Managing Foreign Assistance in a CBRN Emergency The U.S. Government Response to Japan’s “Triple Disaster”
By Suzanne Basalla, esponding to a major disaster is invariably time-critical, complex, and difficult. Supporting a foreign government engaged in a disaster response adds an additional William Berger, and layer of logistical, linguistic, cultural, and organizational challenges. The tsunami caused by the March 11, 2011, earthquake in Japan killed more than 19,000 people C. Spencer Abbot R and destroyed coastal settlements along a massive swath of Japan’s eastern coast. Responding to a natural disaster of such magnitude would prove a monumental task for any country. Japan, through its extensive community level training and significant investment in disaster preparedness, is as experienced and capable as any nation in coping with nature’s hazards. However, as the grave situ- ation at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant unfolded in the days following the tsunami, the Japanese government confronted a crisis of unprecedented and daunting complexity.
Suzanne Basalla is Senior Advisor to U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos. William Berger is a Principal Regional Advisor in the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development and headed the Disaster Assistance Response Team in Japan. Commander C. Spencer Abbot, USN, served at U.S. Embassy Tokyo as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. U.S. Marine Corps (Brennan O’Lowney) U.S. Marine Corps (Brennan
Commanding generals of III Marine Expeditionary Force and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force discuss progress of disaster relief mission at Uranohama Port
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 25 Forum | Managing Foreign Assistance in a CBRN Emergency
To understand the threats to Japan The U.S. Government Approach to provides a standardized approach to manag- posed by the cascading sequence of break- Disaster Assistance ing on-scene activities, with staffing support downs at the plant, and to undertake the The U.S. Government possesses a concentrated in five central areas: command, actions required to halt the disaster’s pro- well-developed and proven system for operations, planning, logistics, and finance/ gression, the Japanese government had to responding to natural disasters abroad, with administration.4 The ICS organizational knit together information, assessments, and the U.S. Agency for International Develop- structure is not unlike the staffing model capabilities from a wide array of government ment (USAID) and its Office of U.S. Foreign used by the U.S. military and is designed to and private sector actors, many of whom do Disaster Assistance (OFDA) playing the be put in place rapidly when required, as well not normally work together. To support Japan lead role. The Foreign Assistance Act of as to integrate a broad spectrum of outside in its efforts to respond to the complex and 1961 created USAID and delegated disaster agencies and organizations. The Department rapidly unfolding crisis, the U.S. Government assistance authority to the USAID adminis- of Homeland Security has incorporated the similarly required disparate agencies that do trator. Yet OFDA’s predecessor office was not ICS construct under NIMS as the founda- not often interact to quickly establish a close, created until 1964–1965 after clear failures in tional structure used in its National Response collaborative working relationship in the interagency coordination during a disaster Framework (NRF), the primary document midst of an emergency. response in Macedonia drove congressional guiding U.S. domestic disaster response plan- This first large-scale U.S. response to pressure for a more robust coordinative ning and execution. The NRF seeks to provide a complex disaster including a chemical, structure. Consideration was given within “scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) Congress at the time to assigning the lead structures” for use in responses ranging from element required a number of organizational adaptations over the course of the crisis. The U.S. Government has established detailed U.S. officials engaged in the response within Japan found that procedures for responding to such incidents existing guidance was vague and undefined with respect to under the rubric of Foreign Consequence interagency organizational processes and structures Management (FCM). Yet in managing the situation, U.S. officials engaged in the response within Japan found that exist- role to the Department of Defense (DOD); those at the local level “to large-scale terrorist ing guidance was vague and undefined however, by assigning the role of lead Federal attacks or catastrophic natural disasters.”5 with respect to interagency organizational agency in an international disaster response The DART team model used by OFDA processes and structures needed to absorb to USAID and OFDA, the United States has represents a similar organizational logic additional personnel sent forward and to maintained a primarily civilian face for its distilled over time through lessons learned execute the foreign assistance aspect of disaster assistance efforts and has provided during DART-led responses to many disasters the FCM function. The government of the a mechanism for coordination of DOD and abroad. The organizational commonality affected state has primary responsibility for other governmental and nongovernmental between the U.S. systems for domestic and responding to CBRN events within its ter- actors involved in disaster relief.2 Given the international disaster response has proved ritory. Some indeterminacy exists, however, wide array of actors involved in a disaster useful, as several recent major disasters within the U.S. Government as to the lead response—a number that only continues to have led the U.S Government to draw on agency role during a foreign assistance effort grow in present day emergencies—effective significant domestic disaster response capac- in response to a CBRN emergency.1 Within disaster relief coordination poses a constant ity to augment response efforts overseas. For the affected country, responsibility falls to challenge for OFDA and for the humanitarian example, Federal Emergency Management the Chief of Mission, in this case U.S. Ambas- relief community, especially when significant Agency (FEMA) Administrator Craig Fugate sador to Japan John Roos, to coordinate the numbers of military or other Federal Govern- traveled with USAID Administrator Rajiv activities of the various agencies involved in ment personnel are involved. Shah to Port-au-Prince soon after the January the disaster response. Over time, both the OFDA drew on the very successful 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and FEMA person- Japanese and the U.S. governments’ organiza- “incident management system” concept devel- nel were deployed to the U.S. Embassy in Port- tional mechanisms evolved in response to the oped by the U.S. Forest Service to create its au-Prince to work alongside colleagues from complex demands of supporting the Japanese Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) OFDA who led the response under a DART government through its management of the model, through which OFDA organizes structure. The DART also coordinated the nuclear emergency. The lessons of the crisis responses to the most serious disasters abroad. activities of several Department of Health and response warrant review and consideration, Domestically, the Department of Homeland Human Services Disaster Medical Assistance as future responses to a natural or manmade Security’s National Incident Management Teams that were deployed to Haiti, but pri- disaster abroad that include a CBRN System (NIMS) provides a well-understood marily focuses on domestic disaster response.6 aspect—whether an epidemic; an attack with organizational structure that readily incor- DARTs are often led by OFDA regional a radiological dispersal device, or “dirty porates contributions from external actors, is advisors who live and work in their areas of bomb”; or a terrorist attack with a biological tailored in size to the situation at hand, and responsibility, and are thus familiar with the agent—would also necessitate rapid integra- can be replicated at the local, state, or national geography, governments, and issues that affect tion of disparate but vital capabilities from level.3 A key mechanism within NIMS is the disaster responses in those regions. Richard both inside and outside government. Incident Command System (ICS), which Stuart Olson, in studying the OFDA DART
26 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BASALLA, BERGER, and ABBOT system, noted that “One of the singular advan- the March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake to include representatives from the NRC in tages of deploying a DART is that it automati- represents the largest cooperative military the original composition of the DART. This cally clarifies who is in charge, which avoids the undertaking in the history of the U.S.-Japan decision ensured that U.S. nuclear power usual problem of leadership and reporting con- alliance. To confront the crisis, the Japan Self- expertise, and reachback to U.S.-based col- fusion when multiple [U.S.] agencies go into Defense Forces (JSDF) mobilized more than leagues, was available from the early days of the field. This clarity even extends to the U.S. 100,000 personnel, establishing the first joint the unfolding crisis. The ability to rapidly military when [it is] involved in a response.”7 task force in its history and calling up reserve fund and support interagency colleagues from Substantial progress has been made over the forces to active duty for the first time. More relevant agencies is one of the key advantages past decade in clarifying and systematizing than 24,000 U.S. troops supported Japan’s of the DART construct, and the short-notice coordination between USAID and DOD in disaster response through Operation Tomo- deployment of these experts reflects the particular. USAID development advisors and dachi, working closely with USAID, the U.S. value of close interagency consultation and OFDA humanitarian assistance advisors have Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the information-sharing in the immediate wake been stationed in each of the DOD geographic U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and a host of a major disaster. combatant commands, and an Office of Mili- of other U.S. Government agencies. Indeed, OFDA maintains agreements with tary Affairs (now the Office of Civilian-Mili- the response to the March 11 “triple disaster” Fairfax County (Virginia) and Los Angeles tary Cooperation) was created within USAID represented an unprecedented whole-of- County (California) to provide rapidly in 2005. While occurring in very different con- government effort by both Japan and the deployable Urban Search-and-Rescue (USAR) texts, both the 2010 U.S. disaster response in United States. teams. On March 13, USAR teams arrived Haiti and the 2011 response in Japan involved Immediately after receiving reports of in Japan aboard a commercial aircraft char- substantial numbers of military personnel, the massive damage and loss of life caused by tered by OFDA, and the equipment cache placing a premium on both interagency and the tsunami, USAID mobilized and deployed arrived via U.S. Air Force C-17s, pursuant to multinational coordination. a DART to coordinate U.S. assistance to the a formal USAID request for DOD support. Japanese government. USAID Administrator With Misawa Air Base providing invaluable The Initial Response to Japan’s Shah, after assessing reports from the region logistics, mapping, and other support, these Humanitarian Crisis in consultation with senior officials from USAR teams focused their efforts on the The collaborative effort between across the U.S. Government, made a timely areas of Ofunato and Kamaishi on the heavily Japan and the United States in the wake of decision, within 24 hours of the earthquake, damaged Iwate coast. The DART quickly U.S. Air Force (Shane A. Cuomo) U.S. Air Force
U.S. military and Japanese officials discuss deployment of water pumping station for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant during Operation Tomodachi
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 27 Forum | Managing Foreign Assistance in a CBRN Emergency assigned a humanitarian assistance advisor Because the Japanese government disaster environment. Military officers on to the military at the headquarters of U.S. organizes its disaster relief efforts at the pre- both sides who could work in both Japanese Forces–Japan (USFJ) at Yokota Air Base to fectural level—roughly analogous to that of and English were especially valuable to the assist with civil-military coordination and the a U.S. state—it does not maintain a national disaster response effort and in high demand vetting of requests for U.S. military assistance civilian agency specifically focused on disaster to facilitate communication and coordination received from the Japanese government. relief, as FEMA does in the United States. The at all levels, from boots-on-the-ground roles OFDA uses a system called the Mission JSDF thus plays an especially important role to policy-level coordination in Tokyo. These Tasking Matrix (MITAM) to receive, assess, in large-scale disaster relief within Japan. As included foreign area officers in various validate, and prioritize requests for military such, the close working relationship and long U.S. commands within Japan, officers with assistance during a disaster. This system history of combined exercises between the language training stationed at the Embassy, has been successfully used to facilitate civil- U.S. and Japanese militaries proved extremely as well as others, such as officers enrolled in military coordination in numerous disaster valuable throughout the course of Operation foreign war college and exchange billets with response efforts, and the MITAM system is Tomodachi and in the disaster response more the JSDF. A large number of outside augmentees from a variety of organizations joined perma- nently stationed USFJ personnel. Augmenta- tion of existing U.S. military capacity in Japan included the deployment of a joint task force led by Admiral Patrick Walsh, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Admiral Walsh served
U.S. Navy (Matthew M. Bradley) during his forward deployment to Japan as overall joint task force commander at the augmented headquarters and led what was designated the Joint Support Force (JSF). Command of the JSF was then passed to Lieu- tenant General Burton Field, USAF, the USFJ commander. The military’s joint task force construct is a key mechanism through which a staff can be built or augmented in response to the needs of a particular situation and represents a well-understood and frequently exercised process that can quickly absorb and channel the activities of supplementary per- sonnel arriving during a contingency or crisis. Marine Corps CBRN specialists remove This process was key to enhancing USFJ’s radioactive contamination from Army generator capacity to cope with the massive demands of during Operation Tomodachi executing Operation Tomodachi, coordinating with other U.S. agencies, and supporting the thoroughly briefed to U.S. military partici- broadly. Through Operation Tomodachi, the JSDF in their crisis response efforts. pants in the Joint Humanitarian Operations U.S. military delivered approximately 189 Course taught by OFDA personnel. During tons of food, 87 tons of relief materials, and Confronting the Nuclear Emergency the Operation Tomodachi relief effort, USFJ 2 million gallons of potable water to support U.S. Embassy Tokyo and civilian U.S. successfully used a related process named the Japan’s relief efforts. Government agencies involved in the disaster Joint Requirements Review Board to assess After consultations with the Japanese response faced similar challenges and the requests brought forward by the MITAM government, U.S. forces cleared the debris- need for additional staff and resources as the system and to determine whether those covered runway at Sendai Airport sufficiently severity of the crisis became clear. As DART requests could be supported based on the to allow a C-130 aircraft to land on March 16, personnel were arriving to carry out the U.S. joint task force commander’s priorities and only 5 days after the tsunami. The opening humanitarian response in the days following the resources available. USFJ also positioned of the airport allowed the Japanese govern- the earthquake and tsunami, the situation Bilateral Crisis Action Teams with the ment and relief agencies to fly massive at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Japanese government at the Japanese joint quantities of supplies into the area. The rapid became a prime focus of U.S. officials as they task force headquarters in Sendai and at the opening of the airport was accomplished by sought to support the Japanese government Ministry of Defense headquarters in Ichigaya, hard-working men and women of the U.S. and safeguard the well-being of the large where the USFJ deputy was stationed. USFJ military and made possible by close com- community of American citizens living and also hosted a JSDF general officer and numer- munication and cooperation between U.S. working in Japan. ous other JSDF officers at USFJ headquarters commanders and the JSDF. Communication The NRC personnel who initially at Yokota Air Base. is of paramount importance in a post- deployed with the DART team were soon
28 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BASALLA, BERGER, and ABBOT augmented by senior NRC management and fisheries management during the Deepwater Japanese government inquiries regarding additional NRC staff. The NRC team set its Horizon oil spill crisis to help inform officials potential U.S. assistance. A government in base of operations within the Embassy and engaged in managing the crisis in Japan. the throes of managing such a complex crisis worked closely with senior Embassy staff, The U.S. Civilian Response Corps deployed has limited capacity for addressing requests USFJ, and officials from other agencies who personnel to Embassy Tokyo via the USAID for information and other inquiries amid the arrived to assist the response effort. The Office of Civilian Response to augment civil- many other activities involved in managing DOE augmented the Energy Attaché’s office ian capacity in support of the response effort. the crisis. Recognizing the large number of in the Embassy with officials from the DOE Ultimately, some 145 additional person- information channels between the U.S. and National Nuclear Security Administration nel arrived at U.S. Embassy Tokyo to augment Japanese governments, the Japanese govern- and other DOE personnel to advise on the the 270 direct-hire personnel normally sta- ment, in consultation with U.S. officials, response to radiological contamination, tioned there. This number does not include established an effective mechanism for the status of the accident as it progressed, the many U.S. military augmentees who were centralizing intergovernmental dialogue and subsequent stabilization and cleanup assigned to USFJ headquarters in Yokota and under the oversight of Goshi Hosono, then activities. DOE soon partnered with U.S. other locations throughout Japan and the special advisor to Prime Minister Naoto Pacific Command (USPACOM) and USFJ to undertake airborne measurements of ground social media proved an especially useful tool for engaging with deposition of radioactive elements and shared the results of those assessments with the the community of U.S. citizens in Japan Japanese government. This capacity was later transferred to the Japanese government, and numerous U.S. officials who visited Japan for Kan, and later designated the minister in the measuring equipment was then flown on shorter periods for meetings with Japanese charge of managing the nuclear crisis. This aircraft operated by the JSDF. officials and Embassy colleagues. Thus, the mechanism, formally known as the Joint One of the most critical challenges faced U.S. Ambassador and U.S. officials support- Crisis Management Coordination Group, by Ambassador Roos and Embassy staff was ing the Japanese government faced two key but generally referred to by U.S. officials communicating with the substantial com- challenges: to structure and facilitate dialogue as the “Hosono Process,” structured and munity of U.S. citizens in Japan regarding with the Japanese government through the enhanced communication between the two the rapidly evolving emergency at the nuclear course of the disaster response, and to effec- governments on issues related to the crisis, plant. Ultimately, social media proved an tively organize and manage the additional particularly regarding U.S. support to the especially useful tool for engaging with the U.S. civilian personnel arriving in support of Japanese government. Furthermore, the community of U.S. citizens in Japan, and the the response effort. focused dialogue at the Hosono Process Embassy Public Affairs staff used Twitter, meetings spurred interagency coordina- YouTube, and Facebook to provide updates on Structuring Bilateral Dialogue tion on both sides. On the U.S. side, a need the situation and to distribute information on A broad array of information channels, became increasingly apparent as the crisis response measures, such as recommendations often directly from offices in Washington, continued into April for an interagency orga- on protective measures including evacuation DC, to Japanese counterparts and vice versa, nization internal to the Embassy, specifically zones around the plant. presented a challenge to those on the ground focused on supporting U.S. engagement in One of the core challenges in manag- in Japan seeking to grasp the breadth of U.S. the Hosono Process, and capable of absorb- ing a CBRN emergency is to understand and Government activities associated with the ing and integrating the efforts of additional acknowledge the uncertainty and fear that unfolding crisis. In contrast to the longstand- personnel sent to the Embassy from various arises among potentially affected citizens and ing communication paths between USFJ and agencies in response to the crisis. to address public concerns through timely the Ministry of Defense/JSDF, the ad hoc The DART served this role in part and transparent communication. A risk dialogues between the many other U.S. agen- through the end of April, as the NRC repre- communication expert from the Centers for cies involved and relevant Japanese ministries sentatives were themselves members of the Disease Control, along with subject matter reflected the intensity and risk presented by DART, and the DART coordinated closely experts from multiple agencies, engaged the crisis, the sheer number of agencies and with the Embassy’s Emergency Action Com- directly with the community of U.S. citizens actors involved within both governments, and mittee, the Joint Support Force, and other in several forums to answer questions and the dauntingly complex nature of the chal- organizations involved in supporting the help explain the practical effects of some of lenges being faced. The Japanese and U.S. gov- Japanese government. The DART concept is the complex technical issues associated with ernments both grappled with the herculean a well-honed method for deploying civilian the crisis. Visiting experts from the Food and task of managing information flows between capacity to a foreign country to assist local Drug Administration helped assess the effects agencies and offices inside and outside of gov- crisis-affected citizens, typically basing opera- of the radiological release on the food chain, a ernment, many of whom do not often interact tions in the U.S. Embassy, and coordinating radiation oncologist from the National Cancer under normal circumstances.8 U.S. Government relief efforts with the host Institute provided expert views on potential The conversations occurring between country government under the authority of health effects on the population, and officials U.S. and Japanese government agencies the U.S. Chief of Mission. Yet while the mili- from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric frequently involved U.S. requests for infor- tary joint task force construct serves to orga- Administration drew lessons learned from mation on the evolving situation and the nize and manage personnel and resources in ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 29 Forum | Managing Foreign Assistance in a CBRN Emergency U.S. Marine Corps (Vernon T. Meekins) T. U.S. Marine Corps (Vernon
Members of USAID and Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue team meet in Ofunato, Japan, after earthquake and tsunami support of a military contingency operation, engagement in the Hosono Process. The BACC Secretariat and U.S. Embassy. The BACC no analogous coordination mechanism exists included representatives from OFDA and all of tasking matrix essentially applied to bilat- to absorb and structure civilian personnel the relevant Embassy offices, as well as other eral coordination of nuclear-related foreign sent to a U.S. Embassy to support crisis man- stakeholder organizations such as the NRC, assistance the proven MITAM system used agement in the case of a CBRN emergency DOE, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, by the DART for civil-military coordination, that affects Americans abroad and/or has USPACOM, and USFJ. The BACC reached providing a single tool for listing all requests domestic impacts.9 back to parent agencies in Washington as for U.S. assistance, tracking progress toward well as to the private sector through the U.S. their accomplishment, and recording the U.S. Organizing for Interagency Department of Commerce’s Foreign Com- and Japanese personnel responsible for vetting Collaboration mercial Service. NRC also facilitated technical and responding to the requests. As the humanitarian needs in the region dialogue with the Institute of Nuclear Power Using the shared matrix, members of the affected by the tsunami became less acute Operators on behalf of the BACC. BACC team were able to interact effectively toward the latter part of April, the DART The BACC received requests for assis- with Japanese counterparts in a working-level assessed that an appropriate time had been tance from the Japanese government via the support group that was established to inform reached to stand down its humanitarian Hosono Process at multiple venues: in higher and implement decisions reached through response function. Yet because of the ongoing level meetings, at action officer–level working the Hosono Process. Formal requests for need for support and bilateral dialogue on groups chaired by the Japanese Cabinet material assistance were categorized as to matters relating to the nuclear emergency, a fol- Secretariat, and in a radiological monitoring their priority, and requests for information low-on body was needed to help bring together subworking group hosted by the Japanese and technical assistance were included in the various stakeholders involved in providing Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, a separate section. As requests were either support to the Japanese government in the Science, and Technology. Each of these meet- completed or withdrawn, they were moved to consequence management sphere. In coopera- ings involved representatives from numerous the end of the BACC matrix. The matrix was tion with DART leadership, and in consulta- Japanese and U.S. organizations involved in exchanged between the U.S. and the Japanese tion with involved offices in Washington, DC, supporting the crisis response. Assistance prior to Hosono Process meetings, with addi- Ambassador Roos convened an organizational requests were added to a tracking matrix that tions and modifications made collaboratively mechanism entitled the Bilateral Assistance was developed by the DART and managed in advance. This collaborative system proved Coordination Cell (BACC) to support U.S. bilaterally between the Japanese Cabinet extremely useful in enabling timely and
30 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BASALLA, BERGER, and ABBOT efficient responses to requests for assistance in a complex disaster response, an approach 5 Department of Homeland Security, “National by the Japanese government, created a single, that may also prove useful in the unfortunate Reponse Framework,” available at