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"Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart Attitude"
By Adrian Zenz - Version of this paper accepted for publication by the journal Central Asian Survey "Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart Attitude" - China's Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang1 Adrian Zenz European School of Culture and Theology, Korntal Updated September 6, 2018 This is the accepted version of the article published by Central Asian Survey at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997 Abstract Since spring 2017, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China has witnessed the emergence of an unprecedented reeducation campaign. According to media and informant reports, untold thousands of Uyghurs and other Muslims have been and are being detained in clandestine political re-education facilities, with major implications for society, local economies and ethnic relations. Considering that the Chinese state is currently denying the very existence of these facilities, this paper investigates publicly available evidence from official sources, including government websites, media reports and other Chinese internet sources. First, it briefly charts the history and present context of political re-education. Second, it looks at the recent evolution of re-education in Xinjiang in the context of ‘de-extremification’ work. Finally, it evaluates detailed empirical evidence pertaining to the present re-education drive. With Xinjiang as the ‘core hub’ of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing appears determined to pursue a definitive solution to the Uyghur question. Since summer 2017, troubling reports emerged about large-scale internments of Muslims (Uyghurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz) in China's northwest Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). By the end of the year, reports emerged that some ethnic minority townships had detained up to 10 percent of the entire population, and that in the Uyghur-dominated Kashgar Prefecture alone, numbers of interned persons had reached 120,000 (The Guardian, January 25, 2018). -
Uyghur Dispossession, Culture Work and Terror Capitalism in a Chinese Global City Darren T. Byler a Dissertati
Spirit Breaking: Uyghur Dispossession, Culture Work and Terror Capitalism in a Chinese Global City Darren T. Byler A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2018 Reading Committee: Sasha Su-Ling Welland, Chair Ann Anagnost Stevan Harrell Danny Hoffman Program Authorized to Offer Degree: Anthropology ©Copyright 2018 Darren T. Byler University of Washington Abstract Spirit Breaking: Uyghur Dispossession, Culture Work and Terror Capitalism in a Chinese Global City Darren T. Byler Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Sasha Su-Ling Welland, Department of Gender, Women, and Sexuality Studies This study argues that Uyghurs, a Turkic-Muslim group in contemporary Northwest China, and the city of Ürümchi have become the object of what the study names “terror capitalism.” This argument is supported by evidence of both the way state-directed economic investment and security infrastructures (pass-book systems, webs of technological surveillance, urban cleansing processes and mass internment camps) have shaped self-representation among Uyghur migrants and Han settlers in the city. It analyzes these human engineering and urban planning projects and the way their effects are contested in new media, film, television, photography and literature. It finds that this form of capitalist production utilizes the discourse of terror to justify state investment in a wide array of policing and social engineering systems that employs millions of state security workers. The project also presents a theoretical model for understanding how Uyghurs use cultural production to both build and refuse the development of this new economic formation and accompanying forms of gendered, ethno-racial violence. -
Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China's “New Frontier”
Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China’s “New Frontier” I. INTRODUCTION II. BACKGROUND A. Chinese Control of Xinjiang: A Brief Political History 1. Early Interactions with Xinjiang 2. Political Integration in the Qing 3. Increased Unrest on the Frontier 4. Liberation B. CCP’S Policy Towards National Minorities 1. The Winding Road Towards “Autonomy” 2. Early Policy: Unify and Conquer: Dangle the Carrot 3. Welcoming Minorities into the Chinese “Family” 4. Creation of the Autonomous Regions III. ANALYSIS A. An Examination of Relevant Laws 1. Introduction 2. Granting Autonomy: “Give and Take” 3. The Law on Regional National Autonomy 4. Does Xinjiang’s Autonomy Meet International Standards? B. Autonomy: A Salve for China’s “Splittist” Headache C. The Party’s Perspective: Stability and Progress IV. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION Along the ancient Silk Road, beyond the crumbling remnants of the Great Wall’s western terminus and the realm of ethnically Han Chinese1 lies Xinjiang: the vast and desolate northwestern province of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the beginning of Central Asia.2 Strategically located, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is a vital component of China’s political and economic stability.3 1 Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook (last visited Feb. 8, 2002). Han, the state- recognized majority nationality, comprise approximately 91.9% of China’s almost 1.3 billion people. Id. 2 JACK CHEN, THE SINKIANG STORY xx (1977). Xinjiang covers one-sixth of China’s total land area, and at 660,000 square miles, the province is as big as Britain, France, Germany, and Italy combined. -
Interactions Between Africans and Local Chinese in Guangzhou, China
Contemporary Racial Formation in China: Interactions Between Africans and Local Chinese in Guangzhou, China A THESIS Presented to The Faculty of the Department of Anthropology The Colorado College In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of the Bachelor of Arts By Jiumei Gao The Colorado College May/2016 1 Abstract In the 19th century, China encountered the first group of European colonialists and other foreigners. Nationalism, including views on different races, started to form. In the 20th century, ideas of racial categories and how Chinese people belong to the more superior “Yellow race” continued to develop and triggered national pride and rebellion against colonialists. During the Mao-era, nationalism was temporarily replaced with communism, but soon came back after Mao died in 1976. In the 1980s when China opened its market, people of the world, especially of the developing countries, were driven to China for its massive economic opportunities. As a result, Chinese people started to practice ideas of nationalism in their daily interactions with foreigners. This study took an ethnographic approach in order to examine the practice of nationalism in daily life among Chinese residents in Guangzhou, which has the largest African population throughout the country. The study included an explicit review of the historical development of China’s nationalism, along with a one-month ethnographic field research project that utilized interviews with 22 Chinese and 14 Africans in areas with higher concentration of Africans in Guangzhou. The results show that racism against Africans is commonly expressed among the Chinese participants. I found that their rationale of anti-African racism mostly originates from the structure of China’s nationalism that has been building since the 19th century. -
China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) 2018 Human Rights Report
CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG, AND MACAU) 2018 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian state in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the paramount authority. CCP members hold almost all top government and security apparatus positions. Ultimate authority rests with the CCP Central Committee’s 25-member Political Bureau (Politburo) and its seven-member Standing Committee. Xi Jinping continued to hold the three most powerful positions as CCP general secretary, state president, and chairman of the Central Military Commission. Civilian authorities maintained control of security forces. During the year the government significantly intensified its campaign of mass detention of members of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang). Authorities were reported to have arbitrarily detained 800,000 to possibly more than two million Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslims in internment camps designed to erase religious and ethnic identities. Government officials claimed the camps were needed to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism. International media, human rights organizations, and former detainees reported security officials in the camps abused, tortured, and killed some detainees. Human rights issues included arbitrary or unlawful killings by the government; forced disappearances by the government; torture by the government; arbitrary detention by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison and detention conditions; political prisoners; -
Undergraduate Law Journal of Fau Spring 2021 I Edition X
UNDERGRADUATE LAW JOURNAL OF FAU SPRING 2021 I EDITION X CHINA'S "RE-EDUCATION" CAMPS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT POTENTIALITY IRENE GATIMI Honors College Florida Atlantic University Abstract China's counter-terror policy implementation has rung alarm bells on the international scene. Many individuals, observers, and victims alike have claimed that the Xinjiang Uyghur population is experiencing a serious infringement of their basic human rights. After the appointment of Chen Quanguo as the new Communist Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 2016, large-scale vocation education and training centers (dubbed "re-education camps") have emerged alongside the dramatic increase of police presence and surveillance. Chen Quanguo has gained a reputation as an ethnic policy innovator through his pioneering of new methods for securing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule over the Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other ethnic minorities in western China. These new methods have been effective in their purpose but could be put under the scrutiny of international law and body agreements, most notable the General Assembly Resolution 3/260 that adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. If certain allegations about the conditions of the vocation education and training centers prove to be true, then this would be considered criminal. Whether this means there is potential for Chen Quanguo to be tried in International Criminal Court, is still up for debate. 113 UNDERGRADUATE LAW JOURNAL OF FAU SPRING 2021 I EDITION X China's counter-terror policy implementation has rung alarm bells on the international scene. Many individuals, observers, and victims alike have claimed that the Xinjiang Uyghur population is experiencing a serious infringement of their basic human rights. -
Westminsterresearch Colonization with Chinese Characteristics
WestminsterResearch http://www.westminster.ac.uk/westminsterresearch Colonization with Chinese Characteristics: Politics of (In)Security in Xinjiang and Tibet Anand, D. This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Central Asian Survey, 38 (1), pp. 1-19. The final definitive version is available online: https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2018.1534801 © 2018 Taylor & Francis The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or copyright owners. Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/). In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail [email protected] 1 Colonisation with Chinese Characteristics: Politics of (In)Security in Xinjiang and Tibet1 Dibyesh Anand2 China as a victim rather than a proponent of modern colonialism is an essential myth that animates Chinese nationalism. The Chinese statist project of occupying, minoritising and securitising different ethno-national peoples of Central Asia such as Uyghurs and Tibetans, with their own claims to homelands, is a colonial project. Focusing on China’s securitised and militarised rule in Xinjiang and Tibet, the article will argue that the most appropriate lens through which this can be understood is neither nation-building, nor internal colonialism but modern colonialism. It argues that the representation of Uyghurs and Tibetans as sources of insecurity not only legitimises state violence as a securitising practice but also serves contemporary Chinese colonial goals. -
China COI Compilation-March 2014
China COI Compilation March 2014 ACCORD is co-funded by the European Refugee Fund, UNHCR and the Ministry of the Interior, Austria. Commissioned by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Division of International Protection. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author. ACCORD - Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation China COI Compilation March 2014 This COI compilation does not cover the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau, nor does it cover Taiwan. The decision to exclude Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan was made on the basis of practical considerations; no inferences should be drawn from this decision regarding the status of Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan. This report serves the specific purpose of collating legally relevant information on conditions in countries of origin pertinent to the assessment of claims for asylum. It is not intended to be a general report on human rights conditions. The report is prepared on the basis of publicly available information, studies and commentaries within a specified time frame. All sources are cited and fully referenced. This report is not, and does not purport to be, either exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed, or conclusive as to the merits of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Every effort has been made to compile information from reliable sources; users should refer to the full text of documents cited and assess the credibility, relevance and timeliness of source material with reference to the specific research concerns arising from individual applications. -
Chinese Leadership in Tibet
WWW.SAVETIBET.ORG CHINESE LEADERSHIP IN TIBET PAGE 1 / 3 Chinese leaders in front of the Potala Palace in Lhasa Little is reliably known about which individuals therefore have a vested interest in averting any kind and institutions in the People’s Republic of China of conciliation between the Chinese government and (PRC) are ultimately responsible for formulating the Dalai Lama. While such “anti-Dalai” postures and implementing government policy in Tibet. may have been key to advancing their own careers, Instead, China’s complex and factionalized pow- the frequently vicious personal condemnations of er structures are almost entirely opaque on the the Dalai Lama have profoundly alienated the vast question of Tibet, and the relevant government majority of Tibetans from the Chinese establishment and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials in Tibet - long before any considerations of Tibetans’ remain entirely unaccountable to the Tibetan growing social and economic marginalization are people themselves. taken into account. Tibet continues to be controlled - both regionally as THE CENTRAL STATE LEADERSHIP, XI JINPING well as in relevant Party and government offices in Xi Jinping, as the President and, more importantly, as Beijing - by a hard-line conservative faction, made General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, up of people whom several observers have noted currently has the ultimate say on matters concerning over the years have based their careers almost entirely Tibet. His father, Xi Zhongxun, had close connec- on being “anti-Dalai” and “anti-splittist,” and who tions to Tibet and this makes President Xi someone WWW.SAVETIBET.ORG CHINESE LEADERSHIP IN TIBET PAGE 2 / 3 who has a direct family connection with Tibet. -
Initial Assessment of Xi Jinping's Work Report at 19Th Party Congress
21 October 2017 ‘INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF XI JINPING’S WORK REPORT AT 19TH PARTY CONGRESS’ By JAYADEVA RANADE The crucial 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) opened in Beijing on October 18, 2017, amidst stringent security restrictions in Beijing and other major cities in China. Nearly a thousand foreign reporters from 130 countries are reported to be covering the Congress. The Congress was preceded by other important meetings, namely the 7th and last Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee (CC), and of the Party’s powerful anti-corruption body the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) chaired by Xi Jinping’s close associate and Politburo Standing Committee member, Wang Qishan. CCP CC General Secretary Xi Jinping, who holds fourteen formal positions -- more than any other CCP leader so far -- is poised to emerge stronger from this Congress. His sustained anti-corruption campaign has eliminated opposition in the Party and military and drastically reduced the influence wielded by his predecessor once removed, Jiang Zemin. In September 2017, China’s official media publicised that more than 176 CCP cadres equivalent to the rank of central Vice Minister and above had been dismissed and arrested for corruption and that more than 14,000 officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had been similarly dismissed, including more than 86 officers of and above the rank of Major General. Just weeks before the Congress, Xi Jinping publicly demonstrated his authority by arresting two top Generals, appointing 20 Generals to command thirteen new Group Armies and promoting close associates to head the PLA Army (ground forces) and PLA Air Force. -
PLA Attempts to Attract Higher-Quality Recruits
Volume 17, Issue 12 September 21, 2017 In a Fortnight: PLA Attempts to Attract Higher-Quality Recruits What is Xi Jinping Thought? By Willy Lam Himalayan Impasse: How China Would Fight an Indian Border Conflict By Kevin McCauley Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing's Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang By Adrian Zenz, James Leibold Assessing the Sino-Russian Baltic Sea Drill By Richard Weitz PLA Attempts to Attract Conscription, which began in early May, accepts young men and women between the ages of 18– Higher-Quality Recruits 22 and forms the bulk of the PLA. Conscripts By Peter Wood serve for two years, before leaving the PLA or advancing to become Non-Commissioned Of- ficers. Recruits for the PLA’s officer track are In late August, China’s annual conscription (征 brought in at the same time. According to the 兵) period ended. This years’ newest group of Chinese Ministry of Education, over 1,070,000 PLA recruits was reportedly among the worst in college students joined the PLA in 2017, an in- recent memory, with widespread reportage crease of 5.6 percent over last year (Ministry of across Chinese and international media about Education, August 30). the recruits’ health issues. As an article in the Chinese military’s official newspaper put it, “One China’s changing demographics and transition- [unnamed] cities’ physical exam washout rate for ing economy are having an impact on its ability conscripts was 56.9 percent—enough to leave to attract high-quality recruits. The PLA has tra- one speechless” (PLA Daily, October 28). -
Standing Committee (In Rank Order) Remaining Members from the 18Th Central Committee Politburo
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 19th Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee (in rank order) Remaining members from the 18th Central Committee Politburo New members to the 19th Central Committee Politburo The Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) is comprised of the CCP’s top- ranking leaders and is China’s top decision-making body within the Politburo. It meets more frequently and often makes XI JINPING LI KEQIANG LI ZHANSHU WANG YANG WANG HUNING ZHAO LEJI HAN ZHENG key decisions with little or no input from 习近平 李克强 栗战书 汪洋 王沪宁 赵乐际 韩正 the full Politburo. The much larger Central President; CCP General Premier, State Council Chairman, Chairman, Director, Office of CCP Secretary, CCP Central Executive Vice Premier, Secretary; Chairman, CCP Born 1953 Standing Committee of Chinese People’s Political Comprehensively Deepening Discipline Inspection State Council Committee is, in theory, the executive Central Military Commission National People’s Congress Consultative Conference Reform Commission Commission Born 1954 organ of the party. But the Politburo Born 1953 Born 1950 Born 1955 Born 1955 Born 1957 exercises its functions and authority except the few days a year when the Members (in alphabetical order) Central Committee is in session. At the First Session of the 13th National People’s Congress in March 2018, Wang Qishan was elected as the Vice President of China. The vice presidency enables Wang to be another important national leader without a specific party portfolio. But in China’s official CCP pecking order, CAI QI CHEN MIN’ER CHEN