The George W. Bush Administration Perceived: Chinese Security Elites’ Views of U.S

The George W. Bush Administration Perceived: Chinese Security Elites’ Views of U.S. Security Policy Toward China By Lance Noble B.A. in Political Science, December 2002, Simon Fraser University M.A. in Political Science, August 2006, The University of British Columbia A Dissertation submitted to The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 31, 2014 Dissertation directed by David Shambaugh Professor of Political Science and International Affairs The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Lance Noble has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of November 19, 2013. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation. The George W. Bush Administration Perceived: Chinese Security Elites’ Views of U.S. Security Policy Toward China Lance Noble Dissertation Research Committee: David Shambaugh, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Director James Lebovic, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs, Committee Member ii © Copyright 2014 by Lance Noble All rights reserved iii Dedication I would like to thank my advisor Professor David Shambaugh for his guidance during the six years I spent working on my PhD., for helping to make arrangements for my fieldwork, and for the opportunity to benefit from his expertise on my research topic. I would like to thank Professor James Lebovic for keeping me theoretically grounded and for his much-appreciated encouragement during the always-challenging process of researching and writing a dissertation. I would like to thank Professor Robert Sutter for his unceasingly gentlemanly advice and for sharing the insights into Chinese foreign policy that he has developed as both a scholar and a practitioner. I would like to thank the School of International Studies at Renmin University for hosting me as a visiting scholar during my year of fieldwork and Professor Jin Canrong for generously helping me to contact research subjects, many of whom I would not have been able to access on my own. I would also like to acknowledge the generous funding that I received from the Canada-China Scholars’ Exchange Program for my field research and from the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at GW for three Summers of language studies in Taipei and Beijing. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents, George and Leigh-Jane Noble, for instilling a love of learning and reading in me from a young age and my friends and classmates for providing me with a stimulating academic environment that offered me unlimited opportunities to learn from debate and the sharing of ideas. I could not have done this without all of you! iv Abstract of Dissertation The George W. Bush Administration Perceived: Chinese Security Elites’ Views of U.S. Security Policy Toward China This dissertation evaluates how Chinese security and foreign policy elites perceived the signals sent by the two components of the George W. Bush administration’s hedging policy toward China, engagement and balancing. It argues that Chinese security elites’ perceptions can be categorized into four schools of thought: the Malign Containers, the Pragmatic Hegemonists, the Evolutionists, and the New Thinkers. It argues that the existence of these four schools of thought, and the changes that took place in Chinese security perceptions over time, support the argument made by cognitive psychological theories that signals are filtered through preexisting perceptions. It therefore presents a challenge to the argument made by offensive realism that state interactions are determined by the balance of power and that signals do not matter. It also presents a challenge to the argument made by defensive realism and rationalism that information speaks for itself and states can clearly express their intentions to each other through “costly signaling.” The dissertation evaluates U.S. policy, the role that U.S. friends and allies in the region played in it, and Chinese security elites’ perceptions as expressed through published academic materials and interviews. v Table of Contents Dedication………………………………………………………………………………...iv Abstract of Dissertation…………………………………………………………………...v Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 2: Literature Review…………………………………………………………….18 Chapter 3: Timeline of Sino-American Security Relations, 2000-2008………………....57 Chapter 4: U.S. Security Policy Toward China……………………………………...…109 Chapter 5: Friends and Allies Perception of and Cooperation With U.S. Policy………188 Chapter 6: Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Security Policy……………………………….266 Chapter 7: Conclusions…………………………………………………………………418 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………434 Appendix: U.S. Interview Subjects…………………………………………………….479 vi Chapter 1 Introduction Research Question Can states meaningfully signal their strategic intentions and policies to each other? If so, what determines whether recipients correctly identify signals and whether or not they perceive their meanings accurately? Are changes in signals over time appreciated, or do past perceptions produce misinterpretation? How are signals sent indirectly through relations with friends and allies perceived? These questions are highly salient to how states understand and respond to each other, and whether or not they are able to cooperate; avoid conflict; and craft appropriate policies. The specific empirical puzzle to be addressed by this dissertation is: How did Chinese security elites perceive the signals sent by the twin strategic components of the George W. Bush administration’s hedging strategy toward China, engagement and balancing, and changes in U.S. policy toward China during the period of 2001-2009? As Sino-American security relations encompass a wide variety of issues; exhibit a complex mix of cooperation and discord; and important changes in American policy took place during the George Bush administration, it is an ideal dyad with which to answer these questions. Offensive and defensive realists and rationalists view the manner in which signals will be perceived as clear and predictable. Offensive realism argues that signaling is not important due to the fact that intentions will change in line with power capabilities. As a result, signals that are sent today do not provide any credible information regarding a 1 state’s future intentions.1 Defensive realism argues that states can use their military postures to credibly signal their intentions to each other. As doing so successfully will allow them to avoid the costs involved in unnecessary competition, and will make them more secure due to the fact that they can direct these resources toward more pressing security challenges, they will also have significant incentives to attempt to signal their intentions in this fashion. Rationalism similarly posits that the signaling and perception of intentions is not problematic due to the fact that the meanings of signals are clear and they are not open to multiple interpretations. Careful evaluation of the signals that other states send regarding their intentions can therefore lead to objective understandings of intentions.2 In contrast, cognitive psychological explanations view the information that states receive regarding each other’s intentions as ambiguous and therefore open to multiple interpretations.3 As a result, cognitive psychological explanations posit that officials will use cognitive shortcuts in order to reduce complexity.4 As this involves filtering out information that does fit with their existing views, doing so may lead to misperceptions. 1 See David Edelstein, “Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs About Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers,” Security Studies 12, 1 (Autumn 2002). 2 See Andrew Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other,” Security Studies 7, 1 (Autumn 1997); Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19, 3 (Winter 1994/1995); and James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, 1 (February 1997). 3 Brian C. Rathbun, “Uncertain About Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 51, 3 (September 2007): 534. 4 See Deborah Welch Larson “The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision Making,” 15, 1 (1994); James Goldgeier, “Psychology and Security,” Security Studies, 6, 4 (Summer 1997); Janice Gross Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat,” Political Psychology 9, 2 (1988); Richard 2 While scholars of international relations have therefore offered a variety of explanations regarding how states send each other signals and how they perceive each other’s intentions, these theories often assume unitary actors. Much of the literature is also primarily focused on signaling and perception during crises and is thus less relevant to the perception of long-term security intentions. Additionally, the possibility of multiple competing signals being sent and perceived at the same time is often neglected. This constitutes a serious lacuna in the existing literature. This dissertation therefore contributes to a more fine-grained understanding of how intentions are perceived in the field of international

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