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Cesifo Forum 4/2016 (Winter): Collapse of the Ruble Zone and Its CESifo, a Munich-based, globe-spanning economic research and policy advice institution WINTER Forum 2016 VOLUME 17, NO. 4 Focus Marek Dabrowski COLLAPSE OF THE Anders Åslund Brigitte Granville RUBLE ZONE AND Pekka Sutela Natalia Levenko and ITS LESSONS Karsten Staehr Richard Pomfret Patrick Conway Specials SYSTEMIC ASPECTS OF PENSION FUNDS Roel Beetsma, Siert Vos and AND THE ROLE OF SUPERVISION Christiaan Wanningen BREXIT – THEORY AND EMPIRICS Till Nikolka and Panu Poutvaara Spotlight CLIMATE NOTES ON THE Jana Lippelt DEVELOPMENT AND FUTURE OF THE WORLD’S FORESTS Trends STATISTICS UPDATE CESifo Forum ISSN 1615-245X (print version) ISSN 2190-717X (electronic version) A quarterly journal on European economic issues Publisher and distributor: Ifo Institute, Poschingerstr. 5, D-81679 Munich, Germany Telephone ++49 89 9224-0, Telefax ++49 89 9224-98 53 69, e-mail [email protected] Annual subscription rate: €50.00 Single subscription rate: €15.00 Shipping not included Editors: John Whalley ([email protected]) and Chang Woon Nam ([email protected]) Indexed in EconLit Reproduction permitted only if source is stated and copy is sent to the Ifo Institute. www.cesifo-group.de Forum Volume 17, Number 4 Winter 2016 Focus COLLAPSE OF THE RUBLE ZONE AND ITS LESSONS Post-Communist Transition and Monetary Disintegration Marek Dabrowski 3 Lessons from the Collapse of the Ruble Zone Anders Åslund 12 Lessons from the Collapse of the Ruble Zone and the Transferable Ruble System Brigitte Granville 19 Lessons from Trade and Payments between Centrally-Managed Economies Pekka Sutela 27 To Be or Not to Be in the Rouble Zone: Lessons from the Baltic States Natalia Levenko and Karsten Staehr 34 Currency Union and Disunion in Europe and the Former Soviet Union Richard Pomfret 43 Lessons from the Collapse of the Transferable Ruble System and the Joint Currency of Former CMEA Countries for the Eurozone Patrick Conway 48 Specials Systemic Aspects of Pension Funds and the Role of Supervision Roel Beetsma, Siert Vos and Christiaan Wanningen 54 Brexit – Theory and Empirics Till Nikolka and Panu Poutvaara 68 Spotlight Climate Notes on the Development and Future of the World’s Forests Jana Lippelt 76 Trends Statistics Update 79 Focus COLLAPSE OF THE RUBLE ZONE AND ITS LESSONS POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION Demise of the CMEA and the end of the transferable ruble AND MONETARY DISINTEGRATION The TR was not a real currency. Instead, it was an ac- counting unit for the purpose of bilateral trade-relat- MAREK DABROWSKI* ed settlements between member countries of the CMEA. This organisation existed between 1949 and 1991 and included the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslova- Introduction kia, Cuba, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and Vietnam (Albania Political and economic changes in Central and terminated its membership in 1961), as well as a num- Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union ber of countries with ‘observer’ status such as Finland, (FSU) at the end of 1980s and early 1990s resulted in Yugoslavia, North Korea, Angola, Mozambique and just two episodes of monetary disintegration. Firstly, Ethiopia. The TR was used as of 1964. the end of Soviet geopolitical control over CEE led to the demise of the Council for Mutual Economic According to the CMEA’s Complex Program of Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) and its quasi-cur- Socialist Economic Integration approved in 1971, the rency – the transferable ruble (TR). Shortly after- TR was to be also used for multilateral settlement pur- wards, the political disintegration of the Union of poses, i.e. trade surplus of country A against country Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Yugoslavia, and B could be used for imports from country C (Smyslov Czecho-Slovakia also caused monetary disintegra- 1989; Vince 1984). In addition, there was proposal to tions. The newly independent successor states adopt- make the national currencies of CMEA countries con- ed their own currencies, however only the separation vertible to the TR and between themselves. of the Czecho-Slovak crown (koruna) into two new currencies was conducted in and orderly manner, and However, these plans never materialised for a number without major macroeconomic turbulences and of reasons. Firstly, in the ‘classical’ central planning trade disruption. This was reminiscent of the mone- system production targets and trade flows, both do- tary disintegration of the former Austro-Hungarian mestic and foreign, were determined by the govern- Empire after the World War I when Czechoslovakia ment. The government also executed the state monop- was the only successor country thatavoided hyperin- oly on foreign trade. Thus enterprises had very little, if flation (Garber and Spencer 1994). any, choice as to where to sell their products and where to purchase their supplies or investment equipment. This essay aims to summarise the experiences of the Secondly, the government administratively deter- two monetary disintegration episodes, i.e. termination mined most domestic prices, which differed substan- of settlements in TR since 1 January 1991 and the tially both from international prices and between indi- gradual collapse of the Soviet ruble area in 1990– vidual CMEA countries. Thirdly, communist econo- 1993. The second section of this paper is devoted to mies suffered, to various extents, from permanent demise of CMEA and TR. The third section describes macroeconomic disequilibria, which mainly manifest- the collapse of the ruble area in the former USSR ed themselves in the form of a physical shortage of based on my earlier publication (Dabrowski 1995). goods in both consumer and producer markets (the The fourth section analyses macroeconomic conse- so-called ‘shortage’ economy – see Kornai 1980), i.e. quences of monetary disintegration in the former repressed inflation. Fourthly, the national currencies USSR; and the fifth section examines the policy les- of CMEA member states remained unconvertible and sons that can be drawn from both episodes. convertibility was unrealistic as long as macroeco- nomic disequilibria and price distortions were in * Bruegel, Brussels; Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE), Warsaw; and Higher School of Economics, Moscow. The place. Fifthly, exchange rates between TR and nation- opinions expressed in this publication are solely the author’s; they do not necessarily reflect the views of institutions that he is affiliated with. al currencies were determined in an administrative 3 CESifo Forum 4/2016 (December) Focus way and did not have any direct impact on domestic product and price structure of that trade and the abil- prices; differences between transaction prices in TR ity to quickly reorient trade relations to other part- (or in convertible currencies in trade with non-CMEA ners (in the first instance, the EEC/EU). The shock partners) and domestic administrative prices were set- was largely related to two factors – the loss of an ex- tled in the form of individually determined tax/quasi- port market (several goods exported previously to tax rates or subsidies. CMEA partners proved uncompetitive on a world market) and the deterioration in terms of trade In short, the TR was only used as an accounting unit to (Soviet oil and gas was sold to CMEA partners below determine net balances in bilateral barter transactions the international price level). registered on special accounts in the International Bank of Economic Cooperation in Moscow (a CMEA insti- It is not analytically easy to disentangle the effects of tution). A deficit in one year was to be repaid by sur- terminating the CMEA trade regime from the subse- pluses in subsequent years, and took the form of a tech- quent disintegration of the USSR, output decline in nical credit in the meantime. It was the subject of a po- the USSR and FSU countries (which cut demand for litical decision on the inter-state level. In addition, the imports from former CMEA countries), and transi- International Investment Bank, another CMEA insti- tion-related domestic factors, so all existing esti- tution, used the TR as an accounting unit in its opera- mates should be treated with caution. According to tions with CMEA member countries (bilateral or mul- Rosati (1995), GDP losses related to collapse of tilateral investment projects). Interestingly, the TR only trade with the USSR in 1991 varied between less applied to trade transactions. Another set of bilateral than one-third of the total GDP decline in Czecho- exchange rates was used for non-commercial transac- Slovakia and over a third in Bulgaria, and were neg- tions and settlements such as, for example, tourist for- ligible in Romania. eign currency exchanges or private transfers. With the benefit of hindsight, one can argue that the col- The above described system of CMEA trade was ter- lapse of the CMEA trade regime was unavoidable be- minated at the end of 1990 as a result of political and cause it was incompatible with the new political and eco- economic changes in the region. As of 1 January 1991 nomic realities of post-communist transformation. CMEA member states decided to replace (i) the artifi- Furthermore, it can be seen as a kind of Schumpeterian cial CMEA prices with world market prices; (ii) the ‘creative’ destruction that, despite its initial price, the TR with convertible currencies; and (iii) inter-govern- CMEA trade regime allowed and speeded up trade re- mental trade protocols with decentralised trade deci- orientation towards EEC/EU, internal structural and in- sions on the enterprise level (Rosati 1995). These stitutional changes and opened the door to CEE mem- changes eliminated previous differences between in- bership in the EU in the decade to follow. Even tually, tra-regional trade and trade with other partners, for strong intra-CEE trade relations reemerged within the example, countries of the European Economic Single European Market and trade relations between Community (EEC). In countries that had already CEE and FSU were rebuilt on a new market basis.
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