Managing Foreign Assistance in a CBRN Emergency The U.S. Government Response to Japan’s “Triple Disaster” By SUZANNE BASALLA, esponding to a major disaster is invariably time-critical, complex, and difficult. Supporting a foreign government engaged in a disaster response adds an additional WILLIAM BERGER, and layer of logistical, linguistic, cultural, and organizational challenges. The tsunami caused by the March 11, 2011, earthquake in Japan killed more than 19,000 people C. SPENCER ABBOT R and destroyed coastal settlements along a massive swath of Japan’s eastern coast. Responding to a natural disaster of such magnitude would prove a monumental task for any country. Japan, through its extensive community level training and significant investment in disaster preparedness, is as experienced and capable as any nation in coping with nature’s hazards. However, as the grave situ- ation at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant unfolded in the days following the tsunami, the Japanese government confronted a crisis of unprecedented and daunting complexity. Suzanne Basalla is Senior Advisor to U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos. William Berger is a Principal Regional Advisor in the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development and headed the Disaster Assistance Response Team in Japan. Commander C. Spencer Abbot, USN, served at U.S. Embassy Tokyo as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. U.S. Marine Corps (Brennan O’Lowney) U.S. Marine Corps (Brennan Commanding generals of III Marine Expeditionary Force and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force discuss progress of disaster relief mission at Uranohama Port ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 25 FORUM | Managing Foreign Assistance in a CBRN Emergency To understand the threats to Japan The U.S. Government Approach to provides a standardized approach to manag- posed by the cascading sequence of break- Disaster Assistance ing on-scene activities, with staffing support downs at the plant, and to undertake the The U.S. Government possesses a concentrated in five central areas: command, actions required to halt the disaster’s pro- well-developed and proven system for operations, planning, logistics, and finance/ gression, the Japanese government had to responding to natural disasters abroad, with administration.4 The ICS organizational knit together information, assessments, and the U.S. Agency for International Develop- structure is not unlike the staffing model capabilities from a wide array of government ment (USAID) and its Office of U.S. Foreign used by the U.S. military and is designed to and private sector actors, many of whom do Disaster Assistance (OFDA) playing the be put in place rapidly when required, as well not normally work together. To support Japan lead role. The Foreign Assistance Act of as to integrate a broad spectrum of outside in its efforts to respond to the complex and 1961 created USAID and delegated disaster agencies and organizations. The Department rapidly unfolding crisis, the U.S. Government assistance authority to the USAID adminis- of Homeland Security has incorporated the similarly required disparate agencies that do trator. Yet OFDA’s predecessor office was not ICS construct under NIMS as the founda- not often interact to quickly establish a close, created until 1964–1965 after clear failures in tional structure used in its National Response collaborative working relationship in the interagency coordination during a disaster Framework (NRF), the primary document midst of an emergency. response in Macedonia drove congressional guiding U.S. domestic disaster response plan- This first large-scale U.S. response to pressure for a more robust coordinative ning and execution. The NRF seeks to provide a complex disaster including a chemical, structure. Consideration was given within “scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) Congress at the time to assigning the lead structures” for use in responses ranging from element required a number of organizational adaptations over the course of the crisis. The U.S. Government has established detailed U.S. officials engaged in the response within Japan found that procedures for responding to such incidents existing guidance was vague and undefined with respect to under the rubric of Foreign Consequence interagency organizational processes and structures Management (FCM). Yet in managing the situation, U.S. officials engaged in the response within Japan found that exist- role to the Department of Defense (DOD); those at the local level “to large-scale terrorist ing guidance was vague and undefined however, by assigning the role of lead Federal attacks or catastrophic natural disasters.”5 with respect to interagency organizational agency in an international disaster response The DART team model used by OFDA processes and structures needed to absorb to USAID and OFDA, the United States has represents a similar organizational logic additional personnel sent forward and to maintained a primarily civilian face for its distilled over time through lessons learned execute the foreign assistance aspect of disaster assistance efforts and has provided during DART-led responses to many disasters the FCM function. The government of the a mechanism for coordination of DOD and abroad. The organizational commonality affected state has primary responsibility for other governmental and nongovernmental between the U.S. systems for domestic and responding to CBRN events within its ter- actors involved in disaster relief.2 Given the international disaster response has proved ritory. Some indeterminacy exists, however, wide array of actors involved in a disaster useful, as several recent major disasters within the U.S. Government as to the lead response—a number that only continues to have led the U.S Government to draw on agency role during a foreign assistance effort grow in present day emergencies—effective significant domestic disaster response capac- in response to a CBRN emergency.1 Within disaster relief coordination poses a constant ity to augment response efforts overseas. For the affected country, responsibility falls to challenge for OFDA and for the humanitarian example, Federal Emergency Management the Chief of Mission, in this case U.S. Ambas- relief community, especially when significant Agency (FEMA) Administrator Craig Fugate sador to Japan John Roos, to coordinate the numbers of military or other Federal Govern- traveled with USAID Administrator Rajiv activities of the various agencies involved in ment personnel are involved. Shah to Port-au-Prince soon after the January the disaster response. Over time, both the OFDA drew on the very successful 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and FEMA person- Japanese and the U.S. governments’ organiza- “incident management system” concept devel- nel were deployed to the U.S. Embassy in Port- tional mechanisms evolved in response to the oped by the U.S. Forest Service to create its au-Prince to work alongside colleagues from complex demands of supporting the Japanese Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) OFDA who led the response under a DART government through its management of the model, through which OFDA organizes structure. The DART also coordinated the nuclear emergency. The lessons of the crisis responses to the most serious disasters abroad. activities of several Department of Health and response warrant review and consideration, Domestically, the Department of Homeland Human Services Disaster Medical Assistance as future responses to a natural or manmade Security’s National Incident Management Teams that were deployed to Haiti, but pri- disaster abroad that include a CBRN System (NIMS) provides a well-understood marily focuses on domestic disaster response.6 aspect—whether an epidemic; an attack with organizational structure that readily incor- DARTs are often led by OFDA regional a radiological dispersal device, or “dirty porates contributions from external actors, is advisors who live and work in their areas of bomb”; or a terrorist attack with a biological tailored in size to the situation at hand, and responsibility, and are thus familiar with the agent—would also necessitate rapid integra- can be replicated at the local, state, or national geography, governments, and issues that affect tion of disparate but vital capabilities from level.3 A key mechanism within NIMS is the disaster responses in those regions. Richard both inside and outside government. Incident Command System (ICS), which Stuart Olson, in studying the OFDA DART 26 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BASALLA, BERGER, and ABBOT system, noted that “One of the singular advan- the March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake to include representatives from the NRC in tages of deploying a DART is that it automati- represents the largest cooperative military the original composition of the DART. This cally clarifies who is in charge, which avoids the undertaking in the history of the U.S.-Japan decision ensured that U.S. nuclear power usual problem of leadership and reporting con- alliance. To confront the crisis, the Japan Self- expertise, and reachback to U.S.-based col- fusion when multiple [U.S.] agencies go into Defense Forces (JSDF) mobilized more than leagues, was available from the early days of the field. This clarity even extends to the U.S. 100,000 personnel, establishing the first joint the unfolding crisis. The ability to rapidly military when [it is] involved in a response.”7