10 economic transformation in, 27 in Saudi Arabia, 26 managed reform in, 19 United States Yemen Bahrain and, 22 civil war (1994), 29, 55 pressure on regimes for reform, 15–16, generational transition in, 33 32, 37, 39 Islamist participation in, 85–86 USFP (Socialist Union of Popular managed reform in, 20, 28–30 Forces), 34, 46–48 multiparty parliamentary elections in, 55 voter participation, 9, 98 opposition forces in, 28–30, 44 political parties in, 28 al-Wafd Party, 50, 51–52, 79 political unrest in, 106 al-Wefaq, 21, 84 reunification of, 28–29 Western governments secular-Islamist collaboration in, 5 policy choices, concerning Arab world, secular parties in, 55–59 7–8 Yemen Arab Republic, 28–29, 55 pressure on regimes for reform, 15–16, Yemeni Islah Party (YIP), 55, 56, 58 32, 37, 39 Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), 55–58 Youssoufi, Abdul Rahman, 47

Pluralism6x9 rev2.indd 115 6/19/09 4:50:33 PM Pluralism6x9 rev2.indd 116 6/19/09 4:50:33 PM CONTRIBUTORS

Michele Dunne is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment and editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin. She is an expert on Arab politics and U.S. policy. Formerly a specialist at the State Department and White House on Middle East affairs, she is also an adjunct professor of Arab studies at Georgetown University. Dunne’s research interests include political, economic, and social reform in the region and U.S. policy toward the Middle East and the Muslim world. Her recent publications include “The Baby, the Bathwater, and the Freedom Agenda in the Middle East” (Washington Quarterly, January 2009) and “A Post-Pharaonic Egypt?” (American Interest, September/October 2008). Dunne holds a Ph.D. in Arabic language and linguistics from Georgetown University.

Amr Hamzawy is a distinguished Egyptian political scientist who previously taught at Cairo University and the Free University of Berlin and is currently a senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. Hamzawy has a deep knowledge of Middle East politics and specific expertise on the reform process in the region. His research interests include the changing dynamics of political participation in the Arab world and the role of Islamist movements in Arab politics. His most recent book, Human Rights in the Arab World: Independent Voices, co-edited with Anthony Chase, was published in

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2006. Hamzawy regularly contributes articles in Arabic to various academic journals. He also writes a bi-monthly op-ed for the leading Arab daily al- Hayat and a monthly commentary for the Egyptian independent daily al- Masry al Youm.

Marina Ottaway is the director of the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment. She works on issues of political transformation in the Middle East and of Gulf security. She has also written on political reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and African countries. She is a senior associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Program, a research endeavor that analyzes the state of democracy around the world and the efforts by the Unit- ed States and other countries to promote democracy. Before joining the En- dowment, Ottaway carried out research in Africa and in the Middle East for many years and taught at the University of Addis Ababa, the University of Zambia, the American University in Cairo, and the University of the Witwa- tersrand in South Africa. Her extensive research experience is reflected in her publications, which include nine authored books and five edited ones. Her most recent book, Beyond the Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World (edited with Julia Choucair-Vizoso), was published in January 2008.

Pluralism6x9 rev2.indd 118 6/19/09 4:50:33 PM Carnegie Endowment for International Peace The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States. Founded in 1910, Carnegie is nonpartisan and dedicated to achieving practical results. Through research, publishing, convening and, on occasion, creating new institutions and international networks, Endowment associates shape fresh policy approaches. Their interests span geographic regions and the relations among governments, business, international organizations, and civil society, focusing on the economic, political, and technological forces driving global change. Building on the successful establishment of the Carnegie Moscow Center, the Endowment has added operations in Beijing, Beirut, and Brussels to its existing offices in Washington and Moscow, pioneering the idea that a think tank whose mission is to contribute to global security, stability, and prosper- ity requires a permanent international presence and a multinational outlook at the core of its operations.

Officers Jessica T. Mathews, President Paul Balaran, Executive Vice President and Secretary Thomas Carothers, Vice President for Studies Kathleen R. Gerard, Vice President for External Relations Douglas H. Paal, Vice President for Studies George Perkovich, Vice President for Studies Peter Reid, Vice President for Communications

Board of Trustees Richard Giordano, Chairman Jamie Gorelick Stephen R. Lewis, Jr., Vice Chairman James A. Leach Kofi A. Annan Robert Legvold Bill Bradley Jessica T. Mathews Richard A. Debs Zanny Minton Beddoes William H. Donaldson Sunil Bharti Mittal Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. W. Taylor Reveley III Harvey V. Fineberg J. Stapleton Roy Donald V. Fites Vanessa Ruiz James C. Gaither Aso O. Tavitian William W. George Shirley M. Tilghman

Pluralism6x9 rev2.indd 119 6/19/09 4:50:33 PM Pluralism6x9 rev2.indd 120 6/19/09 4:50:33 PM Getting to Pluralism: luralism in the Arab world has not yet matured into functional democratic politics. While ruling establishments, Islamist movements, Pand secular parties have introduced a much greater degree of pluralism into Arab societies, the imbalance of power and interdependence among these actors limits both the degree of political diversity and its effectiveness at bringing about reforms. The Arab world is likely to grapple with political apathy, low voter turnout, dwindling membership in registered parties, and shrinking constituencies for the foreseeable future. Even the Islamists, who demonstrated great ability to organize and gain followers in the past, have begun showing signs of decreasing popularity. Political Actors in the Arab World

Amr Hamzawy is a senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, Lebanon. Ottaway • Hamzawy

Marina Ottaway Amr Hamzawy Editors