The George W. Bush Administration Perceived: Chinese Security Elites’ Views of U.S. Security Policy Toward China
By Lance Noble
B.A. in Political Science, December 2002, Simon Fraser University M.A. in Political Science, August 2006, The University of British Columbia
A Dissertation submitted to
The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
January 31, 2014
Dissertation directed by
David Shambaugh Professor of Political Science and International Affairs
The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Lance Noble has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy as of November 19, 2013. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.
The George W. Bush Administration Perceived: Chinese Security Elites’ Views of U.S. Security Policy Toward China
Lance Noble
Dissertation Research Committee:
David Shambaugh, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Director
James Lebovic, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member
Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs, Committee Member
ii
© Copyright 2014 by Lance Noble All rights reserved
iii Dedication
I would like to thank my advisor Professor David Shambaugh for his guidance during the six years I spent working on my PhD., for helping to make arrangements for my fieldwork, and for the opportunity to benefit from his expertise on my research topic.
I would like to thank Professor James Lebovic for keeping me theoretically grounded and for his much-appreciated encouragement during the always-challenging process of researching and writing a dissertation. I would like to thank Professor Robert Sutter for his unceasingly gentlemanly advice and for sharing the insights into Chinese foreign policy that he has developed as both a scholar and a practitioner.
I would like to thank the School of International Studies at Renmin University for hosting me as a visiting scholar during my year of fieldwork and Professor Jin Canrong for generously helping me to contact research subjects, many of whom I would not have been able to access on my own. I would also like to acknowledge the generous funding that I received from the Canada-China Scholars’ Exchange Program for my field research and from the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at GW for three Summers of language studies in Taipei and Beijing.
Lastly, I would like to thank my parents, George and Leigh-Jane Noble, for instilling a love of learning and reading in me from a young age and my friends and classmates for providing me with a stimulating academic environment that offered me unlimited opportunities to learn from debate and the sharing of ideas. I could not have done this without all of you!
iv Abstract of Dissertation
The George W. Bush Administration Perceived: Chinese Security Elites’ Views of U.S. Security Policy Toward China
This dissertation evaluates how Chinese security and foreign policy elites perceived the signals sent by the two components of the George W. Bush administration’s hedging policy toward China, engagement and balancing. It argues that
Chinese security elites’ perceptions can be categorized into four schools of thought: the
Malign Containers, the Pragmatic Hegemonists, the Evolutionists, and the New Thinkers.
It argues that the existence of these four schools of thought, and the changes that took place in Chinese security perceptions over time, support the argument made by cognitive psychological theories that signals are filtered through preexisting perceptions. It therefore presents a challenge to the argument made by offensive realism that state interactions are determined by the balance of power and that signals do not matter. It also presents a challenge to the argument made by defensive realism and rationalism that information speaks for itself and states can clearly express their intentions to each other through “costly signaling.”
The dissertation evaluates U.S. policy, the role that U.S. friends and allies in the region played in it, and Chinese security elites’ perceptions as expressed through published academic materials and interviews.
v Table of Contents
Dedication………………………………………………………………………………...iv
Abstract of Dissertation…………………………………………………………………...v
Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………1
Chapter 2: Literature Review…………………………………………………………….18
Chapter 3: Timeline of Sino-American Security Relations, 2000-2008………………....57
Chapter 4: U.S. Security Policy Toward China……………………………………...…109
Chapter 5: Friends and Allies Perception of and Cooperation With U.S. Policy………188
Chapter 6: Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Security Policy……………………………….266
Chapter 7: Conclusions…………………………………………………………………418
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………434
Appendix: U.S. Interview Subjects…………………………………………………….479
vi Chapter 1
Introduction
Research Question
Can states meaningfully signal their strategic intentions and policies to each other?
If so, what determines whether recipients correctly identify signals and whether or not they perceive their meanings accurately? Are changes in signals over time appreciated, or do past perceptions produce misinterpretation? How are signals sent indirectly through relations with friends and allies perceived? These questions are highly salient to how states understand and respond to each other, and whether or not they are able to cooperate; avoid conflict; and craft appropriate policies.
The specific empirical puzzle to be addressed by this dissertation is: How did
Chinese security elites perceive the signals sent by the twin strategic components of the
George W. Bush administration’s hedging strategy toward China, engagement and balancing, and changes in U.S. policy toward China during the period of 2001-2009? As
Sino-American security relations encompass a wide variety of issues; exhibit a complex mix of cooperation and discord; and important changes in American policy took place during the George Bush administration, it is an ideal dyad with which to answer these questions.
Offensive and defensive realists and rationalists view the manner in which signals will be perceived as clear and predictable. Offensive realism argues that signaling is not important due to the fact that intentions will change in line with power capabilities. As a result, signals that are sent today do not provide any credible information regarding a
1 state’s future intentions.1 Defensive realism argues that states can use their military postures to credibly signal their intentions to each other. As doing so successfully will allow them to avoid the costs involved in unnecessary competition, and will make them more secure due to the fact that they can direct these resources toward more pressing security challenges, they will also have significant incentives to attempt to signal their intentions in this fashion.
Rationalism similarly posits that the signaling and perception of intentions is not problematic due to the fact that the meanings of signals are clear and they are not open to multiple interpretations. Careful evaluation of the signals that other states send regarding their intentions can therefore lead to objective understandings of intentions.2
In contrast, cognitive psychological explanations view the information that states receive regarding each other’s intentions as ambiguous and therefore open to multiple interpretations.3 As a result, cognitive psychological explanations posit that officials will use cognitive shortcuts in order to reduce complexity.4 As this involves filtering out information that does fit with their existing views, doing so may lead to misperceptions.
1 See David Edelstein, “Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs About Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers,” Security Studies 12, 1 (Autumn 2002). 2 See Andrew Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other,” Security Studies 7, 1 (Autumn 1997); Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19, 3 (Winter 1994/1995); and James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, 1 (February 1997). 3 Brian C. Rathbun, “Uncertain About Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 51, 3 (September 2007): 534. 4 See Deborah Welch Larson “The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision Making,” 15, 1 (1994); James Goldgeier, “Psychology and Security,” Security Studies, 6, 4 (Summer 1997); Janice Gross Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat,” Political Psychology 9, 2 (1988); Richard
2 While scholars of international relations have therefore offered a variety of explanations regarding how states send each other signals and how they perceive each other’s intentions, these theories often assume unitary actors. Much of the literature is also primarily focused on signaling and perception during crises and is thus less relevant to the perception of long-term security intentions. Additionally, the possibility of multiple competing signals being sent and perceived at the same time is often neglected. This constitutes a serious lacuna in the existing literature.
This dissertation therefore contributes to a more fine-grained understanding of how intentions are perceived in the field of international security. Answering this question will necessitate asking several more specific questions such as:
1. When states simultaneously receive multiple signals, what determines which one they hold to be credible? Do they pay attention to the most hostile one? Do they split the difference? Do they disregard both and conclude that they amount to little more than noise?
2. Do the received signals lead states to form perceptions of the state sending signals? If so, how do these impressions resist challenges to their validity?
3. How important are signals sent by security relations with friends and allies? Are these signals perceived as more or less credible than signals that are sent directly?
Hermann, “The Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution: A Strategy for Drawing Inferences About Perception.” International Studies Quarterly Drawing Inferences About Perception,” International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988); Robert Axelrod, “Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition,” The American Political Science Review 67, 4 (December 1973); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, “Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images,” In Political Psychology Kristen Renwick Monroe, Ed. (London: Psychology Press, 2001).
3 The dual nature of the George Bush administration’s policy is attributable to the fact that as China’s power capabilities rapidly expanded during the period of 2001-2009, the U.S. attempted to dispel mistrust and to promote cooperation in areas of mutual concern by engaging China through dialogues and exchanges. At the same time, due to uncertainties regarding China’s long-term intentions, the U.S. also balanced against the possibility that it would seek to challenge American interests by strengthening its alliances in Asia; developing weapon systems; and changing its regional military posture.
Simply put, by enhancing communication and exchanges the U.S. worked toward the best possible outcome while simultaneously planning for the worst by balancing against
China’s power capabilities.
This approach could only be expected to work if Chinese security elites accurately perceived U.S. goals and intentions. If instead they solely focused on signals sent by balancing and concluded that the U.S. was treating China like an enemy, then U.S. security policy could not be expected to produce positive reactions. Alternately, if in a far less likely scenario, Chinese security elites focused on the cooperative signals sent by engagement and discounted the importance of hedging, they may have doubted U.S. resolve to defend its interests and responded accordingly. This dissertation therefore seeks to evaluate the different schools of thought among Chinese security elites regarding
U.S. intentions and which signals they viewed as important.
Sino-American Security Relations
The well-documented importance of U.S. foreign policy to China’s security and position in the international security order ensures that Sino-American security relations
4 constitute an important case of signaling and perception. Furthermore, the fact that their security relations involve a wide range of issues where they often have different interests and understandings ensures that the ability to send clear and credible signals would be highly significant to their ability to pursue their interests. Additionally, the manner in which China interpreted signals sent by the George Bush administration is also of particular interest due to the fact that it was often explicit with regard to the fact that there were two components to its China policy.
An important literature already exists on Chinese perceptions of the U.S. government and society.5 This scholarship has identified improvement in the accuracy of
Chinese perceptions over time as Chinese officials and scholars have had more regular interactions with their American counterparts and the outside world more broadly. While recent research has begun to examine Chinese perceptions during the 21st Century,6 this literature is largely focused on the 1970s through the 1990s. As China took on an increasingly important role in international relations during the period of the George
Bush administration and expanding Chinese capabilities rendered Sino-American security
5 See Stephen Levine, “Perceptions and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, David Shambaugh and Thomas Robinson, Eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000); Phillip Saunders, “China’s America Watches: Changing Attitudes Towards the U.S,” China Quarterly 161 (March 2000); David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); Wang Feiling and Yong Deng, Eds., In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999); Wang Jianwei, Limited Adversaries: Post-Cold War Sino-American Mutual Images (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Zhang Biwu, Chinese Perception of the U.S.: An Exploration of China’s Foreign Policy Motivations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011). 6 Zhu Liqun, “China’s Foreign Policy Debates,” Challiot Papers (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, September 2010).
5 relations more important, this dissertation will also contribute to the literature on Sino-
American security relations by examining Chinese perceptions during the Bush years.
As China continues to play an increasingly important role in international security and international political economy, ongoing academic and policy debates have also taken place regarding the direction of Sino-American security relations and the strategic approach that will best enable the U.S. to both manage China’s rise and defend its interests.7 Some scholars see conflict as an inevitable result of China’s growing capabilities and therefore promote a muscular policy. Scholars who posit that states shape their policies toward each other solely on the basis of power capabilities also discount the importance of signals due to the fact that intentions can be expected to change in line with these capabilities. As a result, attempting to signal a particular approach toward bilateral relations will not lead to a different response from China. According to this line of thinking, enhanced communication and attempts to build trust will not produce a fundamentally different relationship.
Other scholars posit that the future of bilateral relations is indeterminate and that a hardline approach would lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy.8 U.S. policy toward China is therefore viewed as playing an important role in shaping how it perceives U.S. intentions, and as shaping China’s security policy. As a result, correctly perceived, cooperative
American signals can be expected to open up the possibility of better understanding and improvements in Sino-American security relations.
7 For example, see John Mearsheimer and Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy January 5, 2005. 8 Joseph Nye, “The Case for Deep Engagement,” Foreign Affairs 74, 4 (July 1995).
6 Regardless of whether it is argued that an unyielding policy will lead to a more cooperative response from China, or that such a policy would create more conflict and that a more balanced approach will be conducive to trust and cooperation, scholars make implicit assumptions about whether China’s perceptions of American policy matter.
Scholars that do view these perceptions as important also make arguments about the influence that they will have on China’s response and the direction of bilateral security relations. At the very least, scholars who believe that the perceptions of Chinese analysts matter, implicitly assume that an objective evaluation of comparative power capabilities is not the sole factor that shapes China’s response. The argument that a more cooperative policy will lead to a positive response from China or that a tough policy will convince it to act more cooperatively also assumes that China will correctly perceive the signals that are sent by U.S. policy. If instead it focuses solely on America’s capabilities and discounts any signals that it is sent, then these different policy options cannot be expected to produce their desired responses.
Hypotheses
This dissertation will therefore contribute to the debate regarding which theories of perception have the most explanatory power and the best approach toward managing
Sino-American security relations. In order to do so, it will test the following hypotheses:
H1 (Null Hypothesis, Offensive Realism) If Chinese analysts believe that power
capabilities alone determine U.S. policy and shape intentions, they will not
7 perceive signals as important and therefore will not dedicate significant resources
to interpreting them.
H2 (Defensive Realism/Rationalism) As the intended meanings of signals are
clear and are not open to multiple interpretations, over time a consensus will
emerge among Chinese analysts regarding their meaning.
H3 (Cognitive Psychological) As Chinese analysts’ existing perceptions and
cognitive shortcuts shape how signals are perceived, security elites who are
predisposed toward seeing U.S. policy as stable will discount new information
while those who are predisposed to appreciate changes will update their
understandings of U.S. intentions.
Argument
The purpose of these hypotheses is to answer the empirical puzzle posed by this dissertation: How did China perceive the signals sent by the twin strategic components of the George Bush administration’s hedging policy toward China, engagement and balancing, and changes in U.S. policy toward China during the period of 2001-2009?
Offensive realism’s argument that states are dedicated to maximizing their comparative power capabilities and that their behavior reflects their current position in the international system leads it to conclude that states will not consider signals to be an important source of information regarding each other’s intentions. As previously mentioned, this is due to the fact that a change in the current balance of power can be expected to produce a change in intentions. It therefore follows that China will not
8 dedicate significant resources to evaluating U.S. intentions and will focus on enhancing its own capabilities. Factors like the balance between the advantages afforded by a military posture geared toward the offense or the defense are therefore largely irrelevant.
This dissertation argues that H1 is unable to account for Chinese perceptions of the George Bush administration’s policy. Ultimately, comparative power capabilities cannot fully account for how Chinese analysts perceived signals from the U.S. As during the period of 2001-2009 the U.S. possessed the capabilities necessary to pursue the policy of its choice, this explanation is indeterminate. In a security relationship as complex as the one that existed between the U.S. and China during this period, there were also areas of both shared and conflicting interests and cooperation and discord. Furthermore, if an evaluation of power capabilities provided a sufficient explanation of how U.S. intentions were perceived, than perceptions of U.S. intentions would be expected to change as the bilateral balance of power shifted and a consensus would be expected to emerge among
Chinese security elites. In reality, the opposite happened as multiple schools of thought continued to contend and the domestic debate came to encompass a widening range of views. Some of these schools of thought also perceived no change in U.S. intentions as the balance of power shifted.
In contrast, defensive realism and rationalism present multiple arguments for why
China can reach more benign conclusions regarding U.S. intentions. As rationalism assumes that information speaks for itself and is not open to multiple interpretations, it would expect signals to be correctly understood.
9 Charles Glaser argues that China’s size, power, location, and nuclear arsenal would make it challenging to attack successfully.9 The geographical distance between the two countries also ensures that defense has the advantage in their bilateral security relationship. Lastly, the fact that the majority of the U.S.’s conventional capabilities are located across the Pacific Ocean ensures that they pose far less of a threat to China. As a result, while it is understandable that it wants to develop capabilities that will allow it to blunt the effectiveness of U.S. carrier battle groups, it is not necessary for China to attempt to push the U.S. out of the East Asian region, as its presence will not undermine its core deterrent capabilities.10
As defense has the advantage, a decision by the U.S. to adopt a defensive posture would permit it to credibly signal that it is a benign security seeking state. As unnecessary competition can be dangerous due to the fact that it will involve the wasting of finite resources that could be better spent on addressing more pressing threats, China also had strong incentives to identify whether or not the U.S.’s intentions were benign or malign. As factors such as geography; technology; the balance between offense and defense; the U.S.’s military posture; and the resulting severity of the security dilemma can be analyzed objectively, it can be expected that over time a consensus will emerge among Chinese analysts regarding American intentions. As a result, Chinese analysts will dedicate significant amounts of time and resources to examining these factors as they evaluate U.S. intentions and will conclude that hedging reflected predominantly defensive intentions.
9 Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign Affairs 90, 2 (March/April 2011). 10 Ibid.
10 H2’s inability to fully account for the fact that multiple signals must be evaluated at the same time renders the assumptions made by costly signaling more difficult to sustain. Analysts who are predisposed to discount costly signals that reflect the logic of engagement can therefore do so by arguing that signals that reflect the logic of balancing reveal the true intentions of the U.S. Similar to H1, if costly signals provided a sufficient explanation of how U.S. intentions were perceived, then a consensus would be expected to emerge among Chinese security elites. Evidence that non-costly signals were also afforded considerable significance by Chinese security elites from two of the schools of thought also casts doubt on this explanation.
Cognitive psychological approaches expect that analysts’ pre-existing beliefs and perceptions of American intentions will play an important role in shaping how hedging was understood. While signals that fit with these pre-existing perceptions will receive significant attention and will be treated as confirmatory evidence, signals that contradict them will be discounted. Factors such as the offense-defense balance will therefore play a less significant role in determining how signals were perceived.
When compared to the findings of David Shambaugh, Philip Saunders, Wang
Jianwei, and Michael Pillsbury,11 it is clear that Chinese security and foreign policy elites perceptions of U.S. intentions and American politics have continued to become increasingly nuanced and accurate and that some schools of thought are largely free from theses biases. Ultimately, while cognitive psychological biases are less extreme than they were in the past, H3 is still best equipped to explain how Chinese security elites
11 Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist; Saunders, “China’s America Watches”; Wang, Limited Adversaries; Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment.
11 perceived U.S. policy. This is due to the fact that it can account for why no consensus emerged among Chinese security elites regarding U.S. intentions. It can also explain why the two schools of thought predisposed toward seeing U.S. policy as stable discounted the importance of signals that indicated that it was evolving while the two schools of thought that were predisposed toward appreciating the significance of new developments updated their views. Even though changes in the bilateral balance of power and China’s increasing importance in international security provided the context for changes in U.S. security policy toward China and how Chinese security elites were viewing the relationship, continuity in the perceptions of the various Chinese schools of thought cannot be explained without reference to cognitive psychological factors.
Primary Independent Variable: U.S. Security Policy Toward China
The George Bush administration’s security strategy toward China during the
2001-2009 period constitutes this dissertation’s primary independent variable (IV). For the sake of analytical clarity, this policy will be examined through eight functional issue areas that reflect the two components of the policy: engagement and balancing. It will also examine the importance of the EP3 incident, 9/11 and broader developments in the relationship. This will make it possible to evaluate how Chinese decision makers understood the relationship between the two components and how they evaluated the importance of signals in each functional issue area as indicators of American security intentions, whether they saw one component as more or less credible than the other, and therefore their importance to China’s overall understanding of U.S. intentions. The EP3 incident and 9/11 also provide opportunities to examine the relationship between the IV
12 and dependent variable (DV) in conditions similar to the type of exogenous shock described by the cognitive psychological literature.
The IV will be tracked across the 2001-2009 period in order to test whether variation in the strategic signals sent by the U.S. and the relative prominence of the two components produced correlate with variation in how Chinese analysts interpreted U.S. intentions.
Functional Areas for Analysis
As previously mentioned, in order to evaluate China’s perceptions, this dissertation will consider how Chinese analysts understood U.S. policy in eight functional areas across the period of 2001-2009. Four of these functional areas reflect the logic of engagement: Military to Military relations (mil-mil); the Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement (MMCA); the Senior Dialogue; and the responsible stakeholder speech. Three of these functional areas reflect the logic of balancing: missile defense; relations with Japan, Australia, Singapore, and India; and the Global Posture Review
(GPR). Relations with friends and allies also include the Trilateral Security Dialogue
(TSD)12 and the Quadrilateral Group (Quad). Lastly, American policy toward the Taiwan
Strait is treated as a functional area that does not fit simply into either category.
In order to evaluate the IV, the George Bush administration’s security policy toward China, interviews with U.S. policymakers and government officials, speeches and statements by high-level U.S. officials, government documents, and academic sources are
12 The TSD’s official name was changed from Trilateral Security Dialogue to Trilateral Strategic Dialogue in 2006 at the time that it was moved to the Secretary of State/Ministerial level.
13 utilized. In order to evaluate the intervening variable, American security relations with friends and allies in the Asia Pacific, this dissertation makes use of interviews with government officials and influential academics from the relevant countries, speeches and statements by their high-level officials, and government documents and academic sources. In order to evaluate the DV, China’s perception of the George Bush administration’s security policy, interviews with 36 Chinese academics, think tank researchers, and government officials are utilized. It also analyzes speeches and statements by high-level Chinese officials, and the academic debate in China.
An analysis of these sources allows for a fine grained examination of: how accurately the U.S.’s intentions were perceived; which hypotheses can best account for any systemic differences between the U.S.’s intentions and China’s perceptions; the different schools of thought regarding the George Bush administration’s intentions; and changes in Chinese perceptions over time.
Intervening Variable: Role Played by U.S. Allies and Security Partner
One of the primary methods through which the George Bush administration pursued the balancing component of its security policy toward China was through its relations with friends and allies in the Asia Pacific. To various degrees Japan, Australia,
Singapore, and India were all important actors in this regard. As there was variation in terms of their willingness to coordinate with America’s security policy toward China, it will be important to examine whether or not Chinese analysts interpreted their security partnerships with the U.S. as directed toward China and threatening, or motivated by multiple goals and therefore understandable.
14 Dependent Variable: Chinese Interpretations of American signals
As the section on Sino-American security relations has made clear, there are a number of possible explanations for how Chinese analysts interpreted American signals, which signals received the most attention and were taken to be the most credible, and whether or not interpretations of U.S. intentions were shaped by prior perceptions.
Relationship Between Policies and Signals
For the purpose of this study, signals will be understood as deriving from policies concerning the functional areas under study and as reflecting tactics through which the policies in question were articulated or implemented. For example, while the decision to upgrade the U.S.-Japan alliance constitutes a policy, public speeches about the alliance constitute signals of U.S. intentions in this issue area, or individual data points from a signal that was sent across time. While reviewing mil-mil relations at the beginning of the administration and beginning to revive them after 9/11 constitute changes of policy, the cancellation of individual mil-mil exchanges or the sort of exchanges that were permitted to resume after 9/11 constitute signals. While the decision to pursue missile defense constitutes a policy, the development of the system over time, scale of the system, and whether or not there was an attempt to reassure the Chinese in advance of its implementation constitute individual signals.
Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter two, Literature Review, outlines the various theoretical approaches to signaling and perception. This includes realist, rationalist, and cognitivist explanations of
15 how states perceive information. In addition to examining the existing body of literature on Chinese perceptions of U.S. intentions and how this has shaped China’s policy, it also makes use of the literature on Soviet perceptions of the U.S. during the Cold War.13
Chapter three, Timeline of Sino-American Security Relations Under the George
W. Bush Administration, presents a detailed timeline of the major events that took place in relations between the U.S. and China during the period under study. It outlines the evolution of the bilateral security relationship during this period and examines the meaning of important speeches and government documents from both the U.S. and China and the strategic direction of U.S. policy that linked various issues together in a larger framework. By presenting a chronology of key events and developments in policy, this chapter provides the broader context within which the individual functional areas and hedging can be understood.
Chapter four, U.S. Security Policy Toward China, evaluates the George Bush administration’s security policy by functional area. It analyzes: the overall logic of the administration’s approach and goals; its policy on the issues covered in the individual functional areas; how it expected China to perceive its policy; and changes to policy that took place over time. It therefore provides a baseline against which Chinese perceptions of U.S. policy and intentions can be compared. The chapter draws heavily on interviews with U.S. officials in Washington as well as government documents, academic publications, and journalistic sources.
13 See Richard Hermann, Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy (Pittsburgh, PA: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985); Richard Hermann, “The Power of Perceptions in Foreign Policy Decision Making: Do Views of the Soviet Union Determine the Policy Choices of American Leaders?” American Journal of Political Science 30, 4 (November 1986).
16 Chapter five, Friends and Allies Perception of and Cooperation with U.S. Policy, outlines Japan, Australia, Singapore, and India’s security relations with the U.S. It analyzes how these states: perceived the George Bush administration’s goals in security relations with them; how these security relations were perceived as fitting into U.S. strategy toward China; developments in these security relationships across time; and their own bilateral security relations with China. As a result, it provides a baseline against which Chinese perceptions of these state’s policies can be evaluated. This chapter draws on interviews with government officials in Tokyo, Canberra, Singapore, and New Delhi.
It also utilizes government documents, academic publications, and journalistic sources.
Chapter six, Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Security Policy, outlines how Chinese analysts perceived the intentions of the George Bush administration’s security policy toward China. It analyzes the domestic Chinese debate; the different schools of thought in
China; different responses that they advocated for; and their changing perceptions over time. Chinese perceptions will therefore be compared to the security policies of China and its allies as outlined in chapters four and five. This chapter draws heavily on interviews with Chinese academics, think tank researchers, and government officials in
Beijing and Shanghai. It also evaluates all Chinese academic materials published during the period of the George Bush administration.
Lastly, chapter seven, Conclusions, summarizes key findings regarding how
Chinese security elites perceived U.S. security policy toward China. It also discusses the larger implications of these perceptions for Sino-American security relations, Chinese foreign policy decision-making, and theoretical explanations of signaling and perception.
Lastly, it presents areas for further research.
17 Chapter 2
Literature Review
The extant literature on signaling and the perception of intentions includes a wide variety of arguments concerning whether or not signaling is a useful way for states to communicate their intentions and the likelihood that signals will be accurately perceived.
These explanations generally accept the premise that only one signal is sent at a time and that the state, or government, sending it can be treated as a unitary actor. As the George
Bush administration simultaneously sent China cooperative and uncooperative signals concerning different issue areas, and the U.S. Departments of State and Defense were simultaneously sending China different signals, these assumptions are not in line with the realities of Sino-American security relations during the period of 2001-2009. Nor are realist and rationalist explanations able to account for variation in the perceptions of the multiple schools of thought regarding U.S. intentions that existed during this period.
As a result, none of these theories can fully account for how signals are interpreted and intentions in the realm of security are perceived by Chinese elites when multiple signals are simultaneously sent by different parts of the U.S. government.
Hedging
Before the explanations of signaling and perception put forward by the different theoretical traditions are discussed, it is necessary to explain the George Bush administration’s dual security policy toward China. As mentioned in the introduction, it can be described as “hedging” and combines tactics geared toward engagement and cooperation with tactics geared toward balancing and competition.
18 Most simply “hedging” can be defined as working toward the best possible outcome while simultaneously preparing for the worst. Evan Medeiros therefore describes it as involving the pursuit of policies that “on the one hand, stress engagement and integrative mechanisms and, on the other hand, emphasize realist-style balancing in the form of external security cooperation with Asian states and national military modernization programs.”1 As a result of uncertainties regarding China’s future capabilities and behavior, it involves a mix of tactics that both work toward fostering cooperation and involving it in the international order in some areas while simultaneously defending U.S. interests and taking measures that will guard against threats if in the future relations with China become more conflictual. Hedging therefore rejects the idea that China’s growing capabilities will inevitably ensure that it will become an enemy while simultaneously deterring it from posing such a challenge and ensuring that the U.S. would be ready to respond if such a challenge ultimately were to take place.
In an examination of the security strategies of Southeast Asian states, Evelyn Goh characterizes hedging as combining deep engagement with “soft balancing.” She defines it as:
a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality. Instead they cultivate a middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of another.2
Smaller states therefore “hedge” by building up their security relationship with the U.S. as they simultaneously become more economically integrated with China.
1 Evan Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia Pacific Stability,” Washington Quarterly 29, 1 (2005): 145. 2 Evelyn Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies,” Policy Studies 16 (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2005), 2.
19 As a result, for smaller states, hedging involves avoiding having to choose a side in order to continue to benefit from relations with both. In a later piece, Evelyn Goh also argued that for “hedging” to be a useful concept it is necessary to differentiate its goals from those of traditional balancing and containment. It therefore must also include significant components geared toward engagement and reassurance.3 Hence, it would be problematic to characterize a strategy that was primarily focused on containing alliances with far more limited resources dedicated to multilateralism and reassurance as hedging.
Unlike the policy of containment that was enacted against the U.S.S.R. during the
Cold War,4 hedging does not advocate attempting to prevent the rise of China or a corresponding expansion of its capabilities. In light of the degree to which China was integrated into the global economy during the period of the George Bush administration and the importance of the Sino-American economic relationship, hedging recognizes that containing China cannot be done unilaterally; is likely no longer possible; would consume far too many resources if it was; and is therefore poorly suited to current Sino-
American security relations.5 In contrast to hedging, the logic of containment also assumes that a conciliatory approach toward China would fail due to the fact that it would not influence how it views its interests and therefore would only encourage it to be more assertive. The logic of containment would also view this approach as running the risk of
3 Evelyn Goh, “Understanding ‘hedging’ in Asia-Pacific Security,” PacNet 43 (August 31, 2006). 4 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). 5 For a discussion of these issues, see Banning Garrett, “Strategic Straightjacket,” in Strategic Surprise: Sino-American Relations in the Early 21st Century, Jonathan Pollack, Ed. (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2003).
20 convincing smaller states in the Asia Pacific that the U.S. lacked the resolve necessary to underwrite the peace in the region and may leave them to deal with China on their own.6
In the context of the U.S.’s China policy, David Shambaugh has defined engagement as “a process and a vehicle to the ultimate goal of integrating China into the existing rule-based, institutionalized, and normative international system. Engagement is the means, integration the end.”7 As mentioned in the introduction, engagement can be undertaken through fora such as dialogues and exchanges that promote the sharing of different perspectives and therefore enhanced mutual understanding.
Writing specifically about how a dominant power can best manage relations with a rising power, Randall Schweller characterizes engagement as the use of non-coercive means to ameliorate non-status quo elements of a rising power’s behavior.8 Engagement can therefore be distinguished by the fact that it posits that attempting to work with China as a partner will allow the U.S. to influence its behavior, therefore reducing the likelihood that it will become an enemy.9 The fact that neither government’s long-term policy is set in stone therefore ensures that carefully chosen policy options can help the U.S. to avoid worst case scenarios in relations with China and to reduce the amount of tension and conflicts of interests in bilateral relations.
The other half of the George Bush administration’s policy, balancing, can take two forms: internal and external. Internal balancing takes place when a government
6 Robert Ross, “Engagement in U.S. China Policy,” in Engaging China: The Management of a Rising Power Alastair Johnston and Robert Ross, Eds. (New York, NY: Routledge, 1999), 187. 7 David Shambaugh, “Engagement of Containment of China? Calculating Beijing’s Response,” International Security 21, 2 (Autumn 1996): 181. 8 Randall Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 36. 9 Ross, “Engagement in U.S. China Policy,” 188.
21 works to build up its own military capabilities in order to guard against the potential external threat. External balancing takes place when a government strengthens its security relations with third parties.10 This can take the form of either stronger alliances or closer coordination with non-allies. Doing so ensures that they are able to cooperate in deterring threats posed by potential adversaries thereby making themselves more secure.
While they utilize different tools, both components therefore work to shape how
China understood the U.S.’s intentions, the security environment, and its own interests. If combined well, they would allow America to benefit from economic relations and cooperation on security issues of mutual concern while also guarding against the possibility that in the future China will challenge its interests. Uncertainty regarding the long-term direction of the bilateral relationship; the contingent nature of each state’s policy; and the resulting need to plan for multiple possible outcomes at once therefore informed the hedging strategy that evolved during the Bush administration.
Ultimately, a well-conceived policy can only be expected to be effective if the government that it is directed toward correctly understands it. In order to analyze whether a given policy is appropriate it is therefore necessary to evaluate how it will be perceived.
International Relations Theory Literature
Offensive Realism
Offensive realism argues that signaling reveals little regarding the long-term intentions of states, as their intentions are likely to change in line with their power
10 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1979), 168.
22 capabilities.11 This is due to the fact that all states are interested in maximizing their comparative power capabilities in order to ensure that they are as secure as possible. As attempts to signal their benign intentions will be discounted, they are better off working to build up their material capabilities.12 For example, while a state may signal its benign intent today, if in the future a change in the bilateral balance of power renders it comparatively stronger, its intentions can also be expected to change.
Many offensive realists therefore expect states to disregard signals, as the stakes regarding security are too high and they will not be willing to risk being misled. Instead, power capabilities, which are expected to speak for themselves, will constitute the basis on which they will understand each other’s intentions and resolve conflicts.13
John Mearsheimer presents one of the most famous versions of this argument. In the Tragedy of Great Power Politics, he posits that the fact that the international system is characterized by anarchy ensures that states focus on ensuring their own survival and attempt to maximize their security by working to establish regional hegemony. 14 As existing regional hegemons view the possibility of the emergence of a competitor as threatening to their own security, they attempt to maintain a balance of power between states in these regions. It is therefore inevitable that rising powers will come into conflict
11 Andrew Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other,” Security Studies 7, 1 (Autumn 1997): 152. 12 David Edelstein, “Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs About Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers,” Security Studies 12, 1 (Autumn 2002): 7. 13 Brian C. Rathbun, “Uncertain About Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 51, 3 (September 2007): 540. 14 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W.W. & Norton, 2001).
23 with existing regional hegemons. As a result, he argues that dominant powers like the
U.S. should contain future challengers like China while they still can.15
Ultimately, this explanation cannot account for why states dedicate so many resources toward understanding each other’s intentions. If power capabilities are the most important factor in shaping intentions, and states can be relied upon to work to maximize their capabilities, than determining their behavior should be straightforward, as tactics will be the only variable left in question. Nor will variance in signals sent by different parts of a state’s government be expected, as it is assumed to have stable preferences.
Defensive Realism
In contrast, defensive realism posits that states are focused on maximizing their security. As an attempt by a state to improve its comparative power capabilities may create a security dilemma as others that are left feeling less secure respond, it cannot be assumed that this strategy is optimal for security maximization. As a result, an examination of a state’s capabilities does not provide an adequate picture of whether or not it poses a threat, as its intentions also need to be considered. The security policies that states choose to adopt are therefore partially determined by how they perceive the intentions and motives of their counterparts.
States can therefore use their military policies to signal that they are benign security seekers. Doing so enables them to distinguish themselves from malign actors
15 Zbigniew Brzezinski and John Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy, January 5, 2005, accessed January 23, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/01/05/clash_of_the_titans.
24 with expansionary goals.16 As a result, when the balance between the advantages afforded by a military posture geared toward offense or the defense can be distinguished, a state’s military policy sends a credible signal regarding whether its intentions are benign or malign. As a result, choosing a defensive posture will credibly signal that a state is a security seeker with benign motives. Robert Jervis therefore argues that, “assuming that the defense is at least as potent as the offense, differentiation between them allows status- quo states to behave in ways that are clearly different from those of aggressors.”17 As a result, when the offense and defense are distinct, “much of the uncertainty about the other’s intentions that contributes to the security dilemma is removed.”18
The intensity of the security dilemma is therefore partially a reflection of states’ beliefs about each other’s motives and intentions, as increases in another state’s capabilities will be less threatening when it is viewed as seeking security and not attempting to dominate its counterparts.19 Even when the balance between the offense and the defense is unclear, Charles Glaser argues that states can signal their benign intentions by limiting the scale of their military forces or unilaterally reducing their level below what is necessary for deterrence and defense.20 As no state with malign intentions would be willing to take these measures, they will credibly communicate the benign nature of its objectives to others.
The reason that states can be expected to consider the costly measures necessary to signal their intentions is attributed to the fact that unnecessary competition is
16 Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” 53. 17 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, 2 (January 1978): 199. 18 Ibid., 201. 19 Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” 20 Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” 67-70.
25 hazardous. Just as the fact that attempts to cooperate may not be reciprocated and therefore can render a state less secure, unnecessary competition involves wasting resources that could otherwise be directed toward more pressing security challenges.21
States will therefore be more secure when their potential adversaries are also secure, as a feeling of insecurity may lead them to enact potentially threatening policies. Defensive realism argues that a decrease in a state’s capabilities can increase its security by credibly signaling its benign motives, thereby leaving other states feeling more secure and diminishing their need to take measures that will undercut the first state’s security.22
As a result, states that are security seekers have both the means and strong incentives to credibly signal their benign intentions to each other. Charles Glaser argues that “uncertainty about the state’s motives, or even worse, the incorrect belief that the state is motivated by greed . . . will increase the adversary’s insecurity, which in turn will reduce the state’s own security.”23
Rationalism
The explanation of signaling presented by defensive realism utilizes the rationalist approach to political science. Rationalism posits that political actors are utility maximizers that examine the expected costs and benefits associated with a decision in order to evaluate the expected utility that it will produce. They also possess stable, rank ordered preferences that do not change as a result of interactions with other states.
21 Ibid., 58-60. 22 Evan Braden Montgomery, “Breaking out of the Security Dilemma,” International Security 31, 2 (Fall 2006): 160-161. 23 Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” 67-68.
26 Rationalism therefore begins by establishing the parameters of interactions in terms of the actors involved, their preferences, and the strategies that are available to them.24
As a result, information is viewed as speaking for itself and is not viewed as potentially ambiguous. The purpose of interactions with other states and signaling is therefore to reveal one’s existing preferences and type. States will then use the information that they attain from these interactions to more effectively pursue their pre- existing rank ordered preferences by better understanding their counterparts, thereby eliminating misperception. As states are held to be able to objectively interpret incoming information and signals from the world around them, the possibility that one signal could be perceived in multiple ways is discounted. As a result, different analysts are expected to reach the same interpretation of a signal’s meaning.25
While he makes his argument with reference to crises situations, James Fearon posits that states can credibly signal their intentions by tying their hands (removing options from their choice sets), by way of actions such as public statements that produce audience costs, and sunk costs, such as moving troops toward an international border in order to show their commitment to a policy and to make it more difficult to back down.26
For example, a state that is well positioned to win an arms race that still chooses to agree to some sort of parity will be able to clearly signal that it is a security seeker, thereby
24 See James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” in Handbook of International Relations, Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, Eds. (London: Sage, 2002); James Igoe Walsh, “Persuasion in International Politics: A Rationalist Account,” Politics and Policy 33, 4 (December 2005); and Robert Powell, “Guns, Butter, and Anarchy,” American Political Science Review 87, 1 (March 1993). 25 Rathbun, “Uncertain About Uncertainty,” 536. 26 James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, 1 (February 1997): 72.
27 assuaging the concerns of other states.27 Rationalists therefore expect that the signals sent by states practicing self-restraint will be clear.
As a result, Andrew Kydd has argued that over time states will almost always be able to assess each other’s intentions.28 This is particularly true when states, such as the
U.S.S.R. under President Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership, possess the deterrent capability necessary to guarantee their security in the case that the first iteration of their signal is not immediately reciprocated and their counterparts initially remain skeptical regarding their type.29 States can therefore take risks by sending costly signals that will reveal that they are trustworthy, thereby allowing them to develop cooperation.
Signals can also be made credible by domestic institutions and information revealed by domestic politics, such as executive-legislative relations in democracies, as this is difficult to fake. G. John Ikenberry’s argument that during the decades following
World War Two the U.S. signaled its benign intentions by exercising strategic restraint when it subjected its power to the influence of international institutions constitutes one example of this dynamic.30 Costly signals therefore allow states to reveal their type as security seeking and to distinguish themselves from states with malign motives that would not be willing to pay the costs associated with making themselves more vulnerable.
Rationalists also argue that on the big issues states can be treated as unitary actors and therefore will not send contradictory signals. This is attributed to the fact that major
27 Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” 69. 28 Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing,” 117. 29 Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” International Organization 54, 2 (March 2000). 30 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
28 decisions like the purchase of weapon systems are made at the state-level and decisions made by individual agencies will often require funding approval from political leaders.
Defensive realism and rationalism therefore make a number or problematic assumptions: First, only one signal is sent at a time; second, states can be treated as unitary actors; and third, signals are not open to multiple interpretations. As the first two assumptions have already been discussed, it is useful to focus on the third.
The assumption that signals are not open to multiple interpretations is made problematic by the fact that the meaning of adjustments to security policy is highly ambiguous. For example, the U.S. military buildup on Guam that took place as part of the
Global Posture Review (GPR) could be interpreted as directed at China and highly threatening, or as directed toward multiple undesired contingencies in the region and therefore understandable. The literature on psychological approaches will present additional reasons why the claim that information speaks for itself; can be interpreted objectively; and will be understood the same way by different analysts and decision makers remains contentious.
Cognitive Psychology
The cognitive psychological approach views signals as perceived subjectively. It posits that decision makers are subject to cognitive limitations, which constrain the amount of knowledge that can be gained through learning and signaling. The prior perception of decision makers regarding the state sending signals therefore gains importance as signals are filtered through belief systems, evoked sets, the availability
29 heuristic, and other heuristic devices that may vary across states and analysts.31 Analysts must therefore attempt to make sense of the information that they receive, as it does not objectively speak for itself.
Belief system theory and its successor schema theory argue that, due to the fact that decision makers receive more information than they can analyze, analysts develop filtering devices called “schema” which guide the interpretation of incoming data. While data that reinforces the schema is highlighted and easily interpreted, information that contradicts the assumptions of the schema is filtered out or made to fit with it. This builds on Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance, which states that humans look for consistency amongst their cognitions. As a result, when inconsistency is found to exist, something needs to be changed in order to remove dissonance. This can involve reducing the importance of dissonant beliefs; adding more consonant beliefs that outweigh dissonant ones; or by changing dissonant beliefs so they are no longer inconsistent.32
However, the easiest way to deal with discordant information is to ignore it; refuse to accept it; or to avoid information of the type producing dissonance. This pervasive tendency to produce “cognitive consistency” distorts how signals are perceived.
While the cognitive psychological approaches, cognitive dissonance, and schema theory argue that contradictory information will only overturn the schema when a great deal of it is received at once through something like a cathartic event, the fact that small amounts of information are received at a time ensures that the schema will be able to
31 Robert Axelrod, “Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition,” The American Political Science Review 67, 4 (December 1973); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); and Rathbun, “Uncertain About Uncertainty,” 536. 32 Leon Festinger, Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, IL: Row Peterson, 1957), 20.
30 reinterpret or discard these contradictory inputs.33 This also fits with the argument made by Robert Jervis that decision makers are “consistency seeking” and once beliefs are formed decision makers are inclined to assimilating new information to previously existing beliefs and the idea that decision makers may ignore more conciliatory gestures, finding evidence for their own biased interpretations amidst the mass of information they are forced to sift through.34
While the cognitive psychological approach therefore assumes that preexisting perceptions of other states will determine what incoming data receives the most attention and how it is interpreted, this does not account for debates between different analysts that may have different schemas or conflicting interpretations of signals. As a result, the manner in which a state responds to a signal may be determined by the result of a debate among analysts who have reached different interpretations.35 While this raises the possibility that analysts use their interpretations of signals instrumentally, the fact that schemas may also be shaped by the interests of the agencies that actors work for ensures that this is not a cut and dry distinction. Discerning which is more important in terms of causality is problematic as decision makers may not articulate their goals and the link between the policies adopted and their goals may be elusive.36
Psychological studies on how past perceptions determine what sort of information decision makers focus on; what sort of arguments are accepted; and whether different
33 Axelrod, “Schema Theory,” 1260. 34 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 181-182. 35 James Igoe Walsh, “Do States Play Signaling Games?” Cooperation and Conflict 42 (2007): 442. 36 Robert Jervis, “Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images,” in Political Psychology, Kristen Renwick Monroe, Ed. (London: Psychology Press, 2001), 309.
31 interpretations are discounted is also directly relevant to how signals are perceived. The range of psychological processes, such as the availability and representative heuristics and the fundamental attribution error, which can color how signals are understood, is broad and difficult to summarize. However, Jack Levy argues that work on perception highlights the shortcomings of rationalist explanations of signaling, which assume that signals are perceived and interpreted as the sender intends.37 Instead, prior beliefs and emotional needs lead to significant distortions of how signals are interpreted. Signals will therefore be more effective when the sender understands the receiver’s psychology of threat perception and shapes its projection of images to exploit their proclivities.38
Robert Jervis has been one of the most prominent scholars in this field of study; he has argued that past beliefs are of importance to how decision makers understand the world today due to the fact that once beliefs form they resist change and continue to shape behavior. Once lessons are learned from past experiences, they become stable and resist change. Decision makers also tend to “over learn” from the past as recent and important events leave a deep impression on them, especially when they were in error.
Decision makers therefore have a “confirmation bias” as they look for information that supports their existing perceptions. The absence of information is also treated as confirmatory evidence without considering whether such evidence should have been found.39 Robert Jervis has also argued that states perceive behavior that they believe
37 Jack Levy, “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy,” in The Oxford Handbook on Political Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 272. 38 Ibid., 273. 39 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 274.
32 violates the accepted rules of the game or interaction as highly threatening.40 Their perception of the established procedures of international relations and what is usually considered to be the legitimate rights of other states takes on a high degree of salience as the methods it believes other states are utilizing may be more important than whether or not it is making gains or losses.41
Yaacov Vertzberger has also contributed to the literature on misperception and how complex organizations can produce it. Like Leon Festinger and Robert Jervis, he argues that in situations where decision makers who have previously been deceived face adversaries, they will go as far as to discount confirmed information in favor of reliance on prior beliefs onto which they will attempt to graft new information. If this new confirmed information cannot be grafted onto their beliefs, they are more likely to reject or ignore it completely.42 He also focuses on how circumstances where multiple sub- actors are producing different interpretations that are in line with their own goals and interests inhibits both the horizontal integration of information; “the fusion of information from various sources on different subjects into a coherent and comprehensive picture;” and the vertical integration of information.43
Ultimately, he argues that the interconnection between multiple policy issues renders some degree of misperception understandable. This is due to the fact that in an interdependent world in which multiple policy areas are interrelated and influence each
40 Robert Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in Psychology and Deterrence, Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Eds. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 14. 41 Ibid., 15. 42 Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decision Making (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 31. 43 Ibid., 26.
33 other rational behavior in one area will not necessarily amount to “overall coordinated rationality.”44 Decision makers and interrelated bureaucracies therefore face a trade-off between “process efficiency,” which necessitates deconstructing problems into multiple parts, and “process rationality,” which necessitates focusing on how these components influence each other. This is another reason that decision makers have a motivated bias against taking on the complexity of attempting to integrate multiple indicators into a unitary assessment of a situation and instead prefer to focus on one indicator from their conceptual framework with which they will infer their adversary’s expected behavior.45
However, Jack Levy posits that incorrect estimates of the intentions and behavior of other states do not in and of themselves constitute misperception. The main criteria determining whether misperception has taken place must be whether or not probability estimates were reasonable given the information available and whether decision makers at least recognized the “nature of the imponderables and attempted to incorporate them into probability estimates.”46 In evaluating whether or not misperception has taken place, it is therefore important to recognize that “calculated risks based on a reasonable recognition of uncertainties involved should not be classified as misperception.”47
As useful as these explanations are, they do not provide a wide enough range of cases that highlight how the recipients of signals may consistently discount signals that contradict their past perceptions. Examining how Chinese scholars evaluated the cooperative and uncooperative signals that the U.S. was simultaneously sending, which ones they ascribed importance to, and explanations of why provides insights into how the
44 Ibid., 40. 45 Ibid., 67. 46 Levy, “Misperceptions and the Causes of War,” 95-96. 47 Ibid., 96.
34 cognitive psychological explanations work in practice. An examination of the domestic debate in China and the various conclusions that different scholars reached also contributes to a more nuanced explanation as the various degrees to which these psychological processes influence different scholars, as the perceptions of some remained highly stable while the views of others underwent significant changes.
Power Transition Theory
Signaling is also of direct relevance to power transition theory, which posits that once a rising state has power equal to 80% of the capabilities of the dominant power it begins to qualify as a challenger to the dominant power. A.F.K. Organski argues that the degree to which a rising power is satisfied with the international order will determine the likelihood that it will disturb world peace.48 As a status quo power begins to rise and to reach parity with the dominant power, it will attempt to it that it does not pose a threat. If the dominant power does not find the rising power to be threatening, it will also signal as much and they will be able to undergo a peaceful power transition. Scholars working on power transition theory therefore view the U.S. and China’s ability to clearly signal their intentions to each other and the latter’s level of satisfaction with the system as the key variables that would determine whether or not a conflict would take place if in the future a power transition occurs.49 In addition to a global power transition, this would also be germane to a regional power transition in East Asia, as Jack Levy has shown that the majority of wars involving dominant powers have resulted from regional issues, not the
48 A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 364. 49 Jack Levy, “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China.” in China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, Robert Ross and Zhu Feng, Eds. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 17.
35 global balance of power.50 While Jack Levy also presents other critiques of the application of power transition theory to the rise of China, the important point is that the signaling of security intentions within the Sino-American relationship is of great significance to how well they manage their relationship.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita has also argued that signaling can be an important tool in the avoidance of war. He states that “sincere shifts in policy” used to signal that one’s preferences lie with peace “may be a crucial element in dissuading all parties from believing that they can succeed through warfare.”51
Similarly, A.F.K. Organski and other scholars who have worked on power transition theory also implicitly assume that states can send clear signals to each other that will credibly communicate their intentions. They do not appear to account for the possibility that multiple signals will be sent and perceived at the same time. Nor do they provide an explanation of how the recipient of a signal will determine it’s meaning and whether it is credible.
This dissertation is not specifically about the “rise” of China and the possibility that a power transition may take place in the mid or late twenty-first century. It also focuses on how signals from a dominant power toward a rising power were perceived, instead of vice versa. However, the snapshot of security signaling in relations between a dominant and a rising power that it outlines still offers insights into the signaling relations outlined by power transition theory.
50 Ibid., 25. 51 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), 186.
36 Denial and Deception
An additional factor that is of relevance to all of these explanations is known as
“Denial and Deception” (D&D). James Bruce and Michael Bennett define denial as:
“activities and programs designed to eliminate, impair, degrade, or neutralize the effectiveness of intelligence collection within and across any or all collection disciplines, human and technical.”52 Denial can therefore prevent states from gaining a full understanding of their counterpart’s intentions, actions, or capabilities and lead them to conclusions that are more likely to be incorrect if they fail to account for the importance of missing information.
Deception is defined as: “manipulation of intelligence collection, analysis, or public opinion by introducing false, misleading, or even true, but tailored, information into intelligence channels with the intent of influencing judgments made by intelligence producers, and the consumers of their products.”53 Deception therefore involves an attempt to deceive another state by providing it with information that will cause it to develop a flawed understanding of one’s intentions, actions, or capabilities. Taken together these two components can allow a state to strongly influence how their counterpart perceives reality and to guide its actions in a direction that will provide the state performing D&D with a strategic advantage.
The fact that states may work hard to prevent the release of information in some areas while simultaneously deliberately spreading misinformation and incomplete
52 James Bruce and Michael Bennett, “Foreign Denial and Deception: Analytical Imperatives.” in Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations Roger George and James Bruce, Eds. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 122. 53 Ibid.
37 information in other areas complicates how signals are understood. For example, contra the expectations of offensive realism, this may explain why states dedicate so many resources to analyzing each other’s signals. Similarly, it also complicates the assumptions made by rationalists about the utility and trustworthiness of costly signals. The fact that
D&D is an important element in the tradition of Chinese strategic thought also ensures that Chinese security elites can be expected to search for evidence that the U.S. is utilizing this strategy on issues that are important to China’s core national interests, such as the Taiwan Strait and missile defense.
Theoretical International Relations Literature: Contribution
As the preceding section makes clear, there are a wide variety of arguments concerning the effectiveness and importance of signaling. Ultimately, only cognitive psychological explanations can fully account for the likelihood of multiple signals being sent simultaneously and why different schools of thought reached distinct conclusions regarding what these signals revealed. As mentioned in the introduction, the overall goal of this dissertation is therefore to outline a more nuanced explanation of how signals are perceived and the different schools of thought that form regarding their meaning.
Soviet Foreign Policy Literature
The large body of scholarship on Soviet foreign policy and U.S.-Soviet relations that was produced during the Cold War highlights many of the tendencies that have also been noted by past studies of Chinese perceptions of the U.S., namely that over time elite perceptions of the U.S. became more complex and less ideological. As with this thesis,
38 many of these studies examined the perceptions of the influential elite, a group Robert
Putnam defines as: those who have “substantial indirect or implicit influence; those to whom decision makers look for advice, whose opinions and interests they take into account, or from whom they fear sanctions.”54 These studies worked to identify clusters of opinion, or schools of thought, in what has been referred to as “tendency analysis.”55
As with this thesis, many of these studies identified evidence that over time Soviet perceptions of the U.S. had become more varied and sophisticated as they became less influenced by ideology and past perceptions and the political climate in the Soviet Union became more open to differing points of view than it had been during the initial period when ideology was the most rigid.
One of the foundational works in this field is Nathan Leites’ “operational code.”
He states that this is composed of a set of philosophical and operative beliefs that constituted a “cognitive map” of politics through which they perceived and simplified reality. His framework focused on both cognitive heuristics and personal traits that determined Soviet decision-making. Since Nathan Leites had stated that he was attempting to examine “the spirit of a ruling group,” he also included a psychoanalytic examination of personality traits.56 As Alexander George later argued, the usefulness of
Nathan Leites’ original approach was limited by the fact that it did not adequately synthesize the relationship between the different beliefs about politics, which made up
54 Robert Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976), 11. 55 Franklyn Griffiths, “A Tendency Analysis of Soviet Policy Making,” in Interest Groups and Soviet Politics, H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969). 56 Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe: Free Press, 1953), 15.
39 the code.57 Alexander George therefore largely left out the psychoanalytic examinations of personality traits; attempted to make it more systematic by focusing on the cognitive aspects; and organized it around a typology of belief systems.
In his examination of Soviet perceptions during the period of 1956 to 1967,
William Zimmerman analyzes the special challenges faced by analysts of international relations and the U.S. under the Soviet system. This period represents an opening up as during the Khrushchev era scholars were able to provide more objective analysis of world affairs by first paying lip service to Marxist-Leninism dogma with the secret speech denouncing Joseph Stalin constituting the turning point in Soviet thinking on international relations.58 Scholars would then present arguments and analysis that directly contradicted this dogma, such as recognizing that: Marxist dialectics would be influenced by external forces, the U.S. did not represents pure imperialism, and the non-inevitability of world war in the nuclear age.59 In the process, they moved beyond simplistic and biased characterizations of the U.S. and produced more complex and nuanced evaluations of international relations and the U.S. in particular.
This work’s importance lies in the fact that it highlights both the constraints that
Soviet analysts wrote under and how elite politics and the degree to which leaders were willing to listen to dissent and ideologically impure analysis influenced the sort of scholarship that was produced and how it was packaged for Soviet leaders. The magnitude of the change that it identifies is made clear when its findings are compared to
57 Alexander George, “The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making,” International Studies Quarterly 13, 2 (June 1969): 196. 58 William Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956-1967 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), 275. 59 Ibid., 279.
40 those of the distortions and ideological biases that informed writings on imperialism and state-monopoly capitalism that were noted by studies of Soviet perceptions of the U.S. during the Stalinist era.60
Furthermore, as Jerry Hough has argued, the fact that the Soviet Communist Party, like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), was not inclined to admitting to past mistakes in foreign policy ensured that an evaluation of Soviet policy was far more likely to take place through a discussion of the international situation and relations with foreign countries.61 An appreciation of the meaning of these sources was therefore important to an understanding of both Soviet foreign policy and the U.S.S.R. itself. However, as there were multiple goals regarding foreign policy that a Soviet scholar could be working toward with a given argument, this type of analysis necessitated a familiarity on the part of the foreign scholar with the debates taking place within the U.S.S.R.62
In a study that extended William Zimmerman’s line of inquiry to the 1970s and
1980s, Allen Lynch found that Soviet perceptions of international relations and the U.S. continued to become more sophisticated and similar to those of Western scholars after the
Khrushchev era. He finds that as Soviet scholars moved away from explanations that were driven primarily by level of economic development and class international relations were increasingly understood as “an open-ended phenomenon, with no fixed destination; world politics [were] held to be dominated by states, not classes, and the constituent
60 See Frederick Barghoorn, The Soviet Image of the United States: A Study in Distortion (New York, NY: Harcourt, 1950). 61 Jerry Hough, “The Evolution in the Soviet World View,” World Politics 32, 4 (July 1980): 509. 62 Ibid., 509-510.
41 states [could] be said to constitute a system that is more than the sum of its parts.”63 As a result, their conclusions regarding the desirability of the current system aside, their analysis had in some ways become more similar to Western approaches and international relations began to be treated as a distinct field of research that was far less colored by the narrow requirements of Marxist-Leninist ideology.
Steven Weber has also presented a convincing argument that perception played an important role in why during the Cold War the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were able to work toward cooperation in some areas of arms control and not in others. He posits that this is due to the fact that bureaucracies are treated as “channels through which external stimuli are perceived, measured, and interpreted” and in which policy alternatives and potential responses are generated.64 The manner in which the two sides perceived their interests; assessed the preferences of their counterpart; and evaluated how they should respond to their counterpart’s strategy. This was accomplished by examining communication, or signals the two sides sent by moves such as weapons deployments, and feedback as they evaluated how their strategy was being received.65
Importantly, he also found that states occasionally passed through learning periods during which their decision-making systems “demonstrated unusual degrees of elasticity.”66 These periods were largely found to be the result of external shocks, which altered the received wisdom each side had developed regarding their counterpart’s interests. However, once these external shocks led to new understandings of their
63 Allen Lynch, The Soviet Study of International Relations (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 67-69. 64 Steven Weber, Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 21. 65 Ibid., 79-80. 66 Ibid., 246.
42 counterparts interests, these new beliefs also became set in place and resistant to change.
While this argument is in line with the expectations of Leon Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory and Robert Axelrod’s schema theory, as the findings are limited to one dyad during the Cold War era, it is useful to compare similarities and differences that might exist with the later Sino-American case.
Soviet Foreign Policy Literature Contribution
This dissertation builds on the literature on Soviet perceptions of foreign policy and the U.S. by comparing it to a different dyad, a different time frame, and a different system type in order to evaluate which findings remain relevant and which ones operate differently under the changed historical circumstances.
Chinese Security Perceptions
Over the course of the last fifty years a large and diverse literature on the Chinese elite’s perceptions of China’s security environment and how this has shaped foreign policy decision-making has formed. In one of the foundational texts in the field, China
Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, Allen Whiting examines the decision making environment and argues that China’s leaders were acting rationally.67
This is due to the fact that they were highly reluctant to enter into the war and only did so once they perceived that their national security interests had been put at risk by the
American move to cross the 38th parallel. This conclusion is supported by the fact that, as far as Chinese economic planners were concerned, a major military commitment was not
67 Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War. (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1960).
43 expected in 1950.68 While the Chinese government endeavored to signal their resolution to the U.S., their attempts failed as a result of the type of signals they sent and the intermediaries through which they attempted to send them.
It is argued that misperception by both sides played a significant role in these developments. On the Chinese side, U.S. moves on Taiwan and the Korean peninsula were interpreted as reflecting a grand strategy for dominance in Asia. On the U.S. side, it was believed that Chinese worries about Soviet dominance would ensure that it would not intervene, as doing so would improve the U.S.S.R.’s position in Asia and therefore negatively affect its own security. While the argument that xenophobia and expansionist tendencies among Chinese leaders were also important factors is questionable, this study established the foundation of scholarly understanding of how modern Chinese leaders perceive the world.69
Turning toward the contemporary literature on Chinese foreign policy, scholars have described a disconnect between the security environment that China currently faces and the manner in which it is perceived by Chinese elites. In the edited volume In the
Eyes of the Dragon, Wang Feiling argues that, while China’s security environment is the best it has been since before the Opium Wars of 1840-1842, among the Chinese CCP leadership, there still exists a lingering feeling of insecurity.70 As this sense of anxiety has been translated through the CCP’s propaganda apparatus, it has come to be understood as
68 Ibid., 19. 69 Ibid., 2. 70 Wang Feiling, “Self-Image and Strategic Intentions,” in In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World, Yong Deng and Wang Feiling, Eds. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 31.
44 the national interest of China.71 Thomas Christensen has argued that this view of the world has ensured that realism has remained dominant in Chinese strategic thinking to the degree that multilateralism is understood as another tool of great power competition.72
This may be a result of the fact that Chinese leaders have a more comprehensive conception of threat in which domestic stability is paramount and external threats are evaluated in the context of how they influence domestic stability.73 How China understands the world therefore influences the direction of its foreign policy.
Chinese political culture has also played a role in shaping a unique understanding of the international system. Lucian Pye has posited that political culture has been
“singularly important” in shaping Chinese politics with the centrality of hierarchy, elaborate concerns with managing superior-subordinate relations, and the pervasive use of moralistic rhetoric determining politics.74 He has also argued that the Chinese, or
“China,” can “easily live with cognitive dissonance.”75 He posits that Chinese pragmatism is based on a willingness to hold emotions that others will see as contradictory or incompatible. This is said to be attributable to the fact that both Chinese leaders and followers accept as rational the idea that with any change in circumstances there can and should be a change in attitudes and behavior.76
71 Ibid., 32. 72 Thomas Christensen, “Pride, Pressure, and Politics: The Roots of China’s Worldview,” in In The Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World, Yong Deng and Wang Feiling, Eds. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 245. 73 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 286. 74 Lucian Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), ix. 75 Lucian Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China’s Political Cultures (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1988), 88. 76 Ibid., 37.
45 Due to the fact that it plays such a central role in shaping China’s security environment U.S. security policy toward China and the Asia Pacific has a prominent position in Chinese perceptions of international security and is a long-standing subject of interest for Chinese security elites. This is seen in American influence on core Chinese interests, such as the Taiwan Strait; relations with Japan and other neighbors; and the terms on which it has joined international institutions. It is also reflected in the number and prominence of Chinese scholars of international relations who focus on American foreign policy and the number of Chinese journal articles published on this topic. During interviews, a number of scholars argued that the large percentage of their resources that both the Chinese government and Chinese universities dedicate to understanding the U.S. ultimately come at the expense of their ability to understand Africa, Latin America, South
Asia, and South West Asia, regions to which they have dedicated fewer resources and understand more superficially.77 As a result, there is no doubt that Chinese scholars are interested in better understanding the U.S.’s intentions.
There is also ample evidence that over time the domestic Chinese debate regarding the nature of the U.S. and Sino-American relations has continued to become more sophisticated. In 1991, David Shambaugh argued that, in spite of significant progress during the period of 1972 to 1990, Chinese elites’ understanding of the U.S. remained shallow and severely distorted.78 While important variation was found in the perceptions of Marxists and non-Marxists, with the latter less likely to view the U.S. as a unitary actor and more likely to view its foreign policy as ad hoc, many saw all “U.S.
77 Chinese Interview #36, Beijing, China, July 23, 2012. 78 Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist, 41.
46 actions abroad as derivative of a quest for global hegemony.”79 He argued that this was partially attributable to “fundamental differences in basic beliefs about the nature of man and society that make it difficult for Chinese to understand and appreciate liberal premises and principles underlying the pluralistic way U.S. society, polity, and economy function.80
This relates to the role of the belief systems of individuals, which act as an intervening variable between information and decisional outputs. While David
Shambaugh argued that there had been a move toward complexity and non-ideological images of the U.S., he expressed agreement with a senior American official with extensive experience interacting with China’s leading Americanists who concluded that:
“None of these individuals can put themselves in the place of a United States decision maker; they lack the socio-anthropological training necessary for them to transcend their own system and view the United States as an American would.”81 As a result, there is a tendency for decision makers to see what they want to see and to assimilate information into pre-existing structures in order to ensure cognitive consistency.82
Building on these findings, Phillip Saunders examined China’s America watchers during the period of 1989-1999 and found evidence of improvement in terms of the accuracy of perceptions when compared to the period of 1972-1990. This is said to have come partially as a result of the fact that more and more Chinese academics have experience with and training in the U.S. and that variation in U.S. policy during the post-
79 Ibid., 282. 80 Ibid., 298. 81 Ibid., 11. 82 Ibid., 19.
47 Tiananmen period forced them to reconsider their assumptions.83 However, misperception and profound distrust continued to shape the understanding of U.S. intentions held by many America watchers. This was further complicated by the fact that during this period many analysts did not understand the domestic political and bureaucratic motivations behind U.S. policy and instead interpreted it as part of “a coherent, hostile strategy directed against China.”84 Self-censorship also played a role in limiting debate, as America watchers who oppose the idea that the U.S. wants to contain
China were often reluctant to challenge this view publicly.85
Wang Jianwei has also examined Chinese perceptions of the U.S. during the post-
Cold War period. Much like Phillip Saunders, he argues that there is evidence of further moves towards perceptual sophistication and confirms the movement from Marxist to non-Marxist interpretations described by David Shambaugh. In his examination of diplomats, intellectuals, and businesspeople, he argues that the shift toward seeing the behavior of great powers in general, and the U.S. in particular, as determined by the situations they face instead of their disposition as significant.86 While many of these respondents continued to be highly critical of the U.S., a large number were also inclined to see America’s behavior as “more sophisticated and more far sighted than that of other powers.”87 He also found evidence that the likelihood of a change in perception is partially generational. This was due to the fact that the perceptions of younger
83 Saunders, “China’s America Watches: Changing Attitudes Towards the U.S,” 42. 84 Ibid., 51. 85 Ibid., 59. 86 Wang, Limited Adversaries, 178. 87 Ibid., 179.
48 respondents provided more evidence of change over time than those of their more senior counterparts.88
In 2000, Michael Pillsbury argued that Chinese strategic thinkers’ perceptions of
U.S. intentions were still complicated by ideological taboos. For example, at that time no
Chinese author could argue that: the U.S. would grow relatively stronger than other major powers; U.S. relations with Europe or Japan would improve; or that it was wrong to suspect it of being a greedy hegemon seeking to dismember Taiwan or Tibet.89 Nor was the idea that the U.S. would cease to be a superpower and would become one of multiple equal poles in the future security environment debated.90 Increasingly accurate understandings of the U.S. could therefore not be characterized as completely free from biases and distortions.
Uncertainty about the direction of the bilateral relationship and U.S. intentions toward China as China plays an increasingly prominent role in international relations, the balance of power shifts, interdependence deepens, and the number of issues in which U.S. and Chinese interests influence each other expands, have also shaped perceptions. These linkages serve to bind the two countries together while simultaneously exacerbating friction and increasing competition between them.91 The fact that there are therefore strong incentives toward both cooperation and competition ensures that distinct signals are sent on different issues and the overall intentions and policy of each country can be difficult to divine and that they view each other warily.
88 Ibid., 194. 89 Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, xxviii. 90 Ibid., 306. 91 David Shambaugh, “Tangled Titans: Conceptualizing the U.S.-China Relationship,” In Tangled Titans: The United States and China David Shambaugh, Ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 5.
49 This dynamic has contributed to strategic mistrust. Wang Jisi has argued that many Chinese elites believe that U.S. policy is geared toward maintaining its hegemony and that it will therefore attempt to prevent China from gaining stature in the international system.92 While the examples that he presents are primarily from 2008 onwards, he posits that this continues to shape how U.S. actions in international relations and policy toward
China are perceived. Along with co-author Kenneth Lieberthal, he argues that mutual distrust is harmful, as it produces attitudes that lead to deeper distrust and lower levels of confidence among leaders that they understand their counterparts thinking about the future of the relationship.93 The shifting balance of power and uncertainty about the direction of the relationship therefore plays an important role in shaping how signals are perceived.94 Mistrust of each other’s intentions, diverging values, and interests also ensure that the relationship can be damaged by shocks, such as the EP3 incident in 2001, which further complicate effective and credible signaling and accurate perceptions.95
Most recently, in 2013, David Shambaugh argued that the domestic debate in
China has continued to diversify with scholars examining a broader range of topics. He posits that Chinese thinkers can be divided into seven schools of thought that perceive the world and China’s place in it very differently. These schools include: nativism, realism,
92 Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, March 2012), 10-11. 93 Ibid., vi. 94 For a detailed discussion of how this dynamic may unfold and the perceptions that it can produce, see Ashley Tellis, “U.S. China Relations in a Realist World,” in Tangled Titans: The United States and China David Shambaugh, Ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 93-95. 95 Harry Harding, “American Visions of the Future of U.S.-China Relations,” in Tangled Titans: The United States and China David Shambaugh, Ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 407.
50 major powers, Asia first, global South, selective multilateralism, and globalism.96 As relations with the U.S. remain the primary focus of international relations scholarship in
China, each school also presents a distinct perspective on relations with the U.S. with some deeply suspicious of the prospect of cooperating with it and others believing that bilateral cooperation is beneficial to China’s interests. While he views the majority of senior Chinese leaders and working-level foreign affairs specialists as endorsing a focus on relations with the major powers,97 the fact that it possesses multiple international identities ensures that in its international persona China is a conflicted state.98
Regardless of whether China views the U.S. as threatening or not, Robert Sutter has posited that Chinese leaders have concluded that its past confrontations with the U.S. and other states have not served its interests. This belief has been reinforced by the experience of the rising powers during the first half of the twentieth century. As they do not believe that confrontation will assist them in meeting their goal of economic modernization and development, they have decided to moderate their relations with the
U.S. and the broader world community.99 He argues that this strategy is said to have motivated Chinese moves to recognize the continuing importance of the U.S. in international relations and to improve bilateral relations in order to tamp down the perception that China’s rise poses a strategic threat. This is said to be the cause behind the promotion of the idea of China’s peaceful rise and foreign policy publications like
96 David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 27. 97 Ibid., 36. 98 Ibid., 43. 99 Robert Sutter, U.S.-China Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 176.
51 “China’s Peaceful Developmental Road.”100 As a result, Chinese leaders were no longer willing to raise a number of their stock criticisms of the U.S. from the 1990s as serious problems for the bilateral relations as long as they did not directly influence China’s core interests. It is argued that the Chinese government hoped that doing so would allow it to better focus on addressing the domestic challenges that it faced.101 While this does not mean that China has begun to trust the U.S. more, if this argument is correct, it may mean that Chinese responses to hostile American signals may be more muted while their responses to cooperative signals are presented more enthusiastically. Chinese efforts to improve relations with the U.S. and to reduce apprehensions regarding its rise motivated by the calculation that America will continue to be of great importance for the foreseeable future could therefore make it more difficult to evaluate their “true” perception of the signals that were sent by the George Bush administration.
By 2001-2009 in journal articles, and 2011-2012 in interviews, the distortions and taboos that Phillip Saunders and Michael Pillsbury identified had been significantly weakened as some scholars argued that: American hegemony remained robust or was strengthening; security relations with Japan were expanding; relations with Europe were not fundamentally damaged by the U.S. invasion of Iraq; there were positive aspects to
American hegemony; and that the U.S.’s first priority in the Taiwan Strait was stability.
During interviews, some scholars went further and also expressed admiration for Western values and America’s leadership role. As a result, while there is no shortage of articles that reiterate narrow interpretations and standard criticisms of the U.S.’s China policy, it is reasonable to conclude that the wider range of opinions represented in China’s
100 Ibid., 176. 101 Ibid., 177-178.
52 academic journals represent the true perceptions of Chinese scholars which also informed the analysis that they conducted for government consumption. This supports Wang
Jianwei’s argument that there has been a significant shift toward seeing the behavior of the U.S. and other great powers as determined by the situations they face instead of by their dispositions.102
However, even though over time perceptions have become more sophisticated and less colored by ideological taboos and mirror imaging, no consensus has emerged regarding the objectives informing the U.S.’s China policy, or which factors were the most important in shaping it. Instead, an active debate has continued regarding: the intentions and the goals of U.S. security policy; whether or not these goals were changing; which aspects of U.S. policy were the most revealing; and the overall direction of bilateral relations. Examining the Chinese debate during the period of 2001-2009 therefore affords a valuable opportunity to examine whether Chinese perceptions have continued to become more accurate with ideological taboos weakened further.
Contribution to the U.S.-China Literature
This dissertation works toward an enhanced understanding of the factors that determine how Chinese security elites view the U.S. in the context of their security relations. It also contributes to a more fine-grained understanding of the domestic
Chinese debate regarding America’s intentions and the factors that have the largest influence on Chinese perceptions. Focusing on the George Bush administration also provides an opportunity to bring comparisons on U.S.-China relations up to date.
102 Wang, Limited Adversaries, 179.
53 Functional Issue Areas Under Study
As previously mentioned, the two components of the George Bush administration’s hedging policy toward China, engagement and balancing, will be examined with reference to individual issue areas during the period of 2001-2009. Four of the functional areas reflect the logic of engagement: Military to Military relations (mil- mil); the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA); the Senior Dialogue; and the responsible stakeholder template. As these are areas where it participated in exchanges, dialogues, and CBMs with China, they presented the U.S. with opportunities to shape China’s perceptions through positive inducements.
Three of the functional areas reflect the logic of balancing: missile defense; relations with regional friends and allies, Japan, Australia, Singapore, and India; and the
GPR. As these are areas where it took actions that guarded against the potential challenge to its interests posed by China’s growing capabilities, they constitute instances of the U.S. shaping Chinese perceptions through negative inducements. American policy toward the
Taiwan Strait will also be considered as a special case that cannot be simply fit into either category.
Research Subjects
This study utilizes interviews with academics and think tanks researchers from the
U.S., Japan, Australia, Singapore, India, and China. In order to attain a sophisticated understanding of the logic and goals of the policy of the U.S. and its friends and allies, this dissertation also makes use of interviews conducted in 2011 with a wide range of high-level officials who were in office in these countries during the period of 2001-2009.
54 As directly assessing the interpretation of U.S. policy reached by high-level
Chinese decision makers poses a challenge in terms of access to data, this study utilizes interviews conducted with members of the Chinese influential elite during eleven months of field research in Beijing and Shanghai in 2011-2012. As previously mentioned, Robert
Putnam defines the influential elite as those who have “substantial indirect or implicit influence; those to whom decision makers look for advice, whose opinions and interests they take into account, or from whom they fear sanctions.”103
As many influential Chinese professors who specialize in international relations and U.S. foreign policy conduct analysis for senior Chinese leaders, and think tank researchers are explicitly assigned this responsibility, evaluating the perceptions of this group provides valuable insights into how the Chinese government understood the
George Bush administration’s intentions. The study also draws on interviews with a smaller number of Chinese government officials.
Research Materials
Primary research sources include academic articles by Chinese scholars, government white papers, speeches, and memoirs by government officials. Chinese academic sources to be evaluated include articles from the following journals:
Contemporary International Relations, Dangdai Yatai (Contemporary Asia Pacific),
Foreign Affairs Journal, Guoji Guancha (International Survey), Guoji Wenti Yanjiu
(International Issues Studies), Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu (International Relations Studies),
Heping Yu Fazhan (Peace and Development), Meiguo Wenti Yanjiu (American Issues
103 Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, 11.
55 Studies), Meiguo Yanjiu (American Studies), Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (World Economy and Politics), Taipingyang Xuebao (Pacific Journal), Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao/Waijiao
Pinglun (Foreign Affairs Review), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International
Relations), and Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management).
As the positions represented in these journals are widely held to be representative of the different organizations that publish them, they will also provide insights into the role that different think tanks and governments departments played in the Chinese debate and how they related to the various schools of thought.
56 Chapter 3
Timeline of Sino-American Security Relations, 2001-2009
After George W. Bush was selected as the Republican Party’s candidate for the
2000 Presidential election, a group of foreign policy experts flew to his ranch in
Crawford, Texas to advise him on foreign policy. When one advisor noticed that he had a couple of posters from China’s Cultural Revolution in one room of his home, he commented to candidate George Bush that this seemed very unusual for someone from his background. Bush responded that he had long been fascinated by China and saw
America’s future as closely intertwined with it.1
Chapter three presents a timeline of the most significant developments that took place in Sino-American security relations and U.S. security policy toward China during the period of the George Bush administration. It outlines the context within which the functional areas of U.S. policy that are evaluated in chapter four existed and how they fit into overall U.S. security policy. In conjunction with chapter four, it also provides a baseline against which Chinese security perceptions can be compared.
The George Bush administration’s security policy toward China can be described as hedging. This is due to the fact that it worked toward the best possible outcome in relations while simultaneously preparing for undesirable worst-case scenarios.2 This policy was informed by two overarching concepts: engagement and balancing.
Engagement involved pursuing dialogues and exchanges at multiple levels in order to
1 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011. 2 Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia Pacific Stability,” 145.
57 ensure that the two sides could better understand each other’s views and intentions, dispel misperception, and to encourage China to play a more active and constructive role on international security issues, such as non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Balancing involved taking measures that would both reduce the likelihood that it would rise in a direction that was threatening to U.S. interests and international security while also ensuring that if this approach failed the
U.S. and its allies would be prepared to defend against a powerful and hostile China. As
Sino-American security relations encompasses issues where the two sides have both shared and potentially conflicting interests, it can be understood as a complex mixture of cooperation and competition. The combination of the two components of hedging therefore allowed the George Bush administration to pursue both in different issue areas.
The logic and goals of hedging will be discussed in greater detail at the beginning of chapter four.
The findings of this chapter support the conclusion that, while the tactics that were utilized in pursuit of U.S. security policy evolved over time as U.S. priorities and the nature of the bilateral relationship changed, the goals of policy remained largely stable. Instead of representing a fundamental change in how the U.S. conceived of its interests, these developments indicate that it was making important adjustments to how it pursued them. New forms of engagement, such as the responsible stakeholder speech and the Senior Dialogue, should therefore be understood in the context of new forms of balancing, such as the upgrade of relations with friends and allies in the Asia Pacific and the GPR, and vice versa.
58 Sino-American Security Relations, 2000-2008
The 2000 Presidential Campaign and Initial Period in Office
From the very beginning of the 2000 presidential campaign, there was evidence that a Bush administration might chart a different course in policy toward China. During his speech at the Ronald Reagan presidential library in Simi Valley, California on
November 19, 1999, “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” candidate George Bush distinguished his stance from the Clinton administration’s formulation, which had sought to build a strategic partnership with China. He stated that: “China is a competitor, not a strategic partner. We must deal with China without ill-will– but without illusions.”
Highlighting the importance of America’s traditional allies in Asia, he also stated that:
“Never again should an American president spend nine days in China, and not even bother to stop in Tokyo or Seoul or Manila. Never again should an American president fall silent when China criticizes our security ties with Japan.”3 This stance was also reflected in his foreign policy advisor Condoleezza Rice’s Foreign Affairs article,
“Promoting the National Interest,” in which she argued that the signals Washington sends its “real” partners matter and that “never again should a U.S. president go to Beijing for nine days and refuse to stop over in Tokyo or Seoul.”4 Talk of China as a strategic competitor, instead of a strategic partner, continued throughout the campaign.
After the election had taken place and before its final outcome had become clear, it has been reported that the Chinese leadership was also considering the state of the bilateral relationship and whether in recent years China’s foreign policy had served its
3 George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism.” (Speech at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA, Nov. 19, 1999). 4 Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 79 (December/January 2008/2009): 54.
59 interests. It is reported that in November and December of 2000 a three-week retreat was held near Beijing to evaluate the international situation and Chinese foreign policy in preparation for the arrival of the new American administration. It was ultimately concluded that the U.S. was of first order importance to nearly all of China’s interests and goals.5 As a result, while past instability in bilateral relations and attempts to confront the
U.S. on issues of disagreement had negatively influenced China’s pursuit of its interests, the beginning of a new American administration presented an opportunity for a fresh start.6
Once in office the George Bush administration ceased to characterize China as a
“strategic competitor.” However, actions taken by the new administration still indicated that it was taking a different approach toward China, as it downgraded its importance to
American priorities below Japan, India, and Russia. This was reflected by the fact that, while Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, were sent to meet with their counterparts in Japan, Korea, Russia, India, and Europe to discuss the priorities of the new administration, the lower ranking Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, James Kelly, was sent to China. Furthermore, while President George
Bush spoke with the leaders of over twenty countries during the early days of the administration, including the leaders of some African countries, he did not call Chinese
President Jiang Zemin. Even though it would be an exaggeration to conclude that these
5 David Shambaugh, “The New Stability in U.S.-China Relations: Causes and Consequences,” In Strategic Surprise?: U.S.-China Relations in the Early 21st Century Jonathan Pollack, Ed. (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2003), 1. 6 Ibid., 2-3.
60 tactical changes amounted to a new strategy, they did indicate that the administration did not see a need to afford relations with China special consideration.
At the same time, as the new administration conducted general reviews of foreign policy, several issues of importance to relations with China did receive attention. These included: military to military relations (mil-mil), missile defense, relations with Taiwan, and the U.S.-Japan alliance. As a result of the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, restrictions had recently been placed on the Pentagon’s ability to conduct mil-mil with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and it had also been required to submit an annual report on China’s military to Congress. Due to a belief that relations had become nonreciprocal, with the U.S. maintaining a higher level of transparency and revealing more of its capabilities, and that mil-mil was therefore not serving American interests,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld quickly began a policy review of mil-mil after coming to office.7 However, as some low-level exchanges continued to take place in
January to March 2001, mil-mil was not completely frozen during this period.8
While previous debates about missile defense had been focused on protecting against an attack from North Korea, the fact that the section of the system to be deployed in the Asia Pacific included plans for interceptors in Alaska also ensured that it would also be of concern to China. This is due to the fact that missile defense could be used to limit China’s ability to use the prospect of a ballistic missile attack to intimidate Taiwan and also weaken its second strike capability against the U.S., and therefore deterrence based on the prospect of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). At this early stage, the
7 Shirley Kan, “U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress,” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, November 27, 2012): 2. 8 U.S. Interview #10, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2011.
61 administration also continued to indicate an interest in updating, and possibly abrogating, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in order to adjust to new realities in terms of technological and security threats that candidate Bush had outlined during the campaign.9
When compared to its predecessor’s interactions with China on missile defense, the George Bush administration took a harder line. President Bill Clinton’s announcement near the end of his second term that he would not go ahead with the deployment of a limited system10 created the impression that opposition from allies as well as Russia and China had played a role in his decision.11 In contrast, President
George Bush’s May 1, 2001 speech on missile defense made it clear that he was fully committed to going ahead with the system and that the prospect of opposition from these quarters would not deter him from doing so.12 He argued that the emergence of new technologies since the ABM treaty had been signed in 1972 and the attainment of advanced weaponry by countries like North Korea and Iran ensured that MAD no longer provided a sufficient foundation for defense policy and that the U.S. should develop a ballistic missile defense system that would defend it and its allies as soon as possible.13
9 “Presidential Election Forum: The Candidates on Arms Control,” Arms Control Association, September 2000, accessed September 25, 2012, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/736. 10 “Remarks by President Clinton on National Missile Defense,” Arms Control Association, September 1, 2000, accessed September 25, 2012, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_03/clintonnmd. 11 “Spokesman expresses 'grave concern' over NMD, TMD,” Xinhua, January 21, 1999; Zhu Rongji, Chinese Prime Minister, News Conference, Beijing Central Television Program One Network, (Beijing, March 15, 1999). 12 “Presidential Election Forum: The Candidates on Arms Control,” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/736. Accessed on September 24, 2012; George Bush, “Speech on Missile Defense,” (National Defense University, Washington, D.C., May 1, 2001), accessed April 19, 2013, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/news/010501bush.html. 13 Ibid.
62 With regard to the development of the planned system, the George Bush administration both expanded its scale and accelerated the schedule on which it would be deployed. Diverging from President Bill Clinton’s earlier focus on a short-range Theater
Missile Defense (TMD) system that would protect troops stationed abroad and a limited ground based long-range National Missile Defense (NMD) system, the George Bush administration moved away from the distinction between the two and instead focused on
“Ballistic Missile Defense” (BMD). In doing so, it aimed to develop a layered system that would utilize a ground-based system, an expanded version of TMD, and potentially a space based system, which would utilize interceptors that could maneuver outside of the atmosphere.14
In early 2001, China also sent two groups of emissaries to the U.S. in order to gain insights into the new administration’s stance toward bilateral relations. The first group included a stop in Houston in order to meet with George H.W. Bush with the hope that doing so would help them to reach his son. While three former Chinese ambassadors to the U.S. were sent in January 2001, their meetings with National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage were cut short after they attempted to lecture about longstanding points of friction in the relationship, such as the status of Taiwan.15 After an additional Chinese request for high-level meetings, Vice
Premier Qian Qichen travelled to Washington in March 2001. In a move that indicates that bilateral relations with China were not being afforded special status, meetings that
14 Philip Coyle, “Rhetoric or Reality? MD Under Bush,” Arms Control Association, May 2002. 15 Shambaugh, “The New Stability in U.S.-China Relations,” 3.
63 had originally been scheduled to take place on March 19 were delayed for three days so administration officials could first meet with Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro.
Before meetings with Vice Premier Qian Qichen took place, the George Bush administration also attempted to ensure that the senior Korean leadership also had an opportunity to meet with President George Bush.16 However, Vice Premier Qian Qichen was more conciliatory during his March 2001 visit and received assurances from his
American counterparts regarding the administration’s support of the One-China policy.17
When the Chinese government attempted to use these contacts to convince the new administration that it desired better bilateral relations, American officials argued that statements by Chinese government officials and reporting by the state-controlled media that characterized American actions as hegemonic contradicted this claim. As a result, in early 2001, China also began to significantly tone down its rhetoric toward the U.S. and statements critical of America became far less common in the Chinese media than they had been during the 1990s. As a result, the sharp critiques of missile defense that until recently had been a mainstay of the state-owned Chinese press largely ceased.
During this period differences between the George Bush administration’s approach to Asia and that of its predecessor also began to become clear. Many had viewed the Bill Clinton administration’s policy as evolving into a “China-out” approach to the region, under which relations with China constituted the focus and starting point of policy. The George Bush administration instead developed what can be described as an
“out-in” approach toward China and the region, under which the strengthening of
16 Bonnie Glaser, “First Contact: Qian Qichen Engages in Wide-Ranging, Constructive Talks With President Bush and Senior U.S. Officials,” Comparative Connections 3 (April 2001): 1. 17 U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011.
64 relations with allies and friends was prioritized and used as a basis for dealing with China from a position of strength. This was reflected in the bipartisan report co-chaired by
Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye that was released on October 11, 2000: Advancing
Toward a Mature Partnership: The United States and Japan. Commonly referred to as
“the Armitage Report,” it advocated that the U.S.-Japan alliance play a larger role in the
U.S.’s Asia policy, held up Britain’s status as an ally in American policy toward Europe and the Atlantic as a model for Japan, and supported the prospect of Japan lifting constraints on collective self-defense.18 As shortly after it was published five of its sixteen authors, including future Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz, and National Security Council (NSC) Staff members Torkel Patterson and Michael Green, came into office in the George Bush administration, it has been viewed as highly influential on the administration’s thinking toward Japan, Asia, and
China. Furthermore, the fact that the report was critical of the Bill Clinton administration’s failure to follow through on the security agenda set out in the 1996 U.S.-
Japan Tokyo declaration due to concerns regarding China’s response also indicated that the report’s authors were aware of the likely reaction from China.
Indeed, once in office in January 2001, Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage immediately began to argue that the U.S. and Japan should hold new strategic talks in areas such as security, economics, and intelligence. He characterized Japan as the
18 Joseph Nye, Richard Armitage et al., The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, October 16, 2000).
65 U.S.’s most important ally in Asia and posited that relations with China should not come at the expense of the alliance.19
Crises and Turning Points: The EP3 Incident and 9/11
Shortly after these meetings took place, the U.S. and China faced the first crisis in their relations since the George Bush administration had come to power. In 2000, the U.S. military had increased the frequency of its reconnaissance flights taking place approximately 50 km. off of China’s coast to four or five times a week. After being rebuffed when PLA officers complained to their U.S. counterparts during a maritime military security meeting in Honolulu, the PLA began to more aggressively intercept these flights.20 In spite of protests that were lodged by the U.S. in December 2000 and
January 2001, both the flights and interceptions continued until April 1 when the Chinese pilot of an F-8 perished as he aggressively intercepted an American EP3 aircraft on a reconnaissance mission.
After the EP3 made an emergency landing at a Chinese air base on Hainan Island without previous authorization, a tense thirteen-day diplomatic stand-off took place as the
U.S. demanded that the plane and its crew be released and China demanded an apology, compensation, and the end of future spy flights before the crew and aircraft were released.
As the crisis unfolded, tensions continued to ratchet upward with President
George Bush, Pentagon officials, and President Jiang Zemin, making public statements that served to harden their stances and limit their room to maneuver in negotiations.
19 Gaku Shibata. “Armitage: Japan, U.S. Should Hold New Talks,” The Daily Yomiuri, January 3, 2001. 20 Wu Xinbo, “Managing Crisis and Sustaining Peace Between China and the U.S.,” Peaceworks 61 (Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Institute of Peace, April 2008), 15.
66 However, as Secretary of State Colin Powell and the State Department began to take a leading role, a compromise was reached with American statements during the initial stage of the crisis expressing “regret for the loss of life” being changed to being “sorry,” and ultimately providing a letter stating that the U.S. was “very sorry for the loss of life.”21
While the U.S. did not accept that this constituted an apology, China characterized it as one and the crewmembers were released on April 13 with further negotiations concerning the return of the EP3 taking place in a less tense atmosphere.
After the resolution of the crisis and eventual return of the aircraft in pieces, reconnaissance flights were resumed and the mil-mil relationship was frozen with all activities being placed under review on a case-by-case basis.22 The degree to which mil- mil relations with China was now a contentious issue was highlighted by a disagreement over an April 30, 2001 memorandum signed by Chris Williams, a senior adviser to
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for policy matters, which called for the U.S. military to suspend contacts between civilian and military leaders and their Chinese counterparts “until further notice.”23 After intervention from the White House, and within hours of the memo being issued, Defense Department officials stated that the memo had
“misinterpreted the position” of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in spite of the fact that Defense Department officials had earlier confirmed its main points.24 This
21 “Powell: ‘We Regret’ Chinese Pilot’s Loss,” CNN, April 4, 2001, accessed September 21, 2012, http://articles.cnn.com/2001-04-04/world/china.aircollision.12_1_chinese- ambassador-yang-jiechi-chinese-pilot-navy-ep-3?_s=PM:asiapcf; “Bush Pleased by Release of U.S. Crew From China,” Kyodo, April 12, 2001. 22 Kevin Pollpeter, U.S.-China Security Management: Assessing the Military to Military Relationship (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2004), xi. 23 Steven Lee Myers, “Rumsfeld’s Office Reverses China Ban,” The New York Times, May 3, 2001. 24 Ibid.
67 created the impression that an internal debate was continuing to take place regarding how to move forward with bilateral relations.
Shortly after the crisis was resolved, a package of arms sales including submarines, destroyers, and other weapons for Taiwan that had been internally approved before the crisis had begun was publicly announced on April 24.25 Its significance regarding the current state of the relationship was diminished by the fact that the sale had been under consideration by the Bill Clinton administration, had already been internally approved by the George Bush administration before the crisis had begun, and therefore was not approved in retaliation for the crisis.26 Significantly, the package did not include the AEGIS ballistic missile defense system that the Chinese government was most opposed to Taiwan acquiring. President George Bush also declined to approve the
Abrams tanks and Apache helicopters that Taiwan had requested.
While the package of arms sales therefore cannot be described as significantly changing the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait, during an April 25, 2001 interview on ABC, President George Bush made the now famous statement that the U.S. would do “whatever it takes to defend Taiwan.” In spite of the fact that he also went on to say that: “At the same time, we support the One-China policy, and expect the dispute to be settled peacefully” and that a declaration of independence “is not part of the One-
China policy,” his statement was still viewed as the strongest commitment a U.S.
25 David Sanger, “Bush Offering Taiwan Some Arms But Not the Best,” The New York Times, April 24, 2001, accessed January 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/24/world/bush-is-offering-taiwan-some-arms-but-not- the-best.html. 26 U.S. Interview #11, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2011.
68 president had made to defending Taiwan since 1979.27 As mil-mil relations between the
U.S. and Taiwan were also continuing to develop, U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait had moved from “strategic ambiguity,” meaning that the conditions under which it would intervene in a conflict across the Taiwan Strait were left unclear, toward “strategic clarity,” meaning that it had moved toward outlining its likely reaction if a conflict were to take place.28
As the military relationship remained beset with problems, new developments in the diplomatic relationship quickly began to take place. In May 2001, while the higher ranked Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage traveled to Japan, South Korea, and
India, the U.S. also began to seriously engage with China on missile defense with
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly traveling to China to make the case for the administration’s plans. Following these meetings, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that China would not stand idly by and watch its national interests suffer harm.
Despite the fact that no diplomatic breakthrough had taken place, the beginning of serious dialogue still represented a step forward.29
Secretary of State Colin Powell also visited Beijing in late July 2001. During his meetings with President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji, and Vice Premier Qian
Qichen, he stressed that the George Bush administration’s desire to build cooperative,
27 David Sanger, “U.S. Would Defend Taiwan, Bush Says,” The New York Times, April 26, 2001, accessed January 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/26/world/us- would-defend-taiwan-bush-says.html. 28 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity?” in Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Ed. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005), 198-203. 29 Erik Eckholm, “U.S. Envoy Stymied at Missile Talks in China,” The New York Times, May 16, 2001, accessed October 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/16/world/16CHIN.html.
69 forward-looking bilateral relations. Chinese officials also worked to convince him that
China was not like the Soviet Union and did not seek to challenge the U.S.’s leadership.
While Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan had already told Secretary of State Colin Powell that China did not want to “push the U.S. out of Asia” at the recent ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) meeting in Hanoi in July,30 in Beijing Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan told
Secretary of State Colin Powell that China welcomed America’s presence in the Asia
Pacific region as a source of stabilization.31 It is possible that these assertions may have been directed at China’s neighbors in an effort to reassure them that China was not trying to radically change the region as much as it was directed at the U.S. Regardless, it still constituted a significant change from past statements on the U.S.’s regional role. After his visit to Beijing, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that phrases like strategic partner and strategic competitor were not helpful and argued that the relationship was too complex to describe with a single word, term, or cliché.”32
Outside of the security sphere important developments in the relationship during this period included the fact that the U.S. remained neutral toward Beijing’s bid to host the 2008 Olympics, which it won on July 13, 2001. This was in contrast to 1993 when
Congress and elements of the American media had actively opposed its bid to host the
Olympics in 2000.33 Following up on his support for China’s accession to the WTO
30 “Address by Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan at the 8th Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, July 25, 2001, accessed September 20, 2012, http://www.china-un.ch/eng/ljzg/zgwjzc/t85863.htm. 31 Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, press conference, Beijing, July 29, 2001. 32 U.S. Department of State, “Briefing on Trip to Asia,” July 29, 2001, accessed on September 22, 2012, http://20012009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/4347.htm. 33 Alan Riding, “Olympics; 2000 Olympics go to Sydney in Surprise Setback for China,” The New York Times, September 24, 1993, accessed January 20, 2013,
70 during the campaign, President George Bush also recommended awarding China with
Permanent Normal Trading Relations (PNTR) status on June 1, 2001 in order to cover the period of time leading up to its accession in December 2001.34 As a result, while trade relations with China were also of great benefit to the U.S., and the administration had taken a harder and more vocal line on a number of issues that long been sources of friction in the bilateral security relationship, it is inaccurate to characterize President
George Bush as having eschewed opportunities to cooperate and engage through high- level bilateral meetings with China in areas where doing so served American interests.
Instead, it provided no indications that as the world’s only superpower saw a need to compromise with, or respond to pressure from, China on issues that it viewed as relating to core American interests.35
Shortly after Secretary of State Colin Powell’s visit, bilateral relations were altered by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. As the fight against terrorism became the George Bush administration’s top priority, the issues on the agenda of the bilateral relationship also changed. Likely seeing an opportunity to establish common ground with the U.S., and therefore a bilateral relationship that better served China’s interests, President Jiang Zemin was one of the
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/24/sports/olympics-2000-olympics-go-to-sydney-in- surprise-setback-for-china.html. 34 “Bush Calls for Extending Normal Trade With China,” CNN, July 1, 2001, accessed September 21, 2012, http://articles.cnn.com/2001-06-01/politics/white.house.china.trade_1_trade-status-china- s-wto-normal-trade?_s=PM:ALLPOLITICS. 35 Robert Sutter, “Bush Administration Policy Toward Beijing and Taipei,” Journal of Contemporary China 36 (August 2003): 489.
71 first world leaders to both send a telegram and call President George Bush to offer his condolences as well as all necessary support and assistance.36
Evolving Relations: Enhanced Cooperation, Continuing Competition
On September 30, 2001, the administration released its first defense policy assessment with the publication of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). As it was written prior to the change in America’s immediate priorities that resulted from the 9/11 terrorist attacks, its focus served to highlight the continuing underlying tensions in Sino-
American security relations. This is seen in the fact that, without mentioning any country by name, in a veiled reference to China, it referred to “an [Asian] military competitor with a formidable resource base” looking to deny the U.S. regional access “from the Bay of Bengal to the Sea of Japan.”37
With the administration’s attention now firmly directed toward Afghanistan, Sino-
American cooperation in this area quickly rose on the bilateral agenda. Relations continued to move forward in other fields as well with meetings related to the MMCA taking place. After being established prior to the George Bush administration in
December 1997, it remained an active channel for dialogue during the period of 2001-
2009 and a Confidence-Building Measure (CBM) that could serve as a first step towards a bilateral agreement governing Incidents at Sea modeled on the one that had existed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. While it only made arrangements for meetings to
36 “Chinese President Jiang Zemin Expressed Condolences by Telegraph over Terrorist Attacks on America and Talked with President Bush on Telephone to Show China's Position against Terrorism,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, September 13, 2001, accessed September 27, 2012, http://www.china- un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/thematicissues/counterterrorism/t26903.htm. 37 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (2001), 4.
72 discuss maritime and air safety, and did not involve an agreement regarding communication during crises or the rules of engagement, discussions during the period of the George Bush administration commenced with September 14-15, 2001 meetings on
Guam with military officials discussing the avoidance of maritime incidents.38 Meetings also covered general principles of international law and treaties as well as “principles and procedures for the safety of military aircraft and military vessels operating in the vicinity of one another.”39
As the George Bush administration was now largely preoccupied with
Afghanistan, it was significant that President George Bush still made time to attend the
Shanghai APEC meeting from October 18-20, 2001, his first trip abroad since the terrorist attacks. At this time, President George Bush and other senior level officials began to characterize bilateral relations as “constructive, cooperative, and candid” and referred to China as a “great country and not an enemy of the U.S.”40 In a statement that made it clear that China’s support in anti-terrorism had been appreciated, he also stated that: “The President and the government of China responded immediately to the attacks of September 11. There was no hesitancy, there was no doubt that they would stand with the U.S. and our people during this terrible time.”41
In addition to President Jiang Zemin’s call to President George Bush after the attack, the Chinese government took a number of measures in the immediate period
38 Shirley Kan, “U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress.” 26. 39 Bonnie Glaser, “Terrorist Strikes Give U.S.-China Ties a Boost,” Comparative Connections 3 (October 2001): 31. 40 “Jiang Zemin and Bush Hold Talks,” People’s Daily, October 20, 2001. 41 “U.S., China Stand Against Terrorism: Remarks by President Bush and President Jiang Zemin in Press Availability Western Suburb Guesthouse,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary, October 19, 2001.
73 following September 11 that indicated a desire to accommodate the U.S. and to seek common ground. Actions during 2001 and 2002 included: support for UN Security
Council (UNSC) Resolution 1368 to authorize the attacks on the Taliban in Afghanistan; allowing the FBI to open an office in Beijing;42 participating in dialogues on counter- terrorism with the U.S.; and encouraging Pakistan to join in the anti-terrorist coalition.43
During this period China exhibited a newfound willingness to accommodate the
U.S. and the George Bush administration designated the East Turkestan Liberation
Organization as a terrorist group and begun to show more interest in engagement.
Ultimately, this did not lead to radical changes in U.S. policy on issues of longstanding concern for China. For example, as had been long anticipated, on December 13, 2001, the
U.S. withdrew from the ABM treaty. The fact that, in spite of the new level of cooperation in the bilateral relationship, President George Bush only informed President
Jiang Zemin of this decision hours in advance of the announcement can be assumed to have come as a surprise.
However, as Russia did not issue a strong reaction, China would not have been able to express strong opposition on its own without the risk of being isolated in a confrontation with the U.S. Additionally, as the American and Chinese governments were continuing to cooperate in the expanding number of areas where they had shared interests, it does not appear that this development was seen as immediately threatening. This is supported by the fact that in late 2001 Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan characterized the international situation as “general peace, local wars; general relaxation, local tensions;
42 Elisabeth Rosenthal, “F.B.I. to Open Liaison Office in Beijing, Ashcroft Says,” The New York Times, October 24, 2002, accessed October 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/24/politics/24CND-ASHC.html. 43 Shambaugh, “The New Stability in U.S.-China Relations,” 7.
74 and general stability, local disturbances.”44 This constituted a significant shift from the late Clinton years, during which China had fiercely criticized the U.S.’s plans to develop missile defense in the state-owned media and at international conferences.
As recently as July 2000, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan had publicly stated that:
"We believe this idea of the United States will inevitably support a new round of arms race and will compromise international peace and stability."45 In remarks to the General
Assembly of the UN on September 13, 2000, he also stated that: “the proposal for a national missile defense system that is prohibited by the ABM Treaty is essentially aimed at seeking unilateral military and strategic supremacy, and thus a typical example of the
Cold War mentality. Such a plan, if implemented, will only bring serious negative consequences to the security of the whole world."46 Clearly China’s approach had changed significantly.
In spite of this generally positive assessment of the state of international security, bilateral relations in 2002 continued to be composed of a complex mix of cooperation and friction with minimal evidence that China’s attempt to accommodate the U.S. had led to an American quid pro quo. This dynamic was reflected during President George Bush’s second trip to China since coming into office when he visited Beijing February 21-22,
2002 at the end of a three-country Asian tour. During a press conference following
44 “World Situation and China's Diplomacy-- Exclusive Interview with Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan by the People's Daily,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, December 25, 2001, accessed September 23, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/wjbz/2461/t14072.htm. 45 Doug Struck, “Asian Forum Ends in Criticism of U.S. Missile Defense Plan,” The Washington Post, July 30, 2000. 46 Tang Jiaxuan, “Remarks,” Agenda Item #9- General Debate, General Assembly Session, Meeting 12, accessed October 11, 2012, http://www.undemocracy.com/generalassembly_55/meeting_12.
75 meetings, President Jiang Zemin talked about moving the constructive and cooperative relationship forward with President George Bush adding that talks had been “candid.”47
However, during his weekly radio address to the nation before his trip he had referred to Taiwan as a notable friend in the region and equated it with the Philippines, a formal ally.48 During a speech at Tsinghua University in Beijing he stated that: “I am anxious that there be a peaceful resolution that's going to require both parties to come to a solution. And that's what I mean by peaceful dialogue. And I hope it happens in my life time and I hope it happens in yours.”49 He also stated that: “We have also sent the same message that there should be no provocation by either party for a peaceful dialogue.”50
At the same time, he also referred to the importance of the Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA) that requires the U.S. to maintain sufficient forces in the Asia Pacific to defend
Taiwan and stated that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if it were provoked. While he did express his support for the One-China policy in later meetings, no public mention of the
Three Communiqués that the Chinese government views as the foundation of the bilateral relationship was made. As he also declined to repeat President Bill Clinton’s three No’s formulation –no independence for Taiwan; no one China and one Taiwan; and no two
Chinas– it was clear that his administration continued to pursue a different approach which belied the idea that there had been a fundamental change in post-9/11 China policy.
47 “President Bush Meets With Chinese President Jiang Zemin,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary, February 21, 2002, accessed January 10, 2013. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020221-7.html. 48 “Radio Address of the President to the Nation,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary, February 16, 2002, accessed January 10, 2013, http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010929.html. 49 George W. Bush, “President Bush Speaks at Tsinghua University,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary, accessed September 24, 2012, http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020222.html. 50 Ibid.
76 Highlighting the timing of his visit, during his speech at Tsinghua University, he also stated that:
My visit to China comes on an important anniversary, as the Vice President mentioned. Thirty years ago this week, an American President arrived in China on a trip designed to end decades of estrangement and confront centuries of suspicion. Richard Nixon showed the world that two vastly different governments could meet on the grounds of common interest, in the spirit of mutual respect.51
During a speech that largely abstained from criticizing China, he emphasized the role that individual liberty, freedom of religion, community, and the separation of powers played in American society. Regarding the hopes that he had for China’s future, he stated that:
My nation offers you our respect and our friendship. Six years from now, athletes from America and around the world will come to your country for the Olympic games. And I'm confident they will find a China that is becoming a da guo, a leading nation, at peace with its people and at peace with the world.52
His statements in Beijing therefore presented a nuanced balance between: praise for
China’s achievements and potential; a willingness to cooperate on issues of mutual interest; a readiness to highlight differences; and an unwillingness to back down on issues where they fundamentally disagreed.
Ultimately, the summit did not produce any new cooperation on missile proliferation in spite of the fact that White House officials had pointed to this as one of their primary goals. China’s indication in November 2000 that it would publish an export control list and cut off sales of missiles and components had still not produced substantial progress, as it argued that ongoing deals would not be affected and had yet to publish the
51 Ibid. 52 Ibid.
77 promised regulations. As a result of concerns that China was continuing to proliferate to
Pakistan, on September 1, 2001, the George Bush administration had imposed sanctions on China that denied it satellite exports.53 Since Secretary of State Colin Powell had also raised this issue during his July 2001 trip and President George Bush had also pushed for more Chinese cooperation during his trip to Shanghai, it clearly remained a contentious issue in bilateral issues.
Further evidence that the George Bush administration had not reassessed its overall approach to the bilateral security relationship was seen in the fact that the Defense
Minister of the Republic of China on Taiwan was permitted to attend a business conference in St. Petersburg, Florida. During this trip, he met with Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, the first time since the U.S. had broken off formal relations with Taiwan in 1979 that the Defense Minister of the Republic of China on Taiwan had been permitted to visit the U.S. Unsurprisingly,
China expressed its strong displeasure with this development and Vice Foreign Minister
Li Zhaoxing summoned American ambassador Clark Randt for a formal complaint that was prominently reported in the state-controlled media.54
Furthermore, on March 10, The Los Angeles Times disclosed a section of the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that allegedly included Russia and China as nuclear targets and outlined the possibility of using nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict in
53 Shirley Kan, “China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, September 6, 2002): i. 54 “China Protests U.S. Backing for Taiwan,” CNN, March 17, 2002, accessed September 26, 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/03/17/china.us/index.html.
78 the Taiwan Strait.55 After Secretaries Donald Rumsfeld and Colin Powell and National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice assured the Russian Defense Minister that Russia was not being targeted, he stated that he accepted their explanation. In contrast, there was no public diplomatic outreach toward China.56 As a result, after waiting several days, during the same meeting with Ambassador Clark Randt, Vice Foreign Minister Li
Zhaoxing informed him that China would never yield to foreign threats and that together these actions were putting in jeopardy the recent improvement in bilateral relations.57
These developments served to highlight the fact that expanding cooperation in areas of mutual interest had not automatically led to a fundamentally new approach from the George Bush administration. At the same time, the two governments continued to engage each other with high-level meetings as Vice President Hu Jintao spent April 31-
May 1, 2002 meeting with President George Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other officials in Washington. This visit was seen as an important opportunity for him to meet with American leaders in advance of his expected promotion to the position of General Secretary of the CCP at the 16th National
Congress of the CCP in November 2002. Highlighting the fact that even the Department of Defense was increasingly willing to engage with the Chinese government, during this trip, Vice President Hu Jintao became the highest-ranking Chinese official to visit the
55 Yu Bin, “Tales of Two U.S. Partners: Coping With Post-Taliban Uncertainty,” Comparative Connections 14 (April 2002): 4. 56 Ibid., 5. 57 “China Accuses the U.S. of Nuclear Blackmail,” Reuters, March 17, 2002.
79 Pentagon, where he discussed mil-mil relations with Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld.58
The complex mixture of cooperation and competition that characterized bilateral relations was highlighted by the a decision to impose sanctions on eight Chinese entities in May 2002 and to place sanctions on one of them a second time in June 2002 for proliferating to Iran contrary to the promise made in 1997 that China would cease to allow this to take place.59 Shortly before Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s
August trip to Beijing to prepare for the upcoming Presidential summit at Crawford, in
August, China published the missile export control regulations and control list that had been promised in 2000. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage immediately characterized this as a positive development and raised the possibility of dropping the ban on satellite experts after American and Chinese experts had had an opportunity to discuss the new regulations.60
During this period, the publication of the National Security Strategy of the United
States (NSSUS) on September 17, 2002 also served to highlight the changing dynamic in the bilateral security relationship, the logic of the “Asia-in” approach to the region, and therefore the fact that cooperation on anti-terrorism had not fundamentally changed the security relationship. The NSSUS expressed concerns regarding China’s rising power while also recognizing China as a great power and acknowledged its cooperation with the
58 “Vice President Hu Jintao Met With U.S. Defense Secretary,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, May 9, 2005, accessed September 26, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/3722/3725/t19099.htm. 59 Kan, “China Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles,” 11. 60 “Armitage- U.S. ‘delighted’ with Relations with China. Deputy Secretary of State’s Q and A Session in Sydney,” accessed September 28, 2012, http://wfile.ait.org.tw/wf- archive/2003/030813/epf301.htm.
80 U.S. in the war on terror. It also stated that the U.S. would “implement its strategies by organizing coalitions –as broad as practicable– of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favors freedom” and highlighted relations with Japan, South Korea, and Australia and the goal of “develop[ing] a mix of regional and bilateral strategies to manage change in this dynamic region.”61 This reflected the thinking that, while conflict was not inevitable and opportunities to cooperate should be pursued, the U.S. should also continue to hedge against the undesirable ends towards which growing Chinese power could potentially be directed.
In spite of the underlying uncertainties regarding the long-term direction of relations, the relationship between Presidents George Bush and Jiang Zemin remained cordial and during the latter’s October 22-25, 2002 visit to the U.S. President George
Bush hosted him at his Crawford ranch. As the agenda for the trip only allotted ninety minutes to serious discussions, followed by a ranch tour and lunch, some saw the very fact that the meeting was taking place as its real significance, as a visit to President
George Bush’s personal ranch was as a rare gift that was usually only afforded to the leaders of close allies like Great Britain and Israel.62 During discussions that addressed the usual issues in the bilateral relationship, President Jiang Zemin also brought up the subject of their “common interests” regarding the Taiwan Strait. While he was referring to stability and the avoidance of conflict, it was a formulation that Chinese leaders had never previously used to describe the status of the largest stumbling block in Sino-
American relations.63 It was during this meeting that President Jiang Zemin reportedly
61 U.S. Department of Defense, The National Security Strategy of the U.S. (2002), 26. 62 Kenneth Lieberthal, “Behind the Crawford Summit,” Pacnet 44 (October 2002): 1. 63 Chinese interview #17, Shanghai, China, March 15, 2012.
81 floated the idea of a tradeoff: if the U.S. would stops arms sales to Taiwan, China would freeze missile deployments; President George Bush ultimately declined the offer.
Following Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s trip to Pyongyang to confront the
DPRK with evidence of its secret uranium enrichment program, and in a move that highlighted the continuing internationalization of the bilateral relationship and China’s increasing importance to America’s foreign policy priorities, President George Bush went beyond bilateral issues and began a strategic discussion of managing relations with the
DPRK.64
Shortly after this visit, China underwent a once in a decade change in leadership with Hu Jintao promoted to the position of the General Secretary of the CCP during the
November 8-14, 2002 16th National Congress of the CCP. In March 2003 at the Tenth
National People’s Congress (NPC), Hu Jintao was also promoted to the position of
President of China with Wen Jiabao promoted to the position of Premier. However, Jiang
Zemin managed to hold on to his position as head of the Central Military Commission
(CMC) for another year.
In spite of the positive symbolism of the recent summit, in December 2002, the
George Bush administration announced that its missile defense system would be deployed in 2004.65 China’s response to this development was noticeably less hostile than it had been in the past. In addition to the fact that Russia’s decision not to make a strong negative response ensured that a hostile response would isolate it in a confrontation with
64 David Sanger, “Bush and Jiang Vow to Cooperate on North Korea Issue,” The New York Times, October 26, 2012. 65 “President Announces Progress in Missile Defense Capabilities,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary, December 17, 2002, accessed September 26, 2012, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021217.html.
82 the U.S., this also fit with China’s move away from opposing American foreign policy as it attempted to maintain cooperative relations.
Early 2003 saw the trend toward more complex bilateral security relations continue as the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). The U.S.’s request that China use its leverage with Kim Jong-Il was initially rebuffed as in February Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman, Zhang Qiyue, stated that: “We believe the two parties are best able to solve the issue peacefully.”66 On
March 6, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan indicated that the Chinese government remained uninterested in a larger role when he stated that: “the most effective way [to solve the standoff] is for the DPRK and the United States to talk directly to each other.”67
Clearly pressuring a country with which it has such as complicated relationship posed problems for China. Ultimately, it did start to play a more active role in resolving the stand-off as it: began relaying messages between the two sides; warning DPRK officials during their visits to Beijing; and engaging in shuttle diplomacy with Vice
Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo visiting Washington and soon to be chief negotiator for
China in the three and Six Party Talks, Wang Yi, visiting Pyongyang.68
Significantly, while China assured the DPRK of additional aid, it also briefly cut off supplies through a trans-border pipeline and redeployed troops along their shared
66 “China Declines U.S. Appeal to Increase Role In Standoff,” Sydney Morning Herald, February 12, 2003, accessed September 26, 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/02/11/1044927601240.html. 67 “Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan Gives a Press Conference During the 1st Session of the 10th NPC,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, March 6, 2003, accessed September 26, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/3696/t18866.htm. 68 “Six-Party Talks Highlight China’s Role,” People’s Daily, August 30, 2003, accessed September 26, 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200308/30/eng20030830_123403.shtml.
83 border.69 As a result, trilateral talks were held in China in April 2003 when the first round of the Six Party Talks began in August. As during this period the George Bush administration was occupied with the invasion of Iraq, it created a novel situation in which it was to some degree reliant on China to help stabilize the Korean peninsula.
Increasingly Positive Diplomatic Language and Continuing Areas of Difference
On September 5, 2003, during a speech on U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy at The George Washington University, and as a result of ongoing cooperation between the U.S. and China on the DPRK, terrorism, and nonproliferation, as well as the strength of the economic relationship, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that U.S.-China relations were “the best they have been since President Nixon’s first visit.” He also stated that: “Neither we nor the Chinese leadership anymore believe that there is anything inevitable about our relationship, either inevitably bad or inevitably good. We believe that it is up to us together to take responsibility for our common future.”70 Interestingly, in contrast to the Bill Clinton administration’s characterization of a strategic partnership with China as a hope for the future, in Secretary of State Colin
Powell’s comments, and talk of the two countries having a “constructive, cooperative, and candid” relationship, it was now presented as a reality that had been achieved.71
69 Xu Xin, “Harmonization of NTS Securitization in U.S.-China Security Cooperation,” Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies 19 (December 2005): 15. 70 “Powell Says U.S.-China Ties Best Since 1972,” People’s Daily, September 7, 2003, accessed September 24, 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200309/07/eng20030907_123883.shtml. 71 Harry Harding, “Change and Continuity in the Bush Administration’s China Policy,” in George W. Bush and East Asia: A First Term Assessment, Robert Hathway and Wilson Lee, Eds. (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005), 38.
84 During this period, Zheng Bijian, the former Vice President of the Central Party
School, began a campaign to refute the idea that growing Chinese power posed a challenge to the U.S. or the international order. Following similar speeches at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Council for Foreign Relations in
December 2002, in November 2003 he made a high-profile speech at the Boao Forum for
Asia titled “A New Path for China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia.” In it, he highlighted the economic, political, and foreign policy challenges that China faced as it worked to ensure a better life for a population of 1.3 billion people that would soon grow to 1.5 billion. As this was its focus, he argued that as it worked toward modernization it would never seek hegemony and that the historical path toward great power status that relied on aggression and expansion was doomed to failure.72 Instead, China had embraced economic globalization and the openness that came with it and its peaceful rise would be part of the broader peaceful rise of Asia.73 The message sent by this speech was that, as
Chinese leaders faced so many challenges at home in terms of modernization, corruption, and social stability, China wanted to deflate the idea that it posed a threat to the U.S. in the hopes of maintaining a peaceful and stable international environment that would allow it to focus on its domestic goals. “Peaceful Rise” therefore constituted a new concept in Chinese foreign policy that was distinct from Deng Xiaoping’s peace and
72 Zheng Bijian, “A New Path for China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia,” (Speech at the Boao Forum for Asia, Boao, China, November 2, 2003), accessed October 4, 2012, www.brookings.edu/fp/events/20050616bijianlunch.pdf. 73 Ibid.
85 development line, which had included a focus on opposing hegemonism and power politics.74
This conclusion is supported by the fact that in December 2003 Premier Wen
Jiabao raised the same themes about China’s peaceful rise and development during a speech at Harvard University. During his speech, he stated that: “the overriding trend of the present-day world is towards peace and development” and that China was
“determined to secure a peaceful international environment and a stable domestic environment in which to concentrate on our own development, and with it to help promote world peace and development.”75
A significant departure from traditional American statements regarding relations across the Taiwan Strait also took place during Taiwan’s presidential election as
Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian continued to talk of holding a referendum on independence. After holding a meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao in the Oval Office,
President George Bush held a press conference that made his displeasure clear. With
Premier Wen Jiabao standing next to him, he stated that: "We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo," and went on to say that,
“the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally, to change the status quo, which we oppose."76 At the same
74 Peng Guangqian, “Deng Xiaoping’s Strategic Thought,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, accessed October 4, 2012, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/chinview/chinapt1.html. 75 Wen Jiabao, “Turning Your Eyes to China,” (Speech at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 10, 2003), accessed October 3, 2012, http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/12.11/10-wenspeech.html. 76 Brian Knowlton, “Bush Warns Taiwan to Keep Status Quo: China Welcomes U.S. Stance,” The New York Times, December 10, 2003, accessed October 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/10/news/10iht-policy_ed3_.html.
86 time that President George Bush highlighted the fact that American support could not be taken for granted if Taiwan were to provoke a conflict, the U.S. also continued to build up the defense capabilities of the Taiwanese military and military cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan as part of a strategy that has been described as “dual deterrence.”77
The U.S. entered into a presidential election year in 2004. In contrast to previous campaigns, which often led to strong anti-China rhetoric, the primary significance of this election for Sino-American relations was that it involved minimal rhetoric of this kind from either party. In the past, candidate Bill Clinton had criticized President George
H.W. Bush for coddling the “butchers of Beijing” during the 1992 election and in 2000 candidate George Bush himself had disparaged President Bill Clinton for treating China as a potential “strategic partner,” instead of as a “strategic competitor.” In contrast, during the 2004 election President George Bush and candidate John Kerry spent far more time debating issues related to Iraq and the war on terror.
One major policy development that took place during the campaign was the announcement of the GPR. After three years of studies had taken place under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s leadership, on August 16, 2004, President George Bush announced that 60,000-70,000 American troops that were currently stationed abroad, including 20,000 of the 100,000 troops positioned in Asia, would be brought home while the U.S. would simultaneously build up capabilities abroad that had resulted from the
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The goal of this change was to be able to “surge
77 Robert Sutter, “The Taiwan Problem in the Second George W. Bush Administration- U.S. Official’s Views and their Implications for American Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China 48 (August 2006): 419.
87 quickly to deal with unexpected threats,” instead of being ready to fight in place.78 Most significantly for the Asia Pacific region and China’s security environment, the GPR called for one third of the 37,500 troops stationed in South Korea to be brought home over the next couple of years, with a lower number ultimately being redeployed, and, beginning in 2008, the movement of 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam.79
In addition to the fact that the move would reduce tensions in the U.S.-Japan alliance, Guam’s status as a U.S. territory also freed the American military from restrictions regarding the type of conflicts forces stationed on allies’ soil could be used for. The fact that it was further away from China and the DPRK also left troops less vulnerable. Its central location was also of value as it is within four hours flying distance of all important points in East Asia. Capabilities on Guam would also be strengthened with plans to station more nuclear powered attack submarines there in addition to the three that had been stationed on Guam in 2002, cruise missile destroyers, fighter aircraft, as well as long-range B-52 bombers and larger-scale rotations of B-1s and B-2s through facilities on Guam.80 Ultimately, the possible redeployment of an aircraft carrier to
Hawaii or Guam that the GPR raised did not take place.
Up to this point, the “Asia-in” approach to the region had already led to a strengthening of security relations between the U.S. and Australia with the steady expansion of cooperation, interoperability, and consultations on missile defense during
78 George W. Bush, “Speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention,” (Speech at Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, Cincinnati, Ohio, August 16, 2004), accessed September 24, 2012, http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/campaign/speeches/bush_aug16.html. 79 Shirley Kan and Larry Niksch, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 16, 2007), 3. 80 Kan and Niksch, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” 2.
88 the George Bush administration’s first term. The relevance of this alliance to Sino-
American security relations was highlighted when during a visit to Beijing on August 17,
2004 Australia’s Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, stated that the U.S.-Australia alliance only required them to assist each other if one of them was attacked on their home soil. Shortly thereafter the U.S. State Department pointed out that “according to the treaty, an armed attack on either of the treaty partner’s ships in the Pacific would obligate them to act against the common danger.”81 While Foreign Minister Alexander Downer later retracted his remark, it did serve to highlight Australia’s potential role in a conflict.
Consequently, China’s director of North American and Oceanic Affairs for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, He Yafei, made statements warning that the U.S.-Australia alliance should not be invoked in the case of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait with China also pushing Australia to review its treaty obligations in order to ensure that they did not require them to do so, a suggestion that was rejected by the Australian government.82
Evolving Engagement and the Enunciation of “Hedging”
Following President George Bush’s reelection major developments took place in the development of mil-mil, high-level Sino-American dialogues, the U.S.’s thinking toward China and how to “hedge” against its rise as well as relations with Australia,
India, Japan, and Singapore. Important changes also took place in terms of the State
Department officials managing relations with Asia and China as Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and Assistant Secretary of State
81 John Kerin, “Downer Retreats on Taiwan,” The Australian, August 20, 2004. 82 “China Warns Australia on Taiwan Ties,” The Sydney Morning Herald, March 8, 2005, accessed September 23, 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/news/National/China-warns- Australia-on-Taiwan-stances/2005/03/08/1110160778362.html.
89 James Kelly were replaced by Condoleezza Rice, Robert Zoellick, and Christopher Hill respectively.
As planning regarding how to deal with uncertainties related to the future uses to which growing Chinese power might be directed continued, the administration also maintained engagement with China on issues of shared interest and potential cooperation.
A special policy dialogue was held under the auspices of the MMCA between the
Chinese Ministry of Defense and a U.S. delegation led by Undersecretary of State
Richard Lawless in Beijing on January 31, 2005. It covered ways to clarify the “rules of the road” when aircraft and ships encounter each other and dealing with emergency situations.83 However, this was complicated by China’s insistence on first settling differences regarding what constitutes international waters and airspace. While the international norm limits claims to twelve nautical miles, China claimed a two hundred nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with the PLA objecting to U.S. activities within this space.
In January 2005, Sino-European relations also became directly relevant to the
Sino-American security relationship as the possibility of ending the EU’s embargo on arms sales to China that had been enacted in 1989 was raised in response to pressure from
China that had been increasing since 2003.84 As selling the PLA dual use technologies or weapons could potentially increase the threat posed to U.S. forces in the event of a
83 “Chinese, U.S. Defense Ministers Hold First Special Policy Dialogue,” The People’s Daily, February 2, 2005, accessed September 26, 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/01/eng20050301_172513.html; Bonnie Glaser, “Rice Seeks to Caution, Cajole, and Cooperate With China,” Comparative Connections 7 (April 2005): 34. 84 Kristin Archick, Richard Grimmett, and Shirley Kan, “The European Union’s Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for Congress,” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 15, 2005): 6.
90 conflict across the Taiwan Strait, the U.S., Australia, and Japan lobbied the EU to keep the embargo in place and to maintain strong export controls. The U.S. Congress also passed bills that threatened to halt technology transfers and to end the joint development of military programs with EU members if the embargo was lifted.85 This was an especially sensitive issue during a period in which the development of Chinese military capabilities and its buildup next to the Taiwan Strait were issues of increasing concern.86
China’s move to pass the “Anti-Secession Law” on March 14, 2005, which threatened to use “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity” if Taiwan moved towards independence,87 also served to further underline the argument made by the U.S. and its allies in the Asia
Pacific that the proposed change to EU policy could undermine the region’s security balance. Ultimately, the embargo was left in place.
Cooperation in areas where the U.S. and China had shared interests also continued to move forward. Secretary of State-designate Condoleezza Rice highlighted this fact when during her confirmation hearing she stated that the Six Party Talks were something the U.S. was much better doing with South Korea, Japan, Russia, and “most especially with China, which is playing an important role in the Six Party Talks and needs to continue to play an active role.”88
85 Ibid., 3. 86 U.S. Department of Defense, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2005, especially 31-32. 87 “Full Text of Anti-Secession Law,” The People’s Daily, March 14, 2005, accessed September 24, 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/14/eng20050314_176746.html. 88 “Rice Hails China’s Role in Six-Party Talks,” The People’s Daily, January 19, 2005, accessed September 26, 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200501/19/eng20050119_171073.html.
91 The Upgrading of Relations With U.S. Friends and Allies
During this period, ongoing developments in the U.S.-Japan alliance were highlighted by the joint statement that resulted from meetings held by the bilateral
Security Consultative Committee in February 2005. Among their common security objectives, it described the peaceful resolution of questions related to the Taiwan Strait
“as an issue of mutual concern” and also encouraged China to improve its transparency in military affairs.89 The fact that there was nothing new in the language of the declaration was overshadowed by the fact that this was the first time that they had jointly announced their stance on this issue. As a result, the Chinese government reacted negatively to the prospect that the focus of the alliance was expanding.90
By later in the year, Japan had also taken major steps toward cooperating with the
U.S. on ballistic missile defense, as it had started operating the common sea-based
AEGIS combat system equipped air warfare destroyer and was working with the U.S. to develop interceptor missiles.91 Under the Washington agreement, the U.S. deployed the
X-band anti-missile radar system in Japan and shared information and coordinated responses with it. As missile defense requires “seamless communication and operability across huge bureaucracies,” it integrated the U.S. and Japanese militaries to a new level.92
89 “Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, March 19, 2005, accessed September 26, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html. 90 “FM: U.S-Japan Statement on Taiwan Wrong,” China Daily, February 21, 2005, accessed September 26, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/21/content_417930.htm. 91 Peter Alford, “U.S., Japan Upgrade Military Alliance,” The Australian, October 31, 2005. 92 Ralph Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: Has Japan Becomes the Great Britain of Asia?” Issues and Insights 5 (March 2005): 17.
92 During the fourth round of the Shangri-La Dialogue on the security affairs of the
Asia Pacific in June 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld caused a stir by highlighting the mistrust that continued to underlie Sino-American security relations.
While it is widely believed that the modernization of the PLA is geared toward preparing for the possibility of conflict with the U.S., and a conflict in the Taiwan Strait in particular, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that, as no nation threatens
China, its decision to enhance its capabilities is questionable, and described its buildup as threatening to the U.S. and Taiwan.93 Unsurprisingly, China responded negatively, with
Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao stating that: "The remarks that China's military expenditure has grown to be the largest in Asia and the third largest of the world is rootless."94 In contrast to U.S. officials consistent attendance at the Shangri-La dialogue since its inception, the fact that the administration’s focus on operations in the Middle
East had recently led Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to miss the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) in both 2005 and 2006 raised the question of whether the administration’s commitment to South East Asia was declining while China’s power and influence in the region appeared to expand.95
93 Donald Rumsfeld, (Speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 4, 2005), accessed September 20, 2012, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la- dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2005/2005-speeches/first- plenary-session-the-hon-donald-rumsfeld/. 94 “Rumsfeld’s Remarks on China’s Military Expenditures Groundless,” China Daily, June 7, 2005, accessed September 23, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/07/content_449471.htm. 95 Brian Job and Diane Mauzy, “U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited Re-Engagement After Years of Benign Neglect,” Asian Survey 47,4 (2007): 633; Tommy Koh, “America’s Role in Asia: What Does Southeast Asia Want From Washington?,” PacNet 53 (December 21, 2004).
93 In contrast, in 2005 there was no reason to believe that the administration’s interest in South Asia had declined. Incremental improvements to the strength of security relations between the U.S. and India had already been taking place during the George
Bush administration’s first term, and the 2002 NSSUS had stated that the U.S. intended to capitalize on India’s importance to “creating a strategically stable Asia.”96 During the administration’s second term, the relationship came further to the forefront when in
March 2005 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice traveled to India and presented a new cornerstone for transformed bilateral relations by promising that the U.S. would “de- hyphenate” its policies toward India and Pakistan.97 In July of that year, the George Bush administration held a summit with Indian leaders in Washington during which they announced the completion of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), a document that covered cooperation in areas like civil nuclear, civil space, and high technology commerce. The two sides also signed a New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense
Relationship, a document which was intended to set the foundation for U.S.-India defense relations during the following ten years with the goals of enhanced mil-mil relations, greater interoperability, and establishing shared security objectives. Writing in The Wall
Street Journal, the U.S. Ambassador to India from 2001-2003, Robert Blackwill, asked:
“Why should the U.S. want to check India’s missile capability in ways that could lead to
China’s permanent nuclear dominance over democratic India?”98
96 U.S. Department of Defense, The National Security Strategy of the U.S. (2002), 9. 97 Michael Tackett, “Rice Begins Six Nation Asian Trip,” The Chicago Tribune, March 15, 2005, accessed September 23, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-03- 16/news/0503160182_1_six-party-talks-north-korea-nuclear-program. 98 Robert Blackwill, “A New Deal For New Delhi,” The Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2005, accessed September 25, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111136460616084700,00.html.
94 In spite of the fact that the partnership was also directly relevant to the U.S.’s interests in anti-terrorism, preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and maritime security, there was speculation that it reflected an attempt by the U.S. to
“contain” China. At this time, the State Department also announced that it would “help
India to become a major power in the twenty-first century,” and that it understood the implications, including the military implications, of this statement.99 A nuanced evaluation of U.S. policy recognizes that a more powerful India that is able to balance against China would provide an additional incentive for the latter to continue to rise peacefully and to avoid directing its power toward ends that would upset the region’s security environment. As one American official stated:
It is very useful to remind China there are other emerging powerful countries, such as India, who are setting standards we agree with. This is very different from containment; it is more about encouraging or shaping China's view of the international system in a constructive way.100
Instead of attempting to contain China –a strategy that is likely no longer possible due to the level of economic integration between the U.S., its allies, and China– this approach worked to shape the strategic environment in which Chinese leaders made decisions.
Security arrangements like this also enabled India and other countries to confidently become more economically integrated with China, as they provided them with reassurance that the U.S.’s position in the region would prevent China from using
99 U.S. Department of State, “Background Briefing by Administration Officials on U.S.– South Asia Relations,” March 25, 2005, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/43853.htm. 100 Caroline Daniel and Dimitri Sevastopulo, “Washington Treads Gently as China‘s Strength Grows,” Financial Times, August 23, 2005, accessed September 27, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/942c6bbe-1371-11da-beee- 00000e2511c8.html#axzz2JEUrcuGj.
95 these relations against them.101 This served to reinforce the process of regional economic integration that also served American interests.
In July 2005, negotiations that had begun in 2003 between the U.S. and Singapore also reached their conclusion with the signing of the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security (SFA). It covered cooperation in counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, joint military exercises and training, policy dialogues, and defense technology. At the same time, the U.S. also recognized Singapore as a “major security cooperation power.”102 Significantly, Singapore had also recently upgraded the Changi naval base, which was equipped with a deep-water pier that was specifically designed to be able to accommodate aircraft carriers. Gaining the ability to use this facility also fit with the U.S. military’s new focus on having access to places, instead of building more bases abroad. These developments fit with statements from
Singaporean officials that shifting post-9/11 strategic priorities had led the country toward a “long-term strategic realignment that will bring it closer to the U.S.”103
The Expansion and Deepening of Engagement
While China is often characterized as reactive in Sino-American relations with the
U.S. having a more active stance, at the APEC forum meeting that took place in Santiago,
101 Ashley Tellis, “Power Shift: How the West Can Adapt and Thrive in an Asian Century,” (Washington, D.C.: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010), 7. 102 Singaporean Ministry of Defense, “Factsheet- The Strategic Framework Agreement,” accessed on September 23, 2012, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2005/jul/12jul05_nr/12jul05_fs.h tml. 103 Evelyn Goh, “Singapore and the U.S.: Cooperation on Transnational Security Threats,” (paper presented at the Pacific Symposium Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 2005): 4.
96 Chile in 2004, President Hu Jintao suggested the establishment of a bilateral strategic dialogue that would include “talks to look over the horizon and discuss the strategic framework of U.S.-China relations.”104 After the U.S. initially stated that it only had strategic dialogues with allies, in 2005 the two sides ultimately initiated an avenue for consultation that the U.S. referred to as a “Senior Dialogue” and China referred to as a
“Strategic Dialogue.” The first round was held in Beijing in August 2005 with talks taking place between Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick and State Executive Vice
Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo. They included discussions of how the two countries could work together and with other countries on issues such as: Iraq; Afghanistan; the DPRK;
Burma; Latin America; Africa; military transparency; antiterrorism; preventing the proliferation of WMDs; energy security; and reducing the risk of pandemics.105
Continued evidence of the more active Chinese stance could also be seen in the publication of an article by the Chair of the China Reform Forum and past holder of senior posts in the CCP, Zheng Bijian, titled “China’s Peaceful Rise to Great Power
Status” in America’s most important policy journal, Foreign Affairs. Expanding on themes that he had introduced in earlier speeches, it highlighted China’s embrace of globalization, membership in the WTO and liberal trading system, and challenges it faced as a result of the need to develop. He argued that the CCP was committed to
“transcend[ing] the traditional way for great powers to emerge, as well as the Cold War
104 U.S. Department of State, “Special Press Briefing on U.S.-China Senior Dialogue,” December 8, 2005, accessed September 23, 2012, http://2001- 2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/57803.htm. 105 Ibid.
97 mentality that defined international relations along ideological lines.”106 Instead of following the path that ultimately led to war that Germany and Japan had pursued during the twentieth century, China would instead “strive for peace, development, and cooperation with all countries of the world.”107 China’s rise was therefore presented as an opportunity that the U.S. could benefit from, instead of as a threat.
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick addressed similar themes when on
September 21, 2005 he delivered a speech titled “Whither China: From Responsibility to
Stakeholder?”108 In it, he highlighted concerns regarding uncertainties regarding the goals
China would pursue with its increasing power and challenges that this posed for Sino-
American security relations. In what some have described as the first strategic speech on
Sino-American relations to be delivered by a George Bush administration official,109 he stated that, while the China of today is unlike the Soviet Union and has chosen to join the international system, instead of opposing it, there was a “cauldron of anxiety” regarding how it would use its growing power in the future, and that these uncertainties “will lead the U.S. –and others as well– to hedge relations with China.”110 In addition to raising concerns related to the transparency of the PLA’s military modernization and other issues, he encouraged China to play a more active role in solving the problem of the DPRK and
Iran’s nuclear programs, non-proliferation, and the war on terror. Therefore, now that
China was already a member of the international system, the U.S. needed to transform its
106 Zheng Bijian, “China’s Peaceful Rise,” Foreign Affairs 84, 5 (September/October 2005). 107 Ibid. 108 Robert Zoellick. “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” (Speech to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York, NY, September 21, 2005). 109 U.S. Interview #4, Washington, April 26, 2011; U.S. interview #7, Washington, April 29 2011. 110 Zoellick. “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?”
98 policy of integration to encourage China to be a responsible stakeholder, and that “as a responsible stakeholder, China would be more than just a member– it would work with us to sustain the international system that has enabled its success.”111 This would provide a framework built on shared interests within which the two countries could manage their differences. Shortly thereafter, the second round of the Senior Dialogue that was held in
Washington in December 2005 began with a long discussion of the meaning of the term
“responsible stakeholder.” Upon the completion of the second round, Deputy Secretary of
State Robert Zoellick also hosted Executive Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo on a trip to Hyde Park to visit the home of President Franklin Roosevelt, one of the primary architects of America’s place in the modern international order.112
In late 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld continued to state his concerns during his October 18-20 visit to Beijing. During group discussions at the
Central Party School and the PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS), he encouraged
China to enhance transparency regarding military affairs as it would “dispel suspicion and enhance stability.”113 During these visits, the defense chiefs agreed to enhance military education exchanges as well as fleet visits. The Chinese government also
111 Ibid.
112 “Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick to Host Second U.S.-China Senior Dialogue December 7-8, 2005,” Department of State, U.S., accessed September 25, 2012, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/57597.htm.
113 Donna Miles, “Rumsfeld Urges More Transparency From Chinese Military,” American Forces Press Service, October 20, 2005, accessed September 27, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18026.
99 allowed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to visit facilities from China’s ballistic missile force, the Second Artillery, a first in Sino-American mil-mil relations.114
On February 3, the 2006 QDR was released. While it encouraged China to emerge as a responsible stakeholder, it also discussed how the U.S. must seek “prudent hedges” while it worked toward cooperation in order to defend against the possibility that attempts to cooperate would fail to prevent future conflicts.115 It also stated that the U.S. would work to “shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads” in order to ensure that they did not develop in a direction that was contrary to American interests “while hedging against other possibilities.”116
Clearly by the George Bush administration’s second term China’s strengthening capabilities had caused the U.S. to reassess how the bilateral relationship fit into
America’s foreign policy and affected its interests. In contrast to the debate that had taken place in the U.S. during the 1990s regarding “engagement” and “containment,” by the
Bush years “engaging” China by encouraging it to move in a system maintaining direction while also “hedging” by preparing for undesired contingencies had moved to the forefront.
Ongoing Balancing
The 2006 QDR also called for long-range penetrating bombers that would be of value in warfare between great powers. While in the 1990s similar announcements were
114 Philip Pan, “Rumsfeld Chides China for ‘Mixed Signals,’” The Washington Post, October 20, 2005, accessed September 27, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2005/10/19/AR2005101902311.html. 115 U.S. Department of Defense, The Quadrennial Defense Review (2006). 116 Ibid.
100 routinely met with Chinese denouncements of “hegemonism,” from mid-2001 onward the
Chinese state-owned media continued to be far less critical of the U.S. and a spokesman from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) focused on critiquing what the Chinese government viewed as promotion of the “China threat” theory.117
On March 16, the 2006 NSSUS was also issued. The long section on China urged
China to act as “a responsible player” and stated that, while the U.S.’s strategy was to encourage it to make the “right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities.”118 Significantly, in addition to raising concerns regarding its military buildup and future direction, the 2006 Military Power of the PRC report also made use of the responsible stakeholder language.119
In contrast to the “hub and spoke” system of bilateral alliances that the U.S. had long maintained in the Asia Pacific, a move toward enhancing communication between allies took place when it was announced that the Australia-Japan-United States TSD that had previously taken place at the Vice-Ministerial level were upgraded to the Ministerial level for the March 2006 meetings. The TSD was presented as a forum for collaboration in security through a more cohesive policy mechanism and was geared toward discussing security issues both globally and in the Asia Pacific. When Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice came to Sydney to meet with Australian Foreign Minister Alexander
Downer and Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso, she stated that China’s military buildup
117 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman’s Comment on the Contents Related to China in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report Issued by the U.S. Defense Department,”, accessed September 24, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t234274.htm. 118 U.S. Department of Defense, The National Security Strategy of the United States (2006). 119 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (2006).
101 was “concerning for those of us that have a responsibility for defending the peace in the
Asia Pacific region, of which I would count all three [dialogue participants].”120
However, the joint statement that was issued after meetings welcomed China’s
“constructive engagement” in East Asia.121 While they stated that their cooperation was not directed toward Beijing, bilateral security ties between Australia and Japan were also upgraded on March 13, 2007.
As American security policy toward the Asia Pacific region continued to produce developments that China could potentially perceive in a number of ways, engagement at the highest level of the bilateral relationship also continued and April 18-21, 2006 saw
Hu Jintao visit the U.S. for the first time since he became the President of China. During what China referred to as a “state visit” and the U.S. referred to as a “working visit,” he made stops in Seattle, Washington, D.C., and Yale University in New Haven.122 In statements as part of a press conference at the White House following their discussion, both Presidents referred to the two countries as “stakeholders” in the international system, and at a later luncheon President Hu Jintao stated that “China and the U.S. are not only both stakeholders, they should also be constructive partners.”123 While no clear
120 Sundeep Tucker, Guy Dinmore, and David Pilling, “China Remarks Add Edge to Rice Trip to Sydney,” Financial Times, March 16, 2006, accessed November 4, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c05a35b0-b482-11da-bd61- 0000779e2340.html#axzz2YiNLypic. 121 Steven Weisman, “Rice Seeks to Balance China’s Power,” The New York Times, March 19, 2006, accessed November 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/international/asia/19rice.html. 122 Joseph Kahn, “In Candor From China, Efforts to Ease Anxiety,” The New York Times, April 17, 2006, accessed November 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/17/world/asia/17hu.html. 123 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Remarks by President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China at Welcoming Luncheon at the White House Hosted by President
102 breakthrough resulted from the visit, the fact that they planned to meet five times in 2006 at various fora, and three times in 2007, presented a sharp contrast to the period of the
Bill Clinton administration during which such meetings had been less frequent.
In a development that indicated that mil-mil relations had moved past the recovery phase and were once again developing, during the period of May 9-16, 2006
Admiral William J. Fallon, commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific, met with Chinese
Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan and Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing in China.
At this time, he invited senior Chinese officers to observe U.S.-led joint military exercises in June and promised them the opportunity to review U.S. bases and to board
U.S. warships during air-sea drills, which China later accepted. The navies also played an important role in mil-mil relations during this period with the U.S. and Chinese sides holding a search and rescue exercise of the coast of Southern California on September 30,
2006.124
The improved state of mil-mil relations was highlighted at the 2007 Shangri-La
Dialogue that took place in June. At this time, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expression of American concern regarding China’s military buildup was noticeably less confrontational than those of his predecessor from two years earlier.125 At this time,
General Zhang Qinsheng, the highest-ranking Chinese military official to attend the
George W. Bush of the United States of America,” April 20, 2006, accessed September 22, 2012, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng’zxxx/t259220.htm. 124 “China, U.S. Stage Search-and-Rescue Exercises,” PLA Daily, November 20, 2006, accessed September 25, 2012, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2006- 11/20/content_651703.htm. 125 Robert Gates, “The United States and Asia-Pacific Security,“ (Speech at the Shangri- La Dialogue, Singapore, June 2, 2007), accessed November 12, 2012, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue- 2007/plenary-session-speeches-2007/first-plenary-session--the-hon-robert-gates/.
103 dialogue, also stated that China would finalize arrangements for a direct communication link with the U.S. in December during bilateral Defense Consultative Talks.126
In a development that indicated that Japan was continuing to play a more significant role in the security of the Asia Pacific, in 2006 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe began advocating for greater cooperation among democracies in the region. He also spoke in favor of the establishment of a dialogue to address shared security concerns while Foreign Minister Taro Aso promoted the development of an “arc of freedom and prosperity” and cooperation between like-minded democracies.127 As a result, American,
Japanese, Australian, and Indian officials met on the sidelines of the ARF meeting in
Manila in May 2007 in what came to be called the Quadrilateral Group, or “Quad,” for exploratory discussions.128 As the four participating countries had taken the lead in responding to the Tsunami that ravaged Indonesia on Christmas Day 2006, cooperating in disaster relief was one topic of discussion, and it was publicly stated that it was not directed at China. All the same, this meeting led Chinese officials from MOFA to
126 “India and China: Building International Stability,” (Plenary Session at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 2, 2007), accessed November 12, 2012, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue- 2007/plenary-session-speeches-2007/second-plenary-session-qa/. 127 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following His Visits to Indonesia, India and Malaysia,” August 24, 2007, accessed September 26, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/press.html; Taro Aso, “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons,” (Speech at Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, November 30, 2006), accessed September 26, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html. 128 Brahma Challaney, “’Quad Initiative’: An Inharmonious Concert of Democracies,” The Japan Times, July 19, 2007, accessed September 24, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20070719bc.html.
104 demarche their counterparts from these countries to ask them why they were meeting, as well as to issue a public statement that the group’s agenda should be more transparent.129
This nascent grouping received further attention in September 2007 when
Exercise Malabar, which in the past had only included American and Indian naval forces, were expanded to include Japan, Australia, and Singapore, and for the first time took place in the Bay of Bengal.130 Ultimately, the Quad did not lead to further meetings, as
Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith publicly stated that Australia did not desire a formal security relationship with India131 and the Indian government also backed away from developing a formal group.
The Institutionalization of Communication and Increasing Cooperation
The status of the Taiwan Strait once again returned to the forefront in Sino-
American security relations when in July 2007 the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan submitted an application to the UN under the name “Taiwan” and President
Chen Shui-bian advocated holding a referendum in Taiwan on the question of joining the
UN. In contrast to many past periods of potential turbulence across the Taiwan Strait, their shared desire for stability ensured that the American and Chinese governments took similar positions and numerous American officials spoke in opposition to the possibility of a referendum. During an interview of Phoenix TV, Deputy Secretary of State John
Negroponte publicly expressed American opposition to a referendum and described it as
129 Ibid. 130 “Navies Join Forces for Exercise Malabar,” Department of Defense, Australia, September 12, 2007, accessed September 27, 2012, http://www.defence.gov.au/media/download/2007/sep/20070912a/index.htm. 131 Rory Medcalf, “Chinese Ghost Story,” The Diplomat (February/March 2008): 16.
105 “mistake” and “a step towards a declaration of independence.”132 In the course of a speech at the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference in September, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Thomas Christensen also stated that if a referendum were to take place the U.S. “would reiterate that we do not support
Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that require statehood and therefore would not support such a referendum.”133 The contrast from the administration’s language on this issue in 2001 could not be clearer.
High-level mil-mil relations continued with Secretary Robert Gates’ November 4-
6, 2007 visit to Beijing on the invitation of Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan. At this time, he also met with President Hu Jintao and numerous other officials before proceeding to Seoul and Tokyo. Talks covered the secure telephone link, more complex joint naval exercises, plans to increase exchanges between military education institutions and exchanges of officers at the mid and junior level. Once in Tokyo, Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates made a speech at Sofia University during which he stated that, while he was concerned by the lack of clarity regarding the purpose of China’s military buildup and that the U.S. must hedge against undesired future contingencies, he did not see it as an adversary. Instead, it was a competitor in some areas and a partner in others with whom it was important to engage on all facets of their relationship.134 In the same
132 U.S. State Department, “Press Release: John Negroponte Interviewed on Phoenix TV,” August 28, 2007. 133 Thomas Christensen, “A Strong and Moderate Taiwan,” (Speech at the U.S.-China Defense Industry Conference, Annapolis, Maryland, September 11, 2007), accessed November 12, 2012, http://www.scribd.com/doc/6346830/A-Strong-and-Moderate- Taiwan-20070911. 134 Robert Gates, “Speech,” (Delivered at Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan, November 9, 2007), accessed September 25, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1192.
106 speech, he also highlighted the fact that the U.S. would like to see more engagement and cooperation between its allies. In contrast to maintaining the traditional hub and spoke system in which these allies only had strong relations with the U.S., he presented the TSD and developing relations between Australia and Japan as an example of this new model.
As the U.S. and China continued to work to better understand each other’s policies and intentions, the fifth round of the Senior Dialogue took place January 16-20,
2008 in Guiyang, China. In addition to including discussions on issues like Burma, the
Korean peninsula, Iran, the Taiwan Strait, foreign assistance, energy security, and climate change, it was also significant due to the fact that it marked the first time that Chinese military officials were included. By this time the U.S. and China now held over sixty bilateral dialogues which covered the full array of issues in bilateral relations.
August 2008 also saw a sitting U.S. President attend an Olympics being held abroad for the first time when President George Bush and many of his family members, including President George H.W. Bush, attended the opening ceremonies for the Beijing
Summer Olympics and various other events. In addition to numerous high-level meetings, President George Bush and his father also attended the dedication of the new
American embassy in Beijing, the second largest U.S. facility of this kind in the world in terms of staff at that time.
Following a period in which the handling of the issue of the Taiwan Strait from
2003 onward had ensured that it had had less influence on Sino-American relations, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in late 2008 led to the suspension of bilateral mil-mil exchanges by the Chinese government. As a result, a visit by the Vice Chair of the CMC Xu Caihou to the U.S. and a visit by the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey to China
107 were cancelled, as well as working level talks on China’s defense white paper and a
Pentagon report on China’s military power.135
The Evolution of U.S. Relations in the Asia Pacific
As the Chinese government has frequently responded to U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan by suspending mil-mil, this did not change the fact that the last seven years of the
George Bush administration was the longest period of stability in Sino-American relations had experienced since the Ronald Reagan administration. The degree to which the U.S. and China communicated with each other, and the number of channels through which they did so, grew exponentially during this period. While the U.S. had long been one of the central factors in China’s security policy, the extent to which China had become a key consideration for a wide array of the U.S.’s security interests was unprecedented. Ultimately, the U.S.’s bilateral relations with China, India, and Japan were viewed as having all improved during the course of the eight years of the George
Bush administration, a rare state of affairs in American foreign policy.136
135 Bonnie Glaser, “Ties Solid For Transition, But Challenges Lurk,” Comparative Connections 10 (January 20 2009): 3. 136 Victor Cha, “Winning Asia: Washington’s Untold Success Story,” Foreign Affairs 86, 6 (November/December 2007).
108 Chapter 4
U.S. Security Policy Toward China
“The Chinese came to appreciate the administration’s nuanced policy, knowing that we would take a stance when we had to –for instance, on the Dalai Lama– but that we would show respect when we could, as with the Olympics.”1
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the logic and goals of U.S. security policy toward China. This is primarily accomplished by an evaluation U.S. policy in eight functional areas. As mentioned in the Introduction, four of these areas reflect the logic of engagement: Military to Military relations (mil-mil); the Military Maritime Consultative
Agreement (MMCA); the Senior Dialogue; and the responsible stakeholder speech. Three of these areas reflect the logic of balancing: missile defense; relations with Japan,
Australia, Singapore, and India; and the Global Posture Review (GPR). Relations with friends and allies also include the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) and the
Quadrilateral Group (Quad). American policy toward the Taiwan Strait is treated as an area that does not fit simply into either category.
In order to place these specific functional areas within the context of the broader relationship and U.S. security policy toward China, this chapter also discusses more general developments of importance to bilateral relations and U.S. policy, such as the
2000 presidential campaign, important official reports, and U.S. pressure on the EU to maintain its arms embargo on China. Most importantly, this also includes a discussion of
1 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), 646.
109 the two major shocks that took place in Sino-American security relations during the period of the George Bush administration, the EP3 incident and 9/11.
Taken together this provides an in-depth evaluation of the study’s IV, U.S. security policy toward China during the period of the George W. Bush administration.
Along with chapter three, it also provides a baseline against which Chinese perceptions of
U.S. security policy can be compared.
The chapter begins with an examination of the logic of hedging and its two components, engagement and balancing. This provides a structure within which the proceeding sections on individual functional areas and important developments in U.S. policy and bilateral relations can be understood.
Hedging
During the 1990s an active debate took place in U.S. policy and academic circles regarding whether China should be engaged, contained, or congaged.2 While the Bill
Clinton administration ultimately pursued a variant of engagement, during the early Bush years, there was a renewed debate regarding whether the U.S. was attempting to contain
China. Even though prior to the EP3 incident the administration initially took a less cooperative stance, the policy of hedging that emerged over time can be described as consisting of two components: engagement and balancing.
2 See Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, Eds. Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999); David Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of China?: Calculating Beijing’s Responses,” International Security 21, 2 (Fall 1996); James Shinn, Ed. Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement of China (New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations, 1996); and Zalmay Khalilzad et al, The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999).
110 Simply put, engagement involved working to dispel mistrust and misperception, and to influence how China understood its interests through dialogues and exchanges. It also worked to enhance cooperation in areas where they shared interests and to encourage
China to play a more active and positive role in international relations. Balancing involved ensuring that the U.S. would be ready to respond if in the future China were to use its growing power to pursue goals that conflict with U.S. interests, and to deter such a challenge from taking place. While they utilized different tools, both components also worked to shape how China understood its interests and security environment.
If combined well, engagement and balancing would allow the U.S. to benefit from
China’s rise and to work toward the best possible outcome while simultaneously preparing for undesirable worst-case scenarios. Uncertainty regarding the future direction of the relationship, the contingent nature of each country’s future policy, and the resulting need to plan for multiple possible outcomes at once therefore informed the approach that evolved during the administration’s two terms. This logic is reflected in the following passage from Secretary of State Colin Powell’s 2004 Foreign Affairs article: “Neither we nor the Chinese believe that there is anything inevitable about our relationship any longer– either inevitably bad or inevitably good. Instead, we now believe that it is up to us, together, to take responsibility for our common future.”3 This statement implicitly rejected the argument made by realists such as John Mearsheimer that expanding Chinese
3 Colin Powell, “A Strategy of Partnerships,” Foreign Affairs 83, 1 (January/February 2004): 31.
111 power made a future challenge to U.S. interests inevitable, and therefore dictated that the
U.S. move to contain China while it still could.4
As former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during the Bill Clinton administration Joseph Nye argued during the mid-1990s, the best way to turn China into an enemy would be to treat it like one. Such an approach would not be wise as:
Some regional experts believe China will be aggressive outside the Chinese cultural area; others do not. In the face of uncertainty among the experts, suppose that we simply posited a 50 percent chance of an aggressive China and a 50 percent chance of China becoming a responsible great power in the region. On this hypothesis, to treat China as an enemy now would in effect discount 50 percent of the future.5
While the administration’s policy toward China did not reflect this logic during the period prior to the EP3 incident, the combination of engagement plus balancing that evolved over time recognized this uncertainty and worked to avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy that future relations would be driven by enmity.
With that said, the argument can be made that individual aspects of U.S. policy were consistent with the logic of containment. Nevertheless, when they are put in the context of the broader policy, it is clear that this was not the administration’s goal during the post-EP3 period. Thomas Christensen concedes that analysts who saw U.S. policy as informed by containment had a point due to: the restrictions on technology transfers; the pressure on the EU and Israel not to sell China weapons; the buildup on Guam; the offer
4 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Zbigniew Brzezinski and John Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy, January 5, 2005, accessed January 23, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/01/05/clash_of_the_titans. 5 Joseph Nye, “The Case for Deep Engagement,” Foreign Affairs 74, 4 (July/August 1995).
112 to sell Taiwan advanced weapons; and the push for a more active role for Japan in the
U.S.-Japan alliance. However, as none of these measures undermined China’s increasing regional influence, this did not amount to a policy of containment. As U.S. trade, investment, and diplomatic policies did not work toward limiting China’s growing economic power or denying it a larger role in international relations, it is clear that during the period after the EP3 incident the administration’s policy was more complex.6
In one of the best examinations of the U.S.’s policy options during the early Bush years, Banning Garrett argues that the fundamental difference between the policy the administration ultimately chose and containment was that it did not attempt to isolate
China or to slow down or prevent the development of its economic power. Instead, it worked to “enmesh it into the international system to increase its stake in the system to increase its stake in maintaining it.”7 Pursuing this strategy while simultaneously hedging against undesired contingencies with alliance partners and military deployments was logical due to the fact that attempts to weaken and isolate China would be opposed by most other countries. As the globalized trade and financial systems are the fundamental sources of U.S. power, nor would such measures be necessary.8 While containment had constituted an actionable strategy toward a Soviet Union with which the U.S. had minimal economic relations, George Bush administration official Ashley Tellis argues that it was “inutile in the emerging geopolitical environment which was instead
6 Thomas Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy Toward East Asia,” International Security 31, 1 (Summer 2006): 109-110. 7 Banning Garrett, “Strategic Straightjacket,” in Strategic Surprise: Sino-American Relations in the Early 21st Century, Jonathan Pollack, Ed. (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2003), 4. 8 Ibid., 8.
113 characterized by tight and growing economic bonds between the U.S. and its Asian partners on the one hand, and China on the other.”9
As Robert Art asserts, attempting to block China’s economic development, the fundamental source of its growing power, would not work for several reasons. In addition to causing the U.S. economic pain, unless it was done in response to serious Chinese aggression, it would not gain support from other countries and would likely lead to a serious weakening of the U.S.’s regional alliances. Furthermore, unilateral sanctions and cessation of investment by the U.S. would not work if other major economies did not participate and would only serve to cut American businesses off from opportunities that competitors from Japan, South Korea, and the rest of the West would quickly take advantage of.10 The opportunity presented by China’s development was therefore too great and had already produced an economic relationship that precluded containment from being an effective approach. As China was now important to too many of the U.S.’s interests to be ignored, engagement was a fact of life, not a policy option.
Adopting a policy of hedging that encompassed both engagement and balancing therefore enabled the U.S. to continue to benefit from its economic relationship with
China and cooperation in areas of mutual interest while simultaneously responding to the uncertainty concerning the uses toward which China’s growing capabilities would be directed in the future.11 As an analysis of the proceeding functional areas will demonstrate, the administration adopted both cooperative and competitive responses to
China’s rise that would allow it to cooperate with China in areas where they shared
9 Tellis, “U.S.-China Relations in a Realist World,” 91. 10 Robert Art, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul,” Political Science Quarterly 125, 3 (2010): 363-365. 11 Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability,” 146.
114 interests while it also worked to deter undesired behavior, shape its interests, and to prepare for the possibility of a future challenge.
While engagement and balancing therefore constitute a better description of the administration’s policy, this pairing evolved over time and the administration did not come into office with this blueprint in mind. Administration officials argue that early on the question of how these concepts fit together was less significant, as in 2001-2002
China was still viewed as a regional power, not a global one.12 As during the period of
2003-2004, the administration was also preoccupied with Iraq, Afghanistan, and the presidential election, high-level officials did not necessarily have time to think about these sorts of larger strategic questions.13
This does not mean that these ideas only emerged during the administration’s second term; as early as 2002 the State Department’s Director of Policy Planning,
Richard Haass, explicitly stated that he disagreed with self described realists who posit that rising powers will always challenges the dominant power in the system and therefore that growing Chinese power rendered a conflict inevitable. Instead, he argued that:
[W]ith so much on their plate domestically, it would be curious indeed for China’s leaders to seek to destabilize Asia or embark on foreign policy adventures. What China clearly needs is a prolonged period of stability to deal with economic and social challenges – from unemployment to corruption – that grow more pressing every day.14
While he also highlighted the fact that the 2002 NSSUS stated that the U.S. would work to dissuade future military competition, he went on to argue that:
12 U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011. 13 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011. 14 Richard Haass, “China and the Future of U.S. China Relations.” (Remarks to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York, NY, December 5, 2002), accessed January 23, 2013, http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/15687.htm.
115 [T]he last fifty years of European history surely prove that nations can, over time, come to understand their interests differently. The recent history of Europe shows clearly that relations among countries that were former adversaries can evolve to a point where war is unthinkable.
What is more, China is not imperial Germany. No "law" of history now pulls us inexorably toward dangerous and expensive competition, much less conflict. Cooperation is equally – I would argue, more – likely. But what will be central, what in large part will shape the future of our relations, will be how China’s new leaders choose to use their country’s growing power.
The United States is committed to working with China to help shape the future of East Asia and beyond. But China must show that it, too, is prepared to transform its relationship with us – by fully joining efforts to control weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems; by enforcing transparent trade regimes; and by bringing tangible pressure to bear on those who threaten the peace.15
Clearly even if during this period the Defense Department was still taking a harder line approach that left less room for the possibility that relations would evolve in a cooperative direction, an approach consistent with the logic of hedging was being taken seriously by State Department officials.
While growing Chinese power rendered the relationship between these concepts more significant during the administration’s second term, all of the relevant officials accepted that the relationship includes both cooperative and uncooperative elements and that the different mission statements of the State and Defense Departments ensured that they would both be present.16 President George Bush deliberately avoided trying to characterize the relationship with a simple description, as he did not believe that any of the existing models were appropriate. This belief was also reflected in Secretary of State
Colin Powell’s statement that trying to sum the relationship up with a single term or cliché was not helpful. As a result, the administration’s policy straddled both concepts
15 Ibid. 16 Ibid.
116 without attempting to establish a set formulation between them.17 While this does not mean that the two components were always well coordinated, and some have argued that during the second term the focus on engaging China led to insufficient attention being paid to the U.S.-Japan alliance and hedging,18 ideally this involved both working to improve bilateral relations and to dispel misperception through dialogue while simultaneously strengthening America’s forward posture in the region.
One official summed up their thinking at the beginning of the administration’s second term when the balance between the components of hedging was receiving more consideration with the following formulation: First, they wanted strong bilateral ties. At the beginning of the second term this official brought President Hu Jintao a letter outlining this goal, as communicating this way was viewed as having symbolic value.
The fact that President Hu Jintao personally met with him for fifteen minutes –an unusual honor for an official of a lower rank– was taken as a sign that he had understood and accepted the message.19 Second, China’s success was important to U.S. interests. When
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice had communicated this to President Jiang
Zemin, he told her that he believed this. This goal was due to the fact that a dysfunctional
China that was: unable to feed its people; proliferating weapons; subject to social instability; potentially involved in conflicts with its neighbors; and not able to provide an engine for international economic growth, would create additional challenges for the U.S. and lead to lost opportunities. Third, “do not mess with Texas” by challenging U.S.
17 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011. 18 James Przystup and Phillip C. Saunders. “Visions of Order: Japan and China in U.S. Strategy,” Strategic Forum 220 (June 2006): 4-5. 19 U.S. Interview #14, Washington, D.C., May 18, 2011.
117 interests, as its bilateral relations in the Asia Pacific were better than China’s.20 The administration therefore aimed for the “sweet spot” between taking an overly hard stance, and potentially creating a security dilemma, and underbalancing, which would raise the risk that China would perceive the administration as backing down and therefore feel emboldened to act more assertively by making larger demands. At the same time, after the EP3 incident, it engaged with China to an increasingly high degree on a wide range of issues.
While the administration attempted to establish equilibrium between these two priorities, attempting to communicate this balance while they were also reacting to events out of their control was difficult.21 The fact that it had to respond to unpredictable developments ensured that attempting to establish a set formulation between them would not have necessarily been productive and may have diminished its ability to improvise as circumstances required.
Ultimately, it was hoped that this sort of hybrid policy would push China to do better.22 Administration officials believed that their Chinese counterparts did not have any difficulty understanding this approach and that it was the sort of policy that they would adopt under the same circumstances.23
Furthermore, regardless of whether Chinese officials were willing to concede it, administration officials did not believe that they saw the U.S.’s policy as amounting to containment. While Cui Tiankai and other Chinese officials would accuse the U.S. of attempting to contain China, these statements were not viewed as sincere. When officials
20 Ibid. 21 U.S. Interview #11, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2011. 22 U.S. Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 12, 2011. 23 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011.
118 like Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Deputy Assistant Secretary Randall
Schriver would tell them that they did not believe their protests and suggest that they drop them in order to continue with real consultations, they would do so.24 As a result, these accusations were viewed as motivated by domestic Chinese politics and a desire to probe for weaknesses that might cause the U.S. to cede ground. It was therefore viewed as perceiving the two components of hedging as coexisting.25 While Chinese officials were viewed as having come to a better understanding of the competitive nature of the
U.S. policy process and the role of bureaucratic politics, it is expected that they still views it as slightly conspiratorial and that it is unlikely that they appreciate how much is unplanned and the unintended signals that this produces.26
Functional Areas and Important Developments in U.S. Policy
Having outlined the logic of hedging and its two components, engagement and balancing, it is now possible to examine specific functional areas and important developments in U.S. policy that reflected the goals of this policy. Doing so highlights the fact that U.S. policy remained largely stable as the nature of the bilateral relationship and the tactics that were utilized in pursuit of U.S. interests evolved.
The 2000 Presidential Campaign and Description of China as a “Strategic Competitor”
The 2000 presidential campaign, like many before it, produced strong rhetoric regarding relations with China. The clearest example of this was candidate George
24 U.S. Interview #3, Washington, D.C., April 22, 2011. 25 Ibid. 26 U.S. Interview #11, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2011.
119 Bush’s characterization of China as a strategic competitor instead of as a strategic partner.27 However, while Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President
Richard Cheney’s approach to the relationship can be characterized as influenced by this concept, it cannot be characterized as shaping the administration’s policy in office.
This is due to the fact that rhetoric during a campaign and policy statements after a candidate has taken office serve different purposes. First, while it is normal for a candidate to critique the current administration’s policy, this does not mean that this rhetoric would guide policy.28 As once it had taken office the George Bush administration had more important channels for sending signals regarding its intentions and priorities, there was minimal worry that this rhetoric would complicate relations. Second, the foreign policy platform for the presidential election was derived from Republican Party documents that did not necessarily reflect candidate George Bush’s own thinking, as these materials are created by the consensus of the committee that puts them together.29
Third, the term “strategic competitor” is not necessarily threatening, as the U.S. and
China are competitors in many areas. It also fit with the argument that the Clinton administration’s desire to work toward a strategic partnership with China had led it to pay insufficient attention to relations with the U.S.’s friends and allies in the Asia Pacific.30
Thus, once in office, President George Bush and his cabinet ceased to describe
China as a strategic competitor. This was deliberate, as the term did not translate well
27 For example, Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism.” 28 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011. 29 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011. 30 This thinking also informed the argument made by the Armitage Report. Joseph Nye, Richard Armitage et al., The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, October 16, 2000); U.S. Interview #4, Washington, D.C., April 26, 2011.
120 into Asian languages, in which it sounds more threatening and could be understood as implying that one is about to come into conflict.31 In July 2001, Secretary of State Colin
Powell stated that the term had been used to highlight the fact that “there are areas where we have disagreements in and we have interests that do not coincide, and we may find ourselves competing in the region.”32
He went on to say that:
Subsequently though, in recent discussions, I have tried not to focus on one single label. Because what I have discovered . . . is that the relationship is so complex with so many different elements to it that it is probably wiser not to capture it with a single word or a single term or a single cliché.33
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that, even though the idea that China was a strategic competitor continued to inform the thinking of some U.S. leaders, the fact that this terminology was dropped indicated that the George Bush administration’s approach to diplomacy did not represent a major change from past practice and that its policy was more complex than this terminology might imply.
However, in dropping this language, China’s response was not the only one that was considered, as the interpretation of other countries in the region was equally important.34 Administration officials also argued that there should have been nothing surprising about the fact that terminology that was seen as sufficient for the campaign
31 U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011. 32 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Powell, Remarks to the Press, En Route to Canberra, Australia, July 29, 2001,” accessed January 13, 2013, http://2001- 2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/4347.htm. 33 Ibid. 34 U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011.
121 was dropped once the administration had taken office, as it was no longer able to provide a sufficient basis for the complexities of the security and economic relationship.35
Initial Foreign Policy Reviews Once in Office
There is a general consensus that the new administration came to power intent on adopting a tougher stance toward China. This is supported by: the lack of a diplomatic outreach toward China by President George Bush and administration officials; the immediate review of mil-mil relations;36 the prioritizing of relations with friends and allies in the region, and Taiwan in particular; and the strong stance taken on missile defense.37 While these are all important considerations, there are several reasons why the idea that the new administration was specifically focused on relations with China and immediately took a significantly harder stance should be carefully evaluated.
Numerous officials argue that it is an exaggeration to say that there was a major focus on China policy during this initial period. When the administration first came into office, policy toward China was primarily decided at the Deputy level by officials like
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz, not at the principal level by officials like Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell.38 While much was going on during the first year that contributed to an adjustment of security policy toward China, the first several months to a year was dominated by general reviews of America’s broader foreign
35 U.S. Interview #10, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2011. 36 Shirley Kan, “U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress,” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, November 27, 2012): 2. 37 Bush, “Speech on Missile Defense.” 38 U.S. Interview #2, Washington, D.C., April 20, 2011.
122 policy. This is supported by the fact that President George Bush did not make a speech focused on China prior to his January 2002 trip to China, during which he spoke at
Tsinghua University.39 As a result, it is useful to think of these early developments as tactical adjustments that amounted to a harder line approach, not signs of a new strategy.
The lack of diplomatic outreach toward China and focus on relations with friends and allies in policy toward Asia reflected the belief that as the world’s only superpower, the U.S. needed China less than vice versa and that there was therefore no need for the administration to make concessions. Instead, for relations to move forward it would be necessary for China to moderate its stance in the face of superior U.S. capabilities.40
However, the fact that the administration was willing to receive both of the high- level Chinese delegations that travelled to Washington, and provided Vice Premier Qian
Qichen with assurances that the administration would maintain the One-China policy undermine the idea that a fundamental change had taken place. The Defense
Authorization Act passed in 2000 that requires an annual report on China’s military power and placed new limitations on mil-mil also predated the administration. Ballistic missile defense and relations with the regional allies will be discussed further below.
It is also important to recognize that from President Richard Nixon onward it has been normal for each administration to spend its first year trying to make adjustments to relations with China before returning to continuity with past policy.41 These adjustments are further complicated by bureaucratic politics, as the Departments of State and Defense
39 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011. 40 Sutter, “Bush Administration Policy Toward Beijing and Taipei,” especially 479. 41 U.S. Interview #14, Washington, D.C., May 5, 2011.
123 and the NSC Staff promote different priorities.42 As a result, while the George Bush administration initiated a harder line in security policy toward China, the initial changes that took place are best characterized as tactical, not strategic, adjustments. As China also faced similar dynamics in U.S. policy when the Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton administrations came to power, this was not a novel development.43
While there were numerous sources of friction in Sino-American relations during the first stage of the George Bush administration, this is also partially attributable to the political cycle of the relationship. In an interview with James Mann on March 30, 2001,
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated that, while they anticipated some conflict with China, they wanted to get it out of the way in 2001 before the CCP’s leadership transition took place in 2002.44 This would allow them to maintain a low profile during the change in leadership, and therefore avoid potential outpourings of anti-
Americanism similar to the one that took place following the accidental bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 that could destabilize the relationship.45 Front loading issues that could be expected to lead to discord in bilateral relations would therefore allow the administration to avoid potentially larger problems later on.
In sum, while the new administration’s initial approach to relations with China was distinct from that of its predecessor, this was neither unusual or without cause; nor
42 U.S. Interview #2, Washington, D.C., April 20, 2011. 43 See James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship With China, From Nixon to Clinton (New York, NY: Vintage, 2000). 44 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, (New York, NY: Viking Penguin, 2004), 281. 45 Eric Schmitt, “In a Fatal Error, C.I.A. Picked a Bombing Target Only Once: The Chinese Embassy,” The New York Times, July 23, 1999, accessed January 18, 2013, http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/global/072399china-embassy.html.
124 did it constitute evidence that a hardline strategy that would rule out cooperation in areas where the two counties shared interests was being adopted.
Missile Defense
Missile Defense constituted one aspect of the strategic hedging component of the administration’s policy. While President George Bush announced a more aggressive schedule for developing and deploying a missile defense system,46 for a number of reasons administration officials believed that this could not reasonably be characterized as sending China a strong negative signal regarding U.S. intentions. First, the debates surrounding its development had all been focused on the DPRK.47 Second, the scale of the system in Asia was viewed as so modest and easily overcome by countervailing measures that an objective analysis was expected to indicate that it was not intended to target China.48 While their Chinese counterparts made it clear that they did not accept these arguments, U.S. officials believed that the fact that they only had plans to place thirty-six interceptors on the West Coast, and that they were not building enough interceptors or redundancies to remove China’s capacity to maintain deterrence, or its ability to launch a large-scale attack, made it clear that they were focused on the DPRK.49
The Theater Missile Defense (TMD) component of the system was also part of the broader Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) that aimed to transform the U.S.-
46 Bush, “Speech on Missile Defense.” 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid.; U.S. Interview #6, Washington D.C., April 27, 2011. 49 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011.
125 Japan alliance for the new security challenges of the 21st century,50 and therefore was viewed as a normative good in and of itself. It was also believed that China was attempting to develop its own systems.51 Under these conditions, it did not make sense for Japan to have to remain in danger. Furthermore, even if Japan did develop an excellent missile defense system, it would still lack a first strike capability.52
While the possible secondary outcome of China taking the threat that the DPRK’s nuclear program posed to Japan and South Korea more seriously was desirable, American officials did not hold this to be a conscious goal of the administration’s policy, or something that decision makers were strategizing about.53 Any change that it led to in terms of China’s willingness to work toward preventing the DPRK from attaining a nuclear weapon can therefore be described as a “bank shot outcome.”54 As a result, even though the administration was not focused on China’s response, blowback in Sino-
American relations was a price that they were willing to pay as they pursued their goals.55
Lastly, American officials also viewed the fact that the system was being developed in increments, and therefore was not going to be deployed overnight, as significant. As a result, they did not believe that it would be reasonable to view it as rapidly changing the regional security environment. One senior American official concluded that, while there was initial pushback from China, it came to appreciate this
50 Emma Chanlett-Avery, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service (January 18, 2011), 10. 51 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011. 52 U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011. 53 Ibid. 54 U.S. Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 12, 2011. 55 Ibid.
126 fact.56 As a result, no one in the administration saw missile defense as an offensive measure or destabilizing and instead believed that the value it offered in a proliferated world was self-evident.57
Regarding Chinese concerns and threat perceptions, one official noted that even if
China claims that it is concerned by the ways that missile defense could be used to threaten it in the future, the U.S. still has to worry about dealing with existing challenges from the DPRK.58 Furthermore, while one of China’s primary concerns was the prospect of Taiwan being brought under the protection of missile defense, the fact that the George
Bush administration did not approve the sale of the AEGIS defense system to Taiwan59 and the capacity it would have provided to participate in missile defense should have been recognized as significant. However, it was conceded that, regardless of whether the
U.S. had any intention of aiming it at China, a credible upper-tier XO system would threaten China’s ability to respond.60
Missile Defense can therefore be thought of as an indirect signal due to the fact that it communicated more about the U.S.’s approach to the region and the security environment that China would face, rather than the administration’s specific policy toward China. President George Bush communicated this fact when he told Chinese leaders that if they were not going to deal with the DPRK he would have to do so.61
56 U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011. 57 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011. 58 Ibid. 59 David Sanger, “Bush Offering Taiwan Some Arms But Not the Best,” The New York Times, April 24, 2001, accessed January 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/24/world/bush-is-offering-taiwan-some-arms-but-not- the-best.html. 60 U.S. Interview #13, Washington, D.C., May 17, 2011. 61 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011.
127 However, while there is a consensus among officials that China was not a primary focus and, the upper-tier XO component aside, an objective evaluation of the state of the technology and scale of the system supports their stance, the administration’s approach to diplomacy with China during its initial period in office prior to the EP3 incident complicates the signal that was sent. While communicating the fact that the U.S. was far and away the more powerful party, and therefore did not need to compromise with China on issues that were central to its national interest, was a logical way to reduce Chinese demands and leverage, this initial approach to diplomacy also implied that its security concerns were not being considered. This was seen in the fact that: serious engagement with China on missile defense only began with Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s post-EP3 incident trip to Beijing;62 President Jiang Zemin was given minimal forewarning prior to the U.S. announcement of its withdrawal from the ABM treaty; and—in contrast to relations with Russia—no public diplomacy was undertaken toward
China after a section of the NPR was published.63 The fact that an upper-tier XO system is relevant to China’s security environment ensured that this initial lack of diplomacy did send a negative signal.
Mil-Mil
Mil-Mil relations present a case of evolving American policy over time. While the initial review of relations in this area and the freeze that was put in place after the EP3
62 Erik Eckholm, “U.S. Diplomat in Beijing to Calm Fears on Anti-Missile Project,” The New York Times, May 15, 2011, accessed August 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/15/world/us-diplomat-in-beijing-to-calm-fears-on- antimissile-project.html. 63 Bin, “Tales of Two U.S. Partners,” 5.
128 incident ensured that it did not initially send a cooperative signal, after 9/11 the administration’s approach to this aspect of the relationship increasingly reflected the logic of engagement. While exchanges and dialogue provide an opportunity for militaries to share information about their intentions and perceptions of threat, the different approaches each side have toward mil-mil64 and the goals that the George Bush administration wanted to accomplish complicated matters. In the late 1990s, the U.S. had hoped to improve the quality of exchanges in terms of: the intensification of high-level strategic dialogue and its expansion to different levels of military and civilian national security bureaucracies; the expansion of regional security discussions to include other
Asian militaries; the development of functional exchanges in areas like military medicine, environmental security, and relief; training of military personnel and joint exercises; familiarization briefings to encourage transparency; new CBMs; dialogues, exchanges, and site visits to nuclear facilities; safety, security command, and control; joint activity in combating non-conventional and transnational security threats; and the possible coordination of export control measures.65 These goals largely carried over to the new administration, which saw the purpose of ties as to “convince Chinese interlocutors of the correctness of the U.S. worldview on issues like military transparency, international law, and China’s need to participate more in multilateral security initiatives.”66
At the level of political appointments there was widespread recognition of the value of mil-mil relations and the channels of communication that it needed to include. At the
64 See Kevin Pollpeter, U.S.-China Security Management: Assessing the Military to Military Relationship (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 75-86. 65 David Shambaugh, “Enhancing Sino-American Military Relations,“ (Sigur Center for Asian Studies: Washington, D.C., 1998), 4. 66 Kurt Campbell, “The Limits of U.S.-China Military Cooperation: Lessons From 1995- 1999,” Washington Quarterly 29 (Winter 2005/2006), 170.
129 same time, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other administration officials came into office with a desire to audit the state of mil-mil in order to determine whether programs were serving U.S. interests.67 As a result, officials state that, as they were focused on their own goals, little thought was given to how China would interpret this development. Under the stresses of managing security relations on a day-to-day basis, this sort of question was unlikely to be given extensive consideration.68
While President George Bush and Vice President Richard Cheney both hoped that mil-mil could leave both sides better off, the idea that the U.S. ever received that sort of value from the relationship is questionable. Even though by disclosing more information than the PLA did it is reasonable to say that the U.S. had an intention to work toward building trust while simultaneously deterring China from challenging it, it would be an exaggeration to describe this as a strategy.69 The fact that the Sino-American military relationship has always been strongly influenced by the state of the bilateral political relationship also serves to inhibit this sort of strategizing from taking place. In practice, mil-mil is the first thing to be constrained or suspended when the bilateral relationship is troubled and the last aspect to recover.
However, as it takes time to implement these reviews into day-to-day relations, it had not led to a rapid change in the state of mil-mil. The fact that the administration came into power so close to the Spring Festival and Lunar New Year holidays also ensured that there were a limited number of mil-mil exchanges taking place when the review was
67 U.S. Interview #2, Washington, D.C., April 20, 2011. 68 U.S. Interview #6, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011. 69 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011.
130 initiated.70 At the same time, the refusal to permit the military attaché from China’s embassy, General Chen Xiaogong, to visit the Pentagon would have sent a clear signal.
Even though the degree to which the Pentagon limited mil-mil after the EP3 incident did not enjoy administration-wide support, it likely signaled a harder stance than the
Department of State favored.71 At the same time, while objections by White House officials that it did not reflect what was believed to be the meaning of Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s guidance72 may have created the impression that different departments had distinct approaches to China, they also made it clear that that the
Department of Defense was not being permitted to act with complete independence.
Following the freeze in mil-mil relations after the EP3 incident, the administration’s post-9/11 desire to gain China’s cooperation in anti-terror operations and concerns regarding the Taiwan Strait led to renewed interest in having channels of dialogue.73 As a result, a limited shift took place after 9/11 with more contacts resulting. However, the practical nature of their goals ensured that there was minimal discussion regarding how
China would perceive this development.74 The highly politicized nature of the mil-mil relationship also ensures that this sort of issue is not likely to be carefully considered.75
The fact that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld did not support the resumption of
70 U.S. Interview #10, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2011. 71 U.S. Interview #11, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2011. 72 Steven Lee Myers, “Rumsfeld’s Office Reverses China Ban,” New York Times, May 3, 2001, accessed September 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/03/world/rumsfeld-s-office-reverses-china-ban.html. 73 U.S. Interview #11, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2011. 74 Ibid. 75 U.S. Interview #10, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2011.
131 contacts and dragged his feet in doing so with relations remaining limited ensured that no major signals were sent by the initial recovery of mil-mil.76
As a result, while starting with the resumption of the Defense Consultative Talks in December 2002 mil-mil did partially recover as the two sides started discussing ideas for productive exchanges,77 it never returned to the levels that it had reached during the
Clinton years. While there were officials in the administration who saw things like junior officer exchanges as an opportunity to build trust and understanding over the long term, many would also be comfortable with this because it was viewed as low risk and low profile, and therefore would not expect it to send a significant signal.78 One close associate of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld characterized the likely result as “a wary, lower-level engagement between the uniformed elite designed primarily to ‘check the box.’”79
One Pentagon official argued that during the period prior to Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld’s trip to China in 2005 they had more leverage in mil-mil as the
Chinese side began to seek out additional communication and the relationship largely recovered.80 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s approach was therefore viewed as effective due to the fact that China became the party pursuing the U.S. as it requested more contacts.81 As a result, during Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Under
Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith’s 2005 visits they had better access to both facilities
76 U.S. Interview #13, Washington, D.C., May , 2011. 77 U.S. Department of Defense, “Under Secretary Feith Media Roundtable on U.S. China Defense Consultative Talks,” December 9, 2002, accessed August 19, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2850. 78 U.S. Interview #11, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2011. 79 Campbell, “The Limits of U.S.-China Military Cooperation,” 181. 80 U.S. Interview #6, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011. 81 U.S. Interview #11, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2011.
132 and officials across the board.82 One official attributed this to the belief that China respects power and does not trust goodwill from the U.S.83
While mil-mil therefore played a limited role in terms of building trust during the
George Bush administration, it did use the relationship and related security fora to communicate its increasing concerns regarding the PLA’s military modernization. One of the best-known instances of this took place in June 2005 during the Shangri-La Dialogue when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld publicly questioned the purpose of China’s military buildup and described it as threatening. However, when the Director General of
MOFA’s Asian Department, Cui Tiankai, asked if the U.S. felt threatened by China, he stated that it did not.84 Furthermore, when asked how he would respond to a headline stating that he had argued that China, not terrorism, was the main threat to the region he responded that: “Such a headline would be flat wrong.”85 It therefore can be concluded that even under his hawkish leadership the Department of Defense made some efforts to reassure China that it was not being viewed as an immediate threat during the post-9/11 period as it raised concerns regarding the direction of China’s military modernization.
While Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s October 18-20, 2005 visit to Beijing, his first visit since taking office, reflected the fact that the administration was placing more importance on mil-mil and that the relationship had further recovered, he also used it as an opportunity to continue to state his concerns. This was seen during group
82 “Rumsfeld’s Visit Paves Way for Bush’s Impending China Tour,” People’s Daily, October 20, 2005, accessed September 26, 2012, http://english.people.com.cn/200510/20/eng20051020_215640.html. 83 U.S. Interview #6, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011. 84 U.S. Department of Defense, “Secretary Rumsfeld’s Remarks to the International Institute for Strategic Studies,” June 4, 2005, accessed September 27, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3216. 85 Ibid.
133 discussions at the Central Party School and the PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS) when he encouraged China to enhance transparency regarding military affairs in order to dispel suspicion and enhance stability.86 During these visits, the defense chiefs agreed to enhance military education exchanges as well as fleet visits. The fact that it was only two years before Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made a follow-up visit to Beijing in
November 2007 for meetings with Minister of National Defense, Cao Gangchuan, during which he pushed for additional lower level exchanges and the establishment of a defense hotline, also reflected the fact that relations were slowly expanding. While during his speech at the 2007 Shangri-La Dialogue Secretary of Defense Robert Gates also stated that the opaqueness of China’s military spending and modernization programs were issues of concern to the U.S., he went on to argue that “there is reason to be optimistic about the U.S.-China relationship.” In support of this claim, he pointed to the fact that they had increased mil-mil contacts at all levels while also highlighting the importance of their bilateral economic and trade relationship and the building of trust over time as relationships were forged.87
The fact that during its second term the George Bush administration invited the PLA to observe military exercises was also significant, as it indicated that the U.S. was willing to offer China something of value to it. An important example of this was the invitation extended to China to send observers to the Valiant Shield exercise that was held near
86 Donna Miles, “Rumsfeld Urges More Transparency From Chinese Military,” American Forces Press Services, October 20, 2005, accessed September 29, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18026. 87 Robert Gates, “The United States and Asia-Pacific Security,” (Speech at the Shangri- La Dialogue, Singapore, June 2, 2007).
134 Guam in June 2006, the largest U.S. exercise to be held in the Pacific since the Vietnam war and the first one that Chinese officials were invited to observe.88
While these later developments provide evidence of a positive trajectory in mil-mil, it should be recognized that the fundamentally different approaches that the U.S. and
China take toward building trust and advantages and disadvantages of transparency ensure that developing this aspect of relations is always challenging. While American officials believe that trust needs to be built from the bottom-up through lower-level exchanges, Chinese officials have traditionally believed that trust should be developed at the level of senior leaders before cooperation on lower level programs and exchanges can take place.89 While U.S. officials believe that transparency in military policy is important to eliminating misperception, Chinese officials have traditionally believed that a lower level of transparency benefits the weaker party and that the U.S. benefits from being more transparent and showing China its superior capabilities. The logic of China’s stance can be seen in the following comment that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz made to reporters in May of 2002:
We believe that the contact between American military personnel and Chinese military personnel can reduce misunderstandings on both sides and can help build a better basis for cooperation when opportunities arise. So we’d like to enhance those opportunities for interaction but we believe that to be successful we have to have principles of transparency and reciprocity. It’s very important that there’s mutual benefit to both sides. … The more each country knows about what the other one is doing, the less danger is there, I believe, of misunderstanding and confrontation.90
88 “Chinese Delegation Returns After Observing U.S. Military Exercise,” The People’s Daily, June 23, 2006, accessed September 30, 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200606/22/eng20060622_276145.html. 89 See David Finkelstein and John Unangst. Engaging DOD: Chinese Perspectives on Military Relations with the U.S. (Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 1999). 90 “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s Interview with Phoenix Television,” Department of Defense, U.S., May 31, 2002.
135
As a result, while it is an exaggeration to claim that a lot of thought was initially given to how China would view the administration’s policy toward mil-mil, and the change that took place after 9/11 was motivated by practical concerns, over time the
George Bush administration began to dedicate more effort to signaling both its desire to enhance relations and mutual trust in addition to its longstanding concerns regarding the future direction of China’s military modernization. Whether or not this is an aspect of relations in which intentions can be effectively signaled is a separate issue.
The EP3 Incident and its Aftermath
This EP3 incident can be seen as marking the end, or the beginning of the end, of the first stage of the George Bush administration’s policy toward China. This is due to the fact that, while it did not produce a significant change in the substance of U.S. policy, it did lead the administration to adjust how it approached the relationship. As the fact that
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz were the only Defense Department officials who had been confirmed at this point meant that it was less able to handle the crisis, the White House gave the State Department the primary responsibility for managing it.91
While the top officials in the U.S. immediately had a report on what had taken place, it is believed that their Chinese civilian counterparts did not initially understand what had happened. This was due to the fact that their explanation to Ambassador Joseph Prueher regarding the collision did not make sense and was out of line with how the planes involved fly. As a result, it made President George Bush more sympathetic toward
91 U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011.
136 President Jiang Zemin, as it helped him to appreciate the nature of the system within which he had to work and the limitations on the information that he was receiving from the PLA.92 One administration official also posited that the fact that the Department of
State and American Embassy in Beijing had been able to successfully resolve the crisis also diminished the appeal of a confrontational approach, as dialogue and negotiation had proven to be effective tools for crisis management.93 At the same time, the fact that the administration worked to resolve the crisis through normal diplomatic channels and did not undertake any measures that would afford China special status, such as using high- level envoys, indicates that its policy had not undergone a fundamental change.94
Following the release of the crew of the EP3, President George Bush stated that the
U.S. and China needed to “work together on global security problems” and that:
The kind of incident we have just been through does not advance a constructive relationship between our two countries. Both the United States and China must make a determined choice to have a productive relationship that will contribute to a more secure, more prosperous and more peaceful world.95
In light of the still tense environment in which this comment was made, it can be concluded that he was signaling his desire to stabilize the relationship and to avoid a repeat of this sort of crises.
92 For a discussion of the role of Chinese civil-military relations and the upcoming 2002 leadership transition to China’s handling of the EP3 incident, see James Mulvenon, “Civil-Military Relations and the EP-3 Crisis: A Content Analysis,” China Leadership Monitor 1 (Winter 2002). 93 Michael Swaine, America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011), 406, endnote 4. 94 Sutter, “Bush Administration Policy Toward Beijing and Taipei,” 485. 95 “Remarks by the President Upon the Return From China of U.S. Service Members,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 12, 2001, accessed January 21, 2013, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010412- 6.html.
137 At the same time, less than two weeks later he also stated that the U.S. would do
“whatever it takes to defend Taiwan,” while also going on to say that the U.S supported the One-China policy.96 This indicates that the administration’s interest in working toward stable relations and shared interests had not led to a fundamental change of policy.
The incident also led him to conclude that communication between himself and the
NSC Staff and China’s top leaders and senior officials was the only ways to clearly signal
U.S. policy and intentions, as everything that goes through the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and PLA bureaucracies gets distorted.97 As a result, the incident led him to speak to President Jiang Zemin, and later President Hu Jintao, on a very frequent basis in order to build their personal relationship.
Officials argue that the incident also led to an important turning point in how diplomatic relations were handled, as it forced the administration “to stare into the abyss” and confront one possible state of affairs in bilateral relations. As they did not like what they saw, it led to a shift in the administration’s approach to China.98 As a result, there was a subsequent attempt to change the tone of the relations with Assistant Secretary of
State James Kelly’s trip to discuss missile defense in May and the Summer 2001 visits to
Beijing by Secretary of State Colin Powell and the Department of State’s Director of
Policy Planning, Richard Haass. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s subsequent comments about how they should avoid trying to use one term or cliché to sum up the relationship
96 David Sanger, “U.S. Would Defend Taiwan, Bush Says,” The New York Times, April 26, 2001, accessed January 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/26/world/us- would-defend-taiwan-bush-says.html. 97 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011. 98 Ibid.
138 and that phrases like strategic competitor were not helpful highlighted this approach.99 It therefore marked the end of the period in which the administration deliberately lowered the importance of bilateral relations by paying limited attention to China.
One official stated that the incident produced a shift from a policy of “all containment and no engagement” to a more balanced approach.100 This can be described as a tactical development, as there is no evidence that the goals informing its policy fundamentally changed and relations with friends and allies in the region continued to be a priority. In fact, the same official argued that the incident served to reinforce the importance of getting relations with the allies right, as having them signal to China that its behavior was rattling them was viewed as an effective way to communicate U.S. concerns.101 Administration officials believed that MOFA understood and appreciated this development.102 The U.S. can therefore be characterized as avoiding unnecessary conflict, pursuing cooperation, and standing firm in areas where differences existed.
Influence of September 11, 2001 on Relations
While the major turning point in U.S. policy had already resulted from the EP3 incident, the change in the George Bush administration’s priorities resulting from the
9/11 attacks also had a significant influence on the direction of its policy toward China.
One administration official argued that whatever was being planned during the foreign policy reviews that took place before 9/11 came to be of limited importance as the topic
99 U.S. Department of State, “Briefing on Trip to Asia,” July 29, 2001, accessed on September 22, 2012, http://20012009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/4347.htm. 100 U.S. Interview #14, Washington, D.C., May 18, 2011. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid.
139 of managing the rise of China ceased to be a primary concern for policymakers and was instead “left to think tanks and professors.”103 At this point, they were not engaged in grand strategizing, as they were focused on a series of interconnected crises. Instead, they were improvising and also more open to cooperating with China. This was partially a practical change, as the need for China’s cooperation in dealing with the DPRK during this period also limited the administration’s options.104 During the 2003-2005 period, the relationship was therefore viewed through the lens of the Taiwan Strait and relations with the DPRK. Officials state that, while they hoped for more cooperation with China on these and other issues, these other challenges took priority over China policy.105
It can therefore be concluded that the signal sent by the fact that President George
Bush traveled to Shanghai and Beijing was a continuation of the change in priorities resulting from the EP3 incident. Officials state that his decision to attend the APEC meeting in Shanghai so soon after 9/11 when he was extremely busy with anti-terrorism was intended to show that he valued bilateral relations and desired both stronger ties and enhanced cooperation.106 Returning to Beijing several months later and the symbolism involved in arriving on the 30th anniversary of President Richard Nixon’s groundbreaking trip was also deliberate and intended to signal continuity with past policy.
This stability in post-EP3 policy also meant that 9/11 did not lead to a fundamentally different China policy. This is reflected in President George Bush’s statements about relations with Taiwan before and during his trip to Beijing. The fact that the President and high-level officials would not visit China without also making a stop in
103 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011. 104 U.S. Interview #12, Washington, D.C., May 6, 2011. 105 Ibid. 106 U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011.
140 Japan or the ROK was also meant to signal that China should not exaggerate its importance to the U.S. and the significance of the President’s visit.107 The fact that the
Defense Minister of the Republic of China on Taiwan was permitted to travel to Florida; the importance the administration continued to place on relations with friends and allies in the region; its unwillingness to agree to a quid pro quo on China’s approach to domestic separatist movements for assistance on antiterrorism;108 the December 2001 announcement of the decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty; the fact that mil-mil relations remained largely frozen; and the fact that after the publication of a section of the
NPR there was a public diplomatic outreach toward Russia, but not to China,109 indicate that no fundamental rethinking of American interests in bilateral relations had taken place.
As Aaron Friedberg and David Lampton have pointed out, regardless of whether encircling China was one of its objectives, the upgrade of relations with countries bordering China that resulted from the U.S.’s focus on antiterrorism was sure to be of concern to Chinese security elites.110 The outcome of 9/11 can therefore be characterized as a change in priorities, not policy.
The Status of the Taiwan Strait
The status of the Taiwan Strait remains the most sensitive issue in bilateral relations, and, in the eyes of Chinese leaders, the largest barrier to their development. It is relevant
107 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011. 108 Aaron Friedberg, “11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations,” Survival 44, 1 (2002): 35-36. 109 Bin, “Tales of Two U.S. Partners,” 4. 110 Friedberg, “11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations,” 41-42; David Lampton, “Small Mercies: China and America After 9/11,” The National Interest 1 (Winter 2001): 109.
141 to both components of the administration’s policy, as upgrading relations with Taiwan fits with the logic of balancing and it is also the topic on which China is most interested in being engaged and reassured. The fact that over time an important shift took place in the administration’s approach to this issue also ensures that it was highly significant to how Chinese security elites perceived U.S. policy.
The stance that the administration took toward the Taiwan Strait during its first couple of years in office was made clear by: the approval of a large package of arms sales; the expansion of military relations with Taiwan; the granting of permission for the
Defense Minister of Taiwan to visit Florida; the buildup of U.S. capabilities in the region; and President George Bush’s statement regarding the defense of Taiwan. This stance was motivated by the buildup of capabilities the PLA was undertaking by the Taiwan Strait.111
As a result, the administration wanted to signal that they should not even consider using these weapons to attempt to unilaterally change the status quo.112
As the decision to approve the package of arms sales was made before the EP3 incident and was only announced afterwards, it was not a result of, or punishment for, the crisis.113 In fact, most of the studies related to the possibility of making these sales had taken place while the Bill Clinton administration was still in office. As its successor would have to deal with the outcome of arms sales, it had been decided that the next
111 Michael Gordon, “Collision With China: Missiles and Threats; China Buildup Puts Taiwan on Edge,” The New York Times, April 8, 2001, accessed August 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/08/world/collision-with-china-missiles-and-threats- china-buildup-puts-taiwan-on-edge.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 112 U.S. Interview #12, Washington, D.C., May 6, 2011; See Robert Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations,” International Security 27, 2 (Fall 2002), 51-54. 113 U.S. Interview #11, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2011.
142 administration should make the final decision.114 As a result, it can be concluded that this sale was a result of the fundamental military balance and was not intended to send a signal beyond one of standard deterrence and dissuasion. While it is fully understood that
China would react negatively, one official argued that any additional buildup that might have been undertaken in response to American actions was almost certainly something that that the PLA was already planning on doing, and at the very least wanted to do.115
The move from “strategic ambiguity” toward “strategic clarity” was therefore intended to ensure that China remained deterred.116
However, the administration continued to maintain a fine balance in its policy toward the Taiwan Strait.117 While during his visit to Beijing in 2002 President George
Bush highlighted the importance of the TRA to U.S. policy and refrained from publicly referring to the Three Communiqués, the invitation for Vice President Hu Jintao to visit
Washington was also intended to reassure China regarding the U.S.’s intentions. Even though there was nothing in the statements President George Bush made regarding the
One-China policy during Vice President Hu Jintao’s visit that differed from hundreds of earlier conversations, and he had also used these words before, the Chinese delegation
114 U.S. Interview #10, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2011. 115 U.S. Interview #2, Washington, D.C., April 20, 2011. 116 Regarding strategic ambiguity and clarity, see S. Philip Hsu, “Reappraising the Debate and Practice of U.S. Strategic Ambiguity/Clarity Cross-Strait Relations,” The Pacific Review 23, 2 (May 2010). 117 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Balancing Act: Bush, Beijing, and Taipei,” in George W. Bush and East Asia: A First Term Assessment, Robert M. Hathaway and Wilson Lee, Eds. (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, 2005): 131- 144.
143 appeared to find them reassuring.118 Nor did the U.S. agree to sell Taiwan the AEGIS system that would allow it to participate in missile defense or Apache helicopters.
Policy shifted in 2003 when Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian ratcheted up his statements regarding the status of Taiwan and the possibility of holding a referendum and the George Bush administration sent a number of equally important signals. One administration official described President George Bush’s decision to publicly criticize
Chen Shui-bian while Premier Wen Jiabao stood next to him as a “huge signal” that was intended to make it clear that the U.S. would act when China had legitimate security concerns.119 During Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s testimony to a
Congressional hearing related to the 25th anniversary of the TRA in April 2004, he publicly highlighted the disastrous consequences that imprudent policy raised for Taiwan and is worth quoting at length. He stated that:
The U.S. strongly supports Taiwan's democracy, including the right of its people to elect their leaders and make the full range of decisions about their security, economy, foreign relations, and other issues. But we do not support Taiwan independence. A unilateral move toward independence will avail Taiwan of nothing it does not already enjoy in terms of democratic freedom, autonomy, prosperity and security. Realistically, such moves carry the potential for a response from the PRC—a dangerous, objectionable and foolish response—that could destroy much of what Taiwan has built and crush its hopes for the future. It would damage China, too. We, in the United States, see these risks clearly and trust they are well understood by President Chen Shui-bian and others in Taiwan.120
He went on to add that:
What is more, PRC military modernization and the increasing threat to Taiwan indicate to us that Beijing is preparing itself to react in just such a possibility. We
118 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011. 119 U.S. Interview #14, Washington, D.C., May 18, 2011. 120 James Kelly, “Written Statement for Congressional Hearing on ‘The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next Twenty-Five Years,” (Washington, D.C., April 21, 2004), 36.
144 encourage the people of Taiwan to regard this threat equally seriously. We look to President Chen to exercise the kind of responsible, democratic and restrained leadership that will be necessary to ensure a peaceful and prosperous future for Taiwan. There are uncomfortable realities, yet they are facts with which we must grapple. As Taiwan proceeds with efforts to deepen democracy, we will speak clearly and bluntly if we feel as though those efforts carry the potential to adversely impact U.S. security interests or have the potential to undermine Taiwan's own security. There are limitations with respect to what the United States will support as Taiwan considers possible changes to its constitution. We are uncertain about the means being discussed for changing the constitution. We do no one any favors if we are unclear in our expectations or obfuscate where those limitations are. The President's policy regarding our opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo will be reinforced in this dialogue with Taiwan about its political evolution.121
As his testimony also outlined the damage that China would incur if it initiated a conflict, and the U.S.’s opposition to either side unilaterally changing the status quo, his statements clearly changed the tone of American policy toward the Taiwan Strait. They were also reinforced by Secretary of State Colin Powell’s subsequent statement that the
U.S. did not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage’s assertion that the Taiwan Strait was the biggest landmine in bilateral relations and clarification of the fact that the TRA required the U.S. to maintain enough forces in the Pacific to defend Taiwan and to sell it arms, but did not require it to defend it, also fit with this change of tone.122
While these restatements of longstanding American policy were intended to rein
Taiwan in as much as they were directed toward China, they indicate that the George
Bush administration was performing both reassurance and dissuasion on a large scale
121 Ibid., 37. 122 Richard Armitage, interview by Charlie Rose, “The Charlie Rose Show, PBS,” December 10, 2004, accessed September 30, 2012, http://www.taiwandc.org/pbs-2004- 01.htm.
145 toward both sides of the Strait.123 Put another way, while early on the administration had focused on deterring China and strengthening relations with Taiwan, starting in 2003 it pursued a policy of “dual deterrence” that aimed to prevent either side from attempting to unilaterally change the status quo.124
One official stated that President George Bush wanted to make it clear to Taiwan that, while it should not try to change the existing state of affairs, the U.S. would support its attempt to gain international space while also working to convince China that it would not let the situation get out of hand and would keep Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian from doing anything rash.125 This reflected a desire to convince the Chinese government that they were: not going to do anything to provoke them; opposed to unilateral changes to the status quo of the Taiwan Strait; and were not themselves attempting to change the status quo. The idea that this became the administration’s approach to the Taiwan Strait for the rest of its time in office is supported by the fact that it publicly opposed Taiwan’s push for a referendum on UN membership in 2007.126
As a result, one official stated that it should have been clear that the George Bush administration would act when China had legitimate concerns and that it would not initiate significant changes from past policy.127 Administration officials also viewed the
Chinese government as becoming aware of the fact that over time the George Bush
123 U.S. Interview #14, Washington, D.C., May 18, 2011; Kenneth Lieberthal, “Preventing a War Over Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs 84, 2 (March/April 2005): 53-55. 124 Philip Yang, “Doubly Dualist Dilemma: U.S. Strategies Towards China and Taiwan,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 6 (2006), 223. 125 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011. 126 Thom Shanker and Helene Cooper, “Rice Has Sharp Words for Taiwan, as Gates Does for China,” The New York Times, December 22, 2007, accessed September 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/22/world/asia/22diplo.html. 127 U.S. Interview #14, Washington, D.C., May 18, 2011.
146 administration frustration with President Chen Shui-bian had increased, a development that they leveraged to get the U.S. to act.128
At the same time that the U.S. was working to convince China that it was not trying to change the status quo and the two countries reached a limited understanding regarding the status of Taiwan in their bilateral relationship, China’s ongoing military buildup by the Taiwan Strait129 continued to lead the U.S. to prepare for worst-case scenarios. These preparations included: changes to the U.S.’s military posture in the region, such as the buildup on Guam and the upgrading of relations with Japan and
Australia; the pressure that it exerted on the EU to maintain its arms embargo on China; and the development of interoperability in relations with the Taiwanese military.130
While the GPR discusses how Guam’s central location ensures that it is relevant to numerous challenges in the region, the fact that it is only a four-hour flight from Taiwan ensures that deterring China from acting aggressively in the strait is one of them.
These developments signaled to China that it should not attempt to change the status quo and helped to prepare the U.S. for the possibility of a conflict in the strait. Perhaps more so than any other functional area of U.S. policy, its approach to the Taiwan Strait therefore reflects the logic of both engagement and balancing.
128 U.S. Interview #12, Washington, D.C., May 6, 2011. 129 “The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2005,” Department of Defense, U.S., especially 31-32; Jim Yardley and Thom Shanker. “Chinese Navy Buildup Gives Pentagon New Worries.” The New York Times, April 8, 2005. Accessed September 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/08/international/asia/08china.html. 130 Victor Mallet, “Fears of Attack on Taiwan Increase,” The Financial Times, April 6, 2005, accessed September 5, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/1/1c01c46e-a6d3-11d9- a6df-00000e2511c8.html#axzz2e4Kd7YAI.
147 The Maritime Military Cooperation Agreement
The MMCA constitutes a component of strategic engagement. While the agreement was signed in January 1998, and therefore predates the George Bush administration, it remained an active channel of communication during the 2001-2009 period. As due to the fact that China lacked a worldwide navy and the U.S. was unwilling to afford it the same status that Russia had held during the Cold War, it had been unwilling to sign an
Incidents at Sea Agreement.131 As a result, they instead signed the less encompassing
MMCA. However, the fact that it was agreed to at the highest level of the militaries was significant and can be viewed as sending a cooperative signal.132 It had been undertaken with the goal of establishing a forum for communication intended to avoid accidental conflicts between American and Chinese forces at sea and in flight. Article two of the agreement stated that talks would cover “measures to promote safe maritime practices and establish mutual trust such as search and rescue, communications procedures when ships encounter each other, interpretation of the rules of the nautical road, and avoidance of accidents-at-sea.”133 However, it did not include rules for communication during crises.
The third plenary session, the first round of meetings held during the Bush years, took place on Guam in September 2001 with discussions focused on the avoidance of incidents similar to the recent EP3 crisis. During the sixth plenary session, which was held in August 2006 in Hawaii, agreement was reached to: establish communications protocol; plan communications and maneuver exercises; and draft plans for a two-phase search and rescue exercise. As a result, in the Fall of 2006 the first joint exercise was held
131 U.S. Interview #10, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2011. 132 U.S. Interview #6, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011. 133 U.S. Department of Defense, “Agreement on Establishing a Consultative Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety,” January 19, 1998.
148 under the MMCA, eight years after the talks had been initiated. However, by 2007 its value was in doubt, as substantive progress had remained elusive and no plenary meetings or working groups took place that year. When meetings were reconvened in
2008, the U.S. opposed PLA proposals to discuss policy differences at the MMCA and to plan the details of future military exercises.134
Bureaucratically the agreement is managed by Pacific Command and cannot be characterized as having been a high priority for President George Bush, as he did not communicate it as a directive.135 However, the administration did want to have a venue for the discussion of tactical and operational safety, dealing with low-level issues, and cooperation where appropriate.136 Ultimately, the EP3 incident revealed that it was a weak agreement and the administration concluded that they could not do very much with it. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage also went as far as to describe it as
“useless” in 2007137 and retired Rear Admiral Eric McVadon has argued that it has produced “disappointingly little substance.”138 Therefore, while the administration attempted to use it to engage with Beijing on tactical issues, and it did remain an open channel during the Bush years, it cannot be described as sending a strong signal.
The QDR and NSSUS
Due to their public nature and the large amount of attention that they receive both domestically and abroad, the QDR and NSSUS documents are often viewed as
134 Kahn, “U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress,” 26. 135 Ibid. 136 U.S. Interview #13, Washington, D.C. 17, May 17, 2011. 137 U.S. Interview #14, Washington, D.C. 5, May 18, 2011. 138 Eric McVadon, “China and the U.S. on the High Seas,” China Security 3, 4 (Autumn 2007): 14.
149 constituting significant components of an administration’s security policy. As a result of the content outlined in the timeline chapter, these documents can also appear to have been very significant for the George Bush administration’s China policy. The fact that they also used the terminology of “hedging” and “responsible stakeholder” also creates the impression that they were a highly significant reflection of the administration’s thinking on China policy during this period.
While the fact that these documents receive a lot of attention from foreign governments and scholars who are only able to access non-classified materials is understandable, administration officials argue that they are far less significant than many view them to be and were of limited importance to the signaling of U.S. intentions toward
China. In practice, high-level officials did not view them as providing guidance during policy planning meetings.139 Furthermore, as Congress requires these reports, officials were inclined to view them as “homework assignments” that had to be done before they could return to their “real work.”140 The fact that they are the product of committee review also ensures that they are less likely to reflect the thinking and priorities of the
President and cabinet officials. As a result, it is argued that most high-level officials are only vaguely aware of what these documents actually say.141
While some officials recognized that their Chinese counterparts read these documents closely, since engagement goes so much deeper, there was minimal worry that they would be one of the primary channels through which the administration’s intentions
139 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011. 140 Ibid. 141 U.S. Interview #11, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2011.
150 would be signaled.142 As a result, the fact that they used the terminology of “hedging” and “responsible stakeholder” should not be construed as evidence that they summed up the thinking and policy of the administration.
At the same time, while it was not intended to send a signal to China, one official conceded that the 2006 NSSUS did provide a good articulation of the balance that the administration had settled on between engagement and balancing during its second term.143 This reflected an evolution away from its initial stance, which had been informed by the worry that the Bill Clinton administration had been had been too enamored with
China and therefore had undervalued allies in the region. Regardless of whether these documents were guiding the thinking of the administration, the fact that both the 2006
QDR, NSSUS, and Report on the Military Power of the PRC all utilized the “responsible stakeholder” language during a period in which senior administration officials were also using this term in public statements ensured that they were reinforcing the broader signal that was being sent. As a result, while by themselves these documents provided limited insights into the thinking of high-level officials responsible for formulating policy, they did impart some information about the concepts the bureaucracies that produced them were using to analyze the relationship and the terms officials were publicly using to describe policy.
A Relationship that is Constructive, Cooperative, and Candid (and Complex)
Beginning in 2003, President George Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice made statements that the U.S. and China
142 Ibid. 143 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011.
151 had a “candid, constructive, and cooperative” relationship. This related to Secretary of
State Colin Powell’s earlier argument that there was no bumper sticker slogan that could be used to sum up such a multifaceted relationship and that the administration wanted to avoid trying to use one. Later, it was expanded to 4Cs with the addition of “complex.”
High-level U.S. officials did not give much thought to how the Chinese government would interpret this and it was not the subject of strategic debate.144 By the time discussions reach the level of principal meetings no one cares very much about these terms, as they focus on issues like mil-mil, arms sales to Taiwan, and which officials are going to be sent to meetings.145 President George Bush in particular would laugh at people who tried to tell him which terms to use during pre-briefings before meetings with
Chinese officials.146 As a result, while almost everyone would agree that these terms fit with the broad logic of the relationship, and many would recognize that Chinese officials would read into it, they would not describe their enunciation as part of an attempt to signal their intentions. The 3Cs should therefore not be viewed as summing up the U.S.’s aspirations for the relationship.147
One official stated that other governments do not make an issue out of terms like this and only in relations with China is it a concern.148 While some have viewed the use
144 U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011. 145 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011. 146 Ibid. 147 U.S. Department of State, “Briefing on Trip to Asia,” July 29, 2001, accessed on September 22, 2012, http://20012009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/4347.htm. 148 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011.
152 of this description as reflecting an evolution in policy away from “strategic competitor,” it is argued that no one in the administration saw these terms as mutually exclusive.149
While diplomatic language of this sort was less important than it may have appeared, a number of officials concede that it did communicate some information. First, this terminology began to be used in 2003 at the same time that they were working with
China in ways that would have been unimaginable two years earlier and therefore reflected changes in the bilateral relationship.150 Second, the fact that George Bush administration NSC Staff member Michael Green publicly stated that it is inaccurate for
“complex” to be translated into Chinese as “complexity” and to emphasize the difficulties and uncertainties faced by the relationship indicated that some officials attached specific meanings to these terms. He argued that “comprehensive” would be more in line with what had been meant.151 While there was clearly no consensus across the administration to use these terms with a goal in mind, there is evidence that at least some high-level administration officials had considered what they meant and were concerned that they be interpreted accurately. Ultimately, the fact that that they were using less confrontational sounding language communicated some desire to improve relations even if most officials had not given the specific terms a great deal of thought.
The motivation for including “candid” as one of the Cs was to establish a domestic foundation for the relationship, not to signal something to China.152 Chinese
149 U.S. Interview #4, Washington, D.C., May 26, 2011. 150 Ibid. 151 Chen Dongxiao, “‘Fuzaxing’ yu ZhongMei Guanxi Jiegou de Xin Bianhua,” (Complexity and the New Change in the Structure of Sino-American Relations) Meiguo Yanjiu 2 (2006). 152 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011.
153 officials were viewed as increasingly appreciating this sort of candor and the fact that the administration did not waste time on empty polite talk.153
Relations with Friends and Allies in the Asia Pacific
The move to upgrade bilateral security relations with security partners in the Asia
Pacific constitutes a case of strategic hedging. While the 2002 NSSUS may not have guided officials during policymaking meetings, it summed up the logic of this approach in its statement that the U.S. would “implement its strategies by organizing coalitions –as broad as practicable– of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.” It also highlighted Japan and Australia with the goal of “develop[ing] a mix of regional and bilateral strategies to manage change in this dynamic region.”154
As previously mentioned, this approach was rooted in the thinking outlined by the
Armitage Report that the allies, and Japan in particular, had not been paid sufficient attention by the Bill Clinton administration. As the new administration believed that the alliance system maintains peace and prosperity in Asia, they held this to be a major problem.155 The fact that it was during the Bush years that China began to become an international actor of consequence also ensured that the role of the allies received more attention. The administration’s out-in approach to Asia therefore prioritized strengthening the alliances and using them as a foundation China policy.156 As doing so communicated that China should not overestimate its own importance and forget the fact that the U.S.
153 Ibid. 154 U.S. Department of State, National Security Strategy of the United States (2002). 155 U.S. Interview #13, Washington, D.C., May 17, 2011. 156 U.S. Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 12, 2011.
154 had far better relations in the region, this approach was expected to make Sino-American security relations easier to manage.
In the words of Ashley Tellis, who was involved in formulating the administration’s policy toward India, as they did not limit the American economic relationship with China, nor did the U.S. pressure its allies to do so, their policy enabled everyone to continue to enjoy the benefits of trade with China while also creating a basis for “constraining potential Chinese behavior without containing” it.157 Using relations with friends and allies in the region to hedge against undesired Chinese behavior also served to create incentives for China to rise in a direction that did not threaten U.S. interests or those of its friends and allies. Thomas Christensen has argued that since
China would not want to drive these countries closer to the U.S. than absolutely necessary, these security alliances provided incentives for it to moderate its policies and to pursue stable relations with both the U.S. and its Asian neighbors.158
The upgrading of the alliances and security relations could therefore serve to deter the sort of behavior that they would also be useful for responding to. The logic of this approach is reflected in Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s statement that:
The U.S.-Japan relationship, the U.S.-South Korean relationship, the U.S.-Indian relationship all are important in creating an environment in which China is more likely to play a positive than a negative role. These alliances are not against China; they are devoted to a stable security, political, economic, and, indeed, values-based relationships that put China in the context of those relationships, and a different path to development than if China were simply untethered, operating without that strategic context.159
157 Tellis, “U.S.-China Relations in a Realist World,” 92. 158 Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?,” 98. 159 Condoleezza Rice, remarks at Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan, March 19, 2005, accessed January 28, 2013, http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43655.htm.
155 Supporting the regional allies in playing a more important role in the region, and helping them to develop their own capabilities, therefore served to maintain the U.S.’s strategic position and interests by creating limitations on China’s freedom of action.
Regardless of whether or not the allies chose to align with the U.S. against China on individual issues, this approach would serve to shape China’s security environment in ways that benefited U.S. interests.160 In contrast to the logic of containment, this strategy would therefore succeed if allies attempted to work to maintain good relations with both the U.S. and China, with China also working to improve relations with the allies in order to prevent them from aligning against it.
However, relations with the allies cannot be viewed a solely motivated by China, as on their own merits the U.S. has reasons to engage deeply with Australia, India, Japan,
Singapore and others. As an aggregate they may also be more important to American interests than China is. It should also be noted that, while in 2001 and 2005 when Japan remained the world’s second largest economy, China only ranked number six in 2001 and number five in 2005.161 The George Bush administration therefore saw no reason why it should sacrifice relations with all of these countries in order to have a positive relationship with China.162 While officials were aware of the fact that China did not like the developments taking place around its periphery, this was not a major concern.163
160 Tellis, “Power Shift,” 7. 161 “IMF Historical Nominal Data (April 2011),” accessed January 15, 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/download.aspx. 162 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011. 163 U.S. Interview #4, Washington, D.C., April 26, 2011.
156 Japan
The case for a central role for Japan in America’s Asia policy had been highlighted in October 2000 with the publishing of the Armitage Report, which criticized
President Bill Clinton’s decision not to follow through on the security agenda set out in the 1996 U.S.-Japan Tokyo declaration due to concerns about China’s response.164 It had also emphasized the role that Japan could play as a global partner with the U.S. and called for enhanced defense industry cooperation, especially for missile defense.
One of the authors of the report stated that it was intended to communicate to
China that the next administration’s approach to Asia would be different from that of its predecessor and that it would value the regional allies.165 In particular, it was intended to communicate the fact that cooperation with Japan would not be limited, as it was primarily driven by the threat from the DPRK.166 As a result, while the Armitage Report and upgrade of the U.S.-Japan alliance were not primarily motivated by China, they also contained a message that there was a consensus in the region regarding the value of the alliances.167 The fact that so many of the authors came into power shortly after it was published was unique and can be expected to have strengthened the signal that it sent.168
By late 2003, Japan had begun to move toward working with the U.S. to develop a missile defense network in the Asia Pacific in order to address the possibility of a
164 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration of Security Alliance for the 21st Century,” April 17, 1996, accessed January 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html; Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye et al. “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Advancing Toward A Mature Partnership,” (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2000). 165 U.S. Interview #11, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2011. 166 U.S. Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 12, 2011. 167 U.S. Interview #11, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2011. 168 Ibid.
157 missile attack from the DPRK. On December 19, 2003, it announced that it would purchase a two-stage defense system from the U.S. in order to shield major Japanese cities from such an attack.169 In February 2004, the U.S. and Japan also agreed to update the Acquisition and Cross Services Agreement (ACSA), which had previously limited
Japanese support for U.S. forces to bilateral exercises and training; UN Peacekeeping
Operations (UNPKO); humanitarian relief operations; and operations in response to situations surrounding Japan. After the amendment, it also applied to: operations in armed attack situations; situations in which an attack was expected; and operations meant to further efforts of the international community to contribute to international peace and security.170 In June 2004, Japan went further with the passing of seven security bills that were intended to “strengthen war contingency plans” and to facilitate cooperation with the U.S. in the event of an attack.
By late 2005, Japan had also taken major steps toward cooperation with the U.S. on ballistic missile defense, as it had started operating the common sea-based AEGIS combat system equipped air warfare destroyer and was working with the U.S. to develop interceptor missiles.171 Under the Washington agreement from 2004, the U.S. deployed the X-band anti-missile radar system in Japan and the allies shared information and coordinated responses. As missile defense requires “seamless communication and
169 Michael Richardson, “Major Shift in Japanese Defense Policy,” The Straits Times, December 29, 2003. 170 Frank Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: Has Japan Become the Great Britain of Asia?,” Issues and Insights 3 (March 2005), 10. 171 Ibid.
158 operability across huge bureaucracies,” it has been viewed as integrating the U.S. and
Japanese militaries to an “unprecedented degree.”172
China’s response to the upgrade of relations between the U.S. and Japan was not something that was debated by the NSC Staff. As the X-band anti-missile system in
Japan and the enhanced degree of jointery, the ability of militaries to work together in a highly integrated fashion, and bureaucratic integration that this necessitated were directed toward contingencies on the Korean peninsula, China was not a major factor.173
However, it was not necessarily a bad thing if it did worry China, as it might lead it to realize that the status quo was not going to move in its favor and therefore to work harder to resolve the threat posed by the DPRK’s nuclear program.174 While a change in
China’s approach may have been an indirect outcome of the U.S. stance toward the
DPRK, this cannot be described as the result of an actual strategy. This is due to the fact that the incremental and crisis driven nature of the policymaking process ensured that it would be difficult for them to think that strategically. 175
As a result, it is inaccurate to claim that they were linking their relationship with
Japan to China’s policy toward the DPRK. Furthermore, as the George Bush administration had constant dialogues with China about the DPRK, if they perceived such a link as developing, Chinese officials had numerous opportunities to ask their American
172 Cossa and Glosserman, “U.S. Japan Defense Cooperation,” 17. 173 U.S. Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 12, 2011. 174 Ibid. 175 Ibid.; U.S. Interview #12, Washington, D.C., May 6, 2011; U.S. Interview #6, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011.
159 counterparts questions.176 This was seen as especially true at the beginning of the Six
Party Talks.
Ultimately, many U.S. officials view the Chinese government as too self- referential on issues like the U.S.-Japan alliance. Kim Jong-Il was taking multiple steps that required a response and Japan’s geographical position meant that it was a logical partner with whom to respond.177 The launching of the Taepodong missile in 1998 was the key part of the context of the subsequent developments that took place in the alliance and had directly led to Japan contributing billions of dollars to upper-tier missile defense.178 As a result, since the George Bush administration wanted to have a more sensible forward defense posture in line with the threats that it faced, it was reconfiguring
American forces in Japan and the ROK.179 This was viewed as no more than common sense and not something that would signal anything to China.180 Officials argue that while it may be the case that China will always believe that the alliance is directed at it, this does not mean that the U.S. should change its policy. As the threat from the DPRK was the overriding concern, any negative affect that the upgrade might have on relations with China was a price that would have to be paid and was worth paying.181
While the U.S.-Japan alliance is relevant to the U.S.’s policy toward China and one official stated that they want China to be a little nervous, as it will make it realize that
176 U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011. 177 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011. 178 Ibid. 179 For a discussion of the George Bush administration’s policy toward the DPRK during it’s first year and a half in office and the role that relations that Japan and the ROK played in it, see Victor Cha, “Korea’s Place in the Axis,” Foreign Affairs 81, 3 (May/June 2002): especially 90-92. 180 Ibid. 181 U.S. Interview #10, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2011.
160 they do not have a free pass to act as they please in the region, this does not mean that the
U.S. thinks about China during every development in relations with Japan.182 In practice, decision makers are unlikely to think this strategically and long-term about the broader ramifications of incremental developments.183
As previously mentioned, the 2005 U.S.-Japan 2+2 meetings led to the release of a Joint Statement on security affairs. It described the peaceful resolution of issues related to the Taiwan Strait as a matter of mutual concern and also encouraged China to improve its transparency in military affairs.184 This document was intended to be a comprehensive list of things that concerned policymakers in the U.S. and Japan and security issues that they wanted to address.185 As the State Department, Defense Department, and the NSC
Staff all supported the resulting Joint Statement, it can be viewed as representing the
U.S.’s stance toward the alliance.
The statement resulted from the fact that during the course of bilateral discussions it had become clear that both sides would benefit from outlining all of the issues that tied them together.186 This also went along with the evaluation of the troop deployment. One participant in the talks argued that as these were their goals, they did not spend a lot of time considering the broader ramifications of including a phrase about the status of the
Taiwan Strait, or China and Taiwan’s likely perceptions about what this statement meant.
As a result, while they were aware of the fact that they would pay attention to the
182 U.S. Interview #3, Washington, D.C., April 22, 2011. 183 U.S. Interview #6, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011. 184 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” March 19, 2005, accessed September 26, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html. 185 U.S. Interview #3, Washington, D.C., April 22, 2011. 186 Ibid.
161 resulting joint statement, and did not mind, sending some sort of signal to either party, this was not among their primary aims.187
The fact that there was minimal debate between the U.S. and Japan over the wording of the sections about the Taiwan Strait and of welcoming China’s peaceful role in the region indicates that this was not an issue where they held significantly different views.188 Instead, most of the discussions were focused on Japan’s regional and global role. As Japan agreed that it needed to be more active in both Asian and international affairs,189 the U.S.’s invitation to Japan had amounted to asking: “How far can you go?
What can you say?”190 As a result, there was not a lot of time spent on how other countries would perceive or respond to the upgraded relationship. Since the resulting document did not present a stance that should have been surprising to any third parties, the U.S.’s subsequent response to China was that there was not anything new in the statement beyond the fact that they were saying it together.191 Furthermore, while it is not surprising that China saw enhanced cooperation between the U.S. and Japan as undesirable, this does not necessarily mean that it actually viewed it as a real threat.192
While some officials may not have been focused on China’s response, others were interested in using the 2+2 Joint Statement to send China a message. This is due to the fact that the Taiwan Strait was less stable at the time it was released as a result of the
187 Ibid. 188 Ibid. 189 For example, see Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s first speech to the National Diet: “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the 151st Session of the Diet,” Tokyo, Japan, May 7, 2001, accessed August 20, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/speech0105.html. 190 U.S. Interview #3, Washington, D.C., April 22, 2011. 191 Ibid. 192 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011.
162 PLA’s arms buildup that was taking place partially in response to Taiwanese President
Chen Shui-bian’s policy toward Taiwan’s status. As a result, some U.S. officials wanted
China to realize that Japan was also involved.193 It was hoped that this would reduce the possibility that China’s preference would shift toward dealing with the issue of Taiwan’s status in the short term. As administration officials did not have a clear idea of what the leaders of the PLA were thinking, it was necessary to make deterrence on this issue as clear as possible. As a result, offending China’s sensitivities regarding Japan’s historical relationship with Taiwan was viewed as a price worth paying.194 As the language regarding the Taiwan Strait did not appear in the Joint Statement released after the 2007
2+2,195 it can be concluded that its inclusion in 2005 was in response to the Anti-
Secession Law that had been passed by China. One senior Chinese academic who participates in high-level policy talks confirmed that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had told them as much and that Chinese leaders believed her explanation.196
While beginning in 2006 the TSD took on more importance, the U.S.-Japan alliance’s role in the George Bush administration’s security policy toward Asia was most significant during the period that Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was in power. As subsequent Japanese leaders were less able to get things done and the Six Party Talks became the priority in Asia, it led to diminished reliance on the alliance and therefore
193 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011. 194 Ibid. 195 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation,” May 1, 2007, accessed January 20, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0705.html. 196 Chinese Interview #22, Beijing, China, January 17, 2012.
163 reduced confidence regarding what it could accomplish.197 As a result, signals that the upgrade in the alliance did send China were strongest during the period of 2001-2005.
India
During the presidential campaign in 2000, candidate George Bush had already begun to outline a new approach to India when he stated that “this coming century will see democratic India’s arrival as a force in the world . . . India is now debating its future and its strategic path, and the U.S. must pay it more attention.”198 Condoleezza Rice’s article in Foreign Affairs had also referred to the role that India played in the U.S.’s foreign policy calculations. Once in power, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice began to communicate their desire to their Indian counterparts to move past the sanctions the U.S. had imposed on India with the Glen Amendments following its nuclear tests in 1999 in order to upgrade the relationship and security cooperation. With 9/11, the U.S.’s priorities in South Asia changed as it placed more focus on gaining Pakistan’s support on antiterrorism and therefore ensuring that India would not escalate the conflict over Kashmir. While negotiations continued during the rest of the administration’s first term regarding the form that an expanded partnership could take and how to deal with the U.S. sanctions, no major changes took place before 2005. Former U.S. Ambassador to India, Robert
197 U.S. Interview #11, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2011. 198 Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism.”
164 Blackwill, attributed this to bureaucratic resistance from the State Department officials focused on non-proliferation and the hyphenation of policy toward India and Pakistan.199
With the beginning of the administration’s second term, this quickly changed and one of Condoleezza Rice’s first trips abroad as Secretary of State was to New Delhi in
March 2005. During this trip, she offered her Indian counterparts a new strategic deal and promised that the U.S. would “de-hyphenate” its policies toward India and Pakistan.200 In
July of that year, the George Bush administration held a summit with India in
Washington that involved formulating agreements on “common security objectives” and the signing of a nuclear deal (subject to ratification by Congress), which provided India with de facto recognition as a nuclear state.201 The administration therefore removed a number of sanctions on India, which in turn provided the U.S. with backing on missile defense. Ahead of the summit, the U.S. also made its interest in cooperation on advanced weaponry known.202 The administration’s attitude toward India and its global role was clarified further by language in a State Department background briefing that it intended
“to help India become a major world power in the twenty-first century” and that it
“[understood] the implications, including the military implications, of that statement.”203
This was reinforced by the announcement that the U.S. would support requests from
199 Robert Blackwill, “The Indian Imperative,” The National Interest, June 1, 2005, accessed January 28, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-india-imperative-578. 200 Nicholas Burns, “America’s Strategic Opportunity with India: The New U.S.-India Partnership,” Foreign Affairs 6 (November/December 2007): 135. 201 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,” July 18, 2005, accessed August 20, 2013, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718- 6.html. 202 BBC, June 26, 2005. 203 “Background Briefing by Administration Officials on U.S.-South Asia Relations,” The State Department, March 25, 2005.
165 India for “transformative systems in areas such as command and control, early warning, and missile defense.”204 As making arms sales and nuclear cooperation possible would require the administration to expend a large amount of political capital, it was therefore clear that these were significant developments.
As cooperation with India was also relevant to American interests in antiterrorism, guarding against proliferation, and promoting democracy, it cannot be characterized as solely directed at balancing against China. Furthermore, as a state with well over one billion people in a strategically important region and a growing market, the U.S. had reasons to value strategic relations with India that did not target third parties.
Former Defense Department official Dan Blumenthal argues that: “Washington is not interested in creating a satellite or a client state; it genuinely is interested in having a prosperous, democratic, and powerful India as a partner.”205
At the same time, as Ashley Tellis has stated, India is “the one major Asian continental power that had both the capacity and the incentives to balance China.”206
Reshaping the previously estranged relationship with India would therefore “help to preserve a regional equilibrium that favored the U.S.”207 While the new level of Indo-
American cooperation was therefore far broader than a simple hedge against the uncertainties associated with China’s rise, the development of India’s capabilities that would result from enhanced relations with the U.S. would also increase its capacity to internally balance against China for its own reasons. Assisting India was therefore in the
204 Ibid. 205 Dan Blumenthal, “Will India be a Better Strategic Partner Than China?” in Gauging U.S.-Indian Strategic Cooperation, Henry Sokolski, Ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 325. 206 Tellis, “U.S.-China Relations in a Realist World,” 92. 207 Ibid., 92.
166 U.S.’s interest regardless of whether or not it would become a dependable partner that would be willing to align with the U.S. on specific issues vis-a-vis China.
The focus placed on relations with India during the administration’s second term undercuts the argument that the approach advocated by the Armitage Report atrophied over time as the responsible stakeholder template placed more focus on working with
China.208 While relations with Japan may have received less attention during the administration’s second term as the U.S. attempted to work with China to manage the challenge presented by the DPRK’s nuclear program, Japanese politics after Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s tenure and an aging society also potentially served to limit what Japan had to offer. In contrast, India’s population, demographics, economic potential, and concerns regarding China’s strategic intentions ensured that it presented an enormous opportunity for maintaining a balance of power in Asia that favors U.S. interests. As Robert Blackwill stated during a speech in New Delhi in 2009:
President George W. Bush based his transformation of US-India relations on the core strategic principle of democratic India as a key factor in balancing the rise of Chinese power. To be clear, this was not based on the concept of containing China. As you know, there is no better way to clear a room of Indian strategists than to advocate containing China. Rather, it centered on the idea that the United States and India in the decades ahead both had enormous equities in promoting responsible international policies on the part of China and that deep US-India bilateral cooperation in that respect was in the vital national interests of both countries. It was with this strategic paradigm in mind that the Bush Administration treated Indian with at least as much importance as China.209
While no policy is perfectly implemented, this supports the conclusion that during the George Bush administration’s second term it continued to hedge against Chinese
208 Swaine, America’s Challenge, 57. 209 Robert Blackwill, “The Future of U.S. India Relations.” (Speech Given to the Confederation of Indian Industries, New Delhi, May 5, 2009), accessed January 21, 2013, http://www.stratpost.com/the-future-of-us-india-relations-blackwill.
167 power while simultaneously working to expand dialogue and cooperation with China and to promote the logic of the responsible stakeholder template.
As the development of bilateral relations with India constituted a major development, both Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Robert Blackwill wrote articles that made reference to the connection between relations with India and China,210 and the U.S. was well aware of its sensitivities regarding missile defense, it is reasonable to conclude that the administration understood how these changes would be viewed by
China. During his speech in New Delhi, Robert Blackwill went as far as to state that: “In any case, without this China factor at the fore in Washington, in my view the Bush administration would not have negotiated the civil nuclear agreement and the Congress would not have approved it.”211
Australia and the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue
The genesis of the TSD was somewhat unusual. Prior to a bilateral AUSMIN meeting between the U.S. and Australia, Secretary of State Colin Powell’s briefing had stated that the subject of developing a dialogue like the TSD might be raised. While the possibility was not ultimately discussed, when he was asked during the subsequent press conference whether it had been, he responded affirmatively.212 The reason that it was later moved up from the deputy to the principal level in 2006 was that it did not appear that Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick was interested in it and NSC Staff member
210 Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” 56; Blackwill, “A New Deal For New Delhi.” 211 Blackwill, “The Future of U.S. India Relations.” 212 Michael Richardson, “U.S. and Australia to Include Allies in Asia Dialogue,” The New York Times, August 1, 2001, accessed August 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/01/news/01iht-a6.html.
168 Michael Green convinced Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that it was worth doing.
One official argued that the agenda of the dialogue focused on: Iraq; reform of the
Security Council; Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), and more specifically tsunami relief.213 Furthermore, as a result of the responsible stakeholder template, there was less reason to think that this sort of development would be misinterpreted and end up contributing to the development of a security dilemma.
An alternate view from the Defense Department is that China was part of the focus, they were thinking about different ways to check it, and that Australia and Japan were highly engaged in the process.214 This was due to the fact that the U.S. and its allies were attempting to better understand an increasingly capable China that was now better positioned to attain its security interests. The TSD also fit with the U.S. goal of encouraging Japan to take on a normalized regional and global role.215 This is supported by State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack‘s statement that discussion focused on how to ensure that China was a positive force in the region.216
Administration officials stated that minimal debate took place regarding how
China would interpret this development and any signals that it might send.217 While it may have seen the TSD as sending signals that it did not like, this was acceptable and may have been desirable. Furthermore, as China has a trilateral dialogue with Russia and
India, and is also a party to the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement (SCO), it is argued that
213 U.S. Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 12, 2011. 214 U.S. Interview #6, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011. 215 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011. 216 Steven Weisman, “Rice Seeks to Balance China’s Power,” The New York Times, March 19, 2006, accessed November 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/international/asia/19rice.html. 217 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011; U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011.
169 it would be unreasonable for it to oppose or feel threatened by the TSD.218 If the development of dialogues like this were to have a significant negative affect on relations with China, it would indicate that there were more fundamental problems in the bilateral relationship.219 At the same time, the TSD was viewed as sending positive signals of
American engagement in the region toward Australia and Japan and cooperation between market-oriented democracies.
At the very least, the enhanced level of trilateral cooperation that the TSD facilitated in non-traditional security issues provided a foundation on which future multilateral security cooperation in balancing against China could be built. Furthermore, even if officials from the NSC Staff and the State Department did not view this as one of the purposes of the dialogue, officials from the Defense Department viewed it with this possibility in mind. It is also understandable that China would not welcome U.S. statements that ANZUS applied to contingencies in the Taiwan Strait220 and the upgrade of U.S.-Australia security relationship that took place with the signing of the 2007 U.S.-
Australia Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty.
The Quadrilateral Group
The members of the Quad were the core group of respondents who provided
HADR after the December 25, 2004 tsunami that caused significant damage in Indonesia.
The high level of cooperation that their coordinated response to this disaster involved was viewed as providing a foundation for continuing to do so on a more permanent basis.
218 U.S. Interview #4, Washington, D.C., April 26, 2011. 219 U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011. 220 John Kerin, “Downer Retreats on Taiwan,” The Australian, August 20, 2004.
170 Initially the result of an initiative from Japan, U.S. officials also viewed it as an opportunity to help expand Indo-American security relations.221 While China did not provide the motivation for the group to be formed, the identities of the members are strongly tied to the fact that they are democracies and this grouping demonstrated the fact that basic values matter to these countries.222 If they were to build a strong democratic order, it would also be possible to invite China to join after it had met the necessary standards.
As there were many in the administration who worried that China would view the formation of this group as part of a containment strategy, NSC Staff members tried to reassure Chinese officials that it was only a forum for discussions and sharing ideas, not a formal organization.223 The strength of the signal that the brief existence of this group sent would have been reduced by the fact that at any given time at least one of the grouping’s members was having second thoughts and there were therefore no indications that it was expanding.224 Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in particular wanted to downgrade it a level, as he was less interested and wanted to have a “Senior Dialogue” with China.225 It was not viewed as a priority for Assistant Secretary of State Christopher
Hill either, as he was focused on the Six Party Talks.226 With Iran also becoming more of
221 Ibid. 222 U.S. Interview #6, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011. 223 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011. 224 Brahma Challaney, “’Quad Initiative’: An Inharmonious Concert of Democracies,” The Japan Times, July 19, 2007, accessed September 24, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20070719bc.html. 225 U.S. Interview #11, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2011. 226 U.S. Interview #6, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011.
171 a pressing issue, there was less commitment to developing this group. Changing
American priorities therefore determined the administration’s level of interest.227
It is also argued that it is likely that China appreciated the fact that dealing with
India would be difficult. It is therefore believed that China would have been more worried if the U.S. had been providing significant support for India’s bid to join the UN
Security Council.228 Nor did the U.S. provide any backing for the possibility Australia had raised of India joining APEC, something else that China opposed.229
As a result, due to the fact that: Defense Department officials could be expected to view it as an opportunity to expand cooperation in an area that had utility for military relations on traditional security issues; the four members exercised together with
Singapore as a part of Exercise Malabar 2007 shortly after the group held its one meeting; and the members prior cooperation in HADR did not mean that China could not also be invited, ensured that the nascent grouping was of some relevance to the balancing component of U.S. policy. However, the fact that it did not go very far and the U.S. did not push the other members to remain involved after they expressed doubts ensures that it only signaled the type of grouping that China could face in the future, not one that it faced at present.
Singapore
Relations with Singapore had begun to strengthen with the signing of a bilateral trade agreement in 2002. This trend continued with the signing of the Strategic
227 Ibid. 228 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011. 229 Ibid.
172 Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security
(SFA). As the SFA covered cooperation on antiterrorism, antiproliferation, joint military exercises and training, policy dialogues, defense technology, and it had also opened the deep-water pier-equipped Changi naval base that was specifically designed to be able to accommodate aircraft carriers, Singapore has been one of America’s most enthusiastic partners in Asia. This is due to the fact that its security strategy “involves explicit reliance on the U.S.” and a preference for a regional security structure guaranteed by American power, which it views as having a positive influence on the region.230 Regardless of whether the term “quasi-alliance” was accurate, as the U.S. had recognized Singapore as a “major security cooperation power,” it was clear that relations had reached a new level.
Officials argue that this aspect of the George Bush administration’s policy toward
Asia was an example of the Pentagon taking advantage of the fact that Singapore is so forward looking with regard to regional security affairs. It therefore may be a bilateral relationship where the U.S. was not the more active partner, as the development of the military relationship was largely managed by Singapore.231 It is believed that it was thinking about how it could keep the U.S. engaged in the region and actions it could take that would facilitate this. The fact that they built a deep-water pier that was specifically designed for American aircraft carriers was highly significant to this effort. However, the
U.S. was not thinking about how China would perceive it.232
While the George Bush administration hoped that its relations with regional security partners would help to dissuade China from challenging it, cooperation with
230 Goh, “Singapore and the U.S.,” 3. 231 U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011. 232 Ibid.
173 Singapore was desirable for unrelated reasons. When the U.S. military is rotating carrier groups out of the Middle East, it needs a secure place to take on supplies. Singapore is ideal for this role, as it is perfectly situated geographically and poses no security challenges.233 In contrast, for various reasons, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and Japan are all problematic. However, while the U.S. values Singapore’s cooperation on antiterrorism and other issues, they were not attempting to make it a strategic partner, as it does not have that much to offer in that regard.234 As Singaporean officials are so forward thinking, it was assumed that they had considered China’s likely response and had informed it of what was happening.235 As they understand the U.S. government very well, and according to one high-ranking official have had the most skillful embassy in Washington for the last twenty-five years, this sort of communication would be expected to lead to a better understanding of the U.S. by China.236
The European Union Arms Embargo
The George Bush administration made no attempt to hide its attempt to ensure that the EU maintained its arms embargo against China. This was done in order to make it clear that it could still keep the EU in line on issues of relevance to security relations with China.237 As a result, President George Bush, the NSC Staff, and Congress coordinated on bills regarding the joint development of weapon systems that would be cut off if the arms embargo were lifted. This was therefore a signal to both the EU and
233 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011. 234 Ibid. 235 U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011. 236 Ibid. 237 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011.
174 China.238 In addition to the human rights concerns that had originally led to the enactment of the embargo, this was also motivated by the sensitive state of the Taiwan Strait resulting from the Chinese arms buildup that had been taking place in response to
President Chen Shui-bian’s stance on Taiwan’s status and China’s recent enactment of the Anti-Secession Law. As a result, the George Bush administration wanted to ensure that China understood that it should not consider attempting a military solution.239
The Global Posture Review
One NSC Staff member argued that many of the things the administration was doing in Asia in terms of its force posture that were intended to maintain a favorable long-term balance of power were second order effects of the GPR.240 They recognized that the balance of power in Asia was shifting partially as a result of China’s actions and wanted to respond. This was primarily Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s initiative and had been a subject of study long before it was announced in 2004. Had 9/11 not intervened, it is argued that this is likely where his focus would have remained.241
While the buildup on Guam included capabilities that would be of relevance to a conflict with China, they also had utility for a wide range of unrelated security issues in the Asia Pacific. The central location of Guam in the region also supports the conclusion that these capabilities were being deployed with multiple contingencies in mind. Building up in the Western Pacific while partially drawing down troop levels in South Korea is therefore very different from a buildup on the first island chain off of China’s eastern
238 U.S. Interview #13, Washington, D.C., May 17, 2011. 239 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011. 240 U.S. Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 12, 2011. 241 Ibid.
175 seaboard and of less value for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait. However, as this also removed restrictions on the missions for which they could be used resulting from the
U.S.-ROK alliance, this change of location was not entirely positive for China.
It has been reported that an awareness of how China would view the buildup was responsible for the fact that Pacific Command Commander Admiral William Fallon invited the PLA to send observers to the June 2006 Valiant Shield exercise that was held near Guam.242 This constituted a significant attempt to reassure China that was widely reported in the Chinese press.243 At the same time, as during a visit to Guam in 2007
Admiral William Fallon’s successor, Admiral Timothy Keating, acknowledged that the buildup was taking place partially as a result of concerns about tension over the Taiwan
Strait and the DPRK, it is clear that the U.S. military saw its new posture as relevant to contingencies connected to relations with China. He also stressed that there was a high degree of transparency regarding what they were doing and that it was not happening
“under the cover of darkness.”244 As with missile defense, it therefore cannot be concluded that the GPR was rapidly changing China’s security environment, as it constituted an incremental change.
The fact that the GPR also communicated that the U.S. was not ceding the region was therefore useful for reassuring allies and for clarifying its policy toward China. This reduced the possibility of misperceptions that could produce instability. The fact that facilities on Guam were not fully hardened against potential attacks also indicated that in
242 Shirley Kan and Larry Niksch, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 16, 2007), 20. 243 Yang Yi, “A Positive Signal Worth Paying Attention To,” The People’s Daily (Overseas Edition), May 18, 2006. 244 Kan and Niksch, “Guam,” 18.
176 the Asia Pacific the GPR reinforced the signal that the U.S. was hedging against future challenges in bilateral relations without assuming that conflict was inevitable.
The Senior Dialogue
The Senior Dialogue constituted a component of strategic engagement. It grew out of a suggestion from President Hu Jintao to President George Bush during a 2004
APEC forum meeting in which he requested “talks to look over the horizon and discuss the strategic framework of U.S.-China relations.”245 It also roughly coincided with the evolution in the administration’s China policy as they continued to expand cooperation on a wide variety of issues and six rounds of the Senior Dialogue took place during the period of August 2005 to December 2008. Talks were held between Deputy Secretary level officials on the U.S. side and Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo. They involved discussions of how the two countries could work together and with other countries on issues such as: Iraq; Afghanistan; the DPRK; Burma; Latin America; Africa; military transparency; antiterrorism; preventing the proliferation of WMDs; energy security; and reducing the risk of pandemics.246
As during this period China continued to become a more important international actor, and therefore enjoyed expanding influence on issues related to strategic stability, the Senior Dialogue was viewed as something that the U.S. needed to do, not something that was intended to signals its intentions.247 As the Chinese government does not make
245 U.S. Department of State, “Special Press Briefing on U.S.-China Senior Dialogue,” December 8, 2005, accessed September 23, 2012, http://2001- 2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/57803.htm. 246 Ibid. 247 U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2011.
177 major decisions before consensus has been reached, having a dialogue with all of the relevant high-level officials present was valuable. It was therefore an attempt to take
Chinese officials out of their comfort zone with more in-depth discussions that would allow the two sides to learn more about each other’s views.248 As a result, the development of the dialogue can be viewed as part of a broader trend that had taken place as China had become increasingly important to American interests.249
The U.S. Defense Department also wanted to get China to recognize the need for a strategic dialogue so they could discuss issues such as rules for cyber capabilities and weapons in space. It is argued that their shared interest in discussing these issues should be self-evident and therefore should not be tied to the overall state of military relations.250
While a minority of officials would have considered whether this provided an opportunity for the U.S. to reassure China regarding its intentions, the majority viewed it as a continuation of the attempts that President Richard Nixon had started to draw China into a larger range of international issues and to put the relationship in a broader context.251
The fact that they wanted to call it a “senior” dialogue, instead of a “strategic” dialogue, was motivated by the fact that they only wanted to have strategic dialogues with real allies and strategic partners and felt that giving it this status would devalue their real alliances and strategic partnerships and afford China a status that they did not believe it deserved.252 While Chinese officials appeared to resent this distinction, it is believed
248 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011. 249 U.S. Interview #7, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2012. 250 U.S. Interview #6, Washington, D.C., April 26, 2011. 251 U.S. Interview #5, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011. 252 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011.
178 that they understood what it signaled.253 Ultimately, they were viewed as valuing it, as in the past they have worried that their American counterparts do not take them seriously.254
In spite of the fact that the U.S. did not want to label a dialogue on strategic issues as such, the Senior Dialogue represents a significant expansion of bilateral dialogue and a new level of willingness on the part of the U.S. to engage with China as an equal. This served to highlight how much relations had changed since early 2001 and fit with the logic of the responsible stakeholder concept that Deputy Secretary of State Robert
Zoellick presented one month after the first round of the Senior Dialogue was held.
Responsible Stakeholder
The responsible stakeholder template constitutes a component of strategic engagement and a significant strategic statement regarding the administration’s goals in bilateral relations and aspirations for China’s international role. The logic underlying the concept was that China needed to be shown the price of being part of the club of major members of the international system. As a result, it was intended as a framework for its role and engagement that started from the global context, not as a scorecard for evaluating its performance on individual issues.255 It was therefore an attempt to put the relationship in a new strategic context during a period that the U.S. increasingly found itself running up against China on important security issues.256
In an evaluation of the meaning of the term “stakeholder,” Amitai Etzioni differentiates between being a community member in good standing and being an
253 Ibid. 254 U.S. Interview #9, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2011. 255 U.S. Interview #6, Washington, D.C., April 26, 2011. 256 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011.
179 “upstanding citizen of a state,” as more is expected of the former.257 He argues that the contributions made by the former are “voluntary, undergirded by informal norms and informal social controls” while the duties of the latter are set out in law with punishments meted out to those who fail to meet these requirements.258 The voluntary nature of a community member’s contributions can therefore be characterized as establishing a higher standard, as it goes beyond merely respecting the rules to actively making a contribution. Applied to international relations, this concept can therefore be understood as going beyond a request that China merely respect international laws and institutions toward encouraging it to make a contribution to global public goods and to respect norms.
As George Bush administration official Dan Blumenthal put it, “responsible stakeholders work to protect and strengthen the international system as it is currently constituted; they do not merely derive benefit from it.”259
During discussions about the meaning of the concept, U.S. officials presented their Chinese counterparts with a paper that argued that the opposite of a responsible stakeholder was a free rider.260 As a result, they were communicating to China that the
U.S. believed that it had to learn how to deal with its responsibilities.261 This was due to the fact that when a country engages more deeply abroad making the wrong decision can have real ramifications. America’s experience with Rwanda in the 1990s was presented
257 Amitai Etzioni, “Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?” International Affairs 87, 3 (2011): 542. 258 Ibid., 542. 259 Dan Blumenthal, “Is China at Present (or Will China Become) a Responsible Stakeholder in the International Community?” Reframing China Policy: The Carnegie Debates, June 11, 2007, 1, accessed August 23, 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Blumenthal_Responsible%20Stakeholder%20Final% 20Paper.pdf. 260 U.S. Interview #6, Washington, D.C., April 26, 2011. 261 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011.
180 as an example of what can happen when mistakes are made.262 It can therefore also be characterized as an attempt to influence how China conceived of its own interests and priorities, as these changes could not otherwise be expected to take place.263
While China initially interpreted it as meaning that it was a great power, Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s speech had meant that it would become one in the future and that being a responsible stakeholder was something that a great power should aspire to.264 This distinction was viewed as important due to the fact that China is very attentive to how it is treated by the U.S. and wants to be afforded status.265 Their high degree of consciousness regarding the particularities of different types of state visits and summits is viewed as an example of this outlook. However, as China is also seen as likely to attempt to push for more and to take advantage of the U.S. if it is granted the status that it wants right away, the administration did not want to imply that it believed that
China had already become a great power.
While the fact that there is no directly equivalent term in Chinese complicated translation, it was seen as resonating in China due to its own internal debate regarding the peaceful rise concept.266 The decision to have Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick accompany Chinese executive Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo on a visit to FDR’s
262 Ibid. 263 Bates Gill, “China Becoming a Responsible Stakeholder.” Reframing China Policy: The Carnegie Debates, June 11, 2007, 7, accessed August 23, 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Bates_paper.pdf. 264 U.S. Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 12, 2011. 265 Ibid. 266 U.S. Interview #6, Washington, D.C., April 26, 2011.
181 Hyde Park residence was intended to help drive home the idea of what it meant to be a stakeholder that contributes to the maintenance of the international order.267
Ultimately, Chinese officials were viewed as accepting the concept due to the fact that it could be taken as a complement.268 As U.S. officials believe that their Chinese counterparts understood what the speech meant, the main issue for them appeared to be the specific ramifications that it had for Sino-American relations and U.S. policy.269
While the presentation of a new global framework within which Sino-American relations could be understood was highly significant, it also reflected the consensus that emerged from a high-level strategic review regarding the implications of China’s rise and the U.S.’s position in Asia. As it was concluded that America’s position in and importance to Asia remained secure, China’s rise became to be seen as less of a transformative change for U.S. interests.270 Deeper engagement of China and encouraging it to play a larger role in bilateral, regional and international issues was therefore desirable and something that the U.S. could do confidently.
The idea that the “Japan-focused” approach advocated by the Armitage Report has been viewed by some as informing the administration’s policy during its first term with the “China focused” responsible stakeholder approach being of more importance to policy during its second term should not be taken too far, as the differences between them was not as large as they may appear. Michael Swaine has argued that there were not any contradictions between the two approaches due to the fact that they both endorsed a need for hedging and are instead distinguished by the degrees to which they focused on
267 Ibid. 268 U.S. Interview #8, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2011. 269 U.S. Interview #6, Washington, D.C., April 26, 2011. 270 Sutter. U.S.-China Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, 156.
182 engagement versus hedging.271 While the approach that the Armitage Report advocated for placed more focus on shaping China’s choices by focusing on relations with the allies and the approach that Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick supported was more optimistic that cooperative relations could be established, the latter made it clear that no country would risk its future in the face of uncertainties related to China’s rise.272
Furthermore, while Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s formulation included the statement that the U.S. respected China’s interests in the region implied that they could work together to shape the regional and global order, it did not provide any details regarding which Chinese interests it viewed as legitimate.273 As the 2006 NSSUS both encouraged China to be a responsible stakeholder and highlighted the global significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, James Przystup and Phillip Saunders argue that it amounted to an attempt to synthesize the two approaches.274 While they also argue that the 2006 NSSUS did not examine the operational issues involved in making them work together, and that a successful combination is difficult and requires careful coordination in order to maintain a balance between the military and diplomatic components,275 this assumes that the administration was consistently trying to coordinate the two sides.
As a result, while the responsible stakeholder template constituted a significant development in the administration’s policy toward China, it did not signify a radically different approach. Instead, it was a logical response to China’s growing importance to
U.S. interests that reflected a recalibration in the relationship between engagement and
271 Swaine, America’s Challenge, 58. 272 Przystup and Saunders, “Visions of Order,” 3. 273 Ibid., 3. 274 Ibid., 4. 275 Ibid., 5-6.
183 balancing. It also recognized the cooperative and competitive directions China could take in the future and the utility of dialogue and communication to avoiding conflict.
Bureaucratic Politics
Administration officials believed that the fact that signals on things like the TSD were coming from the White House and the State Department as well as the Defense
Department was significant, as China would interpret signals differently if they had only come from the latter.276 While it is natural for the Defense Department to focus on the long-term balance of power and the State Department to focus on China’s immediate response and bureaucratic politics played a role in shaping the administration’s policy toward the Asia Pacific, there was also a high degree of consensus on issues like relations with Japan and India.277 The factor that was viewed as mattering the most was the fact that President George Bush was consistent and clear.278 As a result, when he said one thing and the Defense Department did something else that China did not like, it is believed that they saw him as more credible.279
Developments such as the Chinese government’s decision to set up a
Congressional study group reflect the fact that over time it has come to a better appreciate the role of different departments of the U.S. government.280 They have also come to a better understanding of how factors like the Taiwan lobby can shape policy and have realized that bellicose statements on Taiwan’s status increase the likelihood that arms
276 U.S. Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 12, 2011. 277 U.S. Interview #6, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2011. 278 U.S. Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 12, 2011. 279 U.S. Interview #2, Washington, D.C., April 20, 2011. 280 U.S. Interview #13, Washington, D.C., May 17, 2011.
184 sales will be approved.281 China is also viewed as appreciating the fact that important divisions can also exist within one department and that even the Pentagon was not entirely unified on China policy.282
While bureaucratic politics plays a role in policy toward China, it is argued that the importance of the priorities of individual officials is an important part of this dynamic.
It is expected that with the arrival of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, China likely came to view American bureaucratic politics as less important, as they had not trusted his predecessor Donald Rumsfeld.283 As previously mentioned, Deputy Secretary of State
Robert Zoellick was also less interested in the TSD then his predecessor Richard
Armitage had been. This priority can be contrasted with Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage’s much stronger focus on placing relations with Japan at the center of
America’s policy toward the Asia Pacific. As a result, it can be argued that, while weapons systems “take on a bureaucratic life of their own,” the type of diplomatic signals that the administration sent China were affected by changes in high-level personnel.284
Theoretical Implications
As the offensive realist hypothesis posits that the distribution of power capabilities shapes how states perceive each other and that current policy is of minimal importance, it does not expect developments in U.S. policy to shape Chinese security elites’ perceptions of U.S. intentions. The evolution of U.S. policy will therefore not be
281 U.S. Interview #9, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2011. 282 U.S. Interview #2, Washington, D.C., April 20, 2011. 283 U.S. Interview #9, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2011. 284 Christopher Twomey, “Opportunity in U.S. China Policy Since 9/11: Grasping Tactical Success,” Asian Survey 17 (July/August 2007): 555.
185 afforded importance. At most, this evolution will be viewed as a product of changes in the balance of power, not as something that possesses its own causal weight. Nor will changes in policy be understood as evidence of changing intentions, as intentions are also a reflection of the balance of power.
In contrast, the defensive realist/rationalist hypothesis expects U.S. policy to be perceived accurately. Chinese security elites will focus on costly signals that reveal credible information about U.S. goals. These will include missile defense, relations with friends and allies, and the GPR, as decisions regarding weapon systems and military posture indicate whether it has benign or malign intentions. As defense has the advantage in bilateral relations, the limited scale of U.S. actions in all of these areas and the multiple challenges in the Asia Pacific that these measures are directed toward will reveal that the
U.S. is a security seeker and is not attempting to contain China. While policy toward the
Taiwan Strait underwent multiple twists and turns, the fact that the U.S. did not respond to China’s military buildup across from the Taiwan Strait by selling Taiwan the AEGIS system that would allow it to participate in missile defense or the Abrams tanks and
Apache helicopters that it had requested and the fact that the GPR took place on the second island chain also indicated that it was not attempting to change the status quo.
At the same time, Chinese security elites will be expected to disregard signals that do not involve costs. These will include speeches, diplomatic formulations, and dialogues, as they do not reveal credible information regarding U.S. intentions. The fact that costly signals can be objectively identified and their meanings are clear ensures that Chinese security elites can be expected to reach a consensus regarding U.S. intentions.
186 Lastly, the cognitive psychological hypothesis expects Chinese security elites’ understanding of developments in U.S. policy to be filtered through their preexisting perceptions. These perceptions will also play a part in determining which signals are assigned importance and which are not. Due to the range of preexisting perceptions that are held by individual security elites, no consensus will be expected to emerge regarding the meaning of individual signals, the question of which signals are the most important, and what they reveal regarding U.S. intentions. This is further complicated by the fact that the perceptions of some security elites may evolve while the perceptions of others may remain static.
For example, one security elite might conclude that missile defense, relations with friends and allies, policy toward the Taiwan Strait, and the GPR indicate that the U.S. is actively hostile toward China with the responsible stakeholder speech and Senior
Dialogue either lacking significance or being directed toward entrapping China. Another security elite might conclude that U.S. policy in the former group of areas is understandable and directed toward preparing for undesirable contingencies while policy in the latter group of areas is highly significant and provides evidence that U.S. policy is evolving and that it is not treating China like an enemy.
187 Chapter 5
Friends and Allies Perception of and Cooperation with U.S. Policy
As discussed in chapter two, one of the methods that the George Bush administration used to pursue the balancing component of hedging was through the upgrading of relations with friends and allies in the Asia Pacific region. Attempting to do so had utility for both shaping China’s security environment as its power capabilities expanded and for ensuring that the U.S. would be prepared to respond if a challenge to its interests ultimately did take place. Evaluating this strategy therefore necessitates an examination of how U.S. policy was perceived by Japan, Australia, Singapore, and India; the varying degrees to which they were willing to coordinate with it; and how they expected China to understand developments in their relations with the U.S.
An evaluation of government reports, media sources, the academic literature, and interviews with officials from the countries in question supports the conclusion that these security partners were also hedging as they worked to balance their ties with the U.S. and
China. As each country sought to benefit from relations with both the U.S. and China for as long as possible, with the partial exception of Japan, none of them wanted to be viewed as closely aligning with U.S. security policy toward China. Instead, they attempted to enhance their relations with both in order to maximize their gains from each and room to maneuver between them. Even though security relations with the U.S. allowed them to feel more sanguine about China’s expanding role in the region, it was believed that this relationship should only be used to actively balance against China in the instance of a worst-case scenario.
188 Japan
General U.S. Security Policy Toward China
Japanese officials state that they were comfortable with the George Bush administration’s policy toward China. After the EP3 incident and 9/11, they saw real continuity with the policy of the Bill Clinton administration. The fact that they trusted
Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage also ensured that they were not worried by the early rhetoric.1 As the Japanese MOFA and
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) had been dissatisfied with President
Bill Clinton’s response to the Asian financial crisis, they welcomed a Republican administration.2 Statements that Bush administration officials would not visit China without also making a stop in Japan were also highly appreciated.3 It is believed that under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi Japan took a very similar approach to China and
President George Bush was viewed as having a clear stance for Sino-American relations.4
Upgrade of the Alliance
The Japanese defense community welcomed the thinking informing the Armitage
Report and the security strategy the George Bush administration held coming into power.
President George Bush’s first term was viewed as a highpoint in terms of political momentum for the alliance to solve problems and enhance cooperation. Deputy Secretary
1 Japanese Interview #7, Tokyo, August 4, 2011. 2 Ibid. 3 Japanese Interview #, Washington, D.C., April 22, 2011; Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” 54. 4 Japanese Interview #5, Tokyo, August 2, 2011.
189 of State Richard Armitage’s public and private comments were also significant to the
Japanese government’s understanding of the direction of U.S. policy toward Japan.5
While North Korea was the focus of the upgrade of the alliance, there was also a desire to send a signal of unity between them to China.6 As early on during the Bush years North Korea posed a threat, with China only viewed as a longer-term challenge, there was minimal concern or debate regarding the Chinese government’s perception of the upgrade.7 This remained the case for quite some time as one advisor who participated in the foreign policy study group that met in the Prime Minister’s office on a monthly basis in 2005 stated that, the issue of the Taiwan Strait aside, China’s defense buildup was still not viewed as a primary concern. Instead, they remained focused on North
Korea and the Middle East.8 The fact that the American and Japanese leaders had a strong personal relationship and President George Bush had instructed his officials not to put
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in a difficult position also contributed to Tokyo’s sense of satisfaction with the alliance and its upgrade.9
After 9/11, the immediate focus of the alliance was anti-terrorism and Iraq. This was reflected in Japan’s rapid passing of an Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law on
October 21, 2001, thereby permitting Japanese ships to be deployed abroad to provide logistical support.10 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi believed that the Japanese
5 Japanese Interview #6, Tokyo, August 3, 2011. 6 Japanese Interview #2, Washington, D.C., May 16, 2011. 7 Japanese Interview #5, Tokyo, August 2, 2011; Japanese Interview #3, Tokyo, August 1, 2011. 8 Japanese Interview #7, Tokyo, August 4, 2011. 9 Japanese Interview #3, Tokyo, August 1, 2011. 10 Embassy of Japan in Washington, “Anti terrorism Special Measures Law,” http://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/english/html/pressreleases/2001/100501-3.htm;
190 government needed to support its ally in these areas and therefore was not focused on
China’s perceptions of their enhanced cooperation and changes in Japan’s security policy.
The fact that China and Russia were also cooperating with the U.S. in anti-terrorism and working to improve their relationship with the world’s only hegemon11 ensured that they were not worried by how their Chinese counterparts would perceive their actions.12
This should not be interpreted as meaning that Japan’s vision for the alliance, and its relationship with China, was completely in line with the goals outlined in the
Armitage Report. On November 28, 2002 the Task Force on Foreign Relations for the
Prime Minister that had been established in September 2001 issued a report titled Basic
Strategies for Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: New Era, New Vision, New
Diplomacy. In an apparent response to the idea that the U.S.-Japan alliance should be modeled on the Anglo-American alliance, it stated that the U.S. was the most important country for Japan and that Japan must reexamine and enhance the alliance. It also stated that:
It is not unusual that the policy priorities of Japan and the U.S. should be different at times. It is impossible that the Japan-U.S. relationship will become like the one between the U.K. and the U.S. Japan, while upholding objectives common with the U.S., must have its own axis of coordinates and engage in diplomacy that is complementary to that of the U.S.13
Larry Wortzel, “Joining Forces Against Terrorism: Japan’s New Law Commits More Than Words to U.S. Effort,” The Heritage Foundation, November 5, 2001, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2001/11/joining-forces-against- terrorism. 11 “U.S., China Stand Against Terrorism: Remarks by President Bush and President Jiang Zemin in Press Availability Western Suburb Guesthouse,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary, October 19, 2001; Elisabeth Rosenthal, “F.B.I. to Open Liaison Office in Beijing, Ashcroft Says,” The New York Times, October 24, 2002, accessed October 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/24/politics/24CND-ASHC.html 12 Japanese Interview #3, Tokyo, August 1, 2011. 13 Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, “Basic Strategies for Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy,” November
191
The fact that this argument was made more than a year after Japan had upgraded its ability to cooperate with the U.S. on anti-terrorism indicates that its desire to maintain an independent foreign policy had not fundamentally changed.
At the same time, the report also described the bilateral relationship with China as
“the most important theme in Japan’s foreign policy at the outset of the 21st century. For both countries, the relationship is one that interweaves ‘cooperation and coexistence’ with ‘competition and friction.’”14 Examining the Japanese government’s agenda by issue area, it also described the rapid modernization of the PLA as an issue of concern. This was followed with the statement that “The Japanese alliance with the U.S., which Japan opted for in the interest of its sovereignty and independence, may need to be strengthened in the future, and certainly cannot be expected to weaken.15 Clearly Japan continued to view the U.S.-Japan alliance to be an important factor in its security relations with China.
These developments also need to be considered in the context of the broader meaning of the upgrade of the alliance, as the U.S. and Japan continued to expand their cooperation beyond the simple exchange of security guarantees for basing rights. This encompassed the fifteen security issues that were outlined in a document released by the
Security Consultative Committee in October 2005. These included: air defense; ballistic missile defense; counter-proliferation operations; counter terrorism; minesweeping; and
28, 2002, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2002/1128tf_e.html. 14 Ibid. 15 Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, “Basic Strategies for Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century.”
192 search and rescue operations.16 In a press conference held to announce the agreement,
Japanese Defense Minister Yoshinori Ohno stated that:
The Japan-U.S. alliance to date, if anything, was for the purpose really of defending Japan through the use of Japanese bases and U.S. forces, whereas we are now talking about joint activities in various areas between Japan and the U.S. in order to improve the peace and security around the world.17
This global focus highlights the fact that relations with China were only one of the many issues of relevance to the alliance’s upgrade. Ultimately, these developments were largely limited to the period of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s tenure, as the malaise affecting Japanese politics after his resignation prevented any further significant reforms to Japanese law and its international role.
Missile Defense
Japanese officials stated that, since China was still only viewed as a long-term challenge, debates about missile defense during the George Bush administration were primarily focused on North Korea.18 As a result of North Korea’s missile launch in 1998,
Japan was highly concerned about its future actions; saw real value in missile defense; and was confident that the U.S. was motivated by the same factors. Since in 2001 China was not viewed as posing an immediate challenge, Japanese officials did not view
16 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Security Consultative Committee Document, U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” October 29, 2005, accessed April 3, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n- america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html. 17 David Arase, “Japan, The Active State? Security Policy After 9/11,” Asian Survey 47, 4 (July/August 2007): 581. 18 Japanese Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 22, 2011; Japanese Interview #8, interview with author, Tokyo, August 5, 2011; Japanese Interview #7, Tokyo, August 4, 2011.
193 Chinese perceptions of missile defense as a major impediment to moving ahead.19 This is due to the fact that at the time the gap in power capabilities and the size of their economies remained considerable and there were doubts regarding China’s future economic strength.20
However, there is evidence that domestic politics and regional security relations did shape Japan’s initial stance during the period under study. After North Korea’s missile test in 1998, Japan’s response was limited to agreeing to participate in research with the U.S. It then spent the period of 1998-2001 evaluating its options and preparing to face domestic opposition.21 A white paper published by the Japanese Defense Agency shortly before the period under study, Defense of Japan 2000, stated that: “the Asian region, including Japan, falls within range of China’s intermediate range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs).”22 As the range of China’s missile capability had not expanded during the previous year, this indicates that potential threats from both North Korea and China were being considered as the Japanese government evaluated missile defense.23
At the same time, Japan’s commitment to missile defense was also lower than
America’s with its future role in any system remaining unclear in 2001. At this time
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi only describing Japan’s stance as “understanding” the
U.S. position.24 During that period, several Japanese experts were reported to have stated
19 Japanese Interview #3, Tokyo, August 1, 2011. 20 In 2001, Japan’s GDP was $4.1 trillion while China’s GDP was $1.3 trillion. 21 Richard Samuels, Securing Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 104. 22 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 2000, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2000/w2000_00.html. 23 Caroline Rose, “‘Managing China’: Risk and Risk Management in Japan’s China Policy,” Japan Forum 22, 1-2 (2010): 157. 24 “Koizumi Clarifies Missile Defense Policy with Tanaka, Nakatani,” The Japan Times, June 9, 2001, accessed April 5, 2013,
194 that Japan continued to study a mix of technologies and developments in international security as it evaluated the role that it should have in TMD.25 Budget constraints during a recession and questions regarding how well missile defense would work also played an important role in Japan’s skepticism toward the prospect of participating as actively as the U.S. wanted it to. One key difference in Japan’s approach to missile defense was the fact that it continued to distinguish between NMD, which was designed to target missiles with a range of more than 3000 km., and TMD, which was meant for missiles with a range of less than 3000 km. As the George Bush administration broke from its predecessor’s practice of differentiating between them, Japan came out in favor of TMD while remaining ambiguous regarding NMD, as participating in it would violate Article
Nine of its constitution and China was opposed.26 In an article published in May 2001, one senior official from the Japanese Defense Agency was quoted as stating that: “We can understand U.S. thinking about regarding NMD and TMD as a comprehensive package, but our position will not change: we will only carry on joint research on the
TMD.”27 Elsewhere another Japanese official was quoted as saying that, while NMD was an important issue for China, TMD was “small potatoes.”28 This was due to the fact that an effective NMD system could prevent China from using its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to deter the U.S. from entering into a contingency in the Taiwan Strait.
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2001/06/09/national/koizumi-clarifies-missile- defense-policy-with-tanaka-nakatani/#.UWiO46t35Z8. 25 Evan Medeiros, Rapporteur, “Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security: Views from Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo,” (Monterey, CA: The Stanley Foundation and Center for Nonproliferation Studies and Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 2001): 17. 26 Richard Cronin, “Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects,” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 19, 2002): 17. 27 Ibid. Quoting an article from Asahi Shimbun, May 9, 2001. 28 “Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security,” 20.
195 Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels have argued that Tokyo’s initial concerns regarding China’s response was seen in Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s statement at a press conference prior to meeting with President George Bush in the Spring of 2001 when he urged his American counterpart to consider the effects the U.S.’s plans for missile defense would have on inter-governmental relations in Asia.29 It was only when
Japanese officials were informed one day in advance that the U.S. would be going ahead with missile defense that Japan agreed to participate with the assurance that it would be protected if it did so.30 It can therefore be argued that, while China’s growing capabilities were important to Japan’s decision, it remained wary of facing domestic opposition and publicly aligning against China.
In light of the number of interceptors that it called for, it is believed that it should have been clear that the system was not primarily aimed at China.31 Nor did Japanese officials regard China’s concerns regarding Taiwan as credible, as Japan’s constitution bars it from shooting down missiles directed at Taiwan or the U.S. As the short distance across the Taiwan Strait also ensures that missile defense would not be effective for interceptions, it is argued that Japan rarely considers Taiwan in its missile defense planning.32 It was also posited that the fact that Japan does not possess offensive ballistic missiles meant that its participation should not be viewed as threatening to China.33
It should be recognized that arguments regarding the scale of the system and
Japan’s limited independent capabilities do not address the fact that the development of
29 Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels, “Japan’s Dual Hedge,” Foreign Affairs 81, 5 (September/October 2002). 30 Samuels, Securing Japan, 105. 31 Japanese Interview #2, Washington, D.C., May 16, 2011. 32 Ibid. 33 Japanese Interview #5, Tokyo, August 2, 2011.
196 missile defense indicated that the allies were bringing their relationship and interoperability to a new level. As missile defense requires “seamless communication and operability across huge bureaucracies,” it integrated the American and Japanese militaries to an “unprecedented degree.”34 It is therefore understandable that Chinese analysts would not view it as a welcome development.
However, the ambiguity of missile defense could also produce positive results in relations with China, as it may lead it to do more in relations with North Korea.35 After
North Korea’s 2006 missile launch, putting pressure on China was desirable and the fact that it ultimately agreed to a slightly stronger UN resolution may have been attributable to the threat it felt from the development of missile defense.36 The argument that Japan was primarily motivated by the threat from North Korea is also supported by the fact that following its July 2006 missile test the Japanese government made additional commitments to developing missile defense with the U.S.37 This was seen in the decision to accelerate the deployment of PAC-3 missiles and the refitting of its AEGIS-equipped destroyers so the first could operate SM-3 missiles in late 2007, instead of March 2008, with its remaining destroyers scheduled to operate them by 2010, instead of 2011 as had been previously planned.38
34 Ralph Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: Has Japan Becomes the Great Britain of Asia?” Issues and Insights 5, 3 (March 2005). 35 Japanese Interview #1, interview with author, Washington, D.C., April 22, 2011. 36 Ibid. 37 Bruce Vaughn, “U.S. Strategic and Defense Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region,” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2007): 20; “Abe and Bush Agree to Speed up Ballistic Missile Shield,” The Japan Times, November 19, 2006, accessed August 6, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2006/11/19/national/abe- and-bush-agree-to-speed-up-ballistic-missile-shield/#.UgLDaGT71Us. 38 “Four U.S. Ships to Get Missile Interceptors,” The Japan Times, November 27, 2006, accessed April 3, 2013, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20061127a3.html;
197 The upgrading of the alliance and missile defense should also be considered within the broader context of Japan’s overall defense expenditures. As the 47.9 trillion yen that was budgeted for 2006 represented a lower level of spending than the 49.4 trillion that had been allotted in 1997, Japan cannot be characterized as having built up its defenses. It also reduced the size of its ground forces and the number of combat aircraft and destroyers as the 2005 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) based assessments on the assumption that the threat of an invasion of Japan had declined and that it should therefore focus on threats from WMD; ballistic missiles; and terrorism.39 As the guidelines did not allot funds toward assets that could be used to defend the offshore islands against a challenge from China,40 this appears to have been more than an attempt to avoid creating the impression that missile defense was directed at it. Instead, acquisitions were limited to one air tanker transport Boeing aircraft and four transport
Chinook helicopters.
At the same time, the 2004 NDPG stated that: “China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions.”41 The brevity of this description belies its significance, as, along with North Korea, it was the first time that Japanese national security doctrine had characterized specific states as posing security challenges. Taken
Christopher Hughes and Ellis Krauss, “Japan’s New Security Agenda,” Survival 49, 2 (2007): 162-163. 39 Mike Mochizuki, “Japan’s Shifting Strategy Toward the Rise of China,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 30, 4-5 (2007): 755. 40 Ibid. 41 Japanese Ministry of Defense, “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005,” December 10, 2004, accessed April 1, 2013, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/national.html.
198 together, an examination of Japanese military doctrine, military expenditures, and the alliance’s upgrade therefore present Japan as wary of China’s growing capabilities and responding with incremental measures without overreacting or adopting an alarmist tone.
The EU Arms Embargo
As the possibility of the EU dropping its arms embargo on China emerged, Tokyo coordinated closely with Washington as they demarched their European counterparts and expressed their opposition to such a development. In doing so, Japan was signaling to
China that it was engaged in this and was resolved to maintain the status quo.42 This was reflected in Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura’s February 8, 2005 statement to the EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
Javier Solana, that Japan opposed lifting the arms embargo due to the fact that it believed that doing so would have “a negative effect on security not only in Japan, but also in East
Asia.”43 These actions also fit with the language of the 2005 2+2 Joint Statement that will be discussed below.
This continued in 2007 when on January 13 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was quoted as stating that Japan was opposed to the embargo being lifted during a visit to
Europe.44 In response, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao characterized
42 Ibid.; Japanese Interview #2, interview with author, Washington, D.C., May 16, 2011. 43 Tokyo Shimbun, February 9, 2005. Quoted in Archick, Grimmett, and Kan, “The European Union’s Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. Policy.” 44 Allen Cheng, “Abe’s Support for EU Arms Embargo ‘Provocative,’ China Says,” Bloomberg, January 18, 2007, accessed March 27, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ab_gBL3D4JTM&refer=j apan.
199 his words as “provocative” and going on to state that it had nothing to do with Japan and that Beijing had informed Tokyo that it was unhappy with these comments.45
The 2005 2+2 Joint Statement
The goal of the 2005 2+2 Joint Statement was to describe the alliance in the military field for their own consumption. As their 2002 Joint Statement had included similar language on the responsible and constructive role of China,46 and they had both made multiple statements about the Taiwan Strait in the past, the only part that was new was the fact that they were expressing their concerns together. Following the 2005 2+2 meetings, Japanese officials met with their Chinese counterparts to debrief them with the goal of avoiding misinterpretations of their intentions. While some officials were surprised by how forcefully China ultimately reacted,47 others posit that due to the context in which the statement was made it was understandable that it felt a need to make a strong response.48
Some officials argued that making China feel nervous was desirable and that showing a unified stance between the U.S. and Japan in response to the Anti-Secession
Law was more important. They were also worried about the arms buildup across the
45 Ibid. 46 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” December 16, 2002, accessed February 12, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0212.html. 47 Japanese Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 22, 2011; Japanese Interview #2, Washington, D.C., May 16, 2011; Jim Yardley and Keith Bradsher, “China Accuses U.S. and Japan of Interfering on Taiwan,” The New York Times, February 21, 2005, accessed April 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/21/international/asia/21china.html. 48 Japanese Interview #6, Tokyo, August 3, 2011.
200 Taiwan Strait, as had also been expressed in the 2005 NDPG.49 As a result, some officials wanted China to understand that the allies had the same stance in order to ensure that it did not miscalculate the outcome of an attack, as Japan could provide the U.S. with logistical support.50
Including language on the Taiwan Strait was also viewed as important due to the fact that failing to mention it would send a different kind of signal.51 Shinzo Abe, who at that time was the Acting Secretary General of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, stated that: “It would be wrong for us to send a signal to China that the United States and Japan will watch and tolerate China’s military invasion of Taiwan.” He went on to posit that:
“If the situation surrounding Japan threatens our security, Japan can provide U.S. forces with support.”52
As a result, officials reviewed the wording of all of Japan’s earlier statements regarding the Taiwan Strait in order to ensure that they could make a statement without saying anything new.53 While it was therefore a significant development, Ralph Cossa has pointed out that the fact that the statement listed encouraging “the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue” and encouraging “China to improve transparency of its military affairs” as shared interests did not mean that Japan
49 Japanese Interview #2, Washington, D.C., May 16, 2011. 50 Japanese Interview #3, Tokyo, August 1, 2011; Joel Brinkley, “With Taiwan as Security Issue, Rice Prepares to Meet Japan Leaders,” The New York Times, February 18, 2005, accessed April 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/18/international/asia/18cnd-taiwan.html. 51 Japanese Interview #8, Tokyo, August 5, 2011. 52 Anthony Faiola, “Japan to Join U.S. Policy on Taiwan,” The Washington Post, February 18, 2005, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/articles/A33297-2005Feb17.html. 53 Japanese Interview #10, Tokyo, August 9, 2011.
201 was prepared to play a more active role in confronting China’s growing power.54 Nor had
Article Nine of the pacifist Japanese constitution been altered. The primary significance of Japan’s participation in the statement can therefore be understood as its willingness to bilaterally communicate that it was concerned, not as an indication that under Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi it was prepared to contain China.
The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, the Quadrilateral Group, and Japan’s Evolving
Foreign Policy
In a speech in 2006, Foreign Minister Taro Aso promoted the idea of forming an
“arc of freedom and prosperity” based on the universal values of human rights, democracy, and market economies. In doing so, he advocated partnering with the U.S.,
Australia, India, and NATO to push it forward.55 Shortly before coming to power, Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe had also advocated a values-based approach to diplomacy and the importance of relations with Australia and India in his book, Toward a Beautiful
Country.56
As Japan had not had a very active foreign policy during the previous decade, this approach was adopted with the goal of playing a more important role in international
54 Ralph Cossa, editor’s comment in Yuki Tatsumi, “U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee: An Assessment,” PacNet 10 (March 10, 2005).
55 Taro Aso, “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic Horizon,” (Speech at Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, November 30, 2006), accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html.
56 Shinzo Abe, Utsukushii Kuni E [Toward a Beautiful Country] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 2006).
202 relations.57 The promotion of the TSD and the Quad reflected the thinking that democracies should work to strengthen relations and dialogue. President George Bush had a basic philosophy that the allies and democracies came first and the Japanese government was happy to go along with this approach.58 With the end of the Cold War, a values-based approach was seen as having replaced a threat-based approach.59 It is argued that this is appropriate, as a values-based approach can face all threats. The status of the members as maritime states also ensured that they share interests in this area. As a result, regardless of what China thought, these fora were held to be worthwhile.60
Officials confirm that Japan played a leading role in the formation of the Quad as
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe broached the issue of such a grouping during a May 2006 visit to Washington, something that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was not initially receptive to. After the Quad held its only meeting, he also continued to promote the development of the forum while the other members became less enthusiastic.61 There was an element of hedging informing the development of these fora, as cooperation on non- traditional security issues provided the participants with an opportunity to cement their relations and to enhance shared intelligence capabilities and interoperability in case in the future they were involved in a conflict with China.62 While it is true that the Quad did not lead to significant outcomes, the manner in which Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and
57 Japanese Interview #5, Tokyo, August 2, 2011. 58 Japanese Interview #4, Tokyo, August 2, 2011. 59 David Fouse, “Japan’s ‘Values-Oriented’ Diplomacy,” The New York Times, March 21, 2007, accessed January 25, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/21/opinion/21iht- edfouse.4978402.html. 60 Japanese Interview #6, Tokyo, August 3, 2011. 61 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following His Visits to Indonesia, India and Malaysia,” August 24, 2007, accessed September 26, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/press.html. 62 Japanese Interview #8, Tokyo, August 5, 2011.
203 Foreign Minister Taro Aso promoted it as a partnership of democracies made it clear that their intent was for it to exclude China.
It is argued that this cannot be described as more than hedging as Tokyo,
Canberra, and Washington have all communicated their willingness to conduct sea patrols to Beijing and through high-level dialogue Tokyo has also pursued an Incident at
Sea Agreement.63 The fact that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s successor, Prime Minister
Yasuo Fukuda, also stepped backed from the values-based approach and adopted a more conciliatory policy toward China also limited the long-term importance of this formulation.64
Japan’s Relations with Australia and India
The significance of these fora to Japan’s evolving policy during the period of 2005-
2007 can also be seen in the degree to which they fit with Japan’s efforts to enhance bilateral relations with Australia and India. These developments all coincided with growing concerns regarding China’s rise that began in 2005.65 This is seen in the fact that
Japan and India announced a strategic partnership in 2005 that called for enhanced
63 Ibid. 64 “Interview: Japanese PM Hopes to Elevate Japan-China Ties to New Level,” Xinhua, December 26, 2012, accessed February 15, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/26/content_7312676.htm; Yasuo Fukuda, “Forging the Future Together,” (Speech at Peking University, Beijing, China, December 28, 2007), accessed February 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia- paci/china/speech0712.html. 65 Japanese Interview #3, Tokyo, August 1, 2011.
204 security dialogue and cooperation.66 During an address to a joint session of the Indian
Parliament on August 22, 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that:
Japanese diplomacy is now promoting various concepts in a host of different areas so that a region called “the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” will be formed along the outer rim of the Eurasian continent. The Strategic Global Partnership of Japan and India is pivotal for such pursuits to be successful. By Japan and India coming together in this way, this "broader Asia" will evolve into an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the United States of America and Australia. Open and transparent, this network will allow people, goods, capital, and knowledge to flow freely. Can we not say that faced with this wide, open, broader Asia, it is incumbent upon us two democracies, Japan and India, to carry out the pursuit of freedom and prosperity in the region?67
The fact that the Japanese government was also working to increase Japan-India trade and investment68 with the goal of creating a counterweight against dominance of Asia by
China can be understood as reflecting the same logic as the George Bush administration’s policy toward India.
Japan and Australia also signed a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation on
March 13, 2007 that stated that their relationship was based on shared values and security interests.69 It committed them to strengthening trilateral cooperation with the U.S. in the
TSD and stated that enhanced bilateral cooperation would aid trilateral cooperation and to establishing a dialogue between their Ministries of Defense. While Japan has numerous
66 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership, April 29, 2005, accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/partner0504.html. 67 Shinzo Abe, “Confluence of the Two Seas,” (Speech to the Parliament of India, New Delhi, India, August 22, 2007), accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html. 68 “Abe: India on FTA Fast Track,” The Japan Times, August 23, 2007, accessed August 6, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2007/08/23/business/abe-india-on-fta-fast- track/#.UgLJy2T71Us. 69 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation,” March 13, 2007, accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html.
205 security and economic interests that are not directly related to relations with China that made these partnerships desirable, they clearly were also of relevance to the uncertainties produced by China’s rise. At the same time, as by 2004 the Japanese Security Defense
Force (SDF) was already engaged in official security dialogues with sixteen foreign militaries and NATO, they were part of a broader trend in Japan’s foreign relations that was not limited to the Asia Pacific.70
Even though the network that Japan promoted clearly excluded China, and would be of relevance to any contingencies resulting from China’s rise, it is therefore an exaggeration to argue that this amounted to containment. The fact that these developments were taking place shortly after the Japanese and Chinese governments had agreed to a bilateral strategic dialogue in May 2005, with three rounds taking place that year, was also consistent with the logic of hedging as Japan left all options open while working to improve relations with all major powers.71
Exercise Malabar 2007
Some officials accept that the naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal, which involved the American, Australian, Indian, Japanese, and Singaporean Navies, were intended to send the signal that Japan was not isolated and had friends in the region as the U.S.-Japan alliance had been fortified.72 Other officials claim that, while they were aware of the sort
70 Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 2011), 170. 71 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “China and Japan Hold the First Strategic Dialogue,” May 15, 2005, accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2723/t196121.htm. 72 Japanese Interview #7, Tokyo, August 4, 2011; Japanese Interview #2, Washington, D.C., May 16, 2011.
206 of signal that the Chinese government would take away from Exercise Malabar, as they have good reasons to conduct military exercises, they just got on with it.73 As Japan is prone to natural disasters, the Ministry of Defense sees disaster relief as one of its core responsibilities. It is believed that the Chinese government should understand this and has had many opportunities to see how Japan has responded to disasters at home and abroad.74 The importance of the possibility that hardliners in the PLA may use these exercises as a justification for further military modernization is reduced by the likelihood that this is what they already wanted to do.75 Exercise Malabar 2007 also reflected a new trend during the post-Cold War period toward more bilateral and multilateral exercises.
As a result, even governments with less cooperative relations have begun to hold joint exercises.76
Balancing Relations with the U.S. and China
In 2006, Richard Samuels characterized Japan as adopting a “Goldilocks strategy” as it hedged in its foreign relations. He argued that: “The security strategy and institutions abetting this hedge will be neither too hard nor too soft. Japan will be neither too close to
China nor too far from the United States.”77 An examination of Japan’s actions during the period of the George Bush administration reveals that it was mindful of its position in the triangle and that it did not want to provoke China. At the same time, it is clear that the relationship with the U.S. continued to be viewed as more important to its interests and
73 Japanese Interview #8, Tokyo, August 5, 2011. 74 Japanese Interview #6, Tokyo, August 3, 2011. 75 Japanese Interview #8, Tokyo, August 5, 2011. 76 Japanese Interview #9, Tokyo, August 8, 2011. 77 Richard Samuels, “Japan’s Goldilocks Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly 29, 4 (2006): 125.
207 that it was largely satisfied with its approach to China. This is best characterized as representing continuity with past practice with the level of cooperation between Japan and the U.S. rising as it became more concerned regarding China’s intentions and expanding capabilities.
At the beginning of the George Bush administration, Japanese officials were not thinking about how to balance these two bilateral relationships. The fact that in 2001
China’s GDP only amounted to approximately 25% of Japan’s GDP; Japan was China’s most important trade partner; and there were still doubts regarding China’s economic future ensured that it was not viewed as a significant near-term challenge.78 The amount of attention that China’s military modernization received in 2001 was also considerably lower than the level of concern it had begun to cause by 2004.79 China’s willingness to cooperate with the U.S. after 9/11 also ensured that there was less of a need for Japan to be concerned about tradeoffs in its relationships with them.
On the one hand, Japan wanted to use its relationship with the U.S. to convince
China that it was not isolated and could not be taken for granted as a pacifist.80 As
Japan’s level of concern regarding China’s military modernization rose in line with
America’s, it felt comfortable coordinating with it on hedging. This willingness became more pronounced in 2006 when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took office, as he was more focused on the potential challenge posed by China’s rise. The fact that he upgraded the
Japanese Defense Agency to a full cabinet rank and designated it as “The Ministry of
Defense” also fit with this trend. In contrast, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi had
78 Japanese Interview #4, Tokyo, August 2, 2011. 79 Japanese Interview #3, Tokyo, August 1, 2011. 80 Ibid.
208 publicly stated that he saw China as an opportunity and not as a threat and had actively engaged it at the ministerial and working levels.81
On the other hand, while the U.S. and Japanese approaches to China were viewed as relatively well coordinated, geography ensures that they have different interests.82 As a result, like the U.S., Japan has attempted to expand its own mil-mil relations with China; regularly exchanges port visits; and conducts dialogues between military leaders.83 The goal of the bilateral comprehensive strategic dialogue with China that was launched in
May 2005 was also to strengthen bilateral relations and to address crisis management. As previously mentioned, Tokyo also proposed an Incidents at Sea Agreement for the same reason on multiple occasions but has been rebuffed.84 Japanese officials believe that
China should appreciate that such an agreement is in its own interest and a significant signal of Japan’s willingness to cooperate.85
Japan’s strategy for balancing these relationships became more sophisticated over time as thought was given to using the ASEAN+3 (APT) forum and broader groupings to engage China while simultaneously using the strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance to deter it.
This approach can already be seen in Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s championing of the idea of an East Asian Community during an important speech in Singapore in
2002. In it, he advocated both making the best use of the APT framework; praised
81 “China’s Remarkable Growth not Threat for Japan: Koizumi,” The People’s Daily, October 8, 2003, accessed April 4, 2013, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200310/08/eng20031008_125567.shtml; Mochizuki, “Japan’s Shifting Strategy Toward the Rise of China,” 753. 82 Japanese Interview #6, Tokyo, August 3, 2011; See Richard Bush, The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010). 83 Japanese Interview #4, Tokyo, August 2, 2011. 84 Japanese Interview #5, Tokyo, August 2, 2011. 85 Ibid.
209 China’s regional role; and stated that he expected APT members plus Australia and New
Zealand to be members of this community while also highlighting the importance of the
U.S. and India.86
In 2005, with support from Singapore and other South East Asian countries, Japan also pushed for the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand, and India in the East Asian
Summit (EAS) in order to dilute China’s influence and prevent it from dominating the grouping.87 While Japan was guarding against China’s increasing capabilities by strengthening relations with the U.S. and other democracies, the fact that these groupings required healthy Sino-Japanese relations in order to function ensured that Japan’s advocacy of them constituted part of its engagement strategy. At a trilateral U.S.-Japan-
China track two dialogue, Japanese officials and academics frankly explained this approach to their Chinese counterparts, including senior officials from the CCP. It is believed that their intentions were understood and that American participants communicated the same message.88
During the late Bush years, Japan also advocated for a trilateral mechanism for
CBMs that China expressed a willingness to participate in. Ultimately, it did not move forward due to American concerns regarding how South Korea would respond.89 As
86 Junichiro Koizumi, “Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership,” (Speech to Singaporean Officials, Singapore, January 14, 2002), accessed February 18, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0201/speech.html. 87 Mohan Malik, “China and the East Asian Summit: More Discord Than Accord,” Asia- Pacific Center for Security Studies, (February 2006), 3; Michael Elliott, Zoher Abdoolcarim, and Simon Elegant, “Lee Kuan Yew Reflects,” Time Asia, December 12, 2005. 88 Japanese Interview #7, Tokyo, August 4, 2011. 89 Japanese Interview #4, Tokyo, August 2, 2011; “U.S., Japan, China Plan Trilateral Powwow,” The Japan Times, June 7, 2009, accessed July 11, 2013,
210 Japan shares values with the U.S. that it does not share with China, officials expressed no concern that either the U.S. or China would misperceive their stance as tilting away from the U.S.-Japan alliance.90
It should also be recognized that positive developments took place in Sino-
Japanese relations that led to higher levels of engagement. As previously mentioned, in
May 2005, Japan and China initiated a bilateral strategic dialogue with eights rounds of meetings taking place by the end of the George Bush administration alone.91 The fact that the Japanese and Chinese governments agreed to a mutually beneficial relationship during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to China in 2006 was viewed as evidence that
Japan’s policy had been successful.92
However, positive developments need to be considered within the context of the deep freeze that relations entered as a result of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine that honors Japanese soldiers, including fourteen class-A war criminals. After annual expressions of great indignation by the state-owned
Chinese press and government officials in response to the visits, in 2005 Premier Wen
Jiabao publicly stated his opposition to Japan’s bid to join the UN Security Council.93
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2009/06/07/national/u-s-japan-china-plan-trilateral- powwow/#.Ud7_sT771Us. 90 Japanese Interview #3, Tokyo, August 1, 2011. 91 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “China and Japan Hold the First Strategic Dialogue,” May 15, 2005, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2723/t196121.htm; “China, Japan to Hold 8th Strategic Dialogue,” Xinhua, February 20, 2008, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/243278.htm. 92 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan China Joint Press Statement,” October 8, 2006, accessed February 18, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia- paci/china/joint0610.html. 93 Zhao Huanxin and Hu Qihua, “Japan Told to Face up to History, Reflect on Protests,” China Daily, April 13, 2005, accessed September 5, 2013,
211 After repeated mentions of the issue of the shrine visits by Japanese officials, Vice
Premier Wu Yi’s trip to Japan was also cut short before she was scheduled to meet with
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.94 In late 2005, the Chinese leadership also declined to hold bilateral meetings on the sidelines of APEC, APT, and EAS. Following the further complications that Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to the shrine on August 15,
2006, the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War Two, created for the bilateral relationship it is understandable that at least some officials on both sides would favor an agreement that would normalize relations without larger strategic issues coming into play.
The joint statement that was agreed to during President Hu Jintao’s May 2008 visit to Japan was also seen as significant, as it was the first time that China: accepted solemn responsibility for peace and prosperity in the region; focused less on historical issues than it had in the past; and provided some recognition of Japan’s role in the region during the post-World War Two period.95 By the same token, this development should be considered in the context of the incremental recovery in relations that was facilitated by the fact that Prime Minister Koizumi’s successors declined to continue the shrine visits.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/13/content_433651.htm. 94 “China Envoy Cancels Koizumi Talks,” BBC, May 23, 2005, accessed September 5, 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4572177.stm; For an in-depth timeline of these events, see James Przystup, “Yasukuni Stops Everything,” Comparative Connections 7, 4 (January 12, 2006). 95 Japanese Interview #3, interview with author, Tokyo, August 1, 2011; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a ‘Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,’” May 7, 2008, accessed February 18, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia- paci/china/joint0805.html.
212 Summing up, one influential Japanese professor argued that hedging in relations with the U.S. and China is unavoidable. As Japan’s businesses would be seriously hurt by deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations, engagement is essential. At the same time, since it would be foolish not to prepare for potential problems in the future, the relationship with the U.S. remained at the center of Japan’s foreign policy.96
India
Development of Relations with the U.S.
The Bush years were a significant period for Indo-American relations, as it was the first time that they had a frank bilateral dialogue.97 During this period, India also continued to pursue a stronger relationship with the U.S. The desire to do so was already clear in the comment made by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1998 that India and the U.S. were “natural allies.”98 As a result, the Indian government was encouraged by candidate George Bush’s comments that democratic India was increasingly important in international affairs and that the U.S. must pay more attention to it.99
One way in which it did so was through its measured response to the George Bush administration’s plans for missile defense. This constituted a major development since as recently as July 2000 Defense Minister George Fernandes had stated that: “the U.S. should give up this whole exercise as it will lead to far too many problems that we can
96 Japanese Interview #7, Tokyo, August 4, 2011. 97 Indian Interview #2, New Delhi, June 6, 2011. 98 K.P. Nayar, “Vajpayee Describes India and U.S. as Natural Allies,” The Telegraph, September 29, 1998. 99 Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism.”
213 visualize now.”100 Later that month, Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh also declared that: “We have consistently held a view that opposes the militarization of outer space. . . . We cannot support this development.”101
In contrast, after National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice informed Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh in advance of President George Bush’s speech on his security framework and missile defense on May 1, 2001,102 the Indian Ministry of
External Affairs issued a press release that spoke positively of the move to “seek to transform the strategic parameters on which the Cold War security architecture was built” and that “India, particularly, welcomes the announcement of unilateral reductions by the
U.S. of nuclear forces, as an example.”103 Without stating that it supported the George
Bush administration’s stance, it thereby indicated that it was willing to consider a new approach.
Ashley Tellis, an American expert on Indian politics and foreign policy who played an important role in the George Bush administration’s relations with India, has outlined several reasons why this new stance suited India’s interests.104 First, it could expand the strategic component of Indo-American relations and potentially lead to the
100 “India Asks U.S. to Give Up Missile Testing,” The Hindu, July 4, 2000. 101 “Interview with the Minister of External Affairs Mr. Jaswant Singh,” The Times of India, July 24, 2000, accessed April 19, 2013, http://mea.gov.in/in-focus- article.htm?4011/Interview+with+the+Minister+of+External+Affairs+Mr+Jaswant+Sing h. 102 Bush, “Speech on Missile Defense.” 103 Ministry of External Affairs, India, “The Minister of External Affairs had a Telephonic Conversation this Afternoon with U.S. National Security Adviser, Dr. Condoleezza Rice,” May 2, 2001, accessed April 19, 2013, http://www.mea.gov.in/press- releases.htm?dtl/10732/The+Minister+of+External+Affairs+had+a+telephonic+conversat ion+this+afternoon+with+US+National+Security+Adviser+Dr+Condoleezza+Rice. 104 For an in-depth analysis of Indo-U.S. security relations on missile defense, see Ashley Tellis, “The Evolution of U.S.-Indian Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic Relationship,” International Security 30, 4 (Spring 2006): 127-136.
214 end of U.S. restrictions on technology sales to India that had been in place since 1974.
Second, it had no reason to be concerned by the challenge that U.S. policy posed to the
ABM treaty, which prevented India from being considered a legitimate nuclear weapon state. Third, the strategic framework the George Bush administration was promoting raised the possibility of technological cooperation with friends and allies that would be highly beneficial for India’s interests.105 Missile defense therefore presented an opportunity to begin to strengthen the bilateral security relationship.
Even with this change in the tone of bilateral relations and the emergence of the prospect of enhanced cooperation, the eventual diplomatic breakthrough was long in coming. This is due to the fact that, while there were movements toward greater bilateral strategic cooperation during the George Bush administration’s first term, and it is believed that it wanted India to play a larger role in Asia, they were viewed as halting steps. During Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s initial trip to New Delhi in
May 2001 to consult on issues related to international security,106 the contents of a possible strategic partnership were not outlined and the two sides spent the next four years developing them.107 Robert Blackwill, who served as U.S. ambassador to India during the period of 2001-2003, attributed this delay to the “non-proliferation ayatollahs” in the U.S. Department of State who resisted President George Bush’s directives to improve Indo-American relations and continued to attempt to push India on its nuclear
105 Ibid., 131-134. 106 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, “Visit of Mr. Richard Armitage, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State on 11th May 2001,” May 11, 2001, accessed April 19, 2013, http://www.mea.gov.in/press- releases.htm?dtl/10624/VISIT+OF+MR+RICHARD+ARMITAGE+THE+US+DEPUTY +SECRETARY+OF+STATE+ON+11TH+MAY+2001. 107 Ibid.
215 program while the George Bush administration was developing new priorities for the relationship.108
Indian officials believed that their American counterparts were primarily interested in looking at long-term issues. In contrast, their priority was short-term issues, such as the elimination of export restrictions that denied India access to high technology products. The Indian government therefore stated that it could not discuss a strategic relationship without these topics being put on the agenda. While it was never explicitly declared during negotiations, and India did not accept it, it is believed that the George
Bush administration wanted India to play a role in balancing China.109 It was also believed to be clear that this was not the only reason that they were working toward closer cooperation, as they also had shared interests on numerous other issues in Asia, such as anti-terrorism and WMD.
The bilateral relationship was viewed as beginning to develop much faster in 2005 after Condoleezza Rice was appointed Secretary of State. In March 2005 during one of her first trips abroad in her new position, she made New Delhi her first stop on an Asian tour. At this time, she offered India the package deal that it had expected four years earlier and invited Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to visit the U.S.110 Indian officials believed that it was clear that the civil nuclear deal would be about more than nuclear
108 Robert Blackwill, “The India Imperative,” The National Interest, June 1, 2005, accessed January 28, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-india-imperative-578.
109 Indian Interview #2, New Delhi, June 6, 2011; Indian Interview #1, New Delhi, June 3, 2011. 110 C. Uday Bhaskar, “Condi Rice Visit to Delhi: Landmark in India-U.S. Ties,” (New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, March 24, 2005), accessed April 19, 2013, http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/CONDIRICEVISITTODELHI_CUBhaskar_2 50305; Indian Interview #2, New Delhi, June 6, 2011.
216 cooperation. Prior to this development, they believed that no changes had taken place in
Indo-American relations that should have been viewed as worrisome by China.111
Furthermore, with the exception of joint military exercises, there was nothing in the
NSSP agreement that should have been viewed as threatening toward a third party.112 It was also assumed that the Chinese government realized that its increasing power made cooperation between India and the U.S. inevitable.
As the Sino-American partnership developed, multiple voices from the Indian left expressed opposition and decried the prospect of enhanced cooperation on nuclear and military issues. While the final agreement passed by a narrow margin in 2008113 and has continued to face opposition, ultimately the importance of the possibility that this debate will not be resolved for the foreseeable future is diminished by the fact that during the post-Cold War period India has steadily pursued improved relations with the U.S.114
The Quadrilateral Group
Indian officials attributed the decision to participate in the Quad to Japan’s work to promote it and its relevance to India’s relations with both the U.S. and China. As at the time that it was formed, the U.S. and China had a more extensive relationship with each other than either had with India, it was natural for it to want to develop ties with the U.S.
111 Indian Interview #1, New Delhi, June 3, 2011. 112 Indian Interview #2, New Delhi, June 6, 2011. 113 “Indian Government Survives Vote,” BBC News, July 22, 2008, accessed April 22, 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7519860.stm. 114 Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Foreign Policy Perspectives of an Ambiguous Power,” in Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia, Henry Nau and Deepa Ollapally, Eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 105.
217 in areas that were relevant to China. The Indian government was also interested in signaling its willingness to cooperate with the U.S. and its allies.
This is attributable to the fact that the more that India does with the U.S., the more that China has to consider India’s role in the region and take its interests into account.115
As a result, even though China was not the focus of the Quad, security cooperation that was of some relevance to the possibility of a future challenge from China was desirable.116 As India had limited leverage in its relationship with China, it was also happy to gain some. Its later decision to distance itself from the grouping resulted from both China’s negative response and the fact that Australia’s public expression of disinterest had already indicated that it would not move forward.117
Relations with China
Prior to the announcement of the NSSP, significant improvement in Sino-Indian relations had already taken place in 2003. During Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing in June of that year, he signed a bilateral declaration on cooperation and nine additional protocols enhancing relations in specific areas with Premier Wen
Jiabao.118 This improvement was reflected in the following section of the declaration:
Both sides agreed to hold regular high-level exchanges between the two countries. This will greatly enhance mutual understanding and expand bilateral relations. With a view to deepening their coordination and dialogues on bilateral, regional
115 Indian Interview #4, New Delhi, June 13, 2011. 116 Indian Interview #2, New Delhi, June 6, 2011. 117 Indian Interview #1, New Delhi, June 3 2013; “PM: India Not Part of Contain China Effort,” The Hindu, January 11, 2008, accessed April 9, 2013, http://www.hindu.com/2008/01/11/stories/2008011164001200.htm. 118 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India,” June 25, 2003, accessed January 10, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t22852.htm.
218 and international issues, both sides agreed on the need for annual meetings between Foreign Ministers of the two countries.119
During this period, there were also some signs that India and China might finally be able to settle their longstanding border dispute as they clarified the line of actual control and agreed to work toward a final settlement.120 The fact that the declaration included language stating that the issue of settled populations by the border would be taken into consideration was viewed as a sign that China had become more open to taking
Indian interests into consideration.121 The fact that in 2003 the Chinese and Indian navies held joint exercises for the first time was also viewed as reflecting a rapprochement in bilateral relations following the chill that had resulted from India’s nuclear tests in 1998.
Bilateral relations improved further with the signing of the Sino-Indian strategic partnership during Premier Wen Jiabao’s April 2005 visit to New Delhi. It described the relationship as having a “global and strategic character” and also talked of “jointly addressing global challenges and threats.”122 Some scholars have characterized this as an aspirational partnership that reflected a Chinese initiative to neutralize an attempt by the
U.S. to align with India against it.123 In spite of the grand rhetoric that it included, Indian officials argue that from the announcement of the NSSP through the end of the George
119 Ibid. 120 “China, India Sign Accord on Border Dispute,” Xinhua, April 11, 2005, accessed February 20, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005- 04/11/content_433170.htm. 121 Indian Interview #5, New Delhi, June 14, 2011. 122 “Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China,” April 11, 2005, accessed February 20, 2013, http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/nic/0041/jointstatement.htm. 123 Vidya Nadkarni, Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing Without Alliances (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 123.
219 Bush administration progress in Sino-Indian relations, and border negotiations in particular, ceased.124
Similarly, President Hu Jintao’s 2006 visit to New Delhi was viewed as a major failure in spite of the fact that it produced a joint declaration that aimed to upgrade bilateral relations. This was due to comments made by the Chinese ambassador to India,
Sun Yuxi, shortly before President Hu Jintao’s arrival that the “whole of what you call the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory” and the fact that they were not subsequently retracted by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.125
The subsequent joint declaration that was signed in 2008 between Premier Wen
Jiabao and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, “A Shared Vision for the 21st Century,” stated that the two governments should “strengthen their cooperation and consultation within regional cooperation mechanisms including the EAS, and to explore together and with other countries a new architecture for closer regional cooperation in Asia.”126
During the period of the George Bush administration, this can also be described as an aspiration declaration as no major changes in bilateral relations took place.
Even though relations may not have been moving forward, it is clear that India was continuing to engage with China as it simultaneously developed its relationship with the U.S. Examples of this are seen in the fact that during this time: the two governments undertook a study to evaluate the possibility of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA); the defense ministries signed an MOU for exchanges and cooperation in the field of defense;
124 Indian Interview #1, New Delhi, June 3, 2011. 125 “India, China in Spat Over Border Dispute,” China Daily, November 14, 2006, accessed April 8, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006- 11/14/content_733133.htm. 126 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “A Shared Vision for the 21st Century,” January 15, 2001, accessed February 22, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t399545.htm.
220 the first bilateral anti-terrorism exercise, Hand-in-Hand 2007, was held;127 and in 2007 the annual India-China Defense Dialogue was initiated.128 Due to India’s interest in ensuring that China’s relationship with Pakistan is not used against it; the growing attractiveness of the Chinese market, with the goal of $20 billion US in trade by 2008 being reached in 2006,129 which led to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s announcement that the $40 billion US target for 2010 was being raised to $60 billion;130 and India’s desire to make it clear that it has not chosen a side and remains an independent actor, it had ample motivation to work to improve bilateral relations. The Sino-Indian relationship was therefore growing in spite of the fact that important security challenges remained unresolved.
Admittedly, beyond pursuing its interests on specific issues like territorial claims and economic relations, scholars have questioned whether India had a larger strategy for relations with China.131 As will be discussed below, this is likely one of the reasons that it preferred to maintain as much room as possible to maneuver between the U.S. and China in order to gain from relations with both without committing to a potentially costly security partnership.
127 “Hand in Hand: India, China Armies Inch Closer With Optimism,” People’s Daily, December 26, 2007, accessed February 21, 2013, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6327172.html. 128 Bhartendu Kumar Singh, “Military Diplomacy: The Future of Sino-Indian Military Relations?” China Brief 8, 23 (December 8, 2008). 129 Manmohan Singh, “PM’s Address at the India-China Economic, Trade, and Investment Summit,” January 14, 2008, accessed February 21, 2013, http://pmindia.gov.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=621. 130 Manmohan Singh, “PM’s Statement to the Press in Beijing,” January 14, 2008, accessed February 21, 2013, http://pmindia.gov.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=622. 131 See Harsh V. Pant, “Indian Foreign Policy and China,” Strategic Analysis 30, 4 (October-December 2006).
221 Exercise Malabar 2007
As has been previously mentioned, India invited Australia, Japan, and Singapore to participate in Exercise Malabar 2007, which in the past had been a bilateral exercise with the U.S. In order to put this in context, it should also be noted that while India was engaging in its first joint naval exercise with the U.S. and Japan in April of that year another contingent of the Indian Navy was simultaneously conducting bilateral exercises with the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) Northern Sea fleet off of China’s
East coast.132 The joint exercises therefore reflected the strategy of developing relations with both the U.S. and its friends and allies and China in order to gain from both without creating the impression that it had chosen a side.
Balancing Relations with the U.S. and China
As a result of its rise, some Indian officials now view China, not Pakistan, as the primary potential long-term threat to India’s security.133 In fact, after avoiding the public characterization of China as an enemy for the better part of a decade,134 in 2008 Foreign
132 Pallavi Aiyar, “India to Conduct Naval Exercises with China,” The Hindu, April 12, 2007, accessed April 18, 2013, http://www.hindu.com/2007/04/12/stories/2007041204401200.htm; “Trilateral Naval Exercise in Pacific Ocean,” The Hindu, April 17, 2007, accessed April 18, 2013, http://www.hindu.com/2007/04/17/stories/2007041703491300.htm. 133 Indian Interview #2, New Delhi, June 6, 2011; Rajat Pandit, “Two-Front War Remote, but Threat from China Real,” The Times of India, October 12, 2012, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-10-12/india/34411812_1_military- nexus-china-and-pakistan-line-of-actual-control. 134 In 1998, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes attributed the nuclear tests to the need to guard against the potential threat from China. See John Burns, “India Sets 3 Nuclear Blasts, Defying Worldwide Ban; Tests Bring a Sharp Outcry,” The New York Times, May 12, 1998, accessed April 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/12/world/india-sets-3-nuclear-blasts-defying-a- worldwide-ban-tests-bring-a-sharp-outcry.html.
222 Minister Pranab Mukherjee described it as a “challenge and a priority” and did not characterize it as presenting an opportunity. He also stated that: “We are today faced with a new China. Today’s China seeks to further her interests more aggressively than in the past, thanks to the phenomenal increase of her capacities after thirty years of reforms.”135
The fact that the Chinese government has increased its presence in the section of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan is also perceived as threatening.136
However, as the U.S.’s hub and spoke alliance system in Asia is seen as obsolete in the post-Cold War period, India does not aspire to a formal alliance relationship with the U.S. or any other country.137 Instead it desires a relationship that is strategic in scope without taking the form of a strategic alliance. This reflects continuity with India’s long tradition of non-alignment in foreign policy.138
The fact that relations with China pose a challenge does not mean that India wants to “rush into America’s arms,” or to become overly dependent on it. This is due to the fact that the Indian government remains skeptical regarding the long-term reliability of the U.S. and questions how it will approach China in the future. Harry Harding has argued that India recognizes that relations with China may pose challenges in the future
135 Indrani Bagchi, “Finally, Pranab Calls China a Challenge,” The Times of India, November 8, 2008, accessed April 19, 2013, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-11-05/india/27900493_1_india-and- china-india-china-chinese-president-hu-jintao. 136 Mohan Malik, “China Unveils the ‘Kashmir Card,’” China Brief 10, 19 (September 24, 2010), accessed April 8, 2013, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=369 15&cHash=1c3e5620e9. 137 Indian Interview #2, New Delhi, June 6, 2011. 138 See Sumit Ganguly, Ed., India’s Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010); Sunil Kihlnani et al., “Non-Alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century.” (New Delhi: National Defence College and Centre for Policy Research, 2012).
223 without viewing it as currently being an enemy. It therefore has no desire to give up its improved economic and diplomatic relations with China and does not want to get pulled into a conflict of America’s choosing. Furthermore, Indian officials are not entirely sure that their geostrategic interests line up with America’s, as it has no interest in the Taiwan
Strait.139
At the same time, as India has its own reasons to balance against Chinese power that do not directly relate to Sino-American security relations, it is not necessary that the
U.S. push it to do so.140 Ashley Tellis has argued that the most effective way India can do so is through the “complete and permanent revitalization of Indian national strength.”141
Due to its status as the sole superpower, relations with the U.S. play a special role in this process. Instead of directly aligning with the U.S. against China, India therefore wants the Indo-American relationship to serve as a hedge to be used as a last resort while it pursues internal balancing. Even though India’s desire to play a more prominent role in international affairs ensures that in the long term it is unlikely to view American unipolarity as serving its interests,142 and therefore does not want to be subservient to it, cooperation with the U.S. plays an important role in its growing stature and security policy. At the same time, it has simultaneously developed dialogues and cooperation with
139 Harry Harding, “The Evolution of the Strategic Triangle: China, India, and the United States.” in The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know, Francine Frankel and Harry Harding, Eds. (New York, NY: The Asia Society, 2004), 22- 23. 140 See Tellis, “Power Shift,” 7. 141 Ashley Tellis, “What Should We Expect from India as a Strategic Partner?” in Gauging U.S.-Indian Strategic Cooperation, Henry Sokolski, Ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 247. 142 Rajiv Sikri, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2009), 184.
224 China. In this light, the NSSP is seen as reinforcing India’s security without committing it to siding with the U.S. in the event of a military conflict in Asia.143
Additionally, China is not the only third party that the Indian government considers in its relations with the U.S. The “nightmare scenario” for India is the possibility of the U.S. and China acting in concert to help Pakistan.144 A condominium between the U.S. and China would therefore be unacceptable for its interests.145 As a result, the Indian government is attempting to balance these relations and has not picked a side. As during the Bush years China was also working to improve its ties with the U.S., it is expected that this was clear to it. Indian officials also presented this argument to
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo as their relationship with the U.S. developed.146
It is also expected that the fact that India needs Chinese support in order to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) helped to ensure that it was clear that it continued to maintain an independent foreign policy. This is due to the fact that China could use its veto in these organizations if it perceived India as threatening it.147 India’s participation in both a trilateral forum with
China and Russia and the full range of diplomatic fora in Asia should also have served to clarify its intentions.
143 Indian Interview #2, New Delhi, June 6, 2011. 144 Ibid. 145 Dennis Wilder, “How a G-2 World Would Hurt,” The Washington Post, April 2, 2009, accessed April 14, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-04- 02/opinions/36910160_1_china-justin-yifu-lin-chinese-president-hu-jintao. 146 Indian Interview #1, New Delhi, June 3, 2011. 147 Indian Interview #2, New Delhi, June 6, 2011.
225 However, the Chinese government is not viewed as believing that India is an actor that can enter into its league. As a result, it is not perceived as having been interested in their offer for bilateral military exercises.148 Enhancing relations with the U.S. is therefore an important tool for ensuring that China takes it seriously and considers its interests. This is due to the fact that some Chinese apprehension may provide it with leverage with which it can better pursue the sort of bilateral relationship that it desires.149
As with the other friends and allies, India’s security strategy includes relations with states other than the U.S., and in 2000 and 2004 it signed strategic partnerships with
Russia and the EU respectively. In 2005, it agreed to a partnership with Japan that in
2006 led to the signing of the fifty-seven point “Joint Statement Towards the India-Japan
Strategic and Global Partnership”150 and a declaration on security cooperation at the
Prime Ministerial level in 2008. It listed “policy coordination on regional affairs in the
Asia Pacific region and on long-term strategic and global issues” among its goals.151
Through its Look East strategy, it has also increased its presence in South East Asia by enhancing relations with countries including Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam.152
Without becoming tied down with commitments to any one formal alliance, India has
148 Ibid. 149 Steven Hoffman, “Perceptions and China Policy in India.” in The India-China Relationship: What the U.S. Needs to Know, Francine Frankel and Harry Harding, Eds. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2004), 67. 150 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Joint Statement Towards the India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership,” December 15, 2006, accessed February 20, 2013, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pdfs/joint0612.pdf. 151 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation Between Japan and India,” October 22, 2008, accessed February 20, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pmv0810/joint_d.html. 152 See Anindya Batabyal, “Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India’s Look East Strategy,” China Report 42, 179 (2006).
226 therefore enhanced its security relations with all major powers in order to maximize its room to maneuver.
One high-level Indian official who was active in security relations with the U.S. during the Bush years declined to characterize this as “hedging.” Instead, he argued that it simply amounted to pragmatic diplomacy as India tried to “manage” relations with all important power centers and to avoid having to make choices between different sides that would be contrary to its interests.153
Australia
General U.S. Security Policy Toward China
Australian officials were largely happy with the George Bush administration’s policy toward China. President George Bush’s approach to the Asia Pacific was viewed as an underrated achievement of the administration as relations with China, Japan, and
India had all improved by the time it left office.154 The fact that officials like Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage had deep experience with the region ensured that they were not worried by the direction of policy toward China during the administration’s initial period in office before the EP3 incident and 9/11.155 This was due to the fact that through past government dialogues they had already gotten to know many of the administration’s senior officials.
Unsurprisingly, no one in the Australian government had liked the comment
Richard Armitage had made in 1999 that the U.S. would expect Australia to “bleed for it”
153 Indian Interview #1, New Delhi, June 3, 2011. 154 Australian Interview #4, Canberra, July 21, 2011. 155 Australian Interview #6, Canberra, July 15, 2011; Australian Interview #15, Canberra, July 26, 2011.
227 and to do “dirty, hard, and dangerous work” if there was a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.156
At the same time, since it was generally believed that this would only occur if China were acting aggressively, it was not viewed as reflecting an attempt to pull Australia into a conflict of the U.S.’s choosing. His high-level position in the administration therefore did not raise concerns.157
The fact that the administration was also clear regarding where its red lines were was also seen as supporting stability in the relationship.158 The American and Australian defense establishments are viewed as having very similar views of China during the period of 2005-2008.159 As new evidence regarding Chinese capabilities was attained, they also both began to shift their stances toward it around 2005.160 This was a result of the development of China’s anti-ship ballistic missile system in 2005; anti-satellite capabilities in 2006; and cyber attacks in 2007.161
ANZUS and the Taiwan Strait
Australian officials rejected the idea that Foreign Minister Alexander Downer’s comment during a press conference in Beijing in August 2004 that ANZUS only required the allies to assist each other if one of them was attacked on their home soil reflected a change in Australian policy, or was intended to send a signal to the U.S. or China. This is
156 Richard Armitage, Interview with Tony Jones. “ANZUS Alliance a Sacred Trust: Armitage,” Lateline, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, August 17, 2001, accessed September 23, 2013, http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/stories/s348556.htm. “Chinese Policy Will Test PM,” Canberra Times, December 3, 2007. 157 Australian Interview #9, Canberra, July 20, 2011. 158 Australian Interview #3, Canberra, July 14, 2011. 159 This will be discussed further with reference to Australia’s defense updates and white papers. 160 Australian Interview #12, Canberra, July 22, 2011. 161 Ibid.
228 supported by the fact that he declined to repeat his statement when he was later asked to do so.162 One official who was present at the media conference where his controversial remark was made remarked that immediately afterwards Foreign Minister Alexander
Downer merely stated “Well, I think that went well” and was unaware of the fact that his comment would produce such a strong reaction.163 Prime Minister John Howard’s subsequent remarks reaffirming the importance of the alliance were also intended to make it clear that Australia’s policy had not changed.164
During an Australia-United States Ministerial Consultation (AUSMIN) meeting several years earlier, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage had stated that he did not see much in Australia’s defense posture that would be useful for a Taiwan Strait contingency. His Australian counterparts in attendance then informed him that they did not foresee being involved in such a contingency.165 As this led to further discussion, differing understandings of the alliance had already been addressed well in advance of
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer’s 2004 comments and Australia had no incentive to publicly slight the guarantor of its security.
Ultimately, it is argued that, while no one should assume that Australia’s response to a Taiwan Strait contingency can be predicted in advance, officials do not believe that anyone would question its commitment to its alliance with the U.S.166 The fact that its response would be strongly influenced by whether it was instigated by a provocation from Taiwan or Mainland China, something that would likely also be unclear, also
162 Australian Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 14, 2011; John Kerin, “Downer Retreats on Taiwan,” The Australian, August 20, 2004. 163 Australian Interview #9, Canberra, July 20, 2011. 164 Australian Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 14, 2011. 165 Australian Interview #2, Canberra, July 14, 2011. 166 Ibid.
229 ensured that committing to a particular response in advance regardless of circumstances would be undesirable. Doing so would therefore only serve to complicate its relations with either the U.S. or China.167 As a result, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade stated: “it would depend on a whole range of circumstances that apply at that time. It is impossible for [the government] to speculate what those circumstances might be.”168
Going beyond this diplomatic stance, recognition by Australian officials that the
U.S. government would have limited interests in Australia’s security if it were not willing to fulfill its alliance commitments and to provide it with support in the event of a contingency in the Taiwan Strait also implies that its commitment should not be seriously questioned. As Gary Waters and Desmond Ball have argued, Australia’s dependence on
American technology for information warfare components; related satellite communications; and missile launch detection systems also render it strategically dependent on the alliance.169 The fact that the relationship with China would not be able to replace these assets also ensures that Australia has strong incentives to remain committed to the alliance while maintaining what Mohan Malik has characterized as
“calculated ambiguity” for diplomatic reasons.170
167 Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade References Committee, China’s Emergence: Implications for Australia (Canberra: Senate Printing Unit, March 2006), 121. 168 Ibid. 169 Gary Waters and Desmond Ball, “Transforming the Australian Defence Force (ADF) for Information Superiority,” Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense #159 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australia National University, 2005), 63. 170 Mohan Malik, “The China Factor in Australia-U.S. Relations,” China Brief 5, 8 (June 2005), accessed April 11, 2013, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=384 5&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=195&no_cache=1.
230 Regarding the Director-General of the Department of North American and
Oceanian Affairs in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs He Yafei’s demand that
Australia review ANZUS and ensure that it would not commit it to become involved in a contingency in the Taiwan Strait:171 it appeared that China had read too much into
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer’s comments and therefore was probing for weak spots.172 As Australian officials privately rebuffed these comments, and searching for areas of weakness in the U.S.’s alliances is a normal part of China’s foreign policy behavior, it is not believed that this led to any lasting damage.173 The fact that ANZUS continued to be incrementally upgraded after these comments would have also helped to ensure that this was clear.174 It is argued that this fit with Australia’s implicit deal with
China that it would continue to strengthen relations with the U.S. while working to avoid the impression that it was publicly aligning against it.
Presidents George Bush and Hu Jintao’s Addresses to Joint Sessions of the Australian
Parliament
The opportunity to host Presidents George Bush and Hu Jintao came about because both leaders were on their way home from the APEC meeting in Bangkok.175 As both leaders indicated that they would be willing to come, Prime Minister John Howard
171 “China Warns Australia on Taiwan Ties,” The Sydney Morning Herald, March 8, 2005, accessed September 23, 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/news/National/China- warns-Australia-on-Taiwan-stances/2005/03/08/1110160778362.html. 172 Australian Interview #9, Canberra, July 20, 2011. 173 Australian Interview #5, Canberra, July 15, 2011. 174 Australian Interview #6, Canberra, July 15, 2011. 175 Jane Perlez, “A Visitor from China Eclipses Bush’s Stop in Australia,” The New York Times, October 25, 2003, accessed April 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/25/world/a-visitor-from-china-eclipses-bush-s-stop-in- australia.html.
231 took advantage of it.176 While the fact that the two leaders were invited to address joint sessions of Parliament on subsequent days was not intended to send the U.S. or China a message, it was viewed as a unique opportunity to show the domestic audience that the
Australian government was adeptly managing relations with both of its most important security partner and its most important trade partner.
Australian officials argue that this did not indicate a change in their stance, as their relationship with the guarantor of their security remained more important than their relationships with a trading partner. As previously mentioned, without the security relationship the U.S. would have minimal interests in Australia, and the difference in their values would make it difficult for the Australian and Chinese governments to develop a relationship that is more than transactional.
At the same time, as will be discussed below, this pair of visits fit with the logic of statements made by Prime Minister John Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander
Downer during the 2003-2006 period that Australia did not need to make a fundamental choice between these two relationships.177
During his introduction of President Hu Jintao in the Australian Parliament, Prime
Minister John Howard stated that:
[I]t is self-evident that the relationship between Australia, the United States and China respectively on a two-way basis our relationship with the United States and then again our relationship with China will be extremely important to the stability of our region. Our aim is to see calm and constructive dialogue between the United States and China on those issues which might potentially cause tension between them and it will be Australia’s aim as a nation, which has different, but
176 Australian Interview #2, Canberra, July 14, 2011. 177 For example, Alexander Downer, “Biennial Sir Arthur Tange Lecture on Australian Diplomacy,” (August 8, 2005, Canberra), accessed July 22, 2013, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2005/050808_tange.html.
232 nonetheless close relationships with both of those nations to promote that constructive and calm dialogue.178
The same logic was found in the statement in the 2003 Australian Defense Update that China’s rising power was “the most important factor shaping Asia’s future” and that
Australia’s role would be “helping both sides manage these tensions and their relationship more broadly.”179 In a speech in August 2004, Prime Minister John Howard also referred to the visits to Canberra by Presidents George Bush and Hu Jintao as symbolizing Australia’s success in strengthening ties with the U.S. while at the same time building “an ever-closer relationship with China.180
The logic of these statements has been described by Australian officials as reflecting an attempt to avoid having to choose between Australia’s security and economic interests for as long as possible.181 Australian academic Michael Wesley characterized this as Prime Minister John Howard’s “hope based formula” for relations with the U.S. and China.182
This approach was also highlighted by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer’s delivery of the Biennial Sir Arthur Tange Lecture on Australian Diplomacy in August
2005. In it, he stated that the idea that Australia needed to “choose definitely between its alliance with the U.S. and its links with China also misjudges the nature of Australia’s
178 “Commonsense Relationship with China: Howard Welcomes Hu,” October 24, 2003, accessed October 28, 2012, http://www.australianpolitics.com/news/2003/10/03-10- 24.shtml. 179 Australian Department of Defense, “Defense Update 2003,” Canberra, 79-80. 180 John Howard, “Australia’s Engagement With Asia- A New Paradigm?” Asialink- ANU National Forum (Canberra, August 13, 2004). 181 For a discussion of the tradeoffs Canberra faces, see Hugh White, “Power Shift: Australia’s Future Between Washington and Beijing,” Quarterly Essay 39 (2010). 182 Michael Wesley, The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia, 1996-2006 (Sydney, NSW: ABC Books, 2007).
233 relations with each of these countries.”183 Even though Australian officials state that speeches like this were directed toward the domestic audience, senior leaders genuinely believed the sentiments that they expressed.184 This is supported by the fact that the same logic was also found in the 2005 Australian Defense Update.
Joint White House Press Conference With President George Bush and Prime Minister
John Howard
While the attempt to avoid having to choose continued, Australia stepped away from earlier statements implying that it could play a role in helping the U.S. and China to communicate. This was seen during Prime Minister John Howard and President George
Bush’s joint press conference on July 19, 2005 at the White House. In response to a question regarding the rise of China and how each leader saw the role of Australia in managing the emerging relationship with China, President George Bush highlighted how complex the relationship was. After mentioning a number of areas where the U.S. and
China differed, he stated that the U.S. and Australia could “work together to reinforce the need for China to accept certain values as universal.” He then went on to say that:
I know that Australia can lend a wise message to the Chinese about the need for China to take an active role in the neighborhood to prevent, for example, Kim Jong-Il from developing a nuclear weapon. We’ve got a lot of common interests, and it’s when those common interests and common values intersect, is where we can reinforce each other’s message.185
183 Downer, “Biennial Sir Arthur Tange Lecture in Australian Diplomacy.” 184 Australian Interview #12, Canberra, July 22, 2011; Australian Interview #11, Canberra, July 21, 2011. 185 George Bush, “Press Conference,” Washington, D.C., July 19, 2005.
234 Clearly President George Bush favored a high degree of coordination on China policy between the U.S. and Australia and saw room for the latter to play an active role.
In contrast, in his response to the same question, Prime Minister John Howard argued that it was wrong to assume that a conflict between the U.S. and Australia was inevitable. After stating that Australia’s relationship with the U.S. was closer and deeper than its relationship with China, he posited that Sino-Australian relations were healthy and that it was not based solely on economic opportunity. Most importantly, he then stated that:
[W]e do not presume any kind of mediator role. That would be absurd. We have relationships with the United States, which I’ve talk about and categorized in an unambiguous way. Everybody understands the centrality of that relationship to Australia. The Chinese understand it. But we are unashamed in developing our relations with China, and I am well pleased with the way the economic relationship has developed. And I’ll continue to do everything I can in the interests of Australia to ensure that it develops further.186
Prime Minister John Howard therefore appeared less enthusiastic about the prospect of
Australia publicly playing a central role in expressing differences with China and pushing it to take on more responsibility in the region. Even though this may have reflected the belief that privately expressing differences will produce more positive outcomes, it still amounted to a public move to distinguish Australia’s approach to China from America’s.
One Australian interview subject attributed this to the belief that they could not be seen as signing up for an anti-China group in Washington.187 The Australian government also takes the idea that China is more likely to become an enemy if it is treated like one
186 John Howard, “Press Conference,” Washington, D.C., July 19, 2005. 187 Australian Interview #6, Canberra, July 15, 2011.
235 very seriously. Creating the impression that it was publicly lining up against China could therefore produce undesired outcomes that would only complicate diplomatic relations.
As the U.S. and China now have over sixty bilateral dialogues, Australian officials also discount the idea that they would require assistance and think that it is highly unlikely that either country would be interested in allowing Australia to play this role.188 Ultimately, this argument does not address the issue of whether having both allies relay the same message would increase the likelihood of a positive Chinese response.
It also should be recognized that during the period that Prime Minister John
Howard made these comments, Australia’s defense relationship with the U.S. continued to strengthen. This fits with the previously mentioned implicit offer from Australia to
China that, while they would continue to strengthen the alliance with the U.S., they would not publicly line up against it.189
The EU Arms Embargo
Australian officials argue that the press commentary regarding whether or not
Australia supported the maintenance of the EU arms embargo was incorrect. This is reflected in Foreign Minister Alexander Downer’s statement that they had requested that if the Europeans did end their embargo that they do it “in a way that has no impact on the power balance or the strategic structure of the East Asian region.”190 The fact that
188 Australian Interview #4, Canberra, July 21, 2011. 189 Australian Interview #2, Canberra, July 14, 2011. 190 “Australia Won’t Lobby EU Over China Arms Embargo,” ABC News, February 13, 2005, accessed April 12, 2013, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2005-02-12/australia-wont- lobby-eu-over-china-arms-embargo/1517848.
236 Australia had already ended its own embargo would have also rendered public opposition to the EU doing the same difficult.
Australian officials state that behind closed doors they did express their support for the embargo to their EU counterparts.191 This approach is also attributable to the fact that Australia is less inclined than the U.S. to make public statements on issues like this as it sees little value in angering China. However, they often share the same opinion and choose to express them privately.
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue
As during the time that the TSD was developing Japan was more important to the region than it subsequently became, and Australia was interested in having a more networked system in the Asia Pacific, participation in the TSD was desirable.192 The dialogue also played a useful role in lifting the level of Japan’s involvement in the region,193 something that Australia had supported.194 As Australia wants to be accepted as part of the Asia Pacific for the purpose of regional institution building, dialogues with
Japan have utility. The fact that the dialogue’s three participants have shared interests on a range of global and regional issues where they can benefit from coordinating ensured
191 Australian Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 14, 2011. 192 Australian Interview #8, Canberra, July 19, 2011. 193 Australian Interview #5, Canberra, July 15, 2011; Australian Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 14, 2011. 194 For example, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, “Visit to Japan,” Press release, March 17, 2005.
237 that it was of value for issues that were not tied to relations with China.195 The TSD also provided Australia and Japan with an opportunity to coordinate on relations with the U.S.
The majority of Australian officials do not believe that getting its allies to cooperate more with each other was a significant American goal for the TSD. This is due to the fact that it does not have a lot to gain from them communicating.196 Furthermore, interoperability between Australia and Japan beyond the spillover resulting from their relationships with the U.S. would be very expensive and the reconfiguration to military forces that it would require would be extremely difficult.197
The TSD was viewed as working well and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s comments before their meeting in 2006 that China’s military buildup was “concerning for those of us that have a responsibility for defending the peace in the Asia Pacific, of which
I would count all three [dialogue participants]”198 was not seen as problematic, as
Australian government documents from this period had used similar language.199
Australia continued to maintain a fine balance in its relations with the U.S. and China as during a joint press conference with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice Foreign
Minister Alexander Downer stated that: “From our point of view we’ve never had a concern that the U.S. was pursuing a policy of containment of China or something like that.” He then went on to state that: “Our relationship has its own dynamic, we have our
195 Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade References Committee, China’s Emergence: Implications for Australia, 139. 196 Australian Interview #2, Canberra, July 14, 2011. 197 Ibid. 198 Sundeep Tucker, Guy Dinmore, and David Pilling, “China Remarks Add Edge to Rice Trip to Sydney,” Financial Times, March 16, 2006. 199 Australian Interview #4, Canberra, July 21, 2011.
238 own issues. We have a very good and constructive relationship with China.”200 The fact that the joint statement that the dialogue ultimately produced welcomed China’s constructive engagement in the region and made no mention of its military buildup also indicated a more diplomatic approach.201
China was viewed as receiving the signal that was being sent by the TSD’s 2006 statement. The stronger comments regarding China’s defense spending in 2007 was also partially a result of a growing consensus in the Australian defense community that continuing to avoid talking about China’s capabilities would alarm their American and
Japanese counterparts.202 These concerns in Australia regarding China’s defense modernization had already begun to rise in 2004 with the fact that they were only expressed two years later being attributable to a lag in the system.203
Even though the TSD is not a China-specific dialogue and deals with numerous non-traditional security issues, it still forms part of the context for fora like this.
However, Australia’s efforts to develop mil-mil relations with China during the same period, which were meant to signal that it wanted to establish a strategic partnership should have made the TSD appear less threatening.204 Ultimately, it is believed that
Australia’s sensitivity to China’s concerns regarding Japan’s security role in Asia ensured that they did not experience any major issues with China over the development of this
200 Steven Weisman, “Rice and Australian Counterpart Differ About China,” The New York Times, March 17, 2006, accessed April 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/17/international/asia/17rice.html?_r=0. 201 Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement Australia-Japan-United States,” March 18, 2006, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2006/joint_statement-aus- japan_usa_180306.html. 202 Australian Interview #6, Canberra, July 15, 2011. 203 Australian Interview #10, Canberra, July 20, 2011. 204 Discussed in section on Australia’s mil-mil relationship with China.
239 dialogue.205 Even if it could not be expected to welcome it, China was therefore viewed as willing to live with it. As Australia can also point to dialogues that China maintains that it does not necessarily like, it is expected it to understand that other states are also free to maintain their own.206
As mentioned in the section on Japan’s relations with the U.S. and China,
Australia and Japan also upgraded their security relationship during this period.207 This development reflected the logic of the statement in the 2007 Defense Update that
“Australia has no closer nor more valuable partner in the region than Japan” and language in the 2009 defense white paper that Japan was a “critical strategic partner.”208 This fits with the idea that Australia was attempting to improve relations with all major powers.
The Quadrilateral Group
The cooperation that took place during the four member’s response to the tsunami that damaged Indonesia on Christmas day, 2004 led to the idea that they could cooperate on a more formal and permanent basis with Japan the strongest proponent of doing so.209
Australia neither pushed hard for the development of this grouping nor opposed it.210
205 Australian Interview #5, Canberra, July 15, 2011. 206 Australian Interview #4, Canberra, July 21, 2011. 207 “Australia in Japan Security Deal,” BBC News, March 13, 2007, accessed July 11, 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6444207.stm. 208 Australian Department of Defense, “A Defense Update 2007,” (Canberra: 2007); “Defense Paper 2009: Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030,” (Canberra, 2009). 209 Australian Interview #13, Canberra, July 22, 2011. 210 Ibid.; Australian Interview #4, Canberra, July 21, 2011.
240 Australian officials concede that Chinese pressure was an important factor in the
Quad’s ultimate demise.211 As it viewed the Quad as an Asian NATO that was directed against it, the grouping was not helpful and Australia was therefore not interested.
However, while it was normal for the new government led by Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd to want to distance itself from the policy of its predecessor, the manner in which it disowned the grouping with Foreign Minister Stephen Smith standing next to his Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi, as the announcement was made created the impression that they were giving in to Chinese pressure.212 Defense Minister Brendan Nelson’s statement that
“We do not wish to have formal quadrilateral strategic dialogue in defense and security matters . . . We do not want to do anything which . . . may otherwise cause concern in some countries, particularly China” also gives credence to this interpretation.213
China’s opposition was seen as motivated by a concern that the TSD was expanding its range to the Indian Ocean, a region through which its oil imports are shipped.214 Ultimately, this development was not viewed as having had any lasting effect on relations with the U.S. or China215 and Australia’s relationship with the U.S. continued to strengthen during this period.
Exercise Malabar 2007
Australian officials were not worried by the possibility that participating in
Exercise Malabar 2007 would send China a negative signal, as it was expected to
211 Australian Interview #6, Canberra, July 15, 2011. 212 Rory Medcalf, “Chinese Ghost Story,” The Diplomat (February/March 2008): 16. 213 “Australia Allays Chinese Concerns,” BBC News, July 12, 2007. 214 Australian Interview #13, Canberra, July 22, 2011. 215 Australian Interview #11, Canberra, July 21, 2011.
241 recognize that military exercises involving allies are different. These operations also have real utility for dealing with non-traditional security issues, such as HADR and piracy.216
Furthermore, Australia’s main priority was to enhance relations with India. This was due to the fact that, while Australia is interested in expanding bilateral naval relations, India does not appear to take it seriously.217 As the SCO also holds multilateral drills, China should not view exercises among friends and allies as unusual.218
At the same time, as mentioned above, participating in the exercise can be expected to have undercut the claim that the Quad was not a military organization.
Australia’s efforts to develop its mil-mil relationship with China are expected to have made this less threatening than it might otherwise have been.219
2007 U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty and Upgrade of the Alliance
Australia was not thinking about how China would perceive the U.S.-Australia
Defense Trade Cooperation Agreement and the upgrade of the alliance.220 The main drivers were the desire to keep the U.S. involved in the region and to gain easier access to new technology and hardware.221 The fact that the agreement created a comprehensive framework within which the majority of defense trade could take place without further
216 Australian Interview #5, Canberra, July 15, 2011. 217 Australian Interview #6, Canberra, July 15, 2011. 218 Australian Interview #13, interview by author, Canberra, July 22, 2011; “Six SCO Nations to Stage Military Exercises in Russia,” China Daily, April 26, 2006, accessed August 6, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-04/26/content_577545.htm. 219 Australian Interview #11, Canberra, July 21, 2011. 220 Australian Department of Defense, “Australia-United States Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty,” accessed February 22, 2013, http://www.defence.gov.au/ustradetreaty/. 221 Ibid.
242 need for approval ensured that it was in Australia’s interest.222 As it is believed that it would be nearly impossible for another power to surpass the U.S. militarily, it makes sense for Australia to work for as much access to American technology as possible.223
In practice, the assets that Australia gained from the agreement could have a positive influence on Sino-Australian relations by making it more important to China. If
China was a little worried, it would also be positive for Australia’s interests, as it would ensure that it is taken seriously. It was therefore beneficial to show the alliance experiencing incremental growth.224 In contrast, allowing the perception to develop that it was atrophying would have sent a signal that would not have served its interests.225
Mil-Mil with China
As the PLA is a political actor, Australia wants to have a direct line of communication with it.226 While officials accepted that this relationship can be seen as fitting into its attempt to balance relations with the U.S. and China, the Sino-Australian mil-mil relationship is an asset in and of itself, as these links have value for confidence building and avoiding misunderstandings.227 It was also one way that Australia could make it clear that it was an independent strategic actor. As a result, during the 2001-2004 period, forty-one reciprocal visits at the senior officer level took place. In October 2004, they also conducted their first joint exercise with the HMS Anzac visiting Qingdao on the
222 Australian Department of Defense, “Australia-United States Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty,” http://www.defence.gov.au/ustradetreaty/. 223 Australian Interview #15, Canberra, July 26, 2011. 224 Australian Interview #10, Canberra, July 20, 2011. 225 Australian Interview #14, Canberra, July 25, 2011. 226 Australian Interview #8, Canberra, July 19, 2011. 227 Ibid.
243 East coast of China for a five-day joint search and rescue drill. While the 2005 Defense
Update stated that engagement with China had experienced “unprecedented growth in recent years” and “was now better than it has ever been,”228 Australian officials state that
China’s response has been viewed as largely disappointing and Australia has not learned much from the exchanges.229
The other function of mil-mil with China is to explain its views of the ANZUS alliance and its activities, such as joint training and cooperation on missile defense. This serves to both address Chinese misperceptions and apprehensions regarding the purpose of the alliance while also attempting to deter China by communicating “the costs of provocative PLA actions.”230
The 2009 Defense White Paper
The arguments presented by the 2009 defense white paper, which was being prepared near the end of the George Bush administration, also support the conclusion that no fundamental change in policy had taken place. It concluded that the era of unipolarity was coming to an end in the Asia Pacific.231 The meaning of this language and the importance of the influence this trend will have on Australia’s security environment are believed to be clear.232 As the U.S. faces so many security challenges, Australia worries about the possibility that it will be the issue that will be neglected.
228 Australian Department of Defense, “Australia’s National Security- A Defense Update 2005,” December 15, 2005. 229 Australian Interview #7, Canberra, July 18, 2011. 230 Evan Medeiros et al. Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China’s Rise (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 225. 231 Australian Department of Defense, “Defense Paper 2009,” 30-34. 232 Australian Interview #10, Canberra, July 20, 2011.
244 This white paper therefore constituted an opportunity to communicate its concerns to the U.S. and China. It stated that: “the pace, scope, and structure of China’s military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not carefully, explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans.”233 The message for China was that: if it continued to build up capabilities that will allow it to project power beyond what would be necessary for a contingency in the Taiwan Strait and handicapped the U.S., it could expect a response from other states in the region.234 Capabilities such as the anti-ship ballistic missile system that China had acquired were central to this concern. As a result, since many of their new capabilities have dual use, China was encouraged to clarify their purpose in the same way that the
U.K. and France have spent considerable amounts of time explaining the motivation for their carrier battle groups.235
While it may have been bluster that was intended to gauge whether Australia would back down, when Chinese officials were given an advanced briefing regarding the contents of the white paper and Australia’s plans to build up its naval and air forces in
April 2009, they had a strong negative response to the idea that China was now a factor in
Australia’s defense policy planning.236 This extended to demands that the contents of the paper relevant to China’s security role be revised or Australia would “suffer the
233 Australian Department of Defense, “Defense Paper 2009,” 34. 234 Australian Interview #6, Canberra, July 15, 2011; Australian Interview #7, Canberra, July 18, 2011. 235 Australian Interview #12, Canberra, July 22, 2011. 236 John Garnaut, Michele Grattan, and Anne Davies, “Military Build-Up ‘Risks New Asian Arms Race,” The Age, May 4, 2009, accessed April 12, 2013, http://www.theage.com.au/national/military-buildup-risks-new-asian-arms-race- 20090503-arew.html; Philip Dorling and Richard Baker, “China’s Fury at Defense Paper,” The Age, December 10, 2010, accessed April 12, 2013, http://www.theage.com.au/national/chinas-fury-at-defence-paper-20101209-18rel.html.
245 consequences.”237 However, as they argued that Australia had no right to claim that
China’s actions were untransparent, they also conceded that it was reasonable to argue that their defense modernization was going beyond capabilities relevant to a Taiwan
Strait contingency238 Ultimately, their main goal appeared to be to discern how much the change in Australia’s defense policy would affect its policy toward China.
Balancing Relations with the U.S. and China
The question of how to balance these relationships became more important over the course of the George Bush administration with some viewing the high point of the debate arriving in the period of 2009-2011.239 However, this had already become an issue in the late 1990s after Prime Minister John Howard’s support for American actions during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis produced a chill in Sino-Australian relations. As a result, the defense white paper that Australia had issued in 2000 shortly before the
George Bush administration took office characterized China as the government with the
“fastest growing security influence on the region” and as an “important strategic interlocutor” for Australia.240 It went on to affirm that, while all states in the Asia Pacific had an interest in addressing regional security issues in a manner that would serve shared interests, “some hard issues will need to be addressed frankly, such as different
237 Dorling and Baker, “China’s Fury at Defense Paper.” 238 Australian Interview #12, Canberra, July 22, 2011; Australian Interview #4, Canberra, July 15, 2011. 239 See Carlyle Thayer, “China’s Rise and the Passing of U.S. Primacy: Australia Debates Its Future,” Asia Policy 12 (July 2011). 240 Australian Department of Defense, “Defense 2000: Our Future Defense Force,“ Canberra, 2000, 37.
246 perceptions of the U.S. role in the region.”241 During the course of the following eight years, these differing perceptions became increasingly challenging for Australia’s interests.
Several scholars have posited that during the period of the George Bush administration Australia became more accommodating of China’s interests and less inclined to coordinate with the U.S.242 These arguments often make reference to the increasingly deep Sino-Australian trade relationship and how for the first time in history the guarantor of Australia’s security and its most important trade partner were not the same.
As has been discussed, it is accurate to conclude that Australia: does not want to be pulled into a conflict in the Taiwan Strait; was less inclined to publicly support the EU arms embargo; and walked away from the Quad. In spite of these individual issues, there is more evidence to support James Manicom and Andrew O’Neil’s argument that its willingness to accommodate China on some issues does not indicate that it was strategically distancing itself from the U.S. or drawing closer to China.243 Instead, as
William Tow eloquently described it in 2005, its approach established a “meticulously fine line between a China that is an increasingly integral part of Australia’s economic and
241 Ibid., 38. 242 See He Baogang, “Politics of Accommodation of the Rise of China: The Case of Australia,” The Journal of Contemporary China 21, 73 (2012); Robert Kagan, “The September 12 Paradigm: America, the World, and George W. Bush,” Foreign Affairs 87, 5 (September/October 2008): 38. 243 James Manicom and Andrew O’Neil, “Accommodation, Realignment, or Business as Usual? Australia’s Response to a Rising China,” The Pacific Review 23, 1 (2010).
247 diplomatic agenda and an America that still expects allied loyalty to be exercised in both the regional and international security environments.”244
Officials do concede that early on in the Bush years, Australia did present a different stance toward China with its approach to the Halibut Group,245 which had been intended to be a forum in which the U.S. and its friends and allies could discuss how they could best present their human rights concerns to China. There was a serious debate in
Australia regarding whether it should participate due to concerns that China would view it as part of an attempt to contain it.246
Ultimately, this grouping was of limited importance to the security component of the U.S.-Australian relationship and provides minimal information regarding the direction of the alliance with one former official positing that Australia had overreacted.247 It is therefore argued that it does not undercut the conclusion that the security relationship with the U.S. remained essential to Australia’s policy toward China as it gives it the assurance it needs to safely become more economically dependent on
China.248 In order to make their stance clear, high-level meetings between Australian officials and their Chinese counterparts always include statements about how important
ANZUS is to them. While it is believed that some Chinese officials understand their position, others appear to hope to gradually wean Australia away from the U.S.249
244 William Tow, “ANZUS: Regional Versus Global Security in Asia,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 5, 2 (2005): 213. 245 In June 2003 the Bush administration decided to hold an annual forum in which to discuss issues relating to China and human rights. It invited the UK, Canada, New Zealand, and Japan to participate. 246 Australian Interview #13, Canberra, July 22, 2011. 247 Ibid. 248 Ibid. 249 Australian Interview #10, Canberra, July 20, 2011.
248 Nor is the China-Australia Strategic Dialogue that was announced in September
2007 viewed as reflecting a change in policy, as it was only agreed to because China was pushing for it.250 Traditionalists did not want to label it as a “strategic” dialogue and argued that this terminology meant something, as the only other countries with whom they have this sort of dialogue are the U.S., Japan, and the U.K.251 The decision to designate it as a “strategic dialogue,” instead of as a “strategic partnership,” was a nuanced compromise that was intended to distinguish it from their existing dialogues.252
On balance, the upgrade of ANZUS; development of the TSD; and concerns created by the uncertainty regarding China’s military posture reveal more regarding
Australia’s alignment. As James Reilly has argued, growing dependence on the Chinese market also increases Australia’s interest in hedging against dominance by China.253
Even though China has distinct agendas for its bilateral relationships with each country, Australia’s alliance with the U.S. is also viewed as having some positive knock- offs on its relationship with China.254 Ultimately, it is not believed that there were any significant differences between Australia and the U.S.’s China policies during the period of 2005-2008.255
250 Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Establishment of Australia China Strategic Dialogue,” September 6, 2007, accessed February 22, 2013, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2007/fa113_07.html; Phillip Coorey and Tom Allard, “Security Talks Ease Beijing’s Exclusion Fears,” The Sydney Morning Herald, September 7, 2007, accessed August 6, 2013, http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/security-talks-ease-beijings-exclusion- fears/2007/09/06/1188783415562.html. 251 Australian Interview #4, Canberra, July 21, 2011. 252 Australian Interview #13, Canberra, July 22, 2011. 253 James Reilly, “Counting on China? Australia’s Strategic Response to Economic Interdependence,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 5 (2012): 393. 254 Australian Interview #13, Canberra, July 22, 2011. 255 Ibid.
249 Summing up, it is worth quoting the highly comprehensive report published by the Australian Senate’s Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade References Committee in
March 2006 titled China’s Emergence: Implications for Australia at length.256 After examining the nature of Sino-American relations and Australia’s place between them, it was concluded that:
The committee believes that Australia must maintain its current position of presenting itself as an independent country whose abiding interest is in ensuring that the region as a whole remains politically stable and secure. It recognizes that a cooperative Sino-U.S. relationship is crucial to Australia’s own interests in the region, particularly with respect to the U.S.’ regional security presence and China’s economic opportunities. It believes that Australia, as a friend to both countries, should encourage them, in pursuing their own interests, to place the highest priority on contributing to the stability and prosperity of the region as a whole.257
Singapore
General U.S. Security Policy Toward China
Singaporean officials expressed overall satisfaction and comfort with the George
Bush administration’s policy toward China. As candidate George Bush’s bellicose rhetoric during the campaign did not subsequently cement into policy, they did not view it as worrisome.258 The fact that Pacific Command in Honolulu was more interested in engagement also ensured that they did not over interpret the administration’s rhetoric.259
One senior official downplayed the significance of upswings in bilateral tension, conflicting interests, and heated rhetoric with the argument that the complexity of Sino-
American relations acts as a stabilizing mechanism. This is due to the fact that it is
256 Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade References Committee, China’s Emergence: Implications for Australia. 257 Ibid., 78. 258 Singaporean Interview #2, Singapore, June 17, 2011. 259 Ibid.
250 impossible to define the relationship in terms of any one issue as the wide variety of interests in the bilateral relationship that have to be considered eventually bring policymakers back toward the center.260 As a result, it is important to avoid reading too much into diplomatic tension on individual issues.
President George Bush was viewed as effectively convincing the Chinese that they could trust him through his candor. This was seen as reflected in the fact that he created goodwill by committing to attend the Beijing Olympics without attempting to gain maximum leverage.261 As Singaporean officials believed that their views of China and the region aligned more closely with their American counterparts during the period of the George Bush administration, they saw more opportunities to work with them on security policy.262 In late 2004, Singaporean Ambassador-At-Large Tommy Koh wrote that Singapore believed that it shared common values and interests with the U.S. in areas like political independence; peace and stability; regional prosperity; free trade; and safe navigation through the regional Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and that they appreciated “the indispensible role the U.S. has played in the maintenance of regional security and the positive role it has played in helping the region to achieve rapid social and economic development.”263
This also fits with statements from Singaporean officials that shifting post-9/11 strategic priorities had led the country toward a “long-term strategic realignment that will
260 Singaporean Interview #3, Singapore, June 20, 2011. 261 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York, NY: Crown Publishers, 2010), 428- 429; Singaporean Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 21, 2011. 262 Singaporean Interview #5, Singapore, June 21, 2011. 263 Tommy Koh, “America’s Role in Asia: What Does Southeast Asia Want From Washington?” PacNet 53 (December 21, 2004).
251 bring it closer to the U.S.”264 It should be recognized that this was not limited to managing relations with China, as cooperation on anti-terrorism was also significant. The shared interest in this area was highlighted by the fact that members of the terrorist group
Jemaah Islamiyah, the group that launched that Bali bombing in 2002 that killed 202 people, were arrested in Singapore in December 2001.265
The Changi Naval Base
The decision to build a deep-water pier that was specifically designed for
American aircraft carriers at the Changi naval base was intended as a clear statement of support for America’s presence in the region. This was attributable to the view that
“nature abhors a vacuum” and that if the U.S. were to withdraw from the region China would increase its presence, thereby making Singapore nervous.266 As Singapore does not have any territorial disputes with China and there is a large geographic distance between them, China does not pose any direct security threats to it. Instead, it is concerned by the possibility that China’s rise could be disruptive to the stability of the region.267 As a small state that depends on international trade for a large percentage of its economic activity, regional volatility that limited freedom of navigation at sea would threaten its
264 Goh, “Singapore and the U.S.,” 4. 265 Raymond Bonner and Seth Mydans, “‘Sleeper Cells’ in Singapore Show Al Qaeda’s Long Reach,” Financial Times, January 26, 2002; Barry Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, 3 (2003). 266 Goh, “Singapore and the U.S.,” 4. 267 Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge,” 13.
252 prosperity.268 The increased possibility of a conflict in the South China Sea that would result if there is no stable balance of power would therefore be damaging to its interests.
Keeping the U.S. engaged in the region and encouraging it to view it as more than just a second front in its anti-terrorism campaign269 would also help to maintain a regional balance of power that would afford it some protection against Chinese pressure.
One recent example of such pressure was China’s demands in 2004 that Singapore’s
Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong refrain from visiting Taiwan and subsequent decision to cancel several previously scheduled official meetings when he did.270
This goal was made clear by the statement made by Defense Minister Tony Tan upon the opening of the new facility that:
This base is built to meet the needs of the Republic of Singapore Navy. However, it is no secret that Singapore believes that the presence of the U.S. military . . . contributes to the peace and stability of the region. To that extent, we have facilitated the presence of U.S. military forces.271
Changi naval base therefore played a role in involving the U.S. in the security affairs of the region by identifying an opportunity for Singapore to make itself useful to it. As in
1994 the Singaporean government had asked the U.S. Navy for their specifications and had built the deep-water pier accordingly, this development predated the George Bush administration.272
268 Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, 2 (August 2008). 269 John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?” Foreign Affairs 81, 4 (July/August 2002). 270 Barry Wain, “A David and Goliath Tussle,” Far East Economic Review, August 5, 2004, accessed April 18, 2013, http://www.singapore-window.org/sw04/040805fe.htm. 271 Chan Kay Min, “High-Tech ‘Stars’ at New Naval Base,” Straits Times, March 11, 2001. 272 Singaporean Interview #4, Singapore, June 20, 2011.
253 This fits with the argument that Singapore is an “anticipatory state” that thinks about “possible scenarios for the future and how they might affect” it,273 as after the U.S. was denied continued access to facilities in the Philippines Singapore signed a
Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) offering it access to the Paya Lebar air base and the port of Sembawang. It also gave the U.S. permission to relocate its logistical presence to Singapore.274 One official from Singapore’s Ministry of Defense has been quoted as characterizing this as one of the ways that it “tries to make itself valuable to the major powers” with the goal of ensuring that “they would feel a stake in Singapore’s prosperity, stability, and security.”275
After the signing of the MOU, Chinese officials asked their Singaporean counterparts if they were becoming a stooge of Washington and whether other countries would be able to use the pier. Singapore responded that they could discuss that issue when it had an aircraft carrier. Following this exchange the PLA began to increase port calls to Singapore and upgraded its naval presence in the region.276
However, the fact that vessels from the navies of countries including Malaysia,
Indonesia, the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, France, Japan, China, and India have also been permitted to call at the facility indicates that it is not just about relations with the
273 Yuen Foong Khong, “Singapore: A Time for Economic and Political Engagement,” In Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, Alastair Johnston and Robert Ross, Eds. (New York, NY: Routledge, 1999), 121. 274 See Tan Seng, “America the Indispensible: Singapore’s View of the United States’ Engagement in the Asia-Pacific,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 38, 156 (2011): 165. 275 Quoted in Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security 32, 3 (2008): 127. 276 Singaporean Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 21, 2011.
254 U.S.277 In April 2004 alone, Changi was host to vessels from seventeen navies that were participating in regional Mine Countermeasures and Diving Exercises.278 While it is conceded that Singapore may have informed neighboring countries before construction began, it would not brief China about this sort of development in advance. This is due to the fact that it does not want to be put in a position where it is asking for permission.279
Strategic Framework Agreement
Singaporean officials did not view the possibility of negative Chinese perceptions to the signing of the SFA with the U.S. as a pressing concern. This is partially due to the fact that, while they are a “major security cooperation partners,” Singapore does not consider itself to be a “capital A” ally.280 Nor did it perceive a need to enter into a formal alliance, as they could also accomplish all of its goals under the guise of a partnership.281
Officials therefore did not accept the argument that they had become a “quasi ally” of the
277 Singaporean Interview #6, Singapore, June 22, 2011; Goh Chok Tong, “Speech by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong at the Opening Ceremony of Changi Naval Base,” (Singapore, May 21, 2004), accessed March 27, 2013, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2004/may/21may04_ nr3/21may04_speech.html#.UVNavFt35Z8. 278 “Speech by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong at the Opening Ceremony of Changi Naval Base”; Ministry of Defense, Singapore, “2nd WP MCMEX/DIVEX 2004,” accessed April 5, 2013, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/mcmex/2011/media/news/200 4_gallery.html. 279 Singaporean Interview #4, Singapore, June 20, 2011. 280 Singaporean Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 21, 2011. 281 Singaporean Interview #6, Singapore, June 22, 2011.
255 U.S.282 As a result, China would be expected to appreciate the fact that the SFA was not a formal alliance, something that they had deliberately avoided.283
While Singapore has strategic reasons to cultivate strong ties with the U.S., it wishes to maintain good relations with all major actors and has no reason to believe that the U.S. would come to the rescue of its interests.284 As it is also involved in Iraq and
Afghanistan, nor can a desire to balance against China be characterized as the predominant factor in the upgrade of relations. Enhanced access to U.S. military technology was another important reason for it to pursue deeper bilateral cooperation.
Ultimately, Chinese sensitivities were only one of the reasons that Singapore did not want to have a formal alliance with the U.S.285 The fact that its immediate neighbors,
Indonesia and Malaysia, would not have welcomed such an alliance was one of the most important reasons that it would be undesirable. This was reflected in their negative reactions to the U.S. offer to play a role in patrolling the Strait of Malacca in 2002 and the U.S. proposal of the Regional Maritime Security Initiative in 2004.286
Exercise Malabar 2007
After Singapore accepted an invitation to participate in Exercise Malabar 2007 exercise with the Indian and American Navies, it discovered that the invitation had also
282 Christopher Twomey, “Missing Strategic Opportunities in U.S. China Policy Since 9/11: Grasping Tactical Successes,” Asian Survey 47, 4 (July/August 2007): 549. 283 Singaporean Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 21, 2011. 284 Singaporean Interview #3, Singapore, June 20, 2011. 285 Ibid. 286 “Testimony of Admiral Thomas Fargo, U.S. House of Representatives Regarding U.S. Pacific Command Posture,” March 31, 2004, accessed April 19, 2013, https://cno.ahf.nmci.navy.mil/n2n6/a...nsf/.../fargo%20hasc3-31.doc; Yoichiro Sato, “U.S. and Japan in the Malacca Strait: Lending Hands, Not Stepping In,” Pacnet 29a (July 12, 2004).
256 been extended to Australia and Japan.287 In response, it attempted to divulge its intentions by issuing a statement explaining the context of its decision to participate.288 Singaporean officials also state that they were careful to avoid being seen as joining the Quad and did not want Exercise Malabar to be viewed as the U.S. and four of its proxies ganging up against China as it views exercises like this as threatening.289
Balancing Relations with the U.S. and China
As China is already aware of the fact that it tilts toward the U.S., Singapore did not worry that Chinese perceptions of the upgrade of the U.S.-Singapore security relationship would complicate its ability to balance its relations between them.290 China is also viewed as understanding that everything Singapore does with the U.S. is focused on its own interests and not directed toward it.291 In June 2001, Prime Minister Goh Chok
Tong outlined the role that Singapore hoped the U.S. would continue to play in the region as China rises in a speech to the U.S.-ASEAN business council in Washington. He stated that:
If China grows, and plays by international rules on such issues as weapons proliferation, international trade, freedom of navigation and environmental protection, it can become a constructive player. This is what the rest of East Asia hopes and supports. It makes no sense to mortgage East Asia's future by causing
287 Singaporean Interview #1, Washington, D.C., April 21, 2011. 288 Singaporean Interview #3, Singapore, June 20, 2011; Singaporean Ministry of Defense, “Reply to Media Queries on Ex Malabar 07-2,” July 29, 2007, accessed April 8, 2013, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2007/jul/29jul07_nr.p rint.img.html. 289 Singaporean Interview #2, Singapore, June 17, 2011. 290 Ibid. 291 Singaporean Interview #4, Singapore, June 20, 2011.
257 the Chinese people to conclude that its neighbors and the U.S. want to keep them down.292
He went on to posit that:
I believe it is in everyone’s interest if East Asia remains in balance even as China grows. The U.S. can help to provide this balance. Balance does not mean confrontation. It means that as China grows and becomes stronger, other countries in Asia too should grow and become stronger, buttressed by a U.S. presence. It does not mean conscribing China’s growth or containing its power. It means mutually beneficial growth.293
As China’s rise presents an important economic opportunity that Singapore has taken advantage of, and containment was not desirable, the U.S. continued to be viewed as a vital security provider who could balance China’s growing presence.
China’s post-9/11 willingness to be more helpful toward the U.S. also ensured that there was no reason why it should view similar actions by Singapore as threatening.294 Moreover, the fact that Singapore’s cooperation with the U.S. encourages
China to upgrade Sino-Singaporean ties serves its interests.295 Lastly, Singapore’s considerable investments in China and its role in developing the Suzhou industrial park also indicate that it desires good relations.296
292 Goh Chok Tong, “Managing Strategic Change in East Asia,” (Keynote address to U.S.-ASEAN Business Council annual dinner, Washington, D.C., June 12, 2001), accessed February 18, 2013, http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/washington/newsroom/press_statem ents/2001/200106/press_200106.html. 293 Ibid. 294 Singaporean Interview #2, Singapore, June 17, 2011. 295 Singaporean Interview #6, Singapore, June 22, 2011. 296 Singaporean Interview #3, Singapore, June 20, 2011; Michael Richardson, “Singapore Industrial Park Flounders: A Deal Sours in China,” The New York Times, October 1, 1999, accessed April 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/01/business/worldbusiness/01iht-suzhou.2.t.html.
258 As it has expanded its ties with China, Singapore has worked to do so in such a way as to assure the U.S. that it has not abandoned its traditional stance.297 Bilateral military exercises with the PLA have therefore remained at a low level and it has only slowly built up its relations with China’s defense establishment. However, the fact that it has signed agreements for defense exchanges and security cooperation at the permanent secretary level and have held talks about holding maritime exercises and counterterrorism reflects the fact that it is dedicated to enhancing relations with China.298
While there is a belief that the U.S.’s presence in the region is a necessary condition for stability, it is no longer viewed as a sufficient one.299 This motivated the experiments with security architecture that took place during the Bush years.300 As no one wants to be part of a U.S.-led alliance against China, regional security architecture is viewed as an important component of hedging.301 In spite of the fact that China was not happy that Singapore played an instrumental role in expanding the EAS from APT members to ASEAN+6 by bringing Australia, India, and New Zealand in, and in ensuring that meetings would only took place in the territory of ASEAN members, officials believe that it understood their stance.302 It is also expected that the fact that Chinese leaders take founding Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew’s explanations of how
297 Singaporean Interview #2, Singapore, June 17, 2011. 298 Singaporean Interview #4, Singapore, June 20, 2011; Russell Hsiao, “China and Singapore Sign First Defense and Security Agreement,” China Brief 8, 2 (February 4, 2008), accessed February 18, 2013, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4565. 299 Singaporean Interview #3, interview with author, Singapore, June 20, 2011. 300 Ibid.; See Dick Nanto, “East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy,” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, September 18, 2006). 301 Singaporean Interview #4, Singapore, June 20, 2011. 302 Elliott, Abdoolcarim, and Elegant, “Lee Kuan Yew Reflects.”; Mohan Malik, “The East Asian Summit: More Discord Than Accord,” Yale Global, December 20, 2005.
259 he sees the geostrategic picture seriously can be expected to have enhanced their understanding.303 The Chinese government is therefore believed to understand that
Singapore’s actions are defensive and do not indicate a desire to help contain it.304
This security strategy was also seen in Singapore’s role in setting up the Shangri-
La Dialogue in conjunction with the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). A desire to develop security architecture that would go beyond the ARF and involve officials from all of the governments who have an interest in the region’s security as well as a stake in engaging China and the PLA were the primary motivators for Singapore to promote it.305 It therefore presented an important opportunity to engage China through dialogue in a forum that also involved the U.S.
An attempt to engage China was also evinced by the first annual Sino-
Singaporean defense policy dialogue at the permanent secretary level that took place in
January 2008.306 They also agreed to cooperate on HADR and peacekeeping missions.307
This built on the logic of the Long-Term Cooperative Framework Agreement that the two governments signed in 2000 which stated that: “Both sides will promote security cooperation by facilitating exchanges of high-level visits, dialogues between defense institutions, cooperation between their strategic security research institutions, exchanges between professional groups of their armed forces and exchanges of port calls.”308 In
303 Singaporean Interview #2, Singapore, June 17, 2011. 304 Singaporean Interview #5, June 21, 2011. 305 Singaporean Interview #4, Singapore, June 20, 2011. 306 Hsiao, “China and Singapore Sign First Defense and Security Agreement.” 307 Singaporean Ministry of Defense, “Singapore and China Agree to Enhance Bilateral Defense Exchanges,” November 16, 2005. 308 “China, Singapore Issue Joint Statement on Bilateral Cooperation,” People’s Daily, April 13, 2000, accessed April 5, 2013, http://english.people.com.cn/english/200004/11/eng20000411_38706.html.
260 addition to its own individual efforts, this also followed the China-ASEAN strategic partnership that Singapore had become a party to in 2003 through its membership in the regional grouping.309
Looking at the big picture, in 1996, founding Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee
Kuan Yew, described a “fallback position should China not play in accordance with the rules as a good global citizen” that would potentially involve the U.S. leading a new alliance of Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand to face China.310
However, more recently in 2004, his son, and current Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, presented a more nuanced picture of Singapore’s policy toward relations with the U.S. and China:
Singapore won’t and would never side with the United States against China. No doubt Singapore has felt the implications of a rising China, but what they will do is to push the United States to get along with China. Singapore is very realistic about this. It does not have any ideological problems with this.311
Clearly statements like this amount to good diplomacy. At the same time, Singapore’s policy can be described as working to enmesh the U.S. into the region while simultaneously benefiting from the economic opportunity presented by China’s rise.
As significant as relations with the U.S. therefore are to its strategy, it should be recognized that it has also developed relations with other powers. Evelyn Goh has
309 ASEAN, “Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity,” November 29, 2004, accessed February 18, 2013, http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-summit/item/plan-of-action-to-implement- the-joint-declaration-on-asean-china-strategic-partnership-for-peace-and-prosperity. 310 Lee Kuan Yew, “How the United States Should Engage Asia in the Post-Cold War Period,” (Speech on receiving the Architect of the New Century Award, Nixon Center, Washington, D.C., November 11, 1996). 311 Yali Chen, “Lee Hsien Loong Storm,” Washington Observer Weekly, August 11, 2004.
261 described this strategy as “omni enmeshment” as it works to involve multiple big powers in the region. She characterizes this as: “the process of engaging with an actor or entity so as to draw it into deep involvement in a system or community, enveloping it in a web of sustained exchanges and relationships, with the eventual aim of integration.”312 This strategy amounts to far more than merely choosing one side.
During the period of the George Bush administration, Singapore therefore also worked to enhance its relationship with India.313 This was seen in 2003 when the two countries signed a defense cooperation agreement that called for annual defense policy dialogues; joint exercises; intelligence sharing; and cooperation on defense technology.314
In 2004, this new level of bilateral cooperation also resulted in the establishment of an annual bilateral military exercise. The fact that Singapore supported Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and therefore a larger international role, in the face of Chinese opposition also fit with this strategy.315
In fact, in late 2004, Singaporean Ambassador-at-large Tommy Koh stated that in
Southeast Asia the U.S. was perceived as losing the competition for influence in the region to China and needed to develop an integrated and comprehensive approach to relations with ASEAN. This highlights why Singapore would not want to be completely
312 Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies: Omni- Enmeshment, Balancing, and Hierarchical Order,” 84 (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, July 2005): 5. 313 Amitav Acharya, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2008), 107; Mushahid Ali, "Singapore's Balancing Diplomacy: Defense Cooperation with USA, India," IDSS Commentaries (Singapore: Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, November 12, 2003). 314 David Brewster, “India’s Security Partnership with Singapore,” The Pacific Review 22, 5 (December 2009): 605. 315 Eric Teo Chu Cheow, “Sino-Singaporean Relations Back on Track,” China Brief 5, 16 (July 19, 2005), accessed April 18, 2013, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3879.
262 dependent on the U.S.316 Enhancing relations with these countries therefore both strengthened its ability to hedge against the possibility of malign Chinese dominance and the risk that in the future the U.S. will disengage from the region.
As a small state that cannot expect to shape its region by itself, it is understandable that Singapore favors the presence of multiple major powers in the region. The interest it has in doing so is elucidated by the following quote from its first
Foreign Minister, S. Rajaratnam: “Where there is a multiplicity of suns, the gravitational pull of each is not only weakened but also by a judicious use of the pulls and counter pulls of gravitational forces, the minor planets have a greater freedom of navigation.”317
While the relative weight of the great powers may have changed since 1976, this logic still explains how Singapore pursued its interests a quarter of a century later.
Conclusion
This chapter serves to highlight several important points. First, none of the U.S.’s security partners viewed its policy toward China as overly threatening or worrisome.
Second, to varying degrees, their desire to benefit from relations with both the U.S. and
China limited their willingness to coordinate with the U.S. Third, with the partial exception of Japan, none of them wanted to be viewed as aligning against China. In the remaining three cases, each country worked assiduously to avoid becoming so close to either that it would appear that they were taking a side. Instead, they attempted to
316 Koh, “America’s Role in Asia: What Does Southeast Asia Want From Washington?” 317 S. Rajaratnam, “Untitled Speech on Singapore and Great Power Relations, 1976,” In The Prophetic and the Political: Selected Speeches and Writings of S. Rajaratnam, Chan Heng Chee and Obaid ul Haq, Eds. (Singapore: Graham Brash; New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 292.
263 maximize their room to maneuver between them and their own foreign policy independence. This became especially pronounced at times that it appeared that the U.S. was attempting to align with them.
As mentioned in chapter two, Evelyn Goh describes hedging by small countries as:
[A] set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality. Instead they cultivate a middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of another.318
With the partial exception of Japan, this characterization is supported by the behavior of the four countries under consideration.
Theoretical Implications
As the offensive realist hypothesis posits that the distribution of power capabilities shapes how states perceive each other and that current policy is of minimal importance, it does not expect developments in relations between the U.S. and its friends and allies to shape Chinese security elites’ perceptions of their intentions. At most, the evolution of these relations will be viewed as a product of changes in the balance of power, not as developments that independently reveal information. Changes in these relations will therefore not be understood as indications of changing intentions, as intentions are a reflection of the current balance of power.
In contrast, the defensive realist/rationalist hypothesis expects these security relations and the role that friends and allies played in them to be perceived accurately.
318 Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge,” 2.
264 Chinese security elites will focus on costly signals that reveal credible information about the goals of the U.S. and its friends and allies. As defense has the advantage, the scale of these security relations, the gradual rate at which they have expanded, and the multiple challenges in the Asia Pacific that they are directed toward will reveal that the U.S. and its friends and allies are security seekers that are not attempting to contain China. The fact that the U.S.’s friends and allies ties with China have also expanded, their attempts to establish a balance between their relations with the U.S. and China, and their moderate military postures also signal that they are hedging instead of treating China like an enemy.
The fact that costly signals can be objectively identified and their meanings are clear ensures that Chinese security elites can be expected to reach a consensus regarding these states’ intentions.
Lastly, the cognitive psychological hypothesis expects Chinese security elites’ understandings of developments in relations between the U.S. and its friends and allies to be filtered through their preexisting perceptions. These perceptions will also play a part in determining which signals are assigned importance and which are not. Due to the range of preexisting perceptions that are held by individual security elites, no consensus will be expected to emerge regarding the meaning of developments in these security relations and what they reveal regarding these states’ intentions. This is further complicated by the fact that the perceptions of some security elites may evolve while the perceptions of others may remain static. The sensitive nature of Sino-Japanese relations ensure that perception is likely to be especially important in shaping how the U.S.-Japan alliance is viewed. The fact that Japan was also more inclined toward actively aligning with the U.S. also made these Chinese perceptions understandable.
265 Chapter 6
Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Security Policy
This chapter analyzes Chinese security elites’ perceptions of the George Bush administration’s intentions and security policy toward China. While over time elite
Chinese understandings of U.S. intentions have become more sophisticated and less colored by ideological taboos, no consensus has emerged regarding the goals informing
U.S. policy toward China, or which aspects of its policy are the most important. Instead, an active debate has continued regarding: these goals; whether or not they are changing; which aspects of U.S. policy are the most revealing; and the overall direction of the bilateral relationship.
Scholars participating in this debate can be divided into four distinct schools of thought: the Malign Containers; the Pragmatic Hegemonists; the Evolutionists; and the emerging New Thinkers. Each of these schools has a distinct perspective on U.S. intentions, whether signals matter and which ones were the most important, the degree to which U.S. policy was threatening or understandable, and therefore the security policy that China should adopt toward the U.S.
This chapter outlines the views of each of these schools of thought, the general concepts with which they understood U.S. security policy, and their perceptions of U.S. policy in the eight functional areas and more general developments of importance to bilateral relations and U.S. policy that are outlined in chapter four. This provides an in- depth evaluation of this study’s DV, Chinese security elites’ perceptions of the George
266 Bush administration’s security policy toward China that can be compared to the baseline that was provided by chapters three and four.
As will be discussed after these four schools are introduced, the continuing variation in their views and responses to signals from the U.S. and the new information regarding U.S. intentions that some of them revealed indicates that neither the distribution of power or costly signals can fully explain how Chinese security elites perceived U.S. policy toward China. Instead of having self-evident meanings that spoke for themselves and therefore were not open to multiple interpretations, the individual schools of thought reached conclusions that were in line with their preexisting inclinations. As a result, the Malign Containers and Pragmatic Hegemonists largely discounted signals that indicated that U.S. intentions were changing while new information led the Evolutionists and New Thinkers to update their views.
The Malign Containers
The first school of thought, the Malign Containers, believed that no significant changes took place in U.S. policy toward China during the period of the George Bush administration, as American interests in and intentions toward China remained static. It argued that the U.S. remains committed to containing China and preventing it from posing a challenge to either the U.S.’s interests or position in international relations. It also held China to be the target of most, and perhaps all, developments in U.S. policy toward Asia.
As a result, even if temporary tactical adjustments were undertaken in response to changing conditions, its policy remained focused on containing China. Even when
267 engagement was the form of U.S. policy, its focus therefore continued to be containment.
As a result, at best, comparatively cooperative developments in U.S. policy served this goal and its own interests; at worst, they amounted to a strategic ruse. Scholars from this school of thought therefore attributed more importance to ongoing sources of friction in the bilateral relationship and discounted the significance of attempts at cooperation. Nor was any hope held out that bilateral relations could be based on anything other than power capabilities and narrow self-interest.
As the U.S.’s intentions were understood to be unchanging, the Malign Containers afforded minimal importance to signals. Any signals that did not reflect its established understanding of U.S. policy were also sure to be discounted. In summary, U.S. policy was malign, unchanging, geared toward containment, and seemingly cooperative developments could be disregarded as insignificant.
Pragmatic Hegemonists
The second school of thought, the Pragmatic Hegemonists, also concluded that
U.S. intentions had remained stable and that no major changes to its policy had taken place. However, in contrast to the Malign Containers, it concluded that U.S. security policy toward China was focused on the pragmatic pursuit of its interests, not containment. Adjustments in U.S. policy therefore took place at the tactical level as it continued to pursue its established interests and moves toward enhancing cooperation with China were motivated by a desire to secure assistance on issues where U.S. interests were at stake. As these adjustments would be reversed in the future if doing so served
U.S. interests, they could not be characterized as evidence that U.S. policy was changing.
268 While it was possible that the U.S. would attempt to contain China in the future, it was not currently doing so. The advantage in power capabilities that it enjoyed also ensured that such a policy was currently unnecessary. However, if this gap were to narrow, policy could shift toward containment. The Pragmatic Hegemonists therefore still viewed U.S. policy warily, even as they concluded that some of the adjustments that were undertaken were understandable.
Signals were understood to be of limited importance, as they only indicated what the U.S. was doing under present circumstances. Even if the U.S. were currently sending cooperative signals, if the balance of power were to shift, its actions would be expected to change. Tactical adjustments and the handling of new issues in bilateral relations were therefore viewed as fitting with its long-standing strategy or “containment plus engagement,” or “engagement plus containment.” However, as almost anything can be said to fit with this model, it is not clear what would constitute evidence that U.S. policy had changed.
In summary, U.S. intentions and policy had not changed and cooperative actions were geared toward the pragmatic pursuit of its interests. It is also expected that if in the future doing so would serve U.S. interests tactical changes would be reversed. Signals were therefore of limited importance.
The Evolutionists
Over time, scholars from the third school of thought, the Evolutionists, concluded that real changes in U.S. policy and its view of the bilateral relationship were taking place.
These tactical changes indicated that the manner in which it pursued its interests in the
269 bilateral relationship was also evolving. This was due to the fact that China’s increasingly important role in the international system, changes in comparative power capabilities, and the expanding number of issues in which they either had shared interests or their interests came into contact had led it to begin to make significant adjustments that reflected this new understanding. The fact that there were still aspects of U.S. policy that were viewed as significant sources of friction in the relationship did not disprove this conclusion, as these were long-standing aspects of U.S. policy while the positive aspects were new.
However, even though this reflected a more enlightened understanding of its own interests by the U.S., and not a fundamental change, it was still positive for the bilateral relationship. This was due to the fact that it increased the space in which the two countries could cooperate and come to better understand each other’s intentions. As a result, even though significant changes were taking place at the tactical level, this did not indicate that U.S. strategy or intentions had fundamentally changed.
Signals sent by the George Bush administration were significant, as they revealed information about U.S. intentions. As many believed that during the period of 2001-2009 the U.S. possessed the capabilities necessary to pursue the security policy of its choosing toward China, examining capabilities alone would not provide a full understanding of its objectives.1 Put slightly differently, as it had the resources and influence needed to achieve its foreign policy goals, the only uncertainty concerned its will or intentions.2
The degree to which power capabilities determine how a state will respond to a given challenge has also been reduced by globalization and the rise of non-traditional security
1 Chinese Interview #23, Beijing, China, February 2, 2012. 2 Jin Canrong, “The U.S. Global Strategy in the post-Cold War Era and its Implications for China-U.S. Relations: A Chinese Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary China 10, 27 (2001): 310.
270 issues. Even if comparative power capabilities are accurately measured –something that is very difficult to do– these factors complicate assumptions about a state’s likely response and evaluations of these capabilities.3
As a result, even though U.S. policy is shaped by its capabilities, it still has to decide how to use its power.4 Its actions therefore revealed information about the decisions that it had made. While capabilities were viewed as primary with intentions being secondary, it was accepted that intentions also have to be evaluated for a full understanding of U.S. policy.5 Relating this to traditional Chinese strategic thought, one scholar connected this to Sun Zi’s distinction between power being present in order to send a message and the active use of power.6
In summary, U.S. intentions mattered, its understanding of the bilateral relationship shaped its behavior, significant changes in policy took place at the tactical level, and cooperative developments revealed more than long-standing sources of friction.
New Thinkers
The fourth school of thought, the New Thinkers, which began to take shape at the beginning of the George Bush administration’s second term, represents a significant departure from established mainstream elite Chinese thinking about the U.S.’s intentions toward China. It viewed the changes that the Evolutionists characterized as taking place at the level of tactics as extending up to the more significant strategic level.
3 Chinese Interview #26, Shanghai, China, March 12, 2012. 4 Chinese Interview #22, Beijing, China, January 17, 2012. 5 Chinese Interview #29, Beijing, China, April 4, 2012. 6 Chinese Interview #16, Beijing, China, November 25, 2011.
271 U.S. intentions were therefore open to change, as over time it had undergone new thinking regarding its interests in the bilateral relationship and how it could best secure them. While the New Thinkers still viewed the U.S. as committed to defending its interests and position in the international system, and by no means were cooperative developments interpreted as indicating that the relationship was certain to advance in a positive direction, this new thinking by the U.S. had rendered its actions less threatening.
As a result, uncooperative aspects of U.S. policy were understood as directed toward undesired contingencies, not as threating China.
Understanding the signals sent by the U.S. was therefore important, as its priorities regarding what it wants to do with its power can change over time. This is highlighted by the fact that China’s understanding of its own interests, and therefore intentions, has also changed. For example, while in the past it had openly talked of gaining control of Taiwan by any means necessary, it now talks of mutual gains.7
Another example of this dynamic is the fact that President George Bush’s beliefs about democracies and the nature of relations between them was an important factor in shaping the administration’s policy toward Southwest Asia.8 Power and intentions can also be understood as informing each other, as completely separating the two is problematic and neither will be fully understood without an examination of both.9
In summary, at the beginning of its second term, the George Bush administration began to undergo new thinking regarding its relationship with China that produced changes at the strategic level as it worked to deepen understanding and cooperation
7 Chinese Interview #35, Beijing China, July 9, 2012. 8 Chinese Interview #19, Beijing, China, December 5, 2011. 9 Chinese Interview #27, Shanghai, China, March 15, 2012.
272 through dialogues and exchanges. Moves toward expanding cooperation reflected this new understanding and competitive aspects of U.S. policy were understood to be less threatening, as they were directed toward undesired contingencies.
Argument
There are several reasons why the findings presented by this chapter do not support offensive realism’s argument that the distribution of power shapes how states understand each other’s intentions and that signals will therefore be discounted. Most importantly, interviews with Chinese security elites and the academic literature indicate that they viewed factors other than the balance of power as shaping U.S. intentions, with signals revealing important information regarding what these intentions were. If intentions were solely determined by the balance of power, it is unclear why so much time would be dedicated to analyzing these signals. Nor can it account for why the
Malign Containers and Benign Hegemonists perceived no change in U.S. policy as
China’s stature in and importance to the international system increased while the
Evolutionists and New Thinkers perceived significant changes. If the balance of power is measurable, then scholars from the four schools of thought could be expected to reach a consensus regarding U.S. intentions.
At the beginning of the George Bush administration the offensive realist explanation is also indeterminate, as the U.S. possessed the power capabilities necessary to select the security policy of its choice. In a globalizing world in which U.S. and
Chinese security interests align in some areas and conflict in others, it is not immediately clear what policy the distribution of power would dictate. This is highlighted by the fact
273 that the different conclusions reached by the schools of thought regarding issues of direct relevance to the balance of power, such as: missile defense; relations with friends and allies; the GPR; and U.S. policy in an area of direct relevance to China’s core security interests, the Taiwan Strait, indicate that power capabilities did not speak for themselves.
Lastly, the offensive realist hypothesis cannot account for why some Chinese security elites dedicated so much attention to evaluating the meaning of signals like the responsible stakeholder speech and the Senior Dialogue that did not reveal novel information about the balance of power.
The argument made by defensive realism and rationalism that the meaning of costly signals are clear and will shape how states perceive each other’s intentions is also unable to fully account for Chinese elites’ perceptions of U.S. policy. One, it cannot explain how security elites will determine which one is the most important when multiple signals are simultaneously received, whether the combination of these signals sends a message, and how this would be determined. In a complex security relationship that encompasses a wide range of issues and contains elements of both cooperation and competition like the one that exists between the U.S. and China, this is highly problematic. As this chapter will make clear, the different schools of thought reached distinct conclusions regarding which aspects of U.S. policy were the most significant.
Two, it cannot account for why no agreement emerged regarding the significance of the costly signals that it would expect to be the most significant. If the meanings of signals were clear, then over time a consensus would be expected to develop among
Chinese security elites. As previously mentioned, this did not take place and the debate
274 actually became more diverse. While missile defense, developments in relations with regional friends and allies, the GPR, and policy toward the Taiwan Strait are all instances of the U.S. taking measures that involved incurring costs in terms of resources and the scale of its military posture, and in the last case Taiwan’s military posture, no consensus emerged regarding their meaning. As defense has the advantage and the scale of these measures indicate that they were not directed toward containment, it cannot account for why the Malign Containers and Pragmatic Hegemonists viewed them as evidence of malign U.S. intentions while the Evolutionists and New Thinkers characterized them as largely understandable moves to prepare for contingencies in areas of long-standing bilateral friction that did not detract from the importance of new positive developments in
U.S. policy. Furthermore, with the partial exception of India, nor did any consensus emerge regarding the significance of the friends and allies’ roles in U.S. security policy.
Three, as with offensive realism, it cannot explain why the Evolutionists and New
Thinkers afforded significance to non-costly signals like the responsible stakeholder speech and the Senior Dialogue and viewed the diplomatic visits to Beijing by U.S. officials after the EP3 incident as a highly significant turning point in U.S. policy. This undercuts the argument made by rationalism that only costly signals will be afforded importance while cheap talk will be disregarded. The fact that the perceptions of the individual schools of thought of costly and non-costly signals were highly consistent also implies that a different factor shaped how signals were perceived.
Regarding the cognitive psychological explanation, it should first be recognized that over time Chinese security elites’ perceptions have become more accurate and
275 diverse and that the evolution of U.S. policy toward China is shaped by changes in the bilateral balance of power and China’s increasing importance to regional and international security. However, the cognitive psychological explanation remains best equipped to account for how Chinese security elites perceived the George Bush administration’s intentions.
This is due to the fact that it can explain how Chinese security elites determined which signals were the most important when they simultaneously received more than one; why no consensus emerged regarding the intentions informing U.S. policy; and why the
Malign Containers and Pragmatic Hegemonists’ perceptions remained largely static while the Evolutionists and New Thinkers updated their views as signals revealed new information regarding U.S. intentions.
Preexisting perceptions therefore account for how it was determined which signals were important, as security elites from each school of thought paid more attention to the ones that corresponded with their preexisting perceptions. As the Malign
Containers and Benign Hegemonists were predisposed toward viewing U.S. policy as stable and negative for China’s interests, they afforded limited importance to signals that indicated that it was evolving and saw balancing as threatening. In contrast, as the
Evolutionists and New Thinkers were predisposed toward being open to the idea that U.S. policy was not static, they concluded that balancing was understandable and that signals like the responsible stakeholder speech, and the Senior Dialogue were significant. As a result, they updated their views. This also explains why the individual schools of thought reached such different conclusions regarding the significance and meaning of hedging, the overarching concept that informed developments in U.S. policy toward China during
276 the period of the George Bush administration. The fact that the Evolutionists and New
Thinkers also saw the EP3 incident, and to a lesser extent 9/11, as fundamental turning points in relations that led to significant adjustments to policy also aligns with the argument that an external shock or a cathartic event can lead analysts to reevaluate how their counterpart conceives of its interests.
With the exception of India, this can also account for why there was no consensus regarding the role of the friends and allies and allies in U.S. policy. While there is also evidence of a narrower range of views regarding Japan’s role, this can be attributed to the fact that the sensitive nature of Sino-Japanese relations ensures that this is a topic on which Chinese security elites views are less likely to have evolved and that they will also be less inclined to state comparatively moderate views publicly. However, the fact that even on a topic as sensitive as the U.S.-Japan alliance a range of views can be identified also serves to highlight the importance of past perception.
Engagement + Containment and Hedging
Before Chinese perceptions of important issue areas in U.S. policy are evaluated, it is useful to put them in the context of how broader U.S. strategy and intentions were interpreted. While terms like “checking,” “guarding,” “balancing,” “integration,” and
“cooperation,” are often used in this context, the engagement plus containment and hedging formulations were most widely used and express the same ideas.10 As many scholars understood hedging as a continuation of, or evolution from, engagement plus
10 Chinese security elites rarely characterize hedging as consisting of engagement and balancing.
277 containment, and the meaning of hedging was often evaluated with reference to these terms, it is useful to discuss them together.
The Malign Containers viewed U.S. policy as geared toward containing China and concluded that there was no fundamental difference between containment plus engagement and hedging. U.S. intentions were therefore malign, highly consistent, and not expected to change in the future. Any adjustments that did take place were therefore attributable to short-term tactical modifications undertaken in pursuit of the U.S.’s unchanging goals. The possibility that the U.S.’s intentions could evolve was therefore discounted with no hope held out that the relationship could be based on anything other than the balance of power.
In 2001 during the period before 9/11, multiple scholars made the argument that the new administration did not represent a change to U.S. policy, as it remained geared toward containing China. Any changes that might have taken place were undertaken in support of stable goals and therefore insignificant.
In an article that represented a classic example of this view, Fu Mengzi of the
China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) argued that the U.S.’s long-term goals for relations with China remained geared toward westernizing and dividing it with competition and friction likely to continue to characterize the relationship.11 This was reflected in the U.S.’s move to contain China with NMD, relations with its allies, the development of its relationship with India, and its bias toward
Taiwan. In contrast, engagement was limited to the economic sphere, an area where they
11 Fu Mengzi, “Meiguo Duihua Zhengce de Zhanlue Sikao,” (Strategic Thought in American Policy Toward China) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 6 (2001): 12.
278 did share interests and may be able to cooperate.12 No consideration was given to the possibility that this economic engagement would in the long-term be inconsistent with containment.
Ultimately, regardless of whether U.S. policy was containment plus engagement or engagement plus containment it was undertaken in pursuit of the same fundamental goals that the U.S. had had for relations with China for fifty years. As this was a highly consistent strategy that could not be expected to fundamentally alter, tactical adjustments in pursuit of these goals did not reveal any new information.13 While he argued that external and internal pressures would push the George Bush administration away from its hardline policy back toward one based on realism, this did not amount to a conclusion that anything fundamental would change, only that it would pursue its existing goals in a more moderate fashion.14
Any differences between the current and previous administrations were therefore discounted, as U.S. hostility toward China also remained stable. Sa Benwang from the
China Institute for International Strategic Studies argued that the significance of the shift from the Bill Clinton administration’s policy of engagement plus containment to the
George Bush administration’s policy of containment plus engagement was limited, as the goal of westernizing and dividing China had remained constant.15 Even though the fact
12 Ibid., 13. 13 Ibid., 14. 14 Ibid., 14. 15 Sa Benwang, “Ping Bushi Zhengfu de Duihua Zhengce Tiaozheng,” (Evaluating the Bush Administration’s Adjustment of Policy Toward China) Heping yu Fazhan 3 (2001): 3.
279 that the U.S. was treating China like a strategic competitor instead of as an enemy was positive, this did not amount to a strategic change in what he held to be a stable policy.16
Similarly, Yang Yunzhong from the Department of Political Theory at the Jinan
Military Academy posited that engagement plus containment was a double-edged sword with engagement as the form that policy took while containment remained the goal.17
Engagement was something that was pursued with the objective of causing China to evolve and to bring it into the U.S.-led order. However, showing how much subsequently changed during the course of the George Bush administration, he concluded that U.S. strategy was still focused on Europe and that it would be difficult for the U.S. to redirect more resources and attention toward China and a larger deployment in the Asia Pacific.18
The fundamental point of similarity between all of these scholars is summed up by Lu Junyuan of the Jiangnan Social School’s explanation of changes in U.S. policy after 9/11. He posited that any reduction in the intensity of the U.S.’s containment strategy was attributable to the fact that the emergence of new priorities after 9/11 had forced it to reduce tensions with China.19 As this was a tactical adjustment that could be reversed in the future, U.S. policy continued to consist of containment and exploitation
(利用).20 Simply put, it was believed that new developments in U.S. policy always
16 Ibid., 3. 17 Yang Yunzhong, “Dui 21 Shiji Chuye Meiguo Duihua Zhanlue he ZhongMei Guanxi Zhongda Wenti Sikao,” (Thoughts About U.S. Policy Toward China at the Beginning of the 21st Century and Major Issues in Sino-American Relations) Dangdai Yatai 5 (2001): 4. 18 Ibid., 6. 19 Lu Junyuan, “Kunjing yu Jiyu- Meiguo Duihua Zhanlue Zhong Zhongguo Heping Fazhan de Dilu Zhengzhi Sikao,” (Difficulties and Opportunity: Geopolitical Thought About China’s Peaceful Development in U.S. Strategy Toward China) Taipingyang Xuebao 1 (2006): 70. 20 Ibid., 71.
280 amounted to tactical adjustments that did not affect its underlying goal of containing
China. U.S. policy was evidently viewed as well coordinated, as no analysis of the different roles of the Departments of Defense and State in this policy was presented.
Following the emergence of hedging as a new concept for characterizing U.S. policy toward China, it was concluded that it did not represent anything new and was merely an extension of the containment plus engagement formula. Gu Guanfu of CICIR and Dai Jing present a conflicted evaluation of U.S. policy that largely fit with this conclusion. After characterizing the U.S. as adopting a hedging policy toward China’s rise, they describe the responsible stakeholder template as reflecting some new thinking; high-level meetings, especially between heads of state, and dialogues as working toward mutual trust and understanding; and the resumption of mil-mil relations as reflecting the development of the bilateral relationship.21 These developments are attributed to China’s growing importance in international relations and setbacks suffered by the George Bush administration’s foreign policy.22
After outlining these comparatively positive developments and holding out the hope that some things had changed, they ultimately concluded that the U.S. had not rejected the containment plus engagement formulation and that hedging therefore did not represent a real change.23 The most significant change that had taken place was therefore that the contents of the military side of U.S. policy had become more prominent through developments like the GPR.24 The U.S.-Japan alliance; increasing cooperation with India;
21 Gu Guanfu and Dai Jing, “Xiao Bushi Zhizheng Yilai de ZhongMei Guanxi,” (Sino- American Relations Since George W. Bush Took Power) Heping yu Fazhan 4 (2006): 17. 22 Ibid., 18. 23 Ibid., 17-18. 24 Ibid., 18.
281 and the U.S.’s move to strengthen its position on Guam were all viewed as evidence that the U.S. was adopting a policy of “preventative containment” against China from multiple standpoints, an approach that reflected Cold War thinking.25 As a result, while adjustments that appeared to be positive for China’s interests only amounted to tactical changes, developments that were negative for China’s interests indicated that U.S. policy had not changed and remained hostile. Positive changes were therefore discounted as aspects of policy that were negative for China’s interests were understood to be far more telling.
Alternately, Chen Shaojin from the Institute of International Technology and
Economy at the State Council Development Research Center concluded that the only thing that distinguished hedging from containment plus engagement was that it made the relationship between the two components more ambiguous (模糊) and less clear. As its goal remained the strengthening of U.S. dominance, it did not indicate that any substantial changes had taken place in U.S. intentions.26 Relations with India, Japan,
Pakistan, Vietnam, and the Central Asian countries were therefore geared toward encircling China.27 While he discussed the uncertain nature of the relationship between containment and engagement, his writing only presented standard arguments that the U.S. was an offshore balancer that was intent on encircling China without examining how the engagement component fit with these developments.28 Containment was therefore viewed as more credible.
25 Ibid., 20. 26 Chen Shaojin, Zhongguo yu Baguo Jituan (China and the G8) (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2006), 97. 27 Ibid., 97. 28 Ibid., 97.
282 Interestingly, another scholar with a very negative view of U.S. intentions who also concluded that the U.S. was focused on containment and that hedging did not represent a fundamental change in its intentions still viewed it as positive for China’s interests. 29 This was due to the fact that it had provided China with incentives to rise peacefully with containment being unable to hold it down in the long run due to what he held to be the advantage China derived from its large population. In contrast, absent hedging China would have been more likely to act aggressively and to ultimately lose in a conflict from which it would find it difficult to recover. While the fact that the U.S. can change its policy in the future motivates China to build up its own capabilities as well, hedging on both sides can lead to a “peaceful arms race without war” as each acts defensively. Under these circumstances, conflict can be avoided. No explanation was provided regarding how hedging created these incentives if U.S. policy was still geared toward containment.
The Malign Containers therefore identified no new developments in U.S. policy and did not view engagement or the cooperative aspects of hedging as credible.
The Pragmatic Hegemonists viewed the U.S. as pursuing a policy of engagement plus containment with hedging constituting a continuation of this approach. In contrast to the Malign Containers, even though U.S. policy was viewed as largely stable with changes limited to the tactical level and no new thinking was believed to have taken place, this was not held to amount to containment. At the same time, as some of its
29 Chinese Interview #25, Beijing, March 25, 20012.
283 contents were threatening toward China’s interests, it could not be characterized as benign or as a development that it should welcome.
In 2001, Chu Shulong of Tsinghua University concluded that the U.S. believed that it still had time and the ability to work toward its goals concerning China through engagement. It therefore did not yet need to use comprehensive containment in order to handle relations.30 This was supported by the fact that recent U.S. reports had stated that, while in the future China might be able to challenge the U.S., no country would be able to do so for the next fifteen to twenty-five years.31 During the post-Cold War period, the
U.S. had therefore had a stable policy of engagement plus containment that was directed toward accessing China’s market and securing its cooperation on regional problems while simultaneously maintaining limitations on technology transfers, strengthening its regional alliances, using international rules to check China’s foreign policy, and using Taiwan and
Tibet to check China.32 While this did not amount to containment, nor did it indicate that any significant changes could be expected.
Clearly this continued to be his view as in an article that he co-authored with
Geng Tai in 2003 the argument was made that the fact that the U.S. viewed China as an uncertain variable led it to maintain a policy of engagement plus containment.33 In 2007, he also concluded that the 2006 Quadrennial QDR call to deploy six of the U.S.’s eleven
30 Chu Shulong, “Mei Duihua Zhanlue ji ZhongMei Guanxi Zouxiang,” (U.S. Strategy Toward China and the Direction of Sino-American Relations) Heping yu Fazhan 2 (2001): 40. 31 Ibid., 39. 32 Ibid., 40. 33 Chu Shulong and Geng Tai, Shijie, Meiguo he Zhongguo- Xin Shiji Guoji Guanxi he Guoji Zhanlue Lilun Tansuo (The World, the U.S., and China- An Exploration of International Relations in the New Century and Theory of International Strategy) (Beijing: Tsinghua University Chubanshe, 2003), 199.
284 aircraft carriers in the Pacific and Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s responsible stakeholder speech reflected the two sides of the U.S.’s hedging policy.34 This approach was distinct from containment, as the 2006 QDR revealed that the U.S. had not classified
China as an adversary.
As moderate as this analysis was, it did not conclude that any important changes had taken place in U.S. policy. Instead, it was characterized as pursuing its interests under uncertain and changing conditions. It also placed more focus on U.S. measures to prepare for undesired contingencies and dedicated minimal analysis to the positive side of the formula, which was beneficial for China’s interests.
Like Chu Shulong, others also viewed hedging as an extension of the logic of engagement plus containment, and not something that constituted a fundamental change of policy. Yu Zhengliang, who at that time was affiliated with the Shanghai Institute for
International Studies (SIIS), concluded that, first, hedging recognized that China was now a member in the international system and should be encouraged to play a larger positive role through things like the responsible stakeholder concept and the deepening of integration. Second, it involved pursuing a new strategy with allies and deepened security cooperation in the region in a way that was threatening toward China.35 The U.S. was therefore using a combination of cooperation, competition, engagement, restrainment, and encirclement to simultaneously respond to both the best and worst-case future possibilities. This was complicated by the fact that China’s expanding power capabilities ensured that there was a growing likelihood that traditional containment would play a
34 Chu Shulong, “The Security Challenges in Northeast Asia: A Chinese View,” in East Asia Security: Two Views (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 24-25. 35 Yu Zhengliang, “Shilun Meiguo Duihua de Duizhong Zhanlue,” (Realistic Analysis of America’s Hedging Strategy Toward China) Guoji Guancha 1 (2006): 2.
285 role in U.S. policy.36 Even though the U.S. was not currently containing China and positive developments in its policy had emerged, broader trends therefore indicated that no long-term reorientation would take place.
Liu Aming of the International Relations Research Institute at the Shanghai
Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) also concluded that U.S. policy indicated that it still saw no reason to contain China. This was due to the fact that it recognized that: China’s rise was unavoidable; they shared some strategic viewpoints; and that it would not be able to pose a challenge for a long time.37 As the U.S. still possessed the resources necessary to contain China if in the future it saw a need to do so, it was presently pursuing a hedging policy that mixed engagement, constrainment, and containment.38
The combination of developments such as the Valiant Shield military exercise that was held near Guam during the summer of 2006, the largest since the end of the Cold War, and the responsible stakeholder model reflected the balance in U.S. intentions.39 Instead of indicating that U.S. policy had fundamentally changed and that containment was no longer a consideration, the U.S. had left all options open. Hedging was therefore old wine in new bottles, as it combined long-standing components of U.S. policy.
Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University attributed significance to 9/11 in explaining the fact that the U.S. was no longer attempting to contain China. He argued that after the attacks its policy changed significantly as, it concluded that the likelihood of major power
36 Ibid., 4-5. 37 Liu Aming, “Lun 21 Shiji ZhongMeiYin Sanbian Guanxi,” (Evaluation of Trilateral Relations Between China, the U.S., and India) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 10 (2006): 27-28. 38 Ibid., 29. 39 Ibid., 33.
286 conflict had fallen.40 As a result, he saw no evidence of a strategy of preemptive attack on
China to contain its rise for the foreseeable future. As he concluded that the U.S. would not attempt to contain China if the costs associated with doing so were too high, he advocated that China increase military spending in order to convince it not to try to do so while also strengthening diplomatic relations.41 The fact that the U.S. was not presently attempting to contain China was therefore attributable to its interests and did not indicate that a fundamental change in its thinking had taken place. In contrast to U.S. policymakers like Ashley Tellis who no longer saw containment as a viable option, these scholars believed that it remained a future possibility.
Wang Yiwei of Renmin University concluded that hedging was not overly threatening due to the fact that, while the U.S. could lengthen the time needed for China’s rise and could limit its military modernization with the goal of reducing the challenge to
U.S. hegemony, it was not capable of containing it. As a result, it was a defensive measure that did not change the fact that its policy was geared toward peace.42
At the same time, he characterized hedging as an attempt to bring China in line with the international system while simultaneously isolating and checking it. It therefore refined the U.S.’s established policy by making the distinction between its two components more ambiguous and also involved competing for influence.43 The purpose
40 Yan Xuetong, Guoji Zhengzhi yu Zhongguo (International Relations and China) (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2005), 205. 41 Ibid., 205. 42 Wang Yiwei, Shijie Weirao Meiguo Zhuan? (Does the World Revolve Around America?) (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2005), 124. 43 Ibid., 121.
287 of doing so was to speed up the transfer from one component to the other in order to protect the U.S.’s superior position.44
Even though hedging was an extension of the containment plus engagement model, it did pose some challenges to the bilateral relationship. Wu Xinbo of Fudan
University’s Center for American Studies posited that guarding carried far more weight than engagement, with dissuasion, deterrence, and hedging being the central concepts in the administration’s policy.45 Changes in policy during the George Bush administration’s second term were therefore geared toward preparing for worst-case possibilities in the security sphere and involved competition and an attempt to restrain China.46 This was motivated by the belief that its rapid rise meant that deterrence was now insufficient.47
Even though he presented these motives as understandable, he argued that actions taken by the George Bush administration to avoid danger (避险) were likely to be viewed by China as amounting to containment, as it had involved military measures that went past what was necessary for attaining this goal.48 Much like the security dilemma, hedging could create a self-fulfilling prophecy that produced conflict.49 Without concluding that the U.S. was attempting to contain China, he therefore still viewed it as a source of problems for the bilateral relations.
Summing up the thinking of many scholars in this school, Wang Yusheng from the China Foundation for International Studies concluded that, while the U.S. could not
44 Ibid., 45. 45 Wu Xinbo, “Shixi Bushi Zhengfu Duihua Anquan Zhengce de Hexin Gainian,” (Realistic Analysis of the Core Concepts in the Bush Administration’s Security Policy Toward China) Meiguo Yanjiu 4 (2007): 7. 46 Ibid., 12. 47 Ibid., 14. 48 Ibid., 21. 49 Ibid., 21.
288 completely free itself from Cold War thinking, it could not be denied that hedging constituted an improvement from past policy.50 As a result, even if U.S. policy was somewhat hostile toward China and its interests, it did not amount to active containment.
The Pragmatic Hegemonists therefore viewed the policy of hedging plus engagement and its successor hedging as indicating that the U.S. was pragmatically pursuing its established interests. Neither positive nor negative adjustments therefore indicated that any fundamental changes were taking place.
While to varying degrees all of these explanations concluded that the U.S. was following a strategy in pursuit of its goals in the bilateral relationship, Pan Rui of Fudan
University’s Center for American Studies complicated this explanation by posing the question of whether U.S. policy was well coordinated. On the one hand, he concluded that the George Bush administration’s stance was distinct from a Cold War containment policy, and characterized the defensive containment that dominated its approach as pushing China to develop in the direction that the U.S. desired.51 While he saw a positive trend in U.S. policy after 9/11 as high-level officials in the George Bush administration came to understand China better, he concluded that these developments did not amount to a change in U.S. goals and that engagement remained secondary.52
50 Wang Yusheng, “ZhongMeiRi Sanjiao Guanxi de Yanbian he Qianjing,” (Evolution and Outlook of China-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Relations) Heping yu Fazhan 3 (August 2008): 36. 51 Pan Rui, Lengzhanhou de Meiguo Waijiao Zhengce- Cong Lao Bushi Dao Xiao Bushi (Post-Cold War American Foreign Policy: From George H.W. Bush to George W. Bush) (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2004), 393. 52 Pan Rui, “Xiao Bushi Zhengfu Diyi Renqi Duihua Zhengce he ZhongMei Guanxi,” (George W. Bush’s First Term Policy Toward China and Sino-American Relations) Meiguo Wenti Yanjiu (2005): 180-182.
289 At the same time, he concluded that different parts of the U.S. government had adopted distinct policies toward China. While in the past it had been common for the executive and legislative branches to be divided on foreign policy, he viewed the George
Bush administration as having gone beyond this as policy statements from the White
House, NSC, and State Department were all different.53 For example, while President
George Bush talked about restarting mil-mil during his trip to China, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld did not want to do it; while Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that Taiwan was not sovereign, the Defense Department sent officials to Taiwan and developed their mil-mil relationship.54 Instead of viewing U.S. policy as clearly directed toward defensive containment, he found it difficult to even determine which department represented U.S. policy; instead of tactical changes indicating that U.S. policy was evolving as it came to understand China better, he found no evidence that a domestic consensus had been reached. As U.S. policy was therefore unstable, it could not be concluded that either traditional containment was taking place or that significant tactical adjustments were being made.
The Evolutionists viewed the U.S. as pragmatically pursuing its interests and adjusting its policy accordingly. As a result, the engagement plus containment framework was not viewed as overly threatening. While uncertainties related to the growth of
China’s power ensured that it was preparing for undesired contingencies, this was largely understandable.
53 Ibid., 184. 54 Ibid., 184.
290 Developments in policy during the course of the George Bush administration and the emergence of the concept of hedging also indicated that the U.S. was making significant tactical adjustments as it continued to work to manage relations with China.
The fact that the U.S. required Chinese cooperation on a wide array of issues, and therefore benefitted from healthy bilateral relations, also ensured that engagement remained dominant. While it is normal for there to be a wide variety of U.S. views on security relations with China, and there are always groups in the U.S. that advocate for containment, the fact that engagement and cooperation were dominant ensured that hedging was acceptable and possibly a positive development even if it did not constitute a change at the level of strategy.
Nor was hedging understood as a completely novel approach. Several scholars argued that the Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton administrations had also pursued a version of this strategy.55 While adjustments to this approach occasionally took place, this framework had provided a stable foundation during the post-Cold War period.56 This indicated that the U.S. realized that it could not prevent China’s rise and was only trying to manage it.57
A number of articles published in 2001 also reached the conclusion that the
George Bush administration’s policy did not constitute a major change from President
Bill Clinton’s and that the engagement plus containment framework was still in place. In contrast to the Pragmatic Hegemonists, this was viewed as benign or moderately positive for China’s interests.
55 Chinese Interview #5, Beijing, China, October 26, 2011. 56 Chinese Interview #30, Beijing, China, May 9, 2012. 57 Chinese Interview #5, Beijing, China, October 26, 2011.
291 Looking back at the first 100 days of the George Bush administration, Guo
Zhenyuan from China Institute for International Studies (CIIS) characterized its developing policy as fitting with the dual model that had been in place since the end of the Cold War, as there are areas where the two countries interests aligned and conflicted.58 As a result, even though President George Bush had classified China as a strategic competitor, the statement in his April 24, 2001 speech that it was a partner in some areas and a competitor in others indicated that there was no change from past U.S. policy.59 He viewed this as understandable due to the fact that U.S. hardliners worry about a challenge to its leadership while other interest groups benefit from the economic and trade relationship.60 While he expected the dual nature of U.S. policy to become increasingly clear, he attributed importance to the fact that neither country had characterized the other as an enemy or a threat and did not believe that they could be brought into across the board confrontation.61 As a result, while it was important to consider which component of U.S. policy was dominant,62 it did not currently pose a direct threat to China and there was no reason to assume that it would become more hostile in the future. This was significant as he also characterized the strengthening of relations with allies in the region, missile defense, and the upgrade of relations with
Taiwan as primarily motivated by China.63
58 Guo Zhenyuan, “Xiao Bushi Zhengfu Duihua Zhengce Zouxiang jiqi Dui ZhongMei Anquan Guanxi de Yingxiang,” (The Direction of the George W. Bush Administration’s Policy Toward China and its Influence on Sino-American Security Relations) Heping yu Fazhan 3 (2001): 5. 59 Ibid., 5. 60 Ibid., 5. 61 Ibid., 7. 62 Ibid., 8. 63 Ibid., 5.
292 Similarly, Hao Yufan of Macao University and Zhang Yandong concluded that the size of the Chinese market ensured that the U.S. must engage China and encourage changes that would peacefully bring it into the U.S.-led order.64 Even though there were hardliners in the new administration that shared the view that China was a future enemy and should be treated accordingly, in practice U.S. policy was geared toward avoiding direct conflict. There was therefore a high degree of continuity between the Bill Clinton and George Bush administrations regardless of whether the latter placed more emphasis on containment.65 While the U.S. was preparing for the possibility that China would try to challenge it, its policy was understandable and largely consistent.
Similarly, in a succinct explanation of the limitations of tactical changes, Fu
Mengzi of CICIR wrote that U.S. policy could not fundamentally change and that the Bill
Clinton administration’s policy had already contained elements of guarding and containment.66 As a result, President Bill Clinton’s description of China as a strategic partner had not been cause for Chinese specialists to relax and his successor’s characterization of China as a strategic competitor was not cause to worry.67
Writing four years later, he stated that 9//11 had placed limitations on the influence of the anti-China camp in the U.S. and that the U.S.’s impartiality toward
China’s application to host the 2008 Olympics and President George Bush’s attendance at
64 Hao Yufan and Zhang Yandong, “Xianzhixing Jiechu- Meiguo Xinzhengfu Duihua Zhengce Toushi,” (Constrained Engagement- An Examination of the New American Government’s Policy Toward China) Zhanlue yu Guanli 4 (2001): 38. 65 Ibid., 39. 66 Fu Mengzi, “Meiguo Xin Zhengfu de Duihua Zhengce Pianxiang,” (Erroneous Tendencies of the New American Government’s Policy Toward China) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 1 (2001): 19. 67 Ibid., 17.
293 the Shanghai APEC meeting were signs of a new stance.68 However, these were still only tactical changes as the George Bush administration had a strategy for leading and shaping
China and integrating it into the system.69 At the same time, engagement was undertaken in order to gain China’s cooperation on issues like terrorism. In order to attain its fundamental goal of maintaining its global leadership, the U.S. was also guarding against
China.70 This was less threatening toward China than containment.
All of these scholars therefore presented U.S. policy as displaying continuity with the past, reasonable, slowly evolving, and largely unthreatening in spite of the fact that the U.S. was preparing for the possibility of conflict with China.
While this school perceived engagement as playing the lead role and tactical changes as important, it did not view fundamental changes in U.S. policy as likely due to its focus on defending its interests and guarding against undesired contingencies. Even though there continued to be a component of policy that was based on guarding, and the difference between this and containment was one of degree, not one of kind, on balance this formulation was acceptable for China’s interests. The fact that policy remained stable during the administration’s last seven years in office, with engagement playing the leading role in policy and guarding remaining secondary, meant that it could be afforded a positive evaluation in spite of the fact that changes were incremental and tactical.71
Li Xiaohua of the Chinese Academy of Social Science’s (CASS) Graduate School of World Economics and Politics therefore characterized this policy as “realist
68 Fu Mengzi, “Bushi Zhengfu Duihua Zhengce 2001-2004,” (The Bush Administration’s Policy Toward China, 2001-2004) in ZhongMei Zhanlue Guanxi Xinlun (New Theory of Sino-American Strategic Relations) (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshi, 2005), 41. 69 Ibid., 41. 70 Ibid., 42. 71 Chinese Interview #17, Beijing, China, November 28, 2011.
294 engagement.” This approach recognized that the worst-case scenarios may not come to pass and that it was necessary to work to avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy. In order to foster a more cooperative China while also convincing it that challenging the U.S.’s position was not an option, it involved: encouraging China to enter the international system; expanding channels of engagement; guarding against China’s ability to challenge core U.S. interests in Asia; and preparing to deal with undesired outcomes if the first three components failed.72 While the last component constituted a tactical development, as the first three components and the goals, assumptions, and basis for assessment had not changed significantly, this was merely “old wine in new bottles.”73 Changes that had taken place up to this point were therefore tactical, not strategic.
Scholars from this school who specifically evaluated the scale and intentions of the U.S.’s military deployment in Asia did not see it as contrary to engagement. Writing in 2004, Xue Li of CASS’s Institute of World Economics and Politics also viewed the
George Bush administration’s policy as continuing to be based on engagement.74 While engagement also contained elements of guarding, this did not amount to containment.75
He argued that the U.S.’s approach toward China was fundamentally different than it had been toward the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War due to the fact that: they were major trading partners; the U.S. was the largest investor in China; they had extensive mil-mil
72 Li Xiaohua, “Jiechu de Xiandu: Meiguo Zhanlue Sixiang de Kunnan yu Duihua Zhengce Liangnan,” (The Limitations of Engagement: Difficulties in American Strategic Thought and the Dilemma of Policy Toward China) Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 8 (2002): 15. 73 Ibid., 15. 74 Xue Li, “Jiechu Zhong You Fangfan, Dan Meiyuo Ezhi- Lengzhanhou Meiguo Duihua Zhanlue de Zai Jiedu,” (Engagement Includes Guarding, but No Containment- Reinterpretation of America’s post-Cold War Strategy Toward China) Taipingyang Xuebao 9 (2004): 63. 75 Ibid., 56.
295 exchanges; and the U.S. had not prevented its allies from developing relations with
China.76 He therefore did not see the U.S.’s military presence in Asia as threatening, as it was directed toward a number of goals and, with the exception of the issue of the Taiwan
Strait, China did not oppose this presence. While there are always voices in the U.S. that favor containment, as they lacked influence on policy, this was not threatening. The U.S. could therefore only be characterized as having a policy of containment toward Iran,
Libya, Cuba, and the DPRK.77
As a result, even though he concluded that the highest and longest-term goal of engagement was to change China according to U.S. wishes, and the most immediate goal was to guard against the possibility of extreme Chinese actions, he did not view U.S. policy as overly threatening or unreasonable. All of these conclusions were still based on the view that the U.S. was working to manage the relationship as it pursued its interests with no evidence that it had undergone new thinking regarding bilateral relations being identified.
After making a similar argument Jiang Deqi of Nantong University concluded both that the U.S. posture in the region surrounding China had reached a new level and that it would be incorrect to assume that China was directly threatened or that conflict was likely, as its focus was limited to the effect of China’s rise on the U.S.’s position.78
Foregoing the language of engagement plus containment or hedging, he instead concluded that U.S. strategy consisted of engagement, pressuring, and integration. Nor
76 Ibid., 60. 77 Ibid., 62. 78 Jiang Deqi, “Lengzhanhou Meiguo Duihua Zhengce Zhong de Riben Yinsu,” (The Element of Japan in the U.S.’s post-Cold War Policy Toward China) Dangdai Shijie 8 (2005): 49-50.
296 did he view integration as overly threatening, as encouraging China to accept the rules of the international system was not a zero-sum game in which one country’s gain was another’s loss.79 While he did not imply that U.S. policy was changing at the strategic level and did not explain what had led him to conclude that the U.S.’s military posture in the region did not pose a direct threat, it was clear that he viewed U.S. intentions as relatively benign and its policy as largely acceptable for China’s interests.
U.S. security policy was also rendered less threatening by the conclusion that it was not solely focused on China. Instead, it was understood to be preparing for all sorts of possible future challenges. Even though China was one potential competitor, hedging could not be characterized as specifically directed at it, as it was also relevant to relations with Russia, India, and even Brazil.80 Europe’s decline also ensured that India’s rise was increasingly relevant to U.S. policy.81 Hedging could therefore be characterized as a common sense approach for a hegemon’s relations with rising states.82 Incremental changes resulting from tactical developments in U.S. policy were therefore understandable and largely unproblematic.
Views of U.S. intentions began to evolve further in 2005 at the beginning of the
George Bush administration’s second term. At that time, Hao Yufan of the University of
Macao concluded that the U.S. had already accepted that it could not contain China. As a result, it had developed a flexible system based on engagement plus guarding which
79 Ibid., 50. 80 Chinese Interview #1, Beijing, China, September 28, 2011. 81 Chinese Interview #2, Beijing, China, October 5, 2011. 82 Chinese Interview #6, Beijing, China, November 8, 2011.
297 would enable it to deal with both a more friendly or a more problematic China.83 This approach would permit it to defend its economic interest in China and to influence its international behavior while it also encouraged China to reform its domestic political system.84 At the same time, this limited form of engagement would enable it to develop a system for restraining the possibility of Chinese expansionism. As moderate as this conclusion was, it did not imply that the U.S. had come to view bilateral relations in a new light or that any fundamental changes were taking place beyond the tactical adjustments necessary for a more enlightened pursuit of its self-interest.
Liu Jianfei from the Central Party School’s Institute of International Strategic
Studies presented an example of a scholar from the third school whose perceptions evolved over time. In 2005 he argued that at the beginning of the George Bush administration containment had been central in U.S. policy with cooperation becoming dominant after 9/11 led to a change in its priorities. However, the broader trend was still toward containment becoming the central element, albeit without complete conflict resulting.85
In contrast, in a subsequent article he instead posited that, while there were still elements of guarding and integration in U.S. policy, cooperation remained dominant.86
He therefore characterized the administration’s policy as cooperation plus integration and
83 Hao Yufan, “Bushizhuyi de Qiantu yu Weilai ZhongMei Guanxi,” (The Future of the Bush Doctrine and Future Sino-American Relations) in Bushi de Kunjing (Bush’s Difficulties) Hao Yufan and Zhao Quansheng, Eds. (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe 2005), 317. 84 Ibid., 317. 85 Liu Jianfei, “Meiguo Duihua Zhanlue de Zhuanbian Quxiang,” (Changing Direction of the U.S.’s Strategy Toward China) Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 2 (2005): 30-31. 86 Liu Jianfei, “Zhongguo Duimei Zhanlue de Xianshi yu Lilun Yiju,” (The Practical and Theoretical Basis of China’s Strategy Toward the U.S.) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 6 (2006): 24.
298 guarding as globalization ensured that relations were no longer zero-sum and the fact that global problems required bilateral cooperation also rendering this policy less threatening.87 Both Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s speech at the Central Party
School in 2005 and Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s responsible stakeholder speech appeared to be important to this conclusion, as he quoted the former in his analysis of the meaning of hedging and why the U.S. could not bet its future on the hope that China will rise peacefully and characterized the latter as positive.88 The fact that containment was not mentioned in this article and his focus on hedging indicated that he saw incremental changes as taking place in U.S. policy.
Some scholars viewed a domestic American debate at the beginning of the George
Bush administration’s second term as producing significant tactical adjustments.89 Rear
Admiral and head of the PLA’s College of International Relations Qian Hongliang saw these changes as a result of a conclusion that it shared interests with China on issues like anti-terrorism and non-proliferation and an understanding that it would be difficult to gain the domestic support necessary for a containment policy, the enactment of which would also be damaging to the U.S.’s own interests.90 Even though it believed that China could pose a challenge in the future, presently the U.S. benefited from a candid and constructive relationship. As a result, while the increasing institutionalization of the relationship, the military hotline, and the bilateral dialogues indicated a new approach
87 Ibid., 26-27. 88 Ibid., 24-25. 89 He Jian, Dongbeiya Anquan Hezuo Jizhi Yanjiu (Research on the Institutionalization of Northeast Asian Security Cooperation) (Dalian: Dongbei Caijing University Chubanshe, 2008), 87. 90 Qian Hongliang, Zhongguo Heping Jueqi yu Zhoubian Guojia de Renzhi yu Fanying (China’s Peaceful Rise and Neighboring Countries Understanding and Response) (Beijing: Junshi Youyi Wen Chubanshe, 2010), 47.
299 and produced some strategic trust, this did not amount to a fundamental change as the
U.S. was still hedging against a challenge as it tried to guide China’s rise. Its policy therefore changed from engagement plus containment to integration plus checking.
Beyond pressuring China and ensuring that it did not challenge U.S. interests, communication and coordination also became tools with which to ensure that it did not become a challenger.91
This was attributed to changes in: global structure; the mechanisms through which the world operated as the position of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) declined and the importance of U.S. alliances and NGOs ascended; and the process of major power global strategy.92 Even though the U.S. remained committed to defending its interests, it was therefore responding to a new environment in which China was an important variable with tactical adjustments that recognized new realities. Drawing very similar conclusions, one senior scholar characterized 2005 as the turning point in the relationship as a real equilibrium between engagement and containment was established.
As a result, the relationship became more balanced and clear.93
Niu Xinchun and Gao Yiwei of CICIR viewed hedging as a success, as in spite of
China’s rapid growth during the period of the George Bush administration the bilateral relationship had not suffered and had actually been positive. This was attributed to the recognition that China would not directly challenge the U.S. for a long time.94 Even
91 He, Dongbeiya Anquan Hezuo Jizhi Yanjiu (Research on the Institutionalization of Northeast Asian Security Cooperation), 87. 92 Ibid., 96. 93 Chinese Interview #5, Beijing, China, October 26, 2011. 94 Niu Xinchun and Gao Yiwei, “ZhongMei Guanxi Kewang Chixu Wending,” (Sino- American Relations Can be Expected to Continue to be Stable) Heping yu Fazhan 2 (May 2008): 10.
300 though guarding remained part of its policy, engagement, influence, and observation of
China’s direction were dominant. Recognizing that future conflict remained a possibility, the U.S. still had enough time to change course beforehand and during the interim
China’s growing power would not pose a threat to it. As a result, if relations continued to move forward peacefully, the U.S. would not adopt a Cold War-style policy, nor would it attempt to contain it.95 China’s rise during the period of the George Bush administration therefore had not prevented the two countries from maintaining good relations96 and there was no reason to assume that continued Chinese growth would lead to containment.
The Evolutionists therefore viewed the cooperative aspects of U.S. policy as revealing significant information about its intentions and the direction of the relationship.
As the uncooperative aspects of U.S. policy fit within a broader strategy that was evolving in a cooperative direction, they were not viewed as threatening toward China.
For both the Pragmatic Hegemonists and Evolutionists, analysis of engagement plus containment and hedging was therefore largely limited to: the question of which aspect was dominant; how the U.S. was preparing for undesired contingencies; and how important the tactical changes that were taking place were. Questions such as how the
U.S. was working to enmesh China in the international system; whether economic integration made containment impossible; the different roles of the Departments of
Defense and State in this policy; and the sort of hedging that they thought would be most acceptable received far less attention.
95 Ibid., 11. 96 Ibid., 10.
301 One new consideration during the period of the George Bush administration was the question of whether the U.S. still enjoyed the ability to contain China. Writing in
2005, Bo Mengsun, Yuan Peng, Da Wei, Guo Yongjun, and Wang Wenfeng of CICIR’s
Institute of American Studies and Niu Xinchun of CICIR’s Center for Taiwan Studies argued that in recent years Chinese scholars and policymakers had become less worried by the prospect of the U.S. trying to contain, westernize, and divide China. Even though the U.S. still had the ability to make trouble for China, they concluded that it no longer had the ability to contain it.97 China’s rise therefore meant that the U.S. had to move away from a Cold War-style containment policy in order to deepen engagement.98 This was reflected in the Senior Dialogue, which was a tool for engaging China and to grasp the pulse of its rise.99 This was a novel argument, as during the past it had largely been assumed that the U.S.’s advantage in material power capabilities ensured that it was able to do so.
The New Thinkers viewed hedging as reflecting a significant shift in the George
Bush administration’s policy. Instead of being limited to a tactical adjustment, it reflected a change at the strategic level in how the U.S. conceived of its ties with China as well as a change in its intentions and the nature of their relationship. Even though uncertainties regarding China’s future direction ensured that the U.S. was still preparing for undesired contingencies, this was understandable and did not detract from the new thinking.
97 Bo Mengsun, Yuan Peng, Da Wei, Guo Yongjun, Wang Wenfeng, and Niu Xinchun, “Zhanlue Duihua yu ZhongMei Guanxi,” (Strategic Dialogue and Sino-American Relations) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 8 (2005): 57. 98 Ibid., 60. 99 Ibid., 59.
302 One difference from past policy was the fact that U.S. was now participating in deeper interactions with China. Da Wei and Sun Ru from CICIR’s Institute of American
Studies argued that this was a result of a major American debate that took place in 2005 regarding policy toward China.100 As a result, U.S. policy had changed from that of a strong country toward a weak country to a strong country toward a moderately strong country. This change was producing a new basis for the relationship as the two powers looked to develop and exist in the system together.101 While in the past engagement plus containment had focused on bringing China into the international system, the George
Bush administration was now pursuing deep interaction (深度互动). Provided that China respected international rules as its influence expands, they did not believe that the U.S. would adopt comprehensive containment, as doing so would damage the international system that it leads.102
As significant as this change was, the U.S.’s feeling of uncertainty regarding
China’s future direction also meant that there was no guarantee that cooperation would remain the dominant component of policy. As a result, they advocated that China seize this opportunity to work with the U.S. on global, regional, and bilateral issues in order to reduce American suspicions and to influence its view of China.103 Positive changes in
U.S. thinking and intentions therefore ensured that its policy was open to Chinese influence and that its intentions ensured that hedging was not threatening. Instead of
100 Da Wei and Sun Ru, “Bushi Zhengfu Duihua Zhanlue Tiaozheng Qushe,” (The Trend in Adjustments of the Bush Administration’s Strategy Toward China) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 11 (2005): 9. 101 Ibid., 11. 102 Ibid., 11. 103 Ibid., 12.
303 being limited to tactical adjustments, the fact that a new basis for the relationship was developing ensured that the change went deeper.
Regarding the possibility that new thinking was taking place in the U.S. on policy toward China and the idea that hedging represented something new, the writings of Yuan
Peng, the Director of CICIR’s Institute of American Studies, and how his views developed over time, are of particular interest. In an evaluation of U.S. intentions published in 2001, he focused on constraints on policy put in place by material conditions and other U.S. priorities. The fact that the size of China’s economy would make containment difficult; the disinterest of other countries in joining the U.S. in attempting it; the fact that the U.S. already faced other challenges and would not want to create additional problems; the presence of officials in cabinet from the George H.W. Bush administration with deep foreign policy experience; the U.S. interest in gaining improved access to the Chinese market; and the desire for Chinese cooperation on issues of mutual concern were viewed as ensuring that real containment was unlikely.104 As a result, U.S. policy would continue to be conflicted with both good and bad periods resulting. As reasonable as this conclusion was, it was clearly based on a straightforward understanding of U.S. interests and limitations that did not appear to be subject to debate.
Five years later, in 2006 he published an important article in which he posited that there was now a debate among Chinese scholars regarding whether significant changes in
U.S. strategy toward China were taking place.105 He argued that from 2005 onward there
104 Yuan Peng, “Qiaozhe Huake Bushi Zhuzhenghou de Duihua Zhengce Quxiang,” (The Direction of U.S. Policy Toward China Since George Walker Bush Took Office) Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Luntan 2 (2001): 41-42. 105 Yuan Peng, “ZhongMei Guanxi: Xin Bianhua yu Xin Tiaozhan,” (Sino-American Relations: New Changes and New Conditions) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 5 (2006): 29.
304 had been some qualitative alterations and that as a result one could talk of a change in the context of the relationship, which now extended far beyond bilateral issues and affected broader issues in international relations. He characterized this as a significant historical change.106 Speeches by President George Bush and senior administration officials also provided evidence of new thinking and that the rising China theory and conditional acceptance had surpassed the China collapse theory and comprehensive containment.107
Hedging therefore meant that China’s rise was acceptable as long as it did not challenge the U.S.’s fundamental interests and it acted responsibly. The U.S. deployment in the West Pacific and relations with friends and allies were therefore directed toward ensuring that China could only rise along the path (轨道) that the U.S. favored. The
Pentagon’s use of the State Department’s responsible stakeholder language in the 2006
QDR indicating that this was the case. Significantly, he concluded that hedging was acceptable provided that it stemmed from the trunk of engagement.108
While all of these developments were highly significant, the fundamental cause that he attributed them to was a subtle change in comparative soft power, as he believed that China’s had grown while the U.S.’s had declined with China’s role in the Six Party
Talks and relationship with Russia taking on increasing significance.109 These developments had led the U.S. to reevaluate its relations with China at a deeper level.
In another article published in 2007, he also argued that, instead of adjusting its policy toward bilateral relations, the U.S. was attempting to develop a new strategy that encompassed engagement, integration, and checking. This was due to the fact that it had
106 Ibid., 30-31. 107 Ibid., 32. 108 Ibid., 33. 109 Ibid., 34.
305 realized that: it could not prevent China’s rise; containment was both unattainable and undesirable; and simple engagement was insufficient. In this strategy, engagement was geared toward pushing China to evolve; integration was geared toward assimilating it and shaping an international system that would ensure that it would not challenge the U.S.; and checking replaced containment, as it was suitable for the new era due to the fact that it was more than passive guarding and less than complete containment.110 The expansion of high-level bilateral communication in order to gain a better idea of the pulse of
China’s rise and the strengthening of the military deployment in the West Pacific were therefore part of the same strategy and provided the U.S. with flexibility to adjust as circumstances changed. The fact that changes had therefore taken place at the strategic level also indicated that the U.S. had rethought its policy toward China. While the U.S. was still guarding against undesired contingencies, this was fundamentally different from abstaining from a policy of containment because the costs involved would be too high.
When compared to the conclusions that he had drawn in 2001, the significance of the change in his view of U.S. policy and intentions six years later is clear.
Other scholars in this school also viewed hedging by the George Bush administration as predominantly cooperative and therefore largely unthreatening, as it provided evidence that the U.S.’s thinking toward China had changed over time.111 As its intentions were primarily benign, the buildup on Guam and the GPR were not overly worrisome. The George Bush administration’s policy was therefore 70% cooperation and
110 Yuan Peng, “Zhongguo Jueqi: Meiguo de Pinggu ji Zhanlue Yindui,” in Bushi de Kunjing (Bush’s Difficulties) Hao Yufan and Zhao Quansheng, Eds. (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2007), 197. 111 Chinese Interview #3, Beijing, China, October 8, 2011.
306 30% careful. As a result, provided that it was peaceful and it did not make unreasonable demands to change the international system, the U.S. had accepted China’s rise.
Another scholar concluded that this approach was wise due to the fact that while the George Bush administration had a positive view of China’s growth, it also had to think about the possible outcomes of its expanding power. The hedging strategy that it adopted during its last seven years in office therefore allowed it to secure its interests in
Asia while simultaneously preventing undesirable outcomes in the bilateral relationship.112 This was a result of the fact that President George Bush learned on the job and came to believe that cooperation with China was more important than things like a close relationship with Taiwan.
Interestingly, during interviews one scholar from the Malign Containers who held an extremely negative view of U.S. intentions expressed a comparatively benign view of hedging, while another scholar from the New Thinkers that did view new thinking as taking place held a less positive view of hedging. Even though the latter viewed it as distinct from containment, he still posited that they were both informed by Cold War thinking and argued that it is difficult to express that the hard side of hedging is no more than a backup that would only be used in the case of undesired contingencies.113 As a result, his evaluation of hedging was less positive even though he viewed the George
Bush administration’s policy toward China as changing as it underwent new thinking.
The New Thinkers therefore viewed the emergence of hedging as a significant development in U.S. policy that indicated that its policy was changing at the strategic level and that fundamental changes were taking place in bilateral relations. The
112 Chinese Interview #9, Beijing, China, November 16, 2011. 113 Chinese Interview #27, Shanghai, China, March 15, 2012.
307 uncooperative aspects of U.S. policy did not contradict this strategy, as they were directed toward undesired contingencies, and expanding opportunities for cooperation were influencing the direction of the relationship.
Chinese Perceptions of Functional Areas and Important Developments in U.S. Policy
Having outlined the differences between the four schools of thought, their overall perceptions of U.S. policy, and the general concepts with which they understood it, it is now possible to examine how these schools of thought perceived U.S. policy in both the specific functional areas and general developments of importance to bilateral relations and U.S. policy that were outlined in chapter four. Doing so serves to highlight how differently the various schools of thought interpreted the same issues and events.
The 2000 Presidential Campaign and Description of China as a “Strategic Competitor”
The Malign Containers regarded the strategic competitor language as threatening and as a reflection of the U.S.’s hostile stance. However, as the intentions and policy informing this language were viewed as unchanging, minimal space was dedicated to analyzing the meaning of this term beyond the fact that it fit with U.S. policy.
Some viewed it as sending a signal that a George Bush administration would take a different stance toward China. This was due to the fact that the term was viewed as coming close to describing it as an enemy and that this is not something that would be done without serious consideration.114 It therefore reflected a significant adjustment in
U.S. policy, which was attributable to an attempt by the Republican Party to identify an
114 Chinese Interview #12, Beijing, China, November 18, 2011; Chinese Interview #20, Beijing, China, December 16, 2011.
308 enemy for its own reasons with the large ideological difference between the U.S. and
China ensuring that the latter was suitable for this role.115 According to one scholar, the
Chinese delegation led by Vice Premier Qian Qichen to Washington in 2001 was motivated by concerns about the administration’s intentions that were created by the strategic competitor language.116
This school therefore viewed this language as confirming the conclusion that nothing would change and that U.S. policy toward China remained hostile.
The Pragmatic Hegemonists understood the term as reflecting the fact that relations could become hostile in the future without concluding that it was currently attempting to contain China. Wang Gonglong of the CCP’s Shanghai Administration
Institute concluded that the term meant that at a basic level China was a competitor, not an ally. The U.S. therefore needed to guard against it and potentially contain its rise. The fact that there was a strategic element to their relationship and China could influence U.S. interests meant that it was not a standard enemy. The competitive nature of their relationship also meant that they could become enemies in the future.117 The negative view that the U.S. was taking of the relationship therefore did not amount to open hostility.
Yang Yunzhong from the Department of Political Theory at the Jinan Military
Academy and Ma Jinping also viewed the strategic competitor language as indicating that
115 Chinese Interview #12, Beijing, China, November 18, 2011. 116 Chinese Interview #33, Beijing, China, July 2, 2012. 117 Wang Gonglong, Baoshouzhuyi yu Lengzhanhou Meiguo Duihua Zhengce (Conservatism and Post-Cold War U.S. Policy Toward China) (Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Press, 2006), 269.
309 the U.S. was taking a hard line toward China without concluding that it was currently trying to contain it. In their view, the strategic competitor language reflected the
American belief that, while China could pose a challenge in the future, it needed at least twenty years to modernize its military before it would be able to do so. In the near term, the main threats facing the U.S. were rogue states and terrorism. As a result, it could not focus all of its attention on China with globalization had also ensuring that there were many areas where they could cooperate on the basis of self-interest.118 While engagement remained the shape and the approach of the new administration’s policy, containment and encirclement remained its foundation.119 The absence of a U.S. attempt to contain China therefore did not disprove the conclusion that U.S. policy was geared toward containment.
The Pragmatic Hegemonists therefore concluded that, the fact that the new administration might adopt a harder line and viewed China warily, did not amount to containment.
The Evolutionists viewed this terminology as less important and did not view it as a significant indication of U.S. hostility or the direction of policy. This was attributable to the view that campaign rhetoric does not communicate much about policy and that this terminology was understandable. Regardless of who was elected, they would not be able to change the U.S.’s engagement policy or the ideology, values, and methods for how to change China that informed it. Even though candidate George Bush took a hard stance
118 Yang Yunzhong and Ma Jinping, 21 Shiji Meiguo Anquan Zhanlue yu ZhongMei Guanxi (Twenty-First Century U.S. Security Strategy and Sino-American Relations) (Jinan: Huanghe Chubanshe, 2004), 223. 119 Ibid., 224.
310 toward China and the fact that he was less familiar with it meant that he was more likely to want to make big changes, if elected, he would still have to manage relations and solve problems from the perspective of U.S. interests.120 As a result, he would not be able to drastically change established policy.121
Nor was there anything new or surprising about the fact that candidate George
Bush wanted to distinguish himself from the Bill Clinton administration’s goal of establishing a strategic partnership, a policy his competitor, candidate Al Gore, was associated with. As a result, domestic U.S. politics played an important role in explaining this development and it was necessary to look at whether statements aligned with actual
U.S. actions.122
Even if the terminology indicated that there was likely to be a period of friction over the Taiwan Strait and missile defense, it did not mean that significant changes should be expected or that a Bush administration would depart from the model that
President Richard Nixon had established and all of his successors had followed. The fact that both parties had supported granting China PNTR was also understood as indicating that there were no significant differences between them on China policy.123
Furthermore, the term “strategic competitor” was not necessarily threatening and may have been accurate. This was due to the fact that it meant that there was a strategic component to their relationship, something that it is argued is always the case in relations
120 Chinese Interview #19, Beijing, China, December 5, 2011. 121 Lu Qichang, “Xiao Bushi yu Huaer de Zhengce Bijiao,” (Comparison of George W. Bush and Al Gore’s Policies) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 10 (2000): 29. 122 Chinese Interview #10, Beijing, China, November 17, 2011. 123 Chen Zhichang, “Meiguo Ding Hua Yongjiuxing Zhengchang Maoyi Guanxi yu ZhongMei Guanxi,” (America Affords China Permanent Normalization Trade Relations and Sino-American Relations) in Shijie Fazhan Zhuangkuan 2001 (Conditions of World Development 2001) (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2001), 98.
311 between major powers.124 As the U.S. and China have complex and overlapping interests, it was reasonable to describe them as being both strategic competitors and partners at the same time.125 The significant point was therefore that candidate George Bush had not characterized China as an enemy.126 Nor was having a competitor necessarily a bad thing, as it can motivate a government to perform better and to improve its policies.127
Many of these scholars also recognized the significance of the fact that President
George Bush did not use this terminology while in office or during the APEC meeting in
Shanghai and that this indicated that this language was no longer being used to define relations.128 As a result, it can be concluded that few misperceived campaign rhetoric and the strategic competitor language as sending a significant signal regarding long-term policy where one had not been intended.
Summing up many of the views of the Evolutionists, Yang Jiemian, the President of SIIS, argued that U.S. policy had two components. While the U.S. thought that China was a strategic competitor and a potential challenger, this did not mean that it had already become an enemy. This was highlighted by the fact that during his confirmation hearing
Secretary of State-elect Colin Powell stated that: while China was a competitor in the
124 Chinese Inerview #9, Beijing, China, May 30, 2012. 125 Liu Jianfei, “ZhongMei Jianshexing he Hezuo Guanxi de Xin Fazhan,” (New Development in Sino-American Constructive and Cooperative Relations) Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 5 (2007): 6. 126 Liu Jianfei and Lin Shaoguang, “21 Shijie Quqi de ZhongMeiRi Zhanlue Guanxi,” (China-U.S.-Japan Strategic Relations at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century) (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 2002), 207. 127 Chinese Interview #6, Beijing, China, November 8, 2011. 128 Ding Xinghao, “ZhongMei Guanxi: Gongtong Liyi Lilun Kuangjia yu Zhanlue Jiyu,” (Sino-American Relations: The Expansion of the Shared Interests Theory and Strategic Opportunity) Meiguo Wenti Yanjiu 00 (2007): 61-62.
312 realm of security, the U.S.’s job was to ensure that it did not become an enemy.129
Furthermore, in other areas, such as trade in particular, the two countries could be characterized as partners. The fact that the relationship faced challenges therefore did not mean that it would develop in a negative direction.
These perceptions appear to fit with the views of the Chinese government at this point, as during an interview with The Washington Post President Jiang Zemin stated that: “I do not have a naïve, romantic view that the strategic partnership proposed by
President Clinton was a relationship free from struggle or containment. It involved both.
And also conversely, I do not believe that the competitor President Bush talked about does not contain any elements of cooperation.”130
The Evolutionists therefore viewed this language as largely understandable and unthreatening. This terminology highlighted the fact that the relationship faced challenges and sources of friction without assuming that conflict was inevitable.
It is understandable that at the beginning of the George Bush administration the
New Thinkers had not yet emerged as a school of thought, as at this point there was no reason to conclude that strategic changes were taking place in U.S. policy. In fact, one scholar who over time came to see U.S. policy as exhibiting new thinking stated that early on this language led scholars to worry that it was trying to change China in spite of
129 Yang Jiemian, “Dui Xiao Bushi Zhengfu Duihua Zhengce de Fenxi he Sikao,” (Analysis and Thought Toward George W. Bush’s Policy Toward China) Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 5 (2001): 43. 130 John Pomfret, “Jiang has Caution for U.S.; China’s Leaders Says Taiwan Arms Deal Would Spur Buildup,” The Washington Post, March 24, 2001.
313 that fact that they did not believe that China had the capabilities necessary to pose any sort of challenge to the U.S.131
However, as Ni Shixiong of Fudan University’s Center for American Studies subsequent analysis fit into this school, it is worth noting that, along with his co-author
Zhuang Jianzhong, he argued that in light of the many uncertainties related to the future direction of China and Sino-American relations, the term “strategic competitor” was a realistic characterization that fit with the standard engagement plus containment model. It therefore reflected the fact that the U.S. and China might become either partners or competitive adversaries.132 As a result, it would be misleading to view the strategic competitor language as providing a complete understanding of how the new administration viewed China or to characterize U.S. policy as incapable of evolution.
Missile Defense
The Malign Containers viewed missile defense as directly threatening to China and another indication that the U.S. was attempting to contain it. Working under the assumption that it would include 100 interceptors at the end of the administration’s first term, Shen Dingli, the Director of Fudan University’s Center for American Studies, argued that if the U.S. were to use four interceptors against each missile, with each having a success rate of 50%, it would have a 94% chance of intercepting all twenty-four
131 Chinese Interview #35, Beijing, China, July 9, 2012. 132 Ni Shixiong and Zhuang Jianzhong, “ZhongMei Guanxi de Xin Tiaozhan yu Xin Jiyu- Jian Xi Bushi Zhengfu de Duiwai Zhengce jiqi Dui ZhongMei Guanxi de Yingxiang,” (New Challenges and Opportunities in Sino-American Relations: Simultaneous Analysis of the Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy and Influence on Sino-American Relations) Meiguo Wenti Yanjiu 1 (2001): 22.
314 of the ICBMs that China was said to possess.133 As a result, the system would clearly have a negative impact on its security environment. It was therefore part of a broader strategy to pin China in on land and to deny it strategic space that also involved the strengthening of relations with Taiwan and allies in the Asia Pacific and the deployment on Guam.134
The scale of the proposed system was also viewed as supporting the conclusion that it was directed at China. This was due to the fact that, while it was too large for the
DPRK and too small for Russia, it was suitable for denying China a second strike capability.135 This was based on the argument that, while the number of interceptors that were to be deployed in Alaska were insufficient for the quantity and quality of Russian missiles, they would be adequate for China’s arsenal. It was also concluded that interceptors with a range over 300 km. were not directed at rogue states.136
Similarly, Wang Jia and Shu Zongjia argued that for addressing threats from the
DPRK, Iran, Iraq, and Libya the system was far too powerful (大村小用) and therefore was not being developed with them in mind.137 The fact that China is also a nuclear power and that the number of interceptors would be adequate for dealing with a Chinese
133 Shen Dingli, “China’s Evaluation of the Adjustment to U.S. Security Policy Since September 11, 2001,” Defense and Security Analysis 19, 3 (December 2003): 322. 134 Wang Jia and Shu Zongjiu, “Lun Meiguo Junshi Zhanlue de Tiaozheng jiqi Dui Woguo he Yatai Anquan Huanjing de Yingxiang,” (Discussion of Adjustments to U.S. Military Strategy and Its Influence on China and Asia’s Security Environment) Junshi Lishi Yanjiu 1 (2002): 119-120. 135 Yang and Ma, 21 Shijie Meiguo Anquan Zhanlue yu ZhongMei Guanxi (Twenty-First Century U.S. Security Strategy and Sino-American Relations), 261. 136 Ibid., 261. 137 Wang and Shu, “Lun Meiguo Junshi Zhanlue de Tiaozheng jiqi Dui Woguo he Yatai Anquan Huanjing de Yingxiang,” (Discussion of Adjustments to U.S. Military Strategy and Its Influence on China and Asia’s Security Environment): 118.
315 attack ensured that it is the most logical target.138 Even if it was not the only target, these reasons were seen as sufficient for concluding that U.S. actions were negatively influencing China’s security environment. The fact that the George Bush administration chose to consult with Russia regarding the development of the system while declining to do so with China and discussed the possibility of buying some of Russia’s S-300 missiles
139 was also intended to isolate and threaten it.
The muddying of the distinction between TMD and NMD was also viewed as threatening. Sha Zukang, the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’
Department of Arms Control, outlined this perception when he stated that: “China is not opposed to TMD, that is TMD which will be utilized to protect a country’s troops and for air defense purposes. This kind of TMD may be justified. But any TMD that smacks of
NMD, that is to say, it can play the role and function of NMD and can be used as a front for NMD. And, if such TMD will be used to enhance military alliances, or exceed the legitimate defense requirements by covering areas beyond the scope of their defense,
China would certainly oppose such kind of TMD.”140
The Malign Containers therefore viewed missile defense as a highly threatening development that reflected the U.S.’s long-standing desire to contain China. Instead of being directed toward undesired contingencies and other countries, China was understood to be its main target.
138 Ibid., 118. 139 Ding Kuaisong, “Meiguo Duihua Zhengce de Tiaozheng yu Dongya Anquan,” (Adjustment of U.S. Policy Toward China and East Asian Security) Guoji Zhengzhi yu Anquan 8 (2001): 24. 140 “Sha Zukang’s Briefing on Missile Defense,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, Beijing, March 14, 2001.
316 The Pragmatic Hegemonists viewed missile defense as an undesirable development without concluding that it was part of a containment strategy. Lu Jianren of
CASS’s APEC Policy Research Center concluded that it was best understood as a potential threat. The scale of U.S. strategy for the Asia Pacific and level of deployment revealed information about decisions that had been made for future weapon systems and indicated that it was directed at China.141 U.S. attempts to develop security relations with
Japan and Australia were also viewed as directed toward enhancing missile defense.142 At the same time, the fact that missile defense would take twenty-five years to develop meant that China needed to adopt a measured response. If it reacted too strongly and economic development ceased to be its main priority, it would be falling into America’s trap. It also indicated that it should work to improve relations with India and Japan in order to avoid being encircled.143 Hostile U.S. actions were therefore an indication of the potential for future containment, not current containment.
Scholars in this school of thought believed that missile defense would send a different signal if there was reason to believe that it would be used to defend Taiwan, as this would further complicate China’s goal of unification. However, as the U.S. has not been willing to sell Taiwan the AEGIS defense system that would contribute to its ability to participate in missile defense, they concluded that this was not its primary goal.
The Pragmatic Hegemonists therefore viewed missile defense as a development that raised concerns for China’s security without posing an immediate threat. As result, while it was viewed warily, it did not indicate that the U.S. was pursuing containment.
141 Lu Jianren, “Bushi de Xin Yatai Zhanlue Jiqi Dui Zhongguo de Yingxiang,” (Bush’s New Asia Pacific Strategy and Its Influence on China) Dangdai Yatai 8 (2001): 3. 142 Ibid., 4. 143 Ibid., 5.
317 The Evolutionists viewed China as one of several considerations informing missile defense. It was therefore directed toward undesired contingencies and was not primarily intended as a tool for threatening it. Positive developments in U.S. policy that took place during the period of the George Bush administration also rendered it less threatening. While no one welcomed its development, and it did have security implications for China, it therefore was not understood as posing a direct threat.
Zhu Feng of Beijing University’s scholarship on this topic is particularly useful.
He concluded that the new system indicated that the George Bush administration did not accept the logic of MAD.144 As a missile attack from China would have to travel through
Alaska, and Russia, the U.K, and France are the only other countries that possess ICBMs that can travel more than 2300 km., it was inconceivable that it left China out as a target.145 The fact that the system muddied the difference between TMD and NMD was also significant to this conclusion.146
While it is unsurprising that he viewed it as negative for China’s interests, in a subsequent article in which he was critical of the complications for China’s interests in the Taiwan Strait that the system would create,147 he also stated that no country in Asia, including China, wanted to see the U.S. leave the region. This was due to the positive
144 Zhu Feng, “He Taishi Pinggu Baogao yu Xiao Bushi Zhengfu Xin He Zhanlue,” (The Nuclear Posture Review and the George Bush Administration’s Nuclear Strategy) Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 6 (2002): 24. 145 Zhu Feng, Dandao Daodan Fangwei Jihua yu Guoji Anquan (Ballistic Missile Defense Plan and International Security) (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2001), 679. 146 Zhu Feng, “Xiao Bushi Zhengfu de Daodan Fangjie Jihua yu Xin Zhanlue Jiegou,” (The George Bush Administration’s Missile Defense System and New Srategic Structure) Taipingyang Xuebao 3 (2001): 32. 147 Zhu Feng,Guoji Guanxi Lilun yu Dongya Anquan (International Relations Theory and East Asian Security) (Beijing: Renmin University Chubanshe, 2007), 529.
318 aspects of its military, economic, and strategic presence.148 Undesirable policies on specific issue areas therefore did not amount to a strategy of containment.
Other scholars also concluded that it was not overly threatening due to the view that China was not the primary motivation informing its development. While missile defense was of some relevance to Sino-American security relations, the main targets were
Russia and the immediate threat posed by the DPRK.149 Due to the large gap in power capabilities between the U.S. and China, it would not make sense for it to be the primary focus of the system.
Scholars presented several additional reasons to support the conclusion that missile defense did not pose an immediate threat. First, while it may have been partially aimed at China, this would only be relevant to highly unlikely worst-case scenarios. In the mean time, it was viewed as a defensive system that was of less value to an attack.150
Second, it was unlikely to be utilized, as it was almost impossible to imagine a nuclear war and China would never take the initiative of a ballistic missile strike on U.S. territory.151
Third, the scale of the system was taken to indicate that it did not pose a direct threat. If the U.S. were to deploy 200 interceptors, it would severely limit China’s assurance of a secure second strike. As a result, the limited number of interceptors that
148 Ibid., 107. 149 Ge Lide, “Meiguo Tuichu ‘Fandao Tiaoyue’ ji Zhanlue Fandao Xitong de Fazhan Qianjing,” (America Withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Prospects for the Development of the Strategic Anti-Missile System) Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 4 (2002): 43; Chinese Interview #7, Beijing, China, November 10, 2011; Chinese Interview #32, Beijing, China, May 30, 2012. 150 Chinese Interview #2, Beijing, China, October 5, 2011. 151 Ge Lide, “Meiguo Tuichu ‘Fandao Tiaoyue’ ji Zhanlue Fandao Xitong de Fazhan Qianjing,” (America Withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Prospects for the Development of the Strategic Anti-Missile System): 43.
319 the system included was viewed as a positive sign, as it would prevent the U.S. from concluding that China could not break through its defenses. As a result, even though it ran the risk of sending Taiwan the wrong message, it was not overly worrying to China in terms of other security issues.152 This was due to the fact that, while the interceptors that the system planned for may be well suited to defending the West of the U.S. against an attack from Eastern China, it was not ideal for defending against an attack launched from the West of China against the Eastern U.S.153 As a result, while the main goal of the system was to maintain American hegemony, and to pressure Russia, it did not pose a direct threat to China. It should therefore not respond by positioning itself as an opponent of the U.S., something that the anti-China camp in the U.S. would like to see it do.154
Highlighting the importance of how intentions are perceived, one scholar went further by concluding that, while the system was primarily directed at China, it still was not threatening due to the fact that it was motivated by a desire to hedge. This was attributable the conclusion that it was intended to deal with undesired contingencies that might emerge as China’s capabilities and intentions change. He therefore argued that it was understandable.155
Looking back at the George Bush administration and taking a broad view of the bilateral security relationship, two scholars argued that hard components like missile defense are long-standing aspects of U.S. policy due to its focus on absolute security and
152 Chinese Interview #26, Shanghai, China, March 12, 2012. 153 Xia Liping, “Daodan Fangyu yu Meiguo Yatai Anquan Zhanlue,” (Missile Defense and America’s Asia Pacific Security Strategy) Taipingyang Xuebao 4 (2003): 22. 154 Ge, “Meiguo Tuichu ‘Fandao Tiaoyue’ ji Zhanlue Fandao Xitong de Fazhan Qianjing,” (America Withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Prospects for the Development of the Strategic Anti-Missile System): 43. 155 Chinese Interview #8, Beijing, China, November 15, 2011.
320 convincing other powers that challenging it is useless and that there are always groups in the U.S. that favor taking a tough stance toward China. In contrast, positive aspects of the relationship, such as the Senior Dialogue, the responsible stakeholder template, and the expansion of engagement, were new developments.156
Viewed in this context, missile defense was less threatening, as these positive aspects revealed more about the direction of policy. As the trend was toward a more moderate stance, U.S. policy was on balance positive, even if on individual issues it continued to threaten China.
It also had to be recognized that the White House and the Departments of State and Defense have different views and do not necessarily all have the same goals. As a result, these positive signals communicate more about U.S. intentions and serve to weaken the signal sent by missile defense.157 Therefore, even though the fact that it could be used against China in the future ensured that it still had to pay attention to it, in the near term it did not radically change Sino-American security relations.158
As reasonable as all of these arguments are, none of them implied that the U.S.’s fundamental strategy toward China was evolving. Instead of reflecting changing intentions, it was viewed as pursuing a comparatively moderate policy in order to secure its interests.
Even though the Evolutionists held China to be one of the targets of missile defense, the scale of the system and the state of bilateral relations rendered it less threatening. Evaluating the system within the context of the U.S.’s broader policy also led
156 Chinese Interview #28, Shanghai, China, March 16, 2012. 157 Chinese Interview #35, Beijing, China, July 9, 2012. 158 Ibid.
321 them to take a more moderate view, as cooperative developments in U.S. policy also revealed that there was more to U.S. policy than uncooperative aspects like missile defense.
As the New Thinkers began to emerge as a school of thought in 2005, it is unsurprising that there are no published articles on this topic that reflect this school of thought. As with Wu Xinbo of Fudan University’s Center for American Studies analysis, the New Thinkers assigned less importance to missile defense in their overall evaluation of U.S. intentions. This was due to the fact that changes in the relationship and U.S. policy that were reflected in the Senior Dialogue and the responsible stakeholder speech were viewed as more telling regarding the direction of U.S. policy.159 One scholar also discounted it as a waste of money that reflected the fact that during the 1990s the U.S. had been so far ahead of any potential challenger that it could therefore dedicate resources to a system like this.160 Subsequent developments during the George Bush administration’s second term therefore influenced how missile defense was perceived.
As the New Thinkers attributed importance to cooperative developments, uncooperative aspects of U.S. policy like missile defense were not viewed as providing a complete picture of its intentions.
It is also notable that, while published materials from the 2001-2003 period were more likely to portray the system as threatening and as reflecting negative U.S. intentions, during interviews in 2011-2012, scholars were more likely to express the view
159 Chinese Interview #3, Beijing, China, October 8, 2011; Chinese Interview #27, Beijing, China, March 15, 2012. 160 Chinese Interview #9, Beijing, China, November 16, 2011.
322 that it was not entirely directed at China and did not pose an immediate threat. This raises the possibility that during the 2001-2003 period in which the majority of analysis of missile defense was published it was politically less acceptable to present optimistic conclusions. The subsequent change may also reflect the fact that China became far less willing to publicly criticize the U.S. for missile defense. Alternately, over time subsequent developments in other issue areas may have led these scholars to perceive missile defense differently and therefore toward more optimistic conclusions.
Mil-Mil
The Malign Containers did not perceive developments in mil-mil as indicating that any changes had taken place in the U.S. policy of attempting to contain China.
Positive developments that did take place in this area were only undertaken in pursuit of the U.S.’s own interests and were less indicative of its intentions than its overall security policy toward the region. The U.S.’s relations with allies, missile defense, the GPR, and its ideological commitment to opposing communist states communicated more information about U.S. policy and intentions than its approach to mil-mil.161 The mil-mil relationship was therefore part of the U.S.’s effort to contain China and to suppress authoritarianism as it worked to transform China in line with its own interests.162
While Zhang Linhong from the China Institute for International Strategic Studies characterized the exchange of visits in 2005 as a development that reduced differences in the strategic relationship that could decrease miscalculation and increase shared
161 Chinese Interview #25, Beijing, China, March 5, 2012. 162 Ibid.
323 understanding, and even strategic trust, this served both countries self interests.163 As a result, the development of security relations with U.S. allies in the Asia Pacific as well as the buildup on Hawaii and Guam were more significant and acted to block the development of mil-mil; U.S. policy therefore remained focused on containment.164
The fact that the number of articles that reflect the view of the first school of thought is likely attributable to the belief that this was a minor issue of limited importance to the U.S.’s containment policy. However, it is surprising that no articles made the argument that mil-mil was being used to gain more information about China’s rise in order to contain it.
The Pragmatic Hegemonists concluded that neither the initial downturn in the mil-mil relationship or later improvements indicated that U.S. policy had fundamentally changed. One scholar argued that the fact that it is the Office of the Secretary of
Defense’s responsibility to think about worst case scenarios meant that Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld’s decision to cut off relations before 9/11 was not extremely important.165
While the limited scale of mil-mil was also attributable to restrictions that had been enacted by the U.S. Congress, the fact that it expanded after 9/11 was also in line with
U.S. interests.166 As a result, some scholars viewed mil-mil as merely reflecting the state
163 Zhang Linhong, “2005 Nian Meiguo Anquan Zhanlue Tiaozheng yu Duihua Junshi Guanxi,” (America’s 2005 Security Strategy Adjustment and Military Relations with China) Heping yu Fazhan 1 (2006): 21. 164 Ibid., 32. 165 Chinese Interview #2, Beijing, China, October 5, 2011. 166 Ibid.
324 of the overall relationship without revealing any additional information.167 When the political relationship was damaged, it is normal for mil-mil to suffer; after the political relationship has recovered, it is equally normal for mil-mil to be revitalized.168 Such developments therefore did not send independent signals regarding U.S. intentions.
However, this lack of change was not necessarily problematic. Since the PLA prefers to maintain ambiguity on some issues and does not favor enhanced transparency, it was also willing to see the mil-mil relationship downgraded.169 The fact that the U.S.’s desire to enhance transparency is linked to its thinking about hedging and it is not viewed as applying the same standard to itself also ensures that expanding mil-mil is not necessarily in line with China’s interests and that American attempts to do so are not necessarily positive.170 The limited degree to which mil-mil relations had been developed was also attributable to the U.S. defense laws that were passed in 2000.
While increased efforts to strengthen some aspects of mil-mil were positive for the stability of the relationship, a couple of scholars also argued that the importance of these tactical changes had to be put in perspective. As the Taiwan Strait remains the most fundamental issue in the security relationship, real trust and fundamental changes cannot take place before it is resolved.171 As a result, even if the strengthening of the
167 Chinese Interview #6, Beijing, China, November 8, 2011; Chinese Interview #34, Beijing, China, July 3, 2012. 168 Chinese Interview #19, Beijing, China, December 5, 2011; Chinese Interview #23, Beijing, China, February 2, 2012. 169 Chinese Interview #33, Beijing, China, July 2, 2012. 170 Wu Xiaoming and Xu Weidi, “Junshi Touming yu Anquan Huxin,” (Military Transparency and Mutual Security Trust) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 12 (2005): 55. 171 Chinese Interview #10, Beijing, China, November 17, 2011.
325 institutionalization of the mil-mil relationship was good for their ability to exchange views and manage potential crises, it did not represent a significant change.172
For the Pragmatic Hegemonists any adjustments that the U.S. did make to its approach to mil-mil were of limited importance and revealed minimal information about
U.S. policy. As the influence on the American political climate ensured that mil-mil was particularly open to these sorts of fluctuations, developments did not indicate any departure away from its focus on pursuing its interests.
The Evolutionists viewed developments during the period of the George Bush administration as indicating that the U.S. was adjusting the tactics that it used in mil-mil relations without fundamentally changing its strategy. For example, Sun Ru from
CICIR’s Institute of American Studies concluded that: Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld’s visit to Beijing indicated a new willingness to communicate with China on military affairs; the exchange of visits in 2006-2007 was the highest since the end of the
Cold War; June 2006 was the first time that the U.S. invited China to observe exercises on Guam; and April 2007 was the first time that Chinese military personnel were permitted to tour the Norfolk naval base when naval commander Wu Shengli visited.173
One prominent scholar concluded that this visit by Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld’s marked the recovery of the mil-mil relationship.174 Another concluded that, while he was still a hardliner when he visited China, he made it clear that he did not want
172 Chinese Interview #11, Beijing, China, November 17, 2011. 173 Sun Ru, “Xiangeliya Duihua yu ZhongMei Junshi Hudong,” (The Shangri-La Dialogue and Sino-American Military Interaction) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 6 (2007): 34. 174 Chinese Interview #7, Beijing, China, November 28, 2011.
326 China to become an enemy, and that the mil-mil relationship fully recovered at the beginning of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ tenure.175
Li Yongcheng of Beijing Foreign Studies University also viewed the mil-mil relationship as indicating that the U.S. was not attempting to contain China and that some important developments had taken place. The establishment of a military hotline indicated that both sides were taking a long view of their strategic relationship.176 The fact that there were more than fifty mil-mil communication events during the George
Bush administration, for an average of more than one every two months, was also significant, as this is unusual in relations between major powers and unprecedented in
Sino-American relations.177
The military hotline was an important sign that the relationship was becoming more mature due to the fact that there was still insufficient trust in the relationship, with enhanced trust and mutual transparency needed to reduce the risk of miscalculation.178
The move from more superficial discussions of principles to more practical discussions of
175 Chinese Interview #32, Beijing, China, May 30, 2012. 176 Li Yongcheng, “Chuyi Dangjin Zhongguo de Guojia Anquan Ruan Huanjing,” (My Humble Opinion of China’s Current National Security Soft Environment) Dangdai Shijie 9 (2008): 48. 177 Li Yongcheng, Yitu de Luoji: Meiguo yu Zhongguo de Anquan Ruan Huanjing (The Logic of Intentions: America and China’s Soft Security Environment) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2011), 167. 178 Yang Kai, “ZhongMei Junshi Jiaoliu yu Anquan Huxin Jizhi Jianshi Pingxi,” (Preliminary Evaluation of Sino-American Military Communication and the Establishment of a Mechanism of Mutual Trust) Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Luntan 4 (2009): 60; Wang Yiwei, Shijie shi Tuoyuan de: Weilai Guoji Chengxu Zhanwang (The World is Oval: Outlook for the Future International Order) (Shanghai: Tongji University Press, 2007), 113.
327 cooperation was also significant, as joint exercises and military games can be used to enhance trust.179
The fact that the U.S. allowed China to observe the Valiant Shield military exercises near Guam in 2006 was also significant, as it showed that the relationship was expanding.180 Regarding this development, in an article published in The People’s Daily,
Rear Admiral Yang Yi from the National Defense University described this as “a positive signal worth paying attention to” while also arguing that the U.S. maintains strategic ambiguity on contingencies in the Taiwan Strait and the breadth of issues covered by the
U.S.-Japan alliance.181
However, none of this was viewed as indicating that the U.S. was lowering its defenses or changing its strategy. As with the broader hedging strategy of which it was one part, the U.S. approach to mil-mil involved two aspects. Military exchanges constituted the soft side and were aimed at better understanding the PLA, the direction
China was taking, enhancing transparency, and to mold its strategic choices. At the same time, its forward deployment in the region, and the buildup on Guam in particular, as well as relations with allies constituted the hard side.182
179 Yang, “ZhongMei Junshi Jiaoliu yu Anquan Huxin Jizhi Jianshi Pingxi,” (Preliminary Evaluation of Sino-American Military Communication and the Establishment of a Mechanism of Mutual Trust): 64. 180 Chinese Interview #28, Shanghai, China, March 16, 2012; National Defense University Strategic Research Institute, Guoji Zhanlue Xingshi Fenxi 2006/2007 (Analysis of International Strategic Circumstances 2006/2007) (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2006), 168. 181 Yang Yi, “A Positive Signal Worth Paying Attention To,” People’s Daily (Overseas Edition), May 18, 2006. 182 Sun, “Xiangeliya Duihua yu ZhongMei Junshi Hudong,” (The Shangri-La Dialogue and Sino-American Military Interaction): 35.
328 Even though the development of mil-mil and the reduction of strategic mistrust was highly significant, it was also standard practice for it to develop more during periods of bilateral stability and for it to be the slowest developing aspect of the relationship during periods of instability.183 The fact that it was strongly affected by the broader state of the relationship therefore indicated that the final direction of the U.S. hedging strategy was uncertain.
It was also concluded that the U.S. had deliberately used the three military exercises it held in the Asia Pacific during the period of July-August 2006 to display its superior capabilities.184 As uncertainty regarding China’s future direction was influencing
U.S. policy;185 one intention of the GPR was to deal with China in the Asia Pacific;186 and the fact that to some degree relations with Japan, India, and the TSD were all directed toward China187 indicated that these changes had to be put in perspective. As a result,
U.S. policy continued to combine engagement, constraint, and formalization of the relationship without treating it as an inevitable enemy.188
The Evolutionists therefore recognized that some positive changes were taking place that reflected new thinking. These developments ensured that U.S. actions in the military sphere that were geared toward hedging were not viewed as overly threatening.
At the same time, incremental tactical improvements in this area did not imply that the
U.S.’s overall policy was undergoing fundamental changes.
183 Chinese Interview #31, Beijing, China, May 15, 2012. 184 National Defense University Strategic Research Institute, Guoji Zhanlue Xingshi Fenxi 2006/2007 (Analysis of International Strategic Circumstances 2006/2007), 178. 185 Ibid., 185. 186 Ibid., 176. 187 Ibid., 182. 188 Ibid., 186.
329 The New Thinkers believed that important developments that went beyond the tactical level were taking place in the mil-mil relationship. This fit with the broader changes that were taking place in U.S. policy toward China. The full resumption of relations in 2005 was important to the development of dialogue and the promotion of cooperation in this field.189 This was attributed to the fact that cooperation can spread from one area of the relationship to another. Developments during this period also highlighted the importance of the priorities of individual officials, as Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates was more open and positive toward the mil-mil relationship while his predecessor Donald Rumsfeld had deliberately limited communication.190
However, the mil-mil relationship also highlights the fact that scholars who viewed new thinking as taking place in U.S. policy toward China did not necessarily conclude that this was happening in all areas of the relationship. Yuan Peng, from
CICIR’s Institute of American Studies, who by 2005 had begun to argue that fundamental changes were taking place in U.S. policy, also posited that the fact that it held its largest military exercise in Asia since the war in Vietnam was meant to warn that the Western
Pacific was a strategic red line that the U.S. would not back away from.191 This was part of its strategy for ensuring that China could only rise in the direction that the U.S. favors.
Another scholar who generally saw evidence of new U.S. thinking on China policy during the period of the George Bush administration also viewed mil-mil relations as less significant. This was due to the fact that the issue of Taiwan made it extremely difficult to develop this aspect of the security relationship. The signal sent by the
189 Chinese Interview #9, Beijing, China, November 16, 2011. 190 Chinese Interview #26, Shanghai, China, March 12, 2012. 191 Yuan, “ZhongMeiRi Guanxi: Xin Bianhua yu Xin Tiaozhan,” (China-U.S.-Japan Relations: New Changes and New Conditions): 33.
330 recovery of the mil-mil relationship was therefore of limited importance.192 Two other scholars from the Evolutionists also had little to say about the mil-mil relationship.193
While there is therefore evidence that some scholars from this school viewed mil- mil as reflecting new thinking, the fact that it is limited and other scholars whose views fit with this school attributed minimal importance to this aspect of relations indicates that it was not an important factor in the emergence of the New Thinkers.
The EP3 Incident and its Aftermath
The Malign Containers argued that no major changes took place following the
EP3 incident and that the U.S. remained hostile toward China. Wang Jianwei of the
University of Macao described the George Bush administration’s policy toward China with three Cs of his own. He portrayed the period before the EP3 incident as characterized by “contempt” with the crisis exacerbating this trend by adding
“confrontation” to a relationship that was already coming into conflict in other areas. It therefore was not until after 9/11 that any “cultivation” took place as U.S. priorities changed and the pursuit of its interests temporarily led it to place less emphasis on the difference between democracies and non-democracies.194
During an interview, another scholar from this school of thought completely discounted the idea that the incident had led to any changes in the U.S.’s approach to the bilateral relationship. As the U.S. was viewed as fundamentally hostile toward China, it
192 Chinese Interview #35, Beijing, China, July 9, 2012. 193 Chinese Interview #3, Beijing, China, October 8, 2011; Chinese Interview #27, Shanghai, China, March 15, 2012. 194 Wang Jianwei, “Bushi Zhengfu Duihua Zhengce de Yanbian he ZhongMei Guanxi de Xin Xianshi,” (Evolution in the Bush Administration’s Policy Toward China and New Realities in Sino-American Relations) Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (2002): 40-41.
331 was inconceivable that its policy would move away from containment.195 This was not something that the EP3 incident could change.
For the Malign Containers, adjustments in the American approach to relations with China after the crisis therefore did not indicate that any changes had taken place.
The Evolutionists were divided regarding whether the EP3 incident was significant. Some scholars discounted its importance and concluded that it did not lead to any significant changes. The resumption of reconnaissance flights196 and the fact that the military attaché from the Chinese embassy was still not invited to visit the Pentagon were taken as indications that no major change in policy had taken place.
While the visits to Beijing in July 2001 by Secretary of State Colin Powell and
State Department Director of Policy Planning Richard Haass may have been motivated by a desire to improve relations, this change is best characterized as a short-term and tactical change, not as long-term and strategic.197 Speeches made by Secretary of State
Colin Powell and other officials therefore did not reflect any significant changes in U.S. policy.198
Ultimately, even scholars who did not see any major changes as emerging from the crisis who continued to see U.S. policy as a combination of engagement and containment would concede that it was of some importance. One scholar argued that even though the spy flights in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) continued after the
195 Chinese Interview #25, Beijing, China, March 5, 2012. 196 Chinese Interview #34, Beijing, China, July 3, 2012. 197 Chinese Interview #34, Beijing, China, July 3, 2012. 198 Chinese Interview #12, Beijing, China, November 18, 2011; Chinese Interview #16, Beijing, November 25, 2011.
332 crisis and the signals emanating from the U.S. did not change very much, it became more cautious in its handling of problems in the bilateral relationship. As a result, even if it did not lead to a major change in actions, it did produce a change of attitude.199
Wang Gonglong of the CCP’s Shanghai Administration Institute concluded that the message sent by President George Bush’s earlier decision not to include President
Jiang Zemin in the group of more than twenty world leaders that he called after coming into office was that it was China who needed the U.S., not vice versa. When the two leaders did have their first conversation in July 2002 after the EP3 incident, he viewed it as a signal that the U.S. wanted to improve their relationship. This was also supported by
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s comments during his trip to Beijing that July as the crisis had strengthened the position of moderate conservatives in the administration.200
At the same time, the fact that the U.S. blocked Israeli, Ukrainian, and European arms sales to China provided evidence of its long-term goal of keeping China down.201
Even though the One-China policy remained in place, neoconservatives had not given up on their support for Taiwan either and moderates were also interested in using it as a strategic tool.202 No fundamental changes had therefore taken place.
The Pragmatic Hegemonists therefore did not view the tactical adjustments that the U.S. made after the crisis as indicating that real changes were taking place. The fact that other U.S. actions continued to be contrary to China’s interests was also viewed as supporting this conclusion.
199 Chinese Interview #24, Beijing, China, February 7, 2012. 200 Wang, Baoshouzhuyi yu Lengzhanhou Meiguo Duihua Zhengce (Conservatism and Post-Cold War U.S. Policy Toward China), 272. 201 Ibid., 305. 202 Ibid., 329-330.
333 The majority of the Evolutionists viewed the fact that the crisis was successfully resolved and not permitted to expand as indicating that the U.S. did not want a confrontation and was attempting to manage relations. The fact that it also led to some positive changes in terms of how the U.S. managed the relationship was also significant.
However, this did not indicate that the U.S. was fundamentally rethinking its policy, or that any changes were taking place at the strategic level.
The incident was characterized by some as the fundamental turning point in relations due to the fact that it drove home how dangerous a confrontation would be and led both sides to adjust their policies.203 As a result, both sides began to work to bring competition down to a lower level.204 Even if the trend was not clear to many until after
9/11, it is argued that after the incident a consensus developed that crises had to be controlled. As a result, the relationship could have been expected to improve even if 9/11 had not happened.205
The U.S’s management of the crisis also indicated that it wanted to limit the damage to the bilateral relationship, which began to improve with Secretary of State
Colin Powell’s visit to Beijing.206 The fact that the two sides had resolved the crisis through diplomatic channels was also viewed as indicating that the crisis management structure that they had developed was sufficient.207 The incident had therefore shown that the U.S. was not interested in having a confrontation with China.
203 Chinese Interview #20, Beijing, China, December 16, 2011. 204 Chinese Interview #17, Beijing, China, November 28, 2011. 205 Chinese Interview #30, Beijing, China, May 9, 2012. 206 Tao Wenzhao, Lengzhanhou de Meiguo Duihua Zhengce (Chongqing: Chongqing Chuban Jituan, 2006), 7. 207 Liu and Lin, “21 Shiji Quqi de ZhongMeiRi Zhanlue Guanxi,” (China-U.S.-Japan Strategic Relations at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century), 383.
334 Going further, others concluded that the crisis had brewed a turning point in the relationship, as subsequently both sides made significant efforts to get the relationship back on track. On the U.S. side, this was seen with President George Bush’s request to
Congress to extend Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment to China for the period before it joined the WTO and the U.S.’s neutrality toward Beijing’s bid to host the 2008
Olympics. Along with the candid talks Secretary of State Colin Powell had with Chinese officials during his trip to Beijing that July and the agreement they produced to strengthen the MMCA, these developments had led relations to improve significantly before 9/11 occurred.208
However, this did not mean that a fundamental change had taken place, as mutual guarding (防范) could not be brought to an end.209 While in the same book he argued both that the U.S. plays a positive role in East Asian security, and that the George Bush administration’s tendency to oversimplify and divide the world into black and white was a source of instability this guarding was not viewed as amounting to containment.210
At the same time, as there are always U.S. officials who favor a hard stance toward China, Secretary of State Colin Powell’s visit to Beijing and the fact that
President George Bush sent his father’s former National Security Advisor, Brent
Scowcroft, as a special envoy to communicate the message that he was willing to work with China was more significant than Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s decision to freeze mil-mil relations.211 This made it clear that the Defense Department’s actions could not
208 Li Xiaogang, 9/11 hou Meiguo de Danbianzhuyi yu Shijie (Post-9/11 American Unilateralism and the World) (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 2007), 152. 209 Ibid., 155. 210 Ibdi., 206. 211 Chinese Interview #28, Shanghai, China, March 16, 2012.
335 be taken as representing the view of the entire administration and convinced Chinese officials that they could work with President George Bush.212
This conclusion also fits with Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan’s positive evaluation of the U.S.’s crisis management skills and characterization of President George Bush’s willingness to directly engage with President Jiang Zemin after the crisis was resolved as an encouraging sign.213 He also wrote that when during his July 2001 visit to Beijing
Secretary of State Colin Powell told him that America did not need an enemy and was not looking for one, he developed the impression that the U.S. had already changed its view of China.214
However, this did not amount to arguing that a strategic change had taken place.
While the U.S. was now working to manage the relationship and its policy toward China was starting to change, this did not mean that it had seriously rethought relations.215 It represented a change of approach, not one of strategy.
For the Evolutionists, the outcomes from the EP3 crisis indicated that the U.S. was beginning to make significant tactical adjustments to its approach to security relations with China. The fact that some sections of the U.S. government remained comparatively hostile did not detract from the importance of this development. In contrast to the Pragmatic Hegemonists, less significance was attributed to established aspects of U.S. policy that were contrary to China’s interests, such as ongoing pressure on other countries to refrain from selling China arms.
212 Ibid.; Chinese Interview #30, Beijing, China, May 9, 2012. 213 Tang Jiaxuan, Jing yu Xufeng (Heavy Storm and Gentle Breeze: A Memoir of China’s Diplomacy) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2009), 290. 214 Ibid., 295. 215 Chinese Interview #17, Beijing, China, November 28, 2011.
336 The fact that the New Thinkers had not yet emerged as a school of thought during the period after the EP3 incident is indicated by the lack of any articles that characterized it as a fundamental change. There was therefore a wide consensus that the changes resulting from the incident were limited to the tactical level.
As articles by Yuan Peng, the Director of CICIR’s Institute of American Studies, were of great significance to the later emergence of the New Thinkers, his more modest evaluation of the changes resulting from the EP3 incident is notable. He concluded that after initially taking a harder stance President George Bush had shifted to a more accommodating one toward the resolution of the crisis. However, recently this hard stance had also been evident in its position on missile defense in the face of Russian and
Chinese opposition, vicious incidents like the expulsion of diplomats, and in awkward relations with allies. While U.S. policy was still developing, this indicated that hardliners were influential in the administration.
The conclusion that the fact that communication was primarily handled through diplomatic channels was a positive signal that indicated that the U.S. did not want to allow tensions to escalate and wanted to minimize damage to the relationship, did not amount to an argument that there had been a major change in policy.216 It was therefore evident that he did not yet believe that the U.S. was rethinking its strategy toward China.
While the number of scholars whose perceptions fit with the Pragmatic
Hegemonists and Evolutionists greatly outnumber those who fit with the Malign
216 Yuan Peng, “Danbianzhuyi yue Zou yue Yuan, Daguo Guanxi yue Gao yue Jian,” (Unilateralism Again Goes Further, Major Power Relations Again Go Higher) Zhonghua Gongshang Shibao April 25, 2001.
337 Containers, this is likely attributable to the possibility that scholars who viewed the EP3 incident as lacking significance did not choose to focus their research on it.
The sensitive nature of the topic of China’s management of the crisis and the question of which side had caused the collision ensured that there was also minimal analysis of China’s crisis management system. Nor was any mention made of the fact that
Chinese officials declined to answer when the U.S. attempted to make use of the crisis hotline.
Influence of September 11, 2001 on Relations
The Malign Containers concluded that 9/11 did not produce any fundamental changes in U.S. policy toward China. Even if it led to a shift in priorities as it began to devote more of its resources to anti-terrorism, its fundamental policy had not changed.
This was due to the fact that it remained committed to the pursuit of unipolar hegemony and therefore containing China. This goal was understood to be more significant and long lasting than any tactical changes resulting from 9/11.217 Any cooperation with China on anti-terrorism after 9/11 was therefore attributable to the pursuit of narrow U.S. self- interest and the fact that it viewed terrorism as posing a more immediate threat. This was no different than the U.S.’s willingness to cooperate with China in dealing with the
U.S.S.R. during the Cold War and did not indicate that its commitment to its goal of containing communism and desire to reshape China in its own image had changed.218
217 Yang and Ma, 21 Shiji Meiguo Anquan Zhanlue yu ZhongMei Guanxi (The 21st Century U.S. Security Strategy and Sino-American Relations), 247. 218 Chinese Interview #25, Beijing, China, March 5, 2012.
338 Going further, one scholar argued that the idea that 9/11 had benefited Sino-
American relations was questionable, as the U.S. had used it as an excuse to expand its global presence, especially in regions like Central Asia.219 While it may have a flexible approach, the U.S.’s commitment to pursuing unipolar hegemony, and therefore to damaging China’s interests, remained stable.
As a result, those who had believed that it was U.S. policy to contain or guard against China still thought that this was the case. The real change in their minds was the belief that U.S. priorities had changed and that since China was still much weaker it could be dealt with later.220 The Malign Containers therefore did not see any significant changes as resulting from 9/11. Any movement toward enhanced cooperation was driven by self-interest and not indications that it was moving away from containment.
The Pragmatic Hegemonists concluded that 9/11 had not produced any significant changes in U.S. policy. Any alterations in U.S. tactics were instead attributable to the pursuit of stable interests and altered priorities. Expanded cooperation on issues of mutual interest therefore did not negate the fact that the U.S. was increasing its capabilities in East Asia with the aim of facing the possibility of a challenge from China.
Drawing on the historian Paul Kennedy’s work on the rise and fall of great powers, the
219 Men Honghua, “Guanyu Meiguo Da Zhanlue de Kuanjiaxing Fenxi,” (Concerning Analysis of America’s Grand Strategy Framework) Guoji Anquan yu Zhanlue 1 (2005): 28-29. 220 Chinese Interview #22, Beijing, China, January 17, 2012 (describing views of other scholars).
339 argument was made that there was a very real possibility of armed conflict between the
U.S. and China in twenty years.221
Looking at the relationship in a broader context, one official argued that it is necessary to be clear about whether one is taking a micro or a macro point of view, as this determines whether individual developments are interpreted as meaning that a change has taken place, or whether developments in U.S. relations with its friends and allies and the GPR are taken to indicate that nothing fundamental had changed. He posited that these developments reflected the U.S.’s long-term intentions, while
America’s desire for cooperation with China on anti-terrorism after 9/11 and the DPRK reflected its short-term intentions.222 Alternately, because the U.S.’s focus had shifted to anti-terrorism there were now fewer significant “contradictions” in the bilateral relationship and sources of friction.223
Reaching back further, one scholar argued that the real change in U.S. policy had resulted from the disappearance of the U.S.S.R. and the movement of the strategic center to the Asia Pacific. While 9/11 may have sped up the changes that had already been in motion, this process was already underway.224 Wang Jisi of Beijing University also concluded that the tragedy had not led to change to either of the two sides of U.S. policy,
221 Huo Te and Jiang Shan, “Bushi de Taiwan Zhengce yu Meiguo de Yatai Zhanlue he Changqi Liyi,” (Bush’s Taiwan Policy and America’s Asia Pacific Strategy and Long- term Interest) Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Luntan 5 (2003): 90-91. 222 Chinese Interview #34, Beijing, China, July 3, 2012. 223 Chinese Interview #6, Beijing, China, November 8, 2011. 224 Chinese Interview #13, Beijing, China, November 22, 2011.
340 as neoconservatives remained dominant in the George Bush administration and it was now guarding against China more than it was against Russia.225
For the Pragmatic Hegemonists, adjustments to U.S. policy that emerged after
9/11 did not indicate that any real changes had taken place, as the U.S. was continuing to pursue its interests under new circumstances, and its policy had therefore not changed. If circumstances were to change again, U.S. policy would be expected to alter as well.
The Evolutionists viewed significant tactical changes as taking place after 9/11.
Many of them also concluded that 9/11 constituted the real turning point in relations.226
This was attributed to the fact that, while changes after EP3 had been of a more limited nature, 9/11 represented a more important turning point as it produced an evolution in the
U.S.’s overall policy.227 Even if changes had begun to take place after the EP3 incident, the biggest changes were believed to have taken place after 9/11, as the U.S.’s view of the world and its priorities evolved.228
Yang Jiemian, the President of SIIS, concluded that the significance of 9/11 was found in the fact that it increased space for cooperation. He also attached importance to the bilateral meetings that subsequently took place during the Shanghai APEC summit that led to the establishment of a constructive, cooperation relationship. However, these changes had to be put in context as they were not going to lead the U.S. to do something
225 Wang Jisi, “Dui Dangqian Meiguo Quanqiu Zhanlue yu ZhongMei Guanxi de Fenxi,” (Analysis of America’s Current Global Strategy and Sino-American Relations) in Jiedu Meiguo Da Zhanlue (Decoding America’s Grand Strategy) Hu Angang and Men Honghua, Eds. (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Renmin Chubanshe, 2004), 251. 226 Chinese Interview #29, Beijing, China, April 4, 2012. 227 Chinese Interview #16, Beijing, China, November 25, 2011. 228 Chinese Interview #17, Beijing, China, November 28 2011.
341 dramatic like alter its policy toward the Taiwan Strait. He argued that this was in line with the experience of the last twenty years, which had shown that difficulties in the relationship are normal.229 Regardless, 9/11 was significant, as it led the U.S. to realize that deterrence and containment could not be used to address the threats that it faced.230
Another scholar argued that the significance of 9/11 was seen in the fact that the
U.S. now saw China as a partner instead of as a challenger and that the contents of its security policy had changed, as it was now more focused on non-traditional security issues. At the same time, it still had ample capabilities left to deal with a challenger and did not have to redirect that many of its capabilities toward anti-terrorism.231 As a result, when things are going well, they should not get too excited; when things are going poorly, they should not become too pessimistic.
Similarly, Jia Qingguo of Beijing University saw significant changes in U.S. tactics as taking place without concluding that they amounted to a strategic change.
While the EP3 incident had led to a change in the U.S.’s tone toward China, prior to 9/11 the Pentagon still had not altered its view of China and had yet to invite the Chinese military attaché to visit.232 The fact that President George Bush chose to visit China twice
229 Yang Jiemian, “9/11 hou Kan ZhongMei Guanxi Hezuo yu Muoca Bingcun,” (Looking at the Continued Existence of Cooperation and Friction in Sino-American Relations After 9/11) Jiefang Ribao December 24, 2001. 230 Yang Jiemian, “Meiguo de Quanqiu Zhanlue he Zhongguo de Zhanlue Jiyuqi,” (America’s Global Strategy and China’s Period of Strategic Opportunity) Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (March 2003): 12. 231 Chinese Interview #32, Beijing, China, May 15, 2012. 232 Jia Qingguo, “Partners or Competitors: A Choice to be Made,” in George W. Bush and East Asia: A First Term Assessment Robert Hathaway and Wilson Lee, Eds. (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, 2005), 119.
342 during the four-month period after 9/11 while he was extremely busy with anti-terrorism was also significant, as it indicated that he was pursuing a better relationship.233
However, this did not mean that a fundamental reorientation took place, as the
George Bush administration had two voices on China that sent contradictory signals during its first term. While from 9/11 onwards the voice that advocated for a constructive, cooperative, and candid relationship was dominant over the voice that argued for the need to restrain and contain China, he saw continued contradictions and inconsistencies in the conceptualization and implementation of policy.234 The fact that aggressive realists had a stronger presence than liberals in the institutions overseeing conflict, and therefore had more influence in shaping security and military aspects of the administration’s China policy, was also significant.235
Huang Ping, the director of CASS’s Institute of American Studies, therefore argued that the alliance between the U.S. and China on terror was more than just a pragmatic strategy that would be helpful for dealing with underground organizations.
While it was not necessary for China and the West to share values on Taiwan and Tibet,
China did need it to understand that it faced a difficult situation. As the experience of
9/11 may promote this understanding, it provided an opportunity. As a result, while it would be naïve to say that their differences would now disappear, it would also be irrational to claim that nothing would change.236
233 Ibid., 124. 234 Jia Qingguo, “One Administration, Two Voices: U.S. China Policy During Bush’s First Term,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 6, 1 (2005): 23-24. 235 Jia Qingguo, “Impact of 9/11 on Sino-U.S. Relations: A Preliminary Assessment,” CNAPS, Brookings Institute (July 2002), 18. 236 Huang Ping, “September 11th: A Challenge to Whom?,” Social Sciences Research Council, http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/huang.htm.
343 Jiang Xiyuan presented an additional account of the role of political considerations in the changes that took place. He viewed 9/11 as leading the U.S. to speed up the adjustment toward a policy of engagement that had begun after the EP3 incident in order to gain China’s support on anti-terrorism.237 Presenting a nuanced argument that reflected an appreciation of the incentives U.S. leaders face, he attributed this change to the fact that for both domestic political reasons and for the stability of the overall bilateral relationship it was necessary for President George Bush to do so in order to balance between the far right and center right camps within the Republican Party.238
Vice Premier Qian Qichen appeared to reach a similar conclusion. He wrote that after 9/11 the U.S. shifted the primary focus of its global strategy from precaution against a potential strategic adversary to eliminating the threat caused by terrorism and WMD.
He viewed the focus on antiterrorism in the January 29, 2002 State of the Union Address and the focus of documents like the NSSUS and the “axis of evil” as supporting this interpretation.239 Another scholar posited that the change in the relationship after 9/11 also coincided with China’s talk of a period of strategic opportunity during the first twenty years of the twenty-first century.240
The Evolutionists therefore viewed 9/11 as leading to important changes that amounted to more than temporary adjustments. Instead, they indicated that the U.S. was beginning to adopt a new approach toward the bilateral relationship. Even though this did not involve a change at the strategic level, it was still a significant development.
237 Jiang Xiyuan, Daguo Zhanlue yu Weilai Zhongguo (Major Power Strategy and Future China) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 2003), 145. 238 Ibid., 147. 239 Qian Qichen, “U.S. Adjusts Security Strategy After September 11 Attacks,” International Studies 1 (2004). 240 Chinese Interview #33, Beijing, China, July 2, 2012.
344 The New Thinkers instead concluded that 9/11 represented an important turning point. Looking back, one scholar characterized it as producing the biggest change in U.S. policy due to the fact that it led President George Bush to be more realistic.241 Yuan
Peng, the Director of CICIR’s Institute of American Studies, argued that the experience led the U.S. to conclude that having a bad relationship with China did not suit its interests. While the cooperation that it produced in the realm of anti-terrorism was not a sufficient basis for completely changing the relationship, and the opportunity that 9/11 had afforded them to work together had not yet been fully taken advantage of, it did lead to a new direction.242 The change in the focus of President George Bush’s foreign policy from the major powers to anti-terrorism led to positive cooperation that strengthened the relationship. Even if there were still contradictions in the bilateral relationship and they disagreed on a number of issues, this was a highly significant development.
It was also argued that China’s move to provide it with support in anti-terrorism led the U.S. to trust it more and to move from attempting to encircle it to a policy of hedging and a corresponding reduction in the pressure that it was exerting on it.243
China’s actions therefore played a role in the U.S.’s new thinking.
President George Bush had therefore reached the conclusion that China’s intentions toward the U.S. were not as bad as he had thought and that its development could be of benefit to U.S. prosperity.244 Some scholars went as far as to characterize this
241 Chinese Interview #35, Beijing, China, July 9, 2012. 242 Yuan Peng, “9/11 Shijian yu ZhongMei Guanxi,” (9/11 and Sino-American Relations) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 11 (2001): 63. 243 Qian Xuming and Ni Shixiong, “21 Shiji Xin Dilu Zhengzhi he ZhongMei Guanxi,” (New 21st Century Geopolitics and Sino-American Relations) Meiguo Wenti Yanjiu 0 (2007): 27-29. 244 Chinese Interview #9, Beijing, China, November 16, 2011.
345 as a change at the strategic level, not just a change in tactics. This was attributed to the fact that the U.S. concluded both that it had more reasons to cooperate with China and that it posed less of a threat to it.245 This change sent a positive signal that the U.S. wanted to improve relations and to enhance cooperation.
As positive as all of these reasons were, it should be recognized that it was not only U.S. intentions that were changing during this period. One of the New Thinkers argued that at the same time that the threat from the U.S. toward China began to reduce after 9/11 China was also beginning to feel that its ability to have a disruptive advantage was strengthening.246 Even though ideas and intentions were important, power capabilities were still held to be shaping relations.
While in 2001 the New Thinkers had not yet emerged as a school of thought, and interviews with scholars looked back at an event that had happened ten years earlier, these sources still provide insights into how an event that contributed to the emergence of the New Thinkers was perceived. A shift in how the U.S. perceived its own interests therefore produced changes to policy that rendered it less threatening toward China.
The Taiwan Strait
Not surprisingly, the Malign Containers saw continuity in policy toward the
Taiwan Strait and interpreted it as evidence that the U.S. was working to contain China’s rise and to keep it down. Any changes that did take place were therefore short-term tactical adjustments that did not indicate that U.S. intentions were changing.
245 Chinese Interview #19, Beijing, China, December 5, 2011. 246 Chinese Interview #3, Beijing, China, October 8, 2011 (describing the views of other scholars).
346 Wu Xianbin of CASS’s Institute for Asia Pacific Studies articles on this subject provide an excellent representation of the views of the first school. He argued that, while the fact that the George Bush administration wanted China’s cooperation on non- proliferation, regional security issues, and anti-terror had ensured that it did not sell the
AEGIS system to Taiwan, these amounted to short-term tactical changes, not to a change in policy. As a result, even though it was not willing to allow relations to become too acrimonious, it still wanted to use Taiwan to contain China.247 President George Bush’s statement that he opposed Taiwanese independence did not change this, as it was motivated by the fact that the U.S. was facing multiple additional challenges.248 As U.S. policy toward Taiwan was determined by the overall state of the U.S.-China relationship, incremental improvements did not provide any evidence that its intentions had changed.
At the same time, the fact that it needed China’s help on its security priorities ensured that Taiwan’s usefulness to U.S. strategy would not increase and might decline.249
Adding some nuance to this argument, in a third article published in 2004, he described U.S. policy as highly consistent and including two components. While it might stress one side at a given time, its policy had never been based solely on either of these components. As there were lots of issues on which it desired China’s cooperation, there was also a limit to how much the U.S. could use Taiwan against it.250
247 Wu Xianbin, “TMD yu Taiwan Wenti,” Dangdai Yatai 4 (2002): 17. 248 Wu Xianbin, “Xiao Bushi Zhengfu de Duitai Zhengce,” (The George W. Bush Administration’s Policy Toward Taiwan) in Yatai Diqu Lanpishu Fazhan Baogao (Asia Pacific Region Blue Book Development Report) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2003), 326. 249 Ibid., 336. 250 Wu Xianbin, “Bushi Zhengfu Duitai Zhengce de Tedian jiqi Yuanyin,” (The Special Characteristic and Reason for the Bush Administration’s Policy Toward Taiwan) Dangdai Yatai 3 (2004): 23.
347 Writing near the end of the George Bush administration, Pan Zhongqi of Fudan
University described its stance toward the Taiwan Strait as reflecting a policy of preventative containment, as after 9/11 it continued to be unwilling to give way to China on this issue and still opposed the prospect of one China. Even though President George
Bush spoke against Taiwanese independence while Premier Wen Jiabao stood next to him in December 2003, the U.S. continued to use Taiwan to oppose China’s rise and to pin it down.251 This was seen in the fact that the U.S. had worked to strengthen Taiwan’s defenses, had expanded their military cooperation, and wanted to bring it into missile defense.252
For the Malign Containers, U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait therefore continued to reflect its static policy of containment toward China with all of the changes that took place during the period of the George Bush administration being of limited significance and less important than long-standing examples of hostility toward China’s interests, such as arm sales.253
Regarding the issue of the Taiwan Strait, the Pragmatic Hegemonists did not believe that any significant changes had taken place at the tactical level and that no changes to its policy of engagement plus containment or hedging had emerged. One scholar argued that, while President George Bush’s early statements received a lot of attention from the press, he had only talked of defending Taiwan, not of supporting
251 Pan Zhongqi, “Jiegouxing Zhanlue Hudong yu Lengzhanhou ZhongMei Anquan Guanxi,” (Structural Strategic Interaction and Post-Cold War Sino-American Security Relations) Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu 1 (2007): 152. 252 Ibid., 151-152. 253 Chinese Interview #25, Beijing, China, March 25, 2012.
348 independence. His statement in December 2003 was also aimed at maintaining the status quo, as at this point the U.S. faced numerous other problems.254 U.S. policy could therefore be characterized as “no war, no peace, no unification, and no independence.”255
As it is impossible to predict the end result of a change to the status quo, the U.S. was more interested in stability than in unification or independence.256 Even though
Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian pushed the U.S. and China closer together, the U.S. still keeps its policy unclear whenever it can and only clarifies things when events force it to do so.257
While President George Bush may have initially wanted to provide Taiwan with more robust support, experience taught him how difficult managing relations with China is and the complications created by trying to adjust policy. Ultimately, as arm sales continued, it was clear that no significant change in policy had taken place.258 Even though it was significant that George Bush’s was the first U.S. President to state that he opposed independence, instead of only not supporting it, it was attributable to the fact that the U.S. was busy elsewhere.259
Wang Jisi of Beijing University and Li Xiaogang of CASS’s Institute of
American Studies characterized both the U.S.’s broad policy toward China and its specific policy toward the Taiwan Strait as cooperation plus guarding. They saw evidence of this balance in the fact that, while Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage both made statements opposing a declaration of
254 Chinese Interview #12, Beijing, China, November 18, 2011. 255 Chinese Interview #13, Beijing, China, November 22, 2011. 256 Chinese Interview #14, Beijing, China, November 24, 2011. 257 Chinese Interview #16, Beijing, China, November 25, 2011. 258 Chinese Interview #31, Beijing, China, May 15, 2012. 259 Chinese Interview #34, Beijing, China, July 3, 2012.
349 independence by Taiwan, the day after Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s statement the Pentagon announced that it would send a delegation of active duty officers to Taiwan. As this was the first time that the U.S. would have done so in twenty-six years, it was viewed as revealing its intentions.260 The fact that Sino-American relations had been better during the early twenty-first century therefore did not mean the U.S. would stop interfering in the Taiwan Strait, as Taiwan is of value to its hedging strategy.
The U.S. stance on this issue could only be expected to change when its overall policy of hedging against China has ended or been reduced.261 Short-term tactical adjustments and fluctuations therefore did not indicate that genuine changes were taking place.
Some scholars in this school of thought posited that the unchanged status quo was detrimental to China’s interests. Tao Wenzhao of CASS’s Institute of American Studies believed the policy of dual deterrence was unbalanced. This was due to the fact that when the U.S. wants to deter China it sells Taiwan arms, shares military intelligence, and expands mil-mil ties. In contrast, when it wants to deter Taiwan, its actions are limited to paying lip service to the idea that it should not change the status quo.262 President George
Bush’s initial statement that he would do whatever it took to help Taiwan to defend itself was therefore more credible than the later clarifications.263
260 Wang Jisi and Li Xiaogang, “Zhanwang Weilai Sinian de ZhongMei Guanxi,” (Outlook for the Next Four Years of Sino-American Relations) Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Yuanbao March 17, 2005. 261 Xu Lei, “2006: Geng Jia Fuza de MeiTai Guanxi,” (2006: Adding More Complexity to U.S.-Taiwan Relations) (Interview with Guo Zhenyuan) Renmin Ribao December 26, 2006. 262 Tao Wenzhao, “Sino-American Relations During the George W. Bush Administration,” American Foreign Policy Interests 26 (2004): 413. 263 Tao, Lengzhanhou de Meiguo Duihua Zhengce (America’s Post-Cold War Policy Toward China), 115.
350 Similarly, Liu Jianfei of the Central Party School’s Institute of International
Strategic Studies argued that the U.S. was continuing to use Taiwan to pin China down.
While its ongoing arm sales to Taiwan provided the independence movement with encouragement, it uses the excuse of “respecting the will of the Taiwanese people” as an excuse to do very little to block independence.264 While scrapping the TRA, cutting off mil-mil with Taiwan, or ending arms sales would indicate that a real change had taken place, President George Bush’s actions merely indicated that he did not want to allow a conflict to start.265
Li Baojun and Fang Baibo of Renmin University viewed U.S. policy toward the
Taiwan Strait as informed by the uncertainty regarding China’s future direction and the desire to avoid a conflict.266 On the one hand, they concluded that positive tactical changes had taken place after 9/11 and that the U.S. had moved to suppress and even oppose Taiwanese independence. This reflected the move from viewing China as a strategic competitor to pursuing a constructive, cooperative relationship.267 On the other hand, they also posed the question of whether the U.S. would maintain this position as
China’s power expanded. As a result, over time they viewed the U.S. as becoming less accommodating as it worried about China’s rise and changing circumstances continued to
264 Liu, “Meiguo Duihua Zhanlue de Zhuanbian Quxiang,” 34. 265 Chinese Interview #1, September 28, 2011. 266 Li Baojun and Fang Baibo, “Xiao Bushi Diyi Renqi Nei Taiwan Yinsu Dui ZhongMei Guanxi de Yingxiang Qianxi,” (Initial Evaluation of the Influence of the Factor of Taiwan on Sino-American Relations During the George Bush Administration’s First Term) Guoji Luntan 7, 4 (July 2005): 51. 267 Ibid., 51.
351 produce fluctuations in policy.268 They therefore did not view these positive tactical adjustments as indicating that U.S. policy was fundamentally changing.
Ultimately, the continuation of arms sales and the development of relations between American and Taiwanese officials was also viewed as indicating that President
George Bush’s public statement of opposition to Taiwanese independence had not produced a real change of policy.269 This scholar made this argument while also recognizing that the U.S. may have made some of the offers of arms sales knowing that
Taiwan would not follow through and that the fact that AEGIS was not included was important.270 However, even if nothing had changed, it was still positive to have the U.S. make this sort of statement, as its opposition would render Taiwanese independence impossible.
For the Pragmatic Hegemonists, there was therefore no evidence that the U.S.’s
Taiwan policy had fundamentally changed. Even though some tactical adjustments may have taken place, they could be reversed in the future and did not indicate that its interests or goals had altered.
The Evolutionists attributed importance to changes that did take place in U.S. policy and viewed them as indicating that the U.S. was making adjustments at the tactical level. One scholar from this school based his conclusion that U.S. tactics toward the
Taiwan Strait were changing on an evaluation of President George Bush’s desire to balance between neoconservatives and moderate conservatives and the belief that after
268 Ibid., 52. 269 Chinese Interview #23, Beijing, China, February 2, 2012. 270 Ibid.
352 the EP3 crisis moderate conservatives had gained influence on policy.271 U.S. priorities also changed significantly after 9/11, as it became increasingly worried that Taiwan would unilaterally change the status quo.272
Even though the neoconservatives had not given up on their goal of using Taiwan as a strategic tool, they had concluded that they could not afford it unreserved support, as it was only thinking about its own goals without considering U.S. interests in East
Asia.273 The fact that this had only produced a change of tactics in line with the pursuit of its interests was reflected in the continuing dual nature of U.S. policy toward the Taiwan
Strait as it worked to limit moves toward independence while it also continued to send
“wrong signals” with arm sales and the expansion of mil-mil relations with Taiwan.274
However, the U.S. and China’s shared desire for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait also ensured that there was some space for them to cooperate and that changing U.S. behavior was therefore significant.
In contrast to scholars who argued that the fact that U.S. policy toward the Taiwan
Strait had positive and negative aspects indicated that nothing had changed, Liu
Hongzhou of the PLA’s College of International Relations concluded that this provided evidence that a strong debate was taking place in the U.S. regarding its interest in Taiwan and the threat from China.275 This was seen in the fact that the U.S. was: selling Taiwan
271 Wang, Baoshouzhuyi yu Lengzhanhou Meiguo Duihua Zhengce (Conservatism and Post-Cold War U.S. Policy Toward China), 291 and 331. 272 Ibid., 313. 273 Ibid., 329. 274 Ibid., 331. 275 Liu Hongzhou, “Meiguo Dui Dalu, Taiwan Guanxi Shuang Tisheng, Shuang Shiya jiqi Zhanlue Siwei Chongtu,” (America Dual Upgrade and Dual Pressure Toward Mainland-Taiwan Relations and Conflict in Strategic Thought) Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Luntan 1 (2006): 107.
353 arms; clarifying its role in a potential crisis; helping Taiwan to gain international space while simultaneously opposing attempts to change the status quo; and pushing Taiwan to be less dependent on the U.S. for its defense.276 While the neoconservatives remained interested in using Taiwan to check China, this did not mean that this goal had been adopted as policy.277 Even though this meant that the ultimate direction of U.S. policy was uncertain, it did imply that some significant changes to U.S. tactics had taken place.
The U.S.’s response to the prospect of a referendum on Taiwan in 2007 was also significant to conclusions made by several scholars that even if U.S. strategy had not been fundamentally changed some positive developments had taken place. As a number of high-level officials publicly warned against the dangers posed by a referendum eight times, including representatives from The American Institute on Taiwan (AIT), this was viewed as significant. During this time, communication between Washington and Beijing regarding the Taiwan Strait also reached an “unprecedented level.”278 One senior scholar from this school of thought concluded that this was the most important development in the George Bush administration’s policy toward the Taiwan Strait. This was due to the fact that its willingness to constrain President Chen Shui-bian was far more significant than its public criticism in 2003, which had not been followed up with any material measures.279 However, as positive as this development was, it was viewed as primarily attributable to the idea that China’s cooperation had become increasingly important to
276 Ibid., 106-107. 277 Ibid., 108. 278 Xiang Shu, MeiRi Tongmeng Guanxi Zouxiang (Direction of the U.S.-Japan Alliance) (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2009), 429. 279 Chinese Interview #32, Beijing, China, May 30, 2012.
354 solving global problems as it rose with the U.S. viewed as in decline.280 It therefore did not indicate that U.S. intentions had fundamentally changed, only its capabilities.
While the U.S. continued to offer to sell weapons to Taiwan, as this was nothing new, it did not reveal anything important about its intentions. As a result, from President
George Bush’s criticism of President Chen Shui-bian while Premier Wen Jiabao stood next to him onward the fact that the administration did not support Taiwanese independence became increasingly clear. The public statements made by Secretary of
State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage were also significant to this conclusion.281 Along with the U.S.’s public opposition to the referendum, this revealed more about is intentions than the arms sales, as allowing it to take place would have constituted a significant new development.282
Looking at developments in the context of the broader relationship, one scholar argued that, while signals sent by the administration on this issue were positive, and
President George Bush’s statement that he opposed independence –instead of merely not supporting it– was significant, the fact that the context of relations had changed was of equal importance. While the issue of the Taiwan Strait was still important, since the Sino-
American relationship had become more complex, it was not as central as it had been in the past. As China had also become more confident regarding its long-term ability to resolve the problem on terms favorable for its interests, it was also less sensitive to every minor development in the U.S.’s policy toward the Strait.283
280 Ibid., 408. 281 Chinese Interview #17, Beijing, China, November 28, 2011. 282 Chinese Interview #17, Beijing, China, November 28, 2011. 283 Chinese Interview #33, Beijing, China, July 2, 2012.
355 For the Evolutionists, developments in U.S. policy on this issue reflected the fact that it was rethinking its interests in the Taiwan Strait and making significant tactical adjustments. Long-standing aspects of U.S. policy that China did not like were therefore of less importance, as new developments revealed more information about its intentions.
Nor could the goals of some American political elites on this issue be equated with the policy of the George Bush administration.
The emerging New Thinkers believed that there was evidence that U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait had undergone important changes that went beyond the level of tactics. One scholar characterized George Bush as the first U.S. President that China came to view as not supporting Taiwanese independence. Even if he did not oppose it during his entire time in office, this still constituted an important improvement that was attributable to his move from ambiguity to clarity on policy.284 As a result, even if U.S. policy continued to be “no peace, no war, no independence, and no unification,” the fact that they shared interests in ensuring that it did not become a point of conflict enabled them to develop some trust and a new understanding of their relationship.285
While the U.S.-Japan 2+2 statement that was issued in 2005 was perceived as indicating that the U.S. did not want unification to happen in the near term and that it still viewed Taiwan as of use to hedging, the fact that it did not want China to gain control of
Taiwan too quickly was viewed as understandable.286 After an initial period during which the administration’s policy toward the Taiwan Strait was less promising, President
George Bush was viewed as having learned from experience and ultimately concluding
284 Chinese Interview #3, Beijing, China, October 8, 2011. 285 Ibid. 286 Ibid.
356 that cooperation with China was more important than a close relationship with Taiwan.
As a result, he was viewed as deciding that Taiwan should not be allowed to create a major obstruction in Sino-American relations.287 While these changes began at the tactical level, they ultimately enabled some trust to develop as the U.S. reached a new view of its interests and China developed a new view of U.S. intentions.288
One scholar also concluded that during the period of the George Bush administration the idea that “no war, no peace, no unification, no independence” served
U.S. interests began to change and, provided that it was peaceful, it became more willing to leave the two sides to solve or not solve the problem themselves.289 Unsurprisingly, this was viewed as a significant departure from past practice. It also represents an important evolution in Chinese perceptions of U.S. intentions toward the Taiwan Strait.
In the view of the New Thinkers, developments in U.S. policy toward the Taiwan
Strait therefore amounted to a strategic change that resulted from a new understanding of its interests. As its policy was understood to be moving in a positive direction, developments like the 2005 2+2 statement were afforded less significance.
It is unsurprising that almost all published sources reflect the views of the first three schools of thought with almost all the arguments representing the views of the New
Thinkers being derived from interviews. It appears to still be the case that few scholars are willing to publicly express a more optimistic view regarding U.S. intentions on one of the most sensitive issues in Chinese politics and foreign policy.
287 Chinese Interview #9, Beijing, China, November 16, 2011. 288 Ibid. 289 Chinese Interview #27, Shanghai, China, March 15, 2012.
357 One interesting exception is found in an article published in 2006 by Xin Qiang and Ni Shixiong of Fudan University’s Center for American Studies. They argued that
U.S. policy toward Taiwan is shaped by the fact that its status as a democracy has given them a shared identity in which China is the “other.”290 The U.S. was therefore viewed as feeling responsible for protecting its democracy and as seeing its interests as naturally more in line with those of Taiwan, something that President Chen Shui-bian had also attempted to take advantage of.291 There is therefore some support for the argument that
U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait is not entirely directed at dealing with China.
MMCA
None of the Malign Containers specifically analyzed the MMCA. Nor did they express opinions about it during interviews. This is likely attributable to a belief that it was a minor issue in the bilateral issue that revealed little regarding U.S. policy. As this school discounts the idea that dialogues like this indicate anything about U.S. intentions, this is not surprising.
The Evolutionists did not view the MMCA as reflecting a change in U.S. policy and attributed minimal significance to the agreement. One scholar who conceded that it made sense for dealing with misperception and attempting to strengthen the relationship still viewed it as of limited importance.292 Another who did not perceive U.S. policy or
290 Xin Qiang and Ni Shixiong, “Xingweiti ‘Shenfen’ yu Duiwai Zhengce: MeiTai Guanxi de Jiangouzhuyi Fenxi,” (The Identity of Actors and Foreign Policy: A Constructive Analysis of U.S.-Taiwan Relations) Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 1 (2006): 27. 291 Ibid., 25. 292 Chinese Interview #6, Beijing, China, November 8, 2011.
358 intentions as having changed argued that the fact that the U.S. continued to hold military exercises close to China’s coast revealed more about its intentions and undercut the idea that it was trying to avoid a conflict at sea.293
As with other attempts at engagement, it was viewed as aimed at learning more about China’s rise in order to prevent it from posing a challenge to the U.S.294 As a result, while it may have had some value for transparency, the radically different views that the
U.S. and China have of this issue were viewed as reducing what it could accomplish.295
Some scholars who did not view it as indicating that any major changes had taken place still believed that it was of benefit to China, as meetings held as part of the MMCA provided it with an opportunity to gain experience in the management of maritime issues and training. This was helpful for China’s efforts to improve its own systems and to establish mechanisms for managing crises.296 The fact that the bilateral relationship was growing also heightened the possibility of crises emerging. The development of agreements for managing potential crises therefore made a contribution to the bilateral relationship.297
Furthermore, as China and many other countries benefit from the U.S. military’s efforts to protect the SLOCs, the U.S. and China have more reasons to cooperate at sea than they do to engage in conflict.298 As a result, along with mil-mil and the Senior
293 Chinese Interview #23, Beijing, China, February 2, 2012. 294 Chinese Interview #32, Beijing, China, May 30, 2012. 295 Ibid. 296 Chen, “Fuzaxing yu ZhongMei Guanxi Jiegou de Xin Bianhua,” (Complexity and New Changes in the Structure of Sino-American Relations): 55. 297 Ibid., 55. 298 Cai Penghong, “ZhongMei Haishang Chongtu yu Huxin Jizhi Jianshi,” (Sino- American Maritime Conflict and the Establishment of a Mechanism for Mutual Trust) Waijiao Pinglun 2 (2010): 36-37.
359 Dialogue, it was viewed as fitting into the broader engagement component of U.S. policy and suitable for the relationship.299 At the same time, no indication was made that this represented an important change.
For the Pragmatic Hegemonists any significance attributed to the MMCA derived from the fact that it enabled both countries to pursue their interests at sea more effectively. The fact that this was what motivated the U.S. to pursue it also indicated that no changes to its policy had taken place.
During interviews only one scholar whose views fit with the Evolutionists posited that the MMCA provided evidence that important changes to U.S. tactics were taking place, and that it indicated that the U.S. was working to expand bilateral communication as China’s influence at sea continued to expand.300 As a result, it constituted a significant development in the security relationship that reflected a new approach to relations that had the potential to help develop strategic trust in the relationship.301 He therefore viewed it as holding real value for avoiding accidents, misunderstandings, and miscalculations at sea.302 It should also be recognized that as this article was published in 2002, it only provides an evaluation of the early Bush years.
Another scholar whose views fit with the Evolutionists argued that, while it is better than nothing, the fact that having friends in America’s strategic community will hurt the promotion opportunities of Chinese officials also ensures that they are
299 Chinese Interview #16, Beijing, China, November 25, 2011. 300 Chinese Interview #9, Beijing, China, November 16, 2011. 301 Qian Chuntai, “ZhongMei Haishang Junshi Anquan Cuoshang Jizhi Chuxi,” (Initial Analysis of the Sino-American Maritime Military Consultation Mechanism) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 4 (2002): 10. 302 Ibid., 11.
360 disincentivized from investing in the process.303 Progress in this area is also difficult due to the fact that it can always be destroyed by additional arms sales to Taiwan. As it was therefore of limited use, he paid less attention to the question of what it revealed about
U.S. intentions and potential tactical changes.
There was also minimal analysis of the MMCA that reflected the views of the
New Thinkers. The limited importance of the MMCA to the conclusion reached by this school that important changes were taking place in U.S. policy toward China is also reflected in the fact the two scholars from this school who had little to say about mil-mil did not focus on the MMCA either.304
As a result, the MMCA was of limited importance to the conclusions drawn by the Evolutionists and the New Thinkers. When they did refer to it, it was usually presented as one data point along with mil-mil, the Senior Dialogue, and the responsible stakeholder speech.
The fact that two influential scholars whose views fit with the Evolutionists also argued that it has not been widely studied and to date has not produced any significant outcomes indicates that it has not been viewed as an important component of the security relationship or as revealing a great deal about U.S. policy.305 Furthermore, the majority of the small number of scholars who have written about it have only analyzed it briefly within the context of articles covering broader topics.
303 Chinese Interview #8, Beijing, China, November 15, 2011. 304 Chinese Interview #3, Beijing, China, October 8, 2011; Chinese Interview #27, Shanghai, China, March 15, 2012. 305 Chinese Interview #17, Beijing, China, November 28, 2011; Chinese Interview #33, Beijing, China, July 2, 2012.
361 A Relationship that is Constructive, Cooperative, and Candid (and Complex)
The Malign Containers concluded that the three Cs formulation was unimportant and did not reveal anything about U.S. intentions.306 This was due to the fact that none of these terms necessarily contradicted the idea that China was a strategic competitor. As a result, one scholar dismissed them out of hand and referred to the U.S.’s long-standing hostility toward China.307 While there are not any significant writings that connected the three Cs to the idea that the U.S. is pursuing a policy of containment, this likely reflects the fact that scholars in this school of thought were focused on other issues and viewed the three Cs as of minimal importance to the U.S.’s pursuit of containment.
The Pragmatic Hegemonists viewed the three Cs as fitting with the U.S.’s changing tactics without indicating that any fundamental change in its policy or goals was taking place. As a result, while it may have created incentives for both sides to reconsider the form that their relationship should take, it could not be characterized as representing a major change.308 These scholars were inclined to discount it as a diplomatic formulation that did not reveal anything significant about U.S. intentions.309 It therefore reflected the fact that the relationship had gone through a phase of adjustment and was now characterized as 60% cooperation, not that any major changes in U.S. intentions had taken place.310 However, even if nothing fundamental had changed, the
306 Chinese Interview #13, Beijing, China, November 22, 2011 (describing the views of other scholars). 307 Chinese Interview #25, Beijing, China, March 5, 2012. 308 Chinese Interview #29, Beijing, China, April 4, 2012. 309 Chinese Interview #13, Beijing, China, November 22, 2011. 310 Chinese Interview #20, Beijing, China, December 16, 2011.
362 fact that it indicated that the U.S. had attained an improved understanding of the relationship was positive.311
For the Pragmatic Hegemonists, the three Cs therefore reflected a positive tactical development even though it did not mean that U.S. interests and goals had changed.
The Evolutionists understood it as reflecting America’s changing views and as the framework through which it understood the bilateral relationship after 9/11.312 It was therefore part of an important trend toward more cooperative relations that was also seen in the establishment of high-level dialogues, the Presidential hotline, and the MMCA.
These developments were of value to improving mutual understandings of interests and intentions.313
One scholar who viewed it as a positive development and argued that it gave
Chinese leaders a good impression added the caveat that its formulation was too long. As translation from English to Chinese is problematic, the more succinct the message, the more likely it is to be understood. As a result, this type of description would be clearer if it only possessed one theme that was easily discernible.314 Another scholar also concluded that, as positive as this development was, Americans remained unsure regarding whether the relationship that the three Cs described was primarily characterized
311 Chinese Interview #16, Beijing, China, November 25, 2011. 312 Chen Dongxiao, “Fuzaxing yu ZhongMei Guanxi Jiegou de Xin Bianhua,” (Complexity and the New Change in the Structure of Sino-American Relations): 40. 313 Ibid., 55. 314 Chinese Interview #22, Beijing, China January 17, 2012.
363 by cooperation of conflict. The continued enunciation of the China threat also made it harder for Chinese analysts to evaluate the U.S.’s stance.315
For the Evolutionists, the three Cs therefore provided some support for the argument that the U.S.’s understanding of the relationship was evolving. However, compared to many other positive developments, it amounted to a minor issue.
Regarding the meaning of the individual terms, the Pragmatic Hegemonists and
Evolutionists reached similar conclusions. However, as Wang Gonglong of the CCP’s
Shanghai Administration Institute and Chen Dongxiao, the Vice President of SIIS and
Director of the Department of International Organization and International Law, were the only scholars who outlined their interpretations of each term, this represents a small pool of interpretations.
“Constructive” was interpreted as meaning that they were not enemies and should pursue stability.316 As a result, they should use dialogues and consultation to improve communication and to avoid confrontation.317 “Cooperative” was interpreted as referring to the areas where they shared interests in the realms of economics, culture, and security, especially in anti-terrorism.318 “Candid” was interpreted as referring to the fact that the differences in their cultures, history, and government systems meant that they needed to communicate effectively in order to ensure that their differences did not prevent the
315 Ibid., 41. 316 Wang, Baoshouzhuyi yu Lengzhanhou Meiguo Duihua Zhengce (Conservatism and Post-Cold War U.S. Policy Toward China), 275. 317 Chen, “Fuzaxing yu ZhongMei Guanxi Jiegou de Xin Bianhua,” (Complexity and the New Change in the Structure of Sino-American Relations): 40. 318 Ibid., 40; Wang, Baoshouzhuyi yu Lengzhanhou Meiguo Duihua Zhengce (Conservatism and Post-Cold War U.S. Policy Toward China), 275.
364 bilateral relationship from moving forward.319 Lastly, “complex” meant that there are cooperative and competitive aspects to the relationship, as there are areas where their interests do and do not align.320
One of the New Thinkers viewed the use of the three Cs by the George Bush administration as part of a significant shift that highlighted the fact that its understanding of the bilateral relationship had evolved and that U.S. intentions were changing. While in the 1980s and 1990s the U.S. had understood the relationship in black and white terms, this formulation indicated that it had reached a more nuanced understanding.321 The new formulation was viewed as accurately reflecting the complexity of the relationship and the fact that it is difficult to reach an overall assessment of it. This also supported the conclusion that the U.S. did not have a grand strategy that it was following in relations with China.322 As a result, the three Cs indicated that U.S. intentions were changing and provided the framework through which the U.S. approached the relationship after 9/11.
It appeared that China accepted this terminology as on May 1, 2002 Vice
President Hu Jintao gave a speech in Washington at a dinner hosted by eight American organizations titled: “Enhance Mutual Understanding and Trust Towards a Constructive
319 Ibid., 275. 320 Chen, “Fuzaxing yu ZhongMei Guanxi Jiegou de Xin Bianhua,” (Complexity and the New Change in the Structure of Sino-American Relations): 40. 321 Chinese Interview #3, Beijing, China, October 8, 2011. 322 Chinese Interview #9, Beijing, China, November 16, 2011.
365 and Cooperative Relationship Between China and the U.S.”323 In it, he stated that he had had candid and constructive dialogues with President George Bush, Vice President Dick
Cheney, and other U.S. leaders. After a November 20, 2004 meeting with President
George Bush at an APEC summit, he also noted that they had reviewed the development of bilateral relations over the last four years and were satisfied with the progress in the constructive partnership that had been attained.324
In a speech at Texas A&M University in 2003, Ambassador Yang Jiechi stated that the term “constructive” meant that the relationship had to have a positive nature and that even when they had differences of opinion they should have a forward-looking attitude.325 In the same speech, he also posited that the term “cooperative” meant that their job was not only to maintain the areas of cooperation in the relationship, but also to enlarge and deepen them. It is interesting to note that he did not comment on the meaning of the term “candid.” This supports the idea that China did not want the suggestion that there were sources of conflict in the relationship to be expressed publicly.
Relations with Friends and Allies in the Asia Pacific
Japan
The Malign Containers viewed the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance as threatening and as reflecting a desire to contain China. As the U.S.’s superior power
323 Hu Jintao, “Enhanced Mutual Understanding and Trust Towards a Constructive and Cooperative Relationship Between China and the U.S.” (Washington, D.C.: Speech hosted by Eight American Foundations and Councils, May 1, 2002). 324 “President Hu Jintao Meets With U.S. President Bush,” November 21, 2004, accessed January 11, 2013, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/huvisit/t171299.htm. 325 Yang Jiechi, “A Synchronized Approach for China-U.S. Relations,” (Speech at Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, November 5, 2003).
366 capabilities ensure that it does not require assistance from Japan, developments such as the 2005 2+2 statement were negative and indicated that the U.S. still wanted it to play a larger role.326 As China’s interests are always hurt when the U.S. and Japan upgrade their relations, this was a significant development, which indicated that China had taken the place of the U.S.S.R. as the focus of the alliance.327
Two scholars whose views usually fit with the Evolutionists also expressed very negative views of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Wang Jisi of Beijing University argued that the
U.S. had deliberately pushed China and Japan apart and that hardliners in Washington viewed a manageable level of conflict between China and its neighbors as serving U.S. interests.328
Unsurprisingly, for the Malign Containers, the upgrade of U.S. security relations with Japan was viewed as directed toward China and as indicating that it remained hostile toward it. Minimal analysis of the role of the DPRK or other security issues motivating the upgrade of the alliance was presented.
The Evolutionists viewed the U.S.-Japan alliance as posing concerns for China’s interests without believing that it amounted to containment. This was not understood to constitute a new development, as their alliance was a long-standing source of concern.
Wu Xinbo of Fudan University’s Center for American Studies concluded that with the upgrade that took place during the period of the George Bush administration the
326 Chinese Interview #4, Beijing, China, October 15, 2011. 327 Liu Jiangyong, “RiMei Tongmeng Zhuanxing jiqi Dui Zhongguo de Yingxiang,” (Transformation of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and its Influence on China) Guoji Guancha 1 (2006): 12 and 15. 328 Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for Stability with the U.S.,” Foreign Affairs 84, 5 (September/October 2005): 44.
367 “silver lining” of the alliance had disappeared, as it had changed from acting as a cap on
Japan’s military development to being a propellant.329 He also viewed the upgrade of the alliance as responsible for the expansion of Japan’s relationship with Taiwan.330 As undesirable as these developments were, he concluded that there was one group in the
U.S. that wanted to use the alliance to develop a security arrangement among the U.S.,
Japan, and China in order to engage and integrate China while another group wanted to use it to contain and constraint it.331 China’s perception of, and stance toward, the alliance was therefore determined by whether or not the allies were viewed as aligning against it, as it is willing to live with the alliance if it is geared toward engagement.332 As he also stated that the fact that the U.S. “attaches great importance to the U.S.-Japanese alliance as its key security investment in the region since the Cold War years is also understandable,” it was clear that he did not view U.S. policy as innately hostile.333
Ma Junwei and Xu Xuequn of CICIR Institute of Japanese Studies argued that the allies were upgrading their relationship from coordinating policy at the strategic level to developing a shared military strategy and that the U.S. wanted Japan’s help with intelligence, surveillance, early warning etc.334 At the same time, they also argued that the allies were working to avoid aggravating China on the issue of the Taiwan Strait and
329 Wu Xinbo, “The End of the Silver Lining,” The Washington Quarterly 29, 1 (Winter 2005/2006): 120. 330 Ibid., 125. 331 Ibid., 128. 332 Ibid., 128-129. 333 Ibid., 129. 334 Ma Junwei and Xu Xuequn, “RiMei ‘2+2’ Huiyi Wenjian yu RiMei Tongmeng Zhuanxing,” (The U.S.-Japan ‘2+2’ Meeting Document and the Transformation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 6 (2007): 44.
368 saw themselves as having shared interests with China in maintaining stability.335 The alliance therefore was neither solely directed toward relations with China or entirely negative for its interests.
Writing in 2003, Ni Xiayun from CICIR’s Institute of American Studies wrote that the biggest challenge China could pose to the U.S. and Japan would result from being internally unstable and that a stable and prosperous China would serve their interests.336 As a result, they had an interest in engaging China and could not be characterized as pursuing a Cold War-style containment policy.
Furthermore, since it was not completely directed at China, the relationship with
Japan did not send a highly threatening signal. As the DPRK posed a threat to both the
U.S. and Japan, it was reasonable that they were cooperating in order to face it.
Afghanistan was another issue that was viewed as driving the development of the relationship.337 It was also understandable that Japan was worried by China’s rise and that its alliances with the U.S. helped to assuage its fears.338 Lastly, in addition to being of relevance to relations with China, the U.S. also used the alliance to control Japan.339
The Pragmatic Hegemonists therefore viewed the upgrade of the U.S.-Japan alliance as posing challenges to China’s interests without amounting to containment. As the U.S. adjusted its policy as its interests necessitated, the challenge posed by the DPRK meant that China was not its only focus, and the allies actions toward China’s interests
335 Ibid., 45. 336 Ni Xiayun, “MeiRi Tongmeng Guanxi Xin Toushi ‘MeiRi Anquan Tongmeng’ Pingjia,” (Evaluation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance Relationship New Perspective on the ‘U.S.-Japan Security Alliance’) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 11 (2003): 62. 337 Chinese Interview #34, Beijing, China, July 3, 2012. 338 Chinese Interview #5, Beijing, China, October 26, 2011. 339 Jiang, “Lengzhanhou Meiguo Duihua Zhengce Zhong de Riben Yinsu,” (The Element of Japan in the U.S.’s Post-Cold War Policy Toward China): 26.
369 had not been overly hostile, the fact that the upgrade of the alliance was not desirable was not taken to mean that it was deeply threatening.
Evolutionists who generally viewed the U.S. as adjusting its tactics as it worked to manage relations with China presented multiple additional reasons why the alliance’s upgrade was not threatening, and therefore not contrary to the idea that the U.S. was making positive tactical adjustments as it pursued a hedging policy.
One scholar argued that, even though no one welcomed the language in the joint statement that the U.S. and Japan issued in 2005 describing the peaceful resolution of the
Taiwan Strait as an issue of mutual concern, since it was not perceived as producing any significant change in policy, it was not deemed as deeply threatening.340 Two scholars concluded that this language was included in response to the Anti-Secession Law and stated that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice communicated as much during meetings with Chinese officials.341 As one of these scholars posited that China had also conveyed its stance to the U.S. on this issue before it passed the Anti-Secession Law, he viewed the two countries as having developed communication on this issue.342 As a result, even though dealing with China was an important function of the alliance, it was not the only purpose to which it was directed.343
340 Chinese Interview #7, Beijing, China, November 10, 2011. 341 Chinese Interview #22, Beijing, China, January 17, 2012; Chinese Interview #28, Shanghai, China, March 16, 2012. 342 Chinese Interview #28, Shanghai, China, March 16, 2012. 343 Yu Tiejun, “Dongya de Junshi Touming,” (East Asia’s Military Transparency) in Dongya Heping yu Anquan Yan Xuetong and Jin Dexing, Eds. (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2005), 361.
370 Ultimately, as the U.S. and Japan’s actions were limited to the statement, and it was not accompanied by any new actions, it was not that problematic.344 The fact that the
U.S. was viewed as continuing to oppose Taiwanese independence was also more important than the joint statement.345 As a result, the alliance fit into the strategy of hedging against uncertainties, of which China’s future behavior was only one.346
One scholar also argued that the U.S. can play a positive role in the often-troubled
Sino-Japanese relationship and contributed to the stabilization of relations between China and Japan during the period of heightened tensions in 2006.347 Due to the fact that this sort of positive evaluation of the U.S.’s role in the region is likely to be poorly received at home, it is not surprising that this idea has not been made publicly. It also fits with the argument that the U.S. does not desire bad Sino-Japanese relations, as an isolated Japan cannot contribute to U.S. strategy.348
The hedging pursued by the U.S. and Japan therefore balanced exchanges, engagement, and encouragement of China to play a positive role in the U.S.-led system with guarding, restricting (制约), and military preparations with an eye toward worst- case scenarios.349 Even though the 2005 2+2 statement had openly displayed the relevance of the alliance to the Taiwan Strait, it was not believed that the U.S. wanted the
Sino-Japanese relationship to deteriorate, as they were both important economic partners.
344 Chinese Interview #17, Beijing, China, November 28, 2011. 345 Chinese Interview #30, Beijing, China, May 9, 2012. 346 Chinese Interview #33, Beijing, China, July 2, 2012. 347 Chinese Interview #18, Beijing, China, November 28, 2011. 348 Zhou Qi, “Meiguo Duiri Anquan Hezuo Zhengce Dui ZhongRi Guanxi de Yingxiang,” (The Influence of the U.S.’s Security Cooperation Policy Toward Japan on Sino-Japanese Relations) Dangdai Yatai 2 (2009): 35. 349 Xia Liping, “ZhongMeiRi Zhanlue Guanxi: Zhengqu Gongying he Bimian,” (Sino- American-Japanese Strategic Relations: Strive For Win-Win and Avoidance) Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 9 (2007): 33-34.
371 As a result, while a balance of power between Japan and China serves U.S. interests in maintaining its dominant position, as long as China continues to rise peacefully, the alliance would not be used to constrain it.350
The Evolutionists therefore interpreted developments that were seemingly negative for China’s interests as of limited importance. As a result, this aspect of policy revealed less about U.S. intentions, as it only amounted to one part of the uncooperative side of its hedging policy. The alliance was therefore understood as directed toward undesired contingencies, not containment.
No articles or interview subjects made arguments about the U.S.-Japan relationship that reflected the perspective of the New Thinkers. This may be attributable to the fact that for historical reasons relations with Japan remain a sensitive topic.
India
On perhaps no other security issue during the period of the George Bush administration is there a degree of consensus equal to that found regarding the development of the Indo-American security relationship. While some saw it as motivated by issues in addition to balancing against China, everyone believed that it was directed toward China with opinions only differing regarding whether this reflected containment or hedging. Similarly, a large majority of scholars also viewed it as posing a limited threat due to the fact that differences of interest between the U.S. and India as well as
India’s unwillingness to serve U.S. strategy.
350 Ibid., 38.
372 The Malign Containers viewed the U.S. as having a clear desire to use India to check China. However, many scholars did not believe that India would be prepared to fulfill this role. This resulted from the fact that it was motivated by the desire to gain assistance for its development while remaining unwilling to give up its independent stance.351 Similarly, another scholar posited that, while the U.S. would like India to serve as a reliable junior ally, the fact that it is an ancient civilization with its own foreign policy identity ensured that it was unlikely to fit into this role.352
Interestingly, Chinese scholars did not seriously evaluate the possibility that the
George Bush administration recognized that India was unlikely to act like a traditional ally, or that U.S. interests would already be served by a stronger India that could balance against China for its own reasons. Nor was the possibility that it was not necessary for
India to give up its own interests in relations with Russia and Iran for U.S. security interests to benefit from the expanding relationship. Their analysis was therefore handicapped by a reliance on the framework of traditional alliances and coalitions in which a high degree of coordination is assumed to take place. The possibility that the upgrading of the relationship with India would serve U.S. interests more indirectly was not publicly acknowledged.
Writing from the perspective of the Malign Containers, Sun Puzhang from CIIS concluded that, even though the U.S. would like to use relations with India to check and balance China, it was unlikely that they would be able to develop a genuine alliance, or
351 Shen Dingli, “Meiguo Yazhou Zhanlue Pingjia,” (Evaluation of America’s Asia Strategy) in Meiguo Wenti Yanjiu di 6 (American Issues Research, Volume 6) (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2007), 18. 352 Li Ping, “Toushi YinMei Guanxi de ‘Xin Fazhan,’” (Perspective on the Indo- American Relationship’s ‘New Development’) Dangdai Shijie 9 (2005): 21.
373 even a real strategic partnership. This was due to the fact that their diverging interests in the Indian Ocean, anti-terrorism, and the U.S.’s relationship with Pakistan act to limit the partnership.353 The fact that the U.S. could not entirely view India as an equal in their relationship and India’s unwillingness to give up its position as an independent country in international relations would also serve to limit their relationship.354
The Evolutionists viewed the development of relations between the U.S. and India as understandable and did not perceive it as overly threatening. As India’s development in the field of high technology may also enable it to pose a challenge in the future, the
U.S. was merely keeping its options open.355 While weapon sales and nuclear assistance for India were not desirable, they could also be explained with reference to America’s commercial interests. As the U.S. and India share political values, it is also reasonable that they would want to improve their relationship.356 As a result, along with a desire for stability in Asia; defending the SLOCs; and antiterrorism, concern about the rise of China was only one of multiple reasons for the upgrade of relations.357
Writing in 2005, Hou Hongu cited a 2002 report from the Pentagon titled Indo-
U.S. Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions, which stated that China was an unavoidable factor in the U.S.-India strategic relationship.358 At the same time, U.S. goals
353 Sun Puzhang, “Meiguo Dui Yindu de Zhengce yu MeiYin Guanxi,” (U.S. Policy Toward India and Indo-American Relations) Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 4 (2003): 29. 354 Ibid., 17. 355 Chinese Interview #4, Beijing, China, October 15, 2011. 356 Ma Jiali, “Manmohan Xinge de Meiguo Zhixin yu YinMei Guanxi,” (Manmohan Singh’s Belief in the U.S. and Indo-American Relations) Heping yu Fazhan 4 (2005): 20. 357 Ibid., 21. 358 Hou Hongu, “Bushi Zhengfu Shitou Duiyin Xin Zhanlue,” (The Tendency of the George Bush Administration’s New Strategy Toward India) 11 (2005): 15.
374 also included weakening the military relationship between Russia and India as well as
Russia’s leadership of the Russia-India-China triangle.359 If in the end the fact that India is not in the NPT poses too much of a problem; issues with domestic U.S. law on nonproliferation turn out to pose too high a cost; and India is ultimately of limited strategic help, then this U.S. strategy toward India would weaken.360
Looking further into domestic U.S. politics, Fan Jishe balanced his argument that the U.S. had multiple standards for non-proliferation that were damaging to the non- proliferation regime with the conclusion that, due to legislative limitations on nuclear relations with India, it was unclear that the White House would be able to get Congress to ratify the final agreement.361 What the administration might want to do therefore could not automatically be equated with what it would actually be able to accomplish.
Both Hou Hongu and Zhao Qinhai of CIIS also concluded that U.S. aspirations for the relationship were further limited by the fact that India would not be willing to follow the U.S. or to sacrifice its relationships with Russia and Iran.362 It was therefore difficult to reconcile the U.S. and India’s security interests in and strategy toward Asia.363
In light of India’s independent stance in international affairs, affording it an important
359 Ibid., 16. 360 Ibid., 17. 361 Fan Jishi, “MeiYin Hexieyi Chuangguan Nan,” (The U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement- Crashing Through the Barrier is Difficult) Renmin Ribao, September 1, 2008. 362 Ibid., 16-17; Zhao Qinhai, “MeiYin Junshi Hezuo jiqi Zhiyue Yinsu,” (Indo-American Military Cooperation and the Element of Checking) Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 5 (2008): 24. 363 Liu Xuecheng, “MeiYin Zhanlue Guanxi Hudong jiqi Fazhan,” (The Indo-American Strategic Relationship, Interaction and Development) Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 6 (2005): 30; Wang Xinglong, “MeiYin Haishang Hezuo: Dongji Maodun jiqi Yingxiang,” (Indo- American Cooperation at Sea: Motivation, Contradiction, and Influence) Guoji Luntan 9, 4 (2007): 24-25.
375 role in the U.S.’s Asia policy would therefore amount to letting a “trouble maker” on which it had insufficient influence in.364
In contrast, Xia Liping of Tongji University concluded that Indo-American security relations did not pose a major threat toward China’s role in the strategic triangle.
He argued that the growing interests shared by the three countries in the realm of non- traditional security served to bind them together. The growing Sino-Indian economic relationship and their shared interests as rising powers also made their relationship more important. 365 As a result, as long as China continues to adhere to peaceful development, the U.S. would not be able to use India to check it.366
Contrary to those that viewed shared values as a legitimate cause of the upgrade of the Indo-American security relationship, Zhang Li of Sichuan University argued that this explanation lacked credibility, as during the Cold War these values did not play a significant role in their bilateral relationship. China was therefore the foundation of their cooperation as the U.S. hopes to use relations with India to limit China’s global influence.367 However, the fact that he also highlighted the fact that that the U.S. and
India are diverse societies that include multiple groups with distinct interests in their country’s relationships with China, makes it clear that he did not see this as amounting to containment. He prescribed that China respond by inviting groups from the U.S. and
India to visit China and to increase communication in order to enhance their
364 Jin Canrong and Zhou Jin, “Meiguo Dongya Zhengce de Xin Tedian,” (The New Special Aspect of America’s East Asia Policy) Guoji Guancha 5 (2006): 19. 365 Ibid., 23. 366 Xia Liping, “Lun 21 Shiji ZhongMeiYin Sanbian Guanxi,” (Discussion of 21st Century Trilateral China-U.S.-India Relations) Dangdai Yatai 9 (2003), 19. 367 Zhang Li, “MeiYin Zhanlue Guanxi Zhong de Zhongguo Yinsu,” (The China Element in Indo-American Strategic Relations) Nanya Yanjiu Likan 1 (2009): 17.
376 understanding of China and therefore decrease incentives to attempt to check it.368
Clearly, if he thought that U.S. policy was permanently dedicated to containment, such a response would hold no utility.
As the development of the relationship during the George Bush administration primarily took the form of statements, bilateral talks, and documents, another scholar argued that it was largely aspirational. While in the long term this may lead to more significant developments, it did not create any immediate challenges.369
A number of scholars from this school advocated an interesting response. After examining developments in Indo-American security relations, Jin Canrong of Renmin
University and Zhou Xinyu of Beijing Foreign Studies University argued that China should not be too taken in by engagement or react overly strongly to guarding; it should instead respond positively to engagement with more communication and the development of mutual trust while at the same time carefully observing and managing guarding.370
Similarly, after concluding that it was not currently an anti-China alliance, Zhang
Guihong of Zhejiang University prescribed reduced criticism of the U.S. and diminished resistance to its position in order to ensure that it did not become one.371 He also advocated that China work to deepen economic and security cooperation with the U.S. and to increase mutual security dependence by continuing to work together on antiterrorism and combating the proliferation of WMD. This would ensure that the U.S.
368 Ibid., 18. 369 Chinese Interview #33, Beijing, China, July 2, 2012. 370 Jin and Zhou, “Meiguo Dongya Zhengce de Xin Tedian,” (The New Special Aspect of America’s East Asia Policy): 20. 371 Zhang Guihong, “MeiYin Zhanlue Huoban Guanxi yu Zhongguo: Yingxiang yu Duice,” (The Indo-American Strategic Partnership Relationship and China: Influence and Countermeasure) Dangdai Yatai 5 (2005): 34.
377 continued to have an interest in China’s rise.372 He did not comment on the fact that this was the outcome that the U.S desired as it worked to shape the choices of a rising China by upgrading relations with India.
Australia
While less has been written on the upgrade of the U.S.’s relations with Australia, existing analysis is largely in line with the perceptions of relations with Japan and India.
The Malign Containers viewed Australia as the “southern anchor” in the U.S.’s strategy toward China, thereby complementing the “northern anchor” of Japan.373 Many of these scholars viewed the importance that the U.S. afforded to both of these countries as part of a long-standing containment policy that was intended to encircle China.
Regarding the views of the Pragmatic Hegemonists, one scholar argued that the significance of developments of relations with Australia should not be exaggerated in the immediate term, as it is also directed at cooperation on issues like HADR. As a result, while in the long term it is one way to hedge against uncertainty in Asia, and China in particular, it was not immediately threatening and was part of a stable policy.374
Chinese perceptions of U.S. security relations with Australia will be covered in greater detail in the sections on the TSD and the Quad.
372 Ibid., 34. 373 Ma and Xu, “RiMei ‘2+2 ‘Huiyi Wenjian yu RiMei Tongmeng Zhuanxin,” (The U.S.- Japan ‘2+2’ Meeting Document and Transformation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance): 45. While this article provides one example of the usage of these terms, it should be noted that their analysis is more in line with the second school. 374 Chinese Interview #33, Beijing, China, July 2, 2012.
378 The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and the Quadrilateral Group
The Malign Containers saw these groupings as threatening due to the belief that
China was the main target. One scholar whose views usually fit within the Evolutionists argued that this was made clear by the fact that if it was not they could work together through the ARF or invite China and Indonesia to become involved as well.375
The Pragmatic Hegemonists concluded that these groupings were informed by multiple goals that were not perfectly aligned with each other or against China. While one motivation for them was for the members to face the rise of China together, the U.S. was also interested in ensuring that it was not sidelined in the region with Japan and
Australia hoping that it would give them more leverage on the U.S.376 As the TSD was not necessary for addressing WMD, proliferation, or anti-terrorism, and the members already cooperated with China in these areas, guarding against its rise was one of the goals toward which it was directed. As a result, while they were currently encouraging
China to be a responsible stakeholder and were not trying to contain it, if need be, in the future these groupings could be directed toward this end. This was part of the George
Bush administration’s carrot and stick approach to relations with China.377 Another scholar also argued that, while the fact that the U.S. wanted to use the TSD and Quad to
375 Chinese Interview #32, Beijing, China, May 30, 2012. 376 Hou Ganyue, “MeiAoRi Zhanlue Duihua he Zhongguo de Diqu Anquan Huanjing,” (The U.S.-Australia-Japan Strategic Dialogue and China’s Regional Security Environment) Lishi Jiaoxue Wenti 6 (2008): 42-43. 377 Ibid., 44.
379 shape China’s choices was not entirely bad, and did not amount to containment, the open rhetoric about doing so was seen as insulting and offensive to its sensibilities.378
Ma Junwei and Xu Xuequn of CICIR’s Institute of Japanese Studies viewed the
TSD as intended to link up Japan, the “North anchor” in the U.S.’s regional policy, with
Australia, the “South anchor,” without concluding that this amounted to an attempt at containment.379 This was supported by the fact that the U.S. and Japan were working to avoid aggravating China on the Taiwan issue and awareness of the fact that the stability of Asia was connected to relations between the U.S., Japan, and China.380 Developments like the TSD therefore did not amount to more than hedging.
Drawing heavily on an article by Michael Mandelbaum from Foreign Affairs,381
Liu Aming of the SASS’s Institute of World Politics argued that the final goal of the
Quad was to have a big family of democracies that would also include Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, and possibly Thailand. Tracing its inspiration to G. John Ikenberry and Anne-
Marie Slaughter’s Princeton Project for International Relations Report, Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century, he highlighted the importance of values by arguing that the U.S. believes that having more democracies makes it safer.382 However, the different ideas and goals held by the four members served
378 Chinese Interview #22, Beijing, China, January 17, 2012. 379 Ma and Xu, “RiMei ‘2+2 ‘Huiyi Wenjian yu RiMei Tongmeng Zhuanxin,” (The U.S.- Japan ‘2+2’ Meeting Document and Transformation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance): 45. 380 Ibid., 45. 381 Michael Mandelbaum, “Democracy Without America: The Spontaneous Spread of Freedom,” Foreign Affairs 86, 5 (September/October 2007). 382 Liu Aming, “Minzhu Guojia Tongmeng Zhanlue yu Yishixintai Huayu xia de ZhongMei Guanxi,” (Strategy of Alliances of Democracies and Sino-American Relations Under Ideological Discourse) Meiguo Wenti Yanjiu 4 (2008): 95.
380 to highlight the conflicts and contradictions between democracy and alliances.383 The
U.S.’s support also came with reservations, as there are contradictions between its goals in Asia and democracy.384 As the U.S. and China were also becoming more dependent on each other and working together more, the U.S. did not view China as either a friend or an enemy, an approach consistent with hedging.385
The fact that Australia did not want to have to choose between its security partner and its economic partner, or for China to view the TSD as aimed at it, led it to pursue a moderate approach, something that rendered the TSD less threatening than it otherwise would have been. While Australia also had an interest in strengthening relations with
Japan in the TSD, the fact that India possesses very different weapon systems ensured that Australia did not have much interest in cooperating with it.386
Liu Aming also viewed India as unwilling to provoke China and therefore not interested in seeing the Quad become an anti-China grouping.387 As a result, he concluded that Japan was the only member that was positive about the Quad, as it had pushed for a meeting on the sidelines of the ARF in Manila and it was in line with the values-based diplomacy that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had promoted.388
383 Ibid., 97. 384 Ibid., 98. 385 Ibid., 99. 386 Wu Xinbo, Shishi Ruqi ju Juxin- 21 Shijiqu ZhongMei Guanxi de Xin Geju (Reality is Like a New Chess Board- The New Structure of Sino-American Relations at the Beginning of the 21st Century) (Shanghai: Fudan University Chubanshe, 2010), 29. 387 Liu, “Minzhu Guojia Tongmeng Zhanlue yu Yishixingtai Huayu xia de ZhongMei Guanxi,” (Strategy of Alliances of Democracies and Sino-American Relations Under Ideological Discourse): 100. 388 Ibid., 100; Liu Jianfei, “Shijin Mei ‘Minzhu Guojia Lianmeng’ Zhanlue Gouxiang de Zouxiang,” (Exert All of One’s Strength, the Direction of America’s ‘Democratic Country Alliance’ Strategy Concept) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 11 (2009): 49.
381 Unsurprisingly, there were not any scholars who argued that the development of the TSD and the Quad indicated that U.S. policy toward China was undergoing fundamental changes.
Singapore
Very little has been written on the U.S.’s security relationship with Singapore as scholars focused on Japan, India, and Australia’s role in the TSD and Quad. Singapore’s size was also viewed as indicating that it was of limited importance to U.S. strategy.389
Some scholars did posit that its inclusion in Exercise Malabar 2007 was part of a U.S. strategy to contain China.390 Another also wrote that the fact that American aircraft carriers were using Singapore’s the new facilities at Changi naval base showed a large- scale return to Asia after 1992 and a readiness to face China and the DPRK.391
The Global Posture Review
The Malign Containers viewed the GPR as another example of the U.S. desire to contain China. The decision to redeploy more assets to the Asia Pacific and the buildup on Guam were therefore negative for China’s interests and threatening toward its security. It also fit with the conclusion that the U.S. was working to encircle China and that the upgrades to its alliances were directed toward it as well.392
389 Chinese Interview #14, Beijing, China, November 24, 2011. 390 Chinese Interview #25, Beijing, China, March 5, 2012. 391 Lu Qichang, “Xiao Bushi Zhengfu de Xin Junshi Zhanlue,” (The George Bush Administration’s New Military Strategy) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 5 (2001): 34. 392 Gu and Dai, “Xiao Bushi Zhizheng Yilai de ZhongMei Guanxi,” (Sino-American Relations Since George Bush Took Office): 18.
382 The GPR had therefore made the contents of containment more prominent. This was attributable to the fact that it thought that China already had the capability to break through the first island chain and that it therefore wanted to strengthen its position on
Guam in the second island chain. This strategy fit with developments in security relations with Japan and India and indicated that it was increasing “preventative containment” toward China from multiple standpoints and reflected “Cold War thinking.”393
The Evolutionists viewed the GPR as less threatening, directed at multiple goals, of which China was only one, and even understandable. As a result, it would be an exaggeration to argue that in East Asia it was totally directed at China. At the same time, there was clearly some truth to the conclusion that concerns about China’s direction were important to the U.S. decision to adjust its military posture.394 It therefore fit into the U.S. strategy of simultaneously strengthening guarding and engagement.395 This sent the signal that it had the capabilities necessary to respond if China began to develop in a direction that the U.S. did not like.396
As there are many issues in the region that could lead to a conflict, one scholar concluded that it was not surprising that the U.S. wanted to shape China’s choices.397 The fact that it was taking place at the same time that the responsible stakeholder model was
393 Ibid., 20. 394 Wang Jisi, Ni Feng, and Yu Wanli, Meiguo zai Dongya de Zuoyong: Guandian Zhengce ji Yingxiang (America’s Usefulness in Asia: Points of View, Policy, and Influence) (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2008), 11. 395 Ibid., 12. 396 Chinese Interview #17, Beijing, China, November 28, 2011. 397 Chinese Interview #13, Beijing, China, November 22, 2011.
383 being promoted also influenced how it was perceived as together they amounted to hedging.398
Putting it in a global context, some scholars also argued that the review was not limited to Asia with the fact that the U.S. was focused on Southwest Asia also ensuring that it was neither its main priority or fully implemented.399 The limits on its ability to act on the review therefore had to be considered, not just its desire to change its posture. This global context also indicated that China was not the only focus, as the regions around
China where it took place were part of the “arc of instability” in which the U.S. faced additional security concerns.400
Several scholars also argued that the locations in which the buildup took place served to make it less threatening. As China is not a global power, it was described as less concerned by developments along the second island chain. In contrast, a buildup on
Japan, the ROK, or the Philippines would have been perceived as a signal that the U.S. expected China to give way.401 Another scholar stated that as China lacks the desire to project power in the area surrounding Guam and Hawaii, these developments were not overly threatening. The fact that it did not involve any sort of buildup on Taiwan was also important as such an action would be viewed as extremely threatening. In contrast, assets placed in Japan and the ROK may be directed at the DPRK.402
398 Chinese Interview #12, Beijing, China, November 18, 2011. 399 Chinese Interview #20, Beijing, China, December 16, 2011; Chinese Interview #30, Beijing, China, May 9, 2012. 400 Zhang Liping, “Consensus and Conflicts in China-U.S. Relations,” CASS Website, 2005. 401 Chinese Interview #16, Beijing, China, November 25, 2011. 402 Chinese Interview #17, Beijing, China, November 28, 2011.
384 Clearly there was no consensus regarding where China’s red lines are, as other scholars whose views fit with the Evolutionists argued that Guam was too close to China and sent a threatening signal.403 However, even scholars who did see it as more threatening presented nuanced views. One argued that, while the U.S. had numerous goals in the Asia Pacific, in the case of a conflict, all of these capabilities could be used against China.404 Another scholar who viewed it as specifically aimed at China and posed the question of whom else it could be directed toward conceded that the fact that it was taking place on the second island chain indicated that the U.S. did not desire a conflict.
As a result, it showed resolve without constituting an offensive signal.405
Instead of focusing on factors like where the GPR was taking place and the nature of the balance in hedging or between engagement and containment, the New Thinkers focused on the nature of the U.S.’s intentions and broader changes in the relationship.
Ultimately, they were more inclined to conclude that measures like the GPR were directed toward undesired contingencies and that it did not detract from the new thinking that the U.S. was exhibiting on China policy. One scholar posited that while engagement and the military buildup were both undertaken in the pursuit of U.S. goals like changing
China, if it does become more like the U.S., developments like this would cease to pose a threat to it.406 As a result, while it fit with the logic of hedging, it could be not be characterized as threatening or aggressive. If the two countries are able to develop
403 Chinese Interview #14, Beijing, China, November 24, 2011. 404 Chinese Interview #31, Beijing, China, May 15, 2012. 405 Chinese Interview #32, Beijing, China, May 30, 2012. 406 Chinese Interview #3, Beijing, China, October 8, 2011.
385 strategic trust, it will also be viewed in a different light.407 The GPR was also of some value to China, as it provided it with an opportunity to learn about how it should transform its own military.408
Ultimately, the number of scholars who viewed the GPR as unthreatening and understandable significantly outnumbered those who concluded that it posed a threat.
The Senior Dialogue
The Malign Containers argued that the Senior Dialogue was not significant as the
U.S. continued to pursue its goal of containing China. One scholar who completely discounted the importance of the dialogue posited that this sort of specific development was far less important than the U.S.’s overall policy toward China. As U.S. it continued to be focused on containment and ensuring that it could not challenge U.S. interests, the dialogue did not matter.409 Qiu Huafei of Tongji University posited that, while the two sides had established more than fifty dialogues on a wide range of topics, the U.S.’s strategic distrust of China’s intentions had not changed. Since it viewed China as posing a threat to international security and free trade, it still intended to contain the development of its power.410 As a result, while the dialogue fit with the logic of the cooperative aspect of hedging and was useful for calling on China to be a responsible stakeholder, the hard aspect of policy remained dominant.
407 Chinese Interview #9, Beijing, China, November 16, 2011. 408 Chinese Interview #3, Beijing, China, October 8, 2011. 409 Chinese Interview #25, Beijing, China, March 5, 2012. 410 Qiu Huafei, “9/11 hou Meiguo Duiwai Zhanlue Kunjing Chongfan Zhengzhi Xianshi,” (Post-9/11 Difficulties for U.S. Foreign Policy are Bringing it Back to Political Realities) Dangdai Yatai 5 (2008): 96.
386 While continuing to view U.S. policy as geared toward containing China, some scholars in this school highlighted a complex mixture of cooperative and competitive components of the bilateral relationship. Yi Chengde of CIIS argued that the successful development of the strategic dialogue provided evidence that the U.S. and China had attained a new breakthrough411 and that the U.S. had come to see China as a responsible major power with the bilateral relationship based on shared interests.412 However, even this did not lead him to change his basic view of the U.S.’s intentions, as he concluded that it was not able to fundamentally change its policy of guarding against and containing
China.413 Nor was this changed by his view that the wisdom of U.S. policy and positive aspects of the relationship were increasing while negative aspects were decreasing.414
Yu Zhengliang, who at the time was affiliated with SIIS, perceived the Senior
Dialogue as one of the positive developments that had recently taken place in bilateral relations while believing that it was unlikely to influence the long-term direction of U.S. policy. The establishment of the dialogue reflected the fact that the U.S. believed that the policy of bringing China into the international system had worked and the U.S. was now focused on encouraging China to develop in a positive direction. At the same time, as
China’s power continued to expand, containment was likely to play an increasingly
411 Yi Chengde, “ZhongMei Guanxi Xin Fazhan yu Meiguo Duihua Zhengce,” (New Developments in Sino-American Relations and American Policy Toward China) in Zhongguo Heping Fazhan Guoji Huanjing de Xin Bianhua (China’s Peaceful Development, The New Change in the International Environment) Wang Jisi, Ed. (Beijing: Dangdai Shijie Chubanshe, 2006), 71. 412 Ibid., 74. 413 Ibid., 80. 414 Ibid., 81.
387 important role in U.S. policy.415 While up to this point a policy informed by engagement had been appropriate, the reality of comparative power capabilities ensured that a harder approach would become increasingly dominant; this was not something that the Senior
Dialogue could change.
The Pragmatic Hegemonists viewed the Senior Dialogue as reflecting a tactical change that fit with the development of the hedging strategy and an American attempt to better manage relations with China under changing conditions. While this constituted a positive development that indicated that the U.S. was willing to work with China, it did not amount to a fundamental change.
Even though cooperative elements of the relationship like the dialogue had been dominant in 2005, arms sales to Taiwan, the GPR, and the alliance with Japan were still geared toward containing and guarding against China.416 The significance of positive developments in U.S. policy notwithstanding, this did not mean that it had undergone a fundamental change, as depending on current circumstances its approach to China is harder or softer without its basic policy changing.417
Jin Canrong of Renmin University argued that the U.S.’s interest in the dialogue reflected the fact that over the course of the four years preceding its establishment the comparative level of dependence between the two countries had become increasingly equal. This led the White House to accept the reality of China’s rise as something that it
415 Yu, “Shilun Meiguo Duihua de Duichong Zhanlue,” (Discussion of America’s Hedging Strategy Toward China): 4-5. 416 Yuan Zhengqing, “Zhongguo Zhoubian Anquan Huanjing de Jiben Dongshi,” (Basic Movements in China’s Peripheral Security Environment) in Guoji Xingshi Huangpi Shu 2006 (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Banshe, 2006), 221. 417 Ibid., 219.
388 could not contain and viewed both sides as seeing the first round of the dialogue as successful.418 As a result, even though U.S. intentions had not changed at a fundamental level, this indicated that it was adopting a new approach toward relations and was becoming increasingly realistic.
Another scholar concluded that, while the U.S.’s participation in the dialogue was motivated by its long-standing desire to shape China’s choices and to get it to recognize the U.S.’s interests, the fact that it made it clear that it was not treating it as an enemy ensured that it was a positive development.419 As the U.S.’s desire to hedge against uncertainties is understandable, and being brought into the system on these terms is far preferable to being excluded from it, it was not viewed as overly threatening.420
The Evolutionists concluded that significant tactical adjustments had taken place that amounted to more than a continuation of past policy. It also reflected the broader changes that were taking place in the bilateral relationship as China became more important to U.S. interests.
Leading scholar Shi Yinhong of Renmin University posited that, while the
Senior Dialogue could not be expected to resolve problems in the relationship or competition on its own, it indicated that the U.S.: had accepted the reality of China’s rise; was willing to deal with it on a realistic basis; and that a deeper level of thinking and
418 Jin Canrong, “Miandui Bianhua Zhankai Hudong ZhongMei Dou Zai Liqiu Zhudong,” (Face Changes Unfold Movement, The U.S. and China are Both Striving for Movement) Jiefang Ribao, December 4, 2005. 419 Chinese Interview #32, Beijing, China, May 30, 2012. 420 Chinese Interview #7, Beijing, China, November 10, 2011.
389 strategy was now informing how it interacted with China.421 This fit with the logic of the responsible stakeholder template, which informed the dialogue and provided the structure within which it took place. As a result, it helped to formalize the bilateral relationship.422
Ni Feng of CASS’s Institute of American Studies highlighted the importance of the dialogue to the need to build strategic trust in the relationship. He argued that its significance was found in the fact that it went beyond discussing specific problems and instead dealt with the general context of the relationship and building strategic trust.423
This reflected the efforts made by both sides to improve the relationship that had commenced at the beginning of President George Bush’s second term. While the dialogue could not be expected to solve major problems, the contribution that it made to building trust across issue areas was highly significant.424 The influence that it could have on U.S. perceptions of China was therefore as important as what it revealed about its intentions since building trust and promoting a positive attitude toward China could encourage U.S. policy to develop in a desirable direction.425
While China had suggested the dialogue, the U.S. decision to agree to it reflected the fact that a consensus had gradually developed in the George Bush
421 Shi Yinhong, Zhanlue Wenti Sanshi Pian- Zhongguo Duiwai Zhanlue Sikao (Thirty Strategic Issues: China’s Foreign Policy Strategic Thought) (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Chubanshe, 2008), 259. 422 Ibid., 261. 423 Ni Feng, “Tuijin Huxin de Zhongyao Pingtai- ZhongMei Zhanlue Duihua Huigu,” (Promote the Important Platform of Mutual Trust- A Review of the Sino-American Strategic Dialogue) Dangdai Shijie 3 (2008): 13. 424 Ibid., 15. 425 Ni Feng, “ZhongMei Zhanlue Duihua: Jianli Wending de Daguo Guanxi,” (The Sino- American Strategic Dialogue: Establishing Stable Major Power Relations) Zhongguo Jingji Shibao August 29, 2005.
390 administration that it had to manage Sino-American relations.426 This indicated that they were entering a period of normalized relations, which would contribute to the deepening of understanding and allow the two sides to guard against miscalculations.427
The dialogue also reflected the internationalization of the relationship. Wu
Xinbo of Fudan University’s Center for American Studies argued that, while the George
Bush administration was perceived as viewing it as an opportunity to talk about the strategic framework of the relationship; to encourage China to recognize its growing interests in the international system; and to strengthen cooperation, China was also interested in using it to talk about the peaceful development concept.428 The increased understanding and communication that the dialogue could foster also fit with the history of high-level communication between Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai with President
Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as well as between Deng Xiaoping and President Jimmy Carter.429 Another senior scholar argued that the fact that depth of economic interdependence between the two countries also indicated that this was more than a temporary tactical change with the U.S. remaining focused on containment.430
As a result, even though the U.S. tried to distinguish it from the dialogues it holds with allies by declining to label it as “strategic,” and its development was motivated by practical concerns relating to China’s growing power, the fact that its contents were strategic was more important and indicated that the institutionalization of
426 Zhang Yushi, Shiji Zhichu de Guoji Guanxi (International Relations at the Beginning of the Century) (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2007), 317. 427 Ibid., 314. 428 Wu, Shishi Ruqi ju Juxin (Reality is Like a New Chessboard), 173. 429 Ibid., 175. 430 Chinese Interview #30, Beijing, China, May 9, 2012.
391 the relationship was entering a new stage.431 In addition to wanting to improve communication in order to better understand the direction China was heading in, it was an important development for increasing understanding and avoiding miscalculations.
The fact that the U.S. and China could establish a high-level dialogue, something that in the past had only been held between allies, also reflected an important new trend in international relations.432 This was due to the fact that, even if the dialogue would not be able to resolve problems on its own, it showed that the U.S. was making tactical changes.
Along with the responsible stakeholder speech, the Senior Dialogue was one of the most important factors that led to the emergence of the New Thinkers. They viewed the U.S.’s willingness to engage in the dialogue as a highly significant development that went beyond the tactical level. Some scholars argued that it reflected the complex changes that were taking place in the international system and that they were developing a new style of interaction in international politics. In addition to the dialogue, this also encompassed high-level exchanges and the military hotline.433
Bo Mengsun of CICIR’s Institute of American Studies also argued that the significance of the fact that this was the first time that the U.S. and China were engaging in this sort of dialogue should not be underestimated. As instead of merely discussing specific material problems they were now discussing the strategic intentions behind them,
431 Chen Dongxiao, Interview with Xu, “Zhanlue Duihua: ZhongMei Gongtong Xin Sudao,” (Strategic Dialogue: The U.S. and China’s New Shared Channel). 432 Chen, “Fuzaxing yu ZhongMei Guanxi Jiegou de Xin Bianhua,” (Complexity and New Changes in the Structure of Sino-American Relations): 55. 433 Qian and Ni, “ZhongMei Xin Dilu Hudong Guanxi Chuxi,” (Initial Evaluation of the New Interactive Sino-American Geopolitical Relationship): 69.
392 this represented a major development.434 In contrast to being a tactical change, this indicated that the two sides were coming closer together at a fundamental level, a move that was important to their ability to better understand each other and to dispel mistrust.
The range of issues that it dealt with was also significant.
Even though one U.S. motivation was to “grasp the pulse” of China’s rise and to influence it, the dialogue also indicated that the two sides had overcome the idea that they were either friends or enemies. It therefore contributed to a more stable foundation for the relationship.435 China’s participation in similar dialogues with Russia, India, and Japan also reflected this trend and the fact that it was working to improve how it evaluated the state of international relations.436
In a speech at a luncheon hosted by the National Committee on U.S.-China
Relations and the U.S.-China Business Council, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan presented a positive assessment of the significance of the dialogue and the role that China had played in bringing it about. He stated that:
During their Summit meeting in Santiago, Chile last November, President Hu Jintao and President Bush agreed to further the constructive and cooperative relations between the two countries and step up their dialogue and cooperation in bilateral ties and on important international and regional issues. What they did amounted to charting a direction for China-US relations in the 21st century.437
434 Bo Mengsun, “Zhanlue Duihua yu ZhongMei Guanxi,” (Strategic Dialogue and Sino- American Relations) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 8 (2005): 53. 435 Ibid., 59. 436 Ibid., 56. 437 Tang Jiaxuan, “Vigorously Promoting China-US Constructive and Cooperative Relations In the New Century,” (Address at Welcome Luncheon by National Committee on US-China Relations and US-China Business Council, Washington, D.C., July 27, 2005), accessed January 20, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t206613.htm.
393 As the speech also contrasted the growing number of areas of cooperation between the U.S. and China to the early days of diplomatic relations when no such cooperation had existed, and also highlighted their shared interests in anti-terrorism and non-proliferation, it is clear that he viewed this as part of a larger positive trend.
The Responsible Stakeholder Speech
The Malign Containers perceived the responsible stakeholder speech as an updated expression of the U.S.’s long-standing desire to change China to suit its own interests. This terminology therefore did not indicate that anything had changed in U.S. policy or that it was shifting away from containment.
The concept was understood as meaning that China needed to be responsible to the U.S. and reflected its goal of liberalizing and democratizing it. It therefore represented an attempt to push China to take on more responsibility than it was ready for, something that would overtax its limited resources. As one official from the CCP
International Department stated: “First you [the United States] tried to subvert our political system in the 1980s, then you tried to contain us in the 1990s, now you are trying to bleed us through international entanglements in the 2000s.”438 Pushing China to become more involved in international affairs therefore fit with containment.
Similarly, Niu Haibin of Northeast Normal University argued that one of the primary Chinese responses was that it was just a variant of the China threat theory. This was due to the fact that it was meant to uphold the U.S.-led system and its interests while pushing the Chinese government and society to develop in the direction of the U.S.
438 Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 23.
394 model.439 As a result, it could not be taken as an indication that the U.S. bore any goodwill toward China or that it was willing to cooperate with it on anything other than the basis of narrow self-interest.
Alternately, other scholars recognized some positive aspects of the concept while concluding that other components of U.S. policy were more telling and revealed its continuing desire to contain China. Bian Xiaochun argued that the speech indicated that the U.S.’s main goal was to prevent China from challenging its leadership position. After this, its secondary goal was to ensure that China’s rise followed the course that it desired, something he viewed as westernization.440
Evidently comfortable with tensions within policy, he characterized work by leaders in both countries to formalize the structure of relations and the regular exchange of visits by heads of state as reflecting a more mature relationship.441 At the same time, he viewed the U.S.’s move to upgrade relations with friends and allies in the region as strengthening containment.442 Overall, the responsible stakeholder framework therefore indicated that, while some enhanced bilateral cooperation and communication was possible, U.S. policy had not changed.
The Pragmatic Hegemonists did not view the responsible stakeholder speech as representing a significant development, as U.S. policy continued to consist of hedging or
439 Niu Haibin, “Pingxi Zhongguo Zeren Lun,” (Evaluating the China Responsibility Theory) Fudan Guoji Guanxi Pinglun 8 (2008), 96. 440 Bian Xiaochun, “Meiguo de Waijiao Zhengce Xiang Xianshizhuyi Fangxiang Zhuanbian,” (American Foreign Policy is Turning Toward Realism) in Shijie Fazhan Zhuangkuang 2006 (Conditions of World Development, 2006) (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2006), 89. 441 Ibid., 90. 442 Ibid., 91.
395 engagement plus containment. If anything, the fact that it made too many demands on it without affording corresponding benefits meant that it was negative for China’s interests.
While it did not conclude that it amounted to containment, this school of thought was suspicious of its intent and did not see significant changes as taking place in U.S. policy.
Wang Gonglong of the CCP’s Shanghai Administration Institute characterized the concept as meaning that, while China should not challenge the U.S.’s interests in Asia, it also recognized China’s interests. Responsibility was viewed as including issues such as: military transparency; helping the U.S. with regional issues; and accepting global rules and restrictions.443 At the same time, the U.S. was increasing its deployment in Asia with the buildup on Guam and the TSD being directed toward containing it.444 As a result, while the new concept had some positive contents, it was less important than the actions that the U.S. was actually taking.
Ding Xinghao, who at the time was Director of the American Studies Department of SIIS, argued that, in contrast to changes in policy during President George Bush’s first term which resulted from evolving conditions, during his second term they were primarily a result of conceptual developments. The responsible stakeholder speech was held up as the clearest example of this trend. However, this concept did not reflect a change in policy, as hedging remained the leading concept and the focus was on
“responsible,” not “stakeholder.”445 Responsibility was the more important aspect due to
443 Wang Gonglong, “Xianshizhuyi yu Bushi Zhengfu Di Er Renqi Duihua Zhengce,” (Realism and the Bush Administration’s Second Term Policy Toward China) Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 6 (2007): 18. 444 Ibid., 18-19. 445 Ding, “ZhongMei Guanxi: Gongtong Liyi Lilun Kuangjia yu Zhanlue Jiyu,” (Sino- American Relations: The Structure of the Shared Interests Theory and Strategic Opportunity), 62.
396 the fact that the U.S. would still move to exclude China from the system if it was unable to satisfy its expectations.
Similarly, the former secretary of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship
With Foreign Countries, Bian Qingzu, concluded that the responsible stakeholder speech did not represent a major adjustment in the U.S.’s policy toward China or a new basis for its strategy. Instead, it was no more than the most recent expression of its established policy of cooperation plus guarding and engagement plus containment under conditions of globalization and China’s rise.446 While the speech was intended to encourage China to choose a peaceful path of economic development and political liberalization, this did not amount to a significant change.447
Even if it indicated that the U.S. had moved past its previous emotional view of
China with the responsible stakeholder concept taking the place of the “China threat,” it did not amount to a significant change. This was due to the fact that it wanted to bring
China into the international system on America’s terms. If China’s development were to break away from this path, the U.S. would still move to contain it.448
Wang Jisi of Beijing University therefore concluded that the responsible stakeholder template reflected the established central goal of U.S. policy toward China of maintaining its leadership of the relationship while defending its own interests by
446 Bian Qingzu, “Zhongguo Heping Fazhan yu Meiguo Duihua Zhanlue,” (China’s Peaceful Development and American Strategy Toward China) Heping yu Fazhan 4 (2006): 14. 447 Ibid., 14. 448 Ge Tengfei and Zhou Guiyin, Meiguo Zhengzhi Fazhan yu Duiwai Zhengce (American Political Development and Foreign Policy) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2007), 250.
397 cooperating with China where possible;449 this did not represent a new development.
Furthermore, while the U.S. wanted China to accept more responsibility, it remained unwilling to share the benefits.450 There was therefore a mismatch between the demands that the concept made on China and the privileges that it offered. As it only reflected U.S. business interests, and the American security community maintained a consensus on hedging, it was also of limited relevance to the security relationship.451
Stating a similar argument in stronger terms, the former President of CIIS, Ma
Zhengang, argued that: “Once the veil on the ‘China responsibility theory’ is removed, the essence of the argument is clearly revealed: China is an ‘irresponsible’ country.” As a result, it was geared toward restraining and regulating it, pushing it to coordinate with the
Western countries, and to follow America’s wishes.452 While it was not implied that this amounted to containment, as the focus was on getting China to do more and pushing it to live up to Western standards, it did not amount to a positive change.
Wu Xingtang of the China Center for Contemporary World Studies and Renmin
University argued that the focus of the concept was on ensuring that China did not challenge the U.S.’s global interests and gaining its assistance in maintaining the U.S.-led order, not on global peace and development.453 Even though the term presented a positive description of the relationship, he also questioned whether Deputy Secretary of State
449 Wang Jisi, “Qianlun ZhongMei Guanxi de Da Huanjing he Fazhan Qushi,” (Initial Evaluation of Sino-American Relationship’s Grand Environment and Development Trend) Meiguo Yanjiu 1 (2006): 92. 450 Wang, Shijie shi Tuoyuan de: Weilai Guoji Chengxu Zhanwang (The World is Oval: Outlook for the Future International Order), 45. 451 Ibid., 47. 452 Ma Zhengang, “China’s Responsibility and the ‘China Responsibility’ Theory,” China International Studies (Summer 2007): 8-9. 453 Wu Xingtang, “Ruhe Kandai Meiguo Dui Zhongguo de Dingwei,” (How to View America’s Position Toward China) Dangdai Shijie 2 (2006): 14.
398 Robert Zoellick could make the changes that it called for, as he was a high-level official, not a policymaker.454 U.S. policy therefore continued to be directed toward a balance between cooperation and guarding. While both of these components could be upgraded, the former would not expand at the expense of the latter and the speech also represented a new variant of the China threat theory.455 U.S. policy had therefore not changed.
Lastly, an official from MOFA concluded that, while the speech reflected the
U.S.’s stance that China could not challenge its interests or leadership, this was not highly significant. This was due to the fact that its view of its position in international relations would not matter very much if other countries ceased to accept its leadership.
As a result, the concept did not have important ramifications.456
Summing up, in the view of these scholars, the responsible stakeholder concept was neither negative enough to amount to part of a containment strategy or a significant enough change to constitute part of a more positive U.S. policy. It instead indicated that the U.S. was continuing to pursue its established interests in the bilateral relationship.
The Evolutionists viewed the responsible stakeholder template as an important and largely positive development. Even if it did not indicate that U.S. policy and thinking had fundamentally changed, it represented a significant tactical adjustment that reflected the evolution of the bilateral relationship’s nature and importance. As a result, one
454 Ibid., 14. 455 Ibid., 15. 456 Chinese Interview #34, Beijing, China, July 3, 2012.
399 scholar argued that it was an example of how rhetoric can matter and how when it is clear and concise it can effectively communicate meaning.457
Gu Guanfu of CICIR and Dai Jing presented one of the simplest and most straightforward articulations of the views of this school of thought on the responsible stakeholder speech. While they understood the speech as reflecting the U.S.’s desire to apply its own rules and moral standards to the relationship, it still presented an example of new thinking. While this did not mean that it had rejected the policy of engagement plus containment, it reflected the fact that the U.S. was thinking about how to respond to
China’s rise.458 Even though it could not be concluded that fundamental changes were taking place, it still constituted a significant development.
Chen Dongxiao, the Vice President of SIIS and Director of the Department of
International Organization and International Law, concluded that the responsible stakeholder speech revealed three things about U.S. thinking. First, it showed the importance of China’s role in maintaining the current American-led order, something that reflected more objective analysis. Second, the idea that China was a strong and strengthening country was now the basis of policy. Third, the U.S. was raising the importance of China to American interests to a new level.459 This indicated that the U.S. was altering its approach to the bilateral relationship. At the same time, the concept was still informed by the desire to maintain its hegemony with the onus placed on China to live up to the responsibilities that would help to maintain the U.S.-led order. This
457 Chinese Interview #22, Beijing, China, January 17, 2012. 458 Gu and Dai, “Xiao Bushi Zhizheng Yilai de ZhongMei Guanxi,” (Sino-American Relations Since George W. Bush Took Power): 17. 459 Chen, “Fuzaxing yu ZhongMei Guanxi Jiegou de Xin Bianhua,” (Complexity and New Changes in the Structure of Sino-American Relations): 42.
400 reflected its desire to continue to lead the development of the bilateral relationship on an uneven basis with the responsible stakeholder concept being used as a benchmark with which to judge its progress.460
Adding more complexity, Ni Feng of CASS’s Institute of American Studies concluded that the concept reflected the deep change that had taken place in Sino-
American relations during the early twenty-first century. This was seen in the shift in comparative power capabilities and the belief that, while the U.S. remained far more powerful, and China still needed it more than vice versa, China was developing faster and the U.S.’s demands on it were expanding rapidly. As a result, their comparative power and mutual needs were becoming more balanced.461 The responsible stakeholder speech recognized these developments and also reflected the realization that China was not a new Soviet Union.462
Huang Renwei, the Vice Director of SASS, also argued that the speech indicated that the U.S. had realized that it could no longer contain China’s peaceful rise and that a policy of engagement was preferable. This also reflected the fact that they now had close relations and shared interests on issues such as non-proliferation. While the U.S. still wanted to hold China up to a Western standard of democracy in order to change it, the concept was still positive due to the fact that it provided a long-term strategy for
460 Ibid., 43-44. 461 Ni Feng, “Cong Liyi Youguanfang Dao Jianshixing Hezuozhe- Hu Jintao Zhuxi Fangmei yu ZhongMei Guanxi,” (From Responsible Stakeholder to Constructive Cooperator- Chairman Hu Jintao’s Visit to American and Sino-American Relations) Dangdai Shijie 6 (2006): 13. 462 Ibid., 13.
401 managing relations as their shared interests continued to expand.463 Changing circumstances were therefore leading the U.S. to change its approach to the relationship.
Similarly, Ruan Zongze of CIIS understood it as meaning that the U.S. had realized that the traditional way of facing a rising power was no longer effective. This indicated that it did not view China’s rise in the same terms that it had understood relations with the U.S.S.R. and did not believe that China would disrupt the foundations of the international system.464 While there was also a hard side to U.S. policy, this speech represented the soft side and made it clear that there was room for the two countries to work together.465
At the same time, this in no way meant that a challenge to U.S. interests would be tolerated. In contrast to the previous scholars, he saw this as somewhat contradictory and attributed it to the fact that there were differences of opinion in the U.S. regarding whether China’s rise constituted an opportunity which would allow it to play a system maintaining role in the region, or a challenge that could diminish the U.S.’s influence.466
The core meaning of the term was therefore that China had to contribute to global peace and prosperity while it simultaneously pursued its own development.467 While he raised questions concerning who China was meant to be responsible to; whether there
463 Huang Renwei, “Guoji Tixi Zhuanxing yu Zhongguo Heping Fazhan Daolu,” (The Transformation of the International System and the Road of China’s Peaceful Development) Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping Lilun Yanjiu 5 (2006): 6. 464 Ruan Zongze, Zhongguo Jueqi yu Dongya Guoji Chengxu de Zhuanxing: Gongyou Liyi de Suzao yu Kuozhan (China’s Rise and the Transformation of East Asia’s International System: The formation and Expansion of Shared Interests) (Beijing: Beijing University Chubanshe, 2007), 230. 465 Ibid., 233. 466 Ibid., 234. 467 Ni Feng, “Mianxiang Quanqiu de ZhongMei Guanxi Xin Kuangjia,” (The New Structure of Sino-American Relations Faces Toward the Entire World) Zhongguo Jingji Shibao, June 12, 2006.
402 was an international standard to be followed; and the fact that the U.S. also had to be responsible,468 his analysis indicated that he viewed the U.S. as treating China as increasingly important and focused on bringing it into the international system.
Regardless of whether American and Chinese goals were perfectly aligned, this approach was more favorable for maintaining a stable relationship and was therefore positive for China’s interests. While the U.S. and China have different views regarding how much responsibility China should shoulder on issues like security relations with the
DPRK and Iran, this is normal.469 The responsible stakeholder speech therefore reflected the important changes that took place in Sino-American relations during the period of the
George Bush administration and amounted to more than a continuation of past policy.
The evolution of the international system was understood as informing these changes. Another scholar who viewed the speech as a positive development argued that in a globalized world humanity faces numerous problems that concern many countries with the U.S. and China’s status as large countries ensuring that these problems are of particular interest to their relationship. As overcoming strategic mistrust and developing cooperation is important for addressing these issues, the responsible stakeholder concept constituted a positive development that suited China’s interests.470
Li Jie, the Deputy-Director of the MOFA’s Department of Policy Planning, concluded that the concept indicated that the U.S. had recognized that China’s rise could not be blocked and that it was moving from a policy of checking and guarding to
468 Ibid. 469 Chinese Interview #17, Beijing, China, November 28, 2011. 470 Chinese Interview #31, Beijing, China, May 15, 2012.
403 accepting China as a major power.471 Even though it was directed toward getting China to recognize the legitimacy of the international system and to follow international norms in order to influence its internal politics and development, the fact that it represented an improvement from the China threat and collapse theories meant that it was positive for its international position and influence.
It should be recognized that a year earlier in 2007 in an English language journal he had characterized it as reflecting a Western attempt to regulate China’s international behavior by demanding that it both share responsibilities and acknowledge the legitimacy of the existing international system. As a result, “the underlying assumption of the
‘responsibility theory’ was still that China might ‘irresponsibly’ use its national strength; hence whether China is a responsible country should be defined and judged by other countries.”472
At the same time, in 2008 he afforded some legitimacy to the responsible stakeholder model by stating that before a discussion about how China could fairly bear international responsibility could take place it had to be paired with respect for its rights in the political, economic, and security spheres.473 In doing so, he connected the concept to China’s existing interests with the argument that it had a responsibility to peacefully develop, as the fact that it accounted for one fifth of humanity ensured that this was
471 Li Jie, “Cong Zeren Lun Toushi Guoji Tixi Zhuangxing,” (Looking at the Transformation of the International System From the Responsibility Theory) Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 1 (2008): 40. 472 Li Jie, “The Transformation of the International System,” China International Studies (Winter 2007): 152-153. 473 Li, “Cong Zeren Lun Toushi Guoji Tixi Zhuanxing,” (Looking at the Transformation of the International System From the Responsibility Theory): 41.
404 important to global development.474 While he therefore put more emphasis on the stakeholder component than on responsibilities that the U.S. was presenting it with, he viewed it as having some contents that were positive for China’s interests and accepted the argument that it should do more.
President Hu Jintao was said to be happy with the concept, as it was not new for the U.S. to ask China to do more; the new aspect was the idea that it was a stakeholder.475
This was due to the fact that it made it clear that the U.S. was willing to treat China like a major power while also expecting it to do more in international affairs. As the U.S. also criticizes Japan for being a free rider, it was not just about China and should not be viewed as a unique criticism.476 Another scholar therefore argued that it did not matter that the U.S. was trying to make China act more responsibly; the important aspect was the fact that it was putting more effort into integrating it into the international system.477
While the Pragmatic Hegemonists and Evolutionists therefore had largely positive views of the concept, it is unsurprising that some saw China as concentrating on the stakeholder component while the U.S. focused on responsibility.478 This was attributed to the fact that China will respond negatively to finger pointing and the idea that it is the only one that needs to be responsible. It was therefore far more palatable when it was
474 Ibid., 47. 475 Chinese Interview #5, Beijing, China, October 26, 2011. 476 Chinese Interview #4, Beijing, China, October 15, 2011. 477 Chinese Interview #24, Beijing, China, February 7, 2012. 478 Chinese Interview #33, Beijing, China, July 2, 2012.
405 presented as something that both countries should do and President Hu Jintao appreciated it when President George Bush subsequently described both countries as stakeholders.479
Along with the Senior Dialogue, the responsible stakeholder speech was one of the most important factors leading to the emergence of the New Thinkers during the
George Bush administration’s second term. They viewed this speech as indicating that new thinking was taking place at a deep level regarding U.S. policy toward China and its role in international relations. In contrast to the view of the Evolutionists, this was understood as producing important changes that extended beyond the tactical level.
Da Wei and Sun Ru of CICIR’s Institute of American Studies viewed this speech and others as making it clear that U.S. policy toward China was undergoing important changes. This was attributed to a major debate that had taken place in the U.S. in 2005 regarding China’s rise and U.S. policy.480 Ultimately, they accepted that China had to play a more constructive role in international relations and needed to bear more responsibility.481 This was important for China’s own interests as they concluded that there was no guarantee that cooperation would continue to be the dominant component of future U.S. policy.
As a result, China needed to grasp the opportunity to cooperate with the U.S. on global, regional, and bilateral issues in order to reduce its suspicions regarding China’s future direction. While they did not address the issue of how much China should do and whether the expectations set out in the speech were reasonable, their argument indicated that they believed that developments in U.S. policy required a positive response.
479 Chinese Interview #27, Shanghai, China, March 15, 2012. 480 Da and Sun, “Bushi Zhengfu Duihua Zhanlue Tiaozheng Qushi,” (The Direction of Adjustments in the Bush Administration’s Strategy Toward China): 11. 481 Ibid., 12.
406 One scholar from this school also concluded that the responsible stakeholder model may have been the most important signal that the George Bush administration sent
China regarding its intentions. This was due to the fact that it provided evidence that it had recognized that China had already been brought into the international system and that the U.S. could no longer shape its political direction through economic engagement.
While he believed that China did need to take on more responsibility in international relations, the U.S. likely had overly high expectations for its role. The challenges posed by the concept notwithstanding, it therefore constituted a positive development.482
Yu Zhengliang, who at the time was affiliated with SIIS, also concluded that a major debate had taken place within the U.S. in 2005 regarding how to respond to
China’s rise with the decision ultimately being made to prepare for the best and worst possibilities at the same time.483 The fact that the U.S. was now focused on China’s responsibility and democratization as it rose was a reflection of this new thinking and showed that it was willing to accept China’s peaceful rise. As the George Bush administration believed that interests did not constitute a sufficient basis for their relationship, it was trying to get China to adopt its values, as this would provide a stronger foundation.484 These developments also created strategic space in the relationship.485 As a result, while the U.S. was still hedging against China’s rise, and its relations with Japan and India and the buildup on Guam constituted part of this
482 Chinese Interview #3, Beijing, China, October 8, 2011. 483 Yu Zhengliang, “Shilun Meiguo Duihua de Duichong Zhanlue,” (Realistic Evaluation of America’s Hedging Strategy Toward China): 2-3. 484 Ibid., 4. 485 Ibid., 4.
407 strategy,486 the fact that it was no longer promoting the “China threat theory” ensured that the responsible stakeholder concept represented a major development.487 Hedging was therefore not overly threatening, as the U.S.’s intentions had changed.
Yuan Peng, the Director of CICIR’s Institute of American Studies, argued that
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s speech constituted a watershed in terms of surpassing the emotionalism of the China threat theory. Along with recent speeches by
President George Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, it showed new thinking about the relationship and indicated that the
U.S. had moved past simplistic views of China and was now viewing its development more objectively.488 He also viewed the fact that this language was used by the Pentagon in the 2006 QDR as a sign that at a fundamental level various departments of the U.S. government were now in agreement on China policy and only differed in their focuses.489
President Hu Jintao’s statement during a subsequent visit to Washington that the two countries “are not only stakeholders, but also constructive partners” was also taken to indicate that he had accepted the logic of the concept.490 This related to the fact that the relationship now affected broader issues in international relations, something that constituted a deep historical change.491
486 Ibid., 6 487 Ibid., 8. 488 Yuan, “ZhongMei Guanxi: Xin Bianhua yu Xin Tiaozhan,” (Sino-American Relations: New Changes and New Conditions): 32. 489 Ibid. 33. 490 Yuan Peng, “Sino-American Relations: New Changes and New Challenges,” The Australian Journal of International Affairs 61, 1 (March 2007): 107; Matt Mayer, “The Trade Ties That Bind,” Beijing Review 18 (May 4, 2006). 491 Yuan, “ZhongMei Guanxi: Xin Bianhua yu Xin Tiaozhan,” (Sino-American Relations: New Changes and New Challenges): 31.
408 The U.S. had therefore transitioned from focusing on China as a problem to its rise and was working to abandon “Cold War thinking.”492 While it still wanted to change
China, the methods and strategy that it was using had evolved significantly and had become more enlightened.493 At the same time, it made too many demands on China to help the U.S. with major problems, such as Iran, Sudan, and Venezuela while ensuring that it did not pose a challenge. China therefore had to avoid the trap of taking on more responsibility than it was ready for, as doing so would hinder its rise. As a result, he advocated that China accept the positive aspects of the concept while putting aside those that did not suit its interests.494
Li Yongcheng of Beijing Foreign Studies University viewed the speech as reflecting a recent trend in U.S. policy as he concluded that it represented the fruition of an effort that had begun with the 2002 NSSUS to give China a new strategic position.
While the speech essentially said that it had to cooperate with the U.S., its fundamental meaning was positive.495 Interestingly, he raised the possibility that this development could be explained by Stephen Walt’s thesis in Origins of Alliances that states balance against threats, not power, and Alexander Wendt’s argument that interests and what states do with their power are shaped by ideas.496 As it was understandable that the U.S. would want China to act as a responsible stakeholder instead of as a rebel or a challenger, this fit with the overall direction of the relationship toward establishing positive cooperation.497
492 Ibid., 31 and 35. 493 Yuan Peng, “Sino-American Relations: New Changes and New Challenges,” 108. 494 Ibid., 109. 495 Li, Yitu de Luoji: Meiguo yu Zhongguo de Anquan Ruan Huanjing (The Logic of Intentions: America and China’s Soft Security Environment), 161. 496 Ibid., 164. 497 Ibid., 193.
409 This development was taken to reflect the broader changes that were taking place in the relationship. As a result, one scholar concluded that the goals that motivated the
U.S. to put this concept forward also led China to promote the peaceful rise concept.498
New thinking in both the U.S. and China therefore took place in response to the changes that the relationship was experiencing.
As a result, the responsible stakeholder speech reflected both the important changes that had been taking place in bilateral relations and the changes in U.S. strategy toward China that had resulted from its reconsideration of their relationship. As it was understandable that the U.S. was hedging against undesired contingencies and working to defend its interests, the demands that it placed on China did not detract from the significance of this change.
Dissenting Voices
While all of this can be read as implying that the U.S. was perceived to have a coherent policy toward China that was based on an articulated strategy, like Pan Rui of
Fudan University’s Center for American Studies whose views were outlined earlier, some scholars did not believe this to be the case. In 2002, Wang Jianwei of the University of
Macao concluded that different departments of the U.S. government were pursuing distinct approaches to relations with China and that President George Bush did not appear to see a need for consistency across the government. Even though allowing individual departments to pursue their own interests could be characterized as a policy, he did not see any evidence of a strategy and attributed improvements in the relationship to the fact
498 Chinese Interview #9, Beijing, China, November 16, 2011.
410 that China had made a concerted effort to show that it was not going to challenge the U.S. in the Asia Pacific.499
Similarly, Jia Qingguo of Beijing University argued that during its first term two inconsistent voices had emerged in the U.S. China policy. While he believed that from
9/11 onwards those in favor of a policy based on the three Cs had been dominant, those who advocated for restraining and containing China were still present. As a result, he concluded that there was “continued contradiction and inconsistency in the conceptualization and implementation of policy.”500 He attributed these differences of opinion to the fact that some policymakers saw the relationship in zero sum terms while others believed that it was positive sum.
Others questioned whether the U.S. has a long-term plan. Tang Hao of South
China Normal University also argued that there was a contradiction between both describing China as a strategic competitor, and working to encircle it, and as a strategic partner, with the goal of benefitting from its economic growth.501 Highlighting the role that different interest groups play in U.S. policy, he concluded that it was possible that this meant that it did not have a clear, implementable strategy.502
Shi Yinhong of Renmin University argued that adjusting policy is difficult and the available policy alternatives are all problematic. On the one hand, the U.S. now lacked
499 Wang Jianwei, “Bushi Zhengfu Duihua Zhengce de Yanbian he ZhongMei Guanxi de Xin Xianshi,” (Evolution in the Bush Administration’s Policy Toward China and New Conditions in Sino-American Relations): 43. 500 Jia, “One Administration, Two Voices: U.S. China Policy During Bush’s First Term,” 24. 501 Tang Hao, “Jingzheng yu Yizhi- Liyi Jituan Zhengzhi Yingxiang xia de Meiguo Baquan Luoji Jiexi,” (Competition and Will: Analysis of the Logic of American Hegemony Under the Influence of Interest Group Politics) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2010), 325. 502 Ibid., 327.
411 the capacity necessary for containment and pursuing it would come at a significant economic and strategic price. On the other hand, embracing China would lead to a major increase in its power that would render relations more challenging for U.S. interests.
Ultimately, he viewed the administration’s policy as amounting to managing decline during the 21st century.503
Another scholar who generally had a positive view of the George Bush administration’s policy stated that when they had asked Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice what the U.S. expected China to do she highlighted the U.S.’s long-standing interests in Asia without directly responding. He therefore concluded that the U.S. had not fully thought out its policy toward China.504 As a result, even though this scholar generally had a positive view of hedging and the administration’s policy toward China, this led him to reduce his expectations.
Summary
As this chapter has made clear, during the period of the George Bush administration an active debate took place among Chinese experts on international relations and U.S. foreign policy regarding whether signals mattered, U.S. intentions and whether they were changing, which aspects of its policy were the most important, and the policy that China should adopt in response. By the end of the George Bush administration, Chinese scholars were no closer to reaching a consensus on these issues.
In fact, with the emergence of the New Thinkers, the debate became more diverse.
503 Shi Yinhong, “Meiguo Quanshi Duihua Zhanlue he ZhongMei Guanxi,” (America’s Comprehensive Strategy Toward China and Sino-American Relations) in Meiguo Wenti Yanjiu 6 (Research on U.S. Issues, Volume 6) (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2007), 98. 504 Chinese Interview #22, Beijing, China, January 17, 2012.
412 Scholars participating in this debate can be divided into four schools of thought: the
Malign Containers, the Pragmatic Hegemonists, the Evolutionists, and the New Thinkers.
Malign Containers
The Malign Containers viewed U.S. policy as highly stable, impervious to new thinking, hostile to China’s interests, and geared toward containment. Seemingly cooperative aspects of U.S. policy, such as mil-mil relations, the MMCA, the responsible stakeholder speech, and the Senior Dialogue, were therefore discounted as insignificant or misleading. At the same time, far more importance was assigned to competitive aspects of policy, such as missile defense, relations with friends and allies, the GPR, and the protection extended to Taiwan.
While no research institution or university perfectly correlate with one school of thought, scholars from CIISS, CIIS, and institutions affiliated with the PLA have published analyses that fits with this school.
As a result, China should respond to the U.S.’s containment policy by building up its own capabilities in order to prepare for a future confrontation, which is likely inevitable. The fact that the U.S. bears no goodwill toward China also means that it should only cooperate with it in narrow areas where doing so will serve its own interests.
Needless to say, it should also ensure that it is not fooled into thinking that developments like the responsible stakeholder speech and the Senior Dialogue indicate that any changes have taken place in U.S. policy. As U.S. attempts to push China to play a larger international role are therefore self-serving and harmful to China’s interests, they should
413 be resisted in order to ensure that it does not fall into the trap of taking on more responsibility than it can bear.
Pragmatic Hegemonists
The Pragmatic Hegemonists viewed the U.S.’s approach to bilateral relations as flexible and focused on the pursuit of its own interests. As a result, adjustments to its policy in a competitive or cooperative direction were dictated by current circumstances.
Cooperative developments therefore did not indicate that new thinking was taking place, as U.S. policy would shift back to a focus on competition if doing so would serve its interests. Cooperative aspects of U.S. policy like mil-mil relations, the MMCA, the responsible stakeholder speech, the Senior Dialogue, and attempts to maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait therefore did not indicate that any long-term changes were taking place.
Nor did competitive developments indicate that the U.S. was attempting to contain China.
As a result, individual developments in U.S. policy signaled limited information regarding the long-term direction of U.S. policy.
SASS and CICIR research institutions other than the Academy for American
Studies are most closely affiliated with this school of thought.
China should therefore respond by building up its own capabilities in order to prepare for the possibility of a future conflict. At the same time, since such a confrontation is not inevitable, it should also work to prevent the relationship from becoming completely dominated by competition. This could be accomplished by responding positively, if cautiously, to cooperative components of U.S. policy that will serve its own interests while recognizing that there is no guarantee that these aspects of
414 policy will remain dominant. It should also work to counteract competitive aspects of
U.S. policy without responding so strongly that they become more dominant. This amounts to an attempt to manage relations, not to change them.
The Evolutionists
In contrast, the Evolutionists viewed the U.S. as having undergone new thinking that had produced changes at the tactical level. Even though this did not indicate that its fundamental interests in relations with China had changed, its approach to pursuing them had. This was supported by developments in mil-mil relations and the MMCA, as well as the responsible stakeholder speech, the formation of the Senior Dialogue, and attempts to maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait. New instances of cooperation in bilateral relations therefore revealed more about U.S. intentions than long-standing sources of friction, such as missile defense, relations with allies, and the issue of the Taiwan Strait. They were also more likely to recognize that China was not the only focus of missile defense and its regional alliances. Even though fundamental changes had not taken place, signals sent by developments in U.S. policy were significant and there was nothing predetermined about the direction of the relationship.
CASS’s Institute of American Studies is most closely associated with this school of thought.
As with the Pragmatic Hegemonists, the Evolutionists would advocate building up China’s capabilities while simultaneously enhancing cooperative aspects of relations.
In contrast, as the Evolutionists view U.S. policy as having undergone changes at the tactical level, attempts to cooperate by China should be directed toward attaining further
415 incremental improvements in the relationship, not merely toward managing a relationship that is likely to become more competitive or cooperative depending on current circumstances. The fact that the competitive aspects of policy are not solely directed toward China also ensures that there is less of an immediate need to hedge against undesired contingencies in relations with the U.S.
The Evolutionists would therefore support a policy that placed less weight on preparing for worst-case possibilities with a larger focus on working toward the most desirable outcomes and the development of cooperation. At the same time, while they would support using mil-mil, the MMCA, and the Senior Dialogue for enhancing the relationship, this would be directed toward enhancing the utility of cooperation as a tactic with which to secure China’s interests, not as an attempt to establish a new strategic basis for relations.
New Thinkers
The New Thinkers went further by concluding that the U.S.’s understanding of its interests in relations with China and how it could best secure them had changed.
Changes in U.S. policy therefore extended up to the strategic level. While the U.S. remained committed to defending its interests and position in the international system, this new thinking rendered its actions less threatening. As a result, uncooperative aspects of U.S. policy, such as missile defense, relations with allies, and the GPR were understood as directed toward undesired contingencies, not as threats to China. Nor were these aspects of U.S. policy understood as solely directed toward China, as the U.S. faced multiple challenges in the region.
416 Consequently, changes amounted to more than tactical adjustments. While developments in mil-mil relations were interpreted favorably, the responsible stakeholder speech and Senior Dialogue were of particular importance to the emergence of this school of thought. Understanding the signals sent by the U.S. was therefore important, as its priorities regarding what it wanted to do with its power had changed over time.
CICIR’s Institute of American Studies is most closely associated with this school of thought. While some scholars from Fudan University and CFAU also fit with it, the diversity of analysis presented by scholars from these universities prevent them from being affiliated with any one school of thought. For example, scholars from Fudan are also associated with the Malign Containers and the Evolutionists.
The New Thinkers would advocate for a policy that was directed toward building a foundation of trust and cooperation through dialogue and exchanges in order to further enhance the change in bilateral relations that had begun to take place at the strategic level. While it is recognized that it is necessary to prepare for undesirable worst-case scenarios, focusing on the development of trust and cooperation will reduce both the need to prepare for these possibilities and enhance the ability of the U.S. and China to cooperate in the pursuit of their interests. Any assumption that the bilateral relationship had a predetermined endpoint, or that cooperation was impossible would therefore be discounted, as a cooperative response to the positive aspects of U.S. policy would lead to the further development of mutual trust and understanding.
417 Chapter 7
Conclusions
This dissertation has highlighted the fact that Sino-American security relations have continued to become increasingly complex as China plays a progressively important role in international affairs. This has produced significant tactical developments in terms of how the U.S. pursues its interests in security relations with China that have also involved its relations with friends and allies in the Asia Pacific. However, this does not indicate that the fundamental goals of U.S. policy have changed. Instead, they highlight the fact that the manner in which the U.S. pursues its interests has changed as the bilateral security relationship has evolved and China has become more important to its interests.
China’s strengthening position in international relations also ensures that its perceptions of the U.S.’s intentions toward it and the signals sent by its policy are also of increasing importance. As a result, this dissertation contributes to the empirical literature on Chinese perceptions of its international security environment and the theoretical literature on strategic signaling and perception. It provides a detailed examination of the
George Bush administration’s evolving security policy toward China under changing conditions during the period of 2001 to 2009, the logic of hedging, the role that friends and allies in the region played in its strategy, and how Chinese security elites perceived both the cooperative and competitive components of U.S. policy. This last objective was accomplished by outlining the four schools of thought that existed in China regarding the nature of U.S. policy, its intentions, whether they were evolving, and how China should respond.
418 Research involved: an evaluation of all Chinese academic articles and scholarly books on U.S. security policy and Sino-American security relations from the period under study; interviews with American, Japanese, Australian, Singaporean, and Indian officials and academics; and interviews with 36 Chinese experts on international security and U.S. foreign policy. This provided a comprehensive picture of the IV (U.S. policy), intervening variable (the role of regional friends and allies), and DV (Chinese perceptions).
The broad questions informing this dissertation include: Can states meaningfully signal their strategic intentions and policies to each other? If so, what determines whether recipients correctly identify signals and whether or not they perceive their meanings accurately? Are changes in signals over time appreciated, or do past perceptions produce misinterpretation? How are signals sent indirectly through relations with allies perceived?
More specifically, this dissertation has addressed the following empirical puzzle:
How did Chinese security elites perceive the signals sent by the twin strategic components of the George W. Bush administration’s hedging strategy toward China, engagement and balancing, and changes in U.S. policy toward China during the period of
2001-2009?
In order to answer this question, this dissertation presents a detailed account of how the four schools of thought perceived U.S. intentions and signals in multiple issue areas across the period of 2001 to 2009. Answering this question also provided a basis for an evaluation of the explanatory power of the accounts of signaling and perception posed by realism, rationalism, and cognitive psychological theories. This chapter presents the
419 dissertation’s findings regarding these questions, reflects on the state of the Chinese debate, and outlines areas for further research that are suggested by these findings.
Findings
This section outlines the intentions of U.S. policy toward China during the period under study and the goals that informed it; the role that friends and allies were willing to play in U.S. policy and their perceptions of it; and the perceptions that Chinese foreign policy experts from the four schools of thought had of U.S. policy.
U.S. Policy
Chapter four outlines the dissertation’s IV, U.S. security policy toward China.
This dissertation finds that even though there was no fundamental change in U.S. security policy toward China its approach to security relations evolved significantly during the period of the George Bush administration. After initially adopting a comparatively hard line, the administration gradually adjusted toward a more balanced approach as China’s expanding role in international relations ensured that its influence on both U.S. interests and regional and international security challenges grew. As a result, over time a hedging policy that simultaneously prepared for best and worst-case outcomes in bilateral relations and did not assume that the future of the relationship was predetermined took form.
The cooperative aspects of U.S. policy, such as mil-mil relations, the MMCA, the responsible stakeholder speech, and the Senior Dialogue, worked toward the best possible outcome in relations by enhancing communication and understanding through dialogues
420 and exchanges. While China is not the only factor that shapes U.S. security policy toward
Asia, the competitive aspects of U.S. policy, such as missile defense, relations with friends and allies in the region, the TSD, the Quad, and the GPR, simultaneously worked to shape China’s security environment, to dissuade it from posing a challenge, and prepared for such a challenge if one were to take place.
Together these two components amounted to a hedging policy that could be adjusted as circumstances dictated, thereby allowing the U.S. to avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy in which treating China like an enemy would lead it to become one. The fact that the U.S. maintained a large advantage in power capabilities also ensured that at present the competitive aspects of policy remained geared toward contingencies and could not be characterized as actively threatening China. The likely outcome if relations were to become more confrontational that was highlighted by the EP3 incident and the change in U.S. priorities that resulted from 9/11 also contributed to the development of this approach.
As the offensive realist hypothesis affords minimal importance to current policy in shaping how states perceive each other’s intentions, as these intentions are expected to shift in line with power capabilities, U.S. policy would not be expected to shape Chinese security elites’ perceptions. In contrast, the defensive realist/rationalist hypothesis would expect U.S. policy to be perceived accurately and for analysts to update their perceptions when costly signals like missile defense, relations with friends and allies, and the GPR revealed new information. It therefore expects Chinese security elites to reach consensus regarding U.S. intentions. Lastly, the cognitive psychological hypothesis expects preexisting perceptions to shape how U.S. policy was perceived and to determine which
421 signals were assigned importance and which were not. As a result, it does not expect
Chinese security elites to reach consensus regarding U.S. intentions.
Friends and Allies
Chapter five outlines the dissertation’s intervening variable, the role that friends and allies in the Asia Pacific played in U.S. policy toward China. As previously mentioned, one of the methods that the George Bush administration used to pursue the balancing component of hedging was the upgrading of relations with friends and allies in the Asia Pacific region, such as Japan, Australia, Singapore, and India. Attempting to do so had utility for both shaping China’s security environment as its power capabilities expanded and for ensuring that the U.S. would be prepared to respond if a challenge to its interests ultimately did take place. However, as these relationships were also directed toward other security challenges and were not used to directly challenge China’s interests, this cannot be characterized as amounting to containment.
It was found that these states were also hedging as they worked to balance their ties with the U.S. and China. As they sought to benefit from relations with both the U.S. and China for as long as possible, with the partial exception of Japan, none of them wanted to be viewed as closely aligning with U.S. security policy toward China. Instead, they attempted to enhance their relations with both in order to maximize their gains from each as well as their room to maneuver between them so as to avoid the appearance that they were taking a side. Even though security relations with the U.S. allowed them to feel more sanguine about China’s expanding role in the region, it was believed that this
422 relationship should only be used to actively balance against China in the instance of a worst-case scenario.
As with U.S. policy, the primary importance that offensive realism assigns to the distribution of power in shaping how states perceive each other’s intentions ensures that the role of the friends and allies are not expected to shape Chinese security elites’ perceptions. In contrast, the defensive realist/rationalist hypothesis expects costly signals like adjustments in relations with security partners to shape how states perceive each other’s intentions. As a result, it expects U.S. relations with friends and allies to be perceived accurately and for a consensus to emerge among Chinese security elites regarding U.S. intentions. Lastly, the cognitive psychological hypothesis expects preexisting perceptions to shape how these security partnerships are perceived and whether they are viewed as threatening or understandable. Due to the range of preexisting perceptions that are held by Chinese security elites, no consensus is expected to emerge regarding the intentions informing U.S. relations with friends and allies.
Chinese Perceptions
Chapter six evaluates the dissertation’s DV, Chinese security elites’ perceptions of the George Bush administration’s security policy toward China. It was found that over time these perceptions have continued to become more sophisticated and diverse.
However, while Chinese understandings of U.S. security policy have become more accurate and less colored by ideological biases, no consensus has emerged regarding the goals informing U.S. policy toward China, or which aspects of its policy are the most important. Instead, an active debate has continued regarding: U.S. goals; whether or not
423 they are changing; which aspects of U.S. policy are the most revealing; and the overall direction of the bilateral relationship.
Scholars participating in this debate can be divided into four distinct schools of thought: the Malign Containers; the Pragmatic Hegemonists; the Evolutionists; and the emerging New Thinkers. Each of these schools maintains a distinct perspective on U.S. intentions, whether signals matter, which ones were the most important, the degree to which U.S. policy was threatening or understandable, and therefore the security policy that China should adopt toward the U.S.
The Malign Containers concluded that no major changes had taken place in U.S. security policy and that it was highly threatening toward China’s interests, as it continued to be directed toward containment. As a result, seemingly cooperative developments in
U.S. policy were disregarded as insignificant while the competitive aspects of its policy were viewed as revealing its true intentions. As bilateral relations were understood to be based solely on power capabilities and the U.S. was viewed as hostile toward China, no hope was held out that the nature of relations could change. This belief that the U.S.’s intentions were static also ensured that signals were discounted as unimportant and therefore did not contribute to new understandings of U.S. policy.
The Pragmatic Hegemonists concluded that the U.S. was continuing to pursue its interests and to defend its hegemonic position in international relations in a practical fashion. These goals were believed to provide a stable foundation on which U.S. policy toward China was based. Any adjustments to policy that did take place were therefore motivated by the desire to attain stable goals under changing circumstances. As a result, competitive developments were not viewed as indicating that the U.S. wanted to contain
424 China; nor were positive developments interpreted as indicating that U.S. policy was becoming more cooperative. The fact that U.S. goals and fundamental policy were believed to be highly stable also ensured that signals were afforded limited importance.
The Evolutionists concluded that significant changes in U.S. policy and its view of bilateral relations were taking place. While it was concluded that the U.S.’s understanding of its interests in bilateral relations and overall strategy had not changed, its ideas about how it could best secure these interests had. This produced important changes to its policy at the tactical level as it responded to China’s increasingly position in world affairs. Even though there were still sources of friction in the relationship, these positive developments were regarded as indicating that the U.S. was making significant adjustments. The fact that signals from the U.S. revealed that tactical changes and new thinking were taking place also ensured that they were afforded importance.
The New Thinkers went further by concluding that these changes extended to the strategic level. As a result, they indicated that U.S. intentions were open to change and that over time it had reached new conclusions regarding its interests in bilateral relations and how it should pursue them. While they still viewed the U.S. as committed to defending its interests and leadership position, and by no means were positive developments taken to mean that the relationship was certain to advance in a positive direction, new thinking by the U.S. rendered its actions less threatening. As a result, uncooperative aspects of U.S. policy were understood as directed toward undesired contingencies, not as threatening China. Signals were also viewed as highly significant, as they revealed information about U.S. thinking and strategy.
425 As there was no evidence that the size of the first two schools of thought were growing, the third school of thought held a comparatively positive view of U.S. policy, and the fourth school of thought coalesced into a new perspective on U.S. intentions and behavior, it can be concluded that Chinese understandings of the U.S. incrementally improved during the period under study.
This growing plurality of views also bodes well for the ongoing Chinese debate regarding bilateral security relations among the influential elite. Time spent at U.S. and other international universities and think tanks during graduate studies and as visiting scholars can also be expected to continue to contribute to the sophistication of this debate.
However, this does not imply that any sort of linear trend can be expected moving forward, as China’s political system and at times unpredictable political climate also impose some limitations on the opinions that security elites will be willing to express.
For example, during fieldwork in 2011 to 2012, the author found that the release of the names of Chinese scholars who had met with American officials that resulted from
Wikileaks’ disclosure of U.S. government cables and the upcoming political transition that began to take place in late 2012 led multiple security elites to decline requests for research interviews, or to ultimately politely cancel after having initially agreed.
Hypotheses
This dissertation evaluated the explanatory power of three accounts of signaling and perception: offensive realism, defensive realism/rationalism, and cognitive psychological explanations.
426 H1 (Null Hypothesis, Offensive Realism) If Chinese analysts believe that power
capabilities alone determine U.S. policy and shape intentions, they will not
perceive signals as important and therefore will not dedicate significant resources
to interpreting them.
H2 (Defensive Realism/Rationalism) As the intended meanings of signals are
clear and are not open to multiple interpretations, over time a consensus will
emerge among Chinese analysts regarding their meaning.
H3 (Cognitive Psychological) As Chinese analysts’ existing perceptions and
cognitive shortcuts shape how signals are perceived, security elites who are
predisposed toward seeing U.S. policy as stable will discount new information
while those who are predisposed to appreciate changes will update their
understandings of U.S. intentions.
Argument
This dissertation argues that H1 is unable to explain Chinese perceptions of the
George Bush administration’s policy, as an examination of comparative power capabilities cannot fully account for how Chinese analysts perceived signals from the
U.S. As during the period of 2001-2009 the U.S. possessed the capabilities necessary to pursue the policy of its choice, this explanation is indeterminate. As there were also areas of both shared and conflicting interests and cooperation and discord in bilateral security relations, it is not immediately clear which actions the balance of power would dictate that the U.S. pursue.
427 Furthermore, if an evaluation of power capabilities provided an adequate explanation of how U.S. intentions were perceived, than these perceptions would be expected to change as the bilateral balance of power shifted, thereby producing a new consensus among Chinese security elites. Instead, multiple schools of thought with distinct views of U.S. intentions continued to exist and the domestic debate became more diverse. Published materials and interviews also reveal that the signals that the U.S. was sending were held to be important source of information regarding its intentions and the goals of its policy. They also indicate that significant amounts of resources were dedicated to analyzing them. This implies that U.S. intentions were viewed as complex and open to change.
H2 fails to fully account for the fact that the need to simultaneously evaluate multiple signals at the same time renders costly signaling problematic. Nor does it provide insights into how it will be determined which signals are the most important, or whether they will be understood as contributing to a larger signal. As multiple signals are simultaneously being sent, analysts who are predisposed toward a particular view of U.S. intentions can discount signals that contradict their view while attributing more importance to signals that support their preexisting perceptions. As a result, no consensus emerged regarding the meaning of costly signals like missile defense, relations with friends and allies, and the GPR. There is also evidence that some non-costly signals, such as the diplomatic visits to Beijing by U.S. officials after the EP3 crisis, the responsible stakeholder speech, and the Senior Dialogue, were afforded considerable significance by two of the schools of thought. This undercuts the argument made by rationalists that only
428 costly signals will be afforded importance while cheap talk will be discarded as unimportant.
Ultimately, instead of a consensus on which U.S. signals were the most authoritative and what they indicated emerging, this has ensured that multiple schools of thought that have reached distinct conclusions regarding the meaning of U.S. actions and which ones are the most significant have continued to exist. This indicates that it cannot be assumed that costly signals will be interpreted correctly.
When compared to ten or twenty years ago, it has been found that the biases described by the cognitive psychological literature are now less prevalent. Over time the
Evolutionists and New Thinkers have also developed more nuanced and accurate understandings of American politics and foreign policy. Changes in the bilateral balance of power and China’s increasing importance in international security also shaped the context for developments in U.S. policy toward China and how some Chinese security elites viewed the relationship.
The significance of these developments notwithstanding, H3 still provides the most complete explanation of how Chinese security elites perceived U.S. policy. This is due to the fact that it can explain why no consensus emerged regarding U.S. intentions and why the schools of thought reached different conclusions regarding which signals were the most important. It also accounts for why the two schools of thought that are predisposed toward seeing U.S. policy as stable discounted the importance of signals that indicated that it was evolving while the two schools of thought that are predisposed toward appreciating the significance of new developments updated their views. Variation
429 in the perceptions of the different schools of thought and continuity within them is therefore best accounted for with reference to cognitive psychological factors.
Areas for Further Research
No study can analyze all relevant issues and it is necessary to focus on a limited period of time and a comparatively narrow question. However, this dissertation’s findings highlight numerous areas where further research will be of value to both our empirical knowledge of the ongoing evolution of Sino-American security relations and theoretical scholarship on international security.
As Sino-American relations and Chinese foreign policy have continued to develop since the conclusion of the George Bush administration, one of the most obvious areas for further research concerns how the Chinese debate has evolved as the financial crisis, the Barack Obama administration’s statement that it was rebalancing toward the Asia
Pacific, and China’s response to the U.S.’s stance on territorial conflicts in the South
China Sea have unfolded. Research evaluating whether the third and fourth schools of thought have continued to develop during this period and after the ascension of President
Xi Jinping and China’s fifth generation of leaders would be particularly valuable.
While access to data on Chinese foreign policy decision making poses a perennial challenge, an in-depth analysis of the signals that China was sending the George Bush administration in response to U.S. actions would also provide a richer understanding of how American policy was perceived and which school of thought was most in line with
430 China’s response.1 This would also permit an evaluation of how China responded to costly signals by the U.S. and further insights into the utility of the rationalist approach to describing how states understand each other and interact. Furthermore, it would also permit an evaluation of whether there was a feedback loop in which the response to signals that were sent earlier influenced the type of signals that were sent later.
In order to produce a focused study, this dissertation has concentrated on the perceptions of one group, Chinese security specialists who form the influential elite.
However, as Wang Jianwei’s study on Chinese perceptions during the post-Cold War period has indicated,2 analysis of the perceptions of other groups in Chinese society, such as diplomats and businesspeople, can also provide valuable insights. Alastair Johnston’s analysis of public opinion among members of Beijing’s middle class provides another example of the sort of additional research on Chinese perceptions of the George Bush and
Barack Obama administration’s security policy toward China that would contribute to a broader understanding of perceptions of U.S. policy and China’s security environment.3
If Chinese society continues to become more pluralistic and its influence on the Chinese government continues to grow, these perceptions are also likely to play a more important role in shaping China’s security policy.
1 For one example of recent research of this kind, see Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Signaling and Military Provocation in Chinese National Security Strategy: A Closer Look at the Impeccable Incident,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, 2 (2011). For a recent example of research focused on historical incidents that also briefly examines Chinese signaling on Taiwan in 2003-2004, see Paul Godwin and Alice Miller, “China’s Forebearance Has Limits: Chinese Threat and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a Sino- American Conflict,” Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies, China Strategic Perspectives #6 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, April 2013). 2 Wang, Limited Adversaries. 3 Alastair Johnston, “Chinese Middle Class Attitudes Towards International Affairs: Nascent Liberalization,” The China Quarterly 179 (September 2004).
431 Emerging issues in bilateral relations also provide additional opportunities to evaluate how Chinese security elites understand U.S. policy and the direction of the relationship. These include: cyber security; the weaponization of space; and bilateral interactions during the Six Party Talks, an issue complex enough to merit a dissertation of its own. Research in these areas would contribute to a richer understanding of Chinese perceptions of U.S. security intentions.
The fact that the first two issues have emerged comparatively recently also raises the possibility that the outline of the debate has yet to be established and that perceptions may therefore be more diverse and subject to change. As the latter issue concerns an area where China came to play a more proactive role in regional security issues and the U.S. and China attained a degree of cooperation, it also presents a significant case where their interactions and the signals that they were sending each other may have shaped perceptions about how willing the other was to cooperate in areas of shared interest.
An additional area of research that is suggested by this dissertation concerns the relationship between how Chinese security elites perceive China’s changing position in international relations, whether they believe that its power capabilities are expanding viz- a-viz the U.S., and how their views on these issues correlate with the school of thought with which their broader perceptions fit.
For example, it would be worth evaluating whether Chinese security elites who believe that China is, or is not, becoming comparatively powerful are more likely to fit into a particular school of thought regarding the U.S.’s intentions. This would provide insights into whether the belief that China is, or is not, becoming more powerful has led
432 them to conclude that the U.S. feels threatened and is therefore responding hostilely, or whether this is leading the U.S. to attempt to accommodate China.
While important research has already been conducted on China’s relations with the U.S.’s friends and allies in the region and the role in East Asian institution building,4 valuable further analysis can be conducted on the relationship between China’s policy on these issues and its perceptions of the U.S.’s security intentions. This would provide insights into the degree to which U.S. policy has succeeded in its attempt to shape the choices of a rising China, or whether it is likely to cause it to be more hostile toward the
U.S. if in the future it becomes comparatively strong. This will also provide insights into whether this constellation of security relationships can be best characterized as positive or zero-sum.
Moving beyond Sino-American security relations, an additional area for further research concerns China’s relations with other major powers like Europe and Russia. It would be valuable to evaluate whether scholars from each of the schools also have similar views on these issues, or whether there is less of a correlation between how they perceive U.S. security policy, and the role that its friends and allies in the region play in it, and how they perceive security relations with other states.
4 For example, John Garver and Wang Feiling, “China’s Anti-Encirclement Struggle,” Asian Security 6, 3 (2010); Michael Glosny, “Heading Toward a Win-Win Future?: Recent Developments in China’s Policy Towards Southeast Asia,” Asian Security 2, 1 (2006); Zhao Suisheng, Ed., China and East Asian Regionalism: Economic and Security Cooperation and Institution-Building (London: Routledge, 2012).
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478 Appendix
U.S. Interview Subjects
Daniel Blumenthal, Senior Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, Department of
Defense, 2001-2004 and Commissioner on the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, 2006-2012.
Victor Cha, Director for Asian Affairs, NSC 2004-2007 and Deputy head of delegation at
the Six Party Talks in Beijing.
John Corbett, China Desk Officer, Department of Defense.
Evan Feigenbaum, Member of the Secretary of State’s policy planning staff with
principal responsibility for East Asia and the Pacific, 2001-2006 and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, 2006-2009.
David Finkelstein, Vic President and Director, China Studies at the Center for Naval
Analyses.
Aaron Friedberg, Deputy National Security Advisor and Director of Policy Planning,
Office of the Vice President, 2003-2004.
Michael Green, NSC Staff member 2001-2005 and Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Asian Affairs, NSC, 2004-2005.
Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2005-
2009.
James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2001-2005.
Evans Revere, Director for Japanese Affairs, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2005.
479 Randall Schriver, Chief of Staff and Senior Policy Advisor to Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage, 2001-2003 and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2003-2005.
Mark Stokes, Country Director for the PRC and Taiwan, International Security Affairs
Division, Department of Defense.
Dennis Wilder, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asian Affairs,
NSC.
Stephen Yates, Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs,
2001-2005.
480