Queer but Muslim Feminist Study of the Homonationalist Discourses on Queer Migration in Belgium Found in Digital News Media

Gaya Mannaerts Promotor: Dr. Ladan Rahbari Masterproef voorgelegd tot het behalen van de graad van Master in Gender en Diversiteit Academiejaar: 2019-2020 Klassieke Masterproef, woordaantal: 21454 Deze masterproef is een examendocument dat niet werd gecorrigeerd voor eventueel vastgestelde fouten. In publicaties mag naar dit werk worden gerefereerd, mits schriftelijke toelating van de promotor(en) die met naam op de titelpagina is vermeld.

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Abstract Gaya Mannaerts, Master Gender and Diversity, Universiteit Gent

Abstract of Master’s Thesis, Submitted 12 August 2020:

Queer but Muslim: Feminist Study of the Homonationalist Discourses on Queer Migration in Belgium Found in Digital News Media

This thesis looks into the homonationalist discourse surrounding queer Muslim migrants in Belgian digital news media. It uses the War on Terror and queer studies as a conceptual background in order to execute a data analysis on three articles found on digital news media platforms. This thesis argues that the concept of homonationalism is used by right-wing parties to gain control and power, and that the West demands a disavowal of ‘Muslimness’ in order to be considered fully integrated.

KEY WORDS: homonationalism, queer migration, discourse analysis, queer studies, secularism, War on Terror, migration

Deze thesis onderzoekt het homonationalistische discours rond queer moslimmigranten in Belgische digitale nieuwsmedia. Het gebruikt de War on Terror en queer studies als een conceptuele achtergrond om een discourse analyse uit te voeren op drie artikelen op digitale nieuwsmediaplatforms. Deze thesis stelt dat het concept van homonationalisme door rechtse partijen wordt gebruikt om controle en macht te krijgen, en dat het Westen een afwijzing van ‘moslim-zijn’ eist om als volledig geïntegreerd te worden beschouwd.

SLEUTELWOORDEN: homonationalisme, queer-migratie, discoursanalyse, queer- studies, secularisme, War on Terror, migratie

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Acknowledgements Firstly, I would like to thank my parents for supporting me throughout my studies. They have always been my biggest fans, believing in me even when I didn’t. Thank you, I love you!

Secondly, I’d like to thank my friends, for letting me yell at them at every hour of the day, when this thesis became too much and I couldn’t even think about writing another page. Britt and Shauni, thank you for sticking by me, even while you were struggling through your own university career. Evelien and Lien, thank you for your patience, now I can finally go roller skating with you guys! Isi, you are the absolute best, and I adore you so much. Thank you for your kind words, your support, and everything else. I love you all.

Lastly, but certainly not in the least, I would like to thank Dr. Rahbari. Without you, this would have never been what it is now. Thank you for always replying with kindness and words of encouragement, for understanding when it was hard but also for making me want to push myself. I hope this has become something that can make you proud to have been a part of.

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Table of Contents Abstract ...... iii Acknowledgements ...... iv 1. Introduction ...... 1 2. Conceptual and Research Background ...... 5 2.1. Conceptual background ‘War on Terror’ ...... 6 2.1.1. The Hegemonic Rhetoric Used by World Leaders and Media After the Events of 9/11 ...... 6 2.1.2. Law and Policy Changes in the European Union After the Events of 9/11 ...... 8 2.1.3. The State’s Heightened Power and Surveillance Backed by ‘the Threat of Terror’ ...... 10 2.2. Conceptual Background: the Hegemonic Discourses Surrounding (Queer) Muslim Migrants in the Liberal West ...... 12 2.2.1. The Neo-Liberal Concept of ‘Coming Out’ ...... 12 2.2.2. Legal and Social Obstacles Specific to Queer Migrants in the Liberal West ...... 13 2.2.3. The Reproducement of Heteronormativity in Border and Population Control ...... 14 2.2.4. The Perceived Homophobia Within the Muslim Community and Its Link to Colonialism ...... 15 2.2.5. The Secular West’s Inability to See Agency Within Religion, Shaping the Way Muslims, Religion and Queerness are Viewed as Separate Entities ...... 17 3. Methods ...... 21 4. Data Analysis: Belgium ...... 23 4.1. Homonationalist Discourses on Queer Migration ...... 24 4.1.1. Homonationalist Discourses of Islam’s Homo- and Queerphobia in Digital News Media Used to Justify Racist Integration and Migration Policies ...... 25 4.1.2. Heteronormative Discourses in Digital News Media Surrounding the Racialized and Inquisitive Migration and Asylum Approach ...... 41 5. Conclusion ...... 48 6. Bibliography...... 51 7. Appendix ...... 56

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1. Introduction [If we wanted to be heard] we were only allowed to speak in the role of victim, or the exotic - Sam Mouissat (Merhaba)

This thesis was written during the COVID-19 crisis that broke out around the world and made Belgium go into lockdown in March of 2020. Because of the lockdown, and the subsequent closing of all – educational – facilities, this thesis ran into a couple of limitations and added difficulties. To work around these issues, it was decided to slightly adapt the methods used in this thesis and to focus on digital news media. This allowed for a research executed fully from home with online or earlier acquired source material.

While studies on Muslim identities in connection to other social factors are gaining attention, the intersection of queer and Muslim is one that is often overlooked. Most scholarship, policymaking, activism, service provision and cultural work remain centred around the idea of the heterosexual migrant and the queer citizen. As Jasbir K. Puar states, religion has become one side of irreconcilable binary between queer and the hegemonic idea of heterosexuality (Terrorist Assemblage, 2007). In other words – at least in the minds of many – you are either queer or Muslim. This rhetoric not only puts queer Muslims in an – almost – non-existent position, but it also assumes Arabs, people from the Middle East and Muslims to be monolith, a group with no individual morals.

This perceived binary of Muslim versus queer has become even more prevalent in the aftermath of the 11th of September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. The liberal discourse held after these events made for a recurring process of the construction of the Other. It became a discourse of the West versus the Middle Eastern Other, “us versus them”. The War on Terror that followed took on many forms. Not only did it change state policies and media representations surrounding that racialized Other, but it also changed the local and lived experience of the civilians both in the West and the Middle East. The racialized Other became an enemy to be feared and dealt with, a threat not only to ‘our’ Western morals, culture and/or religion, but also a security threat. As Naber says: “going to war ‘over there’ and enacting racism and immigrant exclusion ‘over here’ [became] essential components to the project of protecting national security” (The Rules of Forced Engagement, 2006). It is interesting that the invasion of these so-called terrorist countries, strengthened

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heteronormativity, both in the country of invasion, as in the West, as they both looked for ‘unity’. In one research, civilians of the invaded country pointed out that the war made patriarchy within political movements and families more apparent, for example by having women work for the war efforts, but exclude them from making actual policy changes (Naber & Zaatari, Reframing the war on terror: Feminist and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) activism in the context of the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, 2014). At the same time, the West adopted a discourse wherein terrorism got linked to sexual deviance (Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 2017). This is ironic considering that the West gets hailed as a safe haven for queer people, in comparison to the ‘barbaric, backwards’ East, but yet the West, “having experienced a castration and penetration of its capitalist masculinity, offers up narratives of emasculation as appropriate punishment for bin Laden, brown-skinned folks, and men in turbans” (Puar & Rai, Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots, 2002). Heteronormativity, as such, advocates both anti- and pro-immigration imagery and discourses.

The perceived harsh binary between queer and Muslim, and the heteronormative governance of migrants, create a unique discourse by lawmakers and the public opinion alike, spread out over various digital platforms. The main objective of this thesis is to investigate these hegemonic discourses surrounding queer Muslim migrants on digital platforms in the Belgian context. How are queer, Muslim migrants portrayed in digital media? How did this portrayal evolve in light of the terrorist attacks? Does the discourse on (social) media platforms by citizens and reporters surrounding queer Muslims affect policies? If so, how? It is important to note that this thesis will not investigate who queer migrants are, but rather how the discourse around them is formed. In trying to answer these questions, this thesis will explore the following hypotheses: there is an active and conscious designation of homophobia as a way for the White West to gain power; homonationalism in Belgium pushes White queers into disavowal of - what could be called - a ‘perverse Muslimness’; At the same time, the idea of the Gay International1 allows for White (queer) saviourism.

Throughout this thesis I will opt to use the label ‘queer’ to acknowledge that, as Luibhéid states, “all identity categories are burdened by legacies that must be interrogated, do not map neatly across time and space, and become transformed through circulation within

1 See chapter 2.2 2

specific, unequally local, regional, and transnational circuits” (Luibhéid, Queer/Migration: An Unruly Body of Scholarship, 2008). I argue that the narrow, Eurocentric LGBTQ+ narrative does not take these transformations into account. This Eurocentric LGBTQ+ narrative tends to look at sexuality – and gender – as a binary: homosexuality versus heterosexuality, and so on. Not only that, but it looks at these labels as static. The same can be said about the ‘coming out’ narrative. A narrative that it is often used as a construction of the neoliberal, linear view of the self-realized, individual, sovereign gay subject, wherein a subject goes from ‘in the closet’ and suppressed to ‘out of the closet’ and free. This coming out narrative fails to question “the usefulness of the linear coming-out binary as indicator of a successful ‘self-realization’” (El- Tayeb, 2011). According to El-Tayeb, coming out is “a decontextualized fetish around which the familiar superiority of Western individuality is built” (European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postnational Europe, 2011). Both the LGBT+ narrative and the coming out narrative (more particularly not coming out) are used to further the idea of backwardness and lack of liberation, associated with communities of colour. As Decena argues: “coming out is always partial, […] the closet is a collaborative social formation, and […] people negotiate it according to their social circumstances” (Tacit Subjects, 2008).

This thesis will first focus on a content analysis using the source material that is already there, exploring the studies on global literature in relation to queer migration. The first two chapters will help form the discourse analysis of the present case study, namely Belgian discourse surrounding queer migration on digital news platforms. The discourse analysis will look into how political parties use homonationalistic discourse to convey their message and to what audience. It will look at the tactics used, and the information given in these digital news articles in order to defend their standpoints. Lastly, a conclusion will be formed on the basis of this case study.

The source material used is drawn from a couple of study fields. Firstly, this thesis uses – mainly – American based studies on homonationalism, with Terrorist Assemblages by Jasbir K. Puar as the leading source in this topic, and Queer Muslims in Europe by Wim Peumans for a specific look at homonationalism in Belgium. Secondly, a multitude of sources from the field of queer studies were used to support this thesis’ conceptual background. Thirdly, this thesis looked into sources that discussed the War on Terror, both directly and indirectly linked to

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queer migration. Lastly, news sources from Flemish digital media were used to base this thesis’ discourse analysis on.

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2. Conceptual and Research Background To understand homonationalism, this thesis will first look into two main concepts: The War on Terror, and the hegemonic discourses surrounding (queer) Muslim migrants in the liberal West. Both of these concepts will be broken up into smaller parts in order to fully grasp their importance in relation to queer migration.

The War on Terror was chosen for its importance in the debate surrounding migration. After 9/11, the discourse surrounding migrants on digital media platforms often only focused on (the possibility of) terrorism and the potential dangers migrants could bring with them. The War on Terror also directly affected migration and asylum procedures, and – naturally – the state of the migrants’ country of origin. For the queer migrant, this meant more obstacles to get into the land of destination on the one hand, and a destabilized and sometimes more volatile country of origin on the other hand. To explain this, this thesis will go into a short historical background of the War on Terror, then it will focus on the specific rhetoric used by politicians and media, followed by a look at the specific changes in European Law concerning migrants and the effect this had on queer migrants in particular, and lastly a look at the way state power and surveillance changed after 9/11 and how this affected migrants.

The second concept this part will delve into, will deal with different hegemonic ideas and discourses in the liberal West that have shaped the digital news media and policies alike. The way the West views the queer Muslim migrant, as either a victim that needs to be saved or a non-existent entity, changes the way they are welcomed – or banned – into ‘our’ Western society. As mentioned before, the hegemonic discourse surrounding migrants perceives them on the strict binary between being queer and being Muslim. To take on this perceived binary, this thesis will use queer migration scholarship which has participated and contributed to a wide range of debate that traverses multiple fields and disciplines. It is driven by the idea that international migration and related transnational processes have transformed every facet of our social, cultural, economic and political lives in recent decades (Luibhéid, Queer/Migration: An Unruly Body of Scholarship, 2008). According to sexuality scholarship, the ‘age of migration’ has shaped and is implicated in the construction, regulation and reworking of sexual identities, communities, politics and cultures (Castles & Miller, 2013). Migration studies, meanwhile, theorizes that sexuality constitutes a “dense transfer point for relations of power”, structuring all aspects of international migration (Foucault, 1976). Queer migration

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scholarship, combining and exploring the intersection between sexuality and migration, draws from these bodies of work and has enriched them with studies from different fields such as feminist, racial, ethnic, postcolonial, public health, etc. To explain the different hegemonic ideas and discourses, this thesis will look into the neo-liberal concept of ‘coming out’; legal and social obstacles specific to queer migrants; the reproducement of heteronormativity in border and population control; the perceived homophobia within the Muslim community; and the secular West’s inability to see agency within religion.

2.1. Conceptual background ‘War on Terror’ On the 11th of September 2001, 19 terrorists hijacked four East Coast flights, crashing three of the airplanes into targets in New York and Washington, D.C., with the fourth plane slamming into a field in Pennsylvania after passengers fought back. This caused a death toll of 2,977 people, making it the deadliest attack on U.S. soil in history. This attack, led by al-Qaeda, caused then-president George W. Bush to declare a global ‘War on Terror’ a military campaign in which he called upon world leaders to join the U.S. in their battle against terrorism. In a national address he said: “Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” (President Bush Addresses the Nation, 2001), setting up an ‘us vs them’ discourse that would lead the conversation around the War on Terror for years to come.

In what follows, this thesis will link the plight of queer migrants to Bush’ discourse and the arguments brought to the table when critiquing the War on Terror and its subsequent political and lawful results. This chapter will look at the way the War on Terror works through heteropatriarchal, classist, and imperialistic discourses and practices and will try to shed light on the actual aims behind them (Naber & Zaatari, Reframing the war on terror: Feminist and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) activism in the context of the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, 2014). Reframing the War through a feminist and queer critique, opens the way for a rhetoric beyond imperialistic and nationalistic ideas.

2.1.1. The Hegemonic Rhetoric Used by World Leaders and Media After the Events of 9/11 This ‘us vs them’ rhetoric was flawed for a multitude of reasons. Firstly, it adheres to the idea that nations and their entire populations are to be held responsible for the actions of terrorists. The West has been conditioned – and was further conditioned by this rhetoric- to

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perceive the Middle East as the enemy: hostile, suspect and promoting terrorism. However, as Azar Nafisi in her article, They the People, said, the people and political thoughts there2 are just as diverse as in the West: “[Y]ou won’t believe it…but the whole country is in mourning. You should have been here for the demonstrations and candlelight vigils for America , it is all true: the tears, the long-stemmed roses the candles, […] and then of course the hoodlums attacked and started beating us, especially the young kids, and arresting them. […] The funny thing about it [,] is that those bastards felt betrayed by the love we showed ‘the imperialist Zionist Enemy.’ Ever since that night I keep asking myself, what is it that makes us in this God forsaken place to feel so orphaned and so filled with grief for what happened in a city we have never seen, except in dreams?” (They the People, 2003). One can wonder, however, if the unnuanced discourse of ‘us vs them’ lends Bush an easier audience to rally for his cause.

Secondly, this discourse was framed in terms of a moral dualism between good and bad: “Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we responded with the best of America […] we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world” (President Bush Addresses the Nation, 2001); and a distinction between civilised and barbaric, freedom and fear: “This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight […] And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom – the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time ─ now depend on us. Our nation ─ this generation ─ will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future” (President Bush Addresses the Nation, 2001).

By outlining the events of 9/11 in terms of absolute dualities, George W. Bush made it seem that ‘us’ going to war with ‘them’ was the only natural, obvious thing to do. As ‘they’ are not only differentiated and set into opposition to ‘us’ a hierarchy is imposed as well, one that places the subordinate ‘them’ outside the boundaries of what is desirable. As Solheim notes: “I view reasoning in this manner with a simplistic paired zero-sum relation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ as a blueprint for heightened difference and conflict. I view it as an attempt to unite through the logic of confrontation: either you are with ‘us’ against ‘them’, or you are with ‘them’ and thus against ‘us’” (Either You Are With Us, or You Are With the Terrorists: A Discourse Analysis of President George W. Bush’s Declared War on Terrorism , 2006). This discourse of moral dualism was furthered by the Bush administration’s claims to fight for a

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democratic Arab world: “We stand for freedom — and for the institutions and habits that make freedom work for everyone. The day when a dictator falls or yields to a democratic movement is glorious” (Rogin, 2012).

However, when a call for democracy comes from behind a loaded gun, it is less likely to be heeded. The discourse around the War on Terror has formed a variety of widely accepted ideas: the queer (and female) Arab in need of rescue by a Western hero, and a savage and barbaric culture that needs to be disciplined and civilised, through violence if need be. Meanwhile, the historical conditions that produced terrorism get ignored in favour for a ‘with us or against us’ rhetoric that limits any possibility for discussion (Naber, The Rules of Forced Engagement, 2006).

Besides Bush’ claim for the pursuit of a democratic Arab world, he persisted in his allegation of ties between Iraq and al Qaeda: “The reason I keep insisting that there was a relationship between Iraq and Saddam [Hussein] and al-Qaeda is because there was a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda” (Bush Repeats Allegation of Iraq, al-Qaeda Ties, 2004); and Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction (AP Archive, 2015). However, according to Clarke, as time passed, Americans came to question the war, not just the war on Iraq, but the War on Terror as a whole. This questioning came with the acceptance of seven damning facts: “(1) President Bush did little or nothing about terrorism before 9/11, (2) there was no Iraqi threat to the United States, (3) the Bush administration began plotting to invade Iraq early in their term, well before 9/11, (4) there is no evidence of an Iraqi hand in 9/11, or of any significant support to al Qaeda, (5) there were no weapons of mass destruction and the White House and Pentagon justified their claims about [weapons of mass destruction] by citing phony evidence from Iraqi exiles to whom they paid millions of dollars, (6) the Bush administration had no real plan to administer Iraq after the invasion, and (7) Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld ignored professional military advice and sent too few troops to Iraq to protect our forces” (Clarke, 2004).

2.1.2. Law and Policy Changes in the European Union After the Events of 9/11 The War on Terror also, both directly and indirectly, affected Europe. According to an article by Jack Donnelly, prior to the events of 9/11, European countries cooperated on terrorism policy but mostly dealt with threats domestically (Donnelly, 2005). After these events, however, European states are recognizing the importance of international intelligence

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sharing, law enforcement capacity, and judicial cooperation to combat security and terrorist threats. To replace the traditional extradition between EU members, and to heighten the basis of mutual recognition of other nations’ judicial decisions, the European arrest warrant (EAW) was implemented. However, even before it is full implementation into the European Union, a number of practical problems began to arise, “in particular in relation to the protection of individual rights and legal certainty in the European judicial space” (Alegre & Leaf, 2004). The EAW began to blur the lines between criminal behaviour and actual security threats, leading to the re-interpretation of security threats. The number of human rights abuses and restrictions on civil liberties has increased as a result. Alegre and Leaf highlight a few of these (possible) human rights abuses and restrictions on civil liberties: the risk of a breach of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, by extraditing prisoners, the standard of treatment of these prisoners cannot be assured; the possible breach of article 5 ECHR, the right to liberty, providing that “provides that anyone who is deprived of his or her liberty by arrestor detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his or her detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his or her release ordered if detention is not lawful” (Alegre & Leaf, 2004); the possible breach of article 6 ECHR, the right to a fair trial, similar to the reasoning behind the possible breach of article 3 ECHR; the breach of article 7 ECHR, because of the EAW’s removal of the principle of double criminality in relation to 32 types of offence: “The principle of double criminality states that no one should be extradited for conduct that would not be criminal in both the country making the request and in the requested country” (Alegre & Leaf, 2004); and the possible breach of article 8 ECHR, the right to family life, extradition keeping prisoners far away from their families for an extended period of time (Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too Soon? Case Study: the European Arrest Warrant, 2004).

This has also impacted and broadened the definition of terrorism. The EU Common Positions and Framework Decision on combating terrorism, passed in December 2001, stated that terrorist activity was no longer confined to extreme violence committed for political ends but also any action designed to “seriously damage a country or international organisation or an action that unduly compel[led] a government to act in a particular way” (Fekete, 2004). The link between terrorism and extreme violence was broken in this new, broad definition by

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the inclusion of all those who gave terrorism “any form of support, active or passive”. This created new crimes of association with terrorism, opening the way to detain or investigate individuals fighting in non-violent ways for ethnic self-determination.3 In turn, this lead in some states to the incorporation of the EU Common Positions and Framework Decision into domestic law, introducing emergency legislation and new anti-terrorist laws. In other states, the existing public order, criminal justice, aliens’ legislation, and extended police powers were amended. According to Fekete, “crucially, both approaches led to the creation of a shadow criminal justice system for foreign nationals, including asylum seekers, who would, in future, be denied basic civil liberties and human rights” (Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State, 2004). Countries such as France, Italy and Sweden deported foreign nationals on the basis of a suspected security risk, and the UK Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ACTSA) introduced internment without trial for foreign nationals only, twelve of whom had been incarcerated at Belmarsh and Woodhill prisons without trial for two years from 2002 until 2004 (Dyer, White, & Travis, 2004). Effectively proving Alegre and Leaf right in their fear regarding the protection of human rights.

These law and policy changes also led to direct and indirect influences on queer migration. Hungary, for example, took to rigorous psychological tests to ‘determine sexual orientation’, something the European Union condemned in 2018 after a Nigerian refugee argued it “seriously prejudiced his fundamental rights” (In blow to Hungary, EU court rejects refugee ‘gay tests’, 2018).

2.1.3. The State’s Heightened Power and Surveillance Backed by ‘the Threat of Terror’ Criminologist Janne Flyghed argues that the expansion of anti-terrorism measures has come through the depiction of “imminent danger of dramatic proportions without a shred of empirical support” (as cited in Kappeler & Schaefer, 2018). The level of danger gets concealed or overstated, while the extent and consequences of countermeasures get either exaggerated or toned down.4 The state and media alike use difficult to define buzzwords like ‘the national security’, ‘the safety of the nation’ and ‘public order and safety’ to talk about these threats,

3 See for example the labelling of ANTIFA as a terrorist group amidst the March-June 2020 Black Lives Matter protests (Tucker, 2020); or the labelling of Greenpeace as a terrorist group in the UK (Dodd & Grierson, 2020) 4 Depending on which the, what Flyghed calls, crisis consciousness that is needed for the state to defend their measures 10

using the lack of knowledge on the civilians’ part as a way to gain power over the situation. By repeatedly drawing back to events like 9/11 or the terrorist attacks in Belgium, Brussels on the 22nd of March 2016, the state plays into their own bigger political agenda of power and surveillance. The public’s fear and mistrust pave the way for their consent to increasingly intrusive surveillance and the limiting of personal freedoms. Radical lawyer Gareth Peirce describes how the politics of fear emerging around ‘national security’ takes effect: “‘National security’ has a seductive ring. It frightens off political disagreement. It frightens the population and makes it more subservient to authoritarian measures. It widens a circle of fear as the ever- expanding notion of national security perceives a nation’s interests as being capable of being directly affected by events all around the world. It creates an exaggerated degree of fear and an exaggerated degree of threat, and it is of immense importance to governments and governmental institutions which have an inherent desire to act in secrecy and to hide material from which vital national decisions are made from scrutiny” (Peirce, 2003).

Hörnqvist observes that, in this type of state, belonging to a particular community or group is, in itself, a security threat (The Birth of Public Order Policy, 2004). This opens the way to the use of coercive measure against particular groups: detention for aliens under the Terrorism Act; (low-level) police harassment around mosques; or the double standard used for Muslims going through the asylum process. Profiling has developed itself in two stages. Firstly, it concentrated on suspected ‘enemy aliens’, primarily foreign students, asylum seekers and refugees, mostly from Muslim regions around the world. The EU Common Positions on combating terrorism instructs all member states to vet all asylums to check whether they have any connection to terrorism, including ‘passive’ support of it (Fekete, 2004). Secondly, intelligence services around the EU started to profile all Muslim communities, citizen, and non-citizen alike. By seeing the Muslim, or Islam, as the de facto threat, they fail to recognize the diversity within the Islamic community. This, in return, also had an (in)direct effect on the failure to recognize queer Muslims and their simple existence.

It is mainly assumed that before the attack on Belgian soil on the 22nd of March 2016, the terrorist threat was largely underestimated, and groups like Sharia4Belgium were able to develop without any real resistance (Van Ostaeyen, 2019). However, on the 13th of December 2011 Nordine Amrani, a Belgian of Moroccan descent commit murder-suicide in a busy shopping street in Liege. This led to the death of six people, including two teenagers and a

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toddler. Although it later became clear Amrani had no ties to Islamist extremism, and instead seem to have suffered from long-standing psychological issues, his name is now synonymous for terrorist (Herman & Farhan, 2013).

This profiling has also been backed up by the secularism, historically embraced by European countries.5 Since 9/11 challenges to secularism seem to have escalated, leading to – among other things – new secularist laws being voted in (Fetzer & Soper, 2003). France and Turkey6 banned the wearing of hijabs – the traditional Islamic headscarf covering the head and hair, but not the face - in schools; many countries, such as Belgium, France and some states in Germany, banned the burqa and niqab in all public settings under counterterrorism laws (Smith, 2013). This ‘Islamophobia’, as it is coined by some, is becoming more prevalent in Europe as a whole.7

2.2. Conceptual Background: the Hegemonic Discourses Surrounding (Queer) Muslim Migrants in the Liberal West

This thesis argues that there are several discourses surrounding the topic of (queer) migrant Muslims in the Liberal West that influence both the way we look at queers outside of the West and the policies and dealings of migrants and asylum seekers arriving in the West.

2.2.1. The Neo-Liberal Concept of ‘Coming Out’ As I have mentioned before, it is important to challenge the notion of ‘coming out’ as a neo-liberal construction that plays into the idea of the route from a ‘backwards, oppressed country/situation’ to a ‘free and enlightened country/situation’, the former stereotypically associated with communities of colour (Decena, Tacit Subjects, 2008). According to Decena’s research, it is important to make a distinction between a refusal to speak about and discuss an openly lived queer life, and silence. In his study he found that coming out may be redundant, a verbal confirmation of something that is already understood or assumed (Tacit Subjects, 2008). Peumans, in his research on the lived experience of queer Muslims in Europe, discovers a similar strategy of disclosure and silence around sexuality. Coming out is a hegemonic, Western norm. It is seen as the end of the queer road, and the goal for all queer

5 And vice-versa 6 Turkey lifted the ban again in 2013 (Smith, 2013) 7 See chapter 2.2.5. for a more in-depth analysis on secularism and Islamophobia 12

people. However, according to Peumans, two tactics are important in understanding the sexual stories of non-Western queers: the use of tacit knowledge and silence as a language (Peumans, 2018). By playing with these two tactics, these queers navigate the – often difficult and treacherous – relationship between them and their kin, allowing them to negotiate their sexuality in their own terms. This locking and unlocking of the closet is a step away from the liberalist narrative that advocates for a complete disavowal of the closet and as such creates an alternative, non-hegemonic type of closet. Non-Western queers make their own type of closet by not moving away from it completely, and in fact using it to protect themselves and their relationships, going against the Western hegemonic idea of a suffocating and silencing closet. In these cases, the closet arises as a morally dynamic, fluid, dialogic and powerful tactical space where the closeted person decides who to invite in (Fisher, 2003; Moore, 2012; Peumans, 2018; Poljski, 2011). Disclosure and silence are for them not complete opposites, but instead it is better to talk about a continuum or a revolving door (Conrad & Schneider, 1980).

2.2.2. Legal and Social Obstacles Specific to Queer Migrants in the Liberal West Wim Peumans describes in his book Queer Muslim in Europe how queer asylum seekers deal with a couple of very specific obstacles, both legal and social, when arriving in Belgium. On the one hand, they struggle with their positioning in the intersectional matrix of class, race, gender, and ethnicity. On the other hand, deal with the homonormative and heteronormative moralities and ideas on subjecthood, sexuality and gender (Peumans, 2018).

Using the intersectional model by De Vries, which conceptualizes the intersections of identity in a multidimensional prism, we can argue that the queer migrant finds themselves in a particularly vulnerable position (Vries, 2014). More specifically, the queer migrant finds themselves situated in “the contradiction between the heteronormative social relations mandated for immigrants of colour by the state’s policies and the liberal state’s ideology of universal sexual freedom” (Reddy, 2005).

Throughout the asylum procedure, they are asked to ‘prove their sexuality beyond a reasonable doubt’. The asylum procedure expects a ‘true sexual identity’, one that is fixed and discoverable (Peumans, 2018). In their search for this fixed and discoverable identity, Western government deploys knowledge gained from what Massad dubbed ‘the Gay International’ (Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World, 2002). This Gay International

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is responsible for the “discourse [that] assumes prediscursively that homosexuals, gays, and lesbians are universal [emphasis added] categories that exist everywhere in the world […]” (Massad, 2002). As such, the asylum procedure expects queer migrants to not only ‘prove’ their sexuality, but to do so using Western categories and ideas. Then, the country of arrival decides whether the migrant’s claim is believable and/or whether or not this person could be safe in their own country8 and as such could be sent back. In order to have a successful asylum claim, it is often needed to generate a racist, colonial discourse of oppression to freedom or ‘free country versus backwards country’. According to Luibhéid this system of asylum, that walks the thin line between giving asylum to a very select group – so as not to threaten the dominant system – and letting people into the country of arrival – to lend credence to claims of first-world humanitarianism and democratic freedom –, “reinforces the self-congratulatory posture inherent in the geopolitics of asylum” (Luibhéid, Queer/Migration: An Unruly Body of Sholarship, 2008). As such it plays into the idea of sexual migration as movements from oppression to freedom (Peumans, 2018). Not only that, but the arrival in the country of destination is seen as the teleological, linear and ontological endpoint of their queer journey (Peumans, 2018).

2.2.3. The Reproducement of Heteronormativity in Border and Population Control It is valuable to look at how border control continues to (re)produce the national heteronormativity. While the West is being hailed as ‘free’ and ‘queer friendly’, the wider neo- colonial and neo-imperialistic processes surrounding the asylum process counter this. Emma Pérez argues that it is not a historical coincidence that “the classification of homosexual and heterosexual appeared at the same time that the United States began aggressively policing the borders between the United States and Mexico” (Queering the Borderlands: The Challenges of Excavating the Invisible and Unheard, 2003). As more Mexicans began crossing the Rio Bravo, trekking back and forth as they had done for centuries, the borders became more and more closed, only opening up when there was need for cheap laborers. This closing of the border was supported by scientific racism, fearing that the brown racial and sexual impurities would infect the supposedly pure, White race in the United States.

8 Or in the case of some countries, a safe third country 14

During modern immigration politics, neo-imperialistic countries link heteronormative families with strategies for producing cheap migrant labour; for fighting the ‘War on Terror’ through linking ‘sexual perversion’ with the enemy status and orientalism; and for building the prison industrial complex and extrajudicial detention regimes. Heteronormativity in the global south results in complicated complicities with the hegemonic power relationship, while shaping migration circuits in particular ways (Luibhéid, Queer/Migration: An Unruly Body of Scholarship, 2008).

This makes it so that the queer immigrant is dealing with a number of preconceived notions all coming together and – in some cases – standing directly opposite of each other: on the one hand, there’s the idea of the oppressive country of origin versus the free country of destination; the idea of the heterosexual migrant; the idea of the sexually perverse Other; the idea of the homophobic Muslim versus the homo-tolerant West.

2.2.4. The Perceived Homophobia Within the Muslim Community and Its Link to Colonialism It is important to look at the discourse attached to immigrant populations and communities of colour in relation to deep rooted homophobia and the disapproval of homosexuality. According to Puar, this stems from the promotion of heterosexual marriage as a safety net for immigrant families because of the economic benefits9, casting them in a more conservative and traditional light (Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 2017). The right wing relies heavily on this poor, immigrant, labour worker to sustain its hegemonic ideological base10 and reproduces the political and economic conditions of compulsory heterosexuality, making it a harbour for homophobia.

It is interesting to note that, according to Shakhsari’s article, ‘homeland’ in the Iranian exile discourse is constructed as highly heterosexual, while the exile itself flirts with queerness. According to them, “these gay flirtations construct an image of the perverted West, [while] they also create an innocent heterosexual homeland” (Shakhsari, 2012). Ironically, Puar notes that, as a rite of initiation and assimilation into U.S. heteronormative citizenship, the migrant is expected to disavow the ‘perverse queerness’. This is partly because this ‘perverse queerness’ is linked to the terrorist, a queerness both endowed upon and read

9 Both from the state and their own communities 10 E.g. family values, anti-choice, anti-gay marriage… 15

from the Muslim terrorist’s bodies (Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 2017). The queer migrant, as such, is stuck on the intersection of the brown queer body that is labelled terrorist and the terrorist who is pathologically queer. However, this does not mean a complete disavowal of queerness since, as mentioned above, the West positions itself as a sexual free space. Peumans makes a similar conclusion when he quoted an asylum worker saying that “[an asylum centre is] not Belgium but Afghanistan, Russia, Cameroon, Egypt, Congo […] all in one place” (Queer Muslims in Europe: Sexuality, Religion and Migration in Belgium, 2018). In stating that the centre is “not Belgium”, she implicitly states that Belgium, unlike the migrants’ countries of origin, is a safe and homotolerant haven for queer migrants.

Because of their being at the intersection between queer and Muslim, they are pressured to reproduce the narratives of Western sexual exceptionalism, confirming the stereotype of the liberated Muslim from the formerly repressed East. Rey Chow coins the reproducing of this stereotype as ‘coercive mimetism’, according to him, those marginal to mainstream Western culture are expected to resemble and replicate the perceptions applied to them. In other words, for migrants this means embodying the stereotype of heterosexuality, while for queers this means reproducing the stereotype of the extravagant homosexual (Sacrifice, Mimesis, and the Theorizing of Victimhood (A Speculative Essay), 2006). Morgan Holmes agrees there when she says, a person’s biological sex is a performative and technical transmitter for the cultural demands centred around sexuality (Queer Cut Bodies, 2000). This leaves little room for queer migrants to manoeuvre in, they are expected to either comply to patriotic homonationalism and a reproducement of the stereotype or reclaim the sexual perversion. They are ‘free’ to be queer, but only under the homonationalist terms laid out by the West.

This unlike the migrants’ country of origin where, according to the Western discourse, they have no freedom to be queer and thus potentially turn to the homosocial world of terrorism. Anthropologist Lionel Tiger follows that theory claiming that: “The structure of al- Qaida - an all-male enterprise, of course - appears to involve small groups of relatively young men who maintain strong bonds with each other, bonds whose intensity is dramatized and heightened by the secrecy demanded by their missions and the danger of their projects” (Tiger, 2001). Kimmel argues similarly when he says that terrorism offers the “restoration of their masculinity” and that “what is relevant is not the possible fact of [Mohammed] Atta’s

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gayness, but the shame and fear that surround homosexuality in societies that refuse to acknowledge sexual diversity” (Kimmel, 2002). This coincides with the idea that legalizing homosexuality would lower or even stop the recruitment of young men into terrorist organizations. However, in pinning all blame on the emotive state of the young recruits, they neglect the men’s possible political and economic reasoning. Not only that, but this discourse falls into the discourse of what Joseph Massad calls the ‘Gay International’, an Orientalist reading of Arab male same-sex sexuality (Massad, 2002). This designation of homophobia outside of the West produces a geopolitical mapping that produces neoliberal power relations.

Besides the reproducement of heteronormativity as a perceived safety net, it is also noteworthy to look at how the history of the Western gaze (helped) produce homosexuality as a taboo within the Middle East. While the Middle East was once the place of sin, release, and acts without consequences (Said, 1978), and Foucault’s ars erotica, it now represents a place of repression, and the place of freedom is now part of the Western identity. Scholars have identified colonization as an important moment in which the ideas surrounding non- heteronormative sexualities began to shift in the Muslim world. Peletz, for example, observes how native transgenderism and same-sex eroticism were used as a justification for ‘civilization missions’, and this making a colonial presence necessary (Gender Pluralism: Muslim Southeast Asia since Early Modern Times, 2011). Massad, as well, notes how the Euro- American cultural understandings of sexuality have been imposed in Islamic societies, introducing rigid homo-hetero binaries that were not native to the Islamic Middle East (Re- Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World, 2002).

2.2.5. The Secular West’s Inability to See Agency Within Religion, Shaping the Way Muslims, Religion and Queerness are Viewed as Separate Entities Attached to those very same neoliberal power relations, is the inability to look at agency – female agency and queer agency alike – unless it is secular. In liberal discourse, religion is always pathological, a vessel for oppression and terrorism. Secularism, on the other hand is hailed as the (only) mode for democracy. Charles Taylor asserts that all modern societies can adopt secular regimes, even Islamic regimes that do not adopt a separation of church and state (The Polysemy of the Secular, 2009). To build his argument, he describes a model that constitute a secular regime. This model involves a form of separation of Church

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and state, wherein the state cannot be officially linked to religious confessions, except in a symbolic sense, as in England or Scandinavia. Taylor borrows Rajeev Bhargava’s term ‘principled distance’ to explain that the state needs to have some kind of neutrality in the face of religion. He goes on to say that secularism involves what can be categorized as the French Revolutionary trinity: liberty, equality, and fraternity: “First: no-one must be forced in the domain of religion, or basic belief. This is what is often defined as religious liberty, including of course, the freedom not to believe. This is what is also described as the ‘free exercise’ of religion, in the terms of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Second, there must be equality between people of different faiths or basic belief; no religious outlook or (religious or areligious) ‘Weltanschauwung’ can enjoy a privileged status, let alone be adopted as the official view of the state. Third: all spiritual families must be heard, included in the ongoing process of determining what the society is about (its political identity), and how it is going to realize these goals (the exact regime of rights and privileges). This (stretching the point a little) is what corresponds to ‘fraternity’” (Taylor, The Polysemy of the Secular, 2009).

He further goes on to argue that secularism has less to do with the relation of the state and religion but instead deals with the -according to him – correct response of the democratic state to diversity. Taylor ascribes to the Rawlsian idea of ‘overlapping consensus’, which is built on the assumption that there is no universally agreed basis – secular or religious – for the political principles accepted in a modern, heterogenous society (as cited in Taylor, 1998). Taylor states, in accordance with Rawls, that the political ethic will be embedded in the understanding of the ‘good’ but argues against Rawls that background understandings and foreground political principles need not be tightly bound together. Instead, what the modern, democratic citizen needs is mutual trust, a political identity, based on certain basic principles (democracy, human rights, etc.), and their historical, linguistic, or religious traditions. Free, secular societies require a high level of commitment and participation. Citizens have to do for themselves, what despotic or authoritarian rules would otherwise do for them (Taylor, The Polysemy of the Secular, 2009). This leads to a couple of developments: the rise of the public sphere, the market principle and the emergence of citizenship on the one hand; and a community in which there are no privileged persons or events, on the other hand. As such, according to Taylor, the modern democratic state cannot do without model of secularism that features two prominent ideals: the horizontal, direct-access character of a modern society;

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and second, the grounding of this society in a secular, homogenous time (Taylor, Modes of Secularism, 1998).

A couple of doubts arise when laying out Taylor’s model of secularism. Firstly, Taylor talks about citizen’s participation as a key point of a democratic society. However, when we look at what this participation mostly entails – e.g. taxes and voting – we see that this participation tends to be either enforced by the state and/or a statistical measure of the entire population. Asad uses this point to argue that the distinctive feature of a modern society is neither compulsion (force) nor negation (self-governance as Taylor suggests) but the use of ‘self-discipline’, ‘participation’, ‘law’ and ‘economy’, as a political strategy by the ruling state (Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, 2003). Assad notes as well that there is an absence of direct reflection of the citizen in political representation. On the contrary even, the influence of pressure groups11 is far greater than the proportion of the electorate they are supposed to directly promote. Opinion polls as well, monitor the public’s opinion and enable politicians to influence and anticipate the public sentiment in time for public elections. Lastly, the mass media often cooperates with the state, mediating the public opinion.12 This all makes Assad conclude that, in crucial ways, we do not live in a direct-access society (Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, 2003). Secondly, when looking at the concept of time in Taylor’s model, we see that the reality is a lot more complex than he suggests. While he suggests a homogeneous, secular time, individuals are swayed by other temporalities, shaping their political responses, and configuring a heterogenous society.

Taylor’s model fits into Europe’s altered view on religious freedom since the War on Terror. However, according to Mahmood, it is important to problematise a nation’s secularism as “[people] concede too much in accepting at face value the claim that secularism is about the banishment of religiosity from the public domain, and they concede too little by failing to interrogate secularism’s contention that it is the most effective political solution to warding off religious strife” (Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation, 2006). Secularism, while being held up as the best way to hold off wars based on religious differences, are as such more about power than about agency or security of a nation’s people. A nation uses the rhetoric of secularism to bend religion to its own liberal rule

11 Like the oil lobby in America and the Farmers Union/Boerenbond in Belgium (Ghijs, 2015) 12 For a more in-depth analysis of the mass media, see chapter 4. 19

and gain more sovereign power in doing so. Taylor’s model on secularism assumes the mutual independence of political power and religious life. However, what this model does not hold into account, is the fact that it is the state that has the power to make decisions regarding religious practices and doctrines, not the other way around. This asymmetric power imbalance, is a clear measure of sovereign power through secularity, since the state holds the authority to define the exception (Asad, Trying to Understand French Secularism, 2006).

Asad, as well, notes that even in modern secular countries the place of religion varies. For example, while France has a highly centralized state and secular citizens, in Britain the state is linked to the Established Church and its inhabitants are largely nonreligious, in America meanwhile the population is mainly religious but the federal state is secular (Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, 2003). Using Asad’s point, we can disprove secularism’s claim to normativity. While secularism claims to be neutral to the claims of any religious tradition, national cultures end up privileging religious norms depending on the state’s hegemonic religious norms. This leads to the state compromising the liberal claim to religious neutrality. The secular, political state remakes religious subjectivities (by use of force, if necessary) to render them compliant with the liberal, secular narrative.

The Western view on religion and secularism makes the perceived binary between Muslim and queer that much stricter. Because of the West’s inability to see agency within religion, it fails to see how a queer religious person can find peace within their identity.

New laws like the hijab-ban are supposedly brought forth by European governments as the result of an aim for a more secular society, not an anti-Muslim one. European states claim that these laws have nothing to do with racism or islamophobia, but are driven by anti- terrorist and nationalistic measures. An important factor in these new laws - and in the liberal, secular narrative as a whole – is the drive towards assimilation. We see this drive not only through the hijab-ban but also through the adoption of a number of measures, such as new citizenship laws, compulsory language and civics tests, codes of conduct for the trustees of mosques, etc.

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3. Methods In order to study the validity of the hypotheses and answer the questions mentioned in the introduction, both a content analysis existing source material, and a discourse analysis of digital news media on queer migration will be used. The former will serve as a scientific starting point for the analysis of the latter.

Discourse analysts suggest that the constructive and flexible ways in which language is used, should be a central topic for research (Potter & Wetherell, 2001). It teaches how specific actors construct an argument, and how these arguments fit into wider social practices. More importantly, it can be used to show what kind of statements actors try to establish as true and self-evident by looking into what rhetorical methods they picked to communicate.

Discourse analysis can be described as the study of speech and text, with the focus on language in use (Wetherell, 2001). Discourses are an organised set of statements, with specific perspectives on the world and a tie to the relationship people have with the world around them. “Discourses not only represent the world as it is (or rather is seen to be), they are also projective, imaginaries, representing possible worlds which are different from the actual world, and tied in to projects to change the world in particular directions” (Fairclough, 2003).

It is this construction of a social reality that is central to the exploration done in this thesis. In order to research and analyse the current digital discourse around queer Muslim migrants in the news, the search engine Google was used to collect data. Considering this thesis looks into current, popular discourse, the choice for the use of this search engine was informed by the fact that Google currently owes 87,35 percent of the Search Engine market, making it the largest search engine currently available (Clement, 2020). After the decision on which search engine to use, criteria were defined; all results needed to be in either Dutch or English (in order to assure that there would be nothing lost in translation), all digital documents needed to have originated in Belgium, all forms of digital news media were included (this encompasses both traditional news website and new media news sources such as digital magazines), all digital documents needed to have been written/posted within the last five years (2015-2020). These criteria were chosen to assure the results would represent the current Belgian (with special attention to Flanders) discourse, both in politics as well among civilians.

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After choosing these criteria, the next step was choosing which exact terms would form the basis of the discourse analysis. First, a rough Google search was done to look at preliminary results. Both single words (e.g. migration) as word combinations (e.g. LGBTQ migration) were used to estimate which terms would procure the best results. This rough search came up with the following key words: ‘LGBTQ, LGBT, migratie, homosexueel, homosexualiteit, migrant, migration’, they were used as single words and in different word combinations. The results are discussed and analysed in chapter 4.

Since this is a qualitative, discourse research, the researcher’s positionality within the work will take in an important role, making a completely ‘unbiased, objective’ analysis impossible. I am a queer, White woman and as such my reading and interpretation of the texts, as well as my analysis will be affected by my positionality, a fact that no researcher can escape. It is important to note that, positionality and subjectivity will influence the found data. The reader/researcher will always place a signifying power over the author’s texts, meaning that they will interpret following their own cultural context. This is important considering both the scientific research done in this thesis and the data analysis that will follow, as my positionality will influence my reading. In the same vein, researchers are authors in their own right, and thus the question is how the research gets processed and how the results should be presented. This thesis attempts to process and present the results with a focus on reflexivity. This means that I will not only be aware of my own positionality, but will also let go of the myth of value free research. On the contrary, as this thesis does not – and cannot – strive for a complete objective data analysis, this thesis will accept the researcher as part of the research, and as the data analysis as such.

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4. Data Analysis: Belgium To understand Belgian migration politics, it is important to – shortly – go into its history and structure.

Belgium is made up out of three autonomous regions: the Flemish region in the North, Wallonia in the South, and the Brussels-Capitol region. There are two main linguistic communities: the Flemish Community speaking Dutch and the French-speaking community. While Brussels is officially bilingual, the main spoken language there is French. Besides Dutch and French, there is a small region where the main spoken language is German. As mentioned in the methods section, this thesis will focus on the Dutch-speaking community in Flanders. However, while this thesis will go into Flemish discourse on migration, asylum and migration are a federally led part of Belgian politics.

Lastly, when talking about Belgian migration and homonationalism, it would be remiss not to mention the devastating effects Belgium had on its former colony the Democratic Republic of the Congo.13In 1908 Congo officially became a colony of the kingdom of Belgium14, and it would remain as such until the 30th of June 1960. Belgian’s colonial history and lasting influence on the Democratic Republic of Congo is a point of much contention in Belgian politics – and education15 -. Even now, sixty years after the Democratic Republic of Congo’s independence, true decolonisation is a far-off goal. As Van der Schueren states in his dissertation on the Royal Museum for Central-Africa in Tervuren, Belgium seems to suffer from colonial amnesia. Belgium is able to acknowledge their colonial past on the surface, but refuses to look deeper into the lasting results of this colonial history (Van der Schueren, 2018- 2019).

In June 2020, king Filip issued a formal apology to Congo and professed deep regret for the atrocities done by Belgium to the citizens of Congo. He is the first king to speak out about Congo. Whether this statement was issued because of king Filip’s personal beliefs or in response to the growing support for the Black Lives Matter movement16, is unclear.

13 See chapter 2.2.4. for the link between colonization and homonationalism 14 Before it had been private property of king Leopold II 15 Belgian history in relation to Congo is greatly underrepresented both in secondary school and in higher education (Peumans, 2018) 16 This movement gained traction again after the death of George Floyd in May 2020, and quickly became a global trigger for the demand for justice 23

4.1. Homonationalist Discourses on Queer Migration In a 2018 article, Susan Morgan talks about the dangers of (social) media. According to her “disinformation and fake news are widespread, and those seeking to manipulate the online public sphere can capitalise on declining levels of trust in institutions and experts” (Morgan, 2018). This manipulation sometimes happens as a deliberate attempt to spread disinformation or make people doubt about the information they are given, or it can have a purely financial motivation. It is important to note how much money and power is held by internet platforms. Where traditional media used to receive the most of advertising revenues, this has now gone to digital media platforms. This has created what Tim Wu calls ‘the attention economy’, the resale of human attention and selling it to advertisers (Wu, The Attention Merchants, 2017). According to him, “one of the risks in markets which are completely driven by attention seeking is they tend to run toward the most lurid, outrageous, attention-getting content and operate in a winner-take-all manner. If you care about our culture, care about our media, it is something to be concerned about” (Wu, Tim Wu: The Battle for Our Attention, 2016). It is interesting to see how the attention economy has not only affected capitalist advertisement, but also how politics is often won – and lost – over social media channels. The question raises if people are aware of the new landscape in media where misinformation and disinformation are spread like wildfire and are often hard to distinguish from what is real. Morgan points to the 2016 presidential elections which saw a slew of behavioural targeting of voters and using this data to supress voter turnout (Morgan, 2018).

This difficult landscape of digital media, where the highest bidder gets to have the loudest voice, also influences the way the discourse surrounding (queer) migration is formed. The mass media becomes a substitute for the court, the press is judge, jury, and executioner when it comes to the narratives surrounding migrants. They decide which discourses to push forward regarding migrants and exiles, people that are already vulnerable because of their marginality, their lack of rights, their poverty, making them an easy target. As John Upton has noted, often “[we] are told that we face a complex, overwhelming threat, yet we are given the crudest means of deciphering our predicament: caricatures of Saddam, of bin Laden, of suicide bombers and evil imams. These are the cartoon ogres in whose shadows we are encouraged to unite” (as cited in Fekete, 2004). As Asad notes, the media is not simply the

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means through which individuals imagine their national community, they mediate this imagination (Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, 2003).

This next chapter will go into two different discourses surrounding the issue of queer migration. The first will take a look at a homonationalist discourse that depicts Belgium as a queer safe haven, and thus not a place for Islam and its queerphobia. The second discusses the heteronormative way the migration and asylum procedure is set up.

4.1.1. Homonationalist Discourses of Islam’s Homo- and Queerphobia in Digital News Media Used to Justify Racist Integration and Migration Policies In what follows, this thesis will go into a discourse analysis of two articles arguing different sides around the issue of homonationalism.

The first is an article written by Fernand Van Damme and published in the Flemish, left- leaning newspaper De Morgen. The article was both printed and posted on the newspaper’s website as an exclusive for subscribers, however under different names. The author, Fernand Van Damme is – mainly – online journalist, writing for De Morgen since 2014. He writes articles with a focus on a younger audience and makes exclusives content for and manages De Morgen’s social media. He is openly gay and the content of his articles and social media seem to point to a left-leaning political alignment.

The article was published on the 2nd of April 2017, shortly after the terrorist attack in London on the 22nd of March 2017 that left forty people injured and five people dead. Early 2017, according to writer Van Damme, Vlaams Belang used homonationalist discourses to justify Islamophobia. While the printed version was titled ‘Homo’s en extreemrechts: een gevaarlijke flirt’/ ‘Gays and extreme-right: a dangerous liaison’, the digitally published version was titled ‘“Na de moslims zouden de homo's weleens het volgende slachtoffer kunnen zijn"’ / ‘”After the Muslims, the gays could be the next victim”’. This thesis will analyse the digital version of the article, and as such will use the title used for that version going forward.

Newspaper De Morgen was founded in 1978 as continuation of the shutdown socialist- party newspapers ‘Vooruit’ and ‘Volksgazet’. De Morgen calls itself progressive and independent, however, it is often described as more leftist and socialist (Bertrand & Eeckhout, 2019). Considering its background, these claims are not without base.

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The second article is written by Sam van Rooy and published on the right-leaning news website Doorbraak.be. It was published on the 4th of April 2017 as a response to the former article. The article was digitally published under the name “Islamohomofobie redivivus”. At the time of writing this thesis, the reaction and commentary part of the webpage has been closed for this article, and thus it is impossible to gauge audience reaction.

The author, Sam van Rooy is a politician for the nationalist party Vlaams Belang, and a city counsellor in Antwerp, in 2020 he became Vlaams Belang faction leader in the Antwerp city council. He has written four non-fiction books about Islam and the European Union.

The website Doorbraak.be is a Flemish minded opinion website, since 2014 it is no longer a printed magazine. The website focuses on societal and political facets of the Flemish movement, wanting to “contribute to the formation of opinion and discussion on current topics regarding domestic and foreign politics, state reform, media criticism, society and identity” (Wat is Doorbraak). It claims to be independent from political parties or ‘pressure groups’, however, it is noteworthy to mention that not only was it founded by the politician Wilfried Martens, it often features articles written by right-leaning politicians and journalists. In 2019 it fell into disrepute because of an article about professional football player Romelu Lukaku titled ‘Mensaap neemt strafschop (en scoort)’ / ‘Man-ape takes penalty (and scores)’.

In what follows, this thesis will first analyse both articles separately using the notions and discourses used throughout this thesis. Then, it will go into a comparison of the notions and discourses used, in order to discuss the use of homonationalist discourses of Islam’s homo- and queerphobia in digital news media that are used to justify racist integration and migration policies.

4.1.1.1. “Na de moslims zouden de homo's weleens het volgende slachtoffer kunnen zijn" - Fernand Van Damme, 2nd of april 2017, De Morgen17 The article written by Van Damme goes into the political situation concerning immigration and queer people both outside of Belgium (namely France and the Netherlands) and inside of Belgium. As mentioned, Van Damme himself is gay and leaning left on the political scale, a fact that will guide his writing throughout the article. He never clearly states

17 Retrieved from: https://www.demorgen.be/nieuws/na-de-moslims-zouden-de-homo-s-weleens-het- volgende-slachtoffer-kunnen-zijn~befd69a3/ 26

his positionality, however, as the following analysis will show, it is clear he has objections against the homonationalist discourse surrounding (queer) migrants.

Van Damme uses different sources in his article, both with direct and indirect quotes, most of these sources come from left leaning, queer people. The quotes used are predominantly negative, giving voice to concerns from left-wing politicians and researchers. When these quotes are more positive, they tend to use irony. For example, Dave Sinardet – professor in the political sciences - is quoted saying

"I sometimes say with a laugh: 'Gays should be grateful to the Muslims'. Politicians who want to push the Muslims away from them suddenly embrace gay people and their rights.”

Also interesting to note is the fact that the right-wing is directly quoted only three times throughout the article. Two of those quotes are heavily negative18, and one is an almost iconic quote by Pim Fortuyn19:

"Do I know Moroccans, ma'am? I fuck them."

Because of this choice of quotes – mostly negative and almost completely coming from left-winged people -, Van Damme sets a biased tone, steering the readers’ opinion. This is immediately clear in his title as well. The title is a negative quote uttered by a left-leaning (queer) politician, and as such sets the tone for the rest of the article: beware of homonationalism, and the right-wing that carries this discourse.

Throughout his article, Van Damme points to the Western, hegemonic ‘us vs them’ discourse. He starts his article by explaining this discourse in regard to Marine Le Pen20 and Geert Wilders21, explaining their ‘strategy’ – as Van Damme calls it – as presenting:

“the ‘backward’ Islam as a reactionary threat to the progressive values of West-Europe” [original quotation by Van Damme]

Or as Geert Wilders himself puts it:

18 See following for further analysis of those quotes 19 Former Dutch politician, murdered in 2002 20 French politician in the far-right party Rassemblement National 21 Politician for the Dutch far-right party Partij voor de Vrijheid 27

“Muslims destroy our ‘tolerant’ Netherlands and so threatens ‘our gays’” [original quotation by Van Damme]

The use of the word ‘backward’ by Van Damme is interesting, as it highlights the idea of the civilized West versus the barbaric Middle East, an idea that has been very prevalent in Western discourse. In using this word, he (un)knowingly refers back to Bush’ speech, wherein Bush casts the Middle East in the role of the barbaric land, ready to be civilized. Mattieu Chartraire’s22 quote from the Mr Gay France victory speech highlights a very important discourse as well:

"We welcome boatloads of illegal immigrants, give them papers, houses and social assistance benefits, all at the expense of hard- working French."

In this one sentence, quoted by Van Damme in the very beginning of his article, Chartraire lays out a couple of very clear discourses: one of a “us vs them”, one where the migrant is seen as a monolith of illegals, and one where all French people – on the other hand – are seen as hardworking, upstanding citizens. It is a discourse of good versus evil, lazy, and uncivilized versus hardworking and enlightened.

By using these quotes, Van Damme points to the de-humanizing discourse around Muslims as well. Looking at Chartraire’s quote for example, there is a clear use of negative adjectives when speaking about immigrants (‘illegal’) versus a positive adjective when speaking about French people (‘hard-working’). Specifically, the use of the word ‘illegal’ has been highly contested in the debate around migrants since it links a person to an act or an object. Left-leaning advocates have argued that one can ‘do’ something illegal, but not ‘be’ illegal. Calling a whole group of people after an act, de-humanizes them.

Next, Van Damme goes into the ‘us vs them’ discourses used in Belgium, namely by the far-right party, Vlaams Belang. He quotes Bruno De Lille - representative of the people for Groen23 and an openly gay politician – saying:

22 Mr Gay France 2015 23 Green party in Flanders, leaning centrist-left 28

“Vlaams Belang puts groups – non-Muslims and Muslims – against one another. To be admitted to the ‘us’ group you have to embrace the norms and values of this ‘us’ group completely.”

He continues by saying that this sort of thinking puts queers and Muslims in a very difficult position, as the tool of the nationalistic ideal. He notes the link this thinking has to homonationalism, by using queer people as a way to show ‘our civilization’, they can become a symbol for keeping Muslims out. As Paul Mepschen – teacher social anthropology at the university of Leiden and author - states:

“Gay rights have become a symbol of today’s nationalism: a central aspect of the national identity, and the litmus test of a successful integration and national loyalty. Gay emancipation is increasingly becoming a cultural conflict between gay tolerant 'natives' and homophobic 'immigrants', rather than a fight for sexual reform in a broader sense”

Mepschen’s quote not only highlights the current homonationalism in the hegemonic discourse but also the ‘us vs them’ discourse, explaining to the reader how this discourse makes for a binary view of the civilized West, that is homotolerant versus the barbaric East that is homophobic.

According to Van Damme and his sources, homosexuality and the Islam are put as the two extremes, unable to co-exist in this ‘new nationalism’. This ‘us vs them’, ‘queer versus Muslim’ discourse is often surrounded by fear, says Van Damme. He argues that the fear of Muslims – and thus the fear of terrorism – is used by far-right parties as a way to get queer people to vote for them. He quotes Dave Sinardet:

"A few right-wing parties are responding to [the perceived Muslim’s] gay hatred and are thus seen as saviours in need. Many voters could get the impression that right-wing parties that used to be against gay rights are now better at defending their interests."

However, Van Damme asserts, this not only creates the fallacy of seeing Muslims as one monolith of queerphobic people, it also plays into the “shallow discourse of homonationalism”, as right-wing parties accept homosexuality, but only when it “adapts itself

29

to the heteronormative values like monogamy and marriage.” As the pink vote becomes more important to political parties, homosexuality becomes more tolerable. This is a form of liberal pragmatism, allowing a certain version of values the right-winged parties do not agree with to exist, only to promote and protect their own values and goals. This form of ‘tolerating the queer population’, is often seen as tokenism, a symbolic inclusion of queer rights that does not represent right-winged politicians’ actual thoughts about the topic.

It is when speaking about the far-right’s use of homosexuals in order to close the borders for Muslims, that Van Damme’s words become more emotional. Van Damme’s tone assumes a discontent and maybe even anger with the current situation, especially in the direction of Vlaams Belang:

"The party continues to struggle heavily with homosexuality, but realizes that society has evolved. It no longer holds rants of abuse [at the address of homosexuals].”

The use of the adverb ‘heavily’ and the noun group ‘rants of abuse’ suggest more than an objective look into the situation. Van Damme raises issue with the (far-)right’s history of homophobia, something that now is better hidden but still present in some ways. For example, in August 2018, Theo Francken made a -now deleted- Facebook post about sexy lingerie for men. In it he says: “is the world going crazy or is it just me? Long live the regular guy that doesn’t need all this crap to feel good” (Francken, 2018). In posting this, Francken details a form of acceptable, “normal” maleness. He sets out certain roles and norms people should follow in order to abide to the hegemonic idea of heteronormativity. As Dimitri Cools, chairman of Holebihuis Vlaams-Brabant (a non-profit open house for sexual orientation and gender identity), states: “[…] especially because in your message you are still trying to rectify that it was okay what you wrote because you are pulling the rainbow flag. But that (you and) your party are working on more equal opportunities, equality and better LGBT + rights unfortunately doesn’t make it okay to spread polarizing words about gender norms and other patriarchal ideas” (MDR, 2018). So, like Van Damme argues throughout his article, right-wing parties use their presented platform on queer rights as both a way to get away with upholding heteronormative standards and presenting the Muslim population as the ‘problem’ and the ‘enemy’.

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Van Damme argues that, without the perceived threat of/from Muslims, Belgian right- wing parties would be less willing to accept homosexuality. In other words, the homophobia that is placed within the Muslim community would be as prevalent within White right-wing politicians and their voters, however, because of the ‘us vs them’ discourse, the homosexual community gets “tolerated”. By ‘Othering’ the Muslim community, the right-wing political parties try to strengthen their hold on White voters. This is a recurring process of racialized exclusion that gets heightened in times of crisis or political unrest (such as elections). By ‘allowing’ the White queer to be part of the ‘us-group’, they make it more clear that the racial category that is a Middle-Eastern and Muslim is not part of this group and as such a moral, cultural and civic threat to ‘our society’. Not only that, but as Vlaams Belang has stated upon numerous occasions24, they are a security threat, one we need to protect ‘our (queer) people’ from.

He also argues against the idea of a one-on-one connection between Muslims and homophobic violence, claiming that right-wing parties that state “there is an easy and quick solution [to that violence]” only offer fake solutions. A Dutch study quoted by Van Damme found that with cases of homophobic violence, Moroccans are overrepresented, but people with a Turkish background are less represented and are found to have less tendency to commit violent crimes than people with a native Dutch background. The researchers conclude that not religion was the main issue, but a street culture that strengthens hypermasculine behaviour. De Lille follows that argument saying:

"It is not the case that those who are negative about [homosexuality] necessarily behave aggressively […] That is a generalization. Someone who has questions about homosexuality does not necessarily behave negatively. Even if a lady with a headscarf is negative about homosexuality, that does not mean that she will attack gays."

The research in question was published in 2008 by Laurens Buijs, Gert Hekma and Jan Willem Duyvendak, titled ‘Als ze maar van me afblijven’/ ‘As long as they don’t touch me’. Indeed, this study concluded that not religion but their views and emotions regarding sexuality

24 See appendix image 1&2 31

and masculinity played a huge role in acts of violence. The researchers found that the men they interviewed resorted to violence when they believed themselves to be the object of a gay man’s desire, forcing them into a position that made them perceive being feminine and humiliated (Buijs, Hekma, & Duyvendak, 2008).

However, because this idea of the homophobic Muslim is so prevalent in White people’s minds (and in our media), this idea alone legitimizes the distinction between ‘us vs them’, and thus makes the damnation of Muslims by right-wing parties okay and even needed in their minds. This is turn created what Naber has coined ‘the internment of the psyche’, the constant threat of being harassed, beaten, locked up, etc. of (Muslim) Arabs by White people (Naber, The Rules of Forced Engagement, 2006). This form of internment, that takes power and control over one’s psyche, has effects on the way (Muslim) Arabs perceive these threats and can lead to (exaggerated) acts of violence over felt slights and a feeling of experiencing their being through others (Fanon as quoted in Naber, 2006).

The idea that Muslimness and queerness are two sides of an irreconcilable binary, only meeting each other in violence is challenged when Van Damme asks the reader: “And how to deal with homosexual Muslims?” Highlighting the idea of queerness within the Muslim community and how it does not seem to fit into the current discourse. In asking this rhetorical question he points to the preconceived notion of the heterosexual migrant. He claims that “moreover, there is no attention for developments such as the arrival of pink imams and the first gay-friendly mosque in Paris.” Van Damme argues for a joint struggle, queers and Muslims fighting to have the same rights as the ruling majority. De Lille agrees when he says that “our story will only survive if minority groups also start defending each other”. He also tells Van Damme that queer Muslims are working on emancipation but “if [they] have to fight in [their] own community and in the LGBT-community, it’ll get really though.” The intersectional matrix these queer migrants find themselves on, is one that Van Damme seems to acknowledge. When pushed to ‘pick a side’ on this intersectional matrix, queer Muslims often find themselves at a loss since, if they decide to fight against racism and prejudice and align themselves closer to their Muslims communities, it has been found that this often reproduces cultural nationalism and familial forms of power and control. This can mean a strengthening of the patriarchal control over the family which not only serves to control Muslim women but also pushes men into a role where queerness is not to be accepted. If they find themselves on

32

the other side of this binary, and align themselves with the queer community, they run into similar issues, namely that they are forced to disavow their religion and community, considering how the secular West seemingly has difficulties accepting the way in which religion and queerness can live together in a person’s psyche.

Further, Van Damme quotes De Lille again saying:

“Politicians in Western Europe emphasize their love for the emancipation of gay people at any opportunity25. They are incredibly proud of such achievements as same-sex marriage, adoption by same-sex couples and the prohibition of discrimination against LGBT people. But the reality is sobering. It is pretended that Belgium has become a gay paradise. I would like to inform people who like to believe that, that one in four gays has already attempted suicide here […] and if homosexuality is so accepted here, where is the first footballer to come out?"

In other words, not only does De Lille – and Van Damme by extension – argue that queer Muslims suffer from the erasing of their identities, queer native Belgian people26 do as well. Ideas of tolerance and antidiscrimination are getting warped by extreme right parties, according to Van Damme. The perceived homophobia right-wing parties place within the Muslim community, is present among native Belgians as well, according to Van Damme.

Lastly, Van Damme rounds up his article with a word of warning towards the queer community in Belgium, telling them that extreme right does not respect the queer community, but tolerates them. De Lille notes the same when he is quoted saying:

“[people voting far-right,] please think twice, because you are playing with fire. Homonationalism is a very shallow discourse. If push comes to shove, we could be the next victim.”

25 He uses the phrase “te pas en te onpas”, which does not have a direct translation in English but states overuse and dishonesty 26 The use of native Belgian in this case also holds the assumption of a white person 33

4.1.1.2. Islamohomofobie redivivus – Sam van Rooy, 4th of April 2017, Doorbraak.be The headline of the article written by Sam van Rooy can be loosely translated to ‘Islamic homophobia revived”, a title that clues the audience in on the standpoint van Rooy will be taking. It sets the tone for an article arguing that Muslim are indeed the biggest issue when dealing with homophobia and homophobic violence. His choice for a title (partly) in Latin is remarkable, as it reminds the Belgian reader of another Belgian politician: Bart De Wever27 who is known for his Latin one-liners in his speeches. De Wever is one of the most spoken of politicians in Belgium and a household name in the mouths of the media and voters alike.28 By evoking De Wever in the readers’ mind, a more well-liked and well-known politician, van Rooy gives himself and his article more credibility.

The article starts off with a general condemnation of left-wing parties, and Van Damme and De Morgen in specific. The former he says has “little serious journalism but mostly ‘left’- ‘progressive’ activism” [original quotations by van Rooy], while he accuses the latter of having a “politically correct (and stale) tone”. This delegitimization strategy is used to negatively present the other and give his own writing more weight. The use of the term ‘politically correct’ is also interesting in the current (mostly digital29) discourse. Right-wing voters and politicians alike have started to use this term in order to undermine ideas and arguments brought forth by the left, arguing that their ‘political correctness’ is holding them back from making real decisions. It has become almost a straw man argument with which the right overexaggerates the points the left tries to make and as such make them seem invalid and pointless.

The sources used in this article are either direct quotes from the article written by Van Damme, or link to news articles30, however, most of the article are thoughts and ideas seemingly by van Rooy himself.

Throughout the article, van Rooy attempts to disprove the points Van Damme has made. In paragraph three, for example, van Rooy tries to debunk the progress within queer Muslim communities Van Damme has mentioned:

27 Part of the right-wing party N-VA, and mayor of Antwerp since 2013 28 Much of this can be linked to his appearance in the Flemish game-show ‘De Slimste Mens’ in 2009 29 It is a term often thrown around on platforms where the public can leave comments (such as Facebook) 30 He also links to a column written about non-gendered toilets, that leans heavily on transphobic elements 34

“While he treats (and goes through) the evolution that a party such as Vlaams Belang has experienced with regard to homosexuality with suspicion and disbelief, Van Damme clings to miniscule [own emphasis] points of light within Islam, namely 'the arrival of pink imams and the first gay-friendly mosque in Paris’.”

It could be argued that the use of the word ‘miniscule’ undermines the potential importance of these events. The reasoning that these steps are not big enough and that queers all over the world must experience their sexuality in the same way and thus need the same things from their environment, is a form of thinking Massad dubs the Gay International. This thinking can be linked to the way right-wing political parties talk about Muslim women wearing hijab, pining their form of freedom on these women. According to this discourse, a hijabi woman must be oppressed by her father, brother, husband, etc. in order to wear this garment, disregarding the argument – often made by hijabi women themselves – that this is their own choice and way of expressing themselves and their link to Allah.

This thesis does not claim (queer) Muslims might not want for more within their own communities, however, it does problematize the idea that van Rooy, uses his privilege to call current steps that are being taken as ‘miniscule’. His positionality is far removed from that of a (queer) Muslim, having grown up White and heterosexual in Belgium, as such he speaks from his own context, not that of the people he talks about. When inserting yourself into a context you are not part of, a person must be wary of their own positionality, and of the conversation that already is ongoing. It must be mentioned as well that van Rooy does not come up with any evidence to support his claims. The entire article only gives voice to the White, native Belgian, the reader looks at the issue from a Western point of view. The Muslim voice remains suspiciously silent throughout this article.

Because of the silencing of the Muslim voice, van Rooy also does not spend a lot of time on the issue of queer migrants themselves. Besides the previous quote, he only directly addresses the issue of queer migrants in that same paragraph:

“Van Damme and his two friends De Lille and Sinardet gladly ignore that according to Islamic sources, Islamic law schools and Islamic countries, homosexuality still has to be punished, with death or otherwise. But even without the death penalty or another

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(physical) punishment being applied by an Islamic country - or by Muslims themselves, no rarity -, a Muslim homosexual can expect the necessary physical or mental hatred and terror [own emphasis] (threats, harassment, blackmail), often from family, friends or acquaintances.”

Although this is the only time van Rooy talks about queer migrants, there is a lot of information in this short paragraph. Firstly, van Rooy places the root of homophobia within Islamic communities, something he will do later in his article as well. However, it is even more revealing to look at the words he uses when describing this homophobia within these communities. In using the word ‘terror’, he links not only Muslims but also the queer Muslim with the act of terrorism. This is what Puar described as a tactic during the War on Terror: linking sexual perversion with an enemy status and orientalism. The use of the word ‘terror’ when talking about Muslim communities, is a highly controversial strategy, considering the connotation, used to change the reader’s opinions and feelings towards these communities. As such, van Rooy gets to control the receiver’s perspective.

Throughout the article, van Rooy defends an ‘us vs them’ rhetoric, placing the civil, homotolerant West against the barbaric, intolerant Muslims.

“After all, the fundamental truth is that a process is underway in which homosexuals, just like Jews and women, censor themselves and (forcibly) move away, especially from the neighbourhoods where Muslims make up a growing share of the population; the truth is that in asylum centres homosexuals are intimidated, threatened and bullied by Muslims who are then ‘let loose’ in our society” [original quotations by van Rooy]

It is interesting to look at this quote in-depth, as van Rooy claims that these are just ‘fundamental truths’. By posing these ‘facts’ as evidentialities, he is naturalizing them, ignoring the controversiality of the statements. He does not link to any sources or studies but expects the reader to simply agree with him. Because of the current hegemonic discourse surrounding Muslims and typical ‘concentrated’31 neighbourhoods, it is not unlikely that his readers do

31 In Dutch called ‘concentratiebuurten’, neighbourhoods with an over-representation of POC’s. Often carry a negative stereotype 36

believe van Rooy without a doubt. These so-called concentration neighbourhoods are often portrayed as violent and dangerous and often only appear in the media after a violent incident. In 2017 Bart De Wever was quoted saying the following:

“Look at the pictures of the perpetrators in Barcelona. On the Turnhoutsebaan in Borgerhout you can easily meet twenty men of that type in one evening” (LB, 2017)

It is “that type” of people that, according to van Rooy make the neighbourhoods so dangerous for women, queer people, and Jews. The profiling of – mainly – Arab men is a prevalent rhetoric in right-wing circles, who claim a one-on-one link between ‘these people’ and violence.

His other ‘truth’ is that queer people get bullied by Muslims in asylum centres. Once again, van Rooy provides no sources or evidence for his claim. It seems like van Rooy leans on the cultural deficit theory when he makes his claims: because of the barbaric, uncultured background of these Muslims, they must be homophobic and violent. This theory has informed relation of the West towards former colonies for decades, pining certain stereotypes onto cultures because of their culture alone.

The usage of the words ‘let loose’32 are very interesting as well, by using a phrase with a loaded connotation, he places the Muslim-other in a negative position, one of lower social standing. It may be worthwhile to note that the – original – Dutch wording has a strong connotation linked to either animals or prisoners. This dehumanizing strategy towards Muslims, assures that the reader cannot empathize with them, thus creating a gap between the native Belgian and the Muslim. Dehumanizing Muslims is a strategy that has been used since before the War on Terror, making it easier to condone the bombing of entire villages in order to kill a (small) group of terrorists hiding out. It also allows for an erasing of history and causality, allowing the West to forget their damaging influence on their former colonies and the lasting consequences this has on conflict and immigration.

He links these ‘fundamental truths’ with homophobia within the Muslim community further as well, when he says:

32 In Dutch he uses the word ‘losgelaten’, which has a strong negative connotation 37

“Maybe De Lille should check what is being said and preached about homosexuality in mainstream [original emphasis by van Rooy] Islam and mosques, in the Middle East and in our country, then maybe he can discover a connection [about homophobia and religion/culture].”

The usage of irony sets for a discursive strategy aimed at delegitimating De Lille. His – emphasised – use of the word ‘mainstream’ also points to van Rooy’s ‘us vs them’ rhetoric: ‘they, the mainstream Muslims,’ are homophobic.

It is important to note that van Rooy’s ‘us-group’ is Flanders at large, but mostly Vlaams Belang and its voters; in other words, his community. Proven when he says:

“It is utter madness that nothing fundamental has changed to this day about the generous open borders and reception policy and the endless pampering of Islam. In the meantime, politicians are busy with nonsense such as a "gay walkway", walking hand in hand33 and gender-neutral toilets that N-VA minister Homans is so proud of (at the same time, she finds Koran schools where young Muslims are indoctrinated no problem). As if those kinds of symbolic actions and postmodern futilities do anything to change the influx of Islamic gay haters and their behaviour or mentality; as if as a result homosexuals (and transgenders [sic.]) can suddenly safely walk hand in hand through Muslim neighbourhoods.”

By delegitimating the ‘symbolic actions and postmodern futilities” of the out-group (in this case, every non-Vlaams Belang politician), van Rooy elevates himself and his party as the ‘us’ that knows better. The other – and especially Muslims – are making it so that queer people are unsafe. The Muslim ‘influx’ of people are barbaric, uncivilized gay haters.

He continues this rhetoric:

33 A Dutch action against homophobia from 2017 38

“If Vlaams Belang had gotten its way, the Islamic culture of hate towards homosexuals would not have been massively let in and there would have been a lot less casualties,”

van Rooy writes, using a conditional irrealis mood. By stating this as a thing that ‘would have happened’, but only if Vlaams Belang had gotten its way, he claims a couple of things: it is Muslim homophobia that is the biggest issue when talking about violent crimes towards queers; and Vlaams Belang is the only party that can protect queers from this violence.

To defend his rhetoric of violent Muslims and Vlaams Belang as the saviour of White (queer) people, van Rooy uses a credibility strategy and talks about a study done by sociologist Ruud Koopmans, written in 2013. In van Rooy’s words:

“[the study] concluded that 60% of Muslims in Western Europe refuses to see homosexuals as friends.”

A couple of things should be investigated further when it comes to this study. Firstly, Koopmans is a right-leaning researcher, a positionality that will (un)consciously influence his writing. Secondly, and more importantly, in only mentioning that one piece of data that fits his narrative, he neglects to inform the reader of the full conclusion of Koopman’s paper:

“Although relatively speaking levels of fundamentalism and out- group hostility are much higher among Muslims, in absolute numbers there are at least as many Christian as there are Muslim fundamentalists in Western Europe, and the large majority of homophobes and antisemites [sic.] are still natives” (Koopmans, 2013).

Lastly, he concludes his article with a response to Van Damme’s claims that far-right political parties like Vlaams Belang are eventually dangerous for queers. To do so, van Rooy says this:

“My party may be less 'progressive' because it does not approve the opening of adoption and finds gender neutral toilets 'crazy', but in the society we stand for, in which borders are closed, Islamization is being pushed back and perpetrators of violence are punished

39

much more severely, LGBT…’s [sic.] are much safer and therefore freer.”

This links with the general claim in Vlaams Belang’s political slogans that portray non- native Belgians as a threat34, and homophobic violence is automatically linked to ‘Islamization’.

4.1.1.3. Comparison Both Van Damme and van Rooy use delegitimization strategies in order to turn the reader’s perspective and put the opposite (political) party in a bad light. The two articles try to represent their own perspective positively and the other negatively. In other words, Van Damme used – past – queerphobic language used by Vlaams Belang to depict their homonationalist discourse as deceitful and bad for the queer community. In a similar vein, van Rooy chose to discredit Van Damme, De Morgen, and the entire political left as the dishonest one, claiming that Vlaams Belang’s intentions and politics are the better ones. In effect, both articles use discourses and rhetoric in order to present self-positive and present and other- negative, based on their ideological perspectives.

While no conclusion can be made on the broader discourse of left-wing versus right- wing political ideas35, this analysis has shown how van Rooy utilizes homonationalist discourses in order to defend racialized policies and racist viewings towards the Muslim community. In using discourses such as the hegemonic ‘us vs them’ rhetoric, the legal and social obstacles for queer migrants, the reproduction of heteronormativity, and the perceived homophobia within the Muslim community, he justifies Vlaams Belang’s closed border rhetoric that disproportionally targets Muslims in their propaganda.36

An important note about digital news media is its accessibility. The article by Van Damme in De Morgen is an article only accessible for paying subscribers, making it so that the amount of people that will read the article much lower. The article by van Rooy on the other hand is freely accessible and as such has a higher chance of being found and read. One might also wonder if there is a correlation between paying subscribers and leftist media versus

34 See images 1 and 2 in appendix 35 Considering the fact that the scope of this research is too small, and that discourse analysis does not lend itself to the showing what exactly people believe 36 See image 1 in appendix 40

people who read for free and right-wing media. This thesis does not have a big enough data pool to make conclusive arguments about the possible correlation but it is however interesting to note, especially considering the numerous studies done surrounding the apparent link between the working class and right-wing politics.

4.1.2. Heteronormative Discourses in Digital News Media Surrounding the Racialized and Inquisitive Migration and Asylum Approach The following will be a discourse analysis of the article ‘“Ons asielbeleid lijkt ervan uit te gaan dat LGBT+ vluchtelingen leugenaars zijn”’ / ‘“Our asylum policies seem to assume LGBT+ refugees are liars”’.

The article was written by Astrid Limpens and published in the Belgian, Dutch magazine MO* (‘Mondiaal Nieuws’ / ‘Global News’) on the 27th of November 2019 in response to the CHanGE-campagne (Campaign for sexual Health and Gender Equality) by the University Centre for Development Cooperation37 (UCOS). UCOS wants to focus on human development by stimulating world-citizenship among students in higher education. To achieve this, they offer seminars, trainings, and exchanges for students, doctors and internationalization employees linked to higher education. The CHanGE-campagne targets gender equality, and sexual and reproductive health, with special attention to queer migrants. In 2019, this campaign sent ten young people to Lebanon, Morocco, and Uganda in order to understand why queer people migrate to Belgium. To shed light on the problematic asylum process for queer migrants, they came up with the slogan: “Can you prove you’re straight?”

Astrid Limpens was a writer for MO*, writing articles with a focus on refugees, and the climate, both in the context of Belgium. Not much is known about her political ideals and views.

MO* is both an online and printed magazine, issued by Wereldmediahuis vzw. They focus on global and local events, writing for a wide audience in an effort to make the rapidly changing world understandable, perceptible and manageable (FAQ - Vaak gestelde vragen). They focus on the process of globalisation and its counter forces; migration and diversity; climate, transition, and sustainable development; inequality and human rights; conflict and

37 Universitair Centrum voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 41

polarization. They claim to be independent and not connected to any political party, saying that great importance is attached to pluralism.

4.1.2.1. “Ons asielbeleid lijkt ervan uit te gaan dat LGBT+ vluchtelingen leugenaars zijn” The article by Limpens goes into the current situation of migrants when asking for asylum in Belgium on the ground of being queer. Her title immediately sets the tone for the rest of the article. She uses a negative quote by Loes Verhaeghe (UCOS) to point the reader to the current issues surrounding queer immigration. Limpens’ tone suggests an article that will humanize queer migrants, give a voice to the voiceless, while also showing the fallacies in the minds of the people in charge of the Belgian asylum procedure.

Quotes by Loes Verhaeghe and Benoit Dhondt – lawyer for Antigone Advocaten38 - support Limpens’ points throughout the article:

"Whoever applies for asylum must be able to prove that he or she is covered by refugee status," explains Loes Verhaeghe […]. “For LGBT + refugees, this means that they must be able to demonstrate their sexual orientation or gender identity. In addition, as a refugee you must also be able to demonstrate that you are being prosecuted for that reason in your country of origin. "

Anyone who needs protection as an LGB or transgender person must therefore provide proof. But how do you prove such an intimate aspect of your own identity?

Europe’s heightened state of surveillance and the changing laws that come with that, made for a strict(er) asylum process, one in which the burden of proof lies with the migrant. This is based on the Convention of Genève that states two important factors to determine a person is up for asylum: the grounded fear for prosecution; and proof that the asylum seeker belongs to one of the minority groups laid down in the Convention. This is an especially hard task for queer migrants, seeing as there are no set traits (physical or psychological) that point to a person being queer, and that different countries have varying asylum applications both in general and specific for queer asylum seekers. By asking this rhetorical question, Limpens points the reader to the difficulty of proving one’s sexual orientation.

38 Law firm specialized in asylum and migration cases 42

Limpens points out several times throughout the article that the questions asked by the Belgian asylum policy are “highly intimate”, the use of the emotionally evocative words is a strategy to appeal to the reader’s empathy, and make them see the hardships these migrants have to go through.

Limpens continues her article by explaining the procedure queer migrants go through. As Peumans has noted, the asylum procedure searches for a sexual identity that is fixed and able to be proven, or as Limpens says:

“The replies [to questions surrounding their sexuality] serve as evidence to determine whether you are telling the truth, both about your orientation or gender identity and the risk of persecution”

Following Peumans’ critique surrounding the legal obstacles for queer migrants, Limpens quotes Dhondt:

“[…] Although they are in a vulnerable and very uneven situation, in which their person and integrity are the focus of research. Ultimately, they depend on the case officer interviewing them and deciding whether or not to grant them protection. "

In other words, migrants hinge on the case officer’s willingness and ability to step out of the narrow-mindedness of the Gay International. According to Limpens, queer migrants are expected to talk about very in-depth and personal subjects, as well as traumatic events such as rape or violence. All of this is shared with the asylum seeker’s case officer “out of free will”. However – although this cannot be given as the sole reason for declining asylum -, refusal to give out this intimate information can possibly lead to not being believed. It could be argued that an asylum seeker is expected to fall into the Western hegemonic discourse of oppression to freedom. Dhondt is quoted saying:

“The question is if there’s another way to make your sexuality believable, and how you would prove it. I am not sure about it myself. It remains a delicate case.”

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The fact that it is a delicate situation is further proven when Limpens questions the expertise of the case workers, arguing that their questions often seem ignorant in terms of the lived reality of queers and transgender people.

The judgments confirm that there is often doubt about the truthfulness of the testimony if the refugee "did not make lived statements about the awareness" of his/her orientation. It is difficult to say what would have accounted for 'lived through' for the case handlers.

Limpens’ tone suggests irony, hinting towards a perplexity about the current situation and the racist, colonial undertone the asylum procedure carries. This is further proven when she quotes Verhaeghe:

"[Case workers] ask for tangible evidence that confirms your sexual orientation, but that is very strange and difficult. These people just had to hide their orientation in their country of origin. And even if there is evidence, it is systematically declared implausible."

Verhaeghe notes that the interviews do not start from the refugee's perception, but from a few expectations.

These expectations align with Massad’s Gay International, assuming the universality of experiences and the words used to describe sexuality, gender and the experiences surrounding these. To argue her point further, Limpen has used Verhaeghe’s checklist. This checklist contains eight points that frequently come forward during asylum interviews with queer migrants. According to Verhaeghe, these points can often contain contradicting expectations.

1. The Importance of Sexual Activity: A person who does not focus on this is more likely to be refused on the assumption that the refugee can then live in the country of origin as long as he maintains a “discreet attitude”.

2. Sexual orientation as a primary lifestyle and identity: it is unbelievable if the refugee was not actively looking for a partner or

44

relationship. But taking too many risks to find or keep a relationship is also considered suspicious.

3. Sexual orientation as stable: gender fluidity is often not recognized.

4. Knowledge of LGBT + legislation and organization: knowledge is expected, but in reality this is not self-evident in countries where the LGBT + community is criminalized.

5. Knowledge of the LGBT + scene in Belgium: this is not self-evident either, as not every refugee is interested in it.

6. Evidence: Evidence is often requested, but it is hardly believed when it is presented.

7. Ability to express one's own emotional perception and identity: not every language has the words to talk about such intimate subjects. In addition, interpreters cannot always translate a personal feeling equally well.

8. Religion: Refugees are suspect if they are religious, as this would not go hand in hand with their orientation or gender identity.

This checklist highlights a lot of discourses previously discussed in this thesis.

Most of this checklist highlights the way the Gay International guides the asylum procedure. It is clear from this list that caseworkers are looking for a ‘true sexual identity’, an argument Peumans has argued and condemned in his book. According to Verhaeghe, and her checklist, the discourse surrounding queer migrants is one of ‘universally accepted’ ideas about sexuality, a queer person’s lived social life, queer terminology, and so forth. Things that seem to be accepted as universal facts – in other words, the Gay International – but are in fact highly influenced by a person’s context.

On top of that, the first and second points address the neo-liberal concept of coming out. If a person does not stress the importance of this ‘coming out’ in a Western view – in other words, by being sexually active – their asylum request can be denied. This also assumes a universality in the way queer people experience sexuality, being ‘out and proud’ about it.

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However, as this thesis has shown, often, non-Western queers navigate the closet in an entirely different way.

It is also interesting to look at point eight in-depth, as Verhaeghe notes that case workers are often suspicious of religion. This falls together with the secular West’s inability to see religion and queerness as anything other than two sides of an irreconcilable binary.

This checklist, adapted from a study done by Verhaeghe, lends Limpens’ prior and coming points credibility, persuading the reader in case they had doubts about the validity of this article.

Next, in order to further the reader’s trust in her words, Limpens goes into a factual summary of numbers and percentages concerning the amount of people that ask for asylum on the base of their sexuality and the percentage of that the governments lends asylum. Limpens argues that on the basis of these numbers, an asylum application based on the fear of prosecution because of sexual orientation, does not automatically lead to a bigger chance of acceptance.

“On the contrary, even: "Belgian asylum policy seems to assume a priori that LGBT + asylum seekers are liars and cheaters," says Verhaeghe.”

Limpens and Verhaeghe argue for more expertise during asylum cases, so that stereotypical and subjective expectations can be avoided. One of the stereotypes they talk about is the idea that queer migrants can only feel fear, regret or shame about their sexuality, proved by a quote found in an arrest on the website of the Council for Alien Law Litigation39:

"The above statements in no way indicate that you experienced your homosexual orientation as problematic, while your statements show that Nigerian society has a predominantly homophobic attitude”

This assessment by the Council shows how queer migrants are judged based on Western ideals. Firstly it shows a Western view of coming out, the migrant might have dealt with the closet in a different way and might not have found it necessary to ‘come out’, at least

39 De Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen 46

not while in his country of origin. Secondly, this statement deals with what this thesis has called ‘the perceived homophobia within the Muslim community’. The Western discourse argues that because of the (perceived) homophobia in the migrants’ country of origin, they must either disavow the perverse queerness, embody the Muslim stereotype or they would turn to the homosocial world of terrorism out of anger, frustration and fear. In other words, a queer Muslim that has found (a sort of) peace with their sexuality within the Muslim community in their country of origin, must be lying.

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5. Conclusion This thesis went into the hegemonic discourses surrounding queer Muslim migrants on digital platforms in the Belgian context. To research this, it first looked into the rhetoric that was used after the terrorist attack on American soil on the 11th of September 2001 and the War on Terror that followed. Then, this thesis provided a theoretical basis using queer theory to discuss the hegemonic discourse in the liberal West. Using this theoretical basis of both the War on Terror and queer theory, a discourse analysis was done on three digital news articles.

This discourse analysis aimed to explore the following hypotheses: there is an active and conscious designation of homophobia as a way for the White West to gain power; homonationalism in Belgium pushes White queers into disavowal of - what could be called - a ‘perverse Muslimness’; At the same time, the idea of the Gay International allows for White (queer) saviourism.

Both the conceptual background as the discourse analysis of the articles showed that there was indeed a designation of homophobia from the West towards the East, and more specifically towards Muslim communities. This idea of a cultural deficit, where the Muslim culture is seen as barbaric, uncultured and violent and thus must be homophobic, was prevalent in the analysed article by right-wing politician van Rooy. Furthermore, this thesis has shown that this discourse of designation of homophobia to the East is used by right-wing political parties to create anxiety and fear among native (queer) Belgians and as such gain more votes and power. In order to do this, political parties and digital news websites use an “us vs them” rhetoric that places the Muslim migrant in the role of the ‘Other’, unable to ever truly become one of ‘us’. This ‘us vs them’ rhetoric is also used when defending the idea of a homophobic Middle East, as ‘they’ are ‘our’ enemy, one we need to protect ‘our’ queer people from.

The second hypothesis says that, in order to fit into the norms of homonationalism, White queers are expected to reject ‘perverse Muslimness’. This fits into the previous hypothesis in that, by creating an ‘us vs them’ rhetoric, queer people can find (perceived) safety within right-wing political parties that protect them from the barbaric, violent Middle- East. However, this thesis has also shown that this is not only happening to White queers, but also queers of colour. This thesis showed that, in order to be granted asylum, queer Muslims

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are often forced to condemn their country of origin, portraying their migration as a flight from oppression to freedom. Not only that, but they are often found suspect if they are practising Muslims since the White, secular West finds it hard to see agency within religion as a whole and Islam in particular. As such, both the White queer and the queer of colour are expected to disavow religion in order to fit in and be accepted by the heteronormative majority.

The third and last hypothesis could not directly be found and proven in Belgian digital news media. While queer theory claims that the White West uses the theory of the Gay International in order to claim first-world humanitarianism and democratic freedom, this thesis could not soundly prove this existence using its current data.

By proving the two first hypotheses and taking them together, this thesis has proven that there still is a binary between being Muslim and being queer in the minds of people, and that this perceived binary makes a stronger ‘us vs them’ rhetoric that, in turn, allows for a closed borders rhetoric and a discourse of fear.

A question rises up when discussing the idea of right-winged parties using White queers to condemn Muslim immigrants: what happens to the ‘tolerance’ of the right-wing towards White queers when they get their way and the borders close? In other words, if there is no ‘common enemy’ left to ‘defend’ queer people from, will right-wing parties once more turn their scorn onto queer people and go back to only supporting heteronormative, nuclear families?

In order to go against this hegemonic idea of the heterosexual, homophobic Muslim migrant, more research should be done on the topic of queer migration and protection officers in asylum cases should get specialized support and trainings. To close the gap between ‘us and them’, and to nurture understanding in each other’s culture, first the West must let go of their own superiority complex and be willing to truly listen and understand. This thesis has been written in hopes to start building a bridge between these two cultures, and to highlight the importance of more research about the hegemonic discourse, as it influences people’s minds and as such the voting ballots. With more information, comes more understanding and hopefully more respect.

In the first place, this thesis hopes to influence the workings of asylum applications for queer Muslim migrants. More training should be done in order to fully support both case

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workers and the migrants themselves. Another suggestion this thesis wants to propose is a so-called ‘resting time’ for migrants, this so they can acclimate themselves with both the culture and the words needed to tell their story to their case worker. It is needed to look more into how this could be carried out, without endangering either the migrant or the integrity of the asylum process.

Lastly, this thesis was written with the hope that, by shedding light on the homonationalist discourse that are being used and abused by multiple parties on digital news media, this knowledge can help queer people understand these same machinations when used in other settings. Fear is a valid and understandable emotion when faced with the unknown, however, one must protect themselves from a fake friend, one that will likely stab you in the back when you are no longer needed.

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7. Appendix Image 1: advertising poster for Vlaams Belang Antwerp

(n.d.).Binnenkort in uw buurt? Geen terugkeer van islamterroristen. Campagne 2019. Vlaams Belang. Retrieved from https://vlaamsbelangantwerpen.be/binnenkort-in-uw-buurt-geen-terugkeer- van-islamterroristen/

Image 2: advertising poster for Vlaams Belang Stabroek

(n.d.).Veiligheid Prioriteit: Maak uw kind waakzaam en alert. Campagne 2019. Vlaams Belang, Stabroek. Retrieved from https://vlaamsbelangstabroek.be/maak-uw-kind-waakzaam-en- alert/

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Article 1: ‘Islamohomofobie redivivus’

VRIJE TRIBUNE - 04/04/2017 Sam van Rooy - Leestijd 8 minuten

Omdat steeds meer homoseksuelen voor zogenaamd ‘extreemrechts’ kiezen, schreef de 23-jarige

Fernand Van Damme in De Morgen het artikel: ‘Homo’s en extreemrechts: een gevaarlijke flirt’.

Voor de onlineversie is de titel nog wat tendentieuzer gemaakt: ‘Na de moslims zouden de homo’s weleens het volgende slachtoffer kunnen zijn’ (een waarschuwing van Groen-politicus Bruno De

Lille). ‘Extreemrechts’, ‘gevaarlijk’ en ‘homo’s en moslims slachtoffer’: de politiek correcte (en afgezaagde) toon à la De Morgen is weer gezet.

Wie Van Damme volgt op Twitter, ziet weinig serieuze journalistiek maar vooral ‘links’-

‘progressief’ activisme. In die zin past hij ook perfect bij De Morgen. In zijn artikel citeert Van

Damme Groen-volksvertegenwoordiger Bruno De Lille en professor Dave Sinardet, die net zoals hij ‘links’-‘progressief’ en homoseksueel zijn en passen in het frame dat hij wil creëren. Kon Van

Damme dan echt geen VB-stemmende homoseksueel vinden, of heeft hij niet gezocht? Nochtans was een mail naar mij of mijn partij voldoende geweest.

Terwijl hij de evolutie die een partij zoals Vlaams Belang inzake homoseksualiteit heeft doorgemaakt (en doormaakt) met argwaan en ongeloof bejegent, klampt Van Damme zich vast aan minuscule lichtpuntjes binnen de islam, namelijk ‘de komst van roze imams en de eerste homovriendelijke moskee in Parijs’. Van Damme en zijn twee vrienden De Lille en Sinardet negeren daarbij graag dat homoseksualiteit volgens de islamitische bronnen, islamitische rechtsscholen en islamitische landen nog altijd bestraft moet worden, met de dood of anderszins.

Maar ook zonder dat door een islamitisch land – of door moslims aldaar die eigenrichting toepassen, geen zeldzaamheid – de doodstraf of een andere (lijf)straf wordt toegepast, geldt dat een moslimse homoseksueel de nodige fysieke of mentale haat en terreur kan verwachten

(dreigementen, intimidatie, chantage), vaak ook afkomstig van familie, vrienden of kennissen.

Dat het Vlaams Belang het homohuwelijk al jaren niet meer in vraag stelt, willen Van Damme en de zijnen niet serieus nemen, want dat past niet in de voorbijgestreefde politiek correcte hokjes.

Bruno De Lille verwijst naar de ‘openstelling van adoptie’ en ‘ouderschap voor meemoeders’, waarover VB-voorzitter Tom Van Grieken zegt: ‘Ik vind dat een kind recht heeft op een vader en een moeder. Ik zeg niet dat homokoppels slechte ouders zouden zijn. Maar je moet uitgaan van het belang van het kind.’ Niet per se mijn eigen mening (ik ben er eerlijk gezegd niet uit), maar een respectabele conservatieve visie die het belang van het kind wil vooropstellen. Toch wordt dat

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ene standpunt het Vlaams Belang kennelijk niet vergeven: ‘homofobie’ is helaas net zo’n uitgeholde term als ‘racisme’.

Tegelijkertijd maakt De Lille terecht duidelijk dat ‘het niet zo is dat wie er negatief tegenover staat, zich per se ook agressief gedraagt (…) Ook al zou een dame met hoofddoek negatief tegenover homoseksualiteit staan, dat betekent nog niet dat ze homo’s gaat aanvallen’. Maar het

Vlaams Belang wordt dus wel weggezet als onoprecht, homofoob en zelfs als een ‘gevaarlijke flirt’ voor homoseksuelen omdat de partij de openstelling van adoptie afwijst. Alleen wanneer het zogenaamd ‘extreemrechts’ betreft, geldt kennelijk een soort ‘alles of niets’-principe: of je gaat mee in álles inzake rechten voor homoseksuelen, of je bent homofoob en een gevaar voor de holebigemeenschap. Wanneer het echter de moslimgemeenschap betreft, dan luidt het plots zéér terughoudend dat een negatieve opvatting over homoseksualiteit geen probleem is zolang er geen agressieve daden uit voortkomen.

Om datzelfde frame – ‘cultuur/religie speelt geen enkele rol’ – nog te versterken wil De Lille benadrukken dat er ook bij autochtonen nog veel werk aan de winkel is, want, zo zegt hij: ‘waar blijft de eerste voetballer die uit de kast komt?’ En: ‘Eén op de vier homo’s hier heeft al een zelfmoordpoging ondernomen’. En: ‘Af en toe worden holebi’s geconfronteerd met agressie in het uitgaansleven, en dan lijkt het alsof het altijd dezelfde groep is’, daarbij de islamisering negerend die gaande is in heel wat wijken in West-Europa. De fundamentele waarheid is immers dat er een proces gaande is waarbij homoseksuelen, net zoals joden en vrouwen, zichzelf censureren en

(gedwongen) wegtrekken uit met name de wijken waar moslims een groeiend aandeel van de bevolking uitmaken; de waarheid is dat in asielcentra homoseksuelen worden geïntimideerd, bedreigd en weggepest door moslims, die nadien worden ‘losgelaten’ in onze samenleving.

Misschien moet De Lille eens nagaan wat er in de mainstream islam en moskeeën, in het Midden-

Oosten en bij ons, over homoseksualiteit wordt gezegd en gepredikt, dan kan hij misschien een verband ontdekken. Undercoverreportages in moskeeën laten steevast zien dat imams naar buiten toe een boodschap van tolerantie uitdragen, terwijl hun preken bol staan van typisch islamitische minachting en haat ten opzichte van niet-moslims, vrouwen en homoseksuelen. Ook de lichtzinnigheid waarmee De Lille spreekt over het lot van homoseksuele moslims, is ronduit ondraaglijk.

De Lille vervolgt: ‘Partijen die luid roepen dat hiervoor een snelle en makkelijke oplossing bestaat, winnen dan. Ook al zijn het valse remedies.’ Valse remedies? Mocht het Vlaams Belang

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zijn zin hebben gekregen, dan was de islamitische haatcultuur jegens homoseksuelen niet massaal het land binnengelaten en zouden er heel wat minder slachtoffers zijn gevallen. Het is pure waanzin dat er tot op vandaag niets fundamenteels verandert aan dat riante opengrenzen- en opvangbeleid, en aan het oeverloos gepamper van de islam. Ondertussen zijn politici druk bezig met onzin zoals een ‘gaybrapad’, hand in hand lopen en genderneutrale toiletten waar N-VA- minister Homans zo trots op is (tegelijkertijd vindt ze Koranscholen waar jonge moslims worden geïndoctrineerd geen enkel probleem). Alsof dat soort symbolische acties en postmoderne futiliteiten ook maar iets verandert aan de toestroom van islamitische homohaters en hun gedrag of mentaliteit; alsof daardoor homoseksuelen (en transgenders) plots veilig hand in hand door moslimwijken kunnen lopen.

De Nederlandse socioloog Ruud Koopmans concludeerde na onderzoek dat 60% van de moslims in West-Europa homoseksuelen als vriend weigert te zien. Toch móet en zál het frame van De

Morgen zijn dat moslims en homoseksuelen allebei zogenaamd ‘extreemrechts’ moeten vrezen en dus moeten samenspannen. Voor die ‘gezamenlijke strijd’ wordt door De Lille zelfs Abou Jahjah opgevoerd die ‘dat ook begint in te zien’.

Van Damme schrijft tot slot: ‘Vaak wordt ook enkel de verdediging opgenomen van de ‘goede of normale homo’, die zich aanpast aan heteronormatieve waarden als monogamie en het huwelijk.

De gemarginaliseerde ‘slechte homo’ die daarvan afwijkt, dat is een ander paar mouwen. “Zeker de nieuwe bekeerlingen ter rechterzijde bedoelen ‘met homoseksualiteit verdedigen’ vaak de brave, burgerlijke homoseksueel die op een hetero lijkt”, zegt Sinardet.’

Sinardet mag dit poneren zonder enige onderbouwing en Van Damme pende het vlijtig neer, want het is exact de boodschap die hij en zijn krant willen brengen. Zo beweert Sinardet ook nog: ‘Het

Vlaams Belang blijft zwaar met homoseksualiteit worstelen (…),’ terwijl het glashelder is wat wij willen en niet willen: laat holebi’s met rust en hou je poten thuis!

Van Damme, Sinardet en De Lille willen of kunnen niet zien dat ‘niet-linkse’ of ‘niet- progressieve’ mensen en partijen, los van hun opinie over homohuwelijk of openstelling van adoptie, een oprechte en serieuze bekommernis kunnen hebben over de veiligheid en vrijheid van homoseksuelen (of LGBT…’s). Meer nog, het zijn juist de linkerzijde en ook de N-VA, trots meelopend in de Gay Pride, die hypocriet zijn: ze staan pal voor zaken zoals het homohuwelijk, openstelling van adoptie en genderneutrale toiletten, maar laten tegelijkertijd via asiel en migratie

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talloze moslims binnen die vijandig staan tegenover LGBT…’s, die LGBT…’s minderwaardig

vinden en hen haten of geweld tegen hen goedkeuren.

Mijn partij mag dan misschien minder ‘progressief’ zijn omdat het de openstelling van adoptie

niet goedkeurt en genderneutrale toiletten ‘te gek voor woorden’ vindt, maar in de samenleving

waar wíj voor staan, waarin de grenzen worden gesloten, de islamisering wordt teruggedrongen en

geweldplegers überhaupt véél zwaarder worden gestraft, zijn LGBT…’s véél veiliger en dus

vrijer. Over die ‘transgenderplees’, zoals taalvirtuoos Arthur Van Amerongen ze noemt, raad ik

overigens zijn hilarische column aan.

Tot slot moet gezegd dat De Morgen een reactie van VB-voorzitter Tom Van Grieken publiceerde,

die u hier kunt lezen.

(van Rooy, 2017)

Article 2: ‘Ons asielbeleid lijkt ervan uit te gaan dat LGBT+-vluchtelingen leugenaars zijn’

ASTRID LIMPENS . 27 NOVEMBER 2019

Een 'safe space' voor transgenders en transseksuelen met HIV in Kampala, Oeganda, met dank aan de plaatselijke organisatie Come Out Post-Test Club. In Oeganda wordt opnieuw gesproken over de doodstraf voor homoseksuelen.

Universitair Centrum voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking

In zeventig landen is het nog steeds een crimineel feit als je een andere seksuele oriëntatie of genderidentiteit hebt. Het kan leiden tot discriminatie, opsluiting en in elf landen zelfs nog tot de doodstraf. Om die reden vluchten heel wat holebi's en transgenders weg naar veiliger oorden, waaronder ook België.

‘Wie asiel aanvraagt, moet kunnen bewijzen dat hij of zij onder het vluchtelingenstatuut valt', verklaart Loes Verhaeghe van het Universitair Centrum voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (UCOS). 'Voor LGBT+-vluchtelingen betekent dit dat zij moeten kunnen aantonen wat hun seksuele oriëntatie of genderidentiteit is. Daarnaast moet je als vluchteling ook kunnen aantonen dat je om die reden vervolgd wordt in je land van herkomst.’

Wie als holebi of transgender bescherming nodig heeft, moet dus met bewijzen klaarstaan. Maar hoe bewijs je zo een intiem aspect van je eigen identiteit?

Recht op privacy?

Het Belgische asielbeleid kiest voor een diepgaande aanpak. Een LGBT+-vluchteling moet tijdens de asielprocedure een resem uiterst persoonlijke vragen beantwoorden. De antwoorden dienen als bewijs om te bepalen of je de waarheid spreekt, zowel over je geaardheid of genderidentiteit als het risico op vervolging.

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‘Er is nergens een schriftelijke neerslag toegankelijk van de vragen die gesteld worden', weet Verhaeghe. 'Wel zijn de arresten, de verslagen van de interviews met de vluchtelingen, toegankelijk bij de Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen. Daarin staat de argumentatie waarom iemand al dan niet geloofd wordt.’

De arresten waarover Verhaeghe spreekt, zijn voor iedereen vrij in te kijken op de website van de Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwinstingen. Ze geven een beeld weer van de mogelijk gestelde vragen, die uiterst intiem zijn. Zo komt voornamelijk het seksuele verleden van de vluchteling aan bod. Maar ook traumatische onderwerpen, zoals geweldplegingen of verkrachtingen die de vluchteling in land van herkomst meemaakte, komen uitgebreid ter sprake.

Dit soort getuigenissen zijn persoonlijk en intiem van aard. De vraag is dan ook in welke mate het recht op privacy verzekerd blijft tijdens de ondervragingsprocedure. Advocaat Benoit Dhondt van Antigone Advocaten: ‘Vluchtelingen hebben net zo goed recht op privacy als eender wie. Al bevinden ze zich wel in een kwetsbare en erg ongelijke situatie, waarbij hun persoon en integriteit de inzet zijn van onderzoek. Uiteindelijk zijn ze afhankelijk van de dossierbehandelaar die hen interviewt en die beslist om hen al dan niet bescherming te verlenen.’

'Ze zullen je nooit vragen je privacy op te geven. Maar het idee is wel dat je uit vrije wil zeer intieme informatie deelt met de dossierbehandelaar.’

Vluchtelingen hebben volgens Dhondt de plicht om mee te werken, maar ze kunnen wel weigeren om persoonlijke informatie te delen. 'Men zal nooit vragen om je privacy op te geven. Maar het idee is wel dat je uit vrije wil zeer intieme informatie deelt met de dossierbehandelaar.’

Wat de gevolgen zijn als er toch geweigerd wordt, is volgens Dhondt moeilijk te zeggen. ‘Het staat vast dat bescherming niet kan en mag geweigerd worden enkel en alleen om die reden.'

Of er sprake is over inbreuk op de privacy, is moeilijk te beantwoorden en hangt ook af van de situatie. ‘Het mes snijdt aan twee kanten’, stelt Dhondt. 'Er wordt van LGBT+-vluchtelingen verwacht dat zij hard maken waarom zij hun land ontvluchten. Als ze toch weigeren om op bepaalde vragen te antwoorden, zullen ze moeten uitleggen waarom.'

'De vraag is of er een andere manier is om je geaardheid geloofwaardig te maken, en wat die dan zou zijn. Zelf ben ik daar niet uit. Het blijft een delicate zaak', concludeert Dhondt.

Onwetendheid

Behalve het intieme aspect van de vragen geven de arresten ook blijk van onwetendheid bij de dossierbehandelaars over de leefwereld van holebi’s en transgenders, en hoe zij hun geaardheid en genderidentiteit beleven. De arresten bevestigen dat er vaak twijfel heerst over de waarachtigheid van de getuigenis als de vluchteling ‘geen doorleefde verklaringen aflegde over de bewustwording’ van zijn geaardheid. Wat voor de dossierbehandelaars wel 'doorleefd' zou zijn, is moeilijk te zeggen.

Een mogelijk gevaar is dat getuigenissen te snel als ongeloofwaardig bestempeld worden. ‘Niet iedereen is even goed in het onder woorden brengen van gevoelens over zijn seksuele oriëntatie. Toch is het, volgens het migratiebeleid, ongeloofwaardig als LGBT+-vluchtelingen dat niet kunnen. Men veronderstelt dat deze vluchtelingen juist heel goed hebben nagedacht over hun geaardheid en dat zij daar blijk van kunnen geven.’ Een veronderstelling die volgens Verhaeghe fout is.

‘De indruk die ik krijg is dat de interviewer een checklist in zijn hoofd heeft: wanneer ben je LGBT+ en wanneer ben je dat niet?'

‘Hetzelfde geldt voor bewijzen’, voegt ze daaraan toe. ‘Men vraagt tastbare bewijzen die je seksuele oriëntatie bevestigen, maar dat is heel raar en moeilijk. Deze mensen moesten hun oriëntatie net

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verbergen in hun land van herkomst. Als er toch bewijzen zijn, dan worden die systematisch ongeloofwaardig verklaard.’

Verhaeghe stelt vast dat de interviews niet vertrekken vanuit de beleving van de vluchteling, maar vanuit enkele verwachtingspatronen. ‘De indruk die ik krijg is dat de interviewer een checklist in zijn hoofd heeft: wanneer ben je LGBT+ en wanneer ben je dat niet? Er wordt geen rekening gehouden met persoonlijke invulling.’ Afhankelijk van de verwachte antwoorden wordt de vluchteling geloofd of niet.

Checklist: ben je LGBT+ genoeg om asiel te krijgen?

Loes Verhaeghe (Universitair Centrum voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking) deed in een masterproef onderzoek naar de argumentatie die gebruikt wordt om de seksuele oriëntatie of genderidentiteit van LGBT+-vluchtelingen te beoordelen. Uit haar onderzoek kwamen acht punten naar voren die als een checklist telkens terugkeren tijdens de interviews met vluchtelingen. In deze checklist vallen veel tegenstrijdigheden op, vindt Verhaeghe:

1. Het belang van seksuele activiteit: iemand die dit niet centraal plaatst, wordt sneller geweigerd vanuit de veronderstelling dat de vluchteling in dat geval kan leven in het land van herkomst, zolang hij er een “discrete houding” op nahoudt. 2. Seksuele oriëntatie als primaire levensstijl en identiteit: het is ongeloofwaardig als de vluchteling niet actief op zoek ging naar een partner of relatie. Maar te veel risico’s nemen om een relatie te vinden of behouden, wordt ook als verdacht beschouwd. 3. Seksuele oriëntatie als stabiel: genderfluïditeit wordt vaak niet erkend. 4. Kennis van LGBT+-wetgeving en -organisatie: kennis wordt verwacht, maar dit is in realiteit niet vanzelfsprekend in landen waar de LGBT+-gemeenschap gecriminaliseerd wordt. 5. Kennis van LGBT+-scene in België: ook dit is niet vanzelfsprekend, aangezien niet elke vluchteling hierin geïnteresseerd is. 6. Bewijsmateriaal: er wordt vaak naar bewijsmateriaal gevraagd, maar dat wordt nauwelijks geloofd wanneer het aangereikt wordt. 7. Kunnen verwoorden van eigen gevoelsbeleving en identiteit: niet elke taal beschikt over de woorden om over zulke intieme onderwerpen te praten. Daarnaast kunnen tolken een persoonlijk gevoel niet altijd even goed vertalen. 8. Religie: vluchtelingen zijn verdacht wanneer zij religieus zijn, aangezien dit niet zou samengaan met hun geaardheid of genderidentiteit.

Slechts 7.606 mensen vroegen de laatste tien jaar asiel aan op basis van hun seksuele oriëntatie of genderidentiteit. Gemiddeld 31,8 procent daarvan krijgt daadwerkelijk bescherming in België. Dit cijfer ligt 5 procent lager dan het algemeen percentage van goedgekeurde asielaanvragen. Het risico op vervolging vanwege je seksuele oriëntatie of genderidentiteit biedt dus niet meer kansen op een succesvolle asielaanvraag. Integendeel zelfs: ‘Het Belgische asielbeleid lijkt er a priori van uit te gaan dat LGBT+-asielzoekers leugenaars en bedriegers zijn', stelt Verhaeghe.

Volgens Verhaeghe is expertise rond LGBT+ nog te sterk afwezig.

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Ze geeft aan dat er nood is aan meerdere expertisestemmen tijdens de procedures, zodat stereotiepe en subjectieve verwachtingspatronen kunnen worden vermeden. Die expertise over LGBT+- onderwerpen is nu nog te sterk afwezig, benadrukt Verhaeghe.

Een van de stereotypen die heersen is volgens Verhaeghe de gedachte dat LGBT+-vluchtelingen alleen angst, spijt of schaamte kunnen ervaren voor hun geaardheid. Zoals valt op te merken in de eindconclusie van een arrest: ‘Uit bovenstaande verklaringen blijkt geenszins dat u uw homoseksuele geaardheid als problematisch ervoer, terwijl uit uw verklaringen blijkt dat de Nigeriaanse maatschappij een overwegend homofobe houding aanneemt.’

Can you prove you’re straight?

Om het probleem onder de aandacht te brengen, voert UCOS een CHanGE-campagne. Die legt zich toe op gendergelijkheid en seksuele en reproductieve gezondheid, met een focus op de asielproblematiek bij LGBT+-vluchtelingen. De treffende slogan: ‘Can you prove you’re straight?’

Tien jongeren trokken voor die campagne naar Libanon, Marokko en Oeganda om te begrijpen waarom holebi’s en transgenders de vlucht wagen naar België. Mensen in de LGBT+-gemeenschap ondervinden daar nog veel vormen van discriminatie: moeilijkheden om werk en huisvesting te vinden, aangevallen worden op straat, geen erkenning en bescherming van de staat.

LGBT+-vluchtelingen moeten kunnen bewijzen wat hun geaardheid of genderidentiteit is.

Universitair Centrum voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking/Eline Andries

‘Er is geen enkele antidiscriminatiewet op basis van geaardheid die hen beschermt,’ stelt Gijs van Dyck, die als CHanGEmaker naar Libanon trok. ‘Discrimineren is op elk vlak toegestaan.’

De reis van de CHanGEmakers leverde zowel verhalen van ontreddering als hoop op. De deelnemers willen deze verhalen in België vertellen. ‘Migranten, zowel hetero als holebi, willen dat hun verhaal gehoord wordt’, zegt Latifah Abdou, die voor CHanGE naar Marokko reisde.

‘Migranten, zowel hetero als holebi, willen dat hun verhaal gehoord wordt.’

De deelnemers beseffen dat ze zich in een bijzonder geprivilegieerde positie bevinden. ‘We luisteren dan wel naar hun verhalen, maar eenmaal we weg zijn, blijft alles hetzelfde voor de LGBT+- gemeenschap’, stelt Linde Wyns. Dat ondervond ze na haar reis naar Oeganda. ‘Daar spreken ze nu zelfs weer over het invoeren van de doodstraf.’

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