B u l l e t i n of The North American Paul Tillich Society

Volume XXX, Number 3 Summer 2004 Religious Studies Department Santa Clara University 336 Bannan Hall Santa Clara, CA 95053

PHILOSOPHY Editor: Frederick J. Parrella, Secretary-Treasurer, NAPTS CULTURE THEOLOGY Telephone: 408.554.4714 FAX: 408.554.2387 [email protected] www.NAPTS.org

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In this issue:

A Special Edition Die Judenfrage—ein christliches und ein deutsches Problem by Paul Tillich. Translated by Marion Pauck and Wilhelm Pauck, with an Introduction by Marion Pauck
“The Primacy of Ethics: Relationality in Buber, Tillich, and Levinas” by Guy B. Hammond
“Self, Otherness, Theology, and Ontology: A Critical Engagement between Tillich and Kristeva, Levinas, and Bataille” by Jonathan Rothchild
New Publications
Index of the Newsletter/Bulletin up to and including volume 29. Compiled by Matthew Lon weaver

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The Jewish Question: A Christian and a German Pauck for translating Die Judenfrage into English Problem and writing an Introduction. Die Judenfrage—ein christliches und ein deutsches Paul Tillich Problem consists of four lectures that Paul Tillich delivered in Berlin at the German Institute of Politics in the summer of 1953. The German text was pub- Translated by Marion Pauck lished as a monograph in Berlin by Weiss in 1953, and Wilhelm Pauck and can be found in Gesamelte Werke, Band III, Introduction by Marion Pauck 128-170.

Editor’s Note: Introduction

We are very grateful to Mutie Tillich Farris for per- Marion Pauck mission to publish Die Judenfrage in English for the Bulletin. We are also grateful to Marion Hausner Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 2

Fifty years ago, Paul Tillich handed me a mono- My friendships with many Jewish men and graph that had been published in Germany. It was women throughout my life and everywhere in the titled “Die Judenfrage: Ein Christliches und ein world have been amongst the most rewarding, intel- Deutsches Problem,” and it consisted of four lec- lectually and emotionally, that I have had. In the tures he had delivered in Berlin in 1953. The editors schools that I attended and in academic and publish- of a newly established Jewish journal had invited ing circles in which I moved, there was a mixture of Tillich to write a short article on the subject of Israel all nationalities and religions. Common interests in for them. Tillich, for whom I had done translation literature, music, and painting, both classical and work for several years, asked me to translate perti- avant guard drew us to one another. For me at least nent sections he selected from his lectures. He had a there was never a problem regarding my identifica- secondary reason for giving me this assignment. We tion with Christianity and my friendship with Jews. had become close friends by then and he knew that I And so, it was difficult for me to understand what had found it difficult to come to terms with my was happening in Germany and elsewhere. German heritage during the Second World War. After Wilhelm Pauck and I were married in As a native of New York and the offspring of 1964, we turned to our work on the biography of German born parents, I first became aware in 1936 Paul Tillich. It was Pauck also who urged me to of the evil treatment of Jewish persons in Western complete my translation of “Die Judenfrage” in the Europe, particularly in Germany by Hitler and his hope of publishing it. He helped me with the transla- henchmen. My parents had emigrated to America in tion by correcting my manuscript and occasionally 1920 and had become citizens and successful busi- rewriting small portions of the text; accordingly, I ness people. They wanted no part of Hitler’s Ger- have listed him as co-translator. But because the many. My mother, in fact, was extraordinarily liberal work was too short to publish separately, the transla- and progressive. She hired Irish Catholics, German tion lay for years in a chest in my study. When my and American Protestants, New York Jews, and even colleague and friend, Professor Frederick Parrella one African American to work for her in the cos- learned of its existence, he urged me to publish it in metic shop she owned. In the last case, her high so- the North American Paul Tillich Society Bulletin. I ciety clientele shied away from being treated by a have once again reviewed it, rendering certain pas- black person, no matter how gifted, and my mother sages more graceful and clear—at least I hope this is reluctantly was forced to let her go. the case—aware as I did so that much that Tillich My father, on the other hand, inherited his anti- wrote in 1953 is still, fortunately—and unfortu- Semitic and anti-Jewish prejudices from his father nately—relevant today. and tried in vain to pass them on to me. My resis- When Tillich delivered these lectures in Berlin, tance was enormous and put my father and me on a there were still ruins in that great city which had warpath early in life. The influence of my Lutheran been bombed and invaded by the Allies, and split pastor, Paul Scherer, and my experiences in school between east and west. In 1953, his audience was where Jews and Christians studied and played to- composed of overwhelmingly anti-Nazi intellectuals, gether daily, had already created a positive influence secular and ecclesiastical, former students and col- upon me. The paradox with which I lived was puz- leagues, family and friends. Perhaps because the war zling and painful: on the one hand, my father had had ended only eight years earlier, the listeners helped Austrian and German Jews relocate in Amer- wanted to disassociate themselves from the Holo- ica, feeding them and helping them find jobs. He caust and so the lectures were not met with the usual was very popular in these circles because he was enthusiasm. Passages concerned with “collective witty and well read. He liked, even loved, individual guilt”—albeit redefined by Tillich—were a major Jews. But his prejudice against Jews in general re- irritant. Yet, some members of the audience were mained and even hardened with old age. Yet, my freed by Tillich’s words. His brilliant, elegant analy- father and I loved one another very much and found sis, his historical knowledge and grasp of the relig- mutual joy and understanding in the world of music. ious background, his understanding of the relation- Tillich’s request was both practical and pastoral. He ship between Jews and Christians, and Jews and felt that I would understand my father and people Germans, are reflected in this tightly compressed like him better after I read the lectures and thus be monograph. both enlightened and consoled. And he was right. Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 3

Tillich’s analysis of both German and Jewish attempts to find peace. These multiple struggles history and character converge to help us understand threaten the peace not only of that region but also of the background of this seemingly eternal problem in the entire world. a new light. In the meantime, Germany has done a Tillich’s hope that Christians include space for great deal in the public and secular realm to prevent the Jews and other religious groups—allowing each another Holocaust but the Christian churches there to live next to the other, thus establishing a new have done less. Tillich urges them in these lectures community in order to preserve the old—has not to imitate the Protestant churches in America who been entirely fulfilled. Were he alive today he would began to remove anti-Semitic and anti-Jewish mate- doubtless call for a similar attitude between Muslims rial from Sunday School books. Although our own and Christians. Such hope is fulfilled, broken, and history of absorbing numerous groups of foreigners reborn. Nearly half a century later, we are forced to into our country came earlier and is far more exten- deal with the same problems we faced in our youth. sive than the German experience and although Jews Yet, we can learn from Tillich’s words, which are as in our country have been unusually successful and relevant today as they were when he delivered them. secure, even here now and then anti-Semitism and I am pleased and grateful that Erdmuthe Tillich anti-Judaism remain alive. Farris, to whom I dedicate this translation, has given As I write these words, I think of one of Til- us permission to publish it at long last. I thank her lich’s listeners in the audience in Berlin, a wonderful and I thank Frederick Parrella for the suggestion and man whom I interviewed during my tour of Ger- for his editorial assistance. Finally, I thank my friend many in 1963, collecting material for our biography. and teacher Paul Tillich, as well as my late husband His name is Harald Poelchau. He was an extraordi- Wilhelm Pauck, in memoriam. narily handsome man, tall, blonde, and blue eyed. I remember our first meeting and the laughter we







shared at the fact that we were representatives of Hitler’s ideal—only physically, I hasten to say. The Jewish Question: A Christian Poelchau was pastor at the prison in Spandau where and a German Problem he comforted the inmates because they had been brave enough to speak and act against Hitler. Indeed, Paul Tillich Poelchau risked his life many times to help Jews and non-Jews escape from Germany. When I exclaimed Lecture One how it was that he was never caught, he said, “I look like an Aryan, Hitler’s ideal.” I find it difficult to speak about this subject be- In that same audience, there were a handful of cause I am used to working with comparatively clear persons who studied with Tillich but who supported concepts. The three decisive concepts of these lec- Hitler and criticized Tillich’s lectures in private con- tures are vague. The concept “Jewish Question” is ference. In his travel diary, Tillich remarked that it an indefinite one. What is “the Jewish question”? was a supreme irony that students of his should have Does it refer to the sociological function of the Jews become Nazis but he remained friends with them as a minority, a function that Judaism has fulfilled nevertheless, trying but failing to change their for thousands of years—which other groups, how- minds. ever, have also fulfilled—or does, the “Jewish ques- In 1953, Berlin was the center of a world di- tion” refer to the religious function of the Jews as a vided between east and west, between communism sacramental community? If this is the case, what is and democracy. Today, after the cessation of the the relationship between the sociological and the cold war, and at a time when the United States of sacramental elements involved? America is the sole superpower, the world is divided The ambiguity of the concept “Jew” produces again. The Muslim and the Judeo-Christian worlds further difficulties. What is the meaning of the con- are pitted against one another. For the first time in cept? Does the concept refer to Jews who live as our history, America has become the object of ter- guests, as oppressed people, or as exiles in foreign rorist attacks. The problems that Tillich foresaw re- countries? Does it refer to the members of the state garding Israel’s theocracy are now full blown. The of Israel? What is the relationship between these two Palestinian–Israeli struggles seem to worsen despite groups? Is the Jew one who actively participates in Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 4 the Jewish sacramental community? Is he the one overcome by means of a clear definition of the prob- whose ancestors once belonged to Judaism and then lem before us. What is decisive are the human and divorced themselves from the Jewish community? personal difficulties which one encounters as one Or is the Jew one who was baptized and acknowl- deals with this subject. One is not equally involved edges a humanism beyond confessional religion? in everything about which one lectures. The distance Are we talking about Jewish identity as a religious of the speaker from his subject can be smaller or reality, or are we talking about it as a race? I do not greater. In my case, the distance between my subject believe that there is a Jewish race, as I do not believe and me is as small as possible. there is an Aryan race. But if there were, my ques- It has been my fate to participate in the questions tion would be: is our subject the race problem, or that arise in my lecture. They are existential ques- does the Jewish question involve something special, tions for me. As a Christian theologian, I have taken a race that is, nevertheless, something different from part in Jewish-Christian discussions for decades. I a race? Is the Jewish person a representative of one have experienced the entire burden of these prob- of the eleven great religions that have universal lems that today, as at the beginning of the Christian character, or do we speak—if we speak as Chris- era, excite theological thought. I am not talking tians—about a Jewish person as the forerunner of about the nonsense that is often uttered in these de- Christianity? These are some of the problems that bates, but rather about the questions that ultimately the word “Jew” brings to mind. concern man as man and about which I have strug- The other words in the title of these lectures are gled with my Jewish friends when I have discussed also ambiguous. The word “Christian” can mean the these problems with them. Another reason for my Christian principle that transcends historical Christi- existential involvement in the problems of my sub- anity, be it in the form of a Catholic or in the form of ject is that I am German-born. As an emigrant in the a Protestant expression of this principle. Or “Chris- catastrophic year of 1933, I sided with those who tian” can mean the Christian churches in the past and opposed everything that happened that year in Ger- present, the reality of church history, and the relation many, especially everything that Germany inflicted of the churches to Christian principles. “Christian” on the European Jews. A third reason for my exis- can mean the countries in which a so-called Chris- tential involvement is that for many years Jews have tian culture thrives. I say “so-called” because it is a been among my most intimate friends. Under such very derivative and completely imperfect form of circumstances, discussion of such a subject is diffi- Christian development. The word “Christian” can cult. However, it is even more difficult because my mean all these things. listeners are also existentially involved. There are The word “German” has a many sided meaning. Jews and Germans in this room. At the very outset, It can mean two things. It can mean that there is therefore, one who undertakes to speak to Germans something in the nature of the German character, about Germany and Judaism will be brought face to which makes Judaism positively, or negatively, a face with the German problem in all its radicalness. German problem. It is immaterial, in that case, For it leads up to the question which I shall not try to whether one relates the German character to some avoid, although the temptation to do so is very great, sort of biological factor, or whether one looks upon namely, to the question of collective guilt. I owe you it as a product of German history. In any case, it is an honest word about this problem. Without such a the German character then which poses the problem. word, something unexpressed would remain in the Or is it something completely different? Is it a background of my lecture, and this would disquiet unique situation, is it a catastrophe in German his- you. Hence, I shall speak frankly about it. tory, which created the problem “Judaism and Ger- What is the meaning of collective and individual man Politics”? The word “German” itself as we use guilt? Guilt can mean that one is the direct and im- it in this lecture is ambiguous. mediate cause of an act that renders one guilty. I In what sense, therefore, should the concepts, know that only specific groups of the German nation “Jewish question,” “German,” and “Christian” be are guilty in this sense. Resistance to the concept of used? I believe that we cannot exclude any of the collective guilt is understandable if guilt, in this meanings I have mentioned. They belong together sense, is used as the immediate cause for what hap- and depend on one another. The semantic difficulties pened. I should say therefore that guilt in the sense are not decisive, for to a certain extent they can be of immediate cause cannot be laid upon the German Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 5 nation as a whole. It is the guilt of limited groups can bear to look at himself in a mirror? Everyone and individuals. looks away from his own reflection. That is the psy- There exists a second concept of guilt, namely chological mechanism either in the self or in others. guilt in the sense of the failure to live up to respon- I now come to a fourth concept of guilt, which sibility. Every German is guilty in this sense, includ- is similar to the third, namely, guilt in the sense of ing those who became victims as well as those who forgetting. That is the same psychological mecha- emigrated. I have never failed to make clear to my nism turned toward the future. One does not want to friends in America that I considered myself guilty in know, i.e., one does not want to remember; one the sense of being responsible for what happened. wants to forget. This kind of guilt has become so Why? Because during the years when those who powerful since 1945 that it can lead to disaster. For- committed these crimes prepared for the assumption getting does not mean that one actually forgets, or of political power, we were not strong enough to that one does not think about what happened in hinder them. Nor were we sufficiently one’s daily life. Who thinks of guilt in daily life? self-sacrificing, even when we uttered protests and Forgetting does mean not allowing what has hap- thereby became emigrants or victims. Since the mid- pened to influence the future. It means erasing what dle of the 1920’s, we had sensed what was about to has happened as a factor for the future. This is deci- happen. Often I told my friends how, as in a vision, I sive for the guilt of forgetting. Max Scheler has writ- saw German cities in ruins, exactly as I see Berlin in ten an essay on contrition; it is one of his best. In it, ruins today twenty-five years later. The feeling of he clearly shows that contrition is not a sentimental what was about to happen became stronger to the feeling of pain about the past, but rather the expul- degree by which the powers that would bring about sion of something false from the inner life. To what destruction appeared irresistible. But what does the extent can this expulsion take place; to what extent word “irresistible” in history mean? It means that we does it ever take place? Everything depends on this: were not strong enough to resist what was to come, that those elements which have induced the anti- although we sensed that it would come. That is guilt Semitic madness be driven from the soul, that they in the second sense of the word, and that is the guilt not be forgotten, not be suppressed, not be hidden, of all Germans before 1933, no matter what became but that they be acknowledged and banished, ac- of them. companied by the pain of repentance. The last two In the third sense, guilt means guilt of suppres- forms of guilt have partially unconscious causes. sion of knowledge. This is a deep psychological Therefore, they are tragic, and yet they are “guilt,” problem because it does not involve conscious acts, for one can know about them. nor completely unconscious acts; rather this guilt Finally, I should like to mention a fifth kind of involves acts that are suspended between conscious- guilt of which one is completely conscious, namely ness and unconsciousness. We knew what was hap- the calculating consideration on the basis of which pening, and yet we did not know. I believe everyone one says, “We have done evil but we have also suf- who tells me he did not know, and yet I do not be- fered accordingly. Others have suffered through us, lieve anyone. For I am convinced that if anyone did and now we have suffered through them: we are not want to know, one nevertheless knew enough so even.” I should like to make a theological remark that one was compelled to suppress what one knew. about this. There are two forms of justice. One is the This kind of guilt produces serious psychological justice of proportion. It calculates as follows: “I have and ethical problems. If someone says, “I do not done such and such. Therefore, I deserve such and want to know. I wash my hands of it,” then that is an such. Therefore, for what I have done I have re- example of completely simple guilt; certainly many ceived what I deserve. “ There is a level on which did just this but they are not significant. The many such proportional thinking is unavoidable both in who wanted to know and yet were unable to accept daily life and in the administration of the law. We all the knowledge that pressed in upon them are signifi- calculate what we and others deserve. A lawyer does cant. This is the third kind of guilt. Such guilt ap- so systematically when he seeks to find the right peared only after 1933, and those who were not in proportion between guilt and punishment. Justice is Germany have no part in it. We do not condemn not possible without the element of proportion that them, for we all suppress things that we cannot bear Aristotle defined as the “nature of justice.” to know. What man of even the slightest sensitivity Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 6

But there is another definition of the concept of logically developed as well as culturally acquired justice. It does not deny the proportional element but qualities. One can hardly object to such a concept of transcends it: I am thinking of the Old and New Tes- race from either a humanistic or a religious stand- tament concepts of justice. It recognizes the viola- point. It must remain clear, however, that such a tion of justice and the consequences of the injustice concept involves neither ethical nor religious values. that follow. But this is not the final word. The goal A morally mature or a religiously charismatic person of justice is the reunion of that which has been sepa- is not identical with one we call noble. rated through injustice, God and human beings, one Another concept of race is the descriptive, bio- human being and another human being, one group logical concept of races of humankind, who are dis- and another group. The point of this idea of justice is tinguished by specific physical marks. It is not pos- the justification of the unjust man. But such justice sible to object on a humanistic or Christian basis and the reunion effected by it are possible only if the against this concept either, so long as it is not identi- violation of justice has been acknowledged, and nei- fied with the vertical concept of race, or so long as it ther forgotten nor regarded as settled in the balance is not connected with ethical or religious values. of guilt and punishment. Reuniting justice presup- This, however, is exactly what was done by the pro- poses the acknowledgment and expulsion of its ponents of naturalistic race theories in the second causes. The judgment, “We have suffered equally: half of the 19th century; it led to the anti-Semitic hor- now everything is in order,” contradicts the basic rors of the 20th century. Christian anti-Judaism is law of life as it is expressed in the Biblical idea of completely different from the horizontal concept of justice. The question is this: is reunion possible and race and from the anti-Semitism that resulted there what is necessary to make reunion a reality? from. Anti-Judaism exists throughout church history The distinction between anti-Judaism and anti- and exhibits a tragic guilt of the church. Semitism is of the greatest significance for the un- When we look at the earliest parts of the Gos- derstanding of our problem. Therefore, I wish to pels, we find that Jesus felt he was sent to the Jews. present a brief historical survey of the relationship He was pushed beyond this limit only by special between them. Anti-Judaism is a word I first en- events. The calling of the twelve apostles and the countered when in connection with a study of anti- restoration of the twelve after Judas’s withdrawal is Semitism I was asked to express the attitude of the not an incidental but an intentionally symbolic ac- Catholic and Protestant churches toward the Jewish tion. It means that according to the judgment of the problem. Anyone—a theologian, a church historian, primitive church, Jesus intended to continue the or a secular historian—who studies this problem will Jewish tradition. The church is symbolized by the be surprised and will be forced to recognize the dis- twelve tribes of Israel. It is not the suspension but tinction between anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism. the completion of the Old Testament congregation, The word “anti-Semitism” originated in the 1880’s, naturally not on a national but on a universal basis. during the period of philosophical naturalism. It is a This train of thought contains no anti-Judaism. transformation of the more basic concept of anti- There is also no anti-Judaism in Paul despite his Judaism. It did not exist earlier because theories of radical break with Judaism and his struggle with race arose only at this time in England and France, “Judaizers” in the Christian congregations. Judaism but not to begin with in Germany. was and remained the problem of his life, the prob- It is possible to distinguish between two con- lem of his own existence as a Jewish Christian. The cepts of race: the vertical and the horizontal. The theory he advances in the ninth and eleventh chap- German word rassig has several meanings. When ters of Romans is a profound contribution to the in- applied to human beings, it means “blue blood” or terpretation of history. Judaism has a continuing noble when we want to point to characteristics that function even in the new age. The Jews will not have developed for generations in certain families. cease to exist so long as there are pagans on the The word rassig, which is always used in a positive earth. It is my conviction that this is the Christian sense, can be applied to animals as well as to people, answer to the Jewish question as such. In any case, for example, a “blue-blooded” or “spirited” horse. this answer does not contain anything anti-Jewish. It The word can be used in reference to individuals as is the “no” and the “yes” of Christianity to that well as to groups. In the latter case, it can be equated which is Jewish in the Christian world. Paul himself with the aristocratic principle and it includes bio- would have been (as he himself writes) ready to sac- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 7 rifice the salvation of his soul for the salvation of the knowledge their authority are cut off from every Jewish people. For these and other reasons, many other tradition. As soon as other possibilities appear, anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic Christians consider him however, the unity of consciousness, and therefore to be too Jewish, while no one has been or is still as the security of authority, is threatened. The Jews fiercely opposed as he is on the part of the Jews. represent another tradition, and not only Christianity Anti-Judaism is born at the moment when Chris- but also Islam depended on it. This is the back- tianity comes into the pagan world and must inter- ground of the laws of segregation that were pro- pret itself to paganism. This occurs in the fourth claimed by Innocent III and his successors. It was Gospel that, as is well known, put words into Jesus’ not anti-Semitism but anti-Judaism that dictated mouth in which early Christianity attempts to answer these laws, or to put the matter still more precisely: the questions and problems that were presented to it it was the church’s fear of Jewish influence on its by the pagan world. The author of John attempts to members that produced these laws. When one com- show that the leaders of Judaism, and not Pilate, the pares these laws with Hitler’s so-called Nuremberg Roman procurator, were responsible for the sentenc- laws against the Jewish people, one finds that the ing of Jesus. No Jewish authority had power over decrees of the Nazis are at many points an imitation life and death. In John, Pilate appears as a skeptic of the papal decrees. Jews were forced to wear who is as little convinced of Jesus’ message as he is sashes that marked them as Jews. A Jewish person of the accusation of the Jews, and therefore tries eve- was not permitted to have Christian household help. rything to save Jesus. Pilate is pictured as a weak The Ghetto was more tightly closed. These and other character, as incapable of withstanding the pressure similar laws are found in the papal Bull of the 13th of the Jews, but not as one actually guilty himself. century. The basis of these laws was always the The Jews and the Jews alone are guilty. The mean- curse which, according to Biblical concepts, the ing of this conception is made clear in a later devel- Jews brought upon themselves and their descendants opment of the Pilate legend. We are told of the con- through the crucifixion of Jesus. This is anti-Judaism version of Pilate to Christianity, and of his repen- plain and simple, but it is not anti-Semitism. tance that ultimately causes him to become a saint. I shall again pass over several centuries and In the Egyptian Pilate legend, he does appear as a come to Luther and the Reformation. At the begin- real saint. Although this legend has no historical ning of the Reformation, Luther was convinced that value, it does reveal the attitude of mind which in- the purification of Christianity from heathen ele- creasingly asserted itself and for which we can have ments, which he proposed, would enable the Jews to no other name than anti-Judaism. join the Christian church. In the eyes of the Jews, the I will pass over the next centuries to the year Catholic sacramental system, including its chris- 1215 in which the Fourth Lateran Council took place tological presuppositions, was idolatrous and a de- under Innocent III, the most powerful of the popes. monic abomination. Especially the Mass was judged This year represents the high point of the develop- in this way. Nothing could contradict the Jewish ment of the Middle Ages. At this council, the pope prophetic consciousness as much as the objectifica- proclaimed laws regarding the Jews that had two tion of God through the priestly transubstantiation of sides. On the one hand, the new laws stressed that bread and wine into the body and blood of the incar- the popes were protectors of the Jews and felt nate God. Luther’s criticism of the Mass and its obliged to shield them from the brutal exploitation theological suppositions was similar to this and had of the aristocracy. This corresponded to an old tradi- the same prophetic background. Therefore, Luther tion. On the other hand, Innocent III began the believed that the Jews would be ready to join Chris- struggle against the emerging heresies of the Albi- tianity after the removal of this fundamental offense. gensians and Waldensians and against older In one of his early writings, he expressed himself Manichaean undercurrents as they were represented very positively about the Jews of his time. But his by the Cathari. The Roman church felt itself threat- hope was disappointed. There were elements in ened. It feared that the unity of tradition would be Christianity, common to Catholics and Protestants, lost, and traditions other than its own would enter which made it impossible for the Jews to become into the consciousness of occidental humankind. Christians. It was, however, more than a disap- All authoritarian systems are filled with this pointment that later moved Luther to speak out fear. They feel secure so long as those who ac- against the Jews. He believed, with Paul, that once Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 8

the Jews were converted, the end of history would be nourishment from this often unconscious anti- reached. He hoped for the Last Day. He did not want Judaism of the Christian churches. history to continue, since he understood clearly the In America, the situation seems to be much more destructive consequences of the power politics of his favorable. Liberal Protestantism and liberal Judaism time and he continually suffered from them himself. work together on many levels. It is possible without He spoke of the “dear Judgment day” and waited for much hesitation to invite a Rabbi to speak in a signs of its appearance. But one decisive sign, Christian church. I myself have spoken in syna- namely the conversion of the Jews, did not come to gogues, and occasionally even in a liturgical setting. pass. This led him to his angry attack on the stub- This is astonishingly mature from the point of view bornness of the Jewish people. As a result, Christian of human partnership and mutual understanding. But anti-Judaism took hold in the churches of the Ref- it is no solution to the Christian-Jewish problem. It ormation. In all Christian churches, the Jews of must be presupposed that both religions must leave every generation are burdened with the guilt of the aside as much of their concrete teachings and forms condemnation of Jesus. of worship so that what will remain is merely a rela- It is worth looking at this reproach in the light of tively unsubstantial and unsatisfactory moralism. our analysis of the concept of guilt. Then one imme- The problem of these religions and their relationship diately sees the absurdity of this accusation. None of to one another cannot be solved in any way by the concepts of guilt I have mentioned can be ap- subtraction. plied to this phenomenon. One can hardly say that One criterion for the attitude of Christians to- all the Jewish people who lived at the time of Jesus ward anti-Judaism is their position toward the mis- were responsible for the crucifixion. The accounts sions to the Jews. A group of leading American do not show at all that the same people who greeted theologians who meet twice a year for several days, him with “Hallelujahs” as he entered Jerusalem were once discussed at one of these meetings, in an inter- those who cried, “Crucify Him!” Those who called esting and, for me, a very important way, the ques- for his crucifixion were probably groups stirred up tion of the mission to the Jews. We were very doubt- by the leaders of the people, the mob that at all times ful that such a mission was possible, and if so, under allows itself to be used for such actions. Whatever what circumstances. There was a tendency to con- the historical fact may be, the most we can say is fine the mission to the Jews to those who had broken that the people as a whole did not support Jesus and inwardly with Judaism and should therefore find a were therefore indirectly responsible for what hap- way to Christianity. In any case, there was no clear pened. But one must ask what this very indirect re- answer to the question of the meaning of the mission sponsibility has to do with those who were children to the Jews. I myself agreed with these theologians at that time or not yet born, and what it has to do who said that an active missionary drive from the with all the Jews who were born since then? Yet, Christian side directed to believing Jews is in most this absurd thought is raised again and again in the cases psychologically and sociologically impossible. catechisms and in the teachings of both church tradi- What is possible, however, is a readiness on the part tions. In America, there existed at one time a com- of Christians to receive Jews in such cases where the mission that was appointed to examine Sunday Jewish person has recognized his existential bounda- School textbooks for negative comments about Juda- ries and then has raised the question about what lies ism. Everywhere, anti-Jewish and in some cases beyond. In such cases, the Christian can try to show even anti-Semitic statements were found. This is the that Christian symbols can provide an answer to the constant tragic guilt of the Christian church. It would inner conflict of Judaism. This is not active but pas- be desirable for the German churches to also make sive mission to the Jews. I would not be willing to such an investigation. If, as I hear, it is already being go beyond this. The experience of the Bible and done in certain places, it should be done very thor- church history shows that only in the rarest possible oughly. From my own youth, I remember vividly the cases is it meaningful to do so. impression that anti-Jewish teaching makes on I should like to end this survey of the relation- Christian young people. We sensed the ways of the ship between the Christian churches and the Jewish Jews as ominous and were inclined to see in every question with a reference to the experience that the Jew someone who helped to crucify Jesus. In the last churches had under Hitler. In National Socialism, hundred years, conscious anti-Semitism has drawn religious anti-Judaism was turned into racial anti- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 9

Semitism. The Christians who were at first confused dealt with the development of intellectual history and could not pluck up enough courage to take a from the time of Spinoza, a Jew, through classical clear stand against the early anti-Semitic acts of Hit- German poetry and philosophy, to Marx, also a Jew. ler, soon discovered that the attack upon Judaism as I showed how the rational Jewish mystic Spinoza Judaism was also an attack upon Christianity. One influenced the greatest period of German poetry and realized that, not only in Germany but also every- philosophy, and how at the end of this period the where in the Christian church, a fundamental attack rational Jewish ethicist, Marx, functioned as its on Christianity must begin with a fundamental attack critic. In 1933, people did not hear such facts gladly. on Judaism. Historically, this was a renewal of an As I left the assembly hall, I heard some colleagues ancient experience of the churches. The most dan- say to one another, “Now they even want to make us gerous threat to early Christianity was not the perse- into Jews.” This foolish comment implies a serious cution of Christians but rather the Gnostic- problem, namely the question, “Are there structural syncretistic religion of later antiquity. It tried to analogies between the Jewish and the German char- unite elements of many religions within itself and acter?” I am convinced that such analogies exist, and absorb Christ as a central figure. But it excluded the I have been confirmed in this conviction by my ex- Old Testament and thereby cut off Christianity from periences as an emigrant. It was astonishing to see its historical roots. The church was forced to fight a how many of my Jewish friends, how many Jews in battle of life and death in those days. The church, general, identified themselves with German culture therefore, decided that the New Testament cannot even after the catastrophe. In all of them, one could exist without the Old Testament. It realized that the feel a yearning for the Germany where they had Christ who is separated from the spirit of the Old grown up, and which had molded them. This yearn- Testament prophecy becomes one among many pa- ing was kept alive even underneath the hatred of gan mystery gods. This was at stake in the Gnostic wounded love. By contrast, many non-Jewish émi- movement and this was at stake in National Social- grés, including myself, felt emigration to be an ob- ism, as well in every type of religious nationalism, jective political fact with which they had to come to which is in no case limited to Germany alone. In terms. order to transform Jesus into a cultic God next to One would have expected the opposite. And yet, others, or into a national leader or prophet, one must the fact of which I speak is understandable. Since the lift him out of the context of Old Testament proph- period of the emancipation, a close connection had ecy. For this prophecy was engaged in continual been achieved between German culture and Judaism. struggle with the religious nationalism of its time. Mendelsohn was the philosopher of the Enlighten- The New Testament stands in the continuity of this ment, Spinoza was the saint of Romanticism, Rahel fight or struggle. If the continuity is interrupted, the Varnhagen was the source of its inspiration, and New Testament becomes invalid. This is what the German youth found its poetic voice in Heinrich Christian church knew when it decided that the Old Heine. Nineteenth century philosophy in its neo- Testament is the foundation of the New Testament. Kantian form felt the impact of the philosopher In its stand against National Socialism, the church Cohen; the social revolution became historically ar- experienced once again what it had experienced in ticulate in Marx. Many other examples could be its stand against Gnosticism in the third century: the mentioned. It is amazing to note how quickly the spirit of prophetic Judaism is the only spirit which Jews supplied creative forces to German culture af- can protect the church from sinking back into a na- ter their emancipation, and how, because of a deep tional religion, i.e. heathenism. affinity, a fruitful interpenetration took place. It is difficult to find an explanation for this without Lecture Two pointing to similarities in the spiritual structure of both cultures. Now I want to talk about the Jewish question as The first fact that I would like to mention is that a German problem. I recall an episode that occurred once in their history, both groups, the Germans as in 1933, shortly before Hitler came to power. The well as the Jews, experienced a prophetic movement rector of the University of Frankfurt, where I was of reform: the Jews in Prophecy, the Germans in the professor of philosophy, asked me to deliver the Reformation. Both movements represent a break in university Founders Day Lecture. In this lecture, I the immediate national self-realization of those con- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 10 cerned. In both cases, in Prophetism as well as in the A counterweight to this negative feeling has de- Reformation, something unconditional broke into veloped in both peoples. In certain respects, all na- the relativities and ambiguities of the national proc- tions are conscious of being chosen, but this is more ess of self-realization: the unconditional represented strongly developed in the Jews and in the Germans both judgment and demand. In both cases, national than anywhere else, and has assumed among them self-realization was never again achieved; and the special forms. Allow me, in order to show you what break was never healed. It determined the history of I mean, to point to the consciousness of election both peoples. The Jews ceased to be a people of among the most important western nations. In Aris- space after the break. They became a people of time. totle’s Politics, we find an explanation of the fact The break that the Reformation brought about in that the Greeks are the only people who possess cul- Germany produced a territorial insecurity and world- ture, while all other nations are barbaric. Aristotle historical late onset of this special self-realization of seeks to explain this in spatial-climatic terms. The the German nation. Therefore, we find in both peo- Greeks live neither in the east nor in the west, nei- ples a surprisingly unique emphasis on space as a ther in the north nor in the south; they are the people metaphysical problem. We are not concerned with of the middle. When we talk of the people of the the fact that space as the basis of national self- middle, we are reminded of the Chinese conscious- realization is an actual problem of politics every- ness of being called. The Roman consciousness of where; rather, we are concerned with the fact that in calling is well known. They did not say, “We have both cases the space problem was experienced as a conquered a country.” They said, “We have brought metaphysical problem, namely as a problem of the this land back under the jurisdiction of the Roman final meaning of national existence. people.” The Romans felt that they represented the A second structural analogy closely related to Law and this consciousness made them certain that the first is the spiritual inner strife one finds in both their imperialism was justified by destiny. In the peoples. It is frequently expressed in a mixture of Italians of the Renaissance, we find the feeling that self-hatred and self-over-estimation. I believe that an entire generation is born again, and as it were, on when I make this statement it will be understood by the ground of the old Roman Empire. Renascimento both Germans and Jews. Naturally, we try as hard as does not mean rebirth of a few individuals or rebirth possible to hide this fact from ourselves. Yet, every of the arts and sciences, but it means the rebirth of German who has spent much time with Jews, espe- the humanity of a certain age. cially liberal Jews, and every foreigner who is in a The French concept of election is something dif- position to regard the Germans objectively, will find ferent. They felt themselves to be the bearers of this strange and contradictory mixture. In both cases, modern civilization and thus they justified the impe- it represents destiny as well as character. “A man’s rialism of their Revolution and of the Napoleonic character is his fate,” says Heraclitus, and we can age. The English consciousness of being called can add, “His fate gives man his character.” It is a well- be described as the consciousness of a nation that it known fact that with few exceptions all great Ger- was their destiny to bring a purified Christianity, mans have devastatingly criticized the German peo- namely Protestantism, and Christian humanism to ple. This criticism is something different from the the backward peoples of the earth. The American natural self-criticism that we find in all peoples, and sense of calling involves a new beginning, made in which is a necessary and healthy corrective of their America, after the demons and conflicts of ancient self-acceptance. The great Germans who make this Europe had been forgotten. In the Middle Ages, the criticism do not do so in the hope that they can Germans too, had a sense of calling in the con- change the German character; rather their criticism sciousness of being the national center of unified is an act of despair. On the other hand, one finds in Christianity. And for the medieval German emper- contemporary Judaism a certain anti-Semitism that ors, this was not an ideology but reality. But when is exhibited again and again even by the most intel- we come to modern times, we find no genuine sense ligent and critical Jews. This is particularly sharply of calling in the German people. As a result, it was expressed in Marx’s writings about the Jews. This possible for Hitler to proclaim the absurdities of a background lends the Jewish wit its distinctive char- racial sense of vocation and, in as much as he was acter. filling a vacuum, he was successful. The other pos- sibility, realized in the so-called Realpolitik of the Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 11

19th century, was the powerful political nationalism found their intellectual defender in a Jew who had of the Wilhelminian period. The ugliness and brutal- given up the naturally liberal, critical attitude of the ity of this period can only be understood when one is Jews. In his political theory, he fought for the very aware that it was not united with a consciousness of order of society that had always suppressed him as a election. It is not my purpose to maintain that other Jew and by which he could expect to be attacked at peoples are better than the Germans. I am much any moment in his own emancipated status. In this more concerned with historical destiny. When power connection, Christian theologians of Jewish heritage and consciousness of being elected are united, power are also interesting. After their conversion to Chris- ceases to be brutal power. For a unity is then pro- tianity, they are more radical in their criticism of duced which derives itself from the deepest roots of Judaism than any other Christian theologian. They being, from the unity of being and value to the deny that from which they come. They are often of ground of being itself. Where this unity is lost, self- the greatest value to Christian theology because they contempt is produced on the one side, and brutal, un- see things that the native Christian theologian does ideological will-to-power on the other. not see. They themselves, however, are divided: they With the Jews, things are somewhat different. must suppress something in themselves and there- We have mentioned the religiously-based con- fore they become fanatic. Here also, we find analo- sciousness of election as it is expressed in the Old gies between the Jewish and German existence. In Testament, where it applied first to the nation as a both cases, the denial of self seeks ways in which to whole, and then “to the Remnant that was to be express itself. saved.” Prophetic criticism understood the con- The prophetic break, which both people experi- sciousness of election in this way. The Jewish con- enced in their efforts to achieve national self- sciousness of being called becomes dangerous only realization, has not only psychological but also so- when it loses its religious corrective. As a result, it is ciological consequences. I mean that there is a gulf transformed into nationalism without self-criticism. between the few who rise far above the average, not Among the Germans as well as the Jews, a false only of their own people but also of others, and the consciousness of being elected produces inner masses that are often inferior to the average of other schism and despair. Despair is the expression of an peoples. In a nation that has experienced no such insurmountable schism. The wish to flee the self fol- break, the representative personality emerges from lows from despair. One of the least harmful and im- the substance of the nation. It certainly does not portant forms of this wish to flee the self is the merely reflect this substance. It transcends it in the yearning for the unknown. This yearning is to be direction of the new that makes history, but only in found to a greater degree in Germany than in any so far as this transcendence remains understandable other nation I know. We all know about the yearning to the average person. One can still observe this to- of the Germans for Greece during a classical period, day in England. The great leaders are not separated the ever fresh and new yearning for Italy, the wish to in their substance from the masses. In Germany, the imitate the French or the English, the hope for Rus- great leaders were always isolated. The masses never sia and Asia. As soon as this yearning is fulfilled, understood these leaders as an expression of their and the German settles in one of these nations, he own consciousness. This is how the despair of so disappears among them as a German more rapidly many great Germans becomes understandable. This than do the members of any other nation. This can is why the greatest bearers of culture in Germany only be understood as the secret wish of the Ger- tended to shut themselves off and to oppose the mans to deny themselves as Germans. masses. I have in mind for instance the German clas- An analogy to this is the Jewish ability to adjust sicists, above all Goethe, or the revolutionary groups to every given situation. It is false to explain this of the mid-19th century, for example, Nietzsche. If, ability as purely pragmatic. Other minorities, who however, the leaders are not symbolic of what hap- were in much greater need have refrained from do- pens in the masses, if they do not represent the un- ing so. Behind the adaptability lies the deepest root conscious goal of average people, then the nations of a lack of self-affirmation. An interesting proof of themselves remain unformed. If we look at other this is the emergence of a conservative Jew, of a western nations, we observe in England the effect of man like Stahl, who became the great theoretician of the gentleman ideal on every individual Englishman, the German conservative party. The conservatives of the citizen ideal on every individual Frenchman, Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 12 of the ideal of the rights of man on every individual now like to turn—factors that were certainly opera- American. These ideals were created by a small tive but perhaps not finally decisive. group of leading individuals, but since they were There is an extensive literature on the political expressions of that towards which the nation as a and social origins of recent events in Germany. As whole struggled, they possessed an extraordinary far as economics is concerned, I am dependent on formative power. the analyses of experts. It seems to me correct to say, As a young man, when I encountered French however, that in capitalistic society the Jews re- workers in the streets of Paris for the first time, I ceived protection from the ruling class because they was astonished at the degree to which these people were indispensable as brokers of capital. The more appeared to be civilized. In Germany, there pre- this free brokerage of capital declined in importance vailed the ideal of the civil servant, and above it, as as a result of the development of monopolistic and the highest, the ideal of the officer, which only few state capitalism, the more the rule of the Jews de- could attain. But the ideal of the civil servant is not creased and the more they lost the protection of the able to form human bonds except those that concern ruling classes. But the question is, why do the Jews the official intercourse between civil servants and need such protection? And why do the attacks and citizens. The civil servant ideal creates objective persecutions set in when the protecting groups are no relations but no direct human contacts, or person-to- longer interested in exercising their function? I have person encounters. In this respect, therefore, a vac- already described the origin and development of re- uum was formed. Human contacts remained unde- ligious anti-Judaism. With respect to the present veloped, and they are still undeveloped today, if one situation, it is important to understand why religious compares them with what has been attained in other anti-Judaism developed into political anti-Judaism countries. National Socialism broke into this signifi- and why political anti-Judaism developed into po- cant gap, for it found no resistance in a fully devel- litical anti-Semitism. It is well known that Germany oped reality of human relations. This fact is not did not initiate this development. In the realm of changed by the observation that individual relation- theory, the French and the English were in the lead. ships in Germany achieve a depth, which in other The social (but never the political) segregation of the nations is often made impossible by the general Jews was much more effective in America than in standardization of these relations. pre-Hitler Germany. On the other hand, in America In the Jewish situation, the analogy is as fol- Jews segregate themselves voluntarily to a much lows: there are, on the one hand, individuals who are larger extent than anywhere in western Europe since the bearers of the prophetic spirit and of the highest the time of the emancipation. The city of New York cultural development. On the other hand, there is the contains the largest and most influential Jewish average man who never adjusts himself completely population in the world. It is the largest Jewish city to the standards created by the rest of the world in anywhere. But the Jews are concentrated in special which the greater number of Jews must live. The sections of the city, and this segregation is volun- entire history of the Jewish nation shows that it is tary, not enforced. A problem arises only when indi- impossible to make a whole nation subservient to the viduals break away from these segregated groups absolute ideal of the prophetic message. Hence, and seek to find a place in the rest of society. They there develops a cleavage, similar to the schism to be have greater difficulty finding such a place than they found among the Germans, between the bearers of would have had in Germany around the year 1900. the unconditional demand and the masses who are in Naturally, all of this cannot, in any way, be com- no way equal to this demand. The structural similari- pared to what happened in Germany under Hitler. ties between the German and the Jewish character, to Since the 13th century, religious anti-Semitism in which I have pointed, imply both a very strong at- all European countries was used to divert criticism traction and extreme repulsion between them. It will from the ruling classes to a minority. The despair of be difficult for some of you to make value judg- the masses in economic crises was successfully al- ments about yourself based on this analysis, and yet lowed to vent itself in this way. At the same time, such an analysis must be attempted. I know that the ruling classes were enabled to enrich themselves what I have said is not complete, but I believe none- at the cost of the Jews. This diversionary anti- theless that it clarifies the relationship between the Judaism has produced horrible but always only oc- two peoples better than the factors to which I would casional persecution of the Jews. Systematic anti- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 13

Semitism is an invention of the naturalistic anthro- Biological thinking stresses hereditary factors in pology of the late 19th century. The biological theory the formation of the type, without scientific justifica- of race that was based on certain definite observa- tion to be sure. Acquired characteristics are not in- tions was misused in a dilettantish and distorted way herited, and most characteristics that constitute the for political purposes. This development played into picture of the typical Jew are acquired characteris- the hands of totalitarian dictatorship, which requires tics. They are the result of special sociological con- an absolute enemy, and would have to create one if ditions, and they change with these conditions. he did not exist. Modern depth psychology makes it very clear that There is nothing more absurd, nothing more irra- childhood influences, influences that depend on the tional, than political anti-Semitism. The reasons ad- general and specific environment in which the child vanced in order to rationalize anti-Semitism cancel grows up, determine character. But such arguments each other out. When one engages in criticism, one have no effect upon the anti-Semite. The dogma is normally intends to change that which one criticizes. fixed and the dogma says the Jew is a type. Type is But nothing would be more disagreeable to an anti- opposed to history, nature is opposed to personality, Semitic person than the idea that the “Jew” would and inherited characteristics are opposed to acquired undergo a change under the impact of his criticism. characteristics. But when the type is placed above Normally, individuals are held responsible for mis- history, a human being is no longer perceived as a conduct or for a criminal act. The anti-Semite holds human being. no individual responsible. He establishes the picture Anti-Semites claim that, from the point of view of a group of people who are guilty by being who of other nations, Jewish nature is sensed as some- they are. Personal responsibility, and therefore the thing strange. Without a doubt, we are dealing here demand to treat a person as a person, disappears. In with something strange or alien. But when I heard the case of a criminal act, the criminal is declared the word “strange,” especially in a negative sense, I guilty as a criminal, if a non-Jew is involved. But think of the answer Hamlet gives to the soldier who when a Jew is involved, he is declared guilty be- says, “O day and night, but this is wondrous cause he is a Jew. When one brings these absurdities strange…” namely, “And therefore as a stranger give to mind, one is tempted to doubt the Stoic teaching it welcome.” Strange things are welcome and unwel- that every man naturally partakes of universal rea- come. The foreign element is unwelcome when it is son. Or one must assume that mass psychoses can a part of an individual character that cannot be in- put apparently reasonable people into a state of mind corporated in the whole. It is like a foreign body that in which they cease to take part in universal reason. enters a biological organism, and which the organ- In the Middle Ages, one accused a real collective, ism must either incorporate or reject; if neither of the Ghetto, in most cases unjustly, but yet with some these steps is successful, the organism perishes. appearance of reason. Today, one accuses a type, not Every social minority breaks up the integral nature a collective and not an individual. This is related to of the social group. This is the difference between the naturalistic dehumanization of man, with the the stranger within and the stranger outside the progressive “objectification” of the personal dimen- group. We have seen that Germans love that which sion in an industrial society. The absurdity of all this is foreign, partly because they want to be rid of becomes clear when the instinctive anti-Semite en- themselves by losing themselves in what is strange. counters a real Jew. The real Jew is then always But they cannot tolerate the foreign element alive looked upon as an exception to the rule. In the en- among them, because it wrenches them from their counter with the real Jew, the fiction of the type be- unquestioning self-affirmation, and because their comes invalid. It cannot be verified. But the anti- self-realization is so weak that it cannot admit any- Semite wants the picture to be true, and therefore the thing foreign. Thus, there arises a feeling of anxiety. individual Jew is looked upon as an exception. Ty- Anything alien among the Germans produces anxi- pological thinking is unhistorical. It is unable to ac- ety concerning their own self-realization. Perhaps knowledge that personalities and groups are subject one can put the matter this way: for the German sub- to historical change. It cannot believe that the type conscious, the Jew is too near to be welcomed as a that it attacks can change, and therefore it must be stranger, and not near enough to be experienced as exterminated. an integral part of the nation. Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 14

This, therefore, has a reverse effect: the Jew is tian anti-Judaism, which appears throughout church put into a situation in which what is described in history beginning at the time of the New Testament. terms of type is accentuated in reality. Completely But this too is not a sufficient explanation for the disregarding the grim caricature of a perverted ty- basic fact. Christianity also opposed other minorities pology, such as appeared in Der Stürmer, there still but no case even closely resembles Christian anti- remain special characteristic traits that are accentu- Judaism. And here we come to the basic problem of ated because their owners are treated as strangers. these lectures, that is, the theological problem. To- Therefore, one can say: ideally as well as really, day, therefore, I want to offer a theological analysis, anti-Semitism creates that against which it fights. and then in the last lecture apply the insights, which And it must create it, since it cannot be found in re- this theological analysis will provide for us, to the ality. The anti-Semite is frightened by the mirror that Jewish and German situation. the Jew holds up to him. There are moments in Perhaps some of you think that the philosophical which we dislike, even detest ourselves, when we and theological trains of thought that we wish to fol- see ourselves in a mirror. The mirror tells us what low today are beside the point. But I hope to be able we are for the others who look at us. In many utter- to show you that these peripheral trains of thought ances of cultured Jews, there is something that the lead to the heart of our subject. Germans regard as a “mirror.” The German knows Wherever the holy is encountered, it is the expe- that the mirror tells the truth, but he cannot bear the rience of that which concerns us unconditionally, reflection, and therefore he reacts against the person that which we cannot push aside. We cannot limit it, who holds it up to him. This does not mean that the either in time or in space. It comes upon us with an person who creates the mirror does not need a mirror absolute demand. Wherever that which concerns us himself and would probably react to one in a similar unconditionally manifests itself, it possesses two way. I speak neither philo-Semitically nor anti- sides. On the one hand, it manifests itself as that Semitically but analytically. which is present, which grasps us, which antecedes all action and thought. The holy cannot be derived Lecture Three from something else, neither from moral perfection nor from truth. The holy includes goodness and The central subject of today’s lecture is the Jew- truth, but it is not created by them; it is their ultimate ish question as a religious problem. The remarks of root. The other side of the holy is that it is never the second lecture concerning the break in Israel’s completely finished, that it is always challenging, and Germany’s history through a prophetic move- demanding perfection and promising fulfillment. ment, already give a hint of the fact that in the last The holy contains the tension between that which is resort the Jewish problem can only be understood as and that which ought to be, a tension that reaches a religious problem. It is not sufficient to make so- down into the deepest roots of all being. The tension ciological and socio-psychological analyses as we between the two elements of the holy has a polar have done in the second lecture. The reason for this character. One pole limits the other. As soon as this is that the history of the Jewish people is marked by alternating dependence is questioned, conflicts oc- something unique and particular that can only be cur. What belongs together is torn apart and the parts understood in the light of a religious analysis. The move against one another. Being and what-ought-to- sociological question leads directly to the religious be struggle against one another. To be sure, this question. For although it is possible to apply all struggle can never issue in a complete separation, well-known sociological categories to the history of since the sphere of the holy itself would come to an the Jewish people, once this history is described, end if one of the two poles disappeared completely. there is need for a yet more profound discussion of The holy, insofar as it is present, has sacramen- the question: why did such a history occur? tal character and is preserved and actualized by the Surely, a group like the Jews that has existed for priest. The holy, insofar as it is a demand, has pro- 3000 years can become the object of diversionary phetic character and this demand is the norm of the tactics. Such a group can be caricatured as a type, holy. Both poles are to be found throughout the his- and psychological conflicts can be found within the tory of religion. Everywhere, there is a more group itself. But the decisive question is: how is it priestly-sacramental or a more social-prophetic type. that such a group exists? We have spoken of Chris- If there is only the priestly pole, the sacrament turns Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 15 into magic; if there is only prophetism, gospel be- the holy presence has found an unsurpassable ex- comes law. In both cases, the truth of the holy is ob- pression. And yet, an element of challenging de- scured. The holy is real only when both poles are in mand is not entirely missing in such a system. This some way effective. This does not exclude the fact, element comes alive as the doctrinal and moral law however, that conflicts arise between both poles, as that is mediated through the hierarchy. But in the they have always and everywhere occurred in the sacramental system, the demand is an internal part of history of religion. The history of the relationship the system; it can never be opposed to the system as between Judaism and Christianity and of both to such. German civilization is determined by this polarity. Things are entirely different at the opposite pole: We shall now try to describe these two poles the demand does not remain bound to the sacramen- more closely. Where the holy is experienced as pre- tal; rather it breaks away from and turns against the sent, we are dealing with a sacramental form of re- system itself. In this case, the system is also criti- ligion. The word “sacramental” includes much more cized by reference to elements that are themselves than the so-called sacraments in the narrower sense. part of the system. The bearer of this criticism is the It includes all things and all events in which the holy prophet. He does not criticize from the outside as the is conceived of as present. Sacraments, in the spe- enlightener does, but from within, speaking as the cific meaning of the word, can develop from this. representative of the will of God against the priestly- These are sometimes only remnants of a universal sacramental system. For example, the prophet pro- sacramental attitude towards reality. Where such an claims the social consequences of the commandment understanding of the holy exists, the holy commu- of love over against the mechanical and socially in- nity becomes the mother of every individual belong- different practice of ritual piety. The prophet is not a ing to it. The mother exists before the child; she is prophesier; that is to say, he is not characterized by always already there. In the same way, the church the fact that he can predict the future. To speak as a precedes the individual believer. She is the holy be- prophet means to speak the will of God, to express ing from which the individual can take holiness, but threats and promises, but not romantically by means the individual is not the one who makes the whole of signs to predict future destinies. The prophet is church holy. In a sacramental church, there are holy the one who proclaims the will of God and attacks objects, holy events, holy functions, and holy per- sharply that which is done in the name of the holy sons. Holy in this sense does not mean morally per- against the unconditional demand. This does not fect; rather it means consecrated, belonging to that mean that the prophet opposes the sacramental as which concerns us unconditionally. The sacramental such. It is not his function to deny priestly piety. But type of religion is dependent on the tradition through the prophet denies the sacramental as soon as it which the maternal substance is handed down from claims to accomplish sanctification by itself regard- one generation to another. We are born into this tra- less of the sanctity of the commandment. He op- dition, into this substance, and the priestly bearers of poses the magical misuse of the holy. He is con- this tradition are mediators of the holy to everyone cerned with the social situation and the injustices in who belongs to it. It is this that gives authority to the it that the priestly type either ignores or even prac- bearers of the substance of such a religious group. tices himself. Priestly authority is the authority of that in which the The prophetic type is the Father-type and its holy, as it were, is substantially embodied. The stands in contrast to the sacramental Mother-type. In authority of the bearer of the holy renders him un- the prophet, the tradition turns against itself and touchable, invulnerable to the taboos, excluding re- breaks its own immediacy and certainty. The indi- ligious criticism. There are degrees of the authority vidual is directly confronted by God and his uncon- of the holy: the bearers of religious substance are ditional demand. The priesthood loses its mediating hierarchically ordered. There are degrees of holi- position. The authority of the hierarchy breaks up. ness: the sacramental power of the higher degrees is The degrees of holiness lose their meaning inasmuch greater than that of the lower ones, regardless of the as everyone is equally unable to live up to the abso- personal qualities of the bearers. The complete pic- lute demand. The taboo that protected the church ture of such a sacramental system is the Roman and her representative from criticism disappears. Catholic Church. In the dogma of the infallibility of The prophet criticizes everyone who tries to hide the representative of God on earth, the emphasis of behind the sacramental taboo. And yet, here the Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 16

power of the holy is not undone. The prophet makes would not have been an empire, follow from the his demand not on the basis of an abstract moral law, feeling of an absolute demand which one’s own but rather on the basis of the covenant through space and the god representing this space must which God has pledged himself to his people, or by make. Naturally, a will to power, as well as the full reference to the events on which the church rests. weight of economic interests, stands behind every These two types, which have been briefly de- imperialism. But history has also shown that, with- scribed, each emphasize another element of the holy. out the impetus, which faith in the superiority of Both poles, however, stand in a particular relation to one’s own god or one’s own system of values pro- the categories of space and time. And this is of deci- vides, imperialism has no possibility of being real- sive importance for our problem: the sacramental as ized. the holy that is given can be grasped and seen. One This structure produces the conflict of the gods can deal with it; it is bound to this place; it is limited and with it the conflict of the empires and their mu- by space. The holy is given; one can see, hear, and tual destruction. It is as in individual life where the taste it; it is present in this thing, this event, this per- conflict of absolute values leads to the destruction of son, this group. Everything that exists must have its the individual personality. Either the unity of the own space. To be means to be in a space. This is personal center breaks up or one value subjugates all meant in a simple geographical sense; in order to others, but in such a way that they are suppressed exist we must have a place in the world or on the without being included in the unity. In both cases, earth. But beyond all this there is also a spiritual, the personality is threatened. The same is true with social, and political space, a space where we are at respect to imperialism and its polytheistic back- home, which limits us and protects us from being ground. Polytheism is not something of the past. devoured by an infinite number of possibilities. We Polytheism is an omnipresent possibility. Every na- must have somewhere not only as possibility but tion and every group has the tendency to absolutize also actuality. To be actual means to be present, and its own space in the name of the holy, and to oppose to be present means to have an opposite, a place every other space. This age-old conflict of polythe- where we stand and from which we look at what is ism results in the justification of social and political opposite. injustice. Sacral injustice is the background of all This analysis of the relations between space and other injustice because it gives a religious blessing sacramental holiness enables us to understand poly- to injustice. This can be observed in a feudal order theism, this puzzling phenomenon in the history of where the lower sacral ranks are suppressed by the mankind. The gods of polytheism are gods limited higher ones; or in the suppression of one nation or by space. This is their power and this is their bound- race by another that places itself at the top of the ary. Not plurality but adjacency characterizes poly- polytheistic order of values. This is the world against theism. Adjacency constitutes space. In polytheism, which the prophets had to fight and against which adjacent spaces are given unlimited validity; people the prophetic spirit must fight in every age. obtain holiness, which is symbolized by gods who In every sphere of the prophetic, not space but control a certain space, be it geographic space which time is decisive, and since the future is the authorita- is reserved for a god, or a social space over which a tive mode of time, prophecy is directed to the future. god rules, or a sphere of values represented by a god. Surely, since everything that exists must have a Restriction of the holy to space leads to the conflicts place, the prophetic also originates in a particular between god and god that characterize polytheism. place; however, it breaks up the confinement to this The holy, that which concerns us ultimately, is itself place, not in favor of a universal space as in imperi- unconditioned. Each polytheistic god, therefore, alism, but rather in favor of time. There is no story makes a universal demand upon us. He presses be- that would be as characteristic of this situation as the yond the space reserved for him, and wants to con- story of Abraham’s call. Here everything we have quer all space. Political imperialism is merely one said about the conflict between space and time is side of the imperialism of polytheistic gods. It is the expressed in classical symbols. Abraham is called imperialism of a god who, on the one hand, is abso- out of the space to which he is bound, away from the lute, and, on the other, is bound by space. This re- social, cultural, and religious ties that gave him his sults in the struggle for universal space. The passion, being. He is called out of space into time. The sac- the impetus, the dedication without which there rally consecrated space that he shared with everyone Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 17

is broken through. This does not mean that space as tions. The feeling of the Romans was justified. Juda- space is denied. He is to go into a country that God ism represents an attack on the pantheon of the gods will show him. But future space remains undeter- because it is essentially monotheism bound to time. mined. It is a space that is determined by the mode Polytheism is not merely a plurality of gods; mono- of the future, and the future is the decisive mode of theism does not mean one god against many. Rather, time. polytheism means being bound to the gods of space, The event symbolized in Abraham’s call has al- and monotheism means being bound to the God of ways repeated itself in Jewish history. The event time. As long as the Jewish god, as a national Jewish through which Israel was created as an historical god, stands over other national gods, he is a polythe- reality is traditionally called Exodus, the going out istic god bound by all space like all others, even if he from a space, namely out of Egypt where Israel is only one. Only when the prophetic criticism cut lived, even if not independently. The later history is through the bond between Jahweh and his people, a history of perpetual exile, which means banish- did the God of Israel become the God of monothe- ment from the space to which one belongs. Israel’s ism. This happened when he became the God of history becomes a history of the Diaspora, i.e., the time. dispersion into other nations and a new exile, The God of time is universal, and so is the God namely banishment from these nations. The Jewish of justice. God is not bound to Israel if Israel breaks people also have a space; without one, they could of the covenant based on justice. It was one of the course not be. But it is not their own space. It is a greatest events in the history of mankind when guest-space and the guest-space is not secure since it Amos, the first of the great prophets, threatened Is- can be and has been refused at any time. This means rael with destruction and divided God from his as- the transition of the Jewish people from confinement signed space. The pagan gods are virtually depend- to space to connection to time. This has a threefold ent upon their space. They live from the sacrifice consequence: the line of time is the line of history; it that a historical group offers them. The God of is the line of monotheism; and it is the line of jus- Amos proclaims that every appeal to election and the tice. priestly cult is in vain if justice is destroyed. Amos’s History as history is determined by the future. proclamation, which was taken up by all prophets, Written history has to do with the past, but life in represents the hour of the birth of genuine monothe- history is the life that moves into the future. The ism, a monotheism that is different from the polythe- Historismus of the late 19th century confused the ism that knows only one god. The god of genuine writing of history with the living of history, and it monotheism stands against every sacrally blessed created that mentality of the late bourgeoisie that injustice. He denies all sacramentally based privi- was marked by a tremendous historical knowledge leges; he subjects the bearers of the holy to what and no consciousness of history. History is pointed should be, to judgment, and to promise. He is the to something indefinite, something new, something God of history and of time. other than that from which one comes. History does The history of Judaism is a constant conflict be- not repeat itself. Something new is created by it. tween the power of space to which everything that Historical time, therefore, is irreversible. Physical exists is subjected, and the demands of time that are time can be reversed, but not historical time. torn out of the securities of space. The making of the History, therefore, is always a history of the covenant, the choosing of Israel, the presence of God struggle with the demands of the gods of space. in Israel, the gift of the Law, and the community of Hence, the nation that represents time against space God and people stand in opposition to the breach of is necessarily the enemy of all space-limited nation- the covenant by Israel, the division between God and alisms and imperialisms. There existed a Roman nation, and judgment and rejection. Rejection does anti-Judaism before there was a Christian one. In the not invalidate the election. There is always a rem- Roman pantheon, the gods of all spaces were gath- nant that remains obedient to the God of time and ered together, but they were all subject to the god of carries on Judaism’s function to be the people of Roman space. And the Romans felt that the Jews, time. Judaism, therefore, remains for all time a thorn through the God of time whom they served, attacked in the flesh of all idols of space, all nationalisms and the space of the Empire. He was not the ultimate and all imperialisms. absolute for the Romans and for their subject na- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 18

Christianity, too, is part of this history. In the the Christ whose work has failed? Such discussions proclamation of John the Baptist, one finds a radical disclose the struggle between time and space, which attack on the particular, nationalistic tendency in is a struggle between Judaism and Christianity as Jewish history. Jesus continues this proclamation. well as a conflict within Judaism and within Christi- This is why the first Christians thought of them- anity. selves as fulfillers of the prophetic tradition of Juda- The conflict within Christianity is sharpened by ism. They believed that, for the first time, in the the fact that the Christian nations give their own na- event that they called the appearance of the Christ, tional culture the sacramental blessing of Christian- complete universality was reached; and the princi- ity. The holy, which is seen as present in the church, ples of monotheism and justice were accomplished. is used in order to give a blessing to the national re- Christianity was justified in having this faith as it ality and thus to make it absolute. This resulted in broke through the space limitations of Judaism and the unity of church and state as it was established gathered the elect from all peoples. Christianity also relatively early among Christian peoples. It made did not avoid the conflict between space and time. prophetic criticism of the state as well as of the The faith that the Messiah had already come could church almost impossible. The establishment of the lead to a new space limitation. Neither Mount Sinai, Christian state-church meant an almost complete nor Mount Zion, but rather Golgotha is the spatial conquest of the prophetic by the sacramental. And center for Christian thought. What occurred on this yet, the prophetic was not dead in Christianity. mountain at approximately 30 AD determines the Church history exhibits continuing inner-church entire future. In this event, the Holy appears. It has prophetic reactions against the sacramental- acquired presence and sacramental reality. hierarchical reality. The bearers of these reactions Christ can be called the first sacrament of Chris- were frequently the so-called sects that the great tianity. He is the source of all the sacraments in the churches commonly treated with contempt. But not church and, on this basis, the early Catholic church only have many of these sects themselves become with its strong cultic-sacramental elements was large churches, the sects, even when suppressed by formed; and on this basis, the church of the Middle the church, represented an attack on the church in its Ages developed, with Rome as its holy space. And identity with the state and society. The critique by yet, the prophetic element in Christianity has not the sects is directed against the attempt of sacramen- been lost. Christianity speaks of a second coming of tal religion to remove itself from every prophetic Christ. Christianity knows the boundaries of fulfill- criticism. In this sense, the sects have continued ment within the church; Christianity knows that the what the prophets began: they keep alive the holy as fulfillment must yet come. Thus Christianity stands a demand as well as an anticipation of the future. in tension between the holy that is given and the The Reformation also was such a prophetic reac- holy that is to come, between the “already” and the tion. The principle of Protestantism is the prophetic “not yet” of fulfillment. The question is always principle, namely the rejection of the claim of any- which of the two elements is stressed. If the “al- thing finite that by virtue of its consecration is enti- ready” is stressed, then the sacramental achieves a tled to take the place of God. Such a claim was ad- strong upper hand. The religious life turns towards vanced by the sacramental church of the Middle the past, to tradition, authority, and to everything in Ages and it is emphatically continued in modern which the given holy appears—people, holy writ- Catholicism. This is why there exists a close rela- ings, infallible dogma, liturgical forms. Polytheistic tionship between Protestantism and Judaism. This is tendencies make themselves felt, and justice suffers why Luther believed that it would be possible, on damage. That is the background of all theological the basis of a common prophetic protest, to absorb attacks of the Jews upon Christianity. Judaism into the Protestant movement; this is why In a conversation with a Jewish friend, I was he was deeply disappointed when this did not occur. told that he would find it impossible to call someone There are prophetic and quasi-prophetic move- “the Christ” who had not changed reality. As histori- ments, not only within the religious spheres but also cal reality, the twentieth century is not more perfect in the cultural. The struggle of the Enlightenment than the first. World history, as such, does not pro- against the tyranny of the churches, against the su- vide an argument for the acceptance of Jesus as the perstitions and the distortions of Christianity in all of Christ. And how could one, said he, call someone its forms, was a prophetic attack in secular terminol- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 19

ogy. The bourgeois revolution of the 18th century different from that of any other religious minority. and the anti-bourgeois social revolutions of the 19th And yet, Judaism is a religious community. The and 20th centuries have prophetic protests in the category “religious community” is and is not appli- background. The sects of the Reformation period are cable to the Jews. the parents of many modern revolutions, and behind The same is true of the word nation. In the 18th the sects of the Reformation period stand the sects of century, one spoke of a Jewish nation, but Judaism is the Middle Ages, ancient Christianity, and Jewish not a nation like other nations. It did not come into prophecy. This is also true of the revolutions that being through natus, through birth, nor is it pre- used anti-Christian and anti-religious slogans. They served by historical destiny. Judaism, in contrast to were forced into this position by the fact that the other nations, is a people whose character and exis- sacramental churches were bound to the governing tence are determined by religion. This is something groups that gave religious blessing to injustice. De- unique and singular. But every consideration of his- spite their secular, anti-religious character and de- torical phenomena must acknowledge such appear- spite the perversion of totalitarian in which some of ances and yet must not dissolve them in general the revolutionary movements have resulted, the pro- categories. One could say that in Jewish history, his- phetic spirit that was in them originally, has proved tory has expressed her secret. In Greek history, by to be effective contrast, history has kept its secret hidden; history Our analysis of the structure of religion, above remains subject to nature, and time remains subject all the polarity between the sacramental and the pro- to space. When we regard Judaism from this point of phetic, makes it possible to answer the main ques- view, we must say that Judaism is a nation, but a tions implied in the theme of this lecture. From this nation in a unique sense. It is people and not-people point of view, we can answer the question of Zion- in the same sense in which it is church and not- ism, the question of the relation between Judaism church. The situation of Judaism, of being people and national self-realization, and the question of the and not-people, is expressed by the fact that the Jew relation between Judaism and Christianity. We are is again and again driven out of his own space. especially able to say what the function of Judaism Let us look more critically at the concept of the is to be in the foreseeable future. Its function is to Diaspora, the dispersion, which we mentioned in the keep the spirit of prophecy awake over against na- previous lecture. For Jewry, the Diaspora is not an tional groups and over against the Christian churches historical accident but rather an idea that expresses when they fall victim to a bondage to space. The the character of the Jew himself. With reference to Jews are and must remain the people of time. space, the Jews live necessarily in dispersion. Whenever a nation is dispersed among other nations, Lecture Four it is absorbed by them; the problem of Diaspora is solved through adaptation. This is not true for the The question which is to be answered in today’s Jews for whom the Diaspora is a genuine destiny. To lecture is this: what does the fundamental religious say “nation of time” or “nation-that-is-not-a-nation” analysis offered in the third lecture mean for the is the same thing. The majority of Jews, whenever groups we have mentioned—the Jews, the Germans, they feel or recognize this situation, try to avoid it. and the Christians? This is not a moral defect but rather the almost in- To begin with, when I consider Judaism in rela- evitable result of the contradictory situation in which tion to space and time, as a non-Jew, I feel a certain the Jews find themselves. There are two ways in insecurity. This insecurity is multiplied by the fact which one can avoid Diaspora. The first is assimila- that, as has been shown in the last lecture, the usual tion. One avoids the conditions of Diaspora by giv- sociological categories are inadequate for a descrip- ing up that side of Jewish existence according to tion of Judaism. It must be stated, first of all, that which it is a nation; one identifies himself with the Judaism is not a religious community in the same foreign space in which one lives, not only geo- sense that is true for most other world religions. One graphically but also psychologically, sociologically, cannot compare the Jews with a group of Buddhists and culturally. Giving up the nation-element does or Muslims who live in the oriental world and who not necessarily mean giving up the religious ele- have preserved the religion of their fathers. The po- ments. One can be assimilated without becoming a sition of Judaism within Christianity is qualitatively Christian. I think of specific groups of American Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 20

Jews, in particular the liberal ones. Here an astound- state can be theocratic but it cannot be hierarchic. It ingly broad cultural assimilation has taken place, and is theocratic whenever the laws of its existence, the yet the same group did not have to give up its par- laws of the family, of the schools, of justice, are ticular religious existence. Where, however, assimi- subordinated to basic religious law. In a theocracy, lation succeeds, the meaning of the Diaspora, the will of God is the basis for political structure. It namely the special mission that Judaism has in the is, however, naturally questionable whether it is pos- dispersion, has become lost. Then, frequently, the sible to construct a modern national state on a theo- religious separation is also lost, and a total submer- cratic basis. The development of Israel to date sion into the Christian culture takes place. speaks against this. Although the Jewish assimilation has suffered These are two ways in which many Jews seek to shipwreck in Europe, there are (especially in Amer- avoid the metaphysical destiny of the Diaspora. The ica) still Jewish circles that attempt this solution. In question is whether one is justified to condemn this general, however, Judaism has taken another road evasion morally or religiously. A glance at the his- and followed it with amazing energy. It is the at- tory of Israel in Old Testament times makes it easy tempt of Judaism to create a new space for itself that to find an answer. Every attempt to identify the is its own space. This happened in the Zionist Kingdom of God with a nation must fall. This was movement. The success of Zionism, the creation of a the problem with which all leading men of the Old Jewish state, and the settlement of Palestine, means Testament had to struggle. They discovered that the the end of the Diaspora for a considerable number of chosen people constantly resisted that for which they Jews. This is true not only of the function of Judaism were called, that they constantly betrayed their mis- and of the sociological categories to which we have sion and the covenant on which the mission was pointed, but it is also true also of the spiritual struc- based. On the other hand, these men could not be- ture. Qualities that characterize the Jews in the Dias- lieve that divine providence is destroyed by human pora disappear. Their responsibility for their own guilt. The solution to which they were driven was land and people produce ideas and ideals that are the idea of the “holy remnant” as the bearer of de- similar to those against which Judaism has fought in mand and promise. This is an idea in which despair foreign lands. The position of the basic classes of in human possibility is blended with faith in God. society (for example, the agricultural population) When, in view of this solution, we consider the exis- becomes similar to the position of the same classes tence of the many Jewish people in the world, we in other lands. The bearers of Judaism as a genuine must ask ourselves whether it makes sense to con- nation speak and act like the bearers of the national demn the average Jew in the world for wanting to consciousness in other nations. This does not remain escape the fate of the dispersion or for refusing to unnoticed by those Jews who hold fast to Judaism as belong to the nation of time, the nation without its a people of time and to the Diaspora as its symbol. own space. The problem was simpler when the so- Sharp conflicts arise from this reality in the new na- cial form of the ghetto, into which the Jews were tion as well as in the numerically much larger Dias- forced, made an escape impossible. There was then pora. One is critical of the establishment of a Jewish only one way to escape, namely conversion to Chris- state, an event that goes way beyond that which ear- tianity, and this was almost completely impossible lier Zionists wanted. Or one tries, once the Jewish psychologically. This situation no longer exists. An state exists, to organize it theocratically, namely to escape, be it through adjustment, be it through im- subject the whole of national life to the religious migration to Palestine, is possible. Can one say, ideal. That is the way of certain orthodox groups therefore, that Jews who chose either of these two within the Jewish state. In the daily conflicts result- ways have done something that gives us the right to ing from this structure of Israel’s national existence, condemn them? Can one demand of the average there is manifested the old paradox of the nation that Jew, who after all is an average human being, that he is no nation and that of the religious community belong to the “holy remnant” merely because he is which is no such thing. When one calls the aim of born as a Jew? Apparently, one cannot. And one these groups “theocratic,” one must not confuse cannot, above all, do this when one stands outside “theocratic” with “hierarchic.” Hierarchy is the rule the Jewish community and demands something that of priests, and theocracy is the rule of God, ex- one does not take upon oneself. pressed through the laity and theologians. A secular Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 21

Once this is recognized, we must ask the ques- insincere, even if it is subjectively sincere. It is tion: is it possible that the space that Israel has found without stability since it is anti-Semitism turned up- as its own space may lead to new embodiments of side down. Many Jews react to the exaggerated the prophetic spirit, and that from this new impulses praise of themselves no more comfortably than to will arise for Israel, as well as for the Diaspora? This the distorted disparagement of themselves. They feel seems possible in view of the fact that this space is that these positive and negative sentiments come psychologically and sociologically completely filled from the same source, namely from an aggression by the Jewish spirit. On the other hand, this seems to that has turned itself inside out and is transformed be impossible in view of the dangers that arise when into its opposite but remains basically aggression. a nation is confined to a certain space. We cannot It is also no solution to adopt a patronizing calculate history. My question is a question directed friendliness toward the Jews and to try to fight anti- to the future and it is a hope for the future. It is also Semitism with enlightenment. Enlightenment would possible, however, that modern nationalism will tri- be meaningful only if anti-Semitism had rational umph completely, that Israel will become a nation roots. But since it does not, one can rationally refute that is only a nation, and that the element of the re- every single reproach that is made against the Jews. ligious community will be lost. Concerning this fear, In such a case, another criticism will quickly occur one can offer reasons and counter-reasons, and there which one can easily refute factually only to be con- is no certainty. fronted by a new objection. This game can go on We come now to the second question: what re- endlessly, since the picture of the type is unchange- sults from this analysis for the German situation? able, and since anti-Semitism is determined by its We could say we no longer need to consider this function and not by factual content. Attempts at en- solution because of the fact that the Jews have al- lightenment are not entirely worthless even if they most completely disappeared from German life. But only serve to have us come to know one another. this is no solution. For the individual Jew is not the One part of all animosity between people depends on object of anti-Semitism but rather “the picture of the the fact that a distorted picture is superimposed upon Jew” as a type, about which we have spoken in the the reality of the other one. When I was about to second lecture, is the object. And this type would travel in Italy about five years after the First World remain in the psyche of the anti-Semite even if no War, I was criticized by a shocked Marburg col- single Jew lived in Germany; indeed, it would re- league who felt that a German should not go into a main even if all Jews were to disappear from the country that belonged to “the enemy camp.” These face of the earth. What would happen then would be people had an instinctive feeling for the fact that one that one would look for another object of this typifi- must cut oneself off in order that the picture of such cation. The typical picture of the Jew is determined a thing as an “enemy camp” may not be disturbed by not by the reality that it describes but rather the func- the reality of the real enemies. This is the reason tions that it must fulfill. One of these functions is the why anti-Semitism is almost always destroyed when transfer of the dissatisfaction of the masses with the the not-yet fully fanatical anti-Semite meets a real ruling classes onto a minority. Another is the trans- Jew. Nevertheless, this is not really effective since fer of self-hate onto an object that one can hate. A anti-Semitism has a perverse function in the house- third function is the possibility to accuse another hold of the soul: it springs immediately again into specific group, of being responsible for one’s failure being with the assertion that this specific Jew is an to achieve external success. These functions are con- exception. Therefore, one can make individual peo- stant. And they produce anti-Semitism or, if there ple stop and think by means of enlightenment and were no more Jews, another anti-movement would personal encounter or one can try to protect indi- take over the same function. The disappearance of viduals from becoming victims of its perverted the Jews would be no solution of the anti-Semitic structure as long as they not yet exposed to it. Yet, I problem. It is, however, also no solution if one re- would say that this is also not a solution for the moves the exaggerated negative side in the picture of problem of the relationship between the Germans the typified Jew and replaces it by an over-emphasis and the Jews. It can be important in individual cases, upon the positive side. Many Germans are at this but it does not lead to a fundamental change in the time driven to such philo-Semitism by a bad con- situation. Therefore, we must ask: is there a solution science but there is no solution in this because it is Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 22

which goes deeper, which can transform the basic individual only through the image of the type. When relationship between Germans and Jews? one says, “the American,” one abstracts from every- This question leads us back to the five-fold thing that distinguishes the individual American per- German guilt that I mentioned earlier. The first solu- son, and one refuses to see that this is refuted by tion of the “Jewish question as a German problem” every single American person. Such stereotyping is is that the past be purified. The past can be purified disastrous when it occurs between nations and races. not by confessions of guilt but rather by an inward It was disastrous for the relationship between the assumption of responsibility for what happened Germans and the Jews. And it was and is all the without covering it up by a quantitative balancing of more disastrous when it occurred in the unconscious guilt and punishment. If this does not happen, if this and embodied itself in the language. “cleansing sacrifice,” which is a genuine sacrifice, A third possible solution of the Jewish question does not take place, I see no solution of the Jewish as a German problem can be found in something that question as a German problem. I do not have public the Germans can learn from the Anglo-Saxons, declarations in mind; I do not believe that human namely sober judgment of an actual situation. It is beings will take guilt upon themselves when this not sober to see the Jews or any other group in the guilt is not theirs (in terms of our first definition of image of an abstract type, above all when this type guilt). Rather, I have in mind that the responsibility has been formed by hostility. Nor is it sober to see for what happened must necessarily be acknowl- the Jews in terms of an ideal type. It would be sensi- edged by every German. If one were able to apply ble to say that they are neither worse nor better than the concepts of depth psychology to groups, one average human beings; it would be sensible to say would say that the German people must undergo a that they have specific historically determined char- collective analysis that would raise up the past into acteristics for which Christian anti-Judaism is in part consciousness; such an analysis would have to ap- responsible. proach the unconscious in order to understand the A fourth possible solution of the Jewish question unconscious background of the tendency to typify as a German problem is the need for the German to the Jew as Jew. Such a collective analysis would overcome his inferiority complex and the attempt to uncover the irrational and perverted structures that compensate for it by arrogance. Arrogance that tran- lie at the base of the anti-Semitism of recent German scends the sober recognition of the integral value of history. I believe that the problem of the Jews and every living being is always the result of an inferior- Germans cannot be resolved without such a collec- ity complex. He who is certain of himself, he who tive analysis. It is obvious that a collective analysis boldly takes upon himself his guilt and responsibil- cannot be brought about by having every single in- ity, does not think of himself as inferior nor is he dividual analyzed but rather by having those who arrogant. It seems decisive to me for the German mold public consciousness subject themselves to this people to become sober about themselves through painful process. collective analysis, in order to discover the ability to Let me talk, as an analyst would, about a symp- be sober in relation to the Jews as well as to other tom that in and of itself is not important but is mean- nations. ingful as a symptom: when I returned to Germany, A fifth possible solution of the problem is the in- after an absence of fifteen years, I was struck by the tegration of the Germans in western civilization. fact that the Germans always spoke of other nations This is necessary not because of any present military in the singular. They said, as they still do today, “the requirements but because the unity of Christian hu- Jew,” “the Russian,” “the Englishman,” “the Ger- manistic culture is being threatened at its deepest man.” Before Hitler’s time this expression did not level, perhaps more so than we know. I do not have exist. I often asked myself, “What has happened?” In in mind primarily the present political constellation my time, one spoke of “the Jews,” “the Germans,” but rather two events in the German past that pre- “the Russians.” Today people of whom one cannot vented Germany from opening itself completely to say that they consciously wish to stereotype use the Christian humanism. The first event was the failure singular. I believe that the general tendency to of the Romans in their attempt to conquer middle stereotype lies behind this expression. The individ- and north Germany and to bring to it, with the con- ual human being who belongs to a nation or to a race quest, the values of Greco-Roman antiquity. The is no longer regarded as an individual. One sees the second event I have in mind is the way in which Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 23 northwest Germany resisted Christianity and was should indicate that in the Fourth Gospel everything forcefully converted by Charlemagne, and therefore individual has at the same time a typical symbolic never opened itself from within to Christian values meaning. In the Fourth Gospel, the Jews with whom as much as western and southern Germany did. Jesus struggles represent a kind of piety that can be Thus, northwest Germany became a fertile soil for found in all religions, including Christianity. It is the the pagan elements of National Socialism. The Ger- piety of the law that claims to possess absolute truth man nation can achieve an understanding of the pro- and on this basis rejects the Christ again and again. phetic-humanistic character of Judaism only if it If the churches had said this more clearly, they finds its proper place in the Christian humanism of would have applied anti-Judaistic criticisms not only the west. to the Jews but also to themselves. When the church This suggests a final problem: what is the relig- directs anti-Judaistic criticism to itself, its anti- ious solution of the Christian-Jewish problem? I Judaism cannot degenerate into anti-Semitism. have already pointed out the need for Christendom This leads me to the third thing that the church to accept the Old Testament as an integral portion of must do in relation to the Jews. It must understand the Christian Bible, and the religion of the Old Tes- Judaism as representing a prophetic critique of itself. tament as an integral element of Christian existence. I have previously pointed to the Pauline idea that all I have pointed out that, as early as the first centuries, pagans must embrace Christianity before Israel, too, religious syncretism invaded Christianity and turned can join this universal unity. This idea is a profound against the Old Testament. The Old Testament rep- anticipation of all later historical development, for it resents the God of time, of creation, of justice, of implies that Judaism is needed so long as there is redemption, the God of prophetic judgment and paganism within and outside Christendom. Even in promise. Where this concept is missing, the Chris- the Middle Ages, the existence of the Jews was re- tian congregation is changed back into a pagan sect garded as a warning against the paganizing of the of an occult-mystical kind. The church has resisted church. Modern nationalism makes this warning still this temptation, but the Old Testament has yet an- more necessary. One of the functions of Judaism is other function that has become visible in the last to hold up before the church the mirror of its own centuries in connection with the awakening of the relapse into paganism. “social conscience” in the Christian churches. The There is one point where Christianity and Juda- Old Testament, particularly through the prophetic ism separate from one another and where, as far as I message, speaks of nations, social classes, and po- can see, they will be unable to achieve an agreement. litical forms in relation to the religious message. We This point is Christian faith that Jesus is the Christ, find very little about that in the New Testament. The the conviction set over against the question of Juda- New Testament was written at a time when national ism of how can some one be the Christ when he has groups were dissolved, when the Roman Empire had not fulfilled the function of the Christ, namely, to absorbed everything, and when Roman rulers con- transform reality and bring about a new reality? Is trolled the destiny of individuals and nations, a des- not Jesus who died in despair on the cross the oppo- tiny that was formed by no single individual. There- site of that which the Christ means? This is the fore, New Testament piety is, first, the piety of indi- deepest point of division between Judaism and viduals. New Testament piety produced a new com- Christianity. The question is: has the Messiah come munity, the community of the church. However, the or will the Messiah come? The contrast seems abso- church had no inner connection with national com- lute. And yet, there is in it a converging line, for Ju- munities and destinies. It was the function of the Old daism also contains something which has already Testament, especially for religious-social move- come, namely the covenant that God has made with ments of the last century, to help others to see na- it in the past. In the same way, Christianity contains tional destinies in the light of the prophetic teaching. something that is not in the past, but in the future, The second challenge that Christianity must face namely the symbol of the second coming of Christ. is the struggle against its own anti-Judaism. Anti- In this symbol, Christianity expresses the feeling Jewish utterances go back to the later books of the that the work of Christ is not finished. These are New Testament. From that time forward, anti- converging lines, and yet there remains the funda- Judaism existed in all periods of church history. In mental difference: in Christianity, the turning toward order to fight this tendency, religious instruction Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 24 the Christ who has come, and in Judaism, the turning Christianity and Judaism not only in the German toward the Messiah who is expected. nation but also in all nations. This is the point where analysis stops, and where one can only preach. The content of such a sermon would be to say to Christians that the only argument Introduction and English translation:
Marion that you have against the Jewish argument is to show Hausner Pauck, 2004. that through the coming of Christ a new reality has actually appeared. Although this reality is fragmen- tary and ambiguous, it is able to overcome the con-




















flicts of human existence. The Christian answer is not argumentative. It is an indicative answer. It is an answer of being. Perhaps it is not unjustified to hope that there will emerge from Christian Being that power that will destroy the demonism of anti- Semitism and create a new community between primary “words,” I–Thou and I–It, has, according to THE PRIMACY OF ETHICS: Tillich, been embraced by Protestant theology as a RELATIONALITY IN BUBER, TILLICH, AND LEVINAS way of avoiding the pressures toward objectification characteristic of modern society. Tillich agrees with Guy B. Hammond Buber’s claim—and here Buber exerted a major in- fluence on contemporary theology in general—that One aspect of Tillich’s theology that generated selves are constituted as such in interpersonal rela- considerable discussion during his lifetime and that tionships. As Buber says, “I become through my continues to evoke commentary at present is the relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou. All 2 matter of relating the ontological to the per- real living is meeting.” Tillich also agrees with sonal/ethical categories. As is well known, Reinhold Buber that “the other” sets limits to my control of Niebuhr and others criticized Tillich for losing the the world about me. I can to some extent control (or concreteness of the Biblical narratives in favor of “manage”) the objects in my world. But in relating ontological abstractions.1 Tillich, of course, mounted to a “Thou,” I encounter a presence that I cannot a vigorous defense of the primacy of ontology, while dominate or manipulate without turning the Thou attempting an account of personal relationships into an “It.” Tillich and Buber both understand the within an ontological framework. unconditional character of the moral imperative to In this connection, Tillich on a number of occa- be in fact the demand to acknowledge the person- sions entered into dialogue with Martin Buber, who hood or “Thouness” of the other. This is, no doubt, a was then, and perhaps is still now, the preeminent Kantian theme endorsed by both. Finally, Tillich, in philosopher of the interpersonal. Another thinker accord with Buber that I-Thou encounters are at least who deserves to be brought into this conversation is one of the ways that ultimacy is experienced, agrees the French philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas. A as well that they are one of the ways that God ap- younger contemporary of both Buber and Tillich, pears in human experience without being objecti- 3 Levinas (1906-1995) was decisively influenced by fied. his co-religionist Buber, but, as far as I have been At the same time, Tillich offered criticisms of able to ascertain, did not interact in any significant Buber’s formulations. These seem to me to center way with Tillich. The purpose of this paper is to at- upon Tillich’s commitment to preserving the distinc- tempt, in a preliminary way, an engagement of Til- tion between humanity’s essential nature and the lich and Levinas, employing Buber as an intermedi- existential situation of estrangement from that na- ary between them. ture. In his essay, “Existential Analyses and Relig- There were important areas of agreement be- ious Symbols,” Tillich suggests that “Martin Buber’s tween Buber and Tillich, as Tillich regularly ac- famous phrase, ‘the I-Thou relationship,’—can be 4 knowledged. Buber’s famous distinction of the two understood in essentialist terms,” i.e., can refer to the essential intersubjectivity of human nature. But, Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 25

he argues, Buber went further when he “tried to re- sustains it in being. This question is at the same time move the universals from the encounter between ego an analytical and an existential question, but by ei- and thou, and to make both speechless, because there ther path, one is led beyond both objectivity and are no words for the absolute particular, the other subjectivity. This commitment by Tillich to essen- ego.”5 By implication, Tillich opposes this existen- tialist analysis and to ontology would evolve through tialist “invasion.” I believe that Robison James was several versions, but would remain a key feature of correct in his essay cited above in disputing Tillich’s his perspective. Since Levinas offers an alternative interpretation of Buber at this point. There are, for view of ontology, a comparison here can serve as a Buber, words to address the “you” even if absolutely focal point of an engagement between the two. particular, that is to say, there are words that do not Turning now to Levinas, let me emphasize the lead to objectification. (Levinas gives a detailed preliminary nature of my reading. He was not a analysis of this matter, as we will see in a moment.) prominent influence on American theology in the Tillich’s rather cryptic comment must, I think, seventies and eighties, coming more belatedly to be seen in the broader context of his analysis and attention on this side of the Atlantic. Reading Levi- critique of existentialism in general. There is, he nas is like reading Hegel or Heidegger; you make of contends, a danger that in existentialism’s turn to the him what you can, never being sure you have absolute particular a total break with essentialist phi- grasped his point. Certainly though he belongs as a losophy will occur, and thus existentialist theology participant in the Buber/Tillich dialogue in which we will surrender “all rational criteria for theological have just engaged. thought.”6 Whether Tillich’s interpretation of Buber I would like to explore the approach Levinas is correct is, at least, debatable, but I would contend takes to the relationship of ontological to personal/ that Tillich early and late upholds the view stated in ethical categories, examining the implications of his the above-mentioned essay, “there can be no ethics thought for commentary upon and critique of Til- without an essentialist analysis of man’s ethical na- lich’s approach to the same theme. In general terms, ture and its structures.”7 This is an epistemological/ one can say that Levinas radicalizes Buber, thereby ontological assumption on the part of Tillich: that sharpening the potential for critique of Tillich. At we must know or intuit something about humanity’s the same time, by seeing the direction Levinas takes true being in order to make any moral judgments Buber, one may find reason to side with Tillich. regarding our present estranged existence. We will The place to begin an inquiry into Levinas is note shortly that Emmanuel Levinas makes what I with his assertion of the “primacy of ethics.” Ac- take to be the exactly opposite criticism of Buber: cording to his approach, ethics is relationality; the that Buber leaves in place some essentialist ele- primacy of ethics is the primacy of relation with the ments. other person. Simon Critchley writes: “It is this It is in order to deal with the existing individual, event of being in relation with the other as an act or it seems to me, that Tillich attempts to reconstruct an practice—that Levinas describes as ‘ethical.’”10 It ontology using existentialist analysis. He grants the seems clear that he is not simply asserting the in- limitation of objectifying thought which equates re- tersubjective constitution of selves—a theme he in ality with objective being.8 Objective thinking can- fact shares with many other contemporary currents not grasp personal existence; for this, in his view, “a of thought.11 His focus is not on the “significant oth- special type of concept” is required. Maintaining that ers” of one’s childhood. As Fred Alford suggests, such concepts are “psychological notions with non- the constitutive relationships are those we “live psychological connotations” and are “half-symbolic, from” without experiencing them as other.12 Further, half-realistic indications of the structure of Reality Levinas is not referring to reciprocity, to mutual rec- itself,” he postulates the possibility of “an ontology ognition, in Hegel’s sense. Rather, he centers upon which restricts itself to the structure of finitude.” the awakening of responsibility when I encounter the This structure is found in personal existence; hence, irreducible other and acknowledge my obligation to for existentialism, and for Tillich, “the way to ontol- him or her. Speaking psychologically, he is describ- ogy passes through the doctrine of man.”9 Tillich ing the move from the narcissistic self to the moral insists on the validity of this ontology of finitude, self. (Alford comments amusingly that “for Levinas and he asserts that the analysis of finitude leads to we move directly from babies to saints.”13) Thus, the question of the ground of finitude, the power that Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 26

more accurately Levinas asserts the primacy of As I suggested earlier, Levinas addresses the moral relationality. question whether language, which is based upon Levinas finds this theme in Martin Buber,14 but universals, can deal with the absolutely particular, by pressing forward to implications not found in with the “Thou.” He asks: “Can language as Said Buber, he issues two challenges to the entire West- respect the immediacy of the I-Thou relation?” Dia- ern philosophical tradition. Insisting on the priority logue, when content-laden, is, he contends, of ethics for him means rejecting the priority of on- “a modality of the I-It…But what of language as tology, and rejecting the priority of objectifying ra- Saying? Is it absorbed into the Said without dis- tionality. Put in brief, centering on the I-It relation tinction? Can it not be examined in its purity? It leads to the priority of ontology and objectification; says this or that, but at the same time it says centering on the I-Thou relation leads to the priority Thou.…In it there resounds a call, an event that of ethics. Framing Levinas in terms of the history of does without mediation, even that of a precur- philosophy, he contests Heidegger’s focus on a re- sory knowledge or ontological project…Does newal of the “quest for being,”15 reminding his read- not the immediacy of the I-Thou of which Buber ers that Plato placed the Good beyond Being (cf. speaks reside…in the very urgency of my re- Plato, The Republic, 7. 509b). In place of the Carte- sponsibility that precedes all knowledge? Here sian cogito ergo sum, which highlights the subject’s we are indeed taking a few steps outside consciousness of itself as an object, Levinas substi- Buber.… [The irreducibility of the Thou to an It] tutes “here I am” (me voici), that is, he begins with means that saying Thou is not an aim, but pre- the subject as responsibility rather than with the sub- cisely an allegiance to the Invisible, to the In- ject as self-consciousness.16 visible thought not only as the non-sensible, but In another expression, for Levinas it is not con- as the unknowable and unthematizable per se, of sciousness, but conscience, not complacent self- which one can say nothing. The saying of Thou approbation, but moral demand, that is the starting to the Invisible only opens up a dimension of point of philosophy. And conscience is awakened by meaning in which, contrary to all other dimen- the “face” of the other. The Intersubjectivity that sions of thought, there occurs no recognition of interests Levinas is not “the fortunate meeting of being [essence] depicted in the Said. Neither fraternal souls that greet one another” but “the ex- representation nor knowledge nor ontology; but posedness of my freedom to the judgment of the a dimension in which the other person, ad- other.”17 dressed from the start as Thou is placed.”21 Thus, Levinas postulates a realm of meaning or Thus, Levinas argues, beyond Buber, but against signification that is other than being and beyond ob- Tillich, that there is a dimension of meaning in the I- jectification. Though he finds a critique of objectifi- Thou relationship that is beyond the realm of objec- cation in Buber, Levinas grants that Buber makes tifying, universalizing knowledge. Is this meaning use of ontology, arguing that the persistence of on- still a form of knowledge? If so, it is beyond concep- tology in Buber is “anomalous.”18 By focusing on tual thought, and, as Levinas says at one point, it is the “face” or particularity of the other, Levinas also “a rationality prior to all constitution” (that is, be- closes off the avenue of abstract universality in de- yond all constituting on the part of the subject).22 veloping an ethics, the path taken for example by What does this say? Colin Davis suggests that, as far Kant. To Levinas the ethics of abstract universal as thematizing is possible, it simply says, “here I rules is another form of objectification, the effort to am,” with all the rich implications of that phrase.23 construct an autonomous subject who can dominate Levinas’s ethical theory is incomprehensible, I an objectified world. Instead of endorsing the En- think, unless understood in the context of its relig- lightenment ethic of autonomy, Levinas embraces ious dimension. For Levinas the call to responsibil- heteronomy.19 Here his language becomes remarka- ity experienced through the face of the other be- bly stringent: “I am not simply responsible for the comes for the individual the trace and witness of the other,” says Levinas; I am “taken hostage” by the Infinite.24 The other is for the self not simply limit other. “[The I] is a hostage for the other, obeying a and demand; the face of the Thou also conveys the command before having heard it, faithful to a com- ideal. Levinas writes: mitment that it never made, to a past that has never The other is not simply another freedom; to give been present.”20 me knowledge of injustice, his gaze must come Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 27

to me from a dimension of the ideal. The other view the other as a limit, as properly beyond my must be closer to God than I am. This is cer- control. They both want to resist the philosophical tainly not a philosopher’s invention, but the first tendency to appropriate and absorb the other, setting given of conscience (la conscience morale), against Hegelian totalization the irreducible alterity which could be defined as the consciousness of the other. (We will refer to a Tillichian qualifica- (conscience) of the privilege the other has rela- tion of this agreement later.) They are in accord in tive to me. Justice well ordered begins with the opposing the ideal of Enlightenment autonomy, the other.25 tendency toward deification of the monadological This begins to sound like a Kantian moral argu- self. They both recognize the danger of objectifying ment for the existence of God, the view that the exis- rationality, the drive toward reification of persons as tence of God is presupposed by the fact of ethical well as of the natural and social worlds. responsibility. There are connections with Kant, to Levinas goes further, however, to accuse the en- be sure; but Levinas is a post-modern, post– tire Western ontological tradition of “totalization”— Heideggerian thinker. He accepts the Nietzschean i.e., of “trying to find myself in everything and eve- linkage of morality, God, and Western metaphysics, ryone I encounter,”30 or of reducing the Other to the and the Nietzschean/ Heideggerian critique of tradi- Same. Colin Davis expresses Levinas’s point as fol- tional Western metaphysics— including accepting lows: “To preserve the Other as Other, it must not the death of God “as the highest being or being par become an object of knowledge or experience, be- excellence.” However, unlike the masters of suspi- cause knowledge is always my knowledge, experi- cion such as Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud, Levinas ence always my experience; the object is encoun- asks if there could be another “significance of God” tered only as it exists for me, and immediately its after the end of metaphysics.26 Is it possible to af- alterity is diminished.”31 Thus, Levinas radicalizes firm God not only as beyond knowledge but also the critique of objectification, and extends it to on- beyond being? tology as such. Levinas resists arriving at either a concept or a Tillich accepts the Kantian critique of rationalist direct experience of God. He writes: “The Infinite is ontology. Further, there appears to have been a time, not in front of its witness, but as it were outside, or early on, when he proposed to go beyond ontology on the ‘other side’ of presence, already past, out of altogether. In the 1933 work, The Socialist Decision, reach, a thought behind thoughts which is too lofty speaking of prophetic expectation, Tillich writes: to push itself up front.”27 Kosky summarizes: “The The expectation of ‘a new heaven and a new face does not show me God. It does not present God, earth’ signifies the expectation of a reality that is nor does it indicate God in the manner of a sign that not subject to the structure of being, that cannot synchronizes signifiers and signifieds. Rather, the be grasped ontologically. The old and the new face summons me to God, a-dieu [unto God] but to being cannot be subsumed under the same con- God who is ever departing, bidding adieu, from the cept of being. The new being is intrinsically face that presents itself to me.” It cannot be said that unontological. It cannot be derived from the this trace-God appears as a Thou in the manner of original state.32 Buber. Instead, one’s assuming the mantle of re- Tillich here associates ontology with “myth of ori- sponsibility “is itself the revelation of God and not a gin” and with space,33 in a footnote he elaborates: result or after-effect of it.”28 “Ontology thus has the same degree of justification If not being, is God then not-being? Levinas in- as does the bond of origin as such, i.e., it is justified sists that to hold that existence or non-existence is only insofar as it has been broken by a philosophy of the ultimate question is to submit to the primacy of history. The notion of an abstract ‘fundamental on- being and efficacy (i.e., causality) over signification, tology’ free of any relation to history is thereby ex- and to the denial of transcendence. Instead of opting cluded.”34 This expression points in the direction for the ultimacy of being, he finds another philoso- Tillich would later take; he wants to preserve a link phical choice, “the Platonic word, Good beyond Be- with the “bond of origin,” hence with ontology, but ing.”29 Transcendence for Levinas signifies a move- it must be “broken” by history.35 ment beyond being as well as beyond knowledge. Tillich later, instead of attempting to go beyond Turning to a comparison of Levinas and Tillich, ontology altogether, combines the emphasis on his- we can start with major areas of agreement. Both tory with the existential analysis referred to earlier, Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 28

constructing an ontology that “passes through the Levinas’s view is well summarized by Alphonso doctrine of man.” One might suppose that this ontol- Lingis in the Foreword to Otherwise Than Being: ogy “broken by a philosophy of history” would be [In] transferring religious language to the ethical thoroughly intersubjective and social. It is not clear sphere, Levinas no doubt divinizes the relation- that Tillich fully accomplishes this; his categories ship with alterity…. Not so much that God continue to be predominantly psychological. Perhaps would be a postulate required to render the ethi- his thinking here was influenced more by Kierke- cal imperative intelligible, nor that God would gaard and Heidegger than by Buber. be revealed in ethical phenomena—but that God A comparison of Tillich and Levinas can be is the very nonphenomenal force of the other, brought into focus by examining their respective that God ‘exists’ in his voice, which speaks in approaches to the infinite, the ultimate reality, or the ethical imperative.…[God for Levinas] is the God. As is well known, Tillich insists that one ought Good that calls unto being and to expiation for not to claim that God “exists,” i.e., that God stands the wants and faults of being.42 apart from all else as a being. All beings can become Tillich acknowledges the moral aspect of our an object for some subject, and God cannot become encounter with the divine, but he would want to add an object. To this extent, Tillich agrees with Levi- a reconciling aspect, the transmoral, transpersonal nas: God is beyond the beings.36 But Levinas finds experience of participation.43 Tillich characteristi- traces of a God “not contaminated by Being”37 cally takes a both/and approach—both separation through the transcendence proper to ethics. We en- and participation. Levinas no doubt would argue that counter here a difference of basic intuitions. Levinas Tillich has opted for Hegelian totalization, while he alludes to a “calling into question” that is older than himself would hold out for an irreducible alterity. the questioning of the source and power of being. He We might conclude by asking again, to what ex- writes: “Not the questionable nature of the question tent is the “primacy of moral relationality” compati- that asks: ‘Why is there being rather than nothing- ble with a Tillichian perspective? This question ness?’ But of the question that is contranatural, points us back to Tillich’s formulations about against the very naturalness of nature: ‘Is it just to prophetism and the new being referred to earlier. be’? Bad conscience! The most repressed question, There he contends that prophetic Judaism broke the but older than that which seeks the meaning of be- power of the “myth of origin” by virtue of being ing.”38 placed under an “unconditional (moral) demand.” Tillich of course views the questioning of be- All convictions about the holiness of being are put ing—why is there something and notnothing—to be under the judgment of the demand for righteousness absolutely basic; God is heard through the shock of and justice for the “other” (the stranger, the alien, possible nonbeing. Recall Tillich’s reference to the the poor and needy).44 In a 1932 essay, “Protestan- experience of “the nothingness of an absolute radical tismus und Politische Romantik,” Tillich writes: No,” which can be transformed into “an experience, “The prophet places the Whither, the unconditional no less absolute, of reality, into a radical Yes.”39 Or demand, against the holiness of the bearing powers. again, Tillich comments that on one point he can He places Being under the judgment of the Ought. make no concession—“the ultimacy of being.”40 He He makes the connection with the transcendent Ori- is not immune to the voice of a bad conscience, but gin dependent upon the fulfillment of the moral de- it seems clear that for him the shock of potential mand.”45 It is this orientation toward a reality to be nonbeing is more basic. actualized in the future that, he says, cannot be Possibly the difference between the two thinkers grasped ontologically. This understanding of uncon- can be couched in terms of the distinction between ditional moral demand breaking the primal identifi- mysticism and morality, Tillich in the end allowing cations in Tillich’s thought is comparable to the for the former, Levinas dwelling exclusively with theme of moral responsibility transcending being in the latter. When Levinas aligns himself with the Levinas. The difference is that Tillich does not ad- Plotinian One that is beyond all intelligibility, he vocate a total break with the powers of origin, hence sounds most like Tillich.41 But intimations of this with Being; rather, we should seek fulfillment of the Infinite, beyond Being, appear for Levinas in moral- aim of being in the new being. New being, it would ity, in the moral demand deriving from the other. seem, is real as potentiality but not as actuality. Per- haps potency is a better rendering of the term “es- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 29 sence” in Tillich. New being exerts power as lure and goal, thus indeed as meaning, perhaps, instead lich Society Newsletter, vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring, 1999), 5- of being. In this formulation, it may be that Levinas 13, and Guy B. Hammond, “Response,” 14-15. and Tillich are not so far apart after all. 4 Four Existentialist Theologians, ed. By Will Her- It is interesting to note how the emphases of berg (New York: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1958), 279. Levinas reflect a characteristically Jewish sensibil- 5 Four Existentialist Theologians, 280. ity: his unwillingness to name the name of the Holy 6 Four Existentialist Theologians, 279. One, and yet his conviction that the Infinite is re- 7 Four Existentialist Theologians, 280. vealed in the call to righteousness. At the same time, 8 Cf. Paul Tillich, “Existential Philosophy: Its His- I suggest that Levinas provides a useful standpoint torical Meaning,” in Theology of Culture, ed. Robert from which to interrogate Tillich’s ontology. Does Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), Tillich’s assertion that God is Being-itself serve as a esp. 92. conservative pole in his system, qualifying if not 9 Theology of Culture, 94-98. negating the prophetic expectation of “a new heaven 10 The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, ed. By and a new earth”? It is not so much that Tillich’s Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: “being” is static or immutable; after all, for him Be- Cambridge University Press, 2002), 12. ing-itself is the power of being, encompassing both 11 Cf. my article, “Debates about Intersubjectivity,” in continuity (form) and change (dynamics). But for Religion in the New Millennium: Theology in the Spirit of Tillich love is reunion: consummation is return after Paul Tillich, ed. by Raymond Bulman and Frederick Par- estrangement. Is Tillich after all in thrall to Hegelian rella (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2001), 97- totalization, where otherness and the new are re- 108. duced to sameness and the old? This accusation de- 12 C. Fred Alford, Levinas, the Frankfurt School, and riving from Levinas is worth pondering. Psychoanalysis (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University I conclude that neither Levinas nor Tillich pre- Press, 2002), 21. serves a robust concept of the eternal Thou in 13 Levinas, the Frankfurt School, and Psychoanalysis, Buber’s sense. Both highlight the unconditional 16. moral demand. But Tillich’s “grace,” which gives 14 Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, Outside the Subject (Stan- what is demanded, transcends the divine-human en- ford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 34-35. counter in the direction of reconciliation and unity. 15 Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being: Or For Levinas the voice of the infinite other calls one Beyond Essence (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, into the service of the neighbor; here there is no rec- 1998), xiii; Emmanuel Levinas, God, Death, and Time onciliation, though there is meaning and a sense of (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 126-127; the ideal. I find a certain degree of complementarity 136-137. between Tillich and Levinas, rather than all-out op- 16 Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in position. They both draw upon Buber. In criticizing Collected Philosophical Papers (Pittsburgh: Duquesne and going beyond him, they engage a common set of University Press, 1987), 168, 171, 188-189; Otherwise issues, resolving them in ways that, if not identical, Than Being, xl-xli; Jeffrey L. Kosky, Levinas and the are at least partially compatible. Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana Uni- versity Press, 2001), xiii; “here I am,” of course, is a phrase that appears at key points in the Biblical narrative: it is uttered by Abraham, Samuel, and Isaiah, possibly 1 The Theology of Paul Tillich, ed. by Charles W. others. Kegley (New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1982). 252-263. 17 Emmanuel Levinas, “Philosophy and the Idea of 2 Martin Buber, I and Thou, 2nd ed., trans Ronald Infinity,” in The Continental Ethics Reader, ed. by Mat- Gregor Smith (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, thew Calarco and Peter Atterton (New York: Routledge, 1958), 11; cf. Paul Tillich, “Reply to Interpretation and 2003), 48, 51. Criticism,” in The Theology of Paul Tillich, 387. 18 Outside the Subject, 23; cf. 36-39. 3 For a discussion of Tillich’s relation to Buber, cf. 19 Cf. The Continental Ethics Reader, 50, 51. Robison James, “Revising Tillich’s Model of Reality to 20 “God and Philosophy,” in Collected Philosophical Let God Be Personal,” in The North American Paul Til- Papers, 165. 21 Outside the Subject, 33-34. Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 30

22 Collected Philosophical Papers, 22. is at issue here, because it is not a question of some ac- 23 Colin Davis, Levinas: An Introduction (Notre tual being that concerns us, but of an actuality of mean- Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 79. ing, indeed, the ultimate and most profound actuality of 24 Cf. Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion, 189; I meaning that convulses everythjing and builds everything have been aided in my discussion of Levinas’s philosophy anew.” of religion by Kosky’s perceptive work. 40 Paul Tillich, “Rejoinder,” in The Journal of Relig- 25 The Continental Ethics Reader, 48. ion, vol. XLVI, Jan. 1966, no.1, part 2, 186. 26 Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion, 132, 147; 41 Otherwise Than Being, 95. cf. also xiii-xv. 42 Otherwise Than Being, xxxix. 27 Otherwise Than Being, 149. 43 Cf. Robison James’s discussion of Tillich on par- 28 Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion, 187-189. ticipation in The North American Paul Tillich Society 29 Otherwise Than Being, 94-95. Newsletter, vol. XXV, No. 2, Spring, 1999, 8-9, and his 30 Levinas, the Frankfurt School, and Psychoanalysis, reference to Tillich’s article, “Participation and Knowl- 100. edge: Problems of an Ontology of Cognition,” found in 31 Levinas: An Introduction, 40. Main Works/Hauptwerke, general ed. C. R. Ratschow, 32 Paul Tillich, The Socialist Decision (New York: vol. 1 (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1989), esp. Harper and Row, 1977), 20; I was reminded of this pas- 386. sage by James Reimer’s article, “Nation and Myth of Ori- 44 Cf. The Socialist Decision, 18-23. gin in Paul Tillich’s Radical Social Thought,” in The In- 45 Paul Tillich, Fuer und Wider den Socialismus fluence of the Frankfurt School on Contemporary Theol- (Muenchen: Siebenstern Taschenbuch Verlag, 1969), 86; ogy, ed. by A. James Reimer (Lewisville: The Edwin my translation [“Der Prophet stellt das Wozu, die un- Mellen Press, 1992), esp. 192; in Theodor Adorno’s study bedingte Forderung, gegen die Heiligheit der tragenden of Soren Kierkegaard written under Tillich’s general su- Maechte. Er stellt das Sein unter das Gericht des Soll. Er pervision in 1933, Adorno suggests that for Kiekegaard macht die Beziehung zum tranzendenten Ursprung ab- individual existence is “not ontological”; see Kierke- haengig von der Erfuellung der sittlichen Forderung.”] gaard: Construction of the Aesthetic (Minneapolis: Uni- versity of Minnesota Press, 1989), 71. 33 The Socialist Decision, 18. 34 The Socialist Decision, 166, n.6.




















35 Cf. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. I (Chi- cago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 167-168. 36 Cf. Edgar Towne’s discussion of this point in “Til- lich’s Postmodern View of the Actuality of God,” in The North American Paul Tillich Society Newsletter, vol. 29, Please send notice of any books and no. 3 (Summer, 2003), 26. 37 Otherwise Than Being, xlviii. articles about Tillich or by Tillich 38 Outside the Subject, 92. scholars to the editor. 39 Paul Tillich, “On the Idea of a Theology of Cul- ture,” in Victor Nuovo, Visionary Science: A Translation of Tillich’s “On the Idea of a Theology of Culture” with an Interpretive Essay (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987), 24-25; but note also the continuation of the Please send in your passage, where Tillich draws closer to Levinas: “This has 2004 dues promptly. nothing to do with a new reality that stands beside or above things—rather—the reality forces itself upon us Thank you. that is simultaneously a No and a Yes to things. It is not a being, it is not substance. It is not the totality of beings. It is, to use a mystical formulation, what is beyond being, what is simultaneously and absolutely nothing and some- thing. Nevertheless, even the predicate ‘is’ conceals what Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 31

Self, Otherness, Theology, and physics of Difference and the Renewal of Tradition, Ontology: A Critical Davies reconceptualizes the language of being to Engagement between Tillich and construct a kenotic Christian ontology of difference. Kristeva, Levinas, and Bataille Appealing to Levinas and Ricoeur to address rela- tionality in the post-Holocaust context of annihila- Jonathan Rothchild tion, Davies reinterprets being as “the medium of 1 relation between self and other” and ontology as a Paul Tillich would no doubt be fascinated with narrativity of being disclosed through language- 2 postmodern thinkers, whom—to a considerable ex- based exchanges. Davies problematizes conceptions tent—he had anticipated in his critical appreciation within traditional metaphysics that emphasize being 3 of Nietzsche, Expressionism, depth psychology, and as a unity because they perpetuate essentialism and the “death of God” theologians. My purpose here is exclude and vitiate the concrete other. Yet, given the to analyze Tillich’s conceptions of self with respect postmodern emphasis on fragmentation and attenua- to postmodern thinkers who characterize the self as tion of the self, Davies affirms the necessity of re- the displaced self, anti-cogito, or the self as consti- trieving the language of being: “[T]he language of tuted by otherness. Postmodern thinkers summarily being offers an important resource for articulating assert that the self is to be conceptualized in rela- and drawing forth the intrinsic unity of the self tional terms vis-à-vis the alterity of the other, who is which, albeit deferred, is the ground for the knowl- 4 trace, infinity, or lordship (Emmanuel Levinas), ab- edge of the world as such.” He therefore develops a ject (Julia Kristeva), or ecstatic rupture (Georges theology of compassion that construes ontology as Bataille). These perspectives interrogate Tillich’s relationality committed to “the absolute primacy of theology as to its capacity to accommodate notions the ethical relation with respect to the concrete 5 of otherness. They deconstruct concepts and images other.” that totalize (e.g., being), privilege the unity of the Davies posits that the self’s affirmation of other- self, or reduce otherness to sameness. They therefore ness concomitantly enriches or deepens the self’s present a formidable challenge to Tillich’s system, existence, that is, the self’s being. Compassion com- including, for example, his notions of self- pels kenosis, “a riskful giving and an opening of the 6 centeredness, self-transcendence, and the basic onto- self before existence,” that interconnects existence logical structure of self and world. My essay, how- and ontology because “heightened existence repre- 7 ever, attempts to render this tension productive by sents a higher degree of ontological density.” highlighting the fruits for both interlocutors. Moreover, Davies envisages that self-displacement My thesis is three-fold. First, I affirm sustain- of compassion “sets up a flow of enriched existence ability of Tillich’s project by probing the relation- which draws others towards those who in this way, 8 ship between self, other, ontology, and theology as if by the attraction of being itself” and reinscribes through the mediation of Oliver Davies’s recent self and other in terms of being and existence. work. Second, I argue that critical engagement be- Davies, however, notes that the ontologies of tween Tillich and Kristeva, Levinas, and Bataille Tillich, Bultmann, and Rahner “seem out of place in exposes the limits of Tillich’s notions of otherness, the vigorously language-centred and deconstructive 9 particularly with respect to alterity, transcendence, landscapes of the present day.” There are no addi- and embodiment. Third, I contend that Tillich’s con- tional references to Tillich’s ontology, but evalua- cepts of symbol and love as reunion preserve par- tion of the criticisms with respect to Rahner can be ticipation and selfhood and problematize notions of illuminating for study of Tillich. Davies writes: “We meaninglessness and subjugation of self to other in differ from Rahner then to the extent that knowledge Kristeva, Levinas, and Bataille. of the other is determined by…the ethical particular- ity of the relation of the self to the other, and that The Sustainability of Tillich’s Ontology in the transcendence is a possibility which awakens from Contemporary Contexts within that relation and not from an a priori ground 10 Is Tillich’s ontology still tenable within the anti- of all knowing which encompasses it.” I contend metaphysical milieu of postmodernity? To ascertain that this worry about an a priori ground negating the answer we will consider the recent work of relationality and difference appears misplaced. 11 Oliver Davies. In A Theology of Compassion: Meta- Among possible Tillichian rejoinders, Tillich’s in- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 32

heritance of various aspects of Schelling’s philoso- by letting his ground hold sway over itself and by phy disavows essentialism and accounts for other- struggling against it.”16 Tillich asserts that without ness. Tillich affirms the interconnections between the otherness within God, there would no being, no essence and existence: “[Schelling] did not, how- life, and no personal God.17 To be sure, there are dif- ever, abolish what Hegel and he had done before. He ferences between Tillich and Schelling,18 but it is preserved a philosophy of essence. Against this he apparent that Schelling significantly informs Til- put the philosophy of existence. Existentialism is not lich’s understanding of the relationship between self, a philosophy which can stand on its own legs. Actu- otherness, and reality. Tillich’s nuanced understand- ally it has no legs. It is always based on a vision of ing, in my judgment, gainsays Davies’s criticisms the essential structure of reality.”12 This attempted and attests to the viability of Tillich’s writings in a fusion of existence and the essential structure of re- postmodern context. ality frames Tillich’s correlative method and his conceptions of self and reality (e.g., the tension be- Postmodernity, Otherness, and Ontology: tween life and system and being and non-being). Bataille on Ecstasy and Nonknowledge Schelling attempts to reintegrate essence and ex- Bataille, Kristeva, and Levinas in disparate ways istence because he integrates the “negative philoso- address suffering, exploitation, and annihilation in phy” of the a priori system of absolute Essence and the world;19 each is concerned with the relationship the “positive philosophy” of absolute Existent. between self and other in terms of communication— Schelling’s thought bears the influence of Jacob but not communication couched in terms of rational Boehme, whom Schelling first encountered in the discourse or systematic project. Bataille asks: How work of Franz von Baader. This influence compels can one communicate to the other the excess of de- Schelling to posit that God assumes Being through a sire and experience without explaining away the pro- dialectic of Yes and No; in similar manner, humans fundity of this experience or this other? Through experience freedom as spirit, but through contradic- Nietzschean inspired fragments, Bataille insists that tion.13 Drawing upon Boehme’s notion of abyss in one must disentangle knowledge, communication, God, Schelling in Ages of the World states: “Because and self: “If we didn’t know how to dramatize, we the Godhead, in itself neither having being nor not wouldn’t be able to leave ourselves...But a sort of having being, is, with respect to external Being, nec- rupture—in anguish—leaves us at the limit of tears: essarily a consuming No, it must therefore in such a case we lose ourselves, we forget ourselves also…necessarily be an eternal Yes, reinforcing and communicate with an elusive beyond.”20 This Love, the essence of all essences.”14 anguished rupture functions to undercut the totality Tillich traces shifts within Schelling’s corpus, of knowledge or the “satisfaction”21 of the “prison”22 notably Schelling’s transformation from his early of the Hegelian project, Bataille’s primary target.23 philosophy of identity between nature and spirit (ar- Rupture unfolds ecstasy, which Bataille understands ticulated as a philosophy of nature in his 1800 The to be a “contestation of knowledge”24 or “the defeat System of Transcendental Idealism) to his examina- of thought”25 that discloses excess without annihilat- tion of the self-contradiction of the will and the ing otherness and demands supplication of the self in problem of evil (expressed in his 1809 On the Na- the “horror of surrender.”26 This horror of surrender ture of Human) to his later exploration of the dy- entails anguish and despair, yet it is manifested as namic of the finite and the infinite and the affirma- rapture and joy. Shorn of the limits of discursive tion of existence in positive philosophy (discussed in experience that enclose the self and sublimate other- his 1811-1815 The Ages of the World and the most ness, ecstasy engenders an “inner presence which we influential on Tillich). The later Schelling’s concept cannot apprehend without a startled jump of our en- of potency of being is particularly fecund for Til- tire being, detesting the servility of discourse.”27 In lich’s understanding of ontology, self, and other- the realm of inner presence, ecstasy, sacrifice, eroti- ness.15 From his reading of Schelling, Tillich places cism, laughter, and the sacred converge in a tran- emphasis on the divine process of dialectical Yes scendence that eviscerates project and creates a and No that undergirds God’s existence as a personal situation “whereby life situates itself in proportion to being: “Now, however, Schelling asserted: God ex- the impossible.”28 ists. He has separated himself from his ground and A conspicuous example of ecstatic attempts to has won existence [for himself] as living personality, surmount the “servility of discourse” occurs in Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 33

Bataille’s contemplating the image of a decapitated platonic, sources,34 ecstasy according to Tillich “is Chinese man. Subjected to gruesome torture or, as the classical term for this state of being grasped by Bataille puts it, laceration, the afflicted man para- the Spiritual Presence” that “drives the spirit of man doxically appears to Bataille to be in a sublime state beyond itself without destroying its essential, i.e., of joy. Despite ethical questions regarding instru- rational, structure.”35 In contrast to the destruction of mentality raised by interpreters such as Amy Holly- the demonic, ecstatic reconfiguration is creative be- wood,29 contemplating the victim induces rupture in cause it promotes self-transcendence, yet it preserves Bataille: “I loved him with a love in which the sadis- participation within the ground of being. This tran- tic instinct played no part: he communicated his pain scendence/ participation dialectic occurs in and to me or perhaps the excessive nature of his pain, through the theonomous interpenetration of reason, and it was precisely that which I was seeking, not so ecstasy, and revelation, for “[e]cstasy occurs only if as to take pleasure in it, but in order to ruin in me the mind is grasped by the mystery, namely, by the that which is opposed to ruin.”30 No narrative can ground of being and meaning. And, conversely, explain this relationality, for that would be tanta- there is no revelation without ecstasy.”36 Ecstasy, mount to Hegelian satisfaction, not transcendent ec- reason, and revelation converge in ultimate concern, stasy. This ecstatic experience constitutes a sacrifice where ecstasy is not reduced to project but is self- that is effusive in that “it destroys the depths of the transcending reason that assumes disparate forms, heart, the depths of being, by unveiling them.”31 including prophetic witness, agapic love, and Though Bataille abrogates the soteriological32 un- prayer..37 derpinnings of the Passion, the cross communicates intense pain that disabuses self-interested project. Julia Kristeva on Alterity and Embodiment Influenced by Freud and Lacan, Julia Kristeva’s Tillich’s Response to Bataille: Ecstasy and Ra- work intersects semiotics, psychoanalysis, and femi- tional Structure nism. She shares Bataille’s disquiet towards the he- Is Tillich’s work tantamount to “project”? To gemony of the Hegelian project in the Western address Bataille’s criticisms, let us consider Tillich’s mindset. Kristeva characterizes otherness as the ab- employment of the term ecstasy. Tillich conceives of ject or the discarded that destabilizes self and soci- ecstasy in terms of a self-transcendence experienced ety. In Powers of Horror, Kristeva construes abject in and through rational knowledge; unlike Bataille, as “the jettisoned object [that] is radically excluded Tillich does not perceive an incompatibility between and draws me toward the place where meaning col- ecstasy, knowledge (reason), self, and other. Til- lapses.”38 Similar to Bataille’s notion of ecstasy as lich’s basic ontological structure of self and world communicating non-knowledge and, as we will see does not preclude notions of otherness or ecstasy; a below, Levinas’s repudiation of totality, Kristeva’s fortiori, ecstasy is necessitated by the otherness of abject resists reduction to preconceived meanings. non-being that threatens self and world. Tillich de- Abject precludes simple elision between self and scribes the tumultuous, but intimate relationship be- other, “[f]or the space that engrosses the deject, the tween reason, ecstasy, and the encounter with non- excluded is never one, nor homogeneous, nor to- being: talizable, but essentially divisible, foldable, and The threat of nonbeing, grasping the mind, pro- catastrophic.”39 Moreover, just as Bataille inter- duces the ‘ontological shock’ in which the nega- weaves anguish and rapture, Kristeva associates an- tive side of the mystery of being—its abysmal nihilation of the self and jouissance or radical joy. element is experienced. ‘Shock’ points to a state Kristeva extends her analysis further by juxta- of mind in which the mind is thrown out of its posing the abject and the maternal body. The mater- normal balance, shaken in its structure. Reason nal body, particularly with its the liminal boundaries reaches it boundary line, is thrown back upon it- constituted by the fusion of fluids, dependencies, self, and then is driven again to its extreme and identities, has been muted in Western thought situation.33 such that a woman “will not be able to accede to the Tillich, therefore, concurs with Bataille’s vision complexity of being divided, of heterogeneity, of the of the traumatic effects of ecstasy, but he does not catastrophic-fold-of-‘being.’”40 Additionally noted equate this disorientation with Bataille’s non- by Levinas,41 the maternal body’s unrepresentable knowledge. Appropriated from Scriptural and Neo- abject stands in opposition to the complicity of the Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 34

linguistically and socially constructed narcissism. In and the search for absolute foundations) and homo- Tales of Love, Kristeva contends that the image of geneity (Heidegger’s preoccupation with Dasein49). the Virgin cannot express the otherness of mother- Levinas intends to debunk the Western project of hood because it signifies “the woman whose entire ontology and its proclivity toward totality. Conse- body is an emptiness through which the paternal quently, he embraces the hyperbolic, the superlative, word is conveyed…[and thereby] had remarkably the exteriority, and that “which is not a mode of be- subsumed the maternal ‘abject.’”42 ing showing itself in a theme.”50 Ontology reflects the domestication and reduc- Tillich’s Response to Kristeva: Body as a Dimen- tion of otherness; it is encapsulated in what Levinas sion of the Person denominates as the said, “the birthplace of ontol- Tillich’s treatment of the body is admittedly lim- ogy.”51 Levinas affirms communication between self ited, though his attention to the ontological structure and other, but communication as the saying whose of self and world does not obviate considerations of “articulation and signifyingness [are] antecedent to the body. In Dynamics of Faith, Tillich develops his ontology.”52 Levinas upholds saying because it does concept of self-centeredness, where “body, soul, and not efface the other, it does not imprison the infinity spirit are not three parts of man. They are dimen- and trace of the other, and it functions as “expo- sions of man’s being, always within each other.”43 sure”53 and not (Hegelian) “recognition”54 in that it Centeredness of the self enables Tillich to account induces the self to denude, strip itself, and submit to for these distinct, but interrelated spheres of human otherness. Levinas insists that to be truly for-the- existence. Perhaps Tillich’s most sensitive treatment other one must experience an intersubjective en- of embodiment, assessed by interpreters such as counter with otherness that puts one’s entire being Mary Ann Stenger,44 is illustrated in his critique of into question. Levinas holds that ethics is metaphys- the father-image of God within Protestant theology. ics, not ontology, because metaphysics invites de- Tillich suggests that “[t]he attempt to show that sire, infinity (e.g., the Good beyond Being in Plato nothing can be said about God theologically before and Plotinus because “[t]he Good is before being”55), the statement is made that he is the power of being fracture (because “the breakup of essence is ethics”56 in all being is, at the same time, a way of reducing manifested in the “[r]upture of being qua being”57), the predominance of the male element in the sym- and otherness that precede the thematizing and total- bolization of the divine.”45 Kristeva concurs with izing character of ontology. This otherness imposes Tillich’s hermeneutics of suspicion vis-à-vis gen- “unlimited responsibility”58 that denies individual dered theological construction, but she would prob- freedom: “It is because there is a vigilance before lematize Tillich’s perduring image of self- the awakening that the cogito is possible, so that eth- integration. According to Tillich, self-integration ics is before ontology. Behind the arrival of the hu- coalesces body and mind, “for only then is mutual man there is already the vigilance for the other. The strangeness and interference excluded.”46 Kristeva’s transcendental I in its nakedness comes from the concern for the ineluctable “heterogeneity” of the awakening by and for the other.”59 body therefore appears underappreciated by Tillich This primordial “awakening” challenges Til- even if he is acutely aware of estrangement.47 lich’s ontological structure of self and world. Levi- nas contends that otherness annuls this structure: Levinas: Totality, Communication, and To transcend oneself, to leave one’s home to the Otherness point of leaving oneself, is to substitute oneself Writing in a post-Holocaust context, Emmanuel for another. It is, in my bearing of myself, not to Levinas censures the totalizing tendencies of West- conduct myself well, but by my unicity as a ern thought from Parmenides to Hegel to Husserl to unique being to expiate for the other. The open- Heidegger. These various models cannot appreciate ness of space as an openness of self without a otherness: “Western philosophy has most often been world, without a place, utopia, the not being an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by walled in, inspiration to the end, even to expira- interposition of a middle term that ensures the com- tion, is proximity of the other which is possible prehension of being.”48 Levinas argues that his phi- only as responsibility for the other, as substitu- losophical mentors subsume otherness into rubrics tion for him…[I]t is because newness comes of intelligibility (Husserl’s transcendent reductions Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 35

from the other that there is in newness transcen- reality which transcends the sphere of moral com- dence and signification.60 mands.”67 Levinas worries about “our indifference of Responsibility for the other, not the essential ‘good conscience’ for what is far and what is near;”68 character of the self, radically shapes the formation Tillich similarly disabuses this indifference with re- of the self’s conscience. Levinas asks: “Is not the spect to the demands of essence (an absolute impera- face of one’s fellow man the original locus in which tive) and existence (the particular circumstances of transcendence calls an authority with a silent voice the situation). in which God comes to mind? Original locus of the Does this analysis of conscience mitigate the Infinite?”61 claims that Tillich’s ethics constitutes an overly in- dividualistic ethic (and thus reinforces Levinas’s Tillich’s Response to Levinas critiques of totality)? Eberhard Amelung points to In contrast to Levinas’s notion of the silent voice individualistic tendencies in Tillich’s thought: “Til- induced by the face of the other, Tillich contends lich has done more than most German philosophers that the silent voice of the moral imperative, the con- and theologians in order to overcome the individual- frontation with one’s essential being, becomes actu- istic approach of German idealism. And yet, perhaps alized in and through one’s own conscience. Tillich due to the influence of C.G. Jung and psychother- conceives of conscience as a fundamental mecha- apy, the self remains the center of the system. As nism for overcoming the problem of the dividedness Tillich grew older this tendency became stronger. In of the self. Though Luther’s view of conscience as the course of this development his ethic also re- an inner voice informs Tillich’s understanding of mained strongly individualistic.”69 Thomas Ogletree, conscience, Heidegger’s appeal to silence also has in Hospitality to the Stranger that engages Levinas significant import for Tillich’s view. Heidegger de- and Ricoeur out of a framework of Christian ethics, scribes the call of conscience as declaring a silent deems compelling Tillich’s appeal to a self- nothing: “In the appeal Dasein gives itself to under- transcending moral imperative, but Ogletree too dis- stand its own potentiality-for-being. This calling is covers shortcomings in Tillich’s system with respect therefore a keeping-silent…Only in keeping silent to encounters between others: “Consequently, we does the conscience call.”62 Though Tillich appropri- still do not find in Tillich’s work an account of the ates Heidegger’s image of conscience as the silent actual manifestation of the material meaning of the voice,63 he does amend Heidegger’s conception. Til- moral imperative in the concrete encounter between lich submits that “the self to which the conscience persons. What is even more disappointing is that calls is the essential, not as Heidegger believes, the Tillich, while seeming to give central place to the I- existential self. It calls us to what we essentially are, thou encounter in the constitution of moral experi- but it does not tell with certainty what that is.”64 ence, continually subordinates that encounter to the It is critical, however, to note that Tillich does dynamics of self-integration.”70 Ogletree concludes not disengage this silent call of the essential from that a solution lies somewhere between a Tillichian relationality. For example, in a 1943 radio address, self-integration and a Levinasian call of the other. Tillich impels his German listeners not merely to Though Amelung and Ogletree are correct in press- confront an abstract evil but also to undertake practi- ing Tillich on this crucial issue of self and other, I cal measures in response to the suffering of others: argue that both thinkers do not fully appreciate the “So speak the voices from the land of the dead to aspects of relationality and community (undertaken you, the voices of the Jewish children and women comprehensively in the third volume of the System- and old people murdered by the Nazis under your atic Theology) that underlie and sustain questions of noses. And when you ask where this voice of the self, otherness, love, and justice and to which we dead is speaking to you, you yourselves know the now turn to as a conclusion. answer: it is the voice of your own conscience…You can no longer silence this voice within yourselves.”65 Tillich’s Insights: Symbols and Love as Reunion This convergence of essence (the inner voice) and The dialogue between Tillich and the postmod- existence (the voices of the suffering) underlies the ern thinkers has revealed both the limits and insights reasons why conscience is both “the most subjective of Tillich’s ontology. One insight that has been dis- self-interpretation of personal life”66 and a trans- cussed pertains to the dynamic between transcen- moral judgment “according to the participation in a dence and participation, where the self is tran- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 36

scended in its encounter with disparate forms of oth- tion. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans erness, yet the self is irreducibly preserved in that it Publishing Company, 2003. [First published in remains embedded in the essential structures of real- London by SCM Press in 2001]. ity. Symbols constitute one dimension where tran- Despland, Michael, Jean-Claude Petit, et Jean Rich- scendence and participation co-exist in a fruitful ten- ard, eds. Religion et Culture. Colloque du Cen- sion; symbols open the self to new levels of tran- tenaire Paul Tillich (1986). Québec: Les Presses scendence, but they affirm the presence of meaning de L’Université Laval, 1987. even as they nullify and disintegrate this meaning.71 Fackenheim, Emil. “Schelling’s Conception of Posi- Love as the reunion of the separated functions tive Philosophy.” The Review of Metaphysics similarly along the transcendence/ participation dia- VII (1954): 563-582. lectic. As Tillich writes: “Love is the drive toward Hollywood, Amy. Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sex- the reunion of the separated; this is ontologically and ual Difference, and the Demands of History. therefore universally true.”72 This drive toward reun- Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, ion, exemplified in agape but funded by the desire 2002. of eros, entails “participation in the other one Hummel, Gert and Doris Lax, eds. Being versus through participation in the transcendent unity of Word in Paul Tillich’s Theology? Proceedings unambiguous life,”73 and it is manifested as “partici- of the VII International Paul-Tillich-Symposium pating knowledge which changes both the knower held in Frankfurt/ Main 1998. Berlin: Walter de and the known in the very act of loving knowl- Gruyter, 1999. edge.”74 This “loving knowledge,” even if fragmen- Joy, Morny, Kathleen O’Grady, and Judith Poxon, tary within the Spiritual Presence, mediates between eds. French Feminists on Religion: A Reader. absolutism and relativism and enables Tillich to re- Foreword by Catherine Clément. London: Rout- spond to postmodern critics of ontology. Love as ledge, 2002. reunion affirms, yet transforms self and other, in- Kristeva, Julia. The Portable Kristeva: Updated Edi- tersubjectivity, and justice, in ways that Bataille, tion. Edited by Kelly Oliver. New York: Colum- Kristeva, and Levinas75 appear to abdicate in their bia University Press, 2002. attention to otherness. As recent works in Tillichian ______. Tales of Love. Translated by Leon scholarship76 demonstrate, engagement between Til- Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press, lich and postmodernity should continue to yield con- 1987. structive conversations. Levinas, Emmanuel. Alterity and Transcendence. Translated by Michael Smith. New York: Co- Bibliography lumbia University Press, 1999. Bataille, Georges. Inner Experience. Translated with ______. In the Time of Nations. Translated an Introduction by Leslie Anne Boldt. Albany: by Michael Smith. Bloomington: State University of New York Press, 1988. Indiana University Press, 1994. ______. The Unfinished System of ______. Nine Talmudic Readings. Translated Nonknowledge. Edited and with an Introduction and With an Introduction by Annette Aro- by Stuart Kendall. Translated by Michelle Ken- nomicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, dall and Stuart Kendall. Minneapolis: University 1990. of Minnesota Press, 2001. ______. Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Brown, Robert. The Later Philosophy of Schelling. Essence. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pitts- Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, burgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998. 1977. ______. Time and the Other (and Additional Carey, John, ed. Kairos and Logos: Studies in the Essays). Translated by Richard Cohen. Pitts- Roots and Implications of Tillich’s Theology. burgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1984. ______. Totality and Infinity: An Essay in Cohen, Richard, ed. Face to Face with Levinas. Al- Exteriority. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. bany: State University of New York Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969. Press, 1986. Peperzak, Adriaan, ed. Ethics as First Philosophy: Davies, Oliver. A Theology of Compassion: Meta- The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Phi- physics of Difference and the Renewal of Tradi- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 37

losophy, Literature, and Religion. New York: Edited by Perry LeFevre. Chicago: Exploration Routledge, 1995. Press, 1984. Schelling, F. W. J. von. The Ages of the World [a ______. Morality and Beyond. Foreword by fragment: Third Version c. 1815]. Translated, William Schweiker. Library of Theological Eth- with an Introduction by Jason Wirth. Albany: ics. Louisville: Westminster, 1995 (1963). State University of New York Press, 2000. ______. Systematic Theology. Volume I. ______. On The History of Modern Philoso- Reason and Revelation/ Being and God. Chi- phy. Translation, Introduction, and Notes by cago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951. Andrew Bowie. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- ______. Systematic Theology. Volume II. sity Press, 1994. Existence and the Christ. Chicago: The Univer- Smith, Steven. The Argument to the Other: Reason sity of Chicago Press, 1957. Beyond Reason in the Thought of Karl Barth ______. Systematic Theology. Volume III: and Emmanuel Levinas. American Academy of Life and the Spirit History of the Kingdom of Religion Academic Series, Number 42. Chico, God. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, CA: Scholars Press, 1983. 1963. Snow, Dale. Schelling and the End of Idealism. ______. Theology of Culture. Edited by SUNY Series in Hegelian Studies. Albany: State Robert Kimball. Oxford: Oxford University University of New York Press, 1996. Press, 1959. Stenger, Mary Ann, and Ronald Stone. Dialogues of ______. What is Religion? Edited with an Paul Tillich. Atlanta: Mercer University Press, Introduction by James Luther Adams. New 2002. York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969. Stoudt, John Joseph. Sunrise to Eternity: A Study in Wyschogrod, Edith. “God and ‘Being’s Move’ in the Jacob Boehme’s Life and Thought. Preface by Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.” The Journal Paul Tillich. Philadelphia: University of Penn- of Religion 62 (1982): 145-155. sylvania Press, 1957. Taylor, Mark C. Alterity. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987. 1 A Theology of Compassion, XVII. Tillich, Paul. Against the Third Reich: Wartime Ad- 2 Davies explains the ways Bakhtinian dialogism and dresses to Nazi Germany. Edited by Ronald H. pragmatics pertain to an enhanced being: “Within such a Stone and Matthew Lon Weaver. Translated by dialogical view of the self, the encounter with the other as Matthew Lon Weaver. Louisville: Westminster interlocutor becomes central to our own self-possession as John Knox Press, 1998. speaking and reflexive creatures, and becomes, as we ______. The Construction of the History of have argued, the epiphany of being, as the existential re- Religion in Schelling’s Positive Philosophy: Its alization of our own dialectical self-transcendence” (Ibid., Presuppositions and Principles. Translated with 159). To reify such connections between narrativity and an Introduction and Notes by Victor Nuovo. being, Davies appeal to the stories of Holocaust victims Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1974. Etty Hillesum and Edith Stein and an unnamed victim of ______. The Courage to Be. Second Edition. ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Introduction by Peter Gomes. New Haven. Yale 3 Davies implicates modern figures in his indictment University Press, 2000. of ontology: “We need not progress along the Leibnizean ______. Dynamics of Faith. New York: and Heideggerian path of asking what is the meaning of Harper Torchbooks. 1957. being as such, which would inevitably be to replace our ______. A History of Christian Thought: preferred paradigm, which is concerned specifically with From Its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Exis- the self in relation to the other, with the model we have tentialism. Edited by Carl Braaten. New York: called ‘Being and Oneness,’ which focuses upon the me- Simon and Schuster, 1968. dium of being itself, to the relative exclusion of the con- ______. Love, Power and Justice: Ontologi- crete being” (Ibid., 52). cal Analyses and Ethical Applications. New 4 Ibid., 53. York: Oxford University Press, 1960. 5 Ibid., 73. Davies explains: “Compassion is the rec- ______. The Meaning of Health: Essays in ognition of the otherness of the other, as an otherness Existentialism, Psychoanalysis, and Religion. which stands beyond our own world, beyond our own Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 38

constructions of otherness even. But it is also the discov- Conception of Positive Philosophy,” The Review of Meta- ery of our own nature, as a horizon of subjectivity that is physics VII (1954), 565. Fackenheim clarifies Schelling’s foundationally ordered to the world of another experience, characterization of negative philosophy: “Negative phi- in what Paul Ricoeur has called ‘the paradox of the ex- losophy is not metaphysics, but the search for the meta- change at the very place of the irreplaceable.’ It is here physical principle” ( 579). He concludes ( 582) that then, in the dispossessive act whereby the self assumes Schelling’s fusion of negative and positive philosophy— the burdens of the other, and thus accepts the surplus of while historically undervalued—ultimately fails. For fur- its own identity, that we should recognize the veiled pres- ther study of Schelling’s philosophy and its reception, ence of being” ( 17). please see Dale Snow, Schelling and the End of Idealism, 6 Ibid., 33. Robert Brown, The Later Philosophy of Schelling, Robert 7 Ibid., 35. Scharlemann, “Tillich and Schelling on the Principle of 8 Ibid., 220. Identity,” The Journal of Religion 56 (1976): 105-112, 9 Ibid., 158. and Thomas O’Meara, “F.W.J. Schelling,” The Review of 10 Ibid., 43. Davies does commend Rahner’s ontol- Metaphysics XXI (1977): 283-309. ogy for its anti-reductionistic character, yet he asserts that 14 Ages of the World, 73. Schelling’s contentious Rahner ontology continues to disqualify notions of the claim of the Yes and No of God is further intensified by self as ineluctably mediated by otherness: “But [Rahner’s the order envisaged by Schelling: “The negating, contract- ontology] is still in a Kantian-Heideggerian world, gov- ing will must precede into revelation so that there is erned by the cognitive faculties of the self, rather than a something that shores up and carries upward the grace of world that comes to existence only as the self is given the divine being, without which grace would not be capa- over, without remainder, into the alien power of the ble of revealing itself. There must be Might before there other” (Ibid., 158). is Leniency and Stringency before Gentleness. There is 11 For Tillich and Davies, there is a dialectic relation- first Wrath, then Love. Only with Love does the wrathful ship between ontology and existence that disavows total actually become God” (83). Robert Brown, in The Later essentialism. Moreover, both thinkers envision the en- Philosophy of Schelling, 269, comments that here counter between self and other in self-reflexive terms. Schelling moves beyond Böhme: whereas Böhme ac- Davies describes this impact on the self as transfiguration, counts for the dialectical character of God’s freedom, or the appropriate word for transcendence that “retains the “Ages moves only in the opposite direction. God begins as irreducible mutuality of self and other, albeit as unity in a duality, and attains his unity only as an achievement, a opposition” (Ibid., 43). Tillich speaks of the self-reflexive voluntary duality-in-unity.” impact on the self as insight, conversion, or reunion (al- 15 Tillich renders potency as “[t]he real, dark princi- beit ambiguously experienced) of the self with self, other, ple of the philosophy of nature [that] is nothing other than and world. the actualization of this contradiction. Freedom is the 12 A History of Christian Thought, 438. Tillich offers power to become disunited from oneself. Consistent with a similar assessment in Theology of Culture, 92, original the meaning of the word, Schelling now calls this power emphasis, when he asserts that “Schelling follows Hegel potency” (The Construction of the History of Religion in in emphasizing the ‘subject’ and its freedom against Sub- Schelling’s Positive Philosophy: Its Presuppositions and stance and its necessity. But while in Hegel the ‘subject’ Principles, 48). Schelling makes the same point in The is immediately identified with the thinking subject, in Ages of the World, Section 226, 17: “A being cannot ne- Schelling it becomes rather the ‘existing’ or immediately gate itself as actual without at the same time positing one- experiencing subject.” In his own writing, Schelling iden- self as the actualizing potency that begets itself.” tifies Hegel’s method as one demanding that “[philoso- 16 Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in Schelling’s phy] should withdraw into pure thinking, and that it Philosophical Development, 99 original emphasis. In The should have as sole immediate object the pure concept” Courage to Be, 180, Tillich further elaborates on the im- (On the History of Modern Philosophy, 134). portance of the Yes-No dialectic for the living God: 13 In Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in “Nonbeing makes God a living God. Without the No he Schelling’s Philosophical Development, 31, Tillich de- has to overcome in himself and in his creatures, the divine scribes this contradiction: “Guilt-consciousness is the Yes to himself would be lifeless. There would be no reve- religious expression for the absolute contradiction be- lation of the ground of being, there would be no life.” tween God and man.” Emil Fackenheim, “Schelling’s Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 39

17 In Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 421, Tillich 29 Amy Hollywood castigates Bataille’s use of the elaborates on this point with respect to the Trinity: “There tortured victim on ethical and ideological grounds: is no blessedness where there is no conquest of the oppo- “Bataille’s practice is problematic in that he seems to use site possibility, and there is no life where there is no ‘oth- another human being’s unchosen suffering as a means erness.’ The trinitarian symbol of the Logos as the princi- toward his own ecstatic anguish. Even if we read that ec- ple of divine self-manifestation in creation and salvation static anguish as itself an ethical response to the meaning- introduces the element of otherness into the Divine Life lessness of the other’s radically contingent torment, prob- without which it would not be life.” lems remain, for it is not clear that who suffers is in fact 18 For elaboration on these differences, please see so radically contingent. Rather, differences in race, class, Jerome Stone’s “Tillich and Schelling’s Later Philoso- gender, sexuality, and ethnicity make it more likely that phy,” in Kairos and Logos: Studies in the Roots and Im- members of one or another particular group will be the plications of Tillich’s Theology, edited by John Carey, 3- subject of physical torture and thus serve as the noncon- 35. Stone’s list includes some straightforward distinctions tingent means through which the contingency of human (e.g., Schelling was not a theologian), but it also notes an bodily experience finds experience” (Sensible Ecstasy, important “shift between Schelling and Tillich from the 95). language of speculating to the language of symbol” (35). 30 Inner Experience, 120. Additionally, Ian Thompson, in his Being and Meaning, 31 Ibid., 104. 89, writes: “Schelling tends to subordinate theology to the 32 Among a myriad examples, Bataille contends that philosophy of art, whereas in Tillich’s case art is put to “the will to salvation signifies the resolution to escape the use in the service of theology.” impossible” (The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge, 19 Each of these writers themselves experienced these 21). Bataille does acknowledge affinities between ecstasy phenomena in varying degrees. Bataille battled a pulmo- and mystical theology or negative theology, but he avers nary disease throughout his life to the point where it be- that ecstasy equates to atheology that is “totally negative” came debilitating; Kristeva emigrated from Bulgaria to (Ibid., 146). Contemplation of the cross can be efficacious France; and Levinas endured a double tragedy: his family to the extent that one substitutes oneself for Christ: “Es- died in the Holocaust, and as a French soldier, he became sentially, we must reflect on the crucifixion and place a prisoner of war in Germany. ourselves in the situation of personal assumption, aban- 20 Inner Experience, 11. doning respect in the name of transgression” (Ibid., 236). 21 Ibid., 43. 33 Systematic Theology, Volume 1, 113. 22 Ibid., 59. 34 In terms of the Scriptural sources, Tillich locates 23 Though Bataille concentrates his critiques on the presence of ecstasy in the writings of Paul: “The unity Hegel, Amy Hollywood describes the extent to which of ecstasy and structure is classically expressed in Paul’s Bataille’s disdain toward project also distinguishes his doctrine of the Spirit. Paul is primarily the theologian of views from Sartre’s: “Sartre’s and Bataille’s opposing the Spirit” (Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 116). Paul attitudes toward human projects are crucial here. Sartre further envisages the fusion of ecstasy and structure insists that to be human is to engage in projects; Bataille through Spirit in his letter to the Corinthians: “In the argues that inner experience is the opposite of project; hymn to agape in I Corinthians, chapter 13, the structure thus he generates endlessly recursive negations of his own of the moral imperative and the ecstasy of the Spiritual attempt to provide a method for attaining inner experi- Presence are completely united. Similarly, the first three ence” (Sensible Ecstasy, 30). Indeed, there is a certain chapters of the same letter indicate a way to unite the paradox within Bataille’s writing in that he seeks to refute structure of cognition with the ecstasy of the Spiritual system by constructing his own system of atheology or of Presence” (Ibid., 117). Tillich additionally points to the the unfinished system of nonknowledge. Gospels as illustrative of ecstasy: “Ecstatic experiences 24 Inner Experience, 12. appear again and again in the Gospel stories. They show 25 The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge, 203. the Spiritual Presence driving Jesus into the desert, lead- 26 Inner Experience, 52. ing him through the visionary experiences of temptation, 27 Ibid., 113. giving him the power of divination with respect to people 28 The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge, 21. and events, and making him the conqueror of demonic Bataille reiterates that “[t]he impossible is the loss of the powers and the Spiritual healer of mind and body” (Ibid., self” (Ibid., 24). 144). In terms of the philosophical sources, Plato but es- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 40

pecially Neo-Platonists such as Plotinus uphold the the soul, psyche in the form of a hand that gives even the unique place of ecstasy. Tillich identifies the Middle Pla- bread taken from its own mouth. Here the psyche in the tonist Philo as one of the earliest figures who “developed maternal body” (Otherwise than Being, 67). a doctrine of ecstasy, or ek-stasis, which means ‘standing 42 Ibid., 374. outside oneself.’ This is the highest form of piety which 43 Dynamics of Faith, 106. In Gilkey on Tillich, 29, lies beyond faith” (A History of Christian Thought, 13). Langdon Gilkey indicates that Tillich subsumes the fusion This philosophical conception of ecstasy has subsequently of these dimensions in and through self-awareness: “In us, impacted Christian theologians and mystics, including being is ‘present to itself,’ aware of itself, its body, its Origen, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Bonaventure. environment, its space and time, its future. Here the inor- 35 Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 112; Ibid., 112. ganic, the organic, the psychic, and what even transcends Ecstasy therefore helps further clarify the experience of these, are wedded together in our awareness of our own God as being-itself or the ground of being enables one to being.” speak rationally and ecstatically at the same time. This 44 In “Being and Word in Tillich’s Doctrine of Spiri- speaking about God refers back to the self and its ordi- tual Presence: Issues of Subjectivity and Relationality,” in nary/ ecstatic experience of holiness: “The term ‘ecstatic’ Being versus Word in Paul Tillich’s Theology?, edited by in the phrase ‘ecstatic idea of God’ points to the experi- Gert Hummel and Doris Lax, Stenger probes Tillich’s ence of the holy as transcending ordinary experience interconnection of being and Word that funds his rela- without removing it. Ecstasy as a state of mind is the ex- tional ontology through the Spiritual Presence. Though act correlate to self-transcendence as the state of reality. she concedes his appreciation of the body could be more Such an understanding of the idea of God is neither natu- extensive, Stenger holds that his relational ontology ralistic nor supranaturalistic. It underlies the whole of the “resonates well with several feminist approaches [e.g., present theological system” (Systematic Theology, Vol- Sheila Davaney, Catherine Keller, Thandeka, Linell ume 2, 8). Cady] [because] it affirms the self, including the body, 36 Ibid., 112. draws humans outwardly toward each other, and directs 37 Tillich describes prophetic witness (“Prophets them toward that which is ultimate in a response of devo- speak in terms which express the ‘depth of reason’ and its tion and commitment” (296). ecstatic experience” Systematic Theology, Volume 1, 45 Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 294. 143), agapic love (“As the ecstatic participation in the 46 “Dimensions, Levels, and the Unity of Life,” in transcendent unity of unambiguous life, agape is experi- Main Works, Volume 6: Theological Writings, edited by enced as blessedness” (Systematic Theology, Volume 3, Gert Hummel, 404. 136), and prayer (“A union of subject and object has 47 Tillich’s capacious conception of the person ex- taken place in which the independent existence of each is tends to displaced persons such as refugees; his vigilance overcome; new unity is created. The best and most uni- against reducing them to things comports with Kristeva’s versal example of an ecstatic experience is the pattern of perspective. In Strangers to Ourselves in The Portable prayer.” Ibid., 119). Kristeva: Updated Edition, 265, Kristeva writes: “Let us 38 Powers of Horror, in The Portable Kristeva: Up- not seek to solidify, to turn the otherness of the foreigner dated Edition, 230. into a thing. Let us merely touch it, brush by it, without 39 Ibid., 235 (original emphasis) giving a permanent structure.” Similarly, in “The Theol- 40 Tales of Love, 248-249. Kristeva further elaborates ogy of Pastoral Care: The Spiritual and Theological on this heterogeneity: “We lives on that border, cross- Foundations of Pastoral Care,” The Meaning of Health, roads beings, crucified beings. A woman is neither no- 125, Tillich discusses the dehumanizing treatment of madic nor a male body that considers itself earthly only in refugees as objects: “It was one of my early experiences erotic passion. A mother is a continuous separation, a in this country to come to the sharp realization that the division of the very flesh. And consequently a division of refugees, who felt themselves to be persons, became ob- language—and it has always been so.” (Ibid., 254). jects and nothing more than objects when they were trans- 41 Levinas describes the pure passivity demanded by formed into cases to be dealt with twenty minutes by the the maternal body: “The-one-for-another has the form of social worker. It often broke their self-awareness as a sensibility or vulnerability, pure passivity or susceptibil- person. This example shows that the problem of becom- ity, passive to the point of becoming an inspiration, that ing an object applies to all forms of taking care of some- is, alterity in the same, the trope of the body animated by one, be it the social, the educational, the political, the Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 41

medical, or the psycho-therapeutic function. In all of them notions of love, reunion of the separated, and morality, the heart of the subject-object problem is of decisive im- constitution of the person as person in the encounter with portance.” other persons. In “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas” 48 Totality and Infinity, 43. Levinas contends that the (with Richard Kearney) in Face to Face with Levinas, Western tradition “guarantees knowledge its congenital edited by Richard Cohen, 22, Levinas distinguishes his synthesizing and its self-sufficiency, foreshadowing the preferred notion of sociality from the reductive concept of systematic unity of consciousness, and the integration of unity: “Man’s relationship with the other is better as dif- all that is other into the system and the present” (“Phi- ference than as unity: sociality is better than fusion. The losophy and Transcendence” in Alterity and Transcen- very value of love is the impossibility of reducing the dence, 12). Levinas’s censure of ontology and system is other to myself.” not limited to the epistemological level; a fortiori Levinas 61 “Philosophy and Transcendence,” in Alterity and claims that the totality of ontology and system underlies Transcendence, 5. “God” as the Infinite Other receives the totalitarianism of the state (e.g., Nazism): “Ontology significant treatment in Levinas’s writings, particularly as first philosophy is a philosophy of power” (Totality his reflections on the Talmud. Levinas conceptualizes and Infinity, 46). Tillich contends that power underpins religion in terms of moral experience (“Religious experi- love and justice, but love and justice impose constraints ence, at least for the Talmud, can only be primarily a on power. moral experience,” “Toward the Other,” in Nine Talmudic 49 Levinas, in “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas” Readings, translated and with an introduction by Annette (with Richard Kearney) in Face to Face with Levinas, Aronowicz), where, for example, “[t]he image of God is edited by Richard Cohen, 20, contends that “Dasein is its better honored in the right given to the stranger than in history to the extent that it can interpret and narrate its symbols” (Ibid., 28). When comparing these conceptions existence as a finite and contemporaneous story, a totaliz- to Tillich’s, we can thus note similarities (Tillich also ing experience of past, present, and future.” unites morality and religion) as well as differences (Til- 50 Otherwise Than Being, 183. The face, in fact, “is lich prefers the language of symbols, not obligations to the very collapse of phenomenality” (Ibid., 88). the others, as that which expresses the imago Dei. One 51 Ibid., 42. should not overstate these similarities or differences. For 52 Ibid., 46. example, I argue that there is significant resonance be- 53 Ibid., 49. tween Tillich’s symbol of the “God beyond God” and 54 Ibid., 119. Levinas’s symbol of the transcendent face: “it is as if the 55 Ibid., 122. In Ibid., 156, Levinas develops the same face of the other person, which straightaway ‘demands of point: “The Infinite does not enter into a theme like a be- me’ and ordains me, were the mode of the very intrigue of ing to be given in it, and thus belie its beyond being.” God’s surpassing the idea of God, and of every idea 56 Ibid., 14. where He would be aimed at, visible, and known, and 57 In the Time of Many Nations, translated by Michael where the Infinite would be denied through thematization, Smith, 111. in presence or representation” (“The Old and the New,” in 58 Otherwise Than Being, 10. Time and the Other (and Additional Essays), translated by 59 “The Proximity of the Other,” in Alterity and Tran- Richard Cohen, 136-137, my emphasis). For an extended scendence, 98. In consonance with Kristeva’s analysis of comparison between notions of God in Levinas and Chris- maternity, Levinas asserts that otherness precedes one’s tian theology, specifically Barth’s theology, please see own body: “The sensible—maternity, vulnerability, ap- Steven Smith, The Argument to the Other: Reason Be- prehension—binds the node of incarnation into a plot yond Reason in the Thought of Karl Barth and Emmanuel larger than the apperception of self. In this plot I am Levinas. bound to others before being tied to my body” (Otherwise 62 Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Ed- Than Being, 76). ward Robinson, as quoted by Frank Schalow in “The Ty- 60 Otherwise than Being, 182 (my emphasis). In the pography of Heidegger’s Concept of Conscience,” Ameri- same text, Levinas describes the same phenomenon where can Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Volume LXIX “one discloses oneself by neglecting one’s defenses, leav- (1995), 260. ing a shelter, exposing oneself to outrage, to insults and 63 For Tillich’s presentation of the ‘silent voice,’ see wounding” (Ibid., 49). The image of “leaving a shelter” Morality and Beyond, 24, 34 (“the silent voice of man’s further differentiates Levinas’s account from Tillich’s own essential nature”), and 80 (‘mode of silence’). Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 42

64 Theology of Culture, 138-139. By contrast, Levinas reality, in correlation to dimensions of the human spirit; submits that conscience “welcomes the Other” and “calls and it possesses an integrating and disintegrating power. in question the naïve rights of my powers, my glorious The negation of symbols, of course, derives from Tillich’s spontaneity as a living being” (Totality and Infinity, 84). Protestant principle that repudiates any notion of absolut- 65 Against the Third Reich, 213. ism within symbols. 66 Morality and Beyond, 65. 72 Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 134. Put differ- 67 Ibid., 77. Thus, like Levinas where “transcendence ently, “[l]ove as the reunion of those who are separate is compressed into the sphere of intersubjective exis- does not distort or destroy in its union” (Systematic The- tence” (Edith Wyschogrod, “God and ‘Being’s Move’ in ology, Volume 1, 282). the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,” The Journal of 73 Ibid., 134. Religion 62 (1982), 146), Tillich affirms transcendence as 74 Ibid., 137. encounter (e.g., the moment of kairos experienced as 75 The issue of justice, or the appearance of the third, revelation) that supersedes the self. Yet, unlike Levinas, poses challenges for Levinas. He affirms the centrality of Tillich reinscribes this transcendence as constitutive of justice, but he does fully resolve tensions between the the formation of the moral and cultural dimensions of the relationship of self and other as hostage and lord and the self: “Religion, or the self-transcendence of life under the order and thematization of justice: “The third party intro- dimension of spirit, is essentially related to morality and duces a contradiction in the saying whose signification culture. There is no self-transcendence under the dimen- before the other until then went in one direction. It is of sion of the spirit without the constitution of the moral self itself the limit of responsibility and the birth of the ques- by the unconditional imperative, and this self- tion: What do I have to do with justice? A question of transcendence cannot take form except within the uni- consciousness. Justice is necessary, that is, comparison, verse of meaning created in the cultural act” (Systematic coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order, Theology, Volume 3, 95). thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentional- 68 In the Time of Many Nations, translated by Michael ity and the intellect, the intelligibility of a system, and Smith, 110. thence also a co-presence on an equal footing as before a 69 “Life and Selfhood in Tillich’s Theology,” in Kai- court of justice (Otherwise than Being, 157). ros and Logos: Studies in the Roots and Implications of Theodore de Boer, in “An Ethical Transcendental Tillich’s Theology, edited by John Carey, 182. Philosophy,” in Face to Face with Levinas, edited by 70 Hospitality of the Stranger, 41. Richard Cohen, argues that the presence of the third prob- 71 See, inter alia, “Das Religiöse Symbol,” in Main lematizes Levinas’s notions of unlimited responsibility: Works, Volume 4: Writings in the Philosophy of Religion, “The entrance onto the scene of the third man makes a edited by John Clayton, 213-228. There Tillich develops comparison and weighing of responsibility necessary— further distinctions, including the two levels of religious and thereby also a thematizing and theorizing. This im- symbols, the first level of “religiösen Gegenstandssym- plies a certain correction, as Levinas puts it leniently, of bole” (objective religious symbols) and the second level the infinite demands that the other imposes upon me” of “religiösen Hinweissymbole” (self-transcending relig- (102, original emphasis). ious symbols) (Ibid., 221-224 original emphasis). In his 76 These works include Dialogues of Paul Tillich Dynamics of Faith, 41-43, Tillich adumbrates six features (2002) by Mary Ann Stenger and Ronald Stone, Self-Love of a symbol: it points beyond itself; it participates in that and Christian Ethics (2002) by Darlene Fozard Weaver, to which it points; it opens us levels of reality which oth- Religion in the New Millennium: Theology in the Spirit of erwise are closed to us; it unlocks dimensions and ele- Paul Tillich (2001) edited by Raymond Bulman and Fre- ments of our soul which correspond to the dimensions and derick Parrella, and Tillich and World Religions: Encoun- elements of reality; it cannot be produced intentionally; tering Other Faiths Today (2003) by Robison James. and it cannot be invented. In his 1961 “The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols,” Main Works, Volume 4: Writings in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by John Clayton, 415-420, Tillich identifies slightly different characteristics of a symbol: it points beyond itself; it par- ticipates in the reality of that which it represents; it cannot be created at will; it has power to open up dimensions of Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 43

New Publications “Between Thought and Faith, Culture and Religion, Yearning for Spirituality: Paul Tillich’s Early Hummel, Gert and Doris Lax, eds. Trinität und/oder ‘Church Apologetics’ and Thomas Bandy’s Quaternität—Tillichs Neuerschließung der trini- ‘Spiritual Midwiving,’” Lax, Doris, XXVII, 1 tarischen Problematik/ Trinity and/or Quater- (Winter 2001): 3-10. nity—Tillich’s Reopening of the Trinitarian “Bridging Psychology and Religion: Viktor Frankl’s Problem. Tillich-Studien, vol. 10. Münster/ Existential Psychology and Paul Tillich’s Relig- Hamburg/ London: Lit-Verlag, 2004. Proceed- ious Philosophy,” Sykes, Britt-Mari, XXVIII, 2 ings of the 9th International Paul Tillich Sympo- (Spring 2002): 33-36. sium, Frankfurt/Main 2002. “A Buddhist View of ‘The Significance of the His- Nord, Ilona and Yorick Spiegel, Hrsg. Spurensuche. tory of Religions for the Systematic Theolo- Lebens– und Denkwege Paul Tillichs. Tillich– gian,’” Abe, Masao (Meeting Papers, Nov. Studien, Band 5. Münster/ Hamburg/ London: 1988): 1-8. Lit-Verlag, 2001. This volume contains articles “Comments on The Socialist Emigré,” Donnelly, in German and English, including Rene Tillich’s Brian, XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): 34-36. “My Father, Paul Tillich.” “The Concept of Religion in Paul Tillich’s Systema- tische Theologie of 1913,” Hummel, Gert, XXII, 2 (Apr. 1996): 3-12. INDEX “Concern for Creation: Paul Tillich and the Ecology Articles of the North of Being,” Drummy, Michael F., Newsletter of American Paul Tillich Society the North American Paul Tillich Society XXIV, Newsletter and Bulletin 3 (Summer 1998): 2-8. (up to and including vol. 29) “The Contexts of Courage,” Shaw, Elliott (NAPTS Meeting Papers, November 1991): 27-29. Compiled by M. Lon Weaver “Contribution to Panel Discussion of John J. Carey’s Paulus: Then and Now.” Carey, John J. XXIX, 1 With Volume XXX (2004), The North American Paul (Winter 2003): 22. Tillich Society Newsletter became the Bulletin of The “Contribution to Panel Discussion on Dialogues of North American Paul Tillich Society. Members of the Paul Tillich, by Ronald H. Stone and Mary Ann NAPTS, especially the Secretary Treasurer and editor Stenger.” Stenger, Mary Ann. XXIX, 1 (Winter of the Bulletin, are grateful for Lon Weaver’s work in 2003): 15-17. compiling this index. “Contribution to Panel Discussion on Dialogues of Articles by title is followed by articles by the author’s Paul Tillich, by Ronald H. Stone and Mary Ann last name. Stenger.” Stone, Ronald H., XXIX, 1 (Winter 2003): 12-15. Articles by Title “The Courage to Be after Forty,” Stenger, Mary Ann (NAPTS Meeting Papers, November 1991): “Address at the Annual Banquet of the North 41-42. American Paul Tillich Society, 21 November “Critical Psychology and Ultimate Concern: Paul 1997,” Scharlemann, Robert P., XXIV, 1 (Win- Tillich’s Answer to Faith in the Modern World,” ter 1998): 2-4. Sykes, Britt-Mari, XXIX, 3 (Summer 2003): “The Americanization of Paul Tillich,” Schwarz, 4-8. Hans, XXII, 3 (July 1996): 2-7. “Dialogically Hearing God’s Concrete Word: Bak- “Are There Any Absolutes Left? Postmodernism htin and Tillich.” Slater, Peter. XXIX, 2 (Spring and the Crisis for Tillich Scholars,” Carey, John 2003): 36-51. J., XXIV, 4 (Fall 1998): 3-9 & [in its corrected “Dimensions of Life: The Inorganic and the Organic form] XXV, 1 (Winter 1999): 7-13. in Paul Tillich and Teilhard de Chardin,” “Between Apologetics and Pastoral Care: Paul Til- Huchingson, James E. XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): lich’s Early Sermons (1908-1918), Sturm Erd- 20-23. mann, XXVI, 1 (Winter 2000): 7-20. “The Distortion of Faith as Belief and the Loss of the Symbolic Life: Tillich and Jung on the His- Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 44 torical Problematic of an ‘Epistemythology.’” “A Hermeneutics of Revulsion: Response to Owen Noel, Daniel C. XXIX, 2 (Spring 2003): 29-36. C. Thomas,” Lamm, Julia A. (Meeting Papers, “The Divine Life and Ecstatic Transformation: A Nov. 1994): 45-48. Tillichian Pneumatology,” Victorin-Vangerud, “History and Theology in Tension: Troeltsch’s Nancy M. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1992): 50-54. Glaubenslehre and Tillich’s Dogmatik,” Paul, “The Divine, the Demonic, and the Ninety-Nine Garrett E., XXIX, 3 (Summer 2003): 29-38. Names of Allah: Tillich’s Idea of the ‘Holy’ and “How Does the Letter Kill? The Tillichian and Lu- the Qur’anic Narrative.” Koshul, Basit. XXIX, 1 theran Understandings of Law,” Miller, Kim- (Winter 2003): 42-48. berly R., XXIX, 4 (Fall 2003): 14-23. “Ecstatic Reason and Flow: Paul Tillich and Mihaly “In God’s Image They Were Created: Human Csikszentmihalyi on Ecstatic Experience in a Autonomy and Theonomy,” Kessler, Michael, Critical Conversation in the Theology of Cul- XXX, 1 (Winter 2004): 10-13. ture,” Hooker, Charles, Newsletter of the North “In Honor of Paulus: Reminiscences of Tillich at American Paul Tillich Society XXVI, 2 (Spring Harvard,” Stendahl, Krister, XVIII, 1 (Jan. 2000): 12-24. 1992): 3-8. “Eros and the Church,” Bandy, Thomas G. (Meet- “In Memoriam: John Clayton,” Burch, Sharon, ing Papers, Nov. 1992): 1-4. XXX, 1 (Winter 2004): 7-8. “Essence, Existence and Life: Response to J.-P. Bé- “In Memoriam: Gert Hummel—A Eulogy,” Lax, land and Marc Dumas,” Scharf, Uwe (Meeting Doris, XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): 2-3. Papers, Nov. 1994): 9-11. “In Search of a God for Evolution: Paul Tillich and “Estrangement and Existential Angst in Human Teilhard de Chardin,” Haught, John F., XXVII, Life: An Examination of Paul Tillich and Cornel 3 (Summer 2002): 3-11. West,” Murray, Stephen Butler, XXVII, 2 “In-Between: Tillich’s Relevance to the Religious (Spring 2001): 4-10. Situation in Postmodern North America,” “The Evangelical and Catholic Theology of Paul Bandy, Thomas G., XXVII, 1 (Winter 2001): Tillich: A Lutheran Appreciation,” Braaten, 10-12. Carl, XXVI, 1 (Winter 2000): 2-7. “Individualist Internationalism: International The- “Event and Symbol in Tillich’s Christology: A Re- ory in Tillich’s Religion und Weltpolitik, ” sponse to Fundamentalist Interpretations of Je- Weaver, Matthew Lon, XXVI, 2 (Spring 2000): sus Christ,” Stenger, Mary Ann, XXIII, 3 (Fall 1-8. 1997): 3-11. “The Influence of Troeltsch’s Historicism on Til- “Expanding the Stock of Sources in Tillich’s The- lich’s System of the Sciences,” Olson, Duane, ology of Culture,” Cobb, Kelton (Meeting Pa- XXV, 3 (Summer 1999): 17-21. pers, Nov. 1992): 13-23. “Introductory Remarks about the Tillich Critical “Faith, Religion, and Culture: A Tripod for Interre- Edition Project,” Burch, Sharon (Meeting Papers ligious Dialogue,” Thangaraj, M. Thomas Nov. 1995): 51-53. (NAPTS Meeting Papers, November 1991): “Introductory Remarks on Paul Tillich’s Contribu- 43-47. tion to a Deep Environmental Ethic,” Yunt, Jer- “Forgive Us Our Trespasses,” Wettstein, A. Arnold emy D., XXIV, 3 (Summer 1998): 14-18. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1988): 29-30. “Is Christianity the Most Universal Faith? A Re- “Framing, Fragmenting, and Freud (?): Models of sponse to Robison B. James’s Tillich and the the Self and Faith Formation in Paul Tillich and World Religions: Encountering Other Faiths Iris Murdoch,” Rothchild, Jonathan, XXIX, 4 Today,” Rose, Kenneth, XXX, 1 (Winter 2004): (Fall 2003): 4-14. 15-19. “From Evil Temptress to the First Act of Courage: “Jacob Boehme and Paul Tillich on Trinity and How Paul Tillich Saves Eve in the Genesis Ac- God: Similarities and Differences,” Dourley, count of the Fall,” Davilla, Maria Teresa, John P. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1994): 12-21. XXVI, 3 (Summer 2000): 41-51. “John Milbank’s Asymmetry of Love and Tillich’s “From Ontology to Plausibility: A Critical Realist Theonomy: The Divine in Relation to the Reconstruction of Paul Tillich’s Theology of World,” Rasmussen, Barry G., XXVII, 3 (Sum- Religion,” Lee, Hak Joon, XXVI, 3 (Summer mer 2001): 8-21. 2000): 27-41. Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 45 “Kairos and ‘Epochal Thinking,’” Boss, Marc, “Paul Tillich and Feminist Theology: Echoes from XXIV, 2 (Spring 1998): 2-12. the Boundary,” Moody, Linda A. (Meeting Pa- “Kairos Circle,” Stone, Ronald H., (Meeting Papers, pers, Nov. 1993): 18-24. Nov. 1989): 23-27. “Paul Tillich and Martin Heidegger: A Memoir of a “La pensÈe sauvage: Women and the ‘Primitive’ in Friendship,” Palapathwala, Ruwan, XXVI, 2 Tillich’s Life and Thought,” Fessenden, Tracy (Spring 2000): 24-25. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1993): 1-8. “Paul Tillich and the Millenarian Heritage,” Bulman, “Letter from Tblisi: First Impressions of Georgia,” Raymond F. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1994): Hummel, Gert, XXV, 4 (Fall 1999): 5-7. 22-28. “The Logic of Silence and the Systematic Use of “Paul Tillich and the Post-Modern Debate on Cul- Paradox: Heidegger’s Beiträge and Tillich’s ture,” Haigis, Peter, XXVIII, 2 (Spring 2002): Early Philosophy of Religion,” Prudhomme, 15-24. Jeff Owen (NAPTS Meeting Papers, November “Paul Tillich and the Reconstruction of Sin and Sal- 1991): 21-26. vation in Islamic Theological Anthropology.” “Making Meaning with Religious Symbols: Til- Ashr, Jawad. XXIX, 1 (Winter 2003): 27-42. lich’s Theory of Participation Reconstrued,” “Paul Tillich and the Voice of America,” Weaver, Yob, Iris (NAPTS Meeting Papers, November Matthew Lon, XXIV, 3 (Summer 1998): 19-29. 1991): 48-53. “Paul Tillich and Werner Heisenberg: Crossing the “My Journey into the Work of Paul Tillich (2003 Transcendental Horizon,” Roy D. Morrison II Annual Banquet Address),” Richard, Jean, (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1988): 14-28. XXX, 1 (Winter 2004): 2-7. “Paul Tillich as a Military Chaplain,” Arther, Don- “The Mystery of Salvation,” Grau, Karin, trans., ald, XXVI, 3 (Summer 2000): 4-12. Doris Lax, XXVI, 4 (Fall 2000): 7-8. “Paul Tillich: Christocentric Pluralism or Pluralism “Nature’s Divine and Demonic Being: Tillich’s of Equality,” Cveckova, Veronika, XXVI, 2 Conception of Nature’s Ambiguous Powers and (Spring 2000): 9-12. His Conception of Divinity’s Simultaneous Im- “Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought: The Past and the manence and Transcendence,” Daniell, Anne. Future,” O’Meara, Thomas Franklin (Meeting M., XXV, 3 (Summer 1999): 10-17. Papers, Nov. 1992): 30-32. “The Negative Trinitarian Balance in Tillich’s “Paul Tillich in Scandinavia,” Beckman, Peter Wil- Dogmatik of 1925,” Hummel, Gert (Meeting helm (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1991): 1-2. Papers, Nov. 1988): 36-42. “Paul Tillich in Scandinavia,” Beckman, Peter Wil- “The New Being in Christ: Tillich’s Universal Re- helm (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1992): 5-6. ligious Encounter in the Pluralistic Situation of “Paul Tillich on Peace,” Stone, Ronald H. (Meeting Post-Modernity,” Eickhoff, Jˆrg, XXVIII, 3 Papers, Nov. 1989): 17-22. (Summer 2002): 18-23. “Paul Tillich’s Interpretation of Greek Philosophy “The New Tillich Edition,” John Clayton XIV, 1 (Berlin 1920/21),” Sturm, Erdmann, XXVI, 3 (Jan. 1988): 3-8. (Summer 2000): 12-16. “The North American Paul Tillich Society: Whence “Paul Tillich’s Political Ethics: In Defense of So- and Whither?” Carey, John J., XXV, 1 (Winter cialism,” Peterson, Anna L. (Meeting Papers, 1999): 2-6. Nov. 1992): 38-49. “An Ontology of Depression,” Heller, Jessica, “Paul Tillich’s Systematic Theology, Vol. III: XXVIII, 4 (Fall 2002): 18-28. ‘Norms and Values in the Dimension of Spirit,’ “Ontology of Power in Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Section 1., A., 4., d,” Bergmann, William C. Tillich,” Stone, Ronald, XXVIII, 2 (Spring (Meeting Papers Nov. 1995): 57-59. 2002): 4-14. “Paul Tillich’s Theology of Intellectual Salvation,” “Paul Tillich: A New Catholic Assessment: Report Page, John M., XXVII, 2 (Spring 2001): 11-16. on Current Research,” Parrella, Frederick J. “Paul Tillich’s View of Ecumenism,” Tavard, (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1992): 33-37. George, XXVIII, 1 (Winter 2002): 4-9. “Paul Tillich and Erich Przywara at Davos,” “Paulus und Gustavo,” Ronald H. Stone (Meeting O’Meara, Thomas F., XXX, 1 (Winter 2004): Papers, Dec. 1987): 17-26. 8-9. “Peace Issues in the Work of Paul Tillich,” Lubomir Mirejovsky, XIV, 2 (April 1988): 5-10. Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 46 “The Places of Tillich’s Childhood,” Albrecht, “Remaking Tillich as a Pragmatist: From Founda- Renate and Gertraut Ströber, II, 1 (Oct. 1975): tionalist Ontology to Pragmatic Construction,” 2-4. Grigg, Richard, XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): 36-39. “Polanyi’s Search for a Postcritical Logic in Science “Remarks Concerning Donald Dreisbach’s Symbols and Theology,” Gelwick, Richard (NAPTS and Salvation and Richard Grigg’s Symbol and Meeting Papers, November 1991): 7-11. Empowerment,” Raposa, Michael (Meeting Pa- “Polarities in Tillich’s Thought on Revelation in the pers, Nov. 1994): 49-51. World Religions,” Nikkel, David H., XXVI, 4 “Reminiscences of Paul Tillich,” James Luther Ad- (Fall 2000): 2-6. ams XIV, 4 (Oct. 1988): 3-8. “The Power to Be and the Freedom to Act,” Louni- “A Response to Alexander C. Irwin’s Eros toward bos, John (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1979). the World: Paul Tillich and the Theology of the “The Pragmatism of Paul Tillich,” James, Robison Erotic,” Carey, John J. (Meeting Papers, Nov. B., XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): 46-53. 1992): 10-12. “The Problem of the Historical Jesus in ‘Die Chris- “Response to Bielefeldt and Raposa,” Dreisbach, tliche Gewiflheit und der historische Jesus’ and Donald F. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1994): 52-54. the New Biblical Criticism,” Laliberté, “Response to Jean-Pierre Béland and Marc Dumas,” Madeleine, XXIV, 3 (Summer 1998): 8-14 & [in Barron, Robert (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1994): its corrected form] XXV, 1 (Winter 1999): 7-8. 14-20. “Response to John J. Carey’s Paulus: Then and “Prognosis: Tillich and the Future of Catholic The- Now.” Dreisbach, Donald F. XXIX, 1 (Winter ology,” Bulman, Raymond F. (Meeting Papers, 2003): 25-27. Nov. 1992): 7-9. “Response to Masao Abe’s “A Buddhist View of “The Quest for Absolutes Today: Response to John ‘The Significance of the History of Religions for J. Carey’s Paulus: Then and Now.” Bandy, the Systematic Theologian,’” Terence Thomas Thomas. XXIX, 1 (Winter 2003): 22-25. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1988): 9-13. “The Reason-Revelation Dichotomy: Tillich and “A Response to Professor Langdon Gilkey’s Paper Milbank on the Relationship Between Philoso- (‘Tillich and the Kyoto School’),” Abe, Masao phy and Theology,” Thatamanil, John J., XXVII, (Meeting Papers, Dec. 1987): 11-15. 3 (Summer 2001): 2-8. “A Response to Rob James,” Hammond, Guy B., “Reflections on Brian Donnelly’s The Socialist Emi- XXV, 2 (Spring 1999): 13-14. gré Marxism and the Later Tillich,” O’Keeffe, “Response to Stone (‘Paulus und Gustavo’),” Tay- Terence, XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): 31-34. lor, Mark Kline (Meeting Papers, Dec. 1987): “Rejoinder to Guy Hammond,” James, Robison, 27-31. XXV, 2 (Spring 1999): 14-15. “A Response to Stone and Stenger’s Dialogues of “Religion in a Religionless World: Criticism of Re- Paul Tillich.” Richard, Jean. XXIX, 1 (Winter ligion and After,” Ristiniemi, Jari (Meeting Pa- 2003): 17-21. pers Nov. 1995): 1-14. “Review Essay: The Socialist Decision,” Fisher, “Religion in the New Millennium: Theology in the James V., III, 1 (Dec. 1977): 21-27. Spirit of Paul Tillich—An Emerging Spiritual- “Review: Michael F. Drummy’s Nature, Man and ity,” Parrella, Frederick J., XXVIII, 1 (Winter God According to Paul Tillich,” Stollings, C. 2002): 13-17. Eugene, XXVII, 4 (Fall 2001): 6. “Religion in the New Millennium: Theology in the “Revising Tillich’s Model of Reality to Let God Be Spirit of Paul Tillich—The Future Shape of Personal,” James, Robison B., XXV, 2 (Spring Theology,” Bulman, Raymond F., XXVIII, 1 1999): 5-13. (Winter 2002): 9-11. “Salvation as Cosmic Healing in Tillich,” Grau, “Religion in the New Millennium: Theology in the Karin, XXVIII, 3 (Summer 2002): 24-27. Spirit of Paul Tillich—Whither Theology of “Schelling’s Influence on Tillich’s Theological An- Culture?,” Stenger, Mary Ann, XXVIII, 1 (Win- thropology,” Whittemore, Paul B. (Meeting Pa- ter 2002): 11-13. pers, Nov. 1980). “Religion, Science, and Evolution: Tillich’s Fourth “Science and Technological Rationality,” Thomas, J. Way,” Grigg, Richard, XXVIII, 3 (Summer Mark (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1989): 28-34. 2002): 12-18. Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 47 “Shaking the Foundations Again: Tillich’s Views “Tillich at Chicago,” Brauer, Jerald C., XV, 4 (Oct. on the Role of the Prophet in Contemporary So- 1989): 2-10. ciety.” Bush, Randall K. XXIX, 2 (Spring 2003): “Tillich for Parish Ministry,” Reisz, H. Frederick, 14-29. Jr., XXV, 4 (Fall 1999): 7-15. “The Significance of Paul Tillich’s Dogmatik “Tillich, Jung, and the Trinity-Quaternity Issue,” (1925),” Richard, Jean (Meeting Papers, Nov. Dourley, John P. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1990): 1988): 31-35. 1-8.“Tillich, Marx, and the Interpretation of His- “The Socialist Emigré: Marxism and the Later Til- tory,” Carey, John J. (Meeting Papers, Nov. lich by Brian Donnelly,” Hammond, Guy, XXX, 1989): 1 (Winter 2004): 14-15. 1-7. “Stephen Hawking, Paul Tillich and Knowing the “Tillich on Christ as Symbol Reconsidered: Con- Mind of God,” Wettstein, A. Arnold (Meeting structing a Christology in a Postmodern Age,” Papers, Nov. 1989): 35-39. Marsh, Clive (NAPTS Meeting Papers, No- “Subliminal Marxist or Overt Religious Socialist— vember 1991): 12-20. Response to Brian Donnelly’s The Socialist “Tillich on ‘The Absoluteness of Christianity,’” Emigré. Marxism and the Later Tillich,” James, Robison (Meeting Papers Nov. 1995): Weaver, Matthew Lon, XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): 35-50. 26-30. “Tillich on the Historical Jesus and Christian Faith,” “Syncretism or Correltaion: Teilhard’s and Tillich’s Price, Robert M., XXVIII, 4 (Fall 2002): 14-18. Contrasting Metholdological Approaches to Sci- “Tillich on the Self-Actualization of Life,” Ashton, ence and Theology,” DeLashmutt, Michael W., Loye (Meeting Papers Nov. 1995): 54-56. XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): 12-19. “Tillich, the Demonic, an Symbols of Self- “Systematic Theology, Vol. III Panel Discussion: Deception,” Steffen, Lloyd (Meeting Papers, Spirit as a Dimension of Life,” Davies, Mark Nov. 1994): 55-62. Youmans (Meeting Papers Nov. 1995): 60-66. “The Tillichian Spell: Memories of a Student Mes- “Textual Variants in ‘Self-Integration and Disinte- merized in the 1950s,” Driver, Tom F., XXII, 1 gration in General: Health and Disease,” Gris- (Jan. 1996): 2-8. wold, John E. (Meeting Papers Nov. 1995): “Tillich’s Christological Indebtedness to Schleier- 67-68. macher,” Perkins, R. Wayne, XXVI, 3 (Summer “A Theology for Evolution: Haught, Teilhard, and 2000): 16-26. Tillich,” Carr, Paul, XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): “Tillich’s Christology in the Dogmatics [1925],” 8-12. Dumas, Marc (Meeting Papers, Nov. 19 94): “Thinking Up Rainbows and I Love How They 1-6. Color My Mind: Reflections on the Sermons of “Tillich’s Dialectic and Concept of Reason,” Slater, Paul Tillich.” Moore, Viola (Meeting Papers, Peter (NAPTS Meeting Papers, November Nov. 1988): 43-48. 1991): 30-40. “Thought and Life: Issues of Truth and Morality, “Tillich’s Dialectic: Key to His Cosmic Vision and Response to Owen Thomas,” Stenger, Mary Ann His Idea of Knowledge,” James, Robison B. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1994): 43-44. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1993): 9-17. “Thought and Life: The Cases of Heidegger and “Tillich’s Dogmatics of 1925,” Scharf, Uwe (Meet- Tillich,” Thomas, Owen (Meeting Papers, Nov. ing Papers, Nov. 1993): 25-32. 1994): 29-42. “Tillich’s Early Writings in Social Philosophy and “Tillich and Buber,” Novak, David (Meeting Pa- Social Ethics within the Context of His Theol- pers, Nov. 1990): 9-16. ogy of Culture,” Haigis, Peter, XXVI, 1 (Winter “Tillich and Marx on Religion: Brian Donnelly’s 2000): 21-30. The Socialist Emigré: Marxism and the Later “Tillich’s Epistemology as a Key to His System,” Tillich,” Stone, Ronald H., XXX, 2: 24-26. Grube, Dirk-Martin (Meeting Papers Nov. “Tillich and the Kyoto School,” Gilkey, Langdon 1995): 15-26. (Meeting Papers, Dec. 1987): 1-10. “Tillich’s Method of Correlation: Some Resonances “Tillich and Whitehead: Notes Toward a Partial in Jewish Thought,” Sherman, Franklin (Meet- Reconciliation,” Ford, Lewis S. (Meeting Pa- ing Papers, Nov. 1990): 17-20. pers, Nov. 1980). Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 48 “Tillich’s Ontology of Life and History vis-a-vis Meaning,” Stone, Jerome Arthur (Meeting Pa- Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism,” Arther, pers, Nov. 1990): 21-24. Donald E. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1980). “What Tillich Meant to Me,” Stackhouse, Max L. “Tillich’s Postmodern View of the Actuality of (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1989): 13-16. God,” Towne, Edgar A., XXIX, 3 (Summer “Why Did Westerners Become Fascists? Fromm, 2003): 24-29. Tillich, and Horkheimer on Character Types,” “Tillich’s Pragmatic Argument That the Christian Hammond, Guy B., (Meeting Papers, Nov. Message Has the Strongest Claim to Be Univer- 1989): 8-12. sal.” James, Robison. XXIX, 2 (Spring 2003): “The Words I Recorded, The Man I Knew.” John, 2-10. Peter H. XXIX, 1 (Winter 2003): 4-11. “Tillich’s Presentation of the Trinity and the Con- temporary Renewal of Trinitarian Thought: To- Articles by Author ward a Tillichian Presentation of the Trinity,” MacLennan, Ronald B. (Meeting Papers, Nov. Abe, Masao, “A Buddhist View of ‘The Significance 1992): 24-29. of the History of Religions for the Systematic “Tillich’s Relevance to the Religious Situation in Theologian’” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1988): 1-8. Postmodern North America,” Bandy, Thomas Abe, Masao, “A Response to Professor Langdon G., XXVII, 1 (Winter 2001): 10-12. Gilkey’s Paper (“Tillich and the Kyoto “Tillich’s The Courage to Be after 40 Years,” John School”)” (Meeting Papers, Dec. 1987): 11-15. J. Carey (NAPTS Meeting Papers, November Adams, James Luther, “Reminiscences of Paul Til- 1991): 3-6. lich,” XIV, 4 (Oct. 1988): 3-8. “Theology of Culture After Postcolonialism,” Man- Albrecht, Renate and Gertraut Stˆber, “The Places of ning, Russell, XXVIII, 2 (Spring 2002): 25-32. Tillich’s Childhood,” II, 1 (Oct., 1975): 2-4. “Tillich’s Theology of Culture and Hispanic Theol- Arther, Donald, “Paul Tillich as a Military Chap- ogy,” Pedraja, Luis G., XXV, 3 (Summer 1999): lain,” XXVI, 3 (Summer 2000): 4-12. 2-10. Arther, Donald E., “Tillich’s Ontology of Life and “Toward a Holistic View of Human Being,” Hum- History vis-a-vis Whitehead’s Philosophy of mel, Gert (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1980). Organism.” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1980). “Toward a Salvageable Tillich: The Implications of Ashr, Jawad. “Paul Tillich and the Reconstruction of His Late Confession of Provincialism.” Dourley, Sin and Salvation in Islamic Theological An- John. XXIX, 2 (Spring 2003): 10-14. thropology.” XXIX, 1 (Winter 2003): 27-42. “A Tribute to Professor Robert Scharlemann,” Ashton, Loye, “Tillich on the Self-Actualization of Stenger, Mary Ann, XXV, 1 (Winter 1999): Life” (Meeting Papers Nov. 1995): 54-56. 6-7. Bandy, Thomas G., “Eros and the Church” (Meeting “Troeltsch and Tillich: Christians Seeking Religion Papers, Nov. 1992): 1-4. Outside the Churches,” Stenger, Mary Ann, Bandy, Thomas. “The Quest for Absolutes Today: XXIX, 3 (Summer 2003): 9-18. Response to John J. Carey’s Paulus: Then and “Two Turning Points in Modern Theology: Ernst Now.” XXIX, 1 (Winter 2003): 22-25. Troeltsch and Paul Tillich,” Richard, Jean, Bandy, Thomas G., “Tillich’s Relevance to the Re- XXIX (Summer 2003): 18-24. ligious Situation in Postmodern North America,” “Ultimate Concern in the Politics of Defining Relig- XXVII, 1 (Winter 2001): 10-12. ion,” Wettstein, Arnold (Meeting Papers Nov. Barron, Robert, “Response to Jean-Pierre Béland 1995): 27-34. and Marc Dumas” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1994): “The Varieties of Mystical Experience: Paul Tillich 7-8. and William James,” Nikkel, David H., XXX, 2 Bergmann, William C., “Paul Tillich’s Systematic (Spring 2004): 40-46. Theology, Vol. III: ‘Norms and Values in the “The Vehicle(s) of Salvation According to Paul Til- Dimension of Spirit,’ Section 1., A., 4., d” lich and Stanley Hauerwas,” Weaver, Matthew (Meeting Papers Nov. 1995): 57-59. Lon, XXVIII, 4 (Fall 2002): 5-13. Beckman, Peter Wilhelm, “Paul Tillich in Scandina- “What Religious Naturalism Can Learn from Til- via” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1991): 1-2. lich: The Unconditional Element in Acts of Beckman, Peter Wilhelm, “Paul Tillich in Scandina- via” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1992): 5-6. Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 49 Boss, Marc, “Kairos and ‘Epochal Thinking,’” Cobb, Kelton, “Expanding the Stock of Sources in XXIV, 2 (Spring 1998): 2-12. Tillich’s Theology of Culture.” (Meeting Papers, Braaten, Carl, “The Evangelical and Catholic Theol- Nov. 1992): 13-23. ogy of Paul Tillich: A Lutheran Appreciation,” Cveckova, Veronika, “Paul Tillich: Christocentric XXVI, 1 (Winter 2000): 2-7. Pluralism or Pluralism of Equality,” XXVI, 2 Brauer, Jerald C., “Tillich at Chicago,” XV, 4 (Oct. (Spring 2000): 9-12. 1989): 2-10. Daniell, Anne. M., “Nature’s Divine and Demonic Bulman, Raymond F., “Paul Tillich and the Mille- Being: Tillich’s Conception of Nature’s Am- narian Heritage” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1994): biguous Powers and His Conception of Divin- 22-28. ity’s Simultaneous Immanence and Transcen- Bulman, Raymond F., “Prognosis: Tillich and the dence,” XXV, 3 (Summer 1999): 10-17. Future of Catholic Theology” (Meeting Papers, Davies, Mark Youmans, “Systematic Theology, Vol. Nov. 1992): 7-9. III Panel Discussion: Spirit as a Dimension of Bulman, Raymond F., “Religion in the New Millen- Life.” (Meeting Papers Nov. 1995): 60-66. nium: Theology in the Spirit of Paul Tillich— Davila, Maria Teresa, “From Evil Temptress to the The Future Shape of Theology,” XXVIII, 1 First Act of Courage: How Paul Tillich Saves (Winter 2002): 9-11. Eve in the Genesis Account of the Fall,” XXVI, Burch, Sharon, “In Memoriam: John Clayton,” 3 (Summer 2000): 41-51. XXX, 1 (Winter 2004): 7-8. DeLashmutt, Michael W., “Syncretism or Correl- Burch, Sharon, “Introductory Remarks about the taion: Teilhard’s and Tillich’s Contrasting Tillich Critical Edition Project” (Meeting Papers Metholdological Approaches to Science and Nov. 1995): 51-53. Theology,” XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): 12-19. Bush, Randall K. “Shaking the Foundations Again: Donnelly, Brian, “Comments on The Socialist Emi- Tillich’s Views on the Role of the Prophet in gré” XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): 34-36. Contemporary Society.” XXIX, 2 (Spring 2003): Dourley, John P., “Jacob Boehme and Paul Tillich 14-29. on Trinity and God: Similarities and Differ- Carey, John J., “Are There Any Absolutes Left? ences” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1994): 12-21. Postmodernism and the Crisis for Tillich Schol- Dourley, John P. “Tillich, Jung, and the Trinity- ars,” XXIV, 4 (Fall 1998) & [in its corrected Quaternity Issue” (Meeting Papers, Nov. (Meet- form] XXV, 1 (Winter 1999): 7-13. ing Papers, Nov. 1990): 1-8.Dourley, John P. Carey, John J. “Contribution to Panel Discussion of “Toward a Salvageable Tillich: The Implications John J. Carey’s Paulus: Then and Now,” XXIX, of His Late Confession of Provincialism.” 1 (Winter 2003): 22. XXIX, 2 (Spring 2003): 10-14. Carey, John J., “The North American Paul Tillich Dreisbach, Donald F., “Response to Bielefeldt and Society: Whence and Whither?” XXV, 1 (Win- Raposa” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1994): 52-54. ter 1999): 2-6. Dreisbach, Donald F., “Response to John J. Carey’s Carey, John J., “A Response to Alexander C. Irwin’s Paulus: Then and Now,” XXIX, 1 (Winter Eros toward the World: Paul Tillich and the 2003): 25-27. Theology of the Erotic” (Meeting Papers, Nov. Driver, Tom F., “The Tillichian Spell: Memories of 1992): 10-12. a Student Mesmerized in the 1950s,” XXII, 1 Carey, John J., “Tillich, Marx, and the Interpretation (Jan. 1996): 2-8. of History” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1989): 1-7. Drummy, Michael F., “Concern for Creation: Paul Carey, John J., “Tillich’s The Courage to Be after 40 Tillich and the Ecology of Being,” XXIV, 3 Years” (NAPTS Meeting Papers, November (Summer 1998): 2-8. 1991): 3-6. Dumas, Marc, “Tillich’s Christology in the Dogmat- Carr, Paul, “A Theology for Evolution: Haught, ics [1925]” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1994): Teilhard, and Tillich,” XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): 8- 1-6. 12. Eickhoff, Jörg, “The New Being in Christ: Tillich’s Clayton, John, “The New Tillich Edition,” XIV, 1 Universal Concept of Revelation as a Contribu- (Jan. 1988): 3-8. tion to Inter-Religious Encounter in the Plural- istic Situation of Post-Modernity,” XXVIII, 3 (Summer 2002): 18-23. Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 50 Fessenden, Tracy, “La pensÈe sauvage: Women and Hooker, Charles, “Ecstatic Reason and Flow: Paul the ‘Primitive’ in Tillich’s Life and Thought” Tillich and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi on Ecstatic (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1993): 1-8. Experience in a Critical Conversation in the Fisher, James V., “Review Essay: The Socialist De- Theology of Culture,” XXVI, 2 (Spring 2000): cision,” III, 1 (Dec. 1977): 21-27. 12-24. Ford, Lewis S., “Tillich and Whitehead: Notes To- Huchingson, James E., “Dimensions of Life: The ward a Partial Reconciliation.” (Meeting Papers, Inorganic and the Organic in Paul Tillich and Nov. 1980). Teilhard de Chardin,” XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): Gelwick, Richard, “Polanyi’s Search for a Postcriti- 20-23. cal Logic in Science and Theology” (NAPTS Hummel, Gert “The Concept of Religion in Paul Meeting Papers, November 1991): 7-11. Tillich’s ‘Systematische Theologie’ of 1913,” Gilkey, Langdon, “Tillich and the Kyoto School” XXII, 2 (Apr. 1996): 3-12. (Meeting Papers, Dec. 1987): 1-10. Hummel, Gert, “Letter from Tblisi: First Impres- Grau, Karin, “The Mystery of Salvation,” trans., sions of Georgia,” XXV, 4 (Fall 1999): 5-7. Doris Lax, XXVI, 4 (Fall 2000): 7-8. Hummel, Gert, “The Negative Trinitarian Balance in Grau, Karin, “Salvation as Cosmic Healing in Til- Tillich’s Dogmatik of 1925” (Meeting Papers, lich,” XXVIII, 3 (Summer 2002): 24-27. Nov. 1988): 36-42. Grigg, Richard, “Religion, Science, and Evolution: Hummel, Gert, “Toward a Holistic View of Human Tillich’s Fourth Way,” XXVIII, 3 (Summer Being” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1980). 2002): 12-18. James, Robison B., “The Pragmatism of Paul Til- Grigg, Richard, “Remaking Tillich as a Pragmatist: lich,” XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): 46-53. From Foundationalist Ontology to Pragmatic James Robison B., “Rejoinder to Guy Hammond,” Construction,” XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): 36-39. XXV, 2 (Spring 1999): 14-15. Griswold, John E., “Textual Variants in ‘Self- James, Robison B., “Revising Tillich’s Model of Integration and Disintegration in General: Reality to Let God Be Personal,” XXV, 2 Health and Disease.” (Meeting Papers Nov. (Spring 1999): 5-13. 1995): 67-68. James, Robison, “Tillich on ‘The Absoluteness of Grube, Dirk-Martin, “Tillich’s Epistemology as a Christianity.’” (Meeting Papers Nov. 1995): Key to His System.” (Meeting Papers Nov. 35-50. 1995): 15-26. James, Robison B., “Tillich’s Dialectic: Key to His Haigis, Peter, “Paul Tillich and the Post-Modern Cosmic Vision and His Idea of Knowledge” Debate on Culture,” XXVIII, 2 (Spring 2002): (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1993): 9-17. 15-24. James, Robison. “Tillich’s Pragmatic Argument Haigis, Peter, “Tillich’s Early Writings in Social That the Christian Message Has the Strongest Philosophy and Social Ethics within the Context Claim to Be Universal.” XXIX, 2 (Spring 2003): of His Theology of Culture,” XXVI, 1 (Winter 2-10. 2000): 21-30. John, Peter H. “The Words I Recorded, The Man I Hammond, Guy B., “A Response to Rob James,” Knew.” XXIX, 1 (Winter 2003): 4-11. XXV, 2 (Spring 1999): 13-14. Kessler, Michael, “In God’s Image They Were Cre- Hammond, Guy, “The SocialistEmigré: Marxism ated: Human Autonomy and Theonomy,” XXX, and the Later Tillich by Brian Donnelly,” XXX, 1 (Winter 2004): 10-13. 1 (Winter 2004): 14-15. Koshul, Basit. “The Divine, the Demonic, and the Hammond, Guy B., “Why Did Westerners Become Ninety-Nine Names of Allah: Tillich’s Idea of Fascists? Fromm, Tillich, and Horkheimer on the ‘Holy’ and the Qur’anic Narrative.” XXIX, 1 Character Types” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1989): (Winter 2003): 42-48. 8-12. Laliberté, Madeleine, “The Problem of the Historical Haught, John F., XXVIII, “In Search of a God for Jesus in ‘Die Christliche Gewiflheit und der his- Evolution: Paul Tillich and Teilhard de Char- torische Jesus’ and the New Biblical Criticism,” din,” 3 (Summer 2002): 3-11. XXIV, 3 (Summer 1998) & [in its corrected Heller, Jessica, “An Ontology of Depression,” form] XXV, 1 (Winter 1999): 14-20. XXVIII, 4 (Fall 2002): 18-28. Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 51 Lamm, Julia A., “A Hermeneutics of Revulsion: Re- Jung on the Historical Problemmatic of an sponse to Owen C. Thomas” (Meeting Papers, ‘Epistemythology.’” XXIX, 2 (Spring 2003): Nov. 1994): 45-48. 29-36. Lax, Doris, “Between Thought and Faith, Culture Novak, David, “Tillich and Buber” (Meeting Papers, and Religion, Yearning for Spirituality: Paul Til- Nov. 1990): 9-16. lich’s Early ‘Church Apologetics’ and Thomas O’Keeffe, Terence, “Reflections on Brian Don- Bandy’s ‘Spiritual Midwiving,’” XXVII, 1 nelly’s The Socialist Émigre: Marxism and the (Winter 2001): 3-10. Later Tillich,” XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): 31-34. Lee, Hak Joon, “From Ontology to Plausibility: A Olson, Duane, “The Influence of Troeltsch’s His- Critical Realist Reconstruction of Paul Tillich’s toricism on Tillich’s System of the Sciences,” Theology of Religion,” XXVI, 3 (Summer XXV, 3 (Summer 1999): 17-21. 2000): 27-41. O’Meara, Thomas F., “Paul Tillich and Erich Przy- Lounibos, John, “The Power to Be and the Freedom wara at Davos,” XXX, 1 (Winter 2004): 8-9. to Act.” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1979). O’Meara, Thomas Franklin, “Paul Tillich in Catho- MacLennan, Ronald B., “Tillich’s Presentation of lic Thought: The Past and the Future” (Meeting the Trinity and the Contemporary Renewal of Papers, Nov. 1992): 30-32. Trinitarian Thought: Toward a Tillichian Presen- Page, John M., “Paul Tillich’s Theology of Intellec- tation of the Trinity.” (Meeting Papers, Nov. tual Salvation,” XXVII, 2 (Spring 2001): 1992): 24-29. 11-16. Manning, Russell, “Theology of Culture after Post- Parrella, Frederick J., “Paul Tillich: A New Catholic colonialism,” XXVIII, 2 (Spring 2002): 25-32. Assessment: Report on Current Research” Marsh, Clive, “Tillich on Christ as Symbol Recon- (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1992): 33-37. sidered: Constructing a Christology in a Post- Parrella, Frederick J., “Religion in the New Millen- modern Age.” (NAPTS Meeting Papers, No- nium: Theology in the Spirit of Paul Tillich—An vember 1991): 12-20. Emerging Spirituality,” XXVIII, 1 (Winter Miller, Kimberly R., “How Does the Letter Kill? 2002): 13-17. The Tillichian and Lutheran Understandings of Paul, Garrett E., “History and Theology in Tension: Law,” XXIX, 4 (Fall 2003): 14-23. Troeltsch’s Glaubenslehre and Tillich’s Dog- Mirejovsky, Lubomir, “Peace Issues in the Work of matik,” XXIX, 3 (Summer 2003): 29-38. Paul Tillich,” XIV, 2 (April 1988): 5-10. Pedraja, Luis G., “Tillich’s Theology of Culture and Moody, Linda A., “Paul Tillich and Feminist Theol- Hispanic Theology,” XXV, 3 (Summer 1999) 2- ogy: Echoes from the Boundary” (Meeting Pa- 10. pers, Nov. 1993): 18-24. Perkins, R. Wayne, “Tillich’s Christological Indebt- Moore, Viola, “Thinking Up Rainbows and I Love edness to Schleiermacher,” XXVI, 3 (Summer How They Color My Mind” (Meeting Papers, 2000): 16-26. Nov. 1988): 43-48. Peterson, Anna L., “Paul Tillich’s Political Ethics: Morrison, Roy D. II, “Paul Tillich and Werner Heis- In Defense of Socialism.” (Meeting Papers, Nov. enberg: Crossing the Transcendental Horizon.” 1992): 38-49. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1988): 14-28. Price, Robert M., “Tillich on the Historical Jesus and Murray, Stephen Butler, “Estrangement and Existen- Christian Faith,” XXVIII, 4 (Fall 2002): 14-18. tial Angst in Human Life: An Examination of Prudhomme, Jeff Owen, “The Logic of Silence and Paul Tillich and Cornel West,” XXVII, 2 the Systematic Use of Paradox: Heidegger’s Bei- (Spring 2001): 4-10. träge and Tillich’s Early Philosophy of Relig- Nikkel, David H., “Polarities in Tillich’s Thought on ion.” (NAPTS Meeting Papers, November Revelation in the World Religions,” XXVI, 4 1991): 21-26. (Fall 2000): 2-6. Raposa, Michael, “Remarks Concerning Donald Nikkel, David H., “The Varieties of Mystical Expe- Dreisbach’s Symbols and Salvation and Richard rience: Paul Tillich and William James,” XXX, Grigg’s Symbol and Empowerment” (Meeting 2 (Spring 2004): 40-46. Papers, Nov. 1994): 49-51. Noel, Daniel C. “The Distortion of Faith as Belief Rasmussen, Barry G., “John Milbank’s Asymmetry and the Loss of the Symbolic Life: Tillich and of Love and Tillich’s Theonomy: The Divine in Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 52 Relation to the World,” XXVII, 3 (Summer Stendahl, Krister, “In Honor of Paulus: Reminis- 2001) 8-21. cences of Tillich at Harvard,” XVIII, 1 (Jan. Reisz, H. Frederick, Jr., “Tillich for Parish Minis- 1992): 3-8. try,” XXV, 4 (Fall 1999): 7-15. Stenger, Mary Ann. “Contribution to Panel Discus- Richard, Jean, “My Journey into the Work of Paul sion on Dialogues of Paul Tillich, by Ronald H. Tillich (2003 Annual Banquet Address),” XXX, Stone and Mary Ann Stenger,” XXIX, 1 (Winter 1 (Winter 2004): 2-7. 2003): 15-17. Richard, Jean, “The Significance of Paul Tillich’s Stenger, Mary Ann, “The Courage to Be after Forty” Dogmatik (1925).” (Meeting Papers, Nov. (NAPTS Meeting Papers, November 1991): 41- 1988): 31-35. 42. Richard, Jean, “A Response to Stone and Stenger’s Stenger, Mary Ann, “Event and Symbol in Tillich’s Dialogues of Paul Tillich,” XXIX, 1 (Winter Christology: A Response to Fundamentalist In- 2003): 17-21. terpretations of Jesus Christ,” XXIII, 3 (Fall Richard, Jean, “Two Turning Points in Modern The- 1997): 3-11. ology: Ernst Troeltsch and Paul Tillich,” XXIX Stenger, Mary Ann, “Religion in the New Millen- (Summer 2003): 18-24. nium: Theology in the Spirit of Paul Tillich— Ristiniemi, Jari, “Religion in a Religionless World: WhitherTheology of Culture?,” XXVIII, 1 (Win- Criticism of Religion and After.” (Meeting Pa- ter 2002): 11-13. pers Nov. 1995): 1-14. Stenger, Mary Ann, “Thought and Life: Issues of Rose, Kenneth, “Is Christianity the Most Universal Truth and Morality, Response to Owen Thomas” Faith? A Response to Robison B. James’s Tillich (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1994): and the World Religions: Encountering Other 43-44. Faiths Today,” XXX, 1 (Winter 2004): 15-19. Stenger, Mary Ann, “A Tribute to Professor Robert Rothchild, Jonathan, “Framing, Fragmenting, and Scharlemann,” XXV, 1 (Winter 1999): 6-7. Freud (?): Models of the Self and Faith Forma- Stenger, Mary Ann, “Troeltsch and Tillich: Chris- tion in Paul Tillich and Iris Murdoch,” XXIX, 4 tians Seeking Religion Outside the Churches,” (Fall 2003): 4-14. XXIX, 3 (Summer 2003): 9-18. Scharf, Uwe, “Essence, Existence and Life: Re- Ströber, Gertraut and Renate Albrecht, “The Places sponse to J.-P. Béland and Marc Dumas,” of Tillich’s Childhood.” II, 1 (Oct., 1975): 2-4. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1994): 9-11. Stollings, C. Eugene, “Review: Michael F. Scharlemann, Robert P., “Address at the Annual Drummy’s Nature, Man and God According to Banquet of the North American Paul Tillich So- Paul Tillich,” XXVII, 4 (Fall 2001): 6. ciety, 21 November 1997,” XXIV, 1 (Winter Stone, Jerome Arthur, “What Religious Naturalism 1998): 2-4. Can Learn from Tillich: The Unconditional Schwarz, Hans, “The Americanization of Paul Til- Element in Acts of Meaning.” (Meeting Papers, lich,” XXII, 3 (July 1996): 2-7. Nov. 1990): 21-24. Shaw, Elliott, “The Contexts of Courage.” (NAPTS Stone, Ronald H., “Contribution to Panel Discussion Meeting Papers, November 1991): 27-29. on Dialogues of Paul Tillich, by Ronald H. Sherman, Franklin, “Tillich’s Method of Correla- Stone and Mary Ann Stenger.” XXIX, 1 (Winter tion: Some Resonances in Jewish Thought” 2003): 12-15. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1990): 17-20. Stone, Ronald H., “Kairos Circle” (Meeting Papers, Slater, Peter. “Dialogically Hearing God’s Concrete Nov. 1989): 23-27. Word: Bakhtin and Tillich.” XXIX, 2 (Spring Stone, Ronald, “Ontology of Power in Niebuhr, 2003): 36-51. Morgenthau and Tillich,” XXVIII, 2 (Spring Slater, Peter, “Tillich’s Dialectic and Concept of 2002): 4-14. Reason” (NAPTS Meeting Papers, November Stone, Ronald H., “Paul Tillich on Peace” (Meeting 1991): 30-40. Papers, Nov. 1989): 17-22. Stackhouse, Max L., “What Tillich Meant to Me” Stone, Ronald H., “Paulus und Gustavo” (Meeting (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1989): 13-16. Papers, Dec. 1987): 17-26. Steffen, Lloyd, “Tillich, the Demonic, and Symbols Stone, Ronald H., “Tillich and Marx on Religion: of Self-Deception” (Meeting Papers, Nov. Brian Donnelly’s The Socialist Emigré: Marx- 1994): 55-62. ism and the Later Tillich,” XXX, 2: 24-26. Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 53 Sturm Erdmann, “Between Apologetics and Pastoral Towne, Edgar A. “Tillich’s Postmodern View of the Care: Paul Tillich’s Early Sermons (1908-1918), Actuality of God,” XXIX, 3 (Summer 2003): XXVI, 1 (Winter 2000): 7-20. 24-29. Sturm, Erdmann, “Paul Tillich’s Interpretation of Victorin-Vangerud, Nancy M., “The Divine Life and Greek Philosophy (Berlin 1920/21),” XXVI, 3 Ecstatic Transformation: A Tillichian Pneuma- (Summer 2000): 12-16. tology.” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1992): 50-54. Sykes, Britt-Mari, “Bridging Psychology and Relig- Weaver, Matthew Lon, “Individualist International- ion: Viktor Frankl’s Existential Psychology and ism: International Theory in Tillich’s Religion Paul Tillich’s Religious Philosophy,” XXVIII, 2 und Weltpolitik,” XXVI, 2 (Spring 2000): 1-8. (Spring 2002): 33-36. Weaver, Matthew Lon, “Paul Tillich and the Voice Sykes, Britt-Mari, “Critical Psychology and Ulti- of America,” XXIV, 3 (Summer 1998): 19-29. mate Concern: Paul Tillich’s Answer to Faith in Weaver, Matthew Lon, “Subliminal Marxist or the Modern World,” XXIX, 3 (Summer 2003): Overt Religious Socialist—Response to Brian 4-8. Donnelly’s The Socialist Emigré: Marxism and Tavard, George, “Paul Tillich’s View of Ecumen- the Later Tillich,” XXX, 2 (Spring 2004): 26-30. ism,” XXVIII, 1 (Winter 2002): 4-9. Weaver, Matthew Lon, “The Vehicle(s) of Salvation Taylor, Mark Kline, “Response to Stone (‘Paulus According to Paul Tillich and Stanley Hauer- und Gustavo’).” (Meeting Papers, Dec. 1987): was,” XXVIII, 4 (Fall 2002): 5-13. 27-31. Wettstein, A. Arnold, “Forgive Us Our Trespasses” Thangaraj, M. Thomas, “Faith, Religion, and Cul- (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1988): 29-30. ture: A Tripod for Interreligious Dialogue” Wettstein, A. Arnold, “Stephen Hawking, Paul Til- (Meeting Papers, November 1991): 43-47. lich and Knowing the Mind of God” (Meeting Thatamanil, John J., “The Reason-Revelation Di- Papers, Nov. 1989): 35-39. chotomy: Tillich and Milbank on the Relation- Wettstein, Arnold, “Ultimate Concern in the Politics ship between Philosophy and Theology,” of Defining Religion” (Meeting Papers Nov. XXVII, 3 (Summer 2001): 2-8. 1995): 27-34. Thomas, J. Mark, “Science and Technological Ra- Whittemore, Paul B., “Schelling’s Influence on Til- tionality.” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1989): 28-34. lich’s Theological Anthropology” (Meeting Pa- Thomas, Owen, “Thought and Life: The Cases of pers, Nov. 1980). Heidegger and Tillich” (Meeting Papers, Nov. Yob, Iris, “Making Meaning with Religious Sym- 1994): 29-42. bols: Tillich’s Theory of Participation Recon- Thomas, Terence, “Response to Masao Abe’s ‘A strued” (NAPTS Meeting Papers, November Buddhist View of ‘The Significance of the His- 1991): 48-53. tory of Religions for the Systematic Theolo- Yunt, Jeremy D., “Introductory Remarks on Paul gian.’” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1988): 9-13. Tillich’s Contribution to a Deep Environmental Ethic,” XXIV, 3 (Summer 1998): 14-18.

In the Fall Newsletter:

• Articles by Rachel Sophia Baard and Stephen Butler Murray

• The complete program for the Annual Meeting of the NAPTS in San Antonio, plus information about this year’s banquet Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 54

The Officers of the North American Paul Tillich Society Officers of the Society

John Thatamanil, Vanderbilt University President

Matthew Lon Weaver, University of Pittsburgh President Elect

Terence O’Keeffe, University of Ulster Vice President

Frederick J. Parrella, Santa Clara University Secretary Treasurer

Michael Drummy, Longmont, Colorado Past President

Board of Directors

Term Expiring 2004

Duane Olson, McKendree College Mary Ann Stenger, University of Louisville Jean Richard, Association Paul Tillich d'Éxpression Française

Term Expiring 2005

Doris Lax, Deutsche Paul-Tillich-Gesellschaft Ron MacLennan, Bethany College Stephen Butler Murray, Skidmore College

Term Expiring 2006

Loye Ashton, Millsaps College Rachel Sophia Baard, Villanova University Sharon Peebles Burch, San Rafael, California Jonathan Rothchild, University of Chicago