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Operation Aleppo P Pp Opppperation Aleppo Back Ground Material Related to Chapters 11 & 12 First phase of Battle of Aleppo To Buy Operation Aleppo in paperback or Kindle e-book, visit: www.amazon.co.uk or www.amazon.com (then search Operation Aleppo by Tim Ripley) Battle of Aleppo – Operation Dawn of Victory 24 SepteSeptebetomber to 17 No oebevember 200616 Briefing by Tim Ripley, Part 1 updated 12th January 2017 SOURCES This briefing is based in analysis of multiple sources, including: 1. Analysis of news media still and video imagery 2. Analysis of social media still and video imagery from Syria, Turkey and Russia. Syrian soldiers and militia fighters, Shia militia fighters and Russian servicemen incessantly post on‐line photos of themselves and their fiends. 3. Syrian and Russian ggpovernment news products 4. Google Earth and other commercial satellite imagery By Geo‐location and comparing the above, it is possible to gain a reasonable “ground truth” about © [email protected] what is happening on the ground. NOTE: All the images in this brief Mob +44 (0) 7711 806905 are all sourced from “raw” video imagery from Syria Future Syrian and Allied Operations Against Aleppo, Nov‐Dec 2016 Operation Dawn of Victory Battle Plan Note: Syrian and allied forces have no intention of launching a direct or all out Russian Involvement frontal assault on the heavily populated urban area of eastern Aleppo. Future Russian involvement 3rd Phase: continue push rebels back away from western outer siege lines (mid November) in the final phases will be: 4th Phase: seize rural, industrial and unpopulated areas along the eastern edge of Aleppo city, to pen 1. Airpower and surveillance on the outer the remaining population and rebel fighters tightly into urban areas withwithoutout means to grow food or siege lines to prevent any This photo take in the water sources. (late November) rebel attempt to lift siege office of the Syrian 5th Phase: break up rebel held eastern Aleppo enclave into a series of smaller pockets, which are of Aleppo, hitting targets commander in Aleppo, considered more then likely to surrender and volunteer for “evacuation”. (December) in south west Aleppo and SRG Major‐General Zaid AIM to clear out eastern Aleppo of rebel fighters by the end of December Idlib provinces. Saleh, on 25th Oct 16 2. Psychological warfare to intimidate population show expected rebel and fighters in eastern offensive and the future Aleppo to surrender and Syrian offensive evacuate their enclave operations 3. Demonstration of force Source: @Souria4Syrians with prestige weapons 5th Phase (Kalibr cruise missiles and Operations carrier aviation) to create “intimidation” effect. Russian airpower and strategic weapons have little 4th Phase utility in close quarter street fighting so will not be Operations employed in fighting inside rd eastern Aleppo 3 Phase Operations Rebel Forces in and around Aleppo © [email protected] City, Sept‐Nov 2016 Train in Northern Balance of Forces in Aleppo City: • 8,000 fighters (including 1,000 from Nusra Syria bringing Front) inside Aleppo city (Source: UN) Government Aug to Nov 2016 • 50,000 fighters in Idlib region, to the south reinforcements and west of Aleppo. Some 3‐4,000 of these to Aleppo 7 Aug are trained and equipped for offensive 16, Source: Syrian Government and Allies, July 2016 combat operations @IvanSidorenko Republican Guard and Special Forces, 2,000+ troops • The Russian MOD claimed there were 6,000 1 Syrian Arab Army (SAA) Regulars 2, 500+ troops. Mostly in command, artillery, logistic rebel fighters operating around the western and air force units edge of Aleppo’s outer siege lines Militia: 10,000? fighters (civilian mobilised to operate on shift system to man front line defences) Allies: 8,000? fighters (majority deployed to south of Aleppo city, expect for 1,000 Palest inia n fig hte rs w ho a re based in t he no rt h o f Aleppo ci ty) Syrian Government Reinforcements – 5-6,000 additional troops arrive from Aug Low loaders bring to Oct 2016 Syrian Republican Early August 2016 Guard T‐72s to • Elements 15th Special Forces Division Aleppo, 29th Sept 16 • Military Intelligence Shield Forces - Lions Den Battalion source: Late August 2016 @IvanSidorenko1 • 800th Republican Guard (RG) Regiment from Damascus Late September 2016 • Elements 102nd & 106th RG Brigades & 4th Mechanised Division (identified as moving from Damascus 23/9/16, Column of Syrian with 1,750 troops) Army reinforcements • Units of Tiger Force and Desert Hawks to Kweires Front from Hama arrive in Aleppo 21 Late October • Brigade sized armour equipped unit, local media report 1,500 troops arrive in Aleppo from Damascus and Tartus Oct 16, including 2S1 • Desert Hawks arrive in Aleppo Province 122mm SP gun and • Republican Guard “Shudada Kafr Saghira” Brigade (arrive late Oct) BMP fighting vehicles These units – expect for the Tiger Force and Desert Hawks - were all released from the Damascus region as a result of Source: Arab source the surrender of rebel enclaves around the capital. Take Away: • Syrian Government has more troops capable of “offensive” operations in the Aleppo region than the rebels, by a ratio of 3 or 4:1 Overall commander of wider Aleppo theatre of operations, ALEPPO REGION – Major General Qassem Soleimani (who is also the Pro‐Government Chain of Iranian Revolutionary Guards ) • ) Corps Quds Force commander Command in south Aleppo, 6 Sept 16. Source: Arab Source Syrian/Russian/Iranian/Hizbullah “CentCom” Joint Operations Room or Command Post located at Al Safirah Military Base, south east of Aleppo city Commander Russian Military Contingent in Syria, Lt Gen Aldlexander Zhlhuravlev, Republican Guard gives medals to Palestinian militia in Major‐General Zaid Aleppo, 23rd Oct 16 Saleh, Head of the Source: @IvanSidorenko1 Aleppo Security Committee and commander of Syrian military operations in Lt. Gen. Vladimir Savchenko, head of the Aleppo, 26 Sept 16 Coordination Centre for Reconciliation of Source: Arab Source Opposing Sides, giving out medals to Palestinian militia in Aleppo. He is head of negotiating truces and surrenders, as well as psychological warfare ops. Source: An unidentified Russian general gives https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6if5Y7f medals to troops of Military D2uM Intelligence Shield 223 unit in Aleppo 11 Oct 16 Ba’ath Party Committee in Aleppo runs the city on Source: @IvanSidorenko1 behalf of Damascus government Take Aways: Source: nmedia, , 26 Sept 16 • Operation Dawn of Victory is a “coalition” battle Major General Sergey Sevryukov , commander of • Russia is the “dominant voice” in the coalition, due the presence of the Russian 49th Army with Baath Russian air group in Syria, political support from Moscow and the Russian Party Brigades on advisory veto on the UN Security Council visit to Aleppo, Aug 16 © [email protected] Source: KP.ru Syrian Advance against Aleppo Enclave © [email protected] 24/9/2016 to 17/10/16 Aleppo siege lines 24th September 2016 Aleppo siege lines 16th October 2016 Inner Siege Lines 4km Outer Siege Lines Syrian Penetration 4km Eastern Aleppo Wide Rebel controlled Syrian enclave, with 250,000 to Front 275,000 civilians inside © [email protected] North West Aleppo Government Outer Siege Lines and Rebel Aleppo North East Syrian Arab Army Outer Siege Lines 147th Sppgecial Forces Regiment Offensives •Kwieres Airbase Garrison (driven from Artillery base early Aug 24/9/16 to (Major General Munzer 16) 106th Special Forces Brigade rd Zammam) – 300 airforce troops 83 Republican Guard Battalion 6/10/16 Palestinian militia “Liwaa Al‐Quds” Militia Forces Qadesh 'the lion's lair' RG group •Union of Forat Jarabulus • Zahraa and Nubl National 24/9/16 & 27/9/16 Batttalion (Commnander Aref 29/9/16 Defence Force Successful on 29/9/2016 & 1/10/16 Ehmaid Al Jaber Abu Stayff) •Tiger Force uiits (arrive from Rebels 24/9/16 Tartus, 27 Sep 16) Aleppo City inner siege •Desert Hawks Brigade (arrive 3&4/10/16 1&2/10/16 late Oct) lines •Republican Guard “Shudada Syrian Arab Army HQ of 2nd Reserve Division (2,500 + regular RG + Palestinian Quds Kaffr ShiSaghira”Bi” Briga de (arr ive 30/9/16 late Oct) troops) 2/10/16 & 3/10/16 • 106th Special Forces Brigade (Brigadier Suheil 4/10/2016 – 800 Bn RG Ismail) 5/10/16 – elms 102nd RG Brigade Russian Land Forces • elements 4th Division 5/10/16 – SAA & Baath Bns • 102nd Brigade Republican Guard (arrive from 6/10/2016 Contingent D?/Damascus ?/9/2016) SAA?? • Forward Command post of • 800th Regt RG (arrive from Damascus on 25 Hizbullah Aug) 27/9/16 Coordination Centre for • Military Intelligence Shield Forces ‐ Lions Den 1/10/16 Reconciliation of Opposing Battalion (arrive 6 Aug) •Elements 15th Special Forces Division (arrive 8 Sides Aug ) • Russian Orlan 10 UAV •Desert Hawks (arrive 31 Oct 16) (commander Colonel Mohammad Jaber) detachment •Tiger Force (arrive 31 Ocr 16) • MSTA B Battery 120th Allied Forces Russian Guards Artillery Palestinian militia “Liwaa Al‐Quds” (commanders Omar Hussein Al Hasan & Muhammad Rafi) Regiment, with 4 x 152mm Militia Forces A65 • National Defence Forces(NDF) of Aleppo City • Al-Ba’ath Battalions 102nd RG Brigade • Forward Air Controllers th •Contingent Liwa Imam Al‐Baqir Brigade ( Shia 800 Regt RG • Russian Naval Infantry Baath Bns NDF Brigade) Commander Khaled al Daher Hizbullah Company 24/9/16 & 4/10/16&7/10/16 © [email protected] Government and Rebel Offensives 6/10/16 to 17/10/16 Russian MOD and Syrian 102nd Brigade RG &Liwaa Al‐Quds SAA 7/8/9/10/16 Govt declared unilateral 8/10/16 11 &12/10/16 Ceasefire on SAA ?? 18th Oct 2016 until
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