The Electoral Impact of Wealth Redistribution Evidence from the Italian Land Reform ∗
The Electoral Impact of Wealth Redistribution Evidence from the Italian Land Reform ∗ Bruno Caprettini Lorenzo Casaburi Miriam Venturini† First Draft: November 2018 This Draft: February 1, 2019 Abstract We study the political consequences of a large land reform in Italy, which transferred more than 800,000 hectares of arable land from large to small owners. Using a panel spatial regression discontinuity design, we show that the reform benefited the incum- bent Christian Democrat party. The electoral benefits persist for four decades, until a major crisis in the Italian political system. We conjecture that the reform generated a cooperative political equilibrium in which voters in treated towns supported the can- didates and the agenda of the incumbent party, and the party promoted the interests of these towns. Analysis of fiscal transfers, public sector employment, and referendum voting supports this hypothesis. Keywords: land reform, redistribution, election, Italy. JEL Classification: . ∗We received valuable comments from Ciccio Amodio, Pietro Biroli, Enrico Cantoni, Matteo Cervellati, Stefano Gagliarducci, Luigi Guiso, Michael Kremer, Guilherme Lichand, Claudio Michelacci, Elias Papaioan- nou, Joachim Voth and participants at presentations held at EIEF, IADB, IMT, McGill, Milano Labor Lunch Seminars, SSE, Tor Vergata, U Bologna, U Maryland, U Wien, UPF, U Zurich and at the 2018 Swiss De- velopment Economics Network conference. Tommaso d'Amelio and Jelena Reljic provided excellent research assistance. We thank Massimiliano Baragona for help accessing the archives of the Italian Ministry of the Interior, Eleonora Cesareo for sharing material from ALSIA archive and Nunzio Primavera for very useful discussions. Bruno Caprettini acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation through the SNF Ambizione grant.
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