Asia Pacific Migration Migrations En Asie-Pacifique Migraciones En Asia-Pacífico

Revue européenne des migrations internationales

vol. 35 - n°1 et 2 | 2019 Asia Pacific Migration Migrations en Asie-Pacifique Migraciones en Asia-Pacífico

Nicola Piper and Yves Charbit (dir.)

Electronic version URL: https://journals.openedition.org/remi/12331 DOI: 10.4000/remi.12331 ISSN: 1777-5418

Publisher Université de Poitiers

Printed version Date of publication: 1 October 2019 ISBN: 979-10-90426-64-1 ISSN: 0765-0752

Electronic reference Nicola Piper and Yves Charbit (dir.), Revue européenne des migrations internationales, vol. 35 - n°1 et 2 | 2019, “Asia Pacifc Migration” [Online], Online since 01 January 2021, connection on 20 May 2021. URL: https://journals.openedition.org/remi/12331; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/remi.12331

Asia Pacific Migration

Coordination : Nicola Piper and Yves Charbit

Publication éditée par l’Université de Poitiers avec le concours de • InSHS du CNRS (Institut des Sciences Humaines et Sociales du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) • MSHS (Maison des Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société de Poitiers)

REMi Sommaire Vol. 35 n ° 1 & 2

Migrations en Asie-Pacifique Coordination : Nicola Piper et Yves Charbit

Nicola Piper et Yves Charbit ...... 7 Éditorial : Migrations en Asie et dans le Pacifique Maruja M. B. Asis, Nicola Piper et Parvati Raghuram ...... 13 De l’Asie au Monde : contributions régionales à la recherche globale sur les migrations Johan Lindquist et Biao Xiang ...... 39 L’espace de la médiation : intermédiaires et État en Indonésie et en Chine depuis le XIXe siècle Alice M. Nah ...... 63 L’autorité ambiguë d’un État subrogé. La négociation de l’asile par le HCR face à la complexité des migrations en Asie du Sud-Est Peter McDonald ...... 87 Migration vers l’Australie : de l’exclusion des Asiatiques à leur prédominance John Connell ...... 107 Des marges qui se rétrécissent ? La migration dans les eaux du Pacifique

Varia Olivier Leservoisier ...... 125 L’association Pulaar Speaking à la croisée des chemins. Dynamiques migratoires et débats autour du sens à donner à l’action communautaire au sein du collectif migrant haalpulaaren (Mauritanie, Sénégal) aux États-Unis Cécile Navarro ...... 149 « Le soldat n’a pas fui, il est parti chercher de la force » : explorer les imaginaires migratoires à l’aune des carrières artistiques dans le rap au Sénégal Dominique Vidal ...... 171 Financiarisation du social et formes d’appartenance. Les émigrants portugais en France et la crise de 2008 Elsa Vigneau ...... 191 La théorie de la sécuritisation et la relation entre discours et contexte : une étude de la sécuritisation de l’immigration dans la presse canadienne, 1998-2015 Ildikó Zakariás ...... 215 Altérisation et reconnaissance : les idéologies nationales dans les rencontres donateurs-bénéficiaires en philanthropie co-ethnique hongroise

Chronique juridique Mary Crock ...... 239 Protection des réfugiés en Australie : politiques et pratiques Notes de lecture ...... 251 Livres reçus ...... 261 Note aux auteurs ...... 265 REMi Contents Vol. 35 n ° 1 & 2

Asia Pacific Migration Coordination: Nicola Piper and Yves Charbit

Nicola Piper and Yves Charbit ...... 7 Editorial: Migration in Asia and the Pacific Maruja M. B. Asis, Nicola Piper and Parvati Raghuram ...... 13 From Asia to the World: “Regional” Contributions to Global Migration Research Johan Lindquist and Biao Xiang ...... 39 Space of Mediation. Labour Migration, Intermediaries and the State in Indonesia and China since the Nineteenth Century Alice M. Nah ...... 63 The Ambiguous Authority of a “Surrogate State”: UNHCR’s Negotiation of Asylum in the Complexities of Migration in Southeast Asia Peter McDonald ...... 87 Migration to Australia: From Asian Exclusion to Asian Predominance John Connell ...... 107 Contracting Margins? Liquid International Migration in the Pacific

Varia Olivier Leservoisier ...... 125 Puular Speaking Association at the Crossroads. Migrations and Debates on the Meanings of Community among a Group of Haalpulaaren Migrants (Mauritania, Senegal) in the United States Cécile Navarro ...... 149 “The Soldier didn’t Run Away, He Went Looking for Strength”: Exploring Migration Imaginaries through Artistic Careers in Rap in Senegal Dominique Vidal ...... 171 Financialization of the Social and Forms of Belonging. The Portuguese Emigrants in France and the 2008 Crisis Elsa Vigneau ...... 191 Securitization Theory and the Relationship between Discourse and Context: A Study of Securitized Migration in the Canadian Press, 1998-2015 Ildikó Zakariás ...... 215 Othering and Recognition: National Ideologies in Donor-Recipient Encounters in Hungarian Co-Ethnic Philanthropy

Legal Column Mary Crock ...... 239 Refugee Protection in Australia: Policies and Practice Books Reviews ...... 251 Books Received ...... 261 Note to Authors ...... 265 REMi Índice Vol. 35 n ° 1 & 2

Migraciones en Asia-Pacífico Coordinación: Nicola Piper y Yves Charbit

Nicola Piper y Yves Charbit ...... 7 Editorial: Migraciones en Asia y el Pacífico Maruja M. B. Asis, Nicola Piper y Parvati Raghuram ...... 13 Desde Asia al mundo: aportaciones regionales a la investigación global sobre las migraciones Johan Lindquist and Biao Xiang ...... 39 Espacio de mediación. Migración laboral, intermediarios y el Estado en Indonesia y China desde el siglo XIX Alice M. Nah ...... 63 La ambigua autoridad de un Estado de sustitución: la negociación del asilo por parte de la ACNUR frente a la complejidad de las migraciones en el sudeste asiático Peter McDonald ...... 87 Migración a Australia: de la exclusión de los asiáticos a su predominio John Connell ...... 107 ¿Margen cada vez más estrecho? Migración en aguas del Pacífico

Varia Olivier Leservoisier ...... 125 La asociación Pulaar Speaking al cruce de los caminos. Dinámicas migratorias y búsqueda del sentido que puede impulsar la acción comunitaria dentro del colectivo de los migrantes haalpulaaren (Mauritania, Senegal) en los Estados Unidos Cécile Navarro ...... 149 «El soldado no escapo, se fue a buscar fuerza»: explorar los imaginarios migratorios a través de las carreras artísticas en el rap en Senegal Dominique Vidal ...... 171 Financierización de lo social e formas de pertenencia. Los emigrantes portugueses en Francia y la crisis de 2008 Elsa Vigneau ...... 191 La teoría de la securitización y la relación entre el discurso y el contexto: estudio sobre la securitización de la inmigración en la prensa canadiense, 1998-2015 Ildikó Zakariás ...... 215 Alterización y reconocimiento: ideologías nacionales en los encuentros entre donantes y receptores en la filantropía coétnica húngara

Crónica jurídica Mary Crock ...... 239 Protección de refugiados en Australia: políticas y prácticas Notas bibliográficas ...... 251 Libros recibidos ...... 261 Nota a los autores ...... 265

REMi Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 2019, 35 (1 & 2), pp. 7-12

Editorial: Migration in Asia and the Pacific Nicola Piper1 and Yves Charbit2

This special issue of the European Review of International Migration (REMI) is about migration in Asia and the Pacific. Indeed, it is not feasible, within the limits of a dossier, to provide information on the whole of Asia or to systematically compare the major sub-regions of the Asian continent. Instead, this introduction intends to provide a snapshot that offers some background to this region and to highlight general commonalities and differences.

Throughout its thirty-four years of existence, REMI has published articles on specific countries in Asia: e.g. Japan, Singapore, and China. Previously published special issues were devoted to sub-regions as a whole, such as the Indian sub- continent, or to themes with a regional dimension, such as the practice of Kafala in the Middle East or the Silk Road.

The major fact that makes it impossible to identify characteristics common to the whole of Asia is the extraordinary heterogeneity of this immense continent and the complexities of its migratory movements. The contributions to this issue have one element in common, however, and that is to discuss migration from an intra-regional perspective, i.e. flows within Asia and the Pacific, and thus highlight the existence of intra-regional migration corridors and their respective specificities.

What is true in regard to complex interrelationships in the economic, social, political, cultural, religious and ethnic fields is also true in the field of migration. Indeed, this complexity can be seen diagrammatically in map 1 below.

Several countries, generally the least developed in the region, are typically classified as mainly “migrant senders”: Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines and Sri Lanka. Conversely, the most developed ones are usually treated as immigration countries: Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. Others, the medium-income countries experience both significant inflows alongside significant outflows: India, China, Malaysia and Thailand. As is well known, with increasing development, emigration countries become primarily migrant-receiving countries (e.g. South Korea) and flows have in fact reversed since the 1950s and 1960s in several countries in Asia.

1 British Academy Global Professor, School of Law, Queen Mary University of London, Graduate Centre, Office No. 606, Mile End Road, London E1 4NS, UK; [email protected] 2 Demographer, Emeritus Professor, CEPED, Paris Descartes University/IRD – 45, rue des Saints-Pères – 75006 Paris; [email protected]

7 Nicola Piper and Yves Charbit . Opigez (IRD/CEPED). É , Red Globe Press, 420 p. Conception:

The Age of Migration Map 1: Contemporary Migrations within and from the Asia Pacific Region Source: Castles Stephen, de Hass Hein and Miller Mark J. (2014)

8 Editorial

When international student mobility or mobility for skill training as well as the movement of the highly skilled is included, the map of human migration becomes ever more complex with flows going into multiple directions and regional hubs emerging. The global trends towards freedom of movement in (sub-)regional settings has also reached Asia where ease of travel, such as exemptions from visa requirements, is being implemented step by step by ASEAN and has existed for a while between neighbouring countries (India- Nepal).

Human migration responds to socio-economic opportunities and is thus tied to economic cycles. Certain flows, such as return migration therefore, also occur in the short or medium term, as in the case of the 1997 economic crisis which triggered a return flow of Thai people who had migrated to the United States and other destinations.

In some cases, mobility has deep historical roots, often because of colonial links, particularly in the case of British and Dutch imperialisms, with the recruitment of contract workers (Indenture migration) or sheer forced population movements. Forced migration as an aspect of imperialist projects also played a role in the case of the population displacement triggered by Japan in the 1930s from Korea and China. Politically driven migration resulting in refugee flows is also known to Asia, such as the phenomenon of the “boat people” as a consequence of the Vietnam War. These flows, which have involved millions of people, have led to the formation of diasporas around the world, including in Oceania and parts of Asia particularly in East and South Africa, the United States, Canada and Europe.

Finally, the role of the immigration policies of the countries receiving these flows should not be underestimated in influencing the size and directionality of flows. In addition to North America, both Australia and New Zealand were populated through immigration. The latter countries have traditionally favoured family unification and skilled migration, while others, particularly those in the Gulf region who have lived on oil revenues since the 1970s triggering fast and vast development requiring a large pool of foreign workers due to having been comparatively under-populated and faced with skill shortages, have never had settlement immigration as their objective. As a result of lacking a “melting pot” or “salad bowl” ideology and a free market rein, integration and non-discrimination have never been topics their societies tackled.

Faced with such a diversity of situations, it is to be expected that the characteristics of migrants would also be very diverse. Migration concerns both men and women in their role as primary migrants, but also as those left behind; it concerns low-skilled workers and those recruited for their skills, the so-called “brain drain” or “brain gain”; and those expelled for politico-religious reasons.

At a very general level, and from a strictly statistical point of view, the following table shows that the presence of migrants varies considerably from one sub-region to another, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the region’s total population. The purely quantitative comparison of Asia with the other major regions of the world, Africa, North America and Europe, is instruc- tive.

9 Nicola Piper and Yves Charbit

Table 1: Migrants in the Region of the World (stocks and % of total population)

Major area, region, country Total stock of migrants % of or area of destination in thousands total population World 257,715 3.4 Africa 11,617 2.0 Asia 33,735 1.8 Central Asia 2,831 7. 7 Eastern Asia 4,137 0.5 Southern Asia 6, 616 0.7 South-Eastern Asia 4,747 1.5 Western Asia 14,314 16.0 Europe 38,822 10.5 Northern America 29,695 15.6 Latin America and the Caribbean 4,670 1.5 Oceania 4 ,288 20.7 Australia/New Zealand 4 145 27.8

From the outset, West Asia is a special case. This sub-region includes the oil-producing countries of the Middle East, which rely heavily on foreign labour, mainly from Asia. West Asia has 16% migrants, ten times more than South-East Asia, for example, and thirty times more than East Asia. On the other hand, it is striking to note that West Asia is the region with New Zealand and Australia, Europe or North America where migrants are most numerous (in %). Thus, countries whose wealth is based on oil rent and those with a mainly industrial and tertiary economic structure have a common characteristic: the need to use a foreign labour force that is mainly underqualified, but also able to fill skilled jobs.

Of course, Asia is the most populous continent in the world with more than 4 billion inhabitants and nearly 80 million migrants. But this mass effect should not be given too much meaning, since Africa has only 24.6 million migrants, and the proportion of migrants from Africa is slightly higher than that observed in Asia (2 against 1.8%).

The case of Oceania suggests the same type of observation: Australia and New Zealand alone have 8.1 million migrants, or 96% of the migrant stock in the region, compared to all twenty-one other micro-States in the region (five in Melanesia, seven in Micronesia and nine in Polynesia).

Despite the fact that migration has been part of human history from its inception, the modern and contemporary era differs from previous historical phases in that it displays ever greater complexity with regard to the nature of the governing arrangements and institutional actors involved in shaping migration. The region in question has also been subject to rising institutionalisation and the multiplication of actors with specific interests in migration. As much as the study of migration has moved beyond structural and economic analyses by shifting migrants’ agency to the fore, important contributions have also been made to include the role of non-migrant actors into the analysis of the key factors that mediate and shape migration and migrants’ decision making. Supra-national, governmental and non-governmental institutions all play an important role, both

10 Editorial individually and as part of an institutional web or networks. They typically work in a collaborative manner but at times stand in competition with each other, fillings roles and taking responsibility for aspects of migration left by others or specific groups of migrants (refugees, labour migrants, female migrants, children) that are neglected.

It is therefore not surprising that the theme of governance has repeatedly emerged and is also woven into those contributions to this special issue which point to diverse arrangements and the complexity of geographic, political, institutional aspects of migration governance in the Asia Pacific. As seen elsewhere, migration is regulated in both formal and informal ways. The actions and decisions made by institutions about ways of governing and the design of policies that regulate migration are not necessarily informed by migrants’ needs and their experience but shaped by other interests. It is typically civil society organisations, and in particular migrants’ ability to self-organise and represent themselves, that bring migrants’ voices and lived reality to the attention of decision makers but with varying success. This is particularly vital in regard to the most excluded and vulnerable migrants: the low-skilled, temporary labour migrants — many of whom labour in domestic work, a sector still deemed “informal” — and asylum seekers who have no chances of being formally recognized as refugees in Southeast Asia. The migration laboratory of the Asia Pacific region demonstrates very well the complexities involved in the institutionalisation of migration, the many different interests involved in migration and the diversity of the “migrant” as a category.

The common theme that emerges from the complex picture of the “migration scene” in the Asia Pacific, however, is the central aspect of work, employment and skill development (including study). Securing a livelihood, seeking a better life, social mobility, better education and skill development are all aspirations which centre upon income generation and work. Rural to urban, national to international, gendered, low-skilled, high skilled and refugees: all those migratory flows are tied to the necessity and wish to engage in work and income generation, the acquiring of new skills and further education — for oneself or members of one’s family, i.e. the next generation.

What the case of the Asia Pacific demonstrates in this regard is the blurring of market, state and society when it comes to migration governance: deepening economic neoliberalism and socio-political patronage have resulted in a migration governing system characterized not only by diversity and multiplicity of actors but also, and probably are a result of, privatisation and commer- cialisation of international migration. The lives of migrants and non-migrants (recruiters, families left behind, governmental and non-governmental organisations) in various places (country of origin, destination) are shaped by and contribute to this form of migration governance across space (local, national, regional, global) and place. A complex web of regulatory forces and modes derive from the varying interests and actors. These are the key themes discussed in the contributions to this special issue.

The paper by Asis et al. starts with an overview of academic lenses emerging from the study of intra-Asian migration flows and how those themes and concep- tualisations fit into “global” migration research. The historical significance of

11 Nicola Piper and Yves Charbit

“East meets West” during the colonial period and contemporary global linkages via supply chains capitalism have and are shaping labour migration flows in Asia. The global migration governance frameworks developed by the United Nations impacts on and is impacted upon by regional dynamics and specificities of the Asia Pacific. The UN’s key migration agencies (UNHCR, IOM, ILO) with their regional hubs and country offices are discussed by Alice Nah with specific attention being paid to the role of UNCHR in the politically hyper-sensitive area of forced migration. The theme of historical ties is picked up by Lindquist and Xiang in their discussion of recruitment practices and agents in the case of China and Indonesia. As anthropologists, they provide a locally contextualised picture of the role of non-migrant actors in mediating flows across borders.

The contribution by McDonald raises the issue of Australia’s shifting identity as “European” on the basis of past immigration waves, to see itself as part of its geographic location: the Asia Pacific. The face of Australian society has visibly become more Asian: from those who originate from all over Asia — East, Southeast, South and West. They make important contributions as entrepreneurs, workers, employers in all sorts of sectors and capacities — and importantly also as students. The final paper by Connell rounds this issue off on the basis of his contribution on the Pacific islands and migration between them as well as to Australia and New Zealand. Despite their geographic size, they display complex flows characterized by multiple directionality and temporality (permanent, short-term).

The legal column in this issue is by Crock, a specialist in immigration law, whose contribution provides an overview of Australia’s refugee policy framework. Her analysis of “irregular maritime arrivals” contrasts the comparatively harsh treatment of migrants who arrive by boats (the centre of public debate and international scrutiny) with the country’s generous formal admission programs.

12 REMi Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 2019, 35 (1 & 2), pp. 13-37

From Asia to the World: “Regional” Contributions to Global Migration Research Maruja M. B. Asis1, Nicola Piper2 and Parvati Raghuram3

Asia has become an empirical, theoretical and policy exemplar contributing to driving global migration research. Having experienced large-scale, sustained population movements since the 1970s, the continent has unsurprisingly become subject to rising scholarly interest. Empirically, cross-border South- South or intra-regional migration in search of work and livelihoods has been a significant feature in Asia for many decades. Colonial mobilities included the transport of indentured labour both within and beyond Asia, and the long term movement of colonisers to the colonies and their return migration (Kaur, 2004). This has shaped postcolonial mobilities but these now exist amongst a panoply of migrant streams that are multi-directional. Many of these are intra-regional or inter-regional across countries of the global South as epitomised by the China- Africa link (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009; Pieke, 2012). For a long time migration was treated as a predominantly “single worker” phenomenon, with male migrants generally responding to the need for workers in the productive sectors. However, women have also migranted as workers, especially as domestic workers and to work in the manufacturing sector (Carter, 1995).

These empirical patterns have led to rich theorisations which are increasingly used globally. In particular, the concept of “care chain” (Hochschild, 2000; Parreñas, 2001), which has become widely used in global migration research and policy, draws on the experiences of migrant women from Asian countries who move abroad to meet the need for care workers in the global North, resulting in a care deficit in the migrant women’s home countries. However, this concept already had a history in Asian thinking as an important precursor to the care

1 Executive Director, Scalabrini Migration Center, 40 Matapat St., Brgy. Pinyahan, Quezon City 1100, Philippines; [email protected] 2 British Academy Global Professor, School of Law, Queen Mary University of London, Graduate Centre, Office No. 606, Mile End Road, London E1 4NS, UK; [email protected] 3 Professor of Geography and Migration, The Open University, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK; [email protected] The authors would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their extremely useful comments and suggestions which have led to improved presentation and organisation of our thoughts and material.

13 Maruja M. B. Asis, Nicola Piper and Parvati Raghuram

chain concept as popularised by Arlie Hochschild. It was Thanh-Dam Truong’s (1996) important work on reproductive care which discussed such dynamics by drawing on the Asian case in the 1990s. She was among the early observers who noted the concentration of women migrant workers in Asia in “reproductive work” — both domestic work and entertainment — in contrast to men’s work in productive sectors.

Finally, the mass recruitment of foreign workers on a strictly temporary basis constitutes a policy model which is spreading globally. It is increasingly treated as a solution to stagnating or failing “development projects” in countries of origin and, when considering the role fulfilled by precarious migrant labour in political economic terms, also in countries of destination. In the context of Asia, such policies have acquired dominant features in relation to private recruitment agency-mediated migration and the institutionalisation of migration governance. The role of the web of private recruitment agencies (acorss origin and destination countries) has been crucial in sustaining high levels of temporary labour migration in Asia — and constitutes therefore an important stakeholder (Battistella, 2014). One (intended or unintended) consequence of the labour migration of migrant workers on a temporary basis has been high levels of irregular migration and irregular employment practices. Another consequence is that many migrants are locked into a state of “permanent temporariness”.

These empirical, conceptual and policy insights have been widely studied in Asian migration research but these contributions, the specificities of context and the variations that existing research within Asia point to are often ignored in wider migration research. This paper sets out to highlight these specific contributions of “Asian migration” to global migration research by presenting the context of migration from, to and and within Asia. It begins with a brief overview of Asian migration followed by a discussion of Asian migration research. The following section outlines some of the key contributions made by this research to global migration research and the implications of how this has been taken up selectively in subsequent research globally. The paper suggests that these global versions of Asian migration research are in need of further nuancing. Finally, the paper ends by highlighting how current Asian research also offers new avenues for theorising migration which are yet to be scoped.

The three foci identified in this paper are a tool for developing this line of argument. They are not meant to represent an exclusive list but are used to demonstrate dominant models of theorising and thus, the (often unrecognised) contributions made to global research whilst also highlighting the particular occlusions and exclusions that have resulted from those dominant models. The first theme is on labour migration; the second is family migration, and the third focus concerns governance and politics.

14 From Asia to the World

Asian Migration

Asia has the largest number of international migrants of any continent — around 80 million. Between 1990 and 2017 it increased by 31 million, the largest growth in the world (UN, 2017). 89% of this growth could be attributed to intra-continental flows — most international migrants in Asia had been born in the region. 61 million of the world’s migrants have moved within Asia, making it the largest intra-regional migration flow in the world. Between 1990 and 2000 only three of the top ten bilateral corridors were within Asia but between 2010 and 2017 that number had increased to six. The Gulf countries (classified as “West Asia” by the UN) is unique in terms of its extremely high percentage of non-citizen residents: Qatar and United Arab Emirates have the highest proportion of migrants to total population at 90 and 88% respectively, many drawn from within the continent and from Africa. There are, however, regional differences in the growth of migrant stocks; plus there are up to 7% in Western Asia but almost zero in Central and Southern Asia.

According to ILO estimates of global migration stocks (2015), there were 150.3 million migrants workers in 2013 of whom 83.7 million are men, and 66.6 million are women. The proportion of women in Asian migration stocks is about 42.7% compared to 48.4% globally (UN, 2017). Much of this is due to sharp increases in the numbers and proportions of male migrants in Asia, which has outstripped the increases in migrant women. The Asia-Pacific region hosts 17.2% of this migrant workforce (25.8 million persons). Some of the Asian sub-regions have very high proportions of migrant workers in their worker population. For instance, 35.6% of all workers in the Arab States were migrants and 10% in Central and Western Asia. However, others such as Eastern Asia have very low proportions of migrant workers — only 0.6% — although this figure has to be treated with caution as it includes China which has a miniscule share of migrants in relation to its large population.

As elsewhere, some sectors of Asian labour markets such as construction, plantation/agriculture and fishing have a disproportionate presence of migrant workers, especially men. On the other hand, domestic work offers opportunities for many migrant women although in West Asia where domestic work also includes gardeners, drivers, security guards and cooks, male migrants tend to be employed in this sector too (Fernandez, 2014). 10% of all domestic workers in the Arab region are men (ILO, 2015). In some countries, such as Korea, the manufacturing sector comprises mostly male migrant workers, while in Taiwan, electronics is dominated by women migrant workers. The garment sector also heavily employs female migrant workers from South Asia, as for instance in the Special Economic Zones in the Middle East (Tamkeen Center for Legal aid and Rights, 2011).

Temporary contract migration is recognized as mutually beneficial by governments and employers in destination and sending countries. In destination countries, temporariness facilitates labour market adjustment to economic fluctuations and to the socio-political sensitivities in multi-ethnic societies with on-going nation-building “projects”. For origin countries, temporary labour migration facilitates regular and steady remittance inflows. Seven of the top ten remittance receivers in 2017 were Asian countries — India, China, the Philippines, Pakistan, Vietnam, Bangladesh and Indonesia (World Bank, 2017: 5).

15 Maruja M. B. Asis, Nicola Piper and Parvati Raghuram

Moreover, Asia is also a source region of international migration of students. China and India are the largest student sending countries and account for a significant part of the international outflows of money paid for student fees, much of which flows outside the continent (Raghuram and Sondhi, 2017)4.

Finally, internal migration dwarfs international migration in Asia as elsewhere. Data as of around 2000 suggest a conservative estimate of 740 million internal migrants (UNDP, 2009 cited in Skeldon, 2017: 4). In populous Asian countries such as India, China and Indonesia, internal migration is a key driver of urbanisation and the rise of mega-cities.

In sum, Asia is increasingly important within the context of international migration, not only as a sending region but also increasingly for intra-continental flows. These flows have distinct gendered patterns and are concentrated in some sectors of the labour market, particularly domestic work. Researching Asian Migration

In 2009, a survey of key regional academic journals and prominent migration research centres and networks noted that after a period dominated by economists and quantitative analyses, migration studies had begun to broaden out and become more inclusive in disciplinary and methodological terms (Asis et al., 2010).5 Resonating this, Huguet’s review of articles published in the Asian and Pacific Migration Journal (2016) outlines the themes widely investigated in existing research: macro-level development, human rights of migrants, women in migration, social implications of migration, national policy making, multiculturalism and transnationalism. However, most existing research was found to be ahistorical and lacking a political economic lens. Moreover, gender analysis of migration, which relates to women and men’s roles, paid little attention to masculinity, and was characterised by the absence of longitudional studies assessing social change and consequences of migrants over time, including an inter-generational perspective. Theoretically, it was found that ongoing critiques of modernisation theory had made little inroads into the literature on migration and hence, little space is given to post-development thinking and postcolonial epistemologies.

In subsequent years some of the themes identified have been expanded, others emerged, and still other topics have been dropped. These reflect, in part, new empirical realities given the shifts in the global economy and demographic trends in the intervening decade. The empirical foci have expanded in line with grounded shifts in migration in terms of directionality of migrations, altered role of sending and receiving countries, the profile of migrants, and questions generated by long-term stay and settlement as well as return migration.

4 See e.g. https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/ts4_open_university.pdf. 5 This section builds on a review of Asian migration research conducted in 2008 which sought to examine the key knowledge frames on international migration in Asia in relation to the global debate on the migration-development nexus based on a broad view of what constitutes “development” (Asis et al., 2010).

16 From Asia to the World

Expanding Areas

A topic that has received increasing attention is skilled migration. The drive to maintain their competitive edge and to transform their economies into knowledge economies has prompted Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and fairly recently, China, to attract skilled migrants (UN, 2017). Among the highly skilled who add to China’s roster are returning overseas Chinese or Chinese nationals. Some countries like China have become significant immigrant destinations for those both within and outside the continent. This is particularly evident in the case of student migration, with China emerging as one of the largest destinations for student migrants (Lan and Wu, 2016; Ho, 2017).

Similarly, and in line with the increasing multiscalar analyses of migration, cities have become an important meso-level analytical category (Findlay and Cranston, 2015; Shen, 2010). Transnational “creative knowledge migrants” (Florida, 2002 and 2007) are seen to benefit cities, especially those transiti- toning to post-oil economies, such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi, which are highly dependent on skilled migrants (and lesser skilled labour) (Ewers and Dicce, 2016) leading to new attention on the urban nature of migration.

The changing demography and nature of the family in Asia are also receiving increasing attention. Rapidly ageing societies, especially in East Asia, have resulted in more consideration being paid to issues such as the demand for care workers to assist the elderly (Ogawa et al., 2017; Yeoh and Huang, 2012). While migrants care for older residents, their own ageing and care has been relatively neglected. This is an area for research and policy in the future. Similarly, the impact of migration on shifting family-based care arrangements, including the role of fathers and grandparents as carers, has also grown (Hoang et al., 2011; Knodel and Ngyuen, 2015).

At the other end of the age spectrum, migrant children have also become an object of attention (Beazley, 2015; Beazley et al., 2017; Waters, 2017). In the Asian context, given the reality of strictly temporary contract migration, most research has focused on children left behind, those born to migrants (Kim et al., 2017) and those who are reunited with their mothers returning after divorce or separation (Graham and Yeoh, 2013; Asis, 2006; ECMI, AOS-Manila, SMC and OWWA, 2004). The socio-legal precariousness of their situation has been a key investigative lens. Others have focused on the 1.5 and second generation children, some of whom are the offsprings of mixed couples and thus the product of “marriage migration” (Nagasaka and Fresnoza-Flot, 2015; Asis and Liao, 2017). However, Asian research on migration and children also point to the aspirational nature of the Asian family. In “astronaut families”, typically mothers in middle and upper class families from Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan and Korea have moved to the global North to facilitate access to what they perceives as world class education and sometimes to citizenship (Tsong and Liu, 2009). Singapore too is becoming a destination for Chinese students who are accompanied by their “study mothers” (Huang and Yeoh, 2011). Another variant is sending children abroad for pre-tertiary education, the so-called “early study abroad”, to enhance the children’s chances of getting into prestigious universities (Kim, 2013; Shin, 2013; Kwak, 2013). These phenomena stand in stark contrast to the literature on Africa, for instance, where child migration is seen to epitomize poverty and AIDS (van Blerk and Ansell, 2006).

17 Maruja M. B. Asis, Nicola Piper and Parvati Raghuram

Emergent Topics

An emergent area of research has arisen due to the shifting nature of the region in the global political economic imaginary. Captured by notions such as “Rising Asia” this has led to distinctively new research concerns.

One reason for this is that the global economic recession (2007-2013) had no significant or lasting effect on migration patterns. Unlike the 1997 crisis that hit much of South and South East Asia, the region was relatively unaffected by the downturn, and thus, migration continued (Park et al., n.d.). In India the Ministry of Home Affairs (2010) reported that there are almost 400,000 foreigners of whom students (25%) and employees (11.5%) make up an important part (p. 158). However, there is also a large complement of cross-border migrants particularly from Bangladesh. For instance, the World Bank (2008) estimated that in 2005 there were 5.7 million immigrants in India of whom 2.8% were categorised as refugees. Either way it is clear that India like China are at least regional migration poles. This is a new area of research that has developed in the last decade and has the potential to unsettle the place attachments (south as sending, north as receiving) inherent in much of the migration and development literature (Raghuram, forthcoming).

It is not only new migrants who are turning to Asian destinations, there are a number of return migrants too (Chacko, 2007; Wadhwa et al., 2009; Piper and Withers, 2018; Paul, 2017; Battistella, 2018 and 2014). A number of people are returning because of the enhanced entrepreneurial opportunities they see there (ILO, 2010; Giordano and Terranova, 2012; Jain, 2013; Pieke, 2012; Willis and Yeoh, 2000). However, not everyone’s return is voluntary or celebratory. For many migrants return is due to the foreclosing of opportunities because of the contraction of economic opportunities following the economic crisis not only from Gulf countries (Prakash, 2013; Buckley, 2012) but also from the US. Return was a necessity, not an option (Spitzer and Piper, 2014).

In Asia, return is, in fact, not necessarily the end of temporary migration as migrants may not return to their home countries after working in an overseas destination, but may migrate onwards to other destinations in stepwise migration (Paul, 2017) Other onward destinations like the UK are increasingly restricting opportunities for migrants (Cavanagh, 2012) so the double action of economic crisis and anti-immigrant sentiment in the West with rising opportunities in the Rising Powers may lead to new horizons of mobility as well as immobility (ILO, 2010; Jain, 2013; Wiesbrock, 2008).

While the growth of regional flows has generated attention, this has also occurred at a time of growth of multilateralism, another area of increasing research attention. For instance, multilateral processes and the emergence of the discourse on “migration management” as well as the revival of the migration-development nexus debate have influenced the way in which migration has been researched in Asia (Huguet, 2016). Declining Topics

Although there is greater focus on sexuality (Smith, 2010; Lyttleton, 2014), research on sex workers has declined. For instance, entertainer migration has

18 From Asia to the World been much less under the research radar, largely because the legal migration of entertainers to Japan, the primary destination, has been reduced since 2005. Censured by the US Anti-Trafficking Reports, Japan introduced stricter requirements in the admission of entertainers, which drastically cut the number of entertainers, primarily from the Philippines. Korea continues to receive entertainers, but the numbers are small compared to Japan. All this has meant that this particular research focus has shrunk in recent years.

In line with the expansion of the field, we can observe shifting paradigms on the migration literature on Asia. Moreover, research that used to be predominantly published in local languages is now beginning to appear in English, especially studies carried out by East Asian scholars6, so that horizons of visibility and attention amongst researchers is also changing.

Lodestars of Asian Research

In this section we briefly outline three main foci — labour migration, families and politics — in Asian migration research, the metanarratives they have produced and how these metanarratives are being challenged. We use the term lodestar for these foci as they have become Asian exemplars that have guided so much global research subsequently. We do so in order to expand the imaginaries of Asian migration and to suggest new avenues of research. Labour Migration

One of the key contributions of Asian research to global migration literature is the concept of care chains (Parreñas, 2012). Drawing on the empirical example of Filipina migrants in the US, Arlie Hochschild coined the term “care chains’ to look at the ways in which caring labour is transferred up the chain from urban Philippines to the US and is replaced by migrant workers from rural or semi- urban areas. This metaphor of chains was used to look not only at the redistribution of migrant caring labour but also of affect, with implications for children becoming a particular concern.

The concept of care chains attempts to capture a whole series of movements as well as their differential but interlinked causalities. This work led to a plethora of new research across the world where similar patterns were observed. As a result, the concept of care chains came to be widely adopted. However, its popularity has meant that the analysis of mobility of women has become particularly skewed. First, th meaning and arrangements of care vary and so Asian case should not be used without local specification. For instance, variations in the care diamond, i.e. the institutional factors that shape care — the state, market, household and community — as well as in the definitions of care are often lost (Raghuram, 2012). The role of the state in care provision varies both in financing and direct provision of care. The family too is variable in how care is articulated along gender and generational lines (see below). Besides, the government often

6 The main reason for this is a new cohort of scholars who are conversant in the English language, having done their PhDs in countries where English is the dominant medium, followed by post-doctoral fellowships. There are still many scholars in East Asia though who primarily or exclusively publish in their local language.

19 Maruja M. B. Asis, Nicola Piper and Parvati Raghuram

has a large say in the extent and nature of private provision of care, either as an agent of the state, or as individual provider. Many of these providers may themselves be transnational and the extent to which these other nodes are transnational will therefore vary.

Secondly, research on care chains has differential foci depending on which end of the chain is being studied. In the global South sending context, patriarchy and the family and the effects on children receive considerable attention but in the global North it is the withdrawal of the State and the neoliberalisation of care which receives attention. Yet, this ignores the excellent work that was done on the unequal gender divisions of caring labour in the North in the 1970s and 1980s, especially in the precursor of the care debate — the domestic labour debate (see for instance, Hartmann, 1981) Then, it was precisely these gender inequalities in caring that received attention. Thus, Orozco (2009: 10) argues that although “care chains are led by women, we must consider the places that other actors, especially men, public institutions and businesses occupy, in order to identify the absence of these actors in terms of accountability and in terms of receiving the benefits of care that results from the chains.” Else we are in danger of repeating, yet again, an obsession with the resultant figure of the subaltern woman — the object of many academics’ fantasies and anxieties as many postcolonial authors have convincingly pointed out (Mohanty, 1993; Puwar, 2003). Besides, care chains research has also been critiqued for its’ methodological sexism: women are only seen as caregivers, while all care-giving is seen as female overwritten by a normativity whereby women’s failure to give care is negatively viewed (Dumitru, 2014). Moreover, migration can unsettle established notions of gendered behaviour.

Besides, the global South is largeley seen as a site and source of unskilled labour. Given the importance of these flows this is not surprising. However, migration flows are more complex and intersecting and include skilled workers. Thus, Willis and Yeoh (2000) and Muir et al., (2014), for instance, draw on the experiences of women migrants to China. Comparing these tells us about the differences between those who move through company assignments and those whose move is self-initiated. Although there is no systematic overview of numbers involved, the latter group seems to have more women. They often move in order to overcome gender and other barriers in their existing countries or as spouses (Muir et al., 2014). The latter also move laterally, while the former are often deskilled, employed for their cultural knowledge rather than their particular skills, and may be incorporated temporarily to fill some roles. They, in effect, find it much harder to benefit from movement.

Yet class enables such workers to escape precarity, a theoretical framework increasingly used for theorising female migration globally (Goldring and Landolt, 2013, Lewis et al., 2014). It has been applied to destination countries but much less is known about precarity as a factor leading to out-migration in the first place. Until recently, the language of precarity has been conspicuously absent from much of the literature on the Global South (Piper et al., 2017). This is surprising because migration cannot be seen as a linear path into precarity or a means by which migrants become precarious. Rather, foreign employment should be understood as precarious work undertaken to mitigate existing conditions of precarity at home (Sassen, 2002). In the specific context of strictly

20 From Asia to the World temporary migration leading invariably to return migration and often to re-migration, precarity emerges as “protracted”. This is especially the case in Asia with its extended web of private recruitment agencies leading to migrants incurring debts due to the burden of having to finance their own travel arrangements and job placement. What emerges from this is a view of precarity as a transnational experience that is spatially reconfigured through migration but, nonetheless, represents a constant experience for migrant workers torn between social relations with their natal families and communities and those established in the country of destination.

The concept of precarity, especially its “protracted” nature (Piper et al., 2017), also allows us to move beyond classic development concerns of poverty alleviation, as international migrants are not necessarily the poorest of the poor or characterised by low levels of education. Nor are their reasons for migrating necessarily or even predominantly economic. Like male migration, female migration is motivated by a complex web of social relations. In this sense, precarity takes on multifaceted meanings in cultural, social, and economic terms and is reflective of a multi-layered state of crisis (care, decent work, individual freedoms versus collective needs).

As Spitzer and Piper (2014) argue, the context of labour migration in Asia reflects a precarity brought on by a multiplicity of long-standing social, economic, and political concerns that workers have faced at home and abroad (also see Belanger and Tran Giang, 2013). In the Philippines, for example, decades of neoliberal measures derived from structural adjustment policies have led to continuing employment instability, compelling workers to shift in and out of informal sector employment locally and into contract employment overseas. The rising demand in the global economy for health and domestic workers is the main driver of female migration from the Philippines, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Other countries later followed suit, but not without much ambivalence. The precarity of Asian migrant workers in the current economy is not a new situation but an ongoing one, rooted in the exigencies of neoliberal globalization and globally networked capitalism. Changing Migration, Changing Families

International labour migration is traditionally seen as a mechanism responding to economic and demographic differentials between resource-poor origin countries with labour surplus and more developed destination countries with labour shortage. The family or household was inconsequential in theoretical considerations of migration until the introduction of the new economics of labour migration or NELM (Stark and Bloom, 1985). In this meso level framework, migration is posited as a household strategy for survival or mobility, and locates migration decision-making as a household function instead of deriving from individual action or acted upon by structural forces. While NELM contributed towards understanding the whys or determinants of migration, particularly in the global South, where social protection is inadequate and individuals often have to rely on family-based resources, it is silent on the consequences of migration for families and households in origin countries.

21 Maruja M. B. Asis, Nicola Piper and Parvati Raghuram

In Asia, international labour migration has implicated families and households in divergent and myriad ways, particularly those in origin countries. The strictly temporary labour migration regime in the region created transnational families with migrant workers overseas and their families “left behind” in the origin countries. The separation of migrants and their families invites questions on the gendered renegotiations of power when men migrate and women are left behind (Asis, 2006). Studies on the impact of male migration on “left-behind” families suggest the continuation of male roles as the family breadwinners (Asis and Marave, 2013). In their absence, “left-behind” wives assume dual roles as mothers and fathers to their children, experiences which produced a double- edged consequence: it increased their responsibilities on the one hand, but it also led to new learnings on the other hand, increasing involvement in money transactions and power over decision-making (Gulati, 1993).

Concerns over the effects of migration on families magnified when female labour migration started in the 1980s, finding an audience particularly in the court of public opinion (ECMI, AOS-Manila, SMC and OWWA, 2004; IOM and SMC, 2013). Public anxieties and policy concerns of the family impacts of temporary labour migration invited much academic and research interest in origin countries in the region. Most concerns center on the impact of parental absence on the “left-behind” children. The departure of mothers is considered more problematic for the children because of the role of mothers as primary carers. For migrant women, women’s migration holds the possibility of transforming gender roles within the family. With their greater earnings, women migrants become the main breadwinner in their roles, thereby transgressing traditional gender division. Unlike male migration, women’s migration may be driven by non-economic factors, such as gender surveillance, domestic violence, or escape from a problematic marriage, especially in contexts where women may be stigmatized when their marriage fails (Kim et al., 2017; Constable, 2003). Unlike the work of male migrants in the productive sector, women migrants’ work in the reproductive sector presents daily reminders of the care work they relinquished in their families which they provide to the families that employ them.

The specific case of intra-regional migration Asia requires us to review the notion of the family in general. In Asia, migration is a family project undertaken to advance the welfare of the family and is supported by family members. Grandparents are among non-parental carers on either migrants’ maternal or paternal family who step into the carer’s role. In Indonesia and Philippines, migrants tend to rely more on maternal side while in Vietnam, the paternal family plays a larger role in providing care to left-behind children (Hoang et al., 2015). The extended family, and the intergenerational contract between parents and children suggest the availability of family and kin to step in when parents migrate (Knodel and Nguyen, 2015), does not have the same ring of loss as in some Western nuclear family households.

Research in Asia on how international migration affects young children has been quite extensive. The Child Health and Migrant Parents in Southeast Asia (CHAMPSEA) study is particularly informative because it is based on survey data with fairly large samples which provides a gendered, comparative and longitu- dinal analysis of how parental absence due to international labour migration affects the health and well-being of young children. Data for the first wave, 2008

22 From Asia to the World and 2009, were collected in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam; the second wave was conducted in the Philippines and Indonesia in 2016 and 2017.

Overall, they found that remittances have improved the material conditions of transnational families (Graham and Yeoh, 2013: 310). Contrary to popular views, the health and well-being of the “left-behind’ children are not compro- mised by parental absence. In terms of psychological well-being (based on caregiver reports from the Strengths and Difficulties questionnaire – SDQ), children in father-migrant households in Indonesia and Thailand are more likely to have poor psychological well-being, compared to children in nonmigrant households, while this was not the case in the Philippines and Vietnam (Graham and Jordan, 2011). Other studies probing the impact of parental migration on a range of psychological well-being, such as resilience in Thailand (Jampaklay and Vapatannawong, 2013), and physical health indicators, such as child stunting in the Philippines and Vietnam (Graham and Jordan, 2013), alcohol use in Vietnam (Jordan et al., 2013), smoking in Indonesia (Sukamdi and Wattie, 2013), and school performance in the Philippines (Asis and Marave, 2013) showed variations between countries or children in transnational families faring just as well or better than children co-residing with both parents. Children in transnational families are doing well mostly because the care of children continues to be carried out by family members. Instead of a care deficit, CHAMPSEA noted a care triangle in place among transnational families involving the migrant parent(s), the non-migrant carers at home (which may include the “left-behind” parent or another family member, such as grandparents) and the child (Graham et al., 2012). Family relationships were maintained due to real-time communications between migrants and their families at home. While developments in information and communications technology allow for connectivity, they have also reconfigured being family in the context of transnational migration (Acedera, Yeoh and Asis, 2018).

Fathers were identified as the principal carer of young children by 71% of households in Vietnam, 68% in Indonesia, and 60% in the Philippines among mother-migrant households (Lan et al., 2015: 268). The survey findings supplement earlier qualitative studies (Pingol, 2001 and Asis et al., 2004 in the Philippines, and Gamburd, 2000 in Sri Lanka) which found fathers taking care of their children while their wives work abroad. These provide a counter-narrative to negative public opinions about irresponsible husbands and uncared children while their wives and mothers labour abroad, including findings on delinquent husbands (Parreñas, 2005).7 Few father-carers are full-time carers; most of them continued working outside the home, which, for many, involved balancing their provider and carer roles (Asis, Mendoza and Marave, 2016; Hoang and Yeoh, 2011). From their analysis of migrant wives and left-behind husbands in Vietnam, Hoang and Yeoh, 2011) offered important take-away insights: that men do not fall apart or resort to hyper-masculinity because their migrant wives have more

7 In Sri Lanka, findings from a study that found left-behind children not cared for by fathers led to a policy that prevented women with children under five years old from leaving to work overseas (Save the Children Sri Lanka, 2006; Perrera and Rathnayaka, 2013). In the Philippines, the social costs of migration are viewed by policymakers and advocates largely in terms of perceived ill effects on families, i.e., migration as contributing to marital dissolution, alienation between migrant parents and their children, and a host of juvenile delinquency problems (Asis and Roma, 2010).

23 Maruja M. B. Asis, Nicola Piper and Parvati Raghuram

economic power, and instead of the simplistic dichotomy of separate masculine and feminine spheres, the findings point to the complexity and flexibility of lived (rather than expected) gender relations and identities.

International migration in Asia, thus, casts light on the family as a stakeholder situated between the global and the local, between the market and the state, and as an important safety net for families in origin and destination countries. The research interest spurred by migration “has opened up the Asian family as a material and ideological construct to academic scrutiny, and in the process paved the way for a more critical understanding of gender identities and relations” (Yeoh, 2014: 142). Governing Migration: Politics and Policy

Labour migration has over the last decades also led to greater and more intensified institutionalisation on national, regional and global level — with some coordination among those — which in turn has contributed to sustained flows of temporary migrants. The gradual institutionalisation has been underpinned by particular discourses on migration, linking it to development (the preference by states) and human rights concerns (preference by civil society).

The structural permanence and expanding volume of temporary contract migration, its gendered form and implications for families in Asia have initiated studies taking a more critical view of the migration-development nexus debate highlighting the monetary and social “costs of migration”. This has been paral- leled, if not triggered, by rising politicisation of this type of migration and by an expanding migrant rights activism in Asia. Where such activism has taken on the form of transnational advocacy networks, with the aim of shaping global debates on migration regulation, the objective — and outcome — has been to develop a counter-discourse to the state-led “migration management” frame with its focus on population control rather than a human-centred rights-based approach (Piper and Rother, 2012 and 2014; Piper, 2010). The concept of “governance” has served as a bridge between debates on policy and politics.

The “Asian” way of “doing” migration policy has been based on a narrowly defined regulatory framework whose strictly temporary nature is being navigated (and circumvented) creatively by a range of non-state actors “on the ground” in a variety of ways (Franck et al., 2018). These dynamics between “top down” and “bottom up” processes has given rise to contributions to global governance studies which introduce a perspective emanating from various migrant and civil society initiatives and networks and/or the involvement of a web of facilitators, that is recruiters and brokers (Baas, 2018), to what has otherwise been treated as a state-led arena.

Most research on migration policy has been conducted in a national context taking individual or pairs of countries as point of reference (see also Huguet, 2018). There is still a dearth of research on regional governance or global governance in relation to regions in relation to the role of international organisations in Asia (for exceptions see Kneebone, 2010; Grugel and Piper, 2007). Such lack of research is partly explained by the fact that compared to other regions, an “Asia” formal institutional architecture at regional level (e.g. ASEAN) is poorly developed (Lavenex and Piper, forthcoming). However, apart from formal

24 From Asia to the World processes there are informal ways of governing that are worth examining, such as the so-called regional consultative processes. Other newer developments concern ASEAN’s efforts at harmonising and recognising of skills and qualifications (Jurje and Lavenex, 2018) and enhancement of student mobility (Welch, 2018). Such topics deserve more systematic study.

The Asian experience has led to a fledgling literature taking a critical stance on the ‘development’ impact of temporary contract migration (Chi, 2007; Gibson et al., 2008; Hugo, 2009; Piper and Lee, 2017; Piper, Rosewarne, Withers, 2017) and the costs of migration (Baas, 2018). Such analyses have typically involved a transnational lens and led to the recent call for balancing the more celebratory tenor of “transnationalism studies” which is typically derived from the experience of South-North migration (Piper and Withers, 2018).

The rise in studies on transnationalism by migration scholars from around the world has resonated with scholars of Asian migration since it calls into question the underlying premises of “permanent” migration. Having originally started by anthropologists working on the case of Central Americans in the US8, research on transnational migration which is informed by, or emanates from, the experience of Asian migrants and the dynamics of intra-Asian migration have been increasingly subject to this line of inquiry also. The insights from human geographers and cultural sociologists working on “Asian” transnationalism, however, tended to add to this expanding body of scholarship without making conceptual advancement based on a more critical engagement of the specific reality of migration in Asia which does entail rupture — not because of settlement, however, but due to “forced” return (Piper and Withers, 2018). Such critiques are typically the product of political economists and political sociologists whose work has built bridges to regulation or governance studies by highlighting institutional aspects such as the role of cross-border networks in relation to multilateral and bilateral policy processes.

The role of institutional actors at multiple levels (that is, local, national, regional and global) in the shaping of migration policy and the facilitation of migratory movements has been a phenomenon scholars working on intra-Asian migration have for long grappled with. Studies on migrant networks (Thieme, 2006; Nguyen, 2018) and collective organising by them or on their behalf (Piper and Rother, 2012 and 2014) are a reflection of the increasing number and diversity of institutional actors, located not only within the state but also at sub-state and supra-state levels, involved in shaping or regulating the flow of migrants. Studies on global migration governance have shown that the issues engaging policy makers and advocates go well beyond controlling people’s exit from one country and entry into another and are increasingly perceived as requiring not only bilateral but also multilateral cooperation (Koser, 2010; Betts, 2011). The lack of pathways to permanent residence, let alone citizenship,for the majority of the low skilled, low-wage migrants is indicative of the highly restrictive regulatory environment which does not offer access to many rights. Studies have shown

8 Roger Rose was one of the first anthropologists to challenge the bipolar mode of migration that was popular in the 1970s and 1980s and thus the division of migrants into two types: sojourners and settlers. Through his concept of “transnational migrant circuits” he exposed the problematic nature of the abrupt rupture of ties between sending and receiving communities that dominated thinking (Rose, 1995).

25 Maruja M. B. Asis, Nicola Piper and Parvati Raghuram

that the lack of clear policies dealing with rising phenomena of international marriage (Piper and Roces, 2003) has resulted in lacking programs for migrant integration or incorporation, legal and institutional voids in relation to transnational divorce (Quah, 2015) and return migration of non-citizen mothers and children (Kim, 2017). In the context of legal precarity, the issue of statelessness is also pronounced in Asia (Allerton, 2014). By and large, Asian countries are continuing to assert their sovereignty over territorial borders and population movement (Piper et al., 2018), whilst the emergence of migration governance in a regional and global context as an institutional process running parallel is at an all-time high (Piper and Ramia, 2018). This comes with the realisation of the fact that state responsibility is complicated by rising cross-border mobility and the phenomena of ‘absentee citizens’ and non-citizen residents.

In the sphere of migration, the upholding of rights is rendered difficult by the fact that migrants cross national borders and as “non-citizens” or “absentee citizens” their rights are harder to implement by institutions and regulatory frameworks which are still overwhelmingly nationally oriented. This is further compounded by the prevailing temporary contract migration, leading to defin- itive return migration at the end of a two to four year contract or the slipping into an undocumented status upon overstaying, with marriage migration one of the rare exceptions of offering a pathway to permanent residence (yet rarely citizenship). Yet, as recent studies on the latter have shown, Asian governments are still grappling with filling legal and institutional gaps to address the rising incidences of international divorce leading e.g. to mixed children’s statelessness and other problem issues (Kim et al., 2017).

In addition to citizenship, another arena of protection constitutes international human rights law, since the rights of migrants (even more so when strictly temporary) fall into the responsibility of at least two states — origin country and destination country. But real or perceived failures of international law on migrants have been amply demonstrated (Darrow and Arbour, 2009), and some scholars (such as Neil and Peterie, 2018) have highlighted strategies which governments use to flout their international obligations (Piper and Iredale, 2003). Human rights have, therefore, been described as having a precarious status within international institutions in general (Charlesworth, 2017) and in relation to regional institutions. The regional institutional level can form a bridge between the global and the national/local and thus constitutes another vital step in the gradual acceptance of human rights as truly universal norms. This does not come without its own challenges in light of the different political systems offering more or less limited space for civil society participation.

Migrant rights issues have been subject to fairly extensive research from the viewpoint of civil society activism in Asia (Yeoh et al., 2008; Nah, 2014 ). The findings show that generally speaking migrants’ voices are now better represented due to the fact that migrants have set up their own organisations (often upon return) (Ogaya, 2003) and also engage in advocacy networks at local, national, regional and global level. The rise in collective organising and the formation of transnational and inter-regional networks is in response to but also creates, political opportunities for gaining some form of improvement in migrants’ socio-legal circumstances (Piper and Rother, 2014). The ways in which thes different levels (regional-national-local) of governance are interlinked and

26 From Asia to the World the role and influence of governmental and non-governmental actors deserve more detailed research.

Conclusion: New Research Agendas

We are seeing shifts in global political arrangements which have stood for the last twenty-five years, and migration has been central to some of these shifts. Both Brexit and US politics have drawn on the extant immigrant sentiment which seems to be engulfing parts of the world. It is therefore also reshaping migration. Current policies of forced return, and of blocking entry, even of skilled migrants along with the dissolution or threats to dissolution of free movement has meant that labour and families will be differently put together in the next decades. In doing so, Asia, with its large population and some thriving economies is becoming one of the new centres in a multipolar global arrangement (Pieterse, 2013). Asian migration is thus worth watching.

Our review of the empirical theoretical and policy implications of the previous section shows that there has been a large focus on reproductive sectors of the labour market, yet the articulations between production and reproduction need further work. For instance, how are the lives of migrant and non-migrant men and women in productive sectors, such as finance but also in manufacturing being made possible through the reproductive labour of families? Moreover, as migration for education climbs sharply up the agenda in Asia, how is this paid for? What kinds of work have been required in order to enable migration for education?

The Asian family has become the exemplar of appropriate femininities, something which has been raised by research on the socially reproductive sectors worldwide. Domestic workers and nurses globally have depended on the care meted out by such appropriate femininity. However, as the paper has shown these femininities are not universal across Asia. They are also altering within the context of a rising Asia. And they have particular implications for feminist activities and transnational solidarities.

Theoretically, most migration and development literature looks at mobility not as a way of allowing countries (as imagined ‘nation-states’) to reach out and influence, but as an incursion of borders. Yet, in a globalising world mobility is a central modality through which economic and political power is exercised. This is clearly evident in the case of China. Both capital growth and political influence are acquired through the movement of people. These mobilities have been facilitated to extend the country’s reach. This suggests the need for analysis of how power as a relational concept is and has been practised through migration. The literature that focuses on the effects of migration on development sees migration and development as cause and effect, not as a necessary relation. However, migration is a way of governing societies, not just an object of governance by society (Bærenholdt, 2013).

The focus on the relationship between different forms of mobility is also a topic which needs more attention. What role does the movement of people play in the flow of goods, ideas, policies and money? When is migration a necessary party of investments abroad and what are the different kinds of mobility that

27 Maruja M. B. Asis, Nicola Piper and Parvati Raghuram

these require? Thus, what role does the mobility of people play in the rise to power? This question may be asked historically of “older powers” as well as of those which are currently seen to be emerging. Asking these questions effectively decentres the migrant as the object of study; instead power, its modalities and the part played by mobility in power and influence of the nations to which migrants move too becomes part of the focus.

Despite its focus on Asia, the paper clearly suggests that although there are indeed Asian particularities, there are also generalities. Black theorists, feminists and postcolonial theorists have suggested the need to rethink the existing divisions of the world between Global North and Global South or between conti- nents as in area studies, but instead to examine vectors of power. They argue that the optic of gender, race and class complicates the three-fold division by suggesting new kinds of alliances and different types of disagreements. Fraser (2010) calls the third world that emerges from this kind of analysis the ‘transnational precariat’. The precariat exist simultaneously in different parts of the world but are caught up in the intersectional power relationships that increasingly stretch transnationally. They stretch between sending and receiving countries requiring sensitivity to transnational rights.

In sum, the rise in intra-Asian migration is characterised by multi-directionality and the result of multiple purposes and circumstances. From a global perspective, we would argue that Asian specificities lead to important generali- sations for the study of migration more broadly, by way of a move to a multi-centred, multi-nodal model of international migration; and the formation of transnational class and migrant precariat as a transnational process and phenomenon. Both trends and frames have implications for future research and theorisation. This paper has taken some tentative steps towards such a paradigm shift.

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31 Maruja M. B. Asis, Nicola Piper and Parvati Raghuram

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35 Résumé - Abstract - Resumen

Maruja M. B. Asis, Nicola Piper and Parvati Raghuram From Asia to the World: “Regional” Contributions to Global Migration Research

Migration from Asia has become an important theatre of regional and international migration and thus the crucible of theoretical developments which have attracted global attention. Yet, these contributions have not received explicit acknowledgement. This paper sets out to address this gap by outlining the cross- border, mostly South South, migration especially along corridors between and across East, Southeast, South and West Asia. Empirically, cross-border intra- regional migration in search for work and livelihoods has been a significant feature in Asia for many decades, with male migrants generally responding to the need for workers in the productive sectors and female migrants mostly (but not exclusively) recruited to care work or other reproductive sectors. Over time, this migration has become increasingly multi-directional and complex in terms of categories of migrants, drivers and outcomes. This paper outlines some of this complexity before going on to focus on three themes – labour migration, impact of migration on the family, and governance and politics – to showcase the regional specificities of migration corridors in Asia. In doing so, it points to the implications of the globalisation of Asian specificities for migration thinking.

De l’Asie au Monde : contributions régionales à la recherche globale sur les migrations

Les migrations en provenance d’Asie sont devenues un important théâtre de migrations régionales et internationales et donc le creuset de développements théoriques qui ont une portée mondiale. Pourtant, ces contributions n’ont pas reçu de reconnaissance explicite. Cet article vise à combler cette lacune en décrivant les migrations transfrontalières, principalement Sud-Sud, en particulier le long des corridors entre et à travers l’Asie de l’Est, du Sud-Est, du Sud et de l’Ouest. Empiriquement, la migration intrarégionale transfrontalière à la recherche de travail et de moyens de subsistance est une caractéristique importante en Asie depuis de nombreuses décennies, les hommes migrants répondant généralement au besoin de travailleurs dans les secteurs productifs et les femmes migrantes recrutées principalement (mais pas exclusivement) pour travailler dans le secteur des soins ou d’autres secteurs reproductifs. Au fil du temps, cette migration est devenue de plus en plus multidirectionnelle et complexe en termes de catégories de migrants, de déterminants et de résultats. Le présent document décrit une partie de cette complexité avant de développer trois thèmes : la migration de main-d’œuvre, l’impact de la migration sur la famille, la gouvernance et politique — pour mettre en évidence les spécificités régionales des corridors migratoires en Asie. Ce faisant, il met en évidence les implications de la mondialisation des spécificités asiatiques pour la réflexion sur les migrations.

36 Résumé - Abstract - Resumen

Desde Asia al mundo: aportaciones regionales a la investigación global sobre las migraciones

La migración procedente de Asia se ha convertido en un importante escenario de migración regional e internacional y, por lo tanto, en un crisol de desar- rollos teóricos de alcance mundial. Sin embargo, estas contribuciones no han recibido un reconocimiento explícito. El presente documento tiene por objeto colmar esta laguna describiendo la migración transfronteriza, principalmente la Sur-Sur, en particular a lo largo de los corredores entre y a través de Asia oriental, sudoriental, meridional y occidental. Empíricamente, la migración intrarregional transfronteriza en busca de trabajo y medios de subsistencia ha sido una característica importante en Asia durante muchos decenios, en la que los hombres migrantes en general satisfacen la necesidad de trabajadores en sectores productivos y las mujeres migrantes contratadas principalmente (pero no exclusivamente) para trabajar en el sector de la atención u otros sectores reproductivos. Con el tiempo, esta migración se ha vuelto cada vez más multi- direccional y compleja en términos de categorías de migrantes, determinantes y resultados. Este documento describe parte de esta complejidad antes de desar- rollar tres temas -la migración laboral, el impacto de la migración en la familia, la gobernanza y las políticas- para poner de relieve las especificidades regionales de los corredores migratorios en Asia. Al hacerlo, destaca las implicaciones de la globalización de las especificidades asiáticas para el pensamiento migratorio.

REMi Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 2019, 35 (1 & 2), pp. 39-62

Space of Mediation: Labour Migration, Intermediaries and the State in Indonesia and China since the Nineteenth Century Johan Lindquist1 and Biao Xiang2

It has been increasingly recognized among scholars that migration is mediated by different actors, including those who appear far removed from migrants (Feldman, 2012). Existing literature has pointed out that focusing on processes of mediation provides us with a critical lens to appreciate the relation between migration and broader social change (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013; Sørensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2013; Walters, 2015). Arguably this is particularly evident in Asia where brokers have historically had a crucial role in labour migration (Lindquist, Xiang and Yeoh, 2012). In light of this, the article asks how specific modes of migration mediation have changed over time in Asia, especially in relation to the state. This question will be addressed by examining the case of low-skilled international labour outmigration from China and Indonesia since the nineteenth century.

Our comparison is grounded in what we term “spaces of mediation.” Space of mediation is a conceptual construction, and not a self-evident empirical object. We use “space” in order to capture the complex connections among multiple actors, which are neither clearly localized nor bounded, but centered on the mediation of migration. This space forms an emergent arena of practices and is defined by a constantly changing configuration of multiple connections. The central actors of this space are neither migrants nor state regulators, but are nevertheless indispensable to both the process of and the governance of migration. These actors address the demands of migrants and regulators, but always in the light of their own interests. In the contemporary era, they include commercial recruitment intermediaries — big and small, formal and informal — as well as quasi-government public institutions (such as business associations), NGOs and public media. The multidirectional connections among these actors and the entanglement between their divergent concerns create quasi-autonomous dynamics that actively shape the mediation process. A historical perspec-

1 Professor, Stockholm University, Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University, SE-106 91, Stockholm, Sweden; [email protected] 2 Professor of Social Anthropology, Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology , University of Oxford, 51/53 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 6PE; [email protected]

39 Johan Lindquist and Biao Xiang

tive suggests not only the enduring centrality of the space of mediation in terms of organizing labour circulation, but also ongoing shifts in the balance of power in relation to the state. Taking the “space” of mediation as an entry-point, we investigate how states play their roles in practice without assuming the existence of an autonomous and bounded “state” separated from “society” or “market.”

This article compares the space of migration mediation in China and Indonesia (the Dutch East Indies before 1945) at three modern stages: 1) the period before the entrenchment of the centralized state; 2) the era of national development under the centralized state; and 3) the period since the late 1990s that has been characterized by increasing deregulation in some aspects and re-regulation in others (cf. Table 1). Our comparison shows that, despite the obvious differences between the two states, the space of mediation has followed a comparable evolution. Before China and Indonesia became effectively centralized, the space of mediation was socially autonomous, occupied by identifiable social groups that often served as a link between otherwise separated worlds. In the era of national development, the centralized states aimed to control the space of mediation directly, in terms of both business ownership and operational methods. In the late 1990s the space of mediation in both Indonesia and China underwent a double transformation. First, intermediaries increasingly regained economic autonomy in the wake of market liberalization. In China, public institutions were explicitly banned from commercial labour brokerage, which brought in various kinds of private players and the space expanded rapidly in scope. In Indonesia, economic liberalization and the dismantling of Suharto’s monopolies led to a dramatic growth of labour recruitment companies. Second, however, independent business ownership has not brought about the form of social autonomy that pre-1960s intermediaries enjoyed. States control intermediaries through licensing and de-licensing, monitoring of business conduct, and guidelines about how different types of intermediaries should work together. Both states are hands-off in spirit, hands-on in operation. The following Table summa- rizes the historical changes.

Table 1: Historical Changes in the Space of Mediation of Labour Migration

Period Political context Key players Features Local elites, Pre-centralized nation- representative of Mid-19th century-mid Semi-autonomous, and states (colonialized or foreign/colonial 20th century poorly regulated semi-colonialized) enterprises, civil associations Bifurcated (state Second half of the Centralized, Bureaucrats; informal controlled versus 20th century developmental states (illegal) brokers outlawed) Licensed recruitment Integrated, The end of the Globalizing states companies and professionalized, 20th century onwards associated agents regulated

This comparison is part of our on-going conversation based on long-term field research on labour migration from Indonesia and China over the last two decades. Most recently Lindquist has worked on outmigration from Indonesia, particularly the island of Lombok (ten months between 2007 and 2017), and Xiang on northeast China, particularly Liaoning province (a total of twelve months between 2004 and 2008, and in 2011 and 2017). Lombok is a major sending area

40 Space of Mediation for male oil palm plantation workers to Malaysia and women migrants to Asia and the Middle East, which was partially driven by the economic hardships resulting from the 1997 Asian financial crisis.3 Liaoning Province emerged as a new emigration place in the 1990s amidst massive labour layoffs resulting from the privatization of state-owned enterprises that escalated in 1998. We both realized that, in order to deepen our understanding of the present, we needed to trace it back historically. This article represents fieldwork-informed, historically-based, and comparatively-framed research. It is fieldwork-informed in the sense that our central theoretical question, namely the relation between intermediaries and the state, was derived from our field research on the contemporary condition. We have collected historical data from documentary research. Our analysis of the changes after the mid-twentieth century is based on a mix of information sources, which include scholarly publications, government documents, interviews and field observations. The article is comparatively-framed not only in the sense that it discerns differences and similarities between Indonesia and China, but more importantly, maps continuities and discontinuities across historical stages through comparisons between the two countries. Instead of confining our analysis to labour migration intermediaries alone, we investigate changes in the general intermediary classes between the state and the local society, of which migration intermediaries have been a part.

The “Link Society” Model of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

Large-scale labour migration to and from Asia was initiated in the first half of the nineteenth century as the demand for natural resources across the region exploded in the wake of capitalist expansion, made possible by colonial intervention and transportation innovations such as the steamship. In this process, Asia experienced a “mobility revolution” (Amrith, 2011: 25-29). An estimated average of 150,000 Chinese emigrated annually, leading the Chinese population in Southeast Asia to increase ten-fold between 1840 and 1949 (Cao, 1997: 531).4 Chinese migrants were initially the main source of labour in plantations and mines in the outer islands of the Dutch East Indies, but near the end of the nineteenth century the Dutch colonial state increasingly turned to the growing Javanese population to replace them (Houben, 2018). In this process, Javanese migrants became indentured labourers in plantation belts and mining enclaves in the outer islands of the Dutch East Indies and further afield in Surinam, Malaya, and New Caledonia (Hoefte and Meel, 2018).

An important part of the mobility revolution was the emergence of a space of mediation that linked previously separate societies, either between the colonial and the native, or between formal systems and informal social life, which together with new forms of transport made the actual recruitment and

3 In 2011 East and Central Lombok were the Indonesian regencies with the second and fourth largest number of migrants departing during that year, respectively. Data from the National Agency for the Protection and Placement of International Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI). 4 In the 1850s there were about 1 million Chinese in Southeast Asia (Zhuang, 1994: 55), and the population increased to more than 7 million in the 1920s and to 10 million in the 1940s (Guo, 1989: 118).

41 Johan Lindquist and Biao Xiang

movement of labour across great distances possible. In the Dutch East Indies, indirect colonial rule was institutionalized as a system of intermediaries between populations and societal spheres. The idea of the schakel or “link” society suggested that cultural links could serve as a “channel” connecting “strange worlds” (Abdullah, 1978: 148, cited in Kuitenbouwer, 1980: 105). While ethnic Chinese functioned as middlemen in the colonial economy (Rush, 1990), the Javanese priyayi aristocracy had a similar role in the political and bureaucratic spheres (Sutherland, 1979), and local strongmen, jago, exchanged “order” for the right to engage in extortion, theft, and banditry (Wilson, 2015: 11-13).5 Labour migration came to be conceived and organised in similar terms thus forming the basis for the space of mediation. In China, a new space of mediation emerged because the traditional intermediary structure centered on gentries collapsed, and new linkages had to be made between local societies and foreign powers that demanded labour. In the space of mediation in both countries, private labour brokers and (quasi)colonial officers played important roles by creating infrastructure such as temporary housing and labour depots, as well as funding migration itself (Kaur, 2004: 51).

In the Dutch East Indies, the recruitment of Chinese migrants was initially handled by Chinese brokers via the British Straits Settlements, but as fees increased Dutch private companies received permission to recruit in China beginning in 1888 (Termorshuizen, 2008: 272-273). Even with direct recruitment Chinese labour remained expensive and was increasingly replaced by Javanese migrants recruited by Dutch firms (Houben, 1999a: 3). With a series of Coolie Ordinances aimed to protect the interests of plantation companies by outlining sanctions against workers who violated contracts (Breman, 1990: 63; Tirtosudarmo, 2001: 203), the Dutch attempted to create the basis for an administrative and legal system that would guarantee the circulation of indentured labour to the plantation belts in outer islands (Houben, 1999a: 3). The number of migrants deployed to the outer islands, East Sumatra in particular, was far greater than those sent abroad to other Dutch colonies, such as Surinam, and English and French colonies such as Malaya and New Caledonia, as the colonial authorities in the East Indies aimed to monopolize the substantial Javanese labour reserve (Houben, 2018: 62-63).

The coercive and criticized Cultivation System (1830-1870), based on Javanese corvée labour, gave way to the Ethical Policy (1901), which purported to improve the welfare of colonial subjects. In this process, there was a rapid increase in the number of specialized government departments (Cribb, 1993: 233; see also Sutherland, 1979: 14), and, more generally, a “huge extension of the state apparatus deep into native society and a proliferation of its functions” (Anderson, 1983: 479). This was evident not least in the context of migration, as Javanese migration was perceived both as a way of supplying labour and reducing overpopulation. The so-called “colonization” (kolonisasi) program was initiated in 1905, which permanently moved Javanese peasants to the outer islands (Hardjono, 1988: 427; see also Stoler, 1985: 38), while Recruitment Ordinances (in 1909 and 1914) ostensibly aimed to prevent abuses against

5 In this role, the priyayi became the agents of intensifying state intervention in vaccina- tion campaigns, taxation, and corvée labor, thus increasingly becoming associated with the colonial state (Sutherland, 1979: 16).

42 Space of Mediation coolies, as an extensive series of regulations were made compulsory for recruitment firms. Firms and their recruiters had to be licensed and have well-maintained labour depots in their areas of recruitment, while a limited number of recruitment commissionaires (wervingscommissarissen) were in charge of surveilling the implementation of these regulations (Houben, 1999b: 32-34). Notably, the regulations and broader recruitment system for migrants sent to Surinam and other destinations abroad were governed by the same regulations as those within the East Indies (Houben, 2018: 62-63).

Labour recruitment on Java was divided between a handful of Dutch firms, each with three types of personnel: the mainly European recruiters, the Javanese henchmen (handlangers or glundungan) and the Javanese overseers (mandor), of whom the latter two would approach prospective migrants. State labour inspectors generally blamed henchmen and overseers for engaging in deception and extortion and luring villagers to become coolies under false pretenses (Houben, 1999b: 30). Plantation corporations in the outer islands, with the support of colonial officials who complained that costs were too high while anticipating that the commercial recruitment agencies would not be able to deliver enough workers, created their own recruitment systems (Stoler, 1985: 28; Houben, 1999b: 34). The so-called personal recruitment system was based on sending workers back to Java to recruit family members and fellow villagers. These laukeh (Hokkien for “veteran”) were to be monitored by European representatives of the companies along the way and were likely modeled on earlier forms of direct recruitment in China. Although apparently different, in practice the “two systems were virtually identical” since they made use of the same village-level recruiters (Houben, 1999b: 36), thus illustrating how attempts to establish new forms of labour recruitment were inevitably embedded in already existing networks and relationships (Ibid.: 27).

The predominance of firms and extensive use of village-level recruiters highlight the multiple levels of mediation between the state and prospective migrants that characterized the “link society”, and which created the basis for a space of mediation for labour migration. This space was shaped as the “village” itself became a site of colonial concern (Breman, 1988). During the Cultivation System, the Javanese peasant economy had become organized on a territorial basis by the colonial state, as the village became the primary unit for the extraction of labour and taxes (Breman, 1988: 16). The creation of travel passes further regulated labour mobility and positioned the village chief in a mediating position of power (Barker, 1999: 127-128), not least when it came to the recruitment of migrant labour (Termorshuizen, 2008: 267). During the colonization program, migrants were often chosen by village chiefs who could take the opportunity to displace unwanted residents (Ibid.: 2008: 294). Although it was critical for priyayi to retain good relations with village heads because of the colonial demands for rust en orde (peace and order) they increasingly belonged to different social worlds. As Stoler (1985: 25) has put it, “peasants remained village residents whose contact with the colonial apparatus was cushioned and muted by a layer of native civil servants.” It was thus the social rather than economic autonomy of the village that made brokers both necessary and a problem for labour recruitment companies and colonial authorities.

43 Johan Lindquist and Biao Xiang

As noted, China’s involvement in the mobility revolution was very different. The dramatic increase of outmigration after 1860 was directly related to the encroachment of Chinese sovereignty and the displacement of one space of mediation composed by traditional locally rooted gentries by another consisting of commercial players and local thugs backed by foreign powers. In imperial China, gentry in the countryside functioned as a link between a centralized but small bureaucracy, on the one hand, and the massive rural society, on the other (Wu and Fei, 1948). They assisted the imperial state with ensuring social order (including preventing large-scale outmigration either to other parts of China or overseas) (see Kuhn, 2008), maintaining public programs such as education and irrigation, and collecting taxes. In turn they represented the local society in negotiating with the state, particularly regarding tax deduction and relief provision in years of hardship.

This space of mediation was undermined with the decline of central power and recurring social upheavals. The gentry scholars’s intermediary role was overtaken by entrepreneurial, and often predatory individuals who had connections with the fragile modern state and foreign powers (Duara, 1987). After humiliating defeats in two Opium Wars (1839-1842, and 1856), the Qing court was forced to sign the Beijing Treaty in 1860, which conferred foreign companies the freedom to recruit workers in China to feed the expanding colonial economy worldwide, but primarily in Southeast Asia. Major colonial powers set up recruitment bureaus in key cities and dispatched officers to different parts of China, who in turn relied on local brokers to recruit workers. Called ketou (head of guests) or zhuzaitou (head of piggy), the local brokers often deceived or even kidnapped young men to port cities, particularly Hong Kong, where they were trafficked overseas. Colonial ports became the focal points of this early form of human smuggling, and triad gangs played an important role in recruitment (Ong, 1995). Recognizing the widespread problems, the Qing government banned outmigration recruitment in 1891, and in 1905 the governor of Guangdong, one of the major migrants sending areas, ordered all recruitment agencies to be closed down. But with the support of foreign consular offices, both foreign and local recruiters continued with the business (e.g. Mao, 2004, see also Cao, 1997). Traditional gentries and other local leaders were helpless, though some did launch campaigns attempting to stop the recruitment, including standing in the ports to dissuade men from boarding recruiters’ boats. The mediation process that linked foreign powers and Chinese local societies remained unregulated after free passage workers replaced indentured workers as the main channel of outmigration in 1893. An estimated 7 million Chinese were brought overseas by these intermediaries (Chen Hansheng cited in Li, 2002: 99).

Between 1915 and 1918 Russia, France and Britain recruited an estimated 300,000 Chinese workers to support their First World War efforts, for instance as transport workers and trench builders (see Zhang, 2009; Xu, 2011; O’Neill, 2014; Bailey, 2014; Ma, 2015; Wood and Arnander, 2016). The workers were recruited by Chinese companies with foreign connections, or sometimes by foreign agents directly, and were tacitly endorsed, but hardly regulated, by the Chinese government. Most were not properly informed about the war conditions (Li, 2002: 99-113). Appalled by the unethical recruitment procedure and the abuse that the workers faced overseas, particularly in France, a group of revolution- aries belonging to the Association for Work-Study in France (established in 1912)

44 Space of Mediation experimented with alternative recruitment methods in 1916. They successfully negotiated with the French government and employers to ensure equal pay for Chinese workers to study French at work, direct payment of travel costs and wages to workers rather than through recruiters. The Association then worked with education officers and primary school teachers in hinterland China to recruit literate workers without criminal records, although the number was small (Li, 2002: 106-107; Dirlik, 1991: 326). It is important to note that active participants in the Work-Study in France Movement included Mao Zedong (who actively promoted the movement and recruited a number of worker-students in his home province Hunan, though he did not go to France himself), Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping and other prominent Communist leaders. As such, the space of mediation was not only socially autonomous, but also became politically revolutionary.

Regardless of the nature of these intermediaries, be they traditional aristo- crats or modern entrepreneurs, their social autonomy caused grave concerns for modernizing state. This was true in the Dutch East Indies as well, where even before independence in 1945, the colonial state, while heavily reliant on intermediaries, was also keen to curtail them. While the Recruitment Ordinances aimed to regulate labour recruitment through documentation, officials hoped that dactyloscopy, the science of fingerprint identification, would form the basis for a modern labour system in the Indies through the registration and, as Dutch experts put it, the “sieving” of contract workers (Mrazék, 2002: 101-102). While there was a predictable lack of implementation in the context of labour migration, the proposed use of dactyloscopy was an example of the “fetishization of the tools of surveillance” that characterized the Dutch regime (Barker, 1999: 166). In the divided Dutch colonial society and administration these technologies were imagined as bridging a gap that was inhabited by brokers (see, for instance, Kuitenbrouwer, 1980; Barker and Van Klinken, 2009: 22) who controlled access to prospective migrants independently of any broader recruitment system that was created by state or market actors.

In China, intermediaries were of such a great concern that they stood out as a rare common enemy of diverse social groups. Conservative mandarins, radical reformists and socialist revolutionists all “placed the problem of controlling or eliminating middlemen near the top of China’s constitutional agenda” (Kuhn, 2002: 91). The fact that the Republic of China, which was established in 1912, repeatedly failed to control such intermediaries as those who recruited workers for Europe during the First World War is widely seen as a result of its failure in unifying China, centralizing power and protecting sovereignty, a fundamental weakness that for many had to be overcome through radical social changes.

As McKeown has pointed out more broadly, with the rise of liberalism and “free” labour (as opposed to indentured or debt-bondage labour), informal recruiters were increasingly demonized and connected to premodern forms of labour organization, despite the fact that most were a product of the capitalist economies and mass migrations associated with modernity (McKeown, 2008: 116). In contrast to social relationships, an emerging form of proceduralism based on documentation or technologies such as fingerprinting increasingly came to be seen as a mode of regulating mobility (Ibid.: chapter 10). As is clear from both cases, however, the space of mediation that came to be inhabited by

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various kinds of brokers was difficult to regulate, not least because the state lacked the basic capacity to penetrate local societies that were separated from the modern bureaucracy.

Space of Mediation as a State Project for National Development

The link society model was fundamentally dismantled by the centralized states in both Indonesia and China, and new types of mediation were put in place. The early post-colonial Indonesian state was burdened by debt from the war and distinguished by the penetration of the state by societal groups that gained influence during the revolution and independence from the Netherlands, between 1945 and 1949. In this process, the state bureaucracy grew ten-fold between 1940 and 1968 to 2.5 million civil servants (Anderson, 1983: 482-483). However, the rise of Suharto’s New Order regime, following the destruction of the communist party beginning in 1965, led to the reestablishment of the power of the state vis-à-vis society, as the Indonesian state, by way of the military, was able to nationalize foreign corporations. Power was thus increasingly consolidated and centred on the Suharto family and their crony capitalist network. Furthermore, the Indonesian family planning and transmigration programs are intimately connected with the power of the New Order state to reach into the intimate spheres of everyday life (Warwick, 1986). The latter was based on the Dutch colonization program, renamed transmigrasi when it was initiated in 1950, as the Indonesian state revived the process of moving peasants from overpop- ulated Java, in particular, to less densely populated areas in the outer islands (Tirtosudarmo, 2009). The two programs shared comparable ambitions with regard to demographic engineering and nation-building, as well as transforming livelihoods, and were supported by international organizations such as the World Bank (Tirtosudarmo, 2001).

What is particularly noteworthy, primarily in light of this article, was the use of the petugas lapangan, or “field agent”, who recruited “acceptors” (akseptor) in family planning programs in the early 1970s and supported new arrivals in the transmigration program. In the context of family planning, the petugas lapangan was eventually given the status of civil servant (Niehof and Lubis, 2003: 126-127), thus signaling the state’s attempt to directly access the village and thereby control the space of mediation. The term itself connotes a connection to a bureaucracy and thereby an extension of the state apparatus, rather than a broker whose allegiances are divided, thus pointing beyond the “link society” that characterized the colonial era towards a more expansive form of engagement that has been termed “bureaucratic authoritarianism” (King, 1982). After the 1997 economic crisis, the petugas lapangan became increasingly critical in the recruitment process, as well as a site of state regulation, with the rise of international migration, a point we will return to later.

A national overseas labour migration program was first conceptualized by the Indonesian government in the late 1960s, partly in response to transmigration’s limited effects on the rising problem of unemployment. From the beginning, a key task of the Ministry of Manpower was to gain control over already existing flows of international migration, by creating a space of mediation through

46 Space of Mediation the licensing of private recruitment companies. It took more than a decade, however, before international labour migration became an explicit dimension of national development. In the wake of the global recession in the early 1980s, and particularly after the global slump in oil prices in 1986, which seriously affected the Indonesian economy, state bureaucrats and policymakers saw international labour migration, primarily female domestic workers to Saudi Arabia, as a possible solution to both Indonesia’s foreign exchange and labour market problems (Cremer, 1988; Palmer, 2016: Chapter 2). In order to more efficiently regulate increasing flows of migrants, and to convince migrants to choose documented over undocumented migration, the Centre of Overseas Employment (Pusat AKAN) was created within the Department of Manpower in 1984.6

Migration and trade were considered explicitly together, thus placing international migration in the context of broader economic policy (Palmer, 2016: 26-28). In fact, there was a general agreement that the welfare and rights of Indonesian workers should not take precedent over national development. In line with this, and in order to make Indonesian workers more competitive — as the country was a latecomer to labour export compared to the Philippines — the costs of recruitment were shifted from employers to workers (Ibid.: 37). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the government regulated licenses for recruitment companies, while starting a state-owned company, PT Bijak, in order to influence and regulate the market by creating competition and protecting migrants. During this period, there was also an expansion of particularly male irregular migration to Malaysia. To a certain degree this was a continuation of historical patterns, but also an effect of the growth of the Malaysian economy and, in particular, the oil palm economy. Much of this migration became increasingly clandestine with the growing demands for migration documentation in Indonesia and the gradual expansion of the Malaysian deportation regime. Within this space of mediation, the tai kong (“ship’s captain” in Chinese), the migrant smuggler, and the calo, the murky low-level middleman pervasive in Indonesian everyday life, became a critical figure in the movement of Indonesian migrants across the border (Spaan, 1994; Jones, 2000).

The policy transformations of the 1980s and 1990s thus led to the increasing bifurcation of state-controlled female migration and illegally brokered male migration. Most licensed recruitment companies were based in Jakarta and other major cities, while provincial branch offices recruited villagers, primarily Javanese women. With regard to undocumented migration, chains of tai kong connected rural villages, border areas, and employers abroad, thereby bypassing urban centres. The divisions between the two migration channels were not clear- cut, however, as both were characterized by unclear boundaries between state and non-state actors and depended on village recruiters. As during the colonial period, evidence suggests that village heads and return migrants remained important in the recruitment process (Spaan, 1994), while state officials at the border were engaged in making money off migrants (Jones, 2000).

6 The creation of the centre was influenced by a similar migration-specific government agency in the Philippines (Spaan, 1999: 158-159; Palmer, 2016: 31-32). More generally, the improvement of state capacities to regulate migration was supported by the ILO and UNDP, and was part of a global trend in the 1980s to make international migration to Europe and the United States more legible (Palmer, 2016: 40-41).

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In China, spontaneous labour outmigration was almost completely stopped after the Communist Party took over in 1949. State foreign aid projects that sent (mainly skilled) personnel to more than 50 developing countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia and East Europe (He Xiankai, 1994: 150-162) was the main channel of international labour deployment, managed by the Foreign Economic Liaison Ministry (later the Ministry of Commerce) with branches in all provinces (“bureaus”) and cities (“offices”). When the central government decided to start a project overseas, the ministry would require the bureau in a particular province with suitable expertise and labour force to implement the project. The provincial bureau might in turn ask municipal offices to do the same. As such, there was no space of mediation as labour deployment was directly administered by state regulators. In the reform era following the Cultural Revolution a new space of mediation emerged. This space was initially led by four state- owned companies set up by the central government in 1982, called “central companies”, which carried out international projects on a commercial basis. All the central companies started their international business as labour suppliers, but soon realized that established players in the industry hardly engaged in labour-intensive tasks and instead specialized in design and management. The central companies thus increasingly subcontracted labour-intensive tasks to other companies in China from the mid-1980s. The subcontractor carried out the project independently, and the central company profited from the gap between the amount paid by foreign clients and that paid to the subcontractor. Even when the subcontractor secured a deal with foreign clients, the project had to be presented as that of the central company because the latter were the only legitimate “windows” through which Chinese companies could access the international market. The subcontractor thus had to pay the central companies a “window fee.”

The space of mediation enlarged in the late 1980s with the establishment of provincial “windows,” which were formerly Provincial Bureaus of Foreign Economic Liaison reorganized into companies. The change was partly prompted by the concern that the government’s explicit involvement in international projects may be politically inconvenient. Unlike the central companies that owned tangible assets and specialized in certain business fields, the main function of the provincial windows was to mediate other companies’ international businesses. Some local international companies were shell companies (“briefcase companies” in Chinese) that picked up overseas deals by using their contacts to pass on to others. Window companies were also encouraged to set up subsidiaries in provinces, thus enabling local, non-window companies to “sail to the ocean on others’ boats” (jiechuan chuhai), as official documents at that time had it. In the beginning, the subcontractor companies sent their own employees overseas to carry out projects. But with the introduction of contract- based labour relations aimed at replacing life-long tenure, a reform initiated by the central government, they increasingly recruited contract workers through open hiring for the overseas projects. Thus at least two steps of mediation were involved: first, that of international business by “window” companies; second, that of labour by the subcontractors.

Although the state effectively crushed the intermediary class and monopolized the legitimate forms of international labour placement, this did not eradicate illegal migration, which increased significantly in the 1980s and the

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1990s. Illegal migration took place outside of state control and was brokered by multiple intermediaries, but this does not mean that it was completely unrelated to the state; it was partially a result of the emergence of the so-called “nongovernmental channels” of outmigration in southern China. The nongovernmental channel was an extension of the space of mediation controlled by the state. From the mid-1980s, increasing numbers of employers from Hong Kong and Taiwan travelled to Guangdong and Fujian to recruit workers through their personal networks for fishery and factory jobs in Southeast Asia and Saipan.7 Provincial government encouraged this and initially ordered local window companies to help with the workers’ passports, visas and other paperwork for free, though most companies soon started charging window fees. Xiamen International, a major window company in Fujian province, sent out 40,000 workers between 1984 and 2004, the majority being nongovernmental, with about 85% hired by overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and the south Pacific.8

Non-governmental channels led to large-scale undocumented migration. According to a retired cadre whom Xiang interviewed, a major state-owned company in Shanghai with the “window” status sent more than 3,000 people to Japan every year in late 1980s through the non-governmental channel. The company worked with informal brokers who recruited the would-be migrants who planned to immigrate to Japan, the company then arranged the paperwork for short-term visits or temporary jobs, knowing that most of the migrants would over-stay their visas. The fact that this channel was endorsed by state- owned companies on paper made this form of undocumented migration particularly rampant. Another type of undocumented migration was entirely brokered by informal networks. These individuals did not register companies, and therefore could not provide documents. Transnationally connected, they instead transported people into the destination physically, for instance by voyaging across the Pacific to North America, or by taking a bus or train across Eurasia into western Europe (Smith, 1997; Chin, 1999; Kyle and Liang, 2001; Chin, 2003). Although formally criminalized by the state, the critical part of the networks, namely the “snakeheads” (also known as “yellow ox” in some parts of China) in the migrant-sending communities, were often tacitly tolerated by the grassroots authorities. Apart from the deep roots of human smugglers in the community, local government also hoped that emigrants would contribute to the local economy through remittances (Chin, 2003; Xiang, 2003). In any case, it was no longer possible to develop an autonomous space of mediation free from state intervention as in pre-modern times. A telling example is the role of returned migrants. While returnees were among the most active brokers in the pre-modern times because of their transnational networks, they played a minimum role in the time of nation-states. This is because returnees, often uneducated and unconnected to the state, simply did not have the necessary resources to act as brokers in the new context.

7 Beijing allowed Taiwan fishing boats to anchor at designated ports in Fujian; owners of the boat often recruited labor on shore nearby. Hong Kong and Taiwan garment factories relocated to South Pacific countries and Guam and Saipan of the U.S, in the 1980s and 1990s in order to avoid tariff imposed by the international textile quota system. 8 Interview with deputy director general, Xiamen International, February 25, 2005, Xiamen.

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The existence of undocumented migration, in both Indonesia and China, should not be regarded as a sign of state failure in controlling the space of mediation. The very fact that undocumented migration is categorized in this way, or as “irregular” or “illegal”, is a product of the state’s attempt in monopolizing the “legitimate means of movement” (Torpey, 2000: 5). In fact, it is not possible to conceptualize “illegal” without reference to “legal” migration. Human smugglers had simply remained capable community members if the state had not attempted to undermine their social and cultural authority or even crimi- nalize them. Furthermore, as in Indonesia, it is clear that illegal migration in fact was a significant source of income for state officials, thus illustrating how illegal channels were related to the state-controlled space of mediation in operation. In China, the government launched a series of campaigns against human smuggling in the 1990s primarily because the central state regarded undocumented outmigration as a sign of the disobedience of local government (Xiang, 2003). The crackdown, however, was more a contestation between the central and local governments, rather than a battle between legal and illegal spheres. These efforts brought about a new configuration of the space of mediation at the turn of the millennium, which we will turn to now.

The Professionalization of the Space of Mediation

The space of mediation of labour outmigration from Indonesia and China has expanded significantly since the late 1990s. The volume of migration has increased rapidly, there has been a liberalization of regulation over individual outmigration, and, most importantly, there has been a dramatic growth of migration brokerage. At the same time both the Indonesian and Chinese states have attempted to shape and control the space of mediation through unprece- dentedly hands-on regulations. Indonesia has attempted to formalize the relationship between informal labour recruiters and licensed companies through biometric technology and a broader database system, while China has tried to develop a system in which, in the words of an official in Liaoning province, “agents, officials and migrants all have laws to rely on and rules to follow at every step.”9 As detailed below, both countries went through simultaneous de-regulation and re-regulation. De-regulation were policy changes that encouraged outmigration and allowed for more private players to become legitimate migration intermediaries. But at the same time both states set stricter rules for licensing and guidelines for the intermediary business, thus a process of re-regulation. The simultaneous process of de-regulation and re-regulation turned the space of mediation into a professional domain open to anyone who was qualified and was thus no longer monopolized by public institutions. But as a professional domain, only those who satisfy the state requirement regarding their professional capacity can become recognized players.

Indonesia witnessed significant transformations during the period after the Asian economic crisis and the fall of Suharto in 1998. While the New Order was “characterized by a powerful military, centralized decision-making, violent repression, and ideological control,” the current era can be framed most broadly in terms of “democratization” and “decentralization” (Van Klinken and Barker,

9 Interview, June 2, 2006, Shenyang, Liaoning province.

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2009: 2); the military has lost much of its power and prestige, there has been a dramatic growth of political parties, NGOs, and other civil society groups, and political decentralization has given provinces and districts, and thereby local actors, greater autonomy. Aspinall (2013) describes Indonesia as a “nation in fragments” that should be conceptualized in relation to two sources, namely patronage and neoliberalism. More specifically, contemporary Indonesia is characterized by decentred clientelism in the context of state decentralization, in contrast to the heavily centralized clientelism of Suharto’s New Order, which has “shifted power relations within patron-client relationships” and have tipped “the balance more in favour of the clients” (Ibid.: 31, emphasis in original). This decentred clientelism is particularly evident in the context of international migration, as the number of licensed recruitment agencies have increased dramatically with the liberalization of licensing and the increasing demand for documented migration following the collapse of the Indonesian rupiah. More specifically, this decentring is reflected in the increasing power of the petugas lapangan who are the actual recruiters in villages across the Indonesia, and who have increasingly come to control migrants and thereby profits. The space of mediation has thus come to flourish after 1998.

The Asian financial crisis was a watershed for international migration, as the collapse of the Indonesian rupiah and highly publicized mass deportations of undocumented workers from Malaysia led migrants to turn to documented channels.10 The collapse of the Indonesian rupiah and an intensifying Malaysian deportation regime aimed at undocumented migrants led to the rapid increase in the number of documented migrants, which quadrupled to nearly 800,000 annually within a decade; the majority female domestic care workers and male construction or oil palm workers. Recurring abuses against domestic workers abroad, and the widely acknowledged extortion of returning migrants — all in the context of an increasingly vibrant civil society — led to an intensifying focus on the “protection” (perlindungan) of migrants.11 At the same time there has been a dramatic decline in transmigration, not least in the context of political decentralization, through which it has been viewed as marginalizing local populations and only benefiting migrants rather than sending communities (Tirtosudarmo, 2009: 11). In contrast, as in other parts of the world, the remittance economy has become the new site for grassroots development, and the migrant has been transformed from a site for social engineering into an entrepreneur.

In tandem with political decentralization, there have been attempts to centralize the regulation of international migration. In 2006, the National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, BNP2TKI) was created to coordinate government activities, both on the national and provincial levels. Licensed recruitment companies are increasingly regulated by the government. Each recruitment company must pay a 50,000 US dollar cash bond for licensing

10 See Hugo (2012: 399) for the increase in documented migration. There is no data on the drop in undocumented migration, but on-going fieldwork in migrant-sending areas, in tandem with Malaysian deportation programs point to a significant drop (e.g. Lindquist, 2010). 11 For instance, a specified migrant reception terminal at Jakarta international airport opened in August 1999 (Silvey, 2007).

51 Johan Lindquist and Biao Xiang

and is bound to specific procedures — for instance, a strict process of documentation and compulsory pre-departure training — which increasingly has come to integrate commercial and regulatory infrastructures, not least on the provincial level where most recruitment takes place. There are also regulations concerning the signing of contracts between recruitment companies and employers abroad, which must be mediated by Indonesian government representatives. While the head offices sign the job orders, it is the provincial branch offices that organize the actual recruitment process.

As of 2013 there were 546 licensed recruitment companies (compared to less than fifty in the middle of the 1990s) with approximately 4,000 branch offices around the country12, as well as an inestimable number of petugas lapangan, though these numbers have dropped with the ongoing moratorium on sending migrant workers to the Middle East (Platt, 2018). The petugas lapangan who recruits and delivers migrants to licensed agencies has in an important sense replaced the migrant smuggler, or tai kong, of the earlier era, but is also reminis- cent of the laukeh from the colonial era. Although in some cases former tai kong have become petugas lapangan, the primary difference between the two is that while tai kong escorted undocumented migrants across great distances, petugas lapangan work within a more constricted space, delivering migrants to local recruitment companies while dealing with government paperwork. While the term suggests formality, in fact the petugas lapangan works without contracts and includes a wide range of actors, including low-level civil servants and return migrants. Of critical importance is that they are able to negotiate the interface between village environments, government offices, and recruitment companies (Lindquist, 2012; see also Spaan and Hillman, 2013).

In order for a villager to become a migrant there is an extensive process of documentation. The language associated with documents — tembak, to shoot, or jalan tol, toll road, for instance — points to the extra costs involved in accessing documents quickly. The road metaphor is apt since the process of documentation entails that the petugas lapangan escorts prospective migrants to government offices and spends time waiting for documents to be produced. Great distances, bad roads, and lack of public transportation make mobility arduous and expensive in many areas. Despite the ubiquity of cell phones and that most documented migrants now travel directly by airplane rather than overland, it is the movement of migrants to the urban-based recruitment company prior to departure that is the main logistical problem. It is thus in the space between rural and urban areas different brokers temporarily collaborate. In this process, petugas lapangan — particularly those who are most successful and considered reliable by recruitment companies — are able to control capital, documents, and the migrants themselves, generally without having direct access to foreign markets. Much of this power is based on relations of trust with prospective migrants. In this process, what a figure who was initially imagined as being an extension of the state apparatus, or in the case of international migration, the licensed recruitment company, has in practice come to function as a broker between different societal spheres.

12 Lindquist interview with office manager at the head office of APJATI, the Indonesian Manpower Services Association (Asosiasi Jasa Tenaga Kerja Indonesia), in Jakarta, June 4, 2014. Of the 546 licensed companies, 461 were members of APJATI, and these had a total of 3,227 licensed branch offices.

52 Space of Mediation

The petugas lapangan has therefore been at the centre of regulatory reform. Beginning in 2012, BNP2TKI in collaboration with APJATI (Asosiasi Jasa Tenaga Kerja Indonesia), the Indonesian Manpower Services Association, the national organization for licensed recruitment companies, initiated a government-controlled licensing system for petugas lapangan, who were to be registered in a database using biometric technology, representing in effect a radical attempt to formalize or professionalize the informal and control the space of mediation. This was ideally supposed to allow recruitment companies and government agencies to regain control over the recruitment process and profits. More generally, this was part of BNP2TKI’s broader attempt to create a migrant labour database based on biometric technology in an ongoing shift to e-governance (Lindquist, 2018). Although some dimensions of these reforms have failed — not least because of intra-governmental conflicts (Palmer, 2016) — in the space of mediation that has taken shape through the expansion of labour recruitment, it is possible to see an ongoing process of re-regulation that aims to control and professionalize recruiters on a number of different levels.

In China, the expansion of the space of mediation was driven by liberalization on two fronts, individual outmigration and migration brokerage. The policy consensus in the 1990s was that migration must be made freer. First, nearly twenty administrative procedures in the passport application were cut out, and by 2005 most urban residents were able to apply for a passport by presenting their identity cards. The Passport Law, effective from January 2007, enshrined every citizen’s legal entitlement to possess a passport. As a result, the annual outflow of labour migrants increased from 253,000 in 2000 (China International Contractors’ Association, 2004: 10) to 530,000 in 2015 (China International Contractors’ Association, 2016: 5.). Second, in 2002 there was a watershed policy change regarding labour recruitment companies, which were allowed into the business while at the same time public and government institutions were banned from the business in order to maintain the integrity of both the market and state. The number of licensed companies increased from four in 1979, all state-owned (Zhang Gesheng, 1999: 206), to about 3,000 in 2010, though the number dropped to about 1,000 afterwards.13

The Chinese government thus consciously attempted to govern migration through commercial intermediaries. But this obviously presented challenges. Unlike the pre-reform era when licensed companies were state-owned and obliged to follow government orders, the newly licensed companies are independent enterprises. Furthermore, while the government could previously stop companies from sending workers at a moment’s notice by withholding project approvals or workers’ passports, the liberalization of exit control meant this was no longer feasible. In this context, the government regarded clear, pre-set and impartial rules, rather than via ad hoc, direct and arbitrary interventions, as the way forward. Licensing is the central practical leverage through which the state regulates the migration brokerage. All companies must meet sets of strict criteria

13 The 3,000 recruitment companies included those licensed by the ministries of commerce, labor, transport (specializing in sea farers) and health (specializing in nurse migration). Companies licensed by the ministries of education and public security (for permanent emigration and general-purpose border crossing) sometimes engaged in labor migration as well (estimate based on CHINCA, 2004-2012; Center for International Exchanges, Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2008; Xia Hong, 2012:52).

53 Johan Lindquist and Biao Xiang

to be licensed. They are subject to annual reviews, and those who fail to provide satisfactory documentary evidence about their business performance are deli- censed. Regulators placed great emphasis on companies’ capacity. They identified companies’ financial capacity as the foundation for business success and the determinant of their credibility. “What is credibility?” the official in Liaoning province asked, “If you have the [financial] capacity to pay the full compensation [in case of failure in service], you have the credibility. If you can’t compensate, what credibility can you talk about?” The labour ministry set the national policy in 2002 that all agents had to pay a minimum financial bond of USD 60,000 when applying for licenses, a figure that has increased nearly ten-fold since.14

Apart from the stress on financial capacity, the Ministry of Labour urged all agents to develop the “capacity of resisting risks.” All companies were required to submit a report on their “emergency coping mechanisms” when applying for licenses from 2005 onwards. The report details the procedure, the division of labour, the staff and the telephone numbers designated, and the budget earmarked for dealing with emergencies such as when workers stage strikes overseas. A much more difficult requirement in the license application is that agents must have appointed their legal representatives in destination countries. In addition, it is compulsory that intermediary companies have staff with work experience in international relations and career development. The government also stressed strict documentation procedure. For instance, licensed intermediary companies were required to submit their Service Agreements (between agents and migrants), Employment Contracts (between foreign employers and migrants), proof of the overseas employer’s legal status and the foreign government’s permissions for hiring migrant workers. The companies also have to declare that they have checked all the details in the contracts against laws and regulations of the local government, the national government, and in the destination country. Obviously only a small number of intermediaries could meet these requirements. The scientific regulation was inevitably exclusive. It reinforced the monopoly position of the windows. This unintentionally complicated the space of mediation. What emerged was a multi-layered system of “intermediary chains.” At the top of the chain are window companies in major cities. They sign contracts with foreign firms and process the legal paperwork that was necessary for outmigration, but outsourced the task of labour recruitment to middle-level agents in the prefectures, who in turn subcontract to subagents in local districts or rural townships, who are referred to colloquially as “the legs,” akin to the Indonesian petugas lapangan. When the overseas employer complains to the recruitment agent in the destination country about a migrant, the foreign agent pressures the window company to seek quick solutions, and the “window” often passes the task downward to the “leg,” who disciplines the migrant transnationally by pressuring the migrant’s family in the home country.

14 Liaoning province, for example, doubled the minimum bond from the national level of USD 60,000 in 2002 to USD 120,000 in 2007. The national level was then raised to USD 500,000 in 2012 (State Council, 2012). Ministry of Labor. 2002 [Decree No. 7]. Provincial Rules on Security Bond for International Labor Cooperation. In Liaoning, the agent must deposit the bond with a designated bank. The bank, the agent and the provincial labor bureau sign a three-party legal contract that forbids the bank and the agent from with- drawing the money without the government’s permission, but authorizes the government to use the money to deal with emergencies caused by the agent, particularly to compensate for migrants’ losses.

54 Space of Mediation

The space of mediation is still evolving. In 2010, the State Council designated the Ministry of Commerce as the single authority to oversee land-based labour outmigration. The Ministry of Commerce cut down the number of licensed companies significantly, partly aimed at driving those connected to other ministries, especially the Ministry of Labour, out of the business. At the same time the Ministry of Commerce launched a campaign to set up “labour service platforms” at the county level, and by the end of 2015, there were 310 such platforms across the country (CHICA, 2016: 14). The platforms are networks of government departments coordinated by a specially created government agency, which have direct access to the labour force and to window companies, and are thus able to process the entire recruitment procedure. In other words, it aims to create a new regulatory infrastructure to “flatten” the multi-layered commercial infrastructure. It remains to be seen how this will affect the intermediary business and labour outmigration in general.

Simultaneous deregulation and re-regulation as demonstrated in both Indonesia and China represents a common policy trajectory among a number of Asian countries. In the era of globalization, developmental states deregulate the economy in order to join the global market, but at the same time reintro- duce regulations in order to safeguard their economic sovereignty or capture profits. In Indonesia and China, labour migration mediation is deregulated by opening space for private actors and adopting market mechanisms. This is aimed at promoting outmigration for developmental goals. At the same time the business is reregulated in order to protect migrants’ rights and to reinforce government’s executive power. Licensing turns out to be the chief method of achieving simultaneous de-regulation and re-regulation. Those who are licensed are supposed to be professionally qualified and will therefore mediate labour outmigration in ethical and efficient ways. Although unlicensed entities are still an important part of the scene, they work as subagents of licensed companies and are closely monitored. In sum, the space of mediation has both privatized and professionalized.

Conclusion

Migration should not be understood as constituting migrants’ activities per se. Migrations in modern times are to a great extent constituted by multiple actors other than migrants. These actors are interconnected and thus create a “space of mediation”. Based on historical comparison between Indonesia and China, this article shows that the composition and dynamic of such space has changed over time, which is an integral part of the changing political order in general. Before the mid-twentieth century, the space of mediation arose in response to the emerging modern statecraft that was alien to the local society. The space of mediation linked the process of migration to the administrative regulation imposed from above and afar. At the same time the space of mediation was sufficiently distanced from the power that it could become a site of resistance and even revolutionary activities. The space of mediation shrank dramatically after Indonesia and China became full sovereign nation-states that administered migration processes directly. After the 1990s, outmigration was encouraged, exit control liberalized, and migration increased significantly. The most important consequence of liberalization, however, has been the growth and complication

55 Johan Lindquist and Biao Xiang

of the intermediary business. As we have documented elsewhere, the migration intermediary industry increased much faster than migration itself in both China and Indonesia (Xiang and Lindquist, 2014). The space of mediation has once again assumed a central role in low-skilled labour migration.

The space of mediation and the state are not in opposition. The space of mediation did not necessarily contract when the state expanded, nor did it necessarily “bounce back” when the state retreated. As our historical comparison shows, it was the collapse of the traditional order and the efforts of modern state building that gave rise to the space of mediation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Similarly, the growth of the space of mediation since the 1990s is accompanied by increasingly sophisticated regulation in both countries. As such, it is more productive to investigate how state and non-state actors overlap, rather than how they are separated. This allows us also to distinguish our work from the work of scholars such as Peck and Tickel (2002), who conceptualize the “roll-back” and “roll-out” of the state strictly in relation to recent processes of neoliberalization. As Huang has put it in his research on Chinese history, “contrary to the vision of the public sphere/civil society models, actual socio-political change in China has really never come from any lasting assertion of societal autonomy against the state, but rather from the workings out of state-society relations in the third realm” (Huang, 1993: 238). By the “third realm” Huang means a space that is distinct from state and society but which both participate in. Examples include the imperial justice system in which the state endorsed community arbitrations, which was how the majority civil cases were settled, and the rural gentry class under the county level who represented both state interests and local concerns. The space of mediation can be seen as part of the third realm.

By construing the space of migration mediation as a site where bureaucratic operations and social activities co-evolve, our comparison also sheds light on the question of whether the current era of globalization is a continuation or even repetition of the developments of the nineteenth century. History has not simply gone through a cycle. The contemporary space of mediation differs from the link society in multiple ways. The space of mediation after the 1990s is to a great extent based on the social infrastructure built by the state. The petugas lapangan was cultivated by the Indonesian state during the New Order, and in China the space of mediation was developed primarily through the corporatiza- tion of government agencies. Most privately-owned intermediaries were once state-owned, and their unlicensed sub-agents were often government agencies or public institutions (such as vocational schools). The “legs” were usually persons who enjoyed public authority such as retired cadres or school teachers. The connections with the state ran deep and wide. As such, the era of national development was decisive in shaping on-going transnational flows and connections. The increase of labour migration after the 1990s is more an expansion of national development projects than a “return” to the pre-nation state models.

Will the contemporary space of mediation become more autonomous in time? For instance, will rights-focused NGOs in Indonesia play a countervailing role against commercial intermediaries? Will the new “labour service platforms” in China become a basis for reorganizing public life at the grassroots level? Or will NGOs, now extremely weak in China, one day emerge to put state power

56 Space of Mediation in check? These questions can only be addressed by further empirical research. They are clearly not unique to labour outmigration, and are related to such issues as the roles of political parties and local-central relations. As such, the notion of space of mediation may provide a tool for investigating more general social transformations that take place on multiple fronts but often appear contradictory, as we are witnessing in many Asian countries today.

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Tirtosudarmo Riwanto (2001) Demography and Security: Transmigration Policy in Indonesia, in Myron Weiner and Sharon Russell Eds., Demography and National Security, London, Berghahn, pp. 199-211. Torpey John (2000) The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 224 p. Walters William (2015) Migration, Vehicles, and Politics: Three Theses on Viapolitics, European Journal of Social Theory, 18 (4), pp. 1-20. Warwick Donald (1986) The Indonesian Family Planning Program: Government Influence and Client Choice, Population and Development Review, 12 (3), pp. 453-490. Wilson, Ian (2015) The Politics of Protection Rackets in Post-New Order Indonesia: Coercive Capital, Authority and Street Politics, London, Routledge, 220 p. Wood Frances and Arnander Christopher (2016) Betrayed Ally: China in the Great War, Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 224 p. Wu Han and Fei Xiangtong (Eds.) (1948) Huangquan Yu sShenquan (Emperor and Gentry), Shanghai, Guanzha Press. Xiang Biao (2003) Emigration from China: A Sending Country’s Perspective, International Migration, 41 (3), pp. 21-48. Xiang Biao and Lindquist Johan (2014) Migration Infrastructure, International Migration Review, 48 (S1), pp. 122-148. Xu Guoqi (2011) Strangers on the Western Front: Chinese Workers in the Great War, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 366 p. Zhang Gesheng (1999) Guoji Laowu Jingji [International Labour Economy], Chongqing, Chongqing Daxue Chubenshe [Chongqing University Press]. Zhang Jianguo (Ed.) (2009) Zhongguo Laogong Yu Diyici Shijie Dazhan (Chinese Labourers and the First World War), Jinan, Shandong University Press. Zhuang Guotu (1994) Haiwai Maoyi He Nanyang Kaifa Yu Mingnan Huaqiao Chuguo De Guanxi (The Connection between the Overseas Trade and Southeast Asian Development to the Emigration of Overseas Chinese), Huaqiao Huaren Lishi Yanjiu (Research on the History of Overseas Chinese), 2, pp. 55-59.

61 Résumé - Abstract - Resumen

Johan Lindquist and Biao Xiang Space of Mediation: Labour Migration, Intermediaries and the State in Indonesia and China since the Nineteenth Century It is increasingly recognized that a focus on how migration is mediated by non- migrants can provide a critical lens for examining the relationship between migration and broader social change. This article develops this approach further by examining the mediation process historically and comparatively. We compare the evolution of the complex relations among multiple actors that shape mobilities through what we call the “space of mediation”, using the case of low-skilled international labour outmigration from Indonesia and China since the nineteenth century. In both countries, the space of mediation before the mid-twentieth century was large, quasi-autonomous, and poorly regulated. The space was brought under the control of centralized state in the second half of the twentieth century, and then bifurcated into state-managed labour exports and undocumented outmigration. On entering the twenty-first century, the space of mediation has become both privatized and professionalized, and more expansive, integrated and regulated. L’espace de la médiation : intermédiaires et État en Indonésie et en Chine depuis le XIXe siècle Il est de plus en plus reconnu que la manière dont la migration est médiatisée par les non-migrants fournit une perspective critique pour examiner la relation entre la migration et le changement social plus large. Cet article examine le processus de médiation d’un point de vue historique et comparatif. Il compare l’évolution des relations complexes entre les multiples acteurs qui façonnent les mobilités à travers ce que nous appelons « l’espace de la médiation », dans le cas de l’émigra- tion internationale de main-d’œuvre peu qualifiée d’Indonésie et de Chine depuis le XIXe siècle. Dans les deux pays, l’espace de la médiation avant le milieu du XXe siècle était vaste, quasi autonome et mal réglementé. L’espace a été placé sous le contrôle de l’État centralisé dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, puis a bifurqué vers des exportations de main-d’œuvre gérées par l’État et une émigra- tion clandestine sans papiers. À l’aube du XXIe siècle, l’espace de la médiation est devenu à la fois privatisé et professionnalisé, plus étendu, intégré et réglementé. Espacio de mediación: migración laboral, intermediarios y el Estado en Indonesia y China desde el siglo XIX Se reconoce cada vez más que un enfoque en la forma en que la migración es mediada por los no migrantes puede proporcionar una perspectiva crítica para examinar la relación entre la migración y el cambio social más amplio. Este artículo desarrolla este enfoque examinando el proceso de mediación histórica y comparativamente. Comparamos la evolución de las complejas relaciones entre múltiples actores que conforman las movilidades a través de lo que llamamos el «espacio de mediación», utilizando el caso de la emigración laboral internacional de baja cualificación desde Indonesia y China desde el siglo XIX. En ambos países, el espacio de mediación antes de mediados del siglo XX era amplio, casi autónomo y mal regulado. El espacio fue puesto bajo el control del estado centralizado en la segunda mitad del siglo XX, y luego bifurcado en exportaciones de mano de obra manejadas por el estado y emigración indocu- mentada. Al entrar en el siglo XXI, el espacio de la mediación se ha privatizado y profesionalizado, y se ha vuelto más amplio, integrado y regulado.

62 REMi Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 2019, 35 (1 & 2), pp. 63-86

The Ambiguous Authority of a “Surrogate State”: UNHCR’s Negotiation of Asylum in the Complexities of Migration in Southeast Asia Alice M. Nah1

In December 2018, a majority of the member states of the United Nations adopted the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration as well as the Global Compact on Refugees, the latter proposed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While the impact of these Global Compacts is yet uncertain, what is clear is that this dual-track approach has reinforced the distinction between “refugees” and “migrants” rather than problematizing it. In Southeast Asia, people who are displaced across borders are likely to be more affected by the Global Compact on Migration than by the Global Compact on Refugees, since many of them are not legally recognized as refugees. Even when a subset of actors such as UNHCR and local civil society groups try to identify, protect and assist them, asylum-seeking populations experience the insecurity, instability and uncertainty that come with living as non-citizens with irregular status.

The way that human mobility is understood and managed is shaped fundamentally by the formation of states, borders, and national imaginaries. The forming of postcolonial states in Southeast Asia resulted in varied relationships between people and state authorities. People have been included unevenly as citizens based on their ethnic identity and proximity to political and economic power. Postcolonial nation building has required ideological investment, with political leaders actively (re)constructing national identities. The quest to form coherent identities has not been bloodless — internal strife, armed conflicts, and secessionist movements have marked struggles for power (Brown, 1994; Snitwongse and Thompson, 2005; Oishi, 2016). However, nation-building

1 Lecturer, Centre for Applied Human Rights, Department of Politics, University of York, Heslington, YO10 5DD, United Kingdom; [email protected] Some of the research findings reported in this paper were drawn from a project entitled “The law of asylum in the Middle East and Asia: Developing legal engagement at the frontiers of the international refugee regime”, led by Martin Jones and funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (2016-2019). I am thankful to Nicola Piper, Deepa Nambiar, Sharuna Verghis, Martin Jones and three anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Any mistakes remain the author’s own.

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discourses have also succeeded in fuelling strong and instinctive nationalist pride, which normalizes and legitimizes the perspective that citizens should get preferential treatment over non-citizens.

In Southeast Asia, state borders bisect customary travel routes and territories. Modern immigration control regimes — consolidated in the twentieth century through decolonization — set the terms for “legal” movement across territorial borders. Despite efforts to regulate entry and exit, borders in Southeast Asia have been porous, weakened by prevalent corruption (Franck, 2018) and the inability of states to maintain comprehensive border controls. Well-developed smuggling and trafficking networks cut through Southeast Asian states, often involving chains of agents in different countries (Larsen 2010; Lindquist, 2010).

Historically the most renowned refugee movement in Southeast Asia was the Indochinese refugee crisis. Between 1975-1995, close to 2 million people left Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam overland and on boats, seeking refuge in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines amongst other countries in Asia (Frost, 1980). States in Southeast Asia grappled with the complexities of protecting Indochinese refugees in various ways. The international community developed multilateral agreements to find durable solutions, enacting the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees (CPA) in 1989 (Robinson, 1998). In this Plan, states in Southeast Asia agreed to hold refugees temporarily until they were resettled or repatriated home, voluntarily or not. A legacy of this international response is that states in Southeast Asia presume that refugees are a temporary “international (or UNHCR) problem” that is “solved” through resettlement or repatriation — not local integration.2

At present, UNHCR projects the presence of 1,102,441 refugees and 55,658 asylum seekers in Southeast Asia in 2019 (UNHCR, 2019a).3 Most of the people seeking asylum in Southeast Asia originate from Myanmar. Since August 2017, over 723,000 Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh (UNHCR, 2019b), adding to the 276,200 refugees from Myanmar already there at the end of 2016 (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 2017). One of the key challenges of refugee protection in Southeast Asia is the reluctance of states to legally recognize the status of refugees and to enable their enjoyment of rights. Only three states — Cambodia, the Philippines, and Timor Leste — are state parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Importantly, countries hosting the largest numbers of refugees – Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia – are not.4 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has not committed to any forms of regional protection for people displaced across borders.

2 See for example, perspectives of Malaysian government officials as reported in the report by Equal Rights Trust and the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (2014). 3 It projects a further 1,135,808 stateless persons, 18,050 returned refugees, 332,483 returned internally displaced persons, 515,943 internally displaced persons, and 80,120 “others of concern”. For UNHCR, Southeast Asia includes Bangladesh. 4 While President Joko Widodo passed the landmark Presidential Decree 125 of 2016 Concerning the Handling of Foreign Refugees thus defining and recognizing the status of refugees, this decree only recognizes only two durable solutions for refugees — resettlement or repatriation — not integration, even on a temporary basis.

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The case of Malaysia is of interest to scholars and practitioners for several reasons. First, it hosts refugees in protracted situations5 in urban and rural areas — they are not camp-based. Refugees mingle and live with citizens and other non-citizens; they are not kept geographically separate. Secondly, Malaysia is a key destination in the region for regular and irregular migration. It simultaneously creates legal channels for temporary labour migration while taking a hostile and punitive approach to irregular migration. Malaysia’s immigration control mechanisms are a significant cause of the dangers and risks that refugees experience. Thirdly, Malaysia is a classic example of how UNHCR must advocate for refugee protection within the complexities of migration. Key to the protection of refugees is the recognition that they are a specific type of non-citizen in legitimate need of international protection. UNHCR actively constructs refugees as being different from other “types” of non-citizens, a category that is conceptually and practically kept limited so that “others” — “non-refugees” — are unable to access the rights associated with this identification and so that refugees are perceived as a “much smaller’ and therefore “less threatening” group of people, requiring fewer resources to protect.

Drawing upon interactions with UNHCR officials, refugees, and civil society actors in Malaysia over the past fifteen years or so as a civil society refugee rights advocate and as a researcher6 — I examine how UNHCR, along with local civil society actors, create and expand “protection space” for people who seek asylum through the construction and reification of this category. This article adds to a gap in international relations literature about how international organisations such as UNHCR interact, act, and advocate for refugees at the domestic level. It argues that UNHCR may take on properties of a “surrogate state” (Slaughter and Crisp, 2009; Kagan, 2012; Miller, 2018) but it does so without sovereignty, operating with ambiguous authority. This ambiguity arises from the lack of clarity over its role and powers as an international organization operating in the territory of a state. This ambiguity has resulted in UNHCR gaining ground in refugee protection, but also causes confusion amongst state authorities — and UNHCR officials — about the legitimacy and limits of their authority. The need to cooperate with Malaysian authorities for specific cases of refugees also means that UNHCR cannot be as openly critical as it might want to be.

Troublingly, this approach — of identification, separation and the “rescue” of refugees from arrest, detention, and deportation — embeds UNHCR in domestic immigration control regimes. Refugees are only protected through UNHCR’s continuous intervention and their practices thus become grafted into state immigration control practices, without an exit strategy. Critically, this approach also focuses on creating exceptions for a small number of people. A broader, more

5 UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as a situation where “a refugee population of 25,000 persons or more has been living in exile for five years or longer in a developing country” (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 2004: 5). 6 I volunteered for the National Human Rights Society of Malaysia (HAKAM) from 2002-2008, and was one of the founders of the Migration Working Group of Malaysia. I completed a doctoral dissertation at the National University of Singapore examining immigration control practices in Malaysia in 2012. I am a co-investigator of an international research project entitled “The law of asylum in the Middle East and Asia: Developing legal engagement at the frontiers of the international refugee regime”, led by Martin Jones and funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (2016-2019).

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inclusive approach is required to address the precarity of mobile subjects in Southeast Asia — one that recognizes their rights and their need for protection regardless of the circumstances of their movement.

The Violence of Categories

Scholars on migration have pointed out that the terms used to describe people who cross borders — such as “refugee” and “migrant” — are insufficient in capturing the complexities of their experiences (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018; Karatani, 2005; Zetter, 2015). Such terms are often used to identify and separate different “types” of people who move, but these terms rely on simplified understandings of migration journeys. State authorities tend to assume that people choose when and how they move, begin a unidirectional journey from one place to another, and enter a country of destination with a clear motive.

Immigration control regimes operate on this logic. State authorities classify people who move based on why they enter a country and from where, assigning rights accordingly. However, people who move across borders can often fit in more than one immigration category (for example, a refugee could simultaneously be an international student and the foreign spouse of a citizen), and can change between categories relatively easily (Koser and Martin, 2011; Collyer and de Haas, 2012). While these categories appear self-evident and “timeless”, they are social and political constructions with specific histories (Zetter, 2007; Long, 2013). Decision-making authorities can be stricter or more lenient in the classification of people into these categories, and the meaning of these categories change over time.

Similarly, scholars have been critical of the commonly expressed distinction between “forced” and “voluntary” migration, noting that people who move make choices on their journeys — choices that are constrained to a greater or lesser degree (Castles, de Haas and Miller, 2014; Richmond, 1994; Van Hear, 1998). There are also involuntary aspects of movement in so-called “voluntary migration”, which some scholars suggest should be analysed as “forced economic migration” (Withers and Piper, 2018). Moreover, voluntariness in a decision to leave a place depends on the availability of “acceptable alternatives” (Erdal and Oeppen, 2018). Scholars have also highlighted problems with concepts such as “transit migration”, which presumes that migration begins in one place and ends in another, when such journeys can be erratic, interrupted, and unpredictable (Collyer, 2007; Collyer and de Haas, 2012; Crawley et al., 2016; Sampson et al., 2016). Those who move across borders may not know where to go, may be forced to find alternative destinations, and may spent interminably long periods in places they thought to be temporary (Missbach, 2014; Moutnz, 2011).

In the 1990s, scholars and practitioners working on forced displacement engaged considerably on the topic of “mixed migration”. This body of work arose of out the recognition that refugee movements were often “mixed” with other types of movements, that people who moved can have a “mix” of motivations that could change over time, and that it was therefore difficult to identify refugees (Van Hear et al., 2009). From this viewpoint, migration movements complicated

66 The Ambiguous Authority of a “Surrogate State” the protection of refugees, as states tended to perceive them as migrants (with irregular status) rather than people in need of asylum. The worry by state officials was that those who sought asylum were “really” “economic migrants” abusing asylum systems. The task at hand was therefore to identify, classify, and “separate out” a smaller sub-set of people from larger movements — that is, to “protect refugees within broader migration movements” (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 2002: 10). This approach reinforces the salience and importance of distinguishing between “refugees” and “migrants”. However, some scholars are critical of this approach to “mixed migration”, pointing out that people migrate with different degrees of volition and for diverse reasons, and that “migrants” should not be considered “less deserving” of protection when they need it (Erdal and Oeppen 2018; Bakewell, 2011).

“Mixed movements” continue to be a cause for concern for policymakers and practitioners. In Europe’s “migration crisis” (or “refugee crisis”) from 2015 onwards, political and popular discourse focused on whether the people who moved “deserved” a place in Europe based on their background, countries of origin, and reasons for movement (Holmes and Castañeda, 2016). Again, attention was placed on whether they were (genuine) refugees to which European states had legal obligations to grant asylum or (merely) “migrants” who should be deterred (Goodman, Sirriyeh and McMahon, 2017). Scholars have referred to this as “categorical fetishism” (Apostolova, 2015; Crawley and Sleparis 2018), that is “treat(ing) the categories “refugee’ and “migrant’ as if they simply exist, out there, as empty vessels into which people can be placed in some neutral ordering process like a small child putting bricks into a series of coloured buckets” (Crawley and Sleparis, 2018: 49).

Indeed, categories and the categorization of people as refugees has been the cornerstone of the international refugee protection regime. States and UNHCR have invested significant effort in building refugee status determination processes (RSD) to determine if a person is a refugee under international and domestic law. In countries that do not have domestic systems for this, UNHCR conducts RSD. Over time, UNHCR’s RSD caseload worldwide has grown significantly, even exceeding those of states. However, this task is difficult, time-con- suming, and resource-intensive. Studies show that states and UNHCR struggle to make RSD decisions in a timely, accurate, and consistent manner (Kagan, 2006; Simeon, 2010 and 2017). UNHCR has recognized that it faces a “crisis” in RSD — it is unable to manage its overwhelming caseloads around the world and to meet the protection needs of people of its concern.

The Changing Role of UNHCR in Protracted Refugee Situations

The role of UNHCR in relation to forced displacement has evolved significantly over time (Betts et al., 2008). The international refugee protection regime is based on the principle of burden — or responsibility-sharing — that states need to work together to address forced displacement. UNHCR supervises state practice in relation to international obligations towards asylum seekers and refugees. However, as Türk, the Assistant High Commissioner for Protection (and previous Representative of the High Commissioner to Malaysia from 2004-

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2008) observes, UNHCR plays an unusual role for a UN agency, “interceding directly on behalf of distinct individuals and groups of people” (Türk, 2010: 3). As Türk points out, there are contexts in which UNHCR plays a “de facto state substitution role” (p. 11), with “strong operational involvement” (p. 15). In such contexts, UNHCR gets directly involved in the daily lives of refugees, rather than just engaging in general policy and legal advocacy towards governments.

Reflecting on UNHCR’s role in protracted refugee situations, Slaughter and Crisp (2009) put forward the idea that in some contexts, UNHCR effectively becomes a “surrogate state” to refugees, “complete with its own territory (refugee camps), citizens (refugees), public services (education, health care, water, sanitation, etc.) and even ideology (community participation, gender equality)” (p. 8). Slaughter and Crisp observes that this creates serious dilemmas for UNHCR, for while this approach enables them to protect refugees it also absolves host states of their responsibilities.

Examining UNHCR’s interventions in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, Miller argues that “[international organisations] that take on more surrogate state properties tend to have less influence on the states in which they work” (2018: 6). According to Miller, this occurs because of the marginalization of the state from refugee protection operations and responsibility shifting. Miller argues that marginalized states are incentivized to maintain the status quo, and benefit from letting UNHCR assume the costs and work of protecting and caring for refugees. Miller argues that in contexts when UNHCR plays a stronger surrogate state role, UNHCR can find it difficult to influence states. As states abdicate their responsibilities, UNHCR steps in to fill the void but also takes the blame for whatever goes wrong. States become disinterested in refugee affairs, and UNHCR is forced to hold back its criticism to maintain access to refugees.

A logical solution to the problem of responsibility shifting is therefore to refocus attention on state responsibility. However, as Kagan (2012) points out, this is not a viable option in many countries. As he observes, “Even if fully committed in principle to state responsibility, UNHCR is often trapped into accepting quasi-government functions indefinitely, fearful that if it pulls back, refugees would simply be abandoned because host governments would be unwilling to step in” (p. 317). Focusing on refugee protection in Arab countries in the Middle East, Kagan then argues in favour of UNHCR’s role as a “surrogate state”, highlighting that this offers symbolic and material benefits to governments. He argues that the state-to-UN “responsibility shift” can be used strategically, in a limited way, with clear lines of accountability and realistic expectations.

However, Kagan’s analysis rests on states “ignoring” refugees, or protecting their negative liberties by “doing nothing” while UNHCR takes on the tasks of registration and the provision of services. In some cases, as in Malaysia, the state actively pursues and punished migrants with irregular status, and UNHCR must intervene to protect refugees from such state actions. Kagan’s analysis also presumes that UNHCR has the resources, infrastructure and the goodwill of host states for such “shared responsibility”, and that UNHCR can manage the functions and services of a state efficiently and effectively. As this article shows, despite UNHCR’s significant efforts, its protective reach is limited and it remains

68 The Ambiguous Authority of a “Surrogate State” chronically under-resourced. Furthermore, UNHCR’s adoption of the surrogate state role in Malaysia emerged over time, as its own response to unfolding events and the protection needs of refugees — it was not by the invitation of the Malaysian state, and the lines of accountability, responsibility and authority for refugees are continuously blurred and renegotiated.

In contrast to UNHCR, there is no other international organisation that deals with other forms of migration in a similar way, leading to a significant gap in the protection of people on the move (Hollifield, 2000). While the International Organisation for Migration is perceived as a leading inter-governmental organization dealing with migration and became a “related organization of the UN” in 2016, it is explicitly “non-normative” (Guild and Grant, 2017). Significantly, it does not have the rights-based protection mandate that UNHCR does. As critics point out, IOM’s funding model also means that it often takes on projects funded by states that focus on border control and the implementation of state migration policies rather than the rights of people who move across borders (Brachet, 2015). In contrast, while the International Labour Organisation has played a critical role in developing labour standards and rights for people on the move, its mandate and structure does not lend itself to a broad spectrum of migration management activities (Hughes and Haworth, 2013). Its field presence is also limited. As a result, there is a lacuna in the protection of people experiencing precarity as they move within and across borders.

Protecting Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Malaysia

At the end of December 20187, there were 163,860 asylum seekers and refugees registered with UNHCR, of whom 67% were men and 33% were women (UNHCR, 2019c). 86.5% originate from Myanmar — comprising 88,880 Rohingyas, 26,180 Chins, 9,800 Myanmar Muslims, 4,000 Rakhines and Arakanese, and other ethnicities from Myanmar. 22,070 asylum seekers and refugees come from other countries, mainly from South Asia and the Middle East. In Peninsular Malaysia, most asylum seekers and refugees live in urban areas, with the highest concentrations in Selangor, Kuala Lumpur and Penang. These groups live in two broad types of places — what civil society groups and UNHCR term “urban sites” or “urban areas” — typically run-down, low-cost flats and houses in inner-city neighbourhoods — and “jungle sites” — typically plantation, jungle, or construction areas (Nah, 2010). The former tends to be spaces of urban decay, while the latter tend to be frontiers of urban expansion — places where they can live relatively cheaply and find informal work.

According to Malaysian law, asylum seekers and refugees are not distinguished from migrants with irregular status, and are therefore at risk of arrest, detention and deportation. The Immigration Act 1959/1963 provides the police and immigration authorities with widespread powers to arrest anyone they suspect of committing an immigration offence. Entry into Malaysia without

7 While I have highlighted the politics and complexities of using terms such as “refugee” and “migrant”, it is impossible to move away from using these terms. When using the term “refugee” in this paper, I refer not only to people who have gone through UNHCR’s RSD processes and have been formally recognized as refugees but include those who would like to seek asylum but have not been able to.

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authorization is punishable by a fine of up to RM10,000 and/or imprisonment of up to five years, and possible whipping of not more than six strokes (Section 6-3). Those who stay beyond the period of their permits are liable for the same level of fines and imprisonment (Section 15-1 to 4). Their lack of status in domestic law is the primary source of insecurity for asylum-seeking populations.

Malaysia was a country of first asylum for Indochinese refugees. Through negotiations with other states and through its participation in the CPA, Malaysia eventually hosted around 258,500 Vietnamese refugees in temporary, isolated, closed camps. By 1998, 249,132 had been resettled to third countries and 9,365 returned to Vietnam (UNHCR Malaysia, 1998). The last Vietnamese refugee from this period in history departed Malaysia in August 2005 (Steenhuisen, 2005). Over the past few decades, Malaysia has also voluntarily and formally offered asylum to different groups of Muslim refugees, such as the Khmer Muslims from Cambodia and Muslim refugees from the Southern Philippines in the 1970s (Robinson, 1998; Strauch, 1980); Bosnian Muslims fleeing the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Farley, 1994), and Acehnese refugees from Indonesia in the 2000s (Nah and Bunnell, 2005). In October 2015, Malaysia offered protection to around 3,000 refugees from Syria under a Temporary Relocation Programme for Syrian Migrants. In 2017, it launched a pilot work scheme for UNHCR- registered Rohingyas, permitting around 300 of them to work in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors.

In the 1990s, there were small movements of groups seeking asylum in Peninsular Malaysia — far less visible than the heavily publicized Indochinese refugees. UNHCR registered around 200-250 new arrivals a year who originated from different countries in Asia, the Middle East and Africa (UNHCR Malaysia, 1998). The relative invisibility of these “urban refugees” perpetuated a lack of proactive response from UNHCR and from Malaysian civil society groups. Aside from the Indochinese refugees (then sequestered in camps), the dominant myth until 2003 was that very few, if any, refugees existed in Malaysia.

Asylum-seeking and migrant populations are attracted to Malaysia for several reasons. Firstly, it is relatively easy to gain access into its territories. Robust networks of smugglers, often in collusion with Malaysian immigration border control officials, have constructed numerous routes over land and sea from Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines (Ananta and Arifin, 2004; Battistella and Asis, 2003; Spaan, Naerssen and Kohl, 2002). Malaysia is also a hub for international air travel, with flights coming in from all over the world. It is relatively easy for most travelers to get a tourist visa to visit Malaysia. Asylum-seeking populations can enter Malaysia through several legal means — as migrant workers, tourists, and students — staying on beyond the terms of their visas, and then mounting asylum claims with UNHCR.

Secondly, Malaysia is a relatively affluent country with low unemployment. It is possible to get informal work, particularly in the construction, agriculture and service sectors — albeit with associated vulnerabilities to exploitation (Franck, 2016; HEI, 2011). The availability of work is crucial for the avoidance of poverty, as asylum-seeking populations usually live in Malaysia for years. Thirdly, as numbers grow, refugees have been better able to receive social and material support from members of their own communities in Malaysia (McConnachie,

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2018; Nah, 2014). Fourthly, refugees from Myanmar are not deported directly to Myanmar but to Thailand, which gives them a sense — false or not — that they would be “better protected” in Malaysia. Asylum seekers have also been drawn to Malaysia because it is perceived as a moderate Muslim nation and has had, historically, high rates of UNHCR-facilitated resettlement.

Distinguishing Refugees: UNHCR’s Evolving Practices

Malaysia has permitted UNHCR to maintain an office in Kuala Lumpur since 1975, when it assisted the government in responding to the Indochinese refugee crisis. There is only one UNHCR office in Malaysia, located in the exclusive residential area of Bukit Petaling. All who seek asylum and international protection come to this office eventually — it is where they go to be registered with UNHCR; attend refugee status determination interviews; seek financial assistance; return when released from immigration detention depots; make appeals for help; mount collective protest to express grievances; and from where they depart for resettlement to other countries. As a result, Kuala Lumpur has become a unique node for populations seeking refuge in Malaysia — it is where they mingle, find work, pool resources, establish communities, and seek international protection (Hoffstaedter, 2014; Nah, 2014).

The scope of UNHCR’s work has changed over time. It maintained a relatively quiet operation from 1996 to 2001, receiving an average of 820 new applications for asylum each year (UNHCR, 2004). From 2002 onwards however, UNHCR received significantly larger numbers of new claims for asylum, primarily from nationals from Indonesia (mostly Acehnese) and Myanmar. In 2002, the Malaysian government amended the Immigration Act 1959/1963 to include whipping as a punishment for irregular entry. This, and the ensuing public “crackdown” on migrants with irregular status, prompted many non-citizens to seek asylum as a means for forestalling arrest, punishment and forced deportation (Nah, 2011). In 2003, UNHCR in Malaysia registered a significant increase in new asylum claims, from 2,131 applications in the previous year to 18,626 (UNHCR, 2005). Since then, Malaysia has been one of UNHCR’s busiest RSD operations in the world. Practices of Identification

To protect asylum seekers and refugees as such, it is necessary to identify them. UNHCR performs this function through registration and RSD activities.8 The ways it conducts these activities changes over time, in response to caseload pressures as well as understandings of which refugee groups should be given priority. At present, refugees from Myanmar are treated differently from refugees from other countries (further elaborated below). Typically, non-Myanmar asylum seekers approach UNHCR in their office, and their basic details are taken down. After potentially long periods of waiting in uncertainty, UNHCR calls them for

8 In 2017, the Malaysian government launched a refugee monitoring and tracking system called Tracking Refugees Information Systems (TRIS) through which it would issue “MyRC” cards to refugees. However, the government has not clarified what rights card- holders will have and only a small number have been registered to date.

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registration, issuing them with a paper document. The length of the waiting period depends on their nationality and vulnerability. They are then given dates for RSD interviews, which can be scheduled for several weeks or months ahead of time depending on caseloads.

Some asylum seekers are given a decision after the first interview, while others attend several interviews before a decision is made. In many cases, the process of registration and status determination is protracted, lasting for years, much to the frustration of asylum seekers. Those who are rejected after the RSD interview can appeal the decision made. Those who are rejected again following their appeal can ask for their case to be re-opened based on their ability to provide new information to support their claim. Those recognised as refugees are issued a plastic, tamper-proof, biometric identity card with security features. The asylum seeker letters and the refugee identity cards are time-specific documents with expiry dates that need to be renewed periodically. The renewal of these identity documents allows UNHCR to maintain updated records of the populations under its purview.

Aside from Rohingyas, UNHCR considered refugees from Myanmar to be at the “end of their refugee cycle” and thus not as a high priority. UNHCR restricts registration to those identified as “vulnerable” — either by themselves or by civil society partners through a Partner Referral Network process established by UNHCR — and to those in detention. Although Rohingyas are considered as needing protection as refugees, access to registration is still limited to those identified as vulnerable and to those who are detained, due to the large numbers of Rohingyas in Malaysia.

Between 2004-2008, UNHCR maintained registration levels at around 47,000 persons of concern. In 2009, it increased these numbers, which have now settled to around 140,000-170,000 persons of concern. Year upon year, thousands of asylum seekers and refugees remain unregistered despite their great desire to seek UNHCR assistance. Difficulties in getting registered and their status determined has been one of the most frequent complaints voiced by asylum seekers and refugees. UNHCR restricts registration for several reasons. One is a concern that high registration numbers will invite criticisms by the Malaysian government that UNHCR is not sufficiently rigorous in differentiating between irregular migrants and refugees. Another is that they do not have the resources to register, manage and care for large numbers of people. However, these restrictions have also resulted in negative outcomes, such as the failure of UNHCR to accurately identify and protect particularly vulnerable refugees such as unaccompanied minors and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in spite of their significant efforts to do so. Practices of Intervention and Advocacy

Another very significant way in which UNHCR protects registered refugees is intervening when they are arrested, detained, and charged in court. Since the 2005 crackdown on irregular immigrants, UNHCR has maintained a “hotline” through which it receives emergency calls for assistance. When responding to an arrest, UNHCR records as many details as possible, including the name of the arrested person, their location, the UNHCR reference number (as recorded

72 The Ambiguous Authority of a “Surrogate State” on their UNHCR documents or cards), and, when they are detained in immigration detention depots, their “body number”. UNHCR then contacts the relevant authority to request for their release and/or makes an appointment to see the person in detention. The Police usually release those who hold refugee identity cards after verifying their documents with UNHCR, if they were detained solely for committing an immigration offence. Such releases were more commonplace after UNHCR launched a new mobile app in 2016 (the UNHCR My Verify App) that enables law enforcement agents to check the authenticity of UNHCR cards held by refugees immediately.

Those that are not released by the Police are typically kept in police lock-ups and transferred to immigration detention depots within several days, while those that are arrested by Immigration are either kept in immigration holding facilities or taken directly to immigration detention depots. All non-citizens who are arrested can be legally subject to fourteen days of remand before they must be presented before a magistrate. Often, those under remand are not allowed to make any outside contact, which makes it difficult for them to seek assistance.

In 2005, in response to advocacy by UNHCR and civil society groups, the Attorney General’s Chambers agreed to waive prosecution for immigration offences for recognized refugees registered with UNHCR. However, if a refugee is charged with immigration offences and brought to court, UNHCR makes an application to the Attorney General’s Office for these charges to be dropped and arranges for a Malaysian lawyer to provide legal aid.9 UNHCR’s support of legal aid has produced significant results. Importantly, its legal interventions have helped to establish the precedent that refugees should be exempt from the punishment of whipping for immigration offences.

In the case of Tun Naing Oo vs Public Prosecutor [2009] 6 CLJ 490, the High Court reviewed a judgement by a sessions court judge of an asylum seeker from Burma charged and convicted under section 6(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1959/63 and sentenced to 100 days of imprisonment and two strokes of the cane. In this case, the judge considered whether whipping was a sentence that was “manifestly excessive” and whether the applicant should be spared “on humanitarian grounds” (p. 490). The judge stated:

“It is inhumane and serves no purpose to impose the sentence of whipping upon an asylum-seeker or refugee. If asylum seekers or refugees: (a) have not committed acts of violence or brutality; (b) are not habitual offenders; or (c) have not threatened public order, they should not be punished with whipping.” (p. 491)

The judge observed that asylum seekers and refugees were subject to domestic laws including the Immigration Act 1959/63 and were therefore liable for immigration offences. However, the judge also stated that sentencing must be “appropriate” to their circumstances rather than excessive. Using this legal precedent, Malaysian lawyers have succeeded in ensuring that other refugees are not whipped.

9 However, UNHCR does not intervene if the individual is charged with criminal offences.

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UNHCR also visits asylum seekers and refugees in prisons and immigration detention depots across the Peninsula, monitoring conditions of detention. UNHCR writes to the Immigration Department to request for the release of individual detainees and at different points in time, immigration officials have permitted the release of refugees on different grounds. At present, Rohingyas (and sporadically, other groups) are released, but other Myanmar nationals are almost never released. UNHCR’s interventions for asylum seekers and refugees in detention are significant. In 2018, over a five-month period, UNHCR registered (and conducted RSD) for 969 persons, and secured the release of 1,858 persons of whom sixty eight were children (UNHCR, 2019d).

However, not all asylum seekers and refugees are able to obtain comprehensive assistance from UNHCR, and as such, have faced the full brunt of arrest, punishment for immigration offences, indefinite detention and forced deportation (sometimes leading to refoulement). This occurs for several reasons. As stated, some are unable to call UNHCR when they are arrested or to keep UNHCR updated as to their whereabouts when they are transferred from one detention facility to another. Secondly, law enforcement officers sometimes give UNHCR misleading information, stating that the person they enquire after is not present in their detention facility. This makes it difficult for UNHCR to establish contact with persons of concern in detention. Thirdly, immigration officers exercise discretion in relation to the release of detainees. An officer can reject or delay decisions on applications by UNHCR for the release of individuals depending on his/her mood and foibles. As mentioned above, they also favour the release of some nationalities — such as Rohingyas — over others. Fourthly, it is more difficult for UNHCR to intervene on behalf of asylum seekers and refugees who were not registered with them at the time of their arrest.

The inability of refugees to integrate locally or to return home makes resettlement to a third country the only viable “durable solution”. Historically, UNHCR has been able to negotiate many resettlement places for refugees, making Malaysia a key node in Asia for the dispersal of refugees to developed countries. From facilitating the resettlement of less than 100 people in 2002 (UNHCR, 2002), it facilitated 12,547 in 2015 (UNHCR, 2019e). However, annual numbers have dropped significantly since, down to 2,407 in 2018 (UNHCR, 2019e). Perspectives of UNHCR from those who Seek Refuge

While UNHCR faces political and economic challenges in fulfilling its mandate, it still wields considerable power over the lives of people who seek protection from persecution and conflict (Hyndman, 2000; Moulin and Nyers, 2007) — UNHCR shapes their daily routines, their relationships, their families, and their imagination of their futures. Asylum seekers and refugees who come to Malaysia have some pre-conceptions of what to expect when they arrive, formed based on the stories told by their friends and family, and sometimes, the smugglers who try to attract their business. However, much more intense “learning” occurs as they deal with the practicalities of living and surviving in Malaysia (McConnachie, 2018). Many of the opinions they hold are shaped through formal interactions with community-based organisations, Malaysian NGOs, and UNHCR, as well as through informal interactions with other refugees.

74 The Ambiguous Authority of a “Surrogate State”

New arrivals often find it difficult to trust authority figures. Some feel afraid of UNHCR personnel, seeing the UN system as a form of bureaucratic control that liaises uncomfortably closely with the government of Malaysia and their own governments. They are afraid that their biographical information and their narratives of resistance to state repression collected by UNHCR during RSD interviews will be shared with their own governments without their knowledge. They distrust bureaucracy. Some refugees, especially those who have been arrested in their countries of origin, are instinctively afraid of UNHCR security guards — their uniforms and manners remind them of the military and police at home who mistreated them and/or their families and friends. The reassurance of civil society groups and fellow community members as well as the witnessing of practical assistance and outcomes of asylum claims helps to counter this distrust, but in some cases, it is never fully overcome. Some refugees remain ambivalent about UNHCR, seeing it as a quasi-government entity that may or may not be trustworthy, that may or may not be truly committed to their personal protection, and which wields significant power over their lives.

Those who have been arrested and have had their deportation halted by UNHCR have spent indefinite periods in detention. Sometimes, they have done so after serving prisons sentences and being whipped for immigration offences. Detention conditions vary, but in many immigration detention depots, detainees suffer from overcrowding, poor sanitation, insufficient food, water, clothing and bedding, as well as poor access to health services and exposure to violence from fellow detainees and guards (Nah, 2015). Afraid of deportation, many have opted to live for long periods in these stark circumstances, sometimes for years. Some, unable to bear the uncertainty of indefinite detention, have opted for “voluntary deportation”. To mitigate the risks involved, some detainees from Myanmar have paid bribes to get deported to the Thai-Malaysia border at specific times and into the hands of specific smugglers. They have preferred to risk the dangers faced at border zones with the possibility of freedom afterward than to face the bleakness of continued indefinite detention. However, opting for deportation has been risky. Refugees have been handed over to traffickers at the Thai-Malaysia border, who have held them for ransom and extorted them for exorbitant payments (Aziz, 2014). The price of these transactions has increased over the years, depending on the location of deportation and smuggler involved. Those who failed to pay have been sold — men to fishing boats as forced labourers, and women to brothels and other private businesses.

The Role of Civil Society Actors: Malaysian Civil Society Groups and Refugee Community-based Organisations

Civil society actors in Malaysia — non-governmental organisations (NGOs), faith-based groups, lawyers, and volunteers — have played a critical role in providing services to asylum-seeking populations and providing avenues for advocacy. They have called upon the Malaysian government repeatedly to recognize the specific circumstances of asylum seekers and refugees and to protect their rights, for example in submissions to the Human Rights Council’s University Periodic Review Process and the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Some NGOs publish reports that

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highlight specific challenges faced by refugee communities, such as difficulties of access to healthcare and the high incidence of forced labour and exploitation (HEI, 2010 and 2011). The Bar Council of Malaysia often hold seminars, roundta- bles and conferences to build more awareness about the situation of asylum- seeking populations.

Civil society actors usually coordinate their actions with UNHCR. However, relations with UNHCR can be tricky to navigate. UNHCR’s opinion of their work can be influential; some funders make it an explicit requirement that their grantees collaborate with UNHCR. Civil society groups can have very strong differences of opinion with UNHCR officers on its policies and practices. As a Malaysian lawyer providing legal aid to refugees observed:

“We never operate under the assumption that UNHCR is doing everything right and I don’t think they do, as well [...] They really try to balance a lot of things: not being shut down — which they have been threatened with before — but also dealing with a very hostile government [and] dealing with NGOs that are pushing them.”10

A small but growing number of Malaysian lawyers have been more involved in legal aid to refugees. In some cases, they have aided refugees in appealing rejections in UNHCR’s RSD process. A lawyer involved in the case of a female survivor of trafficking who had been rejected twice stated:

“They basically wanted legal representation because she was very traumatized… and she revealed it, like little bits and bobs here and there that… her husband had basically trafficked her and this… really horrible trafficking syndicate led to her arriving in Malaysia. This was really important information that UNHCR didn’t have before. So, with that, we just kind of went all in and provided representation and she actually got accepted... that was a really important case to know the value of legal representation.”11

A controversial issue at time of writing is UNHCR’s decision that Chin refugees no longer need protection based on their analysis that the situation in Chin state in Myanmar is now stable and secure. In India and Malaysia, Chin refugees have been informed that their refugee status will end on 31 December 2019; they have been strongly encouraged to return voluntarily. Civil society groups dispute UNHCR’s analysis, noting that the situation in Chin state has not been fully stabilized despite some progress in recent years. In June 2018, hundreds of Chin refugees demonstrated at the UNHCR office in Malaysia, protesting this decision. Chin refugee groups remain unconvinced that it is safe to return and are worried that their loss of refugee status would result in greater precarity. The cessation of the status of Chin refugees highlights the significance of distinguishing refugees from migrants and how such acts are often contested, even amongst actors motivated to protect refugees.

It is important to note that asylum-seeking populations themselves have developed strategies to reduce their precarity. They have developed localized, contingent, negotiated arrangements with law enforcement officers that enable

10 Interview with a Malaysian lawyer for the Law of Asylum project, conducted in Kuala Lumpur on 25 November 2017. 11 Interview with a Malaysian lawyer for the Law of Asylum project, conducted in Kuala Lumpur on 30 November 2017.

76 The Ambiguous Authority of a “Surrogate State” them to live with a greater security. They have been able to plead with police officers for the release of their friends or family members — often facilitated with the payment of a bribe. They have been able to visit friends and family in some detention centres, and to arrange for food and goods to be given to, or bought for, detainees. Some asylum-seeking groups have organized themselves into community-based organisations (CBOs), usually formed based on ethnic and/or territorial identity in their country of origin (McConnachie, 2018; Nah, 2014). Through these organisations, refugees run programmes that help their members’ access healthcare, education, and emergency donations (such as food and clothing). They often work in collaboration with Malaysian civil society actors. These self-help groups have also organised collective action — expressing political discontent outside of the embassies of their own countries, or, as mentioned above, protesting their treatment outside the gates of UNHCR.

A notable protection strategy that refugee CBOs have adopted are their own registration systems. The community cards they issue to their members have been given some recognition by the police, who sometimes accept the cards as a basis for identifying an individual as an asylum seeker. In the past, community registration cards were also accepted by UNHCR as a way of “pre-screening” individuals as being genuine asylum seekers. Community registration has also been given recognition by the judiciary. In the case of Tun Naing Oo vv PP, mentioned above, the High Court judge advised asylum seekers and refugees to show their registration with their community as proof of their status to avoid a sentence of whipping. These are daily practices enacted by asylum-seeking groups to signify themselves as being different from other people on the move.

UNHCR’s Ambiguous Authority

UNHCR’s efforts at identifying, protecting and assisting asylum-seeking populations have resulted in the emergence of an alternative regime of regulation aimed at minimizing the negative impacts of Malaysia’s immigration control mechanisms on them. Asylum-seeking populations place great importance on UNHCR registration and recognition of status; it is their only hope of avoiding arrest, detention, whipping and refoulement as well as of getting resettled. However, these interventions require the attentiveness of UNHCR staff; it places great pressure on them to respond to each case reported to them. There have been instances where UNHCR officers have not intervened on time, or at all; there are times when their interventions have been unsuccessful.

The creation of “protection space” for refugees involves political sense- making in situations of uncertainty, in the face of occasional hostility from government officials. UNHCR officers often find themselves make strategic and operational decisions without being able to predict the outcomes of these decisions. In the eyes of civil society groups, they sometimes do not go far enough to protect the rights of refugees, while in the eyes of government authorities they sometimes overstep their mandate (for example, by protecting non-citizens who are not “really” refugees) or fail to fulfill their role (for example, by not resettling refugees as quickly as they “should”). There are also key weaknesses in adopting the “protection space” approach. As Jones (2014: 257) observes critically, this non-binding, non-legal approach:

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“Privileges international interests, fora, and UNHCR as the negotiator; devalues the normative strength of obligations towards refugees; and, allows the underlying responsibility for the provision of refugee protection to drift from the state to UNHCR.”

The impact of UNHCR field presences are also directly affected by funding. Since 2014, UNHCR’s average annual expenditure in Malaysia has been around 40-47% of its average annual budget (UNHCR, 2019f). UNHCR has become embedded in intervening and “rescuing” refugees from Malaysia’s punitive immigration control regime, a role for which there seems no end. This state of affairs is unlikely to change unless Malaysia introduces a formal legal and administrative framework for the protection of asylum-seeking populations. To date, there are no signs that it intends to do so, despite repeated calls for this to happen from Malaysian civil society groups, UNHCR, and the international diplomatic community.

To perform its role of protection, UNHCR “mimics” the approach of state authorities in regulating individuals — it documents individual identity and issues identity cards and letters. It regulates this population, requiring individuals to report themselves periodically to get their time-limited identity cards renewed. However, UNHCR’s reach is not comprehensive. There are thousands of asylum seekers and refugees who remain unregistered. A strategic question that confronts every UNHCR operation at the country level — and from which UNHCR in Malaysia is not exempt — is how far they are able to act for the protection of asylum-seeking populations before they “cross the line”. UNHCR is concerned about pushing too much, and thus reducing their “protection space” — the space they are given to intercede for and provide services to populations in need. UNHCR officials express concern about being declared persona non-grata, being kicked out of the country, and having their country operations shut down. As UNHCR often operates with ambiguity, especially when they respond to unfolding crises and when they try out new initiatives, their fear leads them to be conservative in the interpretation of their mandate and cautious in their advocacy and actions. Two other beliefs shape the nature, quality and boldness of UNHCR’s advocacy and actions for refugees — first, the idea that such protection activities are not really their responsibility but the responsibility of host states (perhaps the psychological rejection by UNHCR officials of their role as “surrogate state” officials), and relatedly, that whatever they manage to do is better than nothing at all.

UNHCR’s interventions demonstrate the interest of the international community in protecting a certain type of vulnerable non-citizen. UNHCR invokes a global governance regime for their protection, using whatever resources it can to compel Malaysia to recognise the special circumstances of asylum seekers and refugees. Cautious of its international image, Malaysia has tempered its exercise of sovereign power, allowing UNHCR to influence the behaviour of its law enforcement authorities. In documenting individual identity, UNHCR provides state authorities with a system for their individual regulation. UNHCR takes on properties of a “surrogate state”, but without sovereignty and with ambiguous authority.

78 The Ambiguous Authority of a “Surrogate State”

Conclusion

Despite the significant efforts at protection mentioned above, life is difficult for most, if not all, asylum-seeking populations in Malaysia. A large proportion suffers from extraordinarily high levels of stress, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and depression (HEI, 2010 and 2011). Some struggle with traumas from the past, particularly if they were raped or tortured. Many live in, or very close to, poverty. Nevertheless, exile in Malaysia is also a time for re-constituting meaning, involvement, and achievement. Community leaders and workers have felt a deep sense of fulfilment when assisting their “own people” (McConnachie, 2018; Nah, 2014). Refugees have become more connected to their own extended kin and to ethnic groups as they try to lead “normal” lives in Malaysia, speaking familiar dialects, getting married, raising children, celebrating cultural identity, and enjoying their own food (Aziz, 2014; Hoffstaedter, 2014). They have also formed unexpected friendships with members of other ethnic groups from their country of origin. However, they are also vulnerable to high levels of violence and exploitation.

This article advances the argument that UNHCR’s approximation of a “surrogate state” in complex migration contexts models to states the daily practices needed to protect asylum seekers and refugees. However, UNHCR’s presence and interventions at the domestic level are contingent on the cooperation and goodwill of states and their efforts are complicated by their ambiguous authority. Their focus on persons of their concern can result in the privileging of refugees over other mobile subjects, the exclusion of those “de-categorised” as refugees, and the neglect of many other non-citizens living with precarity. More comprehensive, integrated, rights-based measures are needed to attend to the specific circumstances of precarious mobile subjects in Southeast Asia to ensure that their rights are respected, protected, and fulfilled.

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Robinson W. Courtland (1998) Terms of refuge: The Indochinese exodus and the international response, New York, Zed Books, 336 p. Sampson Robyn C., Gifford Sandra M. and Taylor Savitri (2016) The myth of transit: the making of a life by asylum seekers and refugees in Indonesia, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42 (7), pp. 1135-1152. Simeon James C. (2017) Refugee adjudication under the UNHCR’s mandate and the exclusion dilemma, Cambridge Law Review, 2, pp. 75-108. Simeon James C. (2010) A comparative analysis of the response of the UNHCR and industrialized states to rapidly fluctuating refugee status and Asylum Applications: Lessons and Best Practices for RSD systems design and administration, International Journal of Refugee Law, 22 (1), pp. 72-103. Slaughter Amy and Crisp Jeff (2009) A surrogate state? The Role of UNHCR in protracted refugee situations, New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper 168, Geneva, UNHCR, [online] last checked on 04/03/2019. URL: https://www. unhcr.org/research/working/4981cb432/surrogate-state-role-unhcr-protracted-refugee-situations-amy-slaughter.html Snitwongse Kusuma and Thompson W. Scott (Eds.) (2005) Ethnic conflicts in Southeast Asia, Singapore, Institute for Southeast Asian Studies-Yusof Ishak Institute, 188 p. Spaan Ernst, Naerssen Ton van and Kohl Gerard (2002) Reimagining borders: Malay identity and Indonesian migrants in Malaysia, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 93 (2), pp. 160-172. Steenhuisen Bram (2005) Last Vietnamese boat refugee leaves Malaysia, UNHCR News Stories, August 30, [online] last checked on 04/03/2019. URL: http://www. unhcr.org/43141e9d4.html Strauch Judith (1980) The Chinese exodus from Vietnam: Implications for the Southeast Asian Chinese, Cambridge, Cultural Survival, Occasional Paper No.1, 14 p. Türk Volker (2010) UNHCR’s role in supervising international protection standards in the context of its mandate - keynote address, Presented at the International Conference on Forced Displacement, Protection Standards, Supervision of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol and Other International Instruments, May 17-20, York University, Toronto, Canada, [online] last checked on 04/03/2019. URL: https://www.unhcr.org/admin/dipstatements/4bf406a56/keynote-address-volker-turk-unhcrs-role-supervising-international-standards.html UNHCR (2019a) Southeast Asia, [online] last checked on 04/03/2019. URL: http:// reporting.unhcr.org/node/39 UNHCR (2019b) Rohingya emergency, [online] last checked on 04/03/2019. URL: https://www.unhcr.org/rohingya-emergency.html UNHCR (2019c) Malaysia: Figures at a glance, [online] last checked on 04/03/2019. URL: https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance-in-malaysia.html UNHCR (2019d) Protection in Malaysia, [online] last checked on 04/03/2019. URL: https://www.unhcr.org/protection-in-malaysia-591401344.html UNHCR (2019e) Resettlement data finder, [online] last checked on 04/03/2019. URL: http://rsq.unhcr.org/en/#6oDQ

83 Alice M. Nah

UNHCR (2019f) Malaysia, [online] last checked on 04/03/2019. URL: http:// reporting.unhcr.org/node/2532 UNHCR (2005) 2003 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook: Malaysia, [online] last checked on 04/03/2019. URL: https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/country/41d2c18d0/2003-unhcr-statistical-yearbook-country-data-sheet-malaysia.html UNHCR (2002) UNHCR Country Operations Plan 2003: Malaysia, [online] last checked on 04/03/2019. URL: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3d941f5f31.html UNHCR Malaysia (1998) Factsheet, Kuala Lumpur, Geneva, UNHCR. Van Hear Nicholas (1998) New diasporas: the mass exodus, dispersal and regrouping of migrant communities, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 298 p. Van Hear Nicholas, Brubaker Rebecca and Bessa Thais (2009) Managing mobility for human development: the growing salience of mixed migration, Human Development Research Paper (HDRP), 20 (2009), pp. 1-35, [online] last checked on 04/03/2019. URL: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdrp_2009_20.pdf Withers Matt and Piper Nicola (2018) Uneven development and displaced care in Sri Lanka, Current Sociology, 66 (4), pp. 590-601. Zetter Roger (2015) Protection in crisis: Forced migration and protection in a global era, Migration, Washington DC, Migration Policy Institute, [online] last checked on 04/03/2019. URL: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/ publications/TCM-Protection-Zetter.pdf Zetter Roger (2007) More labels, fewer refugees: Remaking the refugee label in an era of globalization, Journal of Refugee Studies, 20 (2), pp. 172-192.

84 Résumé - Abstract - Resumen

Alice M. Nah The Ambiguous Authority of a “Surrogate State”: UNHCR’s Negotiation of Asylum in the Complexities of Migration in Southeast Asia

In complex migration contexts, protection actors have had to invest tremendous effort into signifying “refugees” as a legitimate type of non-citizen deserving of international protection. This article examines how the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reinforces the distinction between “refugees” and “migrants” through resource-intensive practices of identification, intervention, and advocacy in Malaysia, which have resulted in the partial, impermanent protection of some refugees. In such situations, UNHCR takes on properties of a “surrogate state” but does so without sovereignty, negotiating the protection of refugees in urban and rural areas with ambiguous authority. In recent years, Rohingyas have become the archetypal refugee in Southeast Asia. Troublingly, UNHCR has argued that other refugees from Myanmar in protracted situations are no longer in need of international protection. Contemporary constructions of “refugees” fail to address the complexities of migration but have become a necessary protection measure. Alternative ways are needed to address the precarity of diverse mobile subjects in Southeast Asia.

L’autorité ambiguë d’un État subrogé : la négociation de l’asile par le HCR face à la complexité des migrations en Asie du Sud-Est

Dans des contextes migratoires complexes, les acteurs soucieux de la protection des migrants ont dû déployer des efforts considérables pour que les « réfugiés » soient reconnus comme des non-citoyens ayant besoin d’une protection internationale. Cet article examine comment le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) renforce la distinction entre « réfugiés » et « migrants » par le biais de pratiques d’identification, d’intervention et de plaidoyer qui nécessitent des ressources considérables en Malaisie et qui ont abouti à la protection partielle et non permanente de certains réfugiés. Dans de telles situations, le HCR se pose comme un « État de substitution », mais sans souveraineté, négociant la protection des réfugiés dans les zones urbaines et rurales avec une autorité ambiguë. Ces dernières années, les Rohingyas sont devenus l’arché- type des réfugiés en Asie du Sud-Est. Il est inquiétant de constater que le HCR a fait valoir que d’autres réfugiés du Myanmar se trouvant dans des situations prolongées n’ont plus besoin d’une protection internationale. Les constructions contemporaines de « réfugiés » ne tiennent pas compte de la complexité de la migration, mais sont devenues une mesure de protection nécessaire. Il faut trouver d’autres moyens de reconnaître et de traiter la précarité des diverses catégories de personnes mobiles vivant dans la région de l’Asie du Sud-Est.

85 Résumé - Abstract - Resumen

La ambigua autoridad de un Estado de sustitución: la negociación del asilo por parte de la ACNUR frente a la complejidad de las migraciones en el sudeste asiático

En contextos complejos de migración, los actores de la protección han tenido que invertir un esfuerzo tremendo en significar a los «refugiados» como un tipo legítimo de no-ciudadanos que merecen protección internacional. Este artículo examina cómo el Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (ACNUR) refuerza la distinción entre «refugiados» y «migrantes» a través de prácticas de identificación, intervención y defensa en Malasia que requieren muchos recursos y que han dado lugar a la protección parcial e impermanente de algunos refugiados. En tales situaciones, el ACNUR asume las propiedades de un «Estado sustituto», pero lo hace sin soberanía, negociando la protección de los refugiados en las zonas urbanas y rurales con una autoridad ambigua. En los últimos años, los rohingyas se han convertido en los refugiados arquetípicos del sudeste asiático. Es preocupante que el ACNUR haya argumentado que otros refugiados de Myanmar que se encuentran en situaciones prolongadas ya no necesitan protección internacional. Las construcciones contemporáneas de «refugiados» no abordan las complejidades de la migración, pero se han convertido en una medida de protección necesaria. Se necesitan formas alternativas para abordar la precariedad de diversos temas móviles en el sudeste asiático.

86 REMi Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 2019, 35 (1 & 2), pp. 87-105

Migration to Australia: From Asian Exclusion to Asian Predominance Peter McDonald1

This paper traces how Australia has shifted from being a country where migration from Asia was heavily restricted to one where most of the immigrants arriving in a very large migration programme are from Asia and most of the new permanent residents are from Asia. At the 1961 Census of Australia, 0.3% of the Australian population were of Asian racial origins and the number of Asians in Australia was lower than it had been in 1861 (Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1967; Choi, 1975). In sharp contrast, 26% of all births in Australia in 2016 had at least one parent born in Asia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Historically, the restriction of entry of Asians to Australia was based upon two broad considerations: 1. a sense of racial superiority and racism and 2. a fear of large numbers of Asians and the ensuing labour market competition. Changes in Asian migration across time are examined in the context of these two considerations. The paper demonstrates the central role that the international student programme has played in the process of change in the twenty first century.

Background: Australia’s Historical Restriction of Immigration from Asia Initial Restriction: The 1850s Gold Rush

For most of the time following British settlement of Australia, Asian migration to Australia was looked upon unfavourably. Attempts in the 1840s to introduce Chinese coolie labours, modelled on the approaches used in Malaya and Indonesia, failed partly because of opposition from Australian workers. The restrictive approach to Asian migration began in earnest in the 1850s during the gold rush in the Colony of Victoria. Although miners arrived in the new colony of Victoria from all over the world, restrictions on landing in the colony were placed only upon the Chinese. Prior to the restrictions implemented in 1855, Chinese miners from the Canton region of China had arrived in large numbers and by mid-1855 the Chinese population of Victoria had risen to 15,000, almost all of whom were men. The restrictions imposed by the Colony of Victoria were circumvented immediately by Chinese arriving in the neighbouring colonies

1 Professor of Demography, Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010 Australia, Room 521a, Level 5, 207 Bouverie Street Carlton, Melbourne, Australia; [email protected]

87 Peter McDonald

of New South Wales and South Australia and then walking to the gold fields in Victoria. Around 15,000 Chinese immigrants arrived at the port of Guichen Bay in South Australia in the first six months of 1857. Subsequently, due to lobbying from Victoria, restrictions were placed upon Chinese migration in South Australia in 1857 and in New South Wales in 1861. The 1861 Act in New South Wales followed the Lambing Flat riot when Chinese were run off their mining sites. Across Australia, in 1861, there were 38,247 China-born men and eleven China-born women constituting about 3.2% of the total population (Choi, 1975).

The account in the previous paragraph derives largely from Choi (1975). Choi considers that opposition to Chinese migration in the 1850s was due mainly to the large numbers arriving simultaneously and the competition that the new arrivals imposed upon other miners. He also refers to the cultural distance between the Chinese and other settlers. While there may be a fine line between the concept of cultural distance and racism, Choi suggests that the opposition was not purely motivated by racism. The anti-Chinese migration Acts were repealed relatively rapidly, in South Australia in 1861, in Victoria in 1865 and in New South Wales in 1867, when the movement from China had slackened off tending to support Choi’s view that the restrictions were driven more by economic motivations than by racism. With the corporatisation of mining in Australia from the 1860s, it was easier to exclude Chinese workers. The Development of the White Australia Policy

Nevertheless, very negative portrayals of Chinese people in the popular press in the second half of the nineteenth century were clearly racist and, although the China-born population of Australia fell between 1861 and 1901, the blatantly racist, White Australia Policy was one of the first Acts to be passed by the newly constituted Government of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. The following statements were made during the 1901 debate on the Act by members of the first parliament who became the first four Prime Ministers of Australia2: “We should pass this bill to secure the future of our fair country against the tide of inferior and unequal Asians arriving from the north, threatening the prospects for white Australians.”(Edmund Barton) “This bill does not go far enough. Asian immigration is only one element of the ‘coloured alien’ problem. Later I will suggest that we change the bill to exclude any person who is an aboriginal native of Asia, Africa or of the Pacific Islands.” (John Watson) “We have all seen the problem caused by coloured people in the United States. We do not want that to happen here. The Opposition wants the new Australia to be a land for the finest products of the Anglo-Saxon race. This Bill will make that happen.” (George Reid) “I argue for the YES vote on this bill to restrict Asian immigration not because Asians are unequal and inferior but because of their high abilities. The Asian races threaten our life style. They take our comfortable jobs and are prepared to accept conditions inferior to those we have become accustomed to.”(Alfred Deakin)

2 Parliamentary Education Office, Immigration Restriction Act 1901, https://web.archive. org/web/20051022064554/http://www.peo.gov.au/resources/immigration_bill.htm

88 Migration to Australia

The two restrictive themes are evident in these statements by politicians: assumed racial superiority and racism (more likely to be expressed by the conservative side of politics, Barton and Reid) and fear of labour market competition (more likely to be expressed by the left side of politics, Watson and Deakin). Abolition of the White Australia Policy

As stated above, there were very few Asians in Australia in 1961 indicating that the White Australia policy had been applied rigidly in the previous sixty years. However, the experiences of the Second World War and, more importantly, the emergence of new post-colonial nations to Australia’s north focussed official attention in Australia much more upon the politics of Asia than had been the case in the pre-war years. In 1949, Australia had been the leading international supporter of independence for Indonesia. Gradually, the White Australia Policy was seen to be an embarrassment for a country wishing to establish good diplomatic relations with its Asian neighbours and Australia’s Asian neighbours were not backward in drawing attention to the restrictive migration policy. International students were a prominent part of the process of opening Australia to migration from Asia. From 1950 onwards, Asian students came to Australia privately and under the government-funded Colombo Plan. Oakman argues that the experiences of Asian students in Australia and Australians’ experiences of them were a significant factor in the ending of the White Australia Policy:

“Although the number of Asian scholars was small, their presence marked something of a watershed in Australia’s cultural development, and their appearance on university campuses and in private homes across the country provided a direct — if subtle — challenge to Australian insularity.” (Oakman, 2002: 98)

In establishing a review of Australian immigration policy in 1966, Harold Holt referred to the impact of the 12,000 Asian students then studying in Australia (Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 8 March 1966, Vol. 50, p. 34). Restrictions on migration from Asia were eased following this review and the White Australia Policy was finally removed totally by the Whitlam Labour Government in 1972. From that point, the use of race, colour or creed in migrant selection became part of history.

The commitment to a non-white Australia was immediately tested through the arrival of very large numbers of refugees from Vietnam and Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s. By 1996, there were 151,000 Vietnam-born persons in Australia and 70,000 Lebanon-born persons in a total of just over 1 million people born in an Asian country, representing 5.5% of the Australian population (derived by the author from data in ABS 2007). This was already a major transformation from the 0.3% of the Australian population that Asians constituted in 1961 but migration policy changes after 1996 have led to much larger numbers of migrants from Asia.

89 Peter McDonald

Revived Restrictive Movements: One Australia, One Nation and Australia First

Opposition to Asian migration arose not very long after the elimination of the White Australia Policy. In 1984, the prominent Australian historian, Geoffrey Blainey, stated that the influx of Asians was threatening the social fabric, giving a degree of respectability to this viewpoint. In 1988, as Leader of the Opposition, John Howard developed the One Australia policy. The policy called for an end to multiculturalism thus ending (temporarily) the bipartisan approach to settlement of immigrants in Australia. While Howard’s speech inaugurating the One Australia policy did not refer to migration from Asia, his subsequent comments on radio and those of his Coalition colleagues, John Stone and Ian Sinclair, were explicitly anti-Asian migration. On the ABC PM programme, Howard called for Asian migration to be reduced. Most explicitly, Sinclair, the Shadow Deputy Prime Minister at the time said:

“If there is any risk of an undue build-up of Asians against others in the community, then you need to control it. I certainly believe that at the moment we need [...] to reduce the number of Asians.” (Markus, 2001: 85-89)

Prominent members of Howard’s own party publicly opposed the sentiments of One Australia. These included Malcolm Fraser, Nick Greiner, Jeff Kennett, Steele Rudd and Ian McPhee. The then Labour Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, was quick to demonstrate the division in the Opposition parties over One Australia. He moved a motion in the parliament rejecting the use of race to select immigrants, to confirm the status quo. Howard voted against the motion but three Liberal MPs voted with the Labour Government (Ramsey, 2006). In his autobiog- raphy published in 2010, Howard wrote that he was wrong to have said in 1988 that Asian immigration had outstripped community tolerance but the context of the statement suggests that he was more concerned about the impact that the statement had had on his political career; that he was wrong to have made the statement rather than that his statement was wrong. In the same book, he claims that, as Prime Minister, he kept the lid on the newly-emergent anti-Asian migration movement in the form of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party (Howard, 2010). In a speech in London on 27 June 2018, Howard is quoted as saying: “1 million of Australia’s population [...] are ethnic Chinese background. [They are] terrific citizens making an enormous contribution to our nation” (The Age, 28 June 2018). Prior to the 1996 election, Pauline Hanson was dis-endorsed as the Liberal Party candidate for the seat of Oxley because of disparaging comments she had made about indigenous Australians. She then ran as an independent candidate and was elected to the House of Representatives in 1996. Famously, in her maiden speech, she said that she believed that “we are in danger of being swamped by Asians” citing, correctly, that, between 1984 and 1995, 40% of new immigrants had come from Asian countries.

At the time, Hanson was advised by John Pasquarelli to “go for broke on Asian immigration” (Pasquarelli, 1998: 10). Pasquarelli had been an adviser to Senator John Stone, avid supporter of Howard’s One Australia policy and went on to be an adviser to the Labour MP, Graeme Campbell, who founded the Australia First Party, the loudest contemporary voice against Asian migration. Thus, there was a connection between these three anti-Asian migration movements across thirty

90 Migration to Australia years (Dorling, 2017). In her return to parliament in 2016 as a Senator, Pauline Hanson has made anti-Muslim migration statements but not anti-Asian statements. According to Dorling (2017), this is because anti-Asian migration has less political traction in contemporary Australia. When asked by a journalist whether she stood by her 1996 statement that Australia was being swamped by Asians, Hanson referred to just one suburb in Sydney, Hurstville, as evidence to support what she had said in 19963.

In 2018, organised opposition to Asian migration tends to be confined to the extreme right, especially the Australia First Party. Being on the extreme fringe, this party expresses its views very forthrightly calling for the reinstatement of the White Australia Policy and inviting all non-White Australians to leave Australia permanently.

The One Australia and One Nation opposition to Asian migration was related to fear that large numbers of Asian immigrants threatened Australia’s way of life, not to the fear that Asians would take the jobs of Australians. The fear, therefore, was socially-based rather than economically-based. Expansion of Asian migration after 1996 has, in contrast, been driven by economic motivations, principally, a continuing strong demand for skilled labour, ironically driven to a large extent by the rise of China as Australia’s most important economic trading partner. The remainder of the paper documents how this shift to a dominance of Asian sources in Australia’s migration programme has occurred.

Asian Migration to Australia, 1996-2017

In 1996, 5.5% of the Australian population had been born in an Asian country. By 2016, this had risen to 13.4%, constituting close to half of the overseas-born population. Between the 2011 and 2016 Censuses, the increase in the Asian- born population of Australia was equivalent to 85% of the net increase in the total overseas-born population, and this percentage rose to 99% for the cities of Sydney and Melbourne. These high percentages apply because, for non-Asian countries of birth, the intercensal increases were offset by mortality due to deaths of the European migrants who arrived in the early post Second World War period. Between 1996 and 2016, the population born in China (not including SARs) increased from 111,000 to 510,000 and, for those born in India, from 78,000 to 455,0004. And, as mentioned above, 26% of all births in Australia in 2016 had at least one Asian-born parent. These are startling changes in a country historically not far away from a policy of exclusion of all Asians. The changes have not occurred because there has been a deliberate preference for migrants from Asia. Rather, substantial Asian migration has been the outcome of a range of policy settings that have had the effect of shifting the migration programme towards movement from Asia.

3 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-14/pauline-hanson-maiden-speech-asian-immigration/7645578 4 Numbers cited here are derived by the author from statistics of country of birth published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics from Australian censuses for the years, 1996 to 2016.

91 Peter McDonald

International Migration Definitions and Trends since 1983 Definitions of International Migration

There are two measures of international migration that are often confused in popular discussion. The first is the government’s Permanent Migration Programme. Set annually by the government, the programme indicates the planned new grants of permanent residence in Australia in a financial year. These grants of permanent residence divide into three streams: Skilled Workers, Family and Humanitarian. The second measure is Net Overseas Migration (NOM). This is the number by which the usual resident population of Australia changes in a year consequent upon international migration. The two measures are fundamentally different. NOM includes many movements that are not part of the Migration Programme. It is the net result of movements into and out of Australia of temporary residents, movements into and out of Australia of Australian and New Zealand citizens and the permanent arrivals and departures of citizens of countries other than Australia and New Zealand. Furthermore, the one component of NOM that may be thought to mirror the Migration Programme, permanent arrivals of citizens of countries other than Australia and New Zealand, differs substantially from the numbers in the Migration Programme in the same year because, in recent years, about half of the grants of permanent residence through the Migration Programme are made to people who are already temporary usual residents of Australia, that is, they have already been counted into NOM at some previous time.

The census numbers cited in the previous section relate to the usual resident population of Australia. Usual residents include persons who do not have permanent residence in Australia but are counted as usual residents because of the duration of their stay in Australia (or absence from Australia). From 1983 to mid-2006, from the perspective of international migration, a person was a resident of Australia if they had lived in Australia continuously for the past twelve months or had not been absent from Australia for a continuous twelve- month period. This definition meant that many long-term temporary residents were not counted as usual residents because they had been out of Australia recently for even a short period. For example, international students undertaking a university degree in Australia would not have been counted as usual residents if they had gone home during a university break. As another example, many skilled temporary workers, although resident in Australia for some number of years would not have been counted in the population if they were frequently out of Australia on business.

Because this approach was regarded as under-counting the population of usual residents of Australia, from July 2006, the Australian Bureau of Statistics has applied a different definition. From that time, a person is a usual resident if he or she has spent twelve out of the past sixteen months in Australia. This is measured through monitoring of passport movements. While this approach implies that there is a sixteen-month delay before it can be determined whether a person should be counted into or out of the population (that is, the movement included in NOM), the Australian Bureau of Statistics uses a statistical model to predict whether or not a new arrival will later be counted into the population

92 Migration to Australia

(or a departure counted out) based on certain characteristics of the person. If the ABS model predicts that the movement is a movement of a usual resident, the movement is included in NOM at the time that it occurs. So, for example, a student from China newly arriving in Australia to take up a three-year undergrad- uate degree in Australia is extremely likely to be counted into the usual resident population from the date of arrival.

The change in definition in 2006 coincided with a large increase in temporary movements to Australia, especially of international students. As a large percentage of international students come from Asia, the change in definition has meant that, since 2006, most of these students have been counted as usual residents of Australia (the numbers are discussed below).

Despite the substantial conceptual differences between the Permanent Migration Programme and Net Overseas Migration, Figure 1 shows that the two numbers are very similar. This result occurs mainly because, in the longer term, temporary residents who are not Australian or New Zealand citizens have to leave unless they attain permanent residence through the Migration Programme. A second reason for the similarity of the two numbers is that the net movement of Australian citizens, permanent residents and New Zealand citizens is close to zero in the longer term, effectively because the net gain of New Zealand citizens matches the net loss of Australian citizens and permanent residents. Wide fluctuations of NOM compared with the Programme numbers indicate years in which there are surges in temporary arrivals as occurred around 2008-09.

Figure 1: Annual Net Overseas Migration (NOM) Compared with the Annual Grants of Permanent Residence through the Permanent Migration Programme (Australia, 1983-84 to 2015-16)

Sources: Department of Home Affairs (Permanent Programme Numbers); Australian Bureau of Statistics (NOM numbers).

93 Peter McDonald

Trends in International Migration

Figure 1 shows that Net Overseas Migration averaged around 100,000 per annum prior to the change in definition that occurred in 2006 after which it has averaged close to 200,000 per annum. In accordance with the view that the Permanent Migration Programme is the fundamental driver of Net Overseas Migration in the longer term, the programme level rose correspondingly from 80,000 in the year 2000 to 210,000 in 2012 after which it has remained at about that level. The combined Skill and Family Stream levels in the Migration Programme were set at 190,000 in the 2012-13 financial year and this same number has been held constant to 2018-19. Since 2012-13, there have been some small fluctuations in the Humanitarian Stream but there was a large increase in 2016-17 of about 10,000 persons from Syria and Iraq.

Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the increase in the Asia-born population of Australia can have two components: (a) changes in the number of Asians who are long-term temporary residents of Australia, notably students and (b) changes in the numbers of Asians who are permanent residents (and citizens) of Australia. Before discussing these possibilities in more detail, as background, it is important to consider the underlying policy changes.

Permanent and Temporary Skilled Migration: Significant Policy Changes from 1995 Onwards Policy Shift to Skilled Migration

In 1995, international migration policy was changed in two important ways. First, a points system was introduced in the selection of new permanent residents with the points being determined by the skill level of the applicant, and entry was limited to those with higher-level skills. Points were awarded for qualifications, work experience, age and English proficiency. Second, in a global economy in which there is a global labour market for those with the highest skills, the view was taken that a more comprehensive and efficient form of temporary skilled migration was required. Importantly, the temporary skilled migration scheme provided a central role for employer sponsorship in the migration programme by providing a streamlined approach in a market where speed plays an important role. When these changes were made in 1995, the skilled permanent and the skilled temporary visa programmes were conceived as largely unrelated entities. Since then, however, they have gradually been merging into a single system in which permanent migration is often preceded by a period of temporary migration. This has been achieved through a series of changes in practice that have enabled applicants for permanent migration in the skill stream to nominate or be nominated while onshore in Australia. Application for Permanent Residence Onshore

The perceived success of the merging of temporary and permanent skilled migration and continuing strong demand for labour in Australia led to a further evolution that enabled international students and working holiday makers (backpackers) to nominate for permanent residence onshore through the skilled stream. Alternatively, international students and working holiday makers took

94 Migration to Australia up employment in Australia via a temporary skilled worker visa (subclass 457) with the aim of later transitioning to permanent residence. This ‘two-step’ strategy has been evaluated favourably (Hawthorne, 2010).

In 2014-15, 129,000 people were granted permanent residence in the Skill Stream but only 42,300 people were counted into the Australian population as new arrivals on a Skill Stream visa. This is because the others granted permanent residence in the Skill Stream had already been counted into the Australian population under a temporary visa category before their permanent residence was granted. In the same year, net migration (NOM) to Australia was 179,000. Of this number, 131,000 (73%) were people holding some form of temporary residence visa at the time they were counted into the population.

In 2016-17, the three main eligibility categories (employer nominated, skilled independent and state or territory nominated) constituted 93% of the permanent skilled migration programme. Close to 60% of persons obtaining permanent residence in these categories had applied onshore and for the largest category, employer sponsored, 86% had applied onshore mainly from a temporary skilled migration visa (Department of Immigration and Border Protection, 2017; Figure 2).

International Students: Significant Policy Changes from 1998 Onwards

The Parliamentary Library has prepared an excellent overview of policy changes relating to international students from 1997 to 2015 (Department of Parliamentary Services, 2016). In 1998, the Howard Government began a campaign to increase the number of international students studying in Australia to enhance Australia’s foreign earnings and to provide an alternative funding source for Australian universities. Since that time, foreign income from international students has risen to become Australia’s third largest export in value after iron ore and coal and around 20% of the income of Australian universities comes from international student fees (DET, 2015), only slightly below the fee income from Australian students. At least for some international students, the prospect of permanent residence in Australia is a motivation to choose to study in Australia. Thus, the potential for permanent residence in Australia is part of the marketing strategy for this important industry.

To facilitate the increase of international students studying in Australia while maintaining the integrity of the system, successive Australian governments have made frequent changes to the migration requirements associated with international students (DET, 2015). The main changes that have contributed to additional immigrant stocks and flows from Asia are as follows: - The points test used to select skilled migrants is modified to grant five additional points where an applicant has obtained their diploma, trade certificate or degree from an Australian educational institution (July 1999). Later, the additional points were increased to ten for Honours and Masters graduate and to fifteen for PhD graduates (March 2003). - Certain groups of successful Australian-educated overseas students with key skills, particularly ICT qualifications, are able to apply and be granted permanent

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residence visas under the Skilled-Independent and related categories without leaving Australia (July 2001). - A new student guardian visa is introduced to allow parents and other relatives to care for international students in Australia (December 2003). - Overseas students are able to apply, on completion of their studies in Australia, for an Occupational Trainee Visa to undertake up to twelve months of supervised on-the-job training in their area of expertise (November 2005). - Graduating international students in certain disciplines are able to apply for a Subclass 485 visa to enable them to remain in Australia for a period of eighteen months to find work in their occupation and improve their English skills (September 2007). Following the Knight review in 2011, this right was extended to all graduating students in Higher Education and increased to two years for a Bachelor degree, three years for Master degree and four years for A PhD degree so long as the applicant’s first visa to study in Australia was granted on or after 5 November 2011. This change was directed explicitly at improving Australia’s position in the international market for students. - Overseas students are granted the automatic right to work up to twenty hours per week under their student visas while their course is in session (April 2008). Prior to this, students had to apply for these work rights. - Massive expansion in 2008 and 2009 of students particularly from South Asia undertaking short courses in mainly private educational institutions with a view to applying for permanent residence in Australia. Many of these educational institutions were merely money-making ventures and, in 2009, many went out of business. This movement distorted the Skill Stream such that almost all new permanent residence visas in the Skill Stream were in the relatively low-level skills of cooks, hairdressers and accountants. This movement was checked in February 2010 with the removal of cooks and hairdressers from the occupation eligibility list for the General Skilled Migration category (MODL). - Then current students in the short-course category just described whose occupation was not on the new list of eligible occupations for permanent residence in the General Skilled Migration category (the Skilled Occupation List, or SOL) were permitted to apply for a temporary skilled graduate visa enabling them to spend up to 18 months in Australia to acquire work experience and find an Australian employer willing to sponsor them on completion of their course. Employer sponsorship was available across a very much wider range of occupations (the Consolidated Skilled Occupations List, or CSOL) which included cooks and hairdressers (February 2010). - At various times across these years, the visa processing requirements were simplified to facilitate ease of entry.

The effect of these changes upon grants of visas to international students is shown in figure 2. The number of grants rose from 111,000 in 1998-99 to 191,000 in 2005-06. With a surge in numbers taking short courses, grants hit 320,000 in 2008-09. The subsequent crackdown on short course students reduced the numbers to around 250,000 but a new surge began from 2013-14 onwards. The new surge was in the university sector and followed the changes made to the Temporary Graduate visa (subclass 485). In the latest year, 2016-17, the number of international student grants hit a new high point at 343,000. At the end of May 2018, there were 561,000 international students in Australia and 71,000 sub-class 485 graduate visa holders, a total equivalent to one in every fourty persons in Australia (Department of Home Affairs, 2018).

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Figure 2: International Student Visa Grants (Australia, 1996-97 to 2016-17)

Source: Department of Home Affairs, 2018.

The Components of Net Overseas Migration

The shift to measurement of migration based on passport movements has enabled the visa types of migrants crossing Australia’s border to be identified. Thus, it is possible to divide net overseas migration into the movements of each visa type. For each movement into or out of Australia, the Australian Bureau of Statistics, using data files provided by the Department of Home Affairs, monitors whether individuals remain in or stay out of Australia for twelve out of the sixteen months following the border crossing. If it is a movement into Australia and the person subsequently is resident in Australia for twelve out of the next sixteen months, this is termed a NOM Arrival. The usual resident who remains out of Australia for twelve out of the next sixteen months is termed a NOM Departure. Net Overseas Migration is then the net of NOM Arrivals and NOM Departures. NOM Arrivals and NOM Departures are tagged with the visa type that the person held at the time of the border crossing upon which his or her NOM status was assessed. The country of citizenship of the mover is also captured along with a range of other characteristics such as age and sex.

Table 1 shows NOM Arrivals, NOM Departures and NOM summed over the twelve-year period, 2004-05 to 2015-16. The data are aggregated over twelve years so that annual fluctuations are smoothed. Each year, when the single number, Net Overseas Migration is published, there is much discussion and interpretation of movements up or down in the press and by the public. Table 1 shows that this single number, NOM, is the net outcome of numerous movement types into and out of the country. This makes interpretation of annual changes in NOM a complex matter. This is even more the case because annual data show that the movements for each visa type can vary considerably from the

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twelve-year averages shown in the table 1. For example, the table shows that the largest component of NOM over the eleven-year period is the net movement of international students at 31.2% of NOM, but in the final year, 2015-16, students composed 42.7% of NOM.

Overall, for the twelve years, 61% of NOM can be attributed to people on temporary visas, 34% to those on permanent residence visas and 5% to the combined net movements of New Zealand citizens and Australian citizens. Only 16% of NOM over the twelve years related to the Permanent Skill Stream, and more than half of these were the partners or children of the person whose skill was assessed. The continually controversial Temporary Skilled visa subclass (the 457 visa) accounted for only 10% of NOM over the twelve years and only 5.7% in 2014-15. In contrast, the percentage of NOM related to Working Holiday Makers was high at 11.1%.

Surprisingly, 13.5% of NOM related to people who had arrived on a Visitor visa. Almost all Visitor visas are issued for a period of just three months yet, over the eleven years, almost half a million people who arrived on a Visitor visa stayed in Australia for twelve out of the next sixteen months. To do this, these people must have shifted to another visa type that allowed them to stay longer. The main visa types to which those on Visitor visas transitioned (in net terms) were the Temporary Skilled visa and the Permanent Family visa (Department of Home Affairs and Department of the Treasury, 2018). Thus, they are likely to have been people arriving in Australia on a Visitor visa with an expectation of taking up one of these longer-term visas.

Table 1: Components of Net Overseas Migration by Visa/Movement Type (Australia, 2004-05 to 2015-16; 12-Year Aggregate)

Visa/Movement Type Visa Components of Net Overseas Migration, 2004-05 to 2014-15 Arrivals Departures Net (N) Net (%) Permanent 1,085,468 220,812 864,656 34.0 Skilled 503,424 92,815 410,609 16.2 Family 398,153 62,543 335,610 13.2 Humanitarian 130,453 1,665 128,788 5.1 Other 53,457 63,808 -10,351 -0.4 Temporary 2,733,004 1,187,117 1,545,887 60.8 Skilled 416,795 170,739 246,056 9.7 Student 1,239,551 447,445 792,106 31.2 Working Holiday 461,312 179,371 281,941 11. 1 Visitor 529,629 185,910 343,719 13.5 Other 85,707 203,650 -117,943 -4.6 New Zealand Citizens 529,722 232,060 297,662 11. 7 Australian Citizen 904,020 1,079,413 -175,393 -6.9 Other 162,600 154,269 8,331 0.3 TOTAL 5,414,814 2,873,671 2,541,143 100.0 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. Special table provided to the author, 21 June 2018. Note 1: Numbers do not add precisely due to ABS randomisation process. Note 2: Persons may change their visa type between arrival and departure thus affecting the net figure. The relatively large net figure for “Other Temporary” mainly reflects people who left Australia when they were on a Bridging visa although they had arrived on some other temporary visa.

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Asians in the Main Migration Flows Skilled Permanent

The final stage in the discussion is to consider the Asian component of Australian migration movements. The Department of Home Affairs (and its predecessors) regularly publishes data on country of citizenship for the main visa grant categories. In relation to grants of permanent residence in the three main permanent migration streams, citizens of Asian countries made up 62.1% of the Skilled Stream and 62.5% of the Family Stream over the nine-year period from 2006-07 to 2014-15. The proportion of Asians has been increasing across time such that, in 2014-15, Asian citizens constituted 67.2% of the Skilled Stream, 67.3% of the Family Stream and 88.7% of the off-shore Humanitarian Stream. As described above, grants in the Skilled Stream are largely grants onshore to persons who arrived on a temporary visa, most often, to those who arrived on an international student visa. Family Permanent

In the Family Stream, three factors are associated with the high percentage of grants to Asians. First, many persons already granted permanent residence in the Skilled Stream are young and single and, later, they bring in a partner from their home country. Many people in the Humanitarian Stream also bring in partners through the Family Stream. Second, many men who are Australian citizens source their brides in Southeast Asian countries. At the 2016 Census, among persons aged thirty to fifty-nine years born in Southeast Asia, there were 148 women for every 100 men. For persons of this age range born in Thailand, there were almost 300 women per 100 men. Among persons in the same age range born in China, there were 142 women for every 100 men. This last result partly reflects the predominance of women among Chinese students in Australia. Third, because of the one-child policy in China, many migrants from China to Australia are eligible to bring their parents to Australia under the long- standing criterion that a majority of the parents’ children live in Australia. Temporary Movements

From 2005-06 to March 2018, two-thirds of all international student visa grants were made to people from Asian countries. About 16% of international students move on to permanent residence in Australia (Department of Home Affairs and Department of the Treasury, 2018). However, among university students, the category most likely to proceed to permanent residence in the Skill Stream, the Asia proportion of grants in the same period was 83%, rising to 87% in the recent period, 2016-17 to March 2018.

The predominance of Asian citizens among the main temporary visa holders in Australia is shown in table 2. Persons on Bridging visas are very largely persons awaiting the outcome of an application for permanent residence (78% Asian). Those on the Temporary Graduate visa are international students who have completed their course but have opted to remain in Australia and seek employment. This is indicative of a desire to remain permanently in Australia (88% Asian). Those who arrived as an international student are in the category most likely to be counted into the Australian population (Table 1), and they are by

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far the largest category in table 2 (82% Asian). The large numbers in these three visa categories and the high proportions who are Asian citizens indicates that the predominance of Asians in the Australian permanent migration programme is very likely to continue in coming years.

While only a bare majority of those on a Temporary Skilled visa are Asian citizens (52.5%), a survey of persons on 457 visas showed that Asians were more likely to have an intention to remain in Australia on a permanent basis than those who came from non-Asian countries (Khoo et al., 2007).

Through a special tabulation provided to the author by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, it is possible to breakdown the net overseas migration movements shown in table 1 into countries of citizenship. Here the interest is in the movements of persons with an Asian country citizenship. Figure 3 shows Net Overseas Migration divided into three components: students from Asia, other Asians and other persons (non-Asians) for the years from 2004-05 to 2015-16. Over the full twelve-year period, Asian citizens made up 62% of NOM, however, in the most recent three years shown in the figure, Asian citizens constituted 77, 86 and 84% of NOM respectively. Asian citizens as a percentage of NOM fell below 50% only for the two years, 2010-11 and 2011-12, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and also the 2010 policy change that made it near to impossible to move from a short course in Australia to a successful permanent residence application.

Finally, in relation to the central argument of the paper, figure 4 shows the arrivals, departures and net movement of students who were citizens of Asian countries across the twelve-year period from 2004-05 to 2015-16. Over a million students who were citizens of Asia were counted into the Australian population over this twelve-year period and only 361,000 were counted out of the population. Net migration of students who were Asian citizens averaged 57,000 per annum but this number has fluctuated considerably across the years from a high of 110,000 in 2008-09 (due to the high intake of short-course students from South Asia who remained long enough to be counted into the population) to a low 19,000 in 2011-12 (following the global financial crisis and the crackdown on short courses as a pathway to permanent residence). In the most recent year, 2015-16, a new high point of 74,000 net migration was reached, 30,000 being from Chinese Asia and 31,000 from South Asia.

Table 2: Temporary Residents in Australia at 31 March 2018, by Visa Subclass, Asian Citizens and Total

Temporary Visa Type Asian Citizen Total % Asian Student 436,502 535,811 81.5 Bridging 152,170 194,875 78.1 Temporary Resident (Skilled) 79,577 151,596 52.5 Working Holiday Maker 48,572 148,124 32.8 Temporary Resident (Other) 76,584 110,314 69.4 Temporary Graduate (485) 57,416 65,246 88.0 Other Temporary 3,854 4,662 82.7 TOTAL 797,259 1,145,382 69.6 Source: Derived by author from Department of Home Affairs, bp0019 temporary residents in Australia at 31 March 2018, pivot table.

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Figure 3: Components of Net Overseas Migration (Australia, 2004-05 to 2014-15)

Source: Special tabulation provided to the author by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 21 June 2018.

Figure 4: Arrivals and departures of students who were citizens of Asian countries who were counted into or out of the Australian population (those who stayed in or out of Australia for twelve out of the subsequent sixteen months, 2004-05 to 2015-16)

Source: Special tabulation provided to the author by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 21 June 2018.

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Conclusion

The paper has documented the degree to which international migration to Australia has come to be dominated by Asian sources and the rapid increase in the proportion of the Australian population that has Asian origins. It has also been argued that these outcomes were unintended consequences of shifts in migration policy, particularly the rise of the international student population as the main source of Australian immigrants. Indeed, given John Howard’s stance on Asian migration in the late 1980s, there is an irony in the fact that the unintended consequence of rapidly increasing levels of Asian migration to Australia has been the result of policy changes set in train by the Howard Government.

While Net Overseas Migration consists of numerous movements, many of which are temporary movements, in the longer term, Net Overseas Migration is driven by the level of the government’s permanent migration programme. In turn, the level of the permanent programme is driven by political decisions that are made on an annual basis. Thus, the future of Asian migration to Australia is contingent upon the annual setting of the Migration Programme level. The principal driver of the Migration Programme level is perceived labour demand relative to supply.

A recent report on future job openings in Australia for the years, 2017-2024, predicts very substantial labour demand in these years (Shah and Dixon, 2018). In an economy with a total of around 12 million employed persons at the beginning of 2017, job openings in the eight-year period are estimated to be 4.1 million, consisting of 1.9 million driven by expansion of demand and 2.2 million by replacement of workers leaving their jobs — mainly the retirements of the large baby-boom generation. This is very substantial demand. McDonald (2017) has also shown that the net increment to the number of employed persons in the period from 2011 to 2016 was made up (83%) by immigrants who arrived in Australia in that five-year period, that is, there is little capacity for non-immigrant Australians to fill the expected large labour demand. So long as these realities are recognised by the government, it can be expected that the Migration Programme level will remain around the present level.

If the logic of the previous paragraph prevails, it can be expected that even higher percentages of future migration levels will be met by migrants from Asia as has been the case in the past three years. This can be predicted on the basis that the Asian student population in Australia is currently at its highest level ever and the Temporary Graduate (subclass 485) visa will be open to most of these students as a major pathway to permanent residence in Australia in the Skill Stream. There are then flow-on effects from new immigrants in the Skill Stream to the Family Stream and direct flows to the Family Stream when international students partner with Australian citizens.

A caveat to this argument is that the Shah and Dixon (2018) study shows that 55% of the job openings for the years 2017-2024 will be in occupations that are below (less skilled) than the major classes of occupation that are open to international migration in the Skill Stream. Thus, Australia will need to find large numbers of lower skilled workers. Two policy options include promoting higher employment rates among older Australians and providing the basic

102 Migration to Australia skills to unemployed Australians to enable them to take up these openings. The Humanitarian Programme offers a third alternative. Continuing difficulties associated with the Syrian and Rohingya peoples are likely to lead to the Humanitarian Programme being dominated by refugees from Asia.

This all points to further increases in the proportion of the Australian population that will have Asian origins. Since 1947 when the Australian population consisted almost entirely of persons of British origin, the nature of the population has been changing. Australia has adapted well to its increasingly multicultural population with people from every country in the world co-existing in relative harmony. For this situation to continue as Australia’s population continues to diversify especially in the direction of persons with Asian origins, broad social acceptance of this change in the nature of the Australian population is necessary.

References Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2017) Births Australia 2016, Data Cubes, Table 6. ABS Catalogue No. 3301.0, Canberra, ABS. Choi C. Y. (1975) Chinese Migration and Settlement in Australia, Sydney, Sydney University Press, 129 p. Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics (1967) Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 30th June, 1961, Volume VIII – Australia, Statistician’s Report, Canberra: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics. Department of Education and Training (2015) Financial Report of Higher Education Providers, Canberra, Department of Education and Training. Department of Home Affairs (2018) Student Visa and Temporary Graduate Visa Program Report, ending at 30 June 2018, Canberra, Department of Home Affairs. Department of Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 2016-17 Migration Programme Report, Canberra, Department of Immigration and Border Protection. Department of Parliamentary Services (2016) Overseas students: immigration policy changes 1997-2015, Parliamentary Library, Research Paper Series, 2015-16, Canberra, Department of Parliamentary Services. Department of the Treasury and Department of Home Affairs (2018) Shaping a Nation: Population Growth and Immigration Over Time, Canberra, Department of the Treasury and Department of Home Affairs. Dorling Philip (2017) Still Anti-Asian? Anti-Chinese? One Nation policies on Asian immigration and multiculturalism, Canberra, The Australia Institute, [online]. URL: https://www.tai.org.au/content/still-anti-asian-anti-chinese-one-nation-policies-asian-immigration-and-multiculturalism Hawthorne Lesleyanne (2010) How valuable is “two-step migration”? Labour market outcomes for international student migrants to Australia, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 19 (1), pp. 5-36. Howard John (2010) Lazurus Rising, Sydney, HarperCollins, 512 p. Khoo Siew-Ean, McDonald Peter, Voigt-Graf Carmen and Hugo Graeme (2007) A global labor market: factors motivating the sponsorship and temporary migration of skilled workers to Australia, International Migration Review, 41 (1), pp. 479-509.

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Markus Andrew (2001) Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 288 p. McDonald Peter (2017) International migration and employment growth in Australia, 2011-2016, Australian Population Studies, 1 (1), pp. 3-12.

Oakman Daniel (2002) “Young Asians in our homes”: Colombo Plan students and White Australia, Journal of Australian Studies, 26 (72), pp. 89-98. Pasquarelli John (1998) The Pauline Hanson Story, By the Man Who Knows, Sydney, New Holland, 338 p. Ramsey Alan (2006) The lost art of crossing the floor, The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 December, [online]. URL: https://www.smh.com.au/national/the-lost- art-of-crossing-the-floor-20060812-gdo5rd.html Shah Chandra and Dixon Janine (2018) Future Job Openings for New Entrants by Industry and Occupation, Adelaide, NCVER, [online]. URL: https://www.ncver. edu.au/research-and-statistics/publications/all-publications/future-job-openings- for-new-entrants-by-industry-and-occupation

104 Résumé - Abstract - Resumen

Peter McDonald Migration to Australia: From Asian Exclusion to Asian Predominance

In a relatively short period, Australia has shifted from being a country where migration from Asia was heavily restricted under the White Australia Policy to one where most of the immigrants arriving in a very large migration programme are from Asia. The paper traces this transition and demonstrates the central role that the international student programme has played in this process of change in the twenty first century. Migration vers l’Australie : de l’exclusion des Asiatiques à leur prédominance

En relativement peu de temps, l’Australie est passée d’un pays où la migration en provenance de l’Asie était fortement limitée par la politique de l’Australie blanche à un pays où la plupart des immigrants arrivant dans le cadre d’un très vaste programme de migration viennent d’Asie. L’article retrace cette transition et démontre le rôle central que le programme des étudiants étrangers a joué dans ce processus de changement au XXIe siècle. Migración a Australia: de la exclusión de los asiáticos a su predominio

En un período de tiempo relativamente corto, Australia ha pasado de ser un país donde la migración de Asia estaba severamente limitada por la política de los blancos australianos a un país donde la mayoría de los inmigrantes que llegan como parte de un programa de migración muy grande provienen de Asia. Este artículo traza esta transición y demuestra el papel central que el programa de estudiantes internacionales ha desempeñado en este proceso de cambio en el siglo XXI.

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REMi Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 2019, 35 (1 & 2), pp. 107-123

Contracting Margins? Liquid International Migration in the Pacific John Connell1

Migration has had a long history in the Pacific, with Pacific islanders sometimes regarded as particularly mobile people, within a sea of islands that covers a third of the planet (Hau’ofa, 1994). In the last half century, there has been both accelerated international migration, especially from the smaller Polynesian and Micronesian states, and rural-urban migration, with declining populations in national peripheries and growing high density urban concentrations. Migration has taken increasingly diverse forms, as it has gone from temporary to more permanent, unskilled to skilled and organized by households and governments. That increased flexibility, diversity and also individualization, and the uncertainty and instability that is attached to this, despite more open options, can be seen as a form of “liquid mobility” (Kymlicka, 2015): an apt phrase in an island realm. It is argued here that even in some of the most remote islands in the world the rationale, outcomes and consequences of migration are not necessarily distinctive, but epitomise two themes of “liquid mobility” hitherto more evident in Europe: distinctions between permanent and temporary migration are breaking down, with outcomes of varying precariousness, and this is undesirable for solidarity and equity. Liquid migration has followed more flexible labour markets, looser family relationships, cheaper travel and legal restrictions on permanency. Critically, these trends have accompanied slow economic growth in the region, the inability to create adequate numbers of jobs in the formal sector, steady population growth and rising expectations of what constitute adequate lives and livelihoods. While migration has long been primarily an economic phenomenon, social, political and environmental factors are also significant, and climate change will intensify future pressures for migration.

This overview focuses on the smaller islands, where economic opportunities are particularly limited and environmental challenges are mounting, to examine the opportunities and constraints that have influenced contemporary development and migration, and which offer a microcosm of broader changes in the region, where migration is one part of a wide-ranging deterritorialisation (Connell and Corbett, 2016). It further emphasises the three states in the region that are entirely composed of atolls, Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands, where vulnerability to both economic and environmental threats is substantial,

1 Professor, School of Geosciences, Room 348 Madsen Building F09, The University of Sydney, Australia; [email protected]

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where migration is increasingly important and the margins of settlement are fading.

Development Challenges

Migration is a function of development, disadvantage and opportunity. Within the Pacific region enormous differences exist between those Pacific island states (PICs) with very high population densities — on less fertile land — as in the atoll states (notably 390 people per sq km in Tuvalu) compared with the much lower densities in the larger, high island, Melanesian states of Papua New Guinea (PNG) (with twenty people per sq km), Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Average annual population increase in the PICs is around 2% but this varies widely. It is greatest in Melanesia, reaching 2.2% in PNG, and lowest in Polynesia and Micronesia, where the impacts of international migration are significant, and several states have falling populations.

Fertility rates remain relatively high in most PICs, resulting in large numbers of young people who require education, training and job opportunities, while high teenage fertility rates are linked to poor education and unemployment. Creating employment is a regional priority. There is extreme competition for jobs, high levels of youth unemployment that have contributed to social tensions in some urban centres and pressures for migration. In most PICs, more than half the population are aged below twenty-four. Relatively few people by number and proportion have post-school (tertiary) education and training, which leaves shortages for skilled positions, and potential migrants without the skills to access good jobs elsewhere.

An economic rationale for migration is partly a function of limited economic growth in the region, the outcome of significant and well-known constraints to economic development in small island states. Conventional economic development has been limited through a combination of factors including small populations, scarce resources, remoteness, fragmentation, susceptibility to extreme events (especially cyclones) in fragile environments, and vulnerability to external economic shocks, which have contributed to a distinctive dependence on aid and imports. Further constraints include high communication, insurance and energy costs, irregular international transport volumes (and uneconomic routes and loads), disproportionately expensive public administration and infrastructure, scarce local skills, problems of matching skills and jobs, limited domestic capital, small domestic markets and few opportunities for economies of scale. Entrepreneurialism is stifled by the lack of skills, capital and contacts, but also by scarce opportunities, beyond small-scale services. Public administration is costly and inefficient, and in most PICs, provision of services — especially transport — to remote areas has worsened rather than improved. Relatively generous overseas aid and remittances have not compensated for such cumulative disadvantages. These constraints have resulted in narrow export specialisation and market orientation, so that export prices and foreign exchange earnings can fluctuate considerably and alarmingly. Manufacturing is conspicuous by its absence and without backward linkages to the agricultural or fisheries sectors. Weak economic growth has meant that the numbers of school-leavers, and thus potential entrants to the workforce, exceeds the number of jobs created (Connell, 2013).

108 Contracting Margins?

Economic development has been disappointing in the more or less half century since independence. Agriculture has produced the bulk of exports for most PICs but in this century has proved more difficult under a regime of increasingly free trade. Fisheries offer existing and future prospects, dependent on international negotiations, while tourism offers options for some, set against the tyranny of distance and intervening opportunities that has resulted in tourism being trivial in the atoll states. High islands — that make up almost all of Melanesia (Fiji, PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) and Polynesia (Samoa and Tonga), though islands are smaller there, have more development opportunities than the more remote atoll states, where opportunities are particularly scarce.

Migration has largely been a response to perceived socio-economic inequalities, that in recent years have been accentuated by both a rise in expectations of incomes and living conditions and greater familiarity with circumstances in overseas countries. Changing aspirations, the increased necessity and desire to earn cash, a preference for regular employment, and distaste for agricultural work have gradually given migration a more obvious economic rationale: a movement in search of wage and salary employment, scarce or absent at home. Rural-Urban Migration and Urbanisation

Rural-urban migration is now mainly a Melanesian phenomenon, but is also substantial in the three atoll states, and is something of an alternative to international migration, where that cannot be achieved. Towns and cities have grown rapidly in the years since independence, and most urban residents are in Melanesian cities and towns. Urban birth rates are high, and a growing proportion of urban residents are now of a second or higher generation with few ties to “home” areas and limited ability and will to return (Petrou and Connell, 2017). Population densities are highest in capital cities despite the active discourage- ment of urban migration and residence. Notions that Pacific islanders are or should be rural people have been difficult to displace (Connell, 2011).

Virtually since independence, urban populations have increased faster than those in rural areas, through a combination of rural-urban migration and urban fertility, posing challenges for planning, land use, water and sanitation, housing and general infrastructure, as well as the need for effective social, health and employment policies (Connell, 2013 and 2017b; Mecartney and Connell, 2017). This has resulted in “over-urbanisation” characterised by high unemployment rates (typified in a “youth bulge”), inadequate housing and services, alongside significant and intensified environmental problems. Social problems including ill-health, domestic violence, theft and alcohol abuse have become more significant. Land shortages are an accelerating urban and coastal phenomenon, alongside land tenure disputes and conflicts, resulting in increasing numbers of informal settlements on unsuitable land.

Throughout the region, greater pressure is being exerted on coastal resources: especially as populations increase, because of the desire for access to services, and to land suitable for development (whether for agriculture, tourism or infrastructure). All urban centres (outside PNG) are coastal, contributing to a “coastal squeeze” that has put pressure on water resources and agricultural land, led to the clearance of mangroves, polluted lagoons, reduced the habitat

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of coastal fisheries, and increased the potential for coastal erosion. As urban centres have grown, newer migrants and newer housing areas, often informal, have located in marginal sites that are vulnerable to hazard. Many urban residents have few sources of income, no legal residential status and no security of tenure, limited access to services and live at high densities, the combination of which poses social problems and health risks. Within parts of Tarawa and Majuro, population densities have approached those in Hong Kong. In fragile urban atoll environments especially, high population densities challenge water supply systems, sanitation, and waste management and present serious environmental management problems. Economic growth is too limited to mitigate or manage such problems, hence interest in international migration has consequently grown. The combination of high population growth rates and fertility, few employment prospects and inadequate living conditions emphasises the economic rationale for migration. International Migration

Migration has long been a feature of Pacific existence, since nineteenth century “blackbirding”, the initially forcible kidnapping of men, to work on plantations from Hawaii to Australia, and to mines, from Chile to Palau (e.g. Maude, 1981). It was particularly significant for the atolls where domestic opportunities were scarce. By the end of the nineteenth century, in remote atolls like those of Tokelau, “the idea of permanent migration, involving a severance of many ties with the home island and of seeking one’s fortune elsewhere, is well established in […] life and thought. For the past seventy years or so it appears to have been accepted that some of nearly every group of siblings must tahe (‘emigrate’) simply because the local resources are seen as insufficient” (Hooper and Huntsman, 1973, 403-404). Although most migration was temporary, it was already underpinned by the desire to benefit both the welfare of the migrants, and of family members who remained at home. Twentieth century migration was more localized in Melanesian plantations and, over time, to scattered mine sites, especially Banaba and Nauru. It remained only exceptionally permanent.

International migration effectively began in the 1960s, particularly from Samoa, after its independence in 1962, spurred by the global long boom, demand for employment and the arrival of jet transport, mostly to metropolitan states (New Zealand and the United States). Tonga soon followed, along with the Cook Islands. That relieved population pressure and initiated a modern phase of remittances back to the islands. Intendedly temporary, migration gradually became more permanent. With rare exceptions, such as the immigration that followed the late 1960s nickel boom in New Caledonia, a lack of intra-regional migration was indicative of limited island economic development.

This process resulted in Tonga and Samoa becoming dependent on remittance flows to a greater extent than almost any other country. So significant has international migration become that, in Polynesia at least, families created small- scale metaphorical “transnational corporations of kin”, by seemingly allocating family members to different countries, while migration became so common it was part of a “culture of migration” where migration is normative and reflects economic imperatives (Connell, 2008). Over time acquiring marketable skills has played a valuable role in enabling migrants to gain better jobs, and migration

110 Contracting Margins? has been of more evidently skilled migrants, such as teachers, health workers, and also sportsmen (Connell, 2009). Losses of skilled labour have become serious in several PICs, with especially small states losing disproportionately more skills than larger states. The loss of skilled workers has raised questions about whether migration constitutes both a brain drain of unacceptable proportions that hampers national development, and a brain-waste as some fail to gain commensurate employment in destinations. Limited return migration has not remedied this problem and remittances may not always compensate for skill drains.

Most migration has been of individuals and later families, moving to metropolitan states, especially New Zealand, and with many becoming permanent migrants. Several migrant generations now exist there and in other metropolitan states. By contrast international migration from PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu is rare. That has partly resulted from different colonial relationships. Typically, migration has largely followed “colonial” lines, notably from much of Micronesia to the United States (enshrined in the Compacts of Free Association, when Palau, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Marshall Islands acquired independence) and from several Polynesian PICs to New Zealand. The three Compact states, Cook Islands and Niue all chose not to gain full independence since migration opportunities might has been lost. Conversely Kiribati and Tuvalu, and the Melanesian states, were latecomers to migration, without migration corridors to the United Kingdom, Australia or elsewhere. Nevertheless, migration from PICs gradually extended, diversified and became more skilled, with the same rationale but some new entrants, notably Tuvalu.

Structural circumstances have changed. Most PICs now benefit from some preferential arrangements, notably in New Zealand, whether permanent migration opportunities (the lotteries of New Zealand and the United States) or schemes for temporary employment (invariably in agriculture) and/or for training in particular activities. Since 2002, New Zealand has offered a Pacific Access Category, which allocates places to a range of Pacific island countries. It offers 1,100 places a year to Samoa, 250 places a year to Tonga and Fiji, and seventu-five to migrants from both Kiribati and Tuvalu, but applicants are only granted a visa if they receive a job offer from New Zealand, a significant constraint for atoll states like Tuvalu (Kagan, 2016b). Demand exceeds supply.

The outcome of these international migration flows has been a substantial population of Pacific islanders in the metropolitan states bordering the Pacific. Currently, almost a million Pacific-born people live elsewhere, compared with a resident population of about 11 million, three quarters of whom are in PNG. Second and third generations swell these numbers significantly. By 2010 some 850,000 people of Pacific ethnicity or ancestry lived in the four main Pacific Rim migrant destinations: New Zealand (350,000), Australia (150,000), USA (300,000) and Canada (50,000). Ultimately migration in search of superior livelihoods is a continuation of past practices, where jet planes are faster, more effective and travel greater distances than canoes. That is abundantly true of atolls and the atoll states. The demographic balance is shifting outwards.

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Remittances

Migration has had massive economic significance. Over generations migrants are well placed to contribute to development at home through their familiarity with needs, and remittances contribute both directly and indirectly to welfare and human capital formation. Remittances, whether from more or less permanent migrants, especially overseas, or from seasonal workers, are of enormous and growing importance, even in the smaller islands of Melanesia, where they have contributed to the emergence of a “singaut economy” (Rasmussen, 2015; Hayes, 1993; Wilson, 2013; Petrou and Connell, 2017). Both unskilled and skilled migrants sustain remittance levels at high levels, over long time periods, often more than twenty years, while skilled migrants may also provide advice (“social remittances”) on education, health and other matters (Connell and Brown, 2004; Brown and Connell, 2015). Remittances have made a very significant contribution to improved housing and water supplies, better access to health and education, more modern forms of consumption, such as solar panels and generators, and small-scale services such as bars or petrol stations, small stores and taxis. Remittances have enabled some diversification out of agriculture, an increased flexibility of livelihood choices, and over time a reduction in both poverty and inequality (Brown, Connell and Jimenez, 2014). Remittances also support local organisations (especially churches) and local needs, such as recovery from cyclone damage and other hazards.

As international migration has become of greater significance, so remittance flows are larger, especially in comparison with aid flows, and more stable than other sources of national and household finance. Remittances compensate in the aftermath of crises and disasters, whether physical (especially cyclones) or economic, being counter-cyclical, in response to economic and environmental shocks (Le De et al., 2013). Growing recognition of the value of remittances has brought new institutional interest in managing flows and “harnessing” remittances for financing investment and economic growth. Remittances have become a new “development mantra” (Kapur, 2005), in a climate of aid fatigue, uncertainty about private investment, the extent of international migration and the propensity in some countries to train workers for migration. They constitute an effective, informal, family-based system of social protection for migrants’ families. At the same time, they may help to sustain a “migration syndrome”, while imposing sacrifices on migrants.

Remittances are such a substantial component of most small PICs that these microstates have been described as having MIRAB (Migration, Remittances, Aid and Bureaucracy) economies, an acronym first devised for Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tokelau and the Cook Islands (Bertram and Watters, 1985), but which is now more broadly relevant. Tonga and Samoa are within the top twenty countries in the world in terms of the contribution of remittances to gross domestic product (GDP). Sustained remittances are crucial for national development and are likely to become more important in the future, even in a global context of substantial opposition to international migration, as aid fatigue increases.

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Atoll States

The Pacific includes some of the most vulnerable islands and countries in the world, increasingly threatened by climate change. Rising sea levels and more intense storms and cyclones pose risks to coastal settlements, water resources, plants and human health (Connell, 2013). Low-lying atolls are prone to a range of hazards, from cyclones to tsunamis, and islanders are less easily able to mitigate such hazards in small islands, or, without high ground, retreat from them (Connell, 2015). More than 150 populated atolls are in the Pacific, with the three atoll states most at risk, being exclusively composed of atolls scattered over a vast expanse of ocean, and which have weak economies, restricting national ability to respond and cope domestically. Atoll states are particularly affected by the tyrannies of distance. Migration and resettlement within the Pacific region are limited, primarily because economic and employment opportunities are absent and appropriate, accessible land is scarce. Kiribati and, to a lesser extent, Tuvalu, unlike the Marshall Islands (and Tokelau), have no significant ex-colonial ties or overseas diaspora populations, hence have no “beachhead” populations overseas with whom to build migration bridges, and fewer assured sources of remittances.

The more distinctive problems of atoll states include intermittent water shortages, poor soils, and a “transport stranglehold” that has been a constraint to development, bypassing many atoll islands. The capital cities of Funafuti, Majuro and Tarawa, all now holding more than half the nations’ populations, after substantial internal migration, are particularly at risk because of high-density, relatively poor migrant populations in low-lying, marginal coastal areas. In Tarawa urban problems have reached crisis proportions: a “perfect storm” of economic problems intensified by environmental changes and extreme pressure on scarce resources (Storey and Hunter, 2010). Continued rural-urban migration has increased the vulnerability of these urban islands, as physical changes (such as causeway construction and sand and gravel mining) further threaten the “natural” environment. Many such marginal areas have only been recently settled, hence the poor are more likely to be at risk, yet they are less easily able to cope.

The converse of the extremes of urbanisation in the atoll states is depop- ulation of the “outer islands”, in itself a relatively new concept in the Pacific, as employment is scarce, skilled workers are reluctant to be posted there and service delivery is limited (Connell, 2013). Almost every Pacific atoll, other than the three urban centres, has lost population in this century. Both Tuvalu and Tokelau have declining populations. Where migration opportunities are blocked, for whatever reason, then livelihoods are actually threatened, as in the densely populated Carteret Islands in PNG (Connell, 2016). The present and future of atolls and atoll states is of particular consequence in the region, because of the significance of economic challenges, but also because of the imminence of anticipated environmental threats to livelihoods, with ongoing climate change.

While migration even in the atoll states remains primarily an economic phenomenon (Shen and Gemenne, 2011; Shen and Binns, 2012; Connell, 2016), environmental factors may gradually become more significant, especially if changes become catastrophic. Since 2015 cyclones in Vanuatu and Fiji, and

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volcanic eruptions in Manam (PNG) and Ambae and Ambrym (Vanuatu) have proved catalysts for migration. Tsunamis, as in the Solomon Islands in 2007 and Samoa in 2009, have had similar but more localised effects. Only uninhabited islets have already succumbed to environmental change yet climate change, by stimulating more frequent and more intense cyclones, is likely to be a factor in contributing to “slow onset” migration and quests for resettlement. Resettlement

Past resettlement schemes in the region provide unpromising precedents. Resettlement programmes have existed in the Pacific at least since the 1900s when people from some FSM atolls were formally relocated on Pohnpei after cyclones. In the 1930s people from Kiribati were resettled in the Solomon Islands and in Fiji. These international movements, of people experiencing drought and reduced livelihoods, occurred within and between British possessions in colonial times. While the resettlement of Banabans in Fiji has been relatively successful, since an “empty” island without local claimants was available and at the time involved no more than about 1000 people, seventy years later, uncertainty still reigns over land tenure (Connell and Tabucanon, 2015). Otherwise most resettlement after environmental hazards, mainly volcanic eruptions and tsunamis (and also forced migration from military and mine sites), has been largely unsuccessful (Connell, 2012; Connell and Lutkehaus, 2017a and 2017b; McAdam, 2014) with migrants seeking to return home, land disputes intensifying, friction occurring with nearby people and challenges in adapting to different ecological zones and cultures.

Resettlement of Manam and Carteret Islanders in PNG, has been typically thwarted by “host” landowners, the impossibility of gaining adequate access to land and land rights and government inactivity, even after, in the case of the Carteret Islands, half a century of attempts, and in the case of Manam, urgent needs. Such relative failures in resettlement raise questions of citizenship, ethics and morality and bode poorly for future resettlement needs. The problems experienced by quite small populations moving short distances in similar cultural contexts are indicative of the potential future problems facing environmental migrants. Settlers have been perceived as outsiders and rival claimants to valuable coastal resources. Although Kiribati has purchased a small island in Fiji, for possible resettlement, the “welcome” that might be attached to migration of i-Kiribati is likely to be ambiguous.

Landowners have been increasingly reluctant to cede land to others, however moral and worthy their claims, even when they shared kinship ties or exchange relationships, especially as their own populations and needs have grown, and land has become more valuable. Neighbours are not necessarily friends. Without some significant political and cultural changes, there is little likelihood of effective resettlement within the Pacific region. The Carteret Islands and Manam are problematic precursors for the future of resettlement in the region. By contrast the resettlement of half the islanders from the Tokelau atolls, which was then experiencing cyclones and overcrowding, to New Zealand in the 1960s (Wessen et al., 1992), offers a more hopeful precedent for resettlement beyond the PICs themselves, albeit in colonial times. But international moves tend to be costly, risky, and require advance planning and political acquiescence and acceptability.

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National Strategies?

If most migration from PICs, other than rare resettlement schemes, has been independent of government involvement and intervention (or even facilitation), as migration became more obviously a development strategy, governments began to intervene to develop and regulate distant employment opportunities. That was spearheaded by Kiribati and Tuvalu, first in developing mining opportunities in Nauru, for most of the twentieth century, and subsequently, beginning in the 1960s, with the establishment of national Marine Training Schools to enable workers to acquire the skills needed to obtain employment on merchant shipping lines. In this century that briefly extended to cruise-ships providing employment opportunities for about 120 I-Kiribati women, between 2004 and 2012. Numbers were small and management was challenging (Kagan, 2016a) and the scheme eventually ended.

Kiribati and Tuvalu were unusual in training workers for migration as “seafarers”, initially men and subsequently also women. That instituted the start of greater interest in, and a wider process of, training people for migration to achieve what the former Kiribati President, Anote Tong, called “migration with dignity”, that is employment in occupations which enabled some degree of self-esteem and higher incomes, rather than low status, low income, entry-level positions, and are also likely to offer some permanency and prospects and enable a more substantial flow of remittances.

PICS without migration ties to metropolitan states have given increased attention to training workers for employment either overseas or at home. Vocational education has been upgraded in several countries. Two new initiatives in this century include the multinational Australia-Pacific Technical College (APTC) and the Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative (KANI). The APTC enables Pacific islanders to gain Australian skills and qualifications in a variety of trade areas, that would enable better access to overseas labour markets, although in the first few years most graduates have remained in their home countries. KANI was a sectoral training scheme, where i-Kiribati nurses were trained in Australia, principally to remain there and generate remittances rather than transfer superior skills to Kiribati. It proved an extremely expensive programme, with doubtful benefits other than for the graduates, and was quite quickly cancelled, but international strategies have continued to evolve. Seasonal Worker Schemes

Accompanying longer-term schemes for more formally skilled workers have been short-term temporary employment schemes introduced between PICs and Australia and New Zealand from 2007. Such schemes have been seen as potential prototypes that might be effective in addressing the need for migration as adaptation in the face of short term hazards and slow onset climate change.

Seasonal worker schemes in the Pacific were introduced in New Zealand in the 1960s, to give opportunities to Pacific islanders to work for short periods in agriculture and provide mainly harvest labour to farmers. However New Zealand faced substantial overstayer problems and the schemes were short- lived (Macpherson, 1981). A new Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme began in 2007 and was followed in 2008 by a similar Australian SWP (Seasonal

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Worker Programme) scheme, both centred on the employment of agricultural workers for up to seven months in a year. New Zealand allows up to 9,500 migrant workers in a single year, and although Australia had no cap, numbers have been much lower. Most independent PICs have been involved; Tonga and Vanuatu have taken greatest advantage of them, whereas Tuvalu and Kiribati have only been marginally involved, disadvantaged by distance and transport costs, unfamiliarity and the difficulty of obtaining visas and passports, with potential workers lacking some basic skills, English language proficiency and the ability to develop workplace links necessary to smooth migration (Bedford et al., 2010).

New Zealand’s RSE scheme has been seen as a success, for its role as a development initiative, and because access to income for Pacific Islanders is the cornerstone of a “triple win” scenario that benefits New Zealand, through filling labour shortages, benefits PICs, through the provision of employment, and benefits the RSE workers and their families. Distinct differences from the nineteenth century era of blackbirding are that demand exceeds supply and a growing number of workers are women (Connell, 2010). Australia provided rather fewer places, partly because it is more fragmented geographically and institutionally. The overall benefits have been mainly positive, despite some social costs (Gibson et al., 2014; Bedford and Bedford, 2010; Petrou and Connell, 2018). That the atoll states have largely failed to benefit emphasizes that risk and opportunities are unevenly distributed and that despite the needs of relatively poor countries and households, they are not the main beneficiaries.

These temporary negotiated transnational schemes are now expanding and extending into non-agricultural areas such as tourism, where there are similar labour deficits. In 2017 Australia introduced a microstate visa for northern Australia, specifically for Kiribati, Tuvalu and Nauru — the “orphan microstates” — to provide opportunities for up to 250 citizens (around fifty per year over five years). By early 2019 Pacific islander workers had been deployed in tourism (in Great Barrier Reef hotels), caring, forestry and meatpacking. Demand in these sectors will continue to grow and will not be met by domestic workers. A long history has accompanied the possibility of increased numbers of PIC (and other) migrants being involved in care giving at a time when the unsatisfied demand for care-givers is steadily increasing and a high proportion of all jobs in caring are held by new migrants from a range of “non-traditional” source countries (Negin et al., 2016). Small numbers and administrative problems are indicative of the constant underlying structural problems for small, remote nations engaging with distant and uncertain labour markets, especially where metropolitan countries are urged to “look after their own” and are distrustful of short-term migrants becoming more permanent (which caused the collapse of the 1960s schemes). However, unlike agricultural employment, vacancies are emerging in areas that require more skills beyond those currently held by most Pacific islanders, but are potentially more long-term.

On a regional scale, since most migration between Pacific island countries and metropolitan states has favoured Polynesian states (Samoa and Tonga) and, more generally, the states with colonial connections to New Zealand and the United States, and seasonal worker schemes favour countries that are not too distant from Australia and New Zealand, migration tends to proceed from

116 Contracting Margins? inequality and contribute further to inequality. Atoll states have been particularly disadvantaged.

Promoting the migration of workers, long important for various Asian governments, has become of greater Pacific significance. In every case this is primarily designed to increase the flow of remittances, but raises questions over whether people are more valued as migrants or as citizens and more basic questions about the use of remittances and the alternatives to a focus on migration. Migration is not a development panacea and a judicious combination of policies is needed to effectively maximise the benefits, for households and for countries. This must be based on reciprocal relationships between countries and between places of origin and destination, while remittance flows must be balanced against the social costs of migration and the skill drain that may be involved. That is crucial in the atoll states where skilled human resources are scarce and migration appears ever more valuable.

Conclusion

Despite the growing significance of government intervention and regulation, throughout the PICs most migration is of islanders making their own decisions, and either moving into already overstretched urban centres or to cities overseas. Pacific people have used a multitude of strategies to achieve mobility: kinship, lotteries, the PAC, national agreements, temporary work schemes and simple illegal overstaying. Simultaneously government interventions in favour of migration (not always with dignity) have increased, and been oriented, at least by Australia, in a most recent phase, to the particular needs of very small atoll states. The value of remittances has shaped a substantial outward urge — at a time of aid fatigue and stagnant economic growth — that has drawn in PICs hitherto less involved with international migration. In the context of globalization and technological advancements, Pacific peoples are now more mobile than ever, travelling over greater distances and more frequently during their lives, partly a “liquid mobility” associated with the growing visibility of “floating populations” that stay temporarily (Engbersen, 2016). Environmental change is likely to enhance all these trends as the liquidity of migration increases further.

While the diversity of migration possibilities has increased, the legal rights and entitlements of Pacific island migrants have tended to decline — including the right to stay — exemplifying a new stratification and inequality within migration. Foreign migrants are all too likely to be seen as foreign workers on temporary visas, easily able to be replaced and removed and denied citizenship and residential status: a new precarity (Underhill and Rimmer, 2015; Petrou and Connell, 2017). Temporary agricultural workers are denied permanency but encouraged to return every year, in order to take advantage of their acquired skills, becoming “permanently temporary” and constantly floating, a situation that does nothing for equity, challenges the etymology of “guest” workers and may enhance domestic problems.

A quarter of a century ago when climate change was just beginning to be seen as a potential threat to low-lying Pacific islands, one geographer, in an article entitled “Earth’s Empty Quarter”, feared that at the end of the present century

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“almost all the descendants of today’s Polynesian or Micronesian islanders will live in Auckland, Sydney, San Francisco and Salt Lake City. Occasionally they may recall that their ancestors once lived on tiny Pacific islands, [now] lonely Pacific islands, set in an empty ocean” (Ward, 1989: 245). While some islands — all atolls — have been depopulated in the last century, it is a gloomy and unlikely prediction but it will take more effective policies and practices at several scales to ensure it does not become closer, and that, in Melanesia especially, urban concentrations are not excessive.

Atolls remain most at risk, but far from exceptional (Rallu, 1981; Connell, 1983), with atoll states characterised as weak and fragile where service delivery to remote areas and islands (where employment opportunities are usually particularly scarce) has worsened, resulting in selective and accelerated migration from outlying areas and outer islands. As long ago as 1954 Osborne (1966: 49) vividly recorded the “last days” of tiny Merir atoll (Palau): “the island is dying… the women are too old to cultivate taro in any quantity and the men cannot keep the coconut groves cleared”. Other Palau atolls, such as Sonsorol, have effectively followed suit (Walda-Mandel, 2016) having failed to go from risk to resilience but chosen to leave a subsistence lifestyle for a more diverse and loosely modern livelihood. As aspirations increase, the human margins have gradually faded.

Land issues have constrained internal migration and resettlement throughout the Pacific region, and access to land is more difficult now than at any time in the past (other than in large private sector land grabs). Only Fiji offers some resettlement opportunities. Established local, regional and transnational networks ease processes of migration and settlement. Slow and steady migration and resettlement, the ability of the people themselves to participate in decision-making, the possibility of some people remaining at home and, in the end, the greater capacity of local people to resist displacement and mitigate environmental change, so the greater the chance of success. Yet there is always a danger of being too slow. Time and timing are of the essence. International migration is increasingly essential.

Demand for migration is likely to become more important in the future for a combination of social, economic and environmental reasons. PICs will need to maintain and develop strategies that most effectively benefit from all opportunities for migration, and to seek out other possible opportunities. Given the complex nature of the relationships between migration, climate change and socio-economic development, at various scales, a challenge for countries and the region as a whole is where best to focus policy (Connell, 2017a). Whatever forms of migration develop it is necessary to create an attractive political, social and economic environment that encourages migrants to remain in contact and be involved in their home countries and islands, to return and to remit and, if feasible, to make investments there. National strategies in the PICs are very slowly evolving in this direction. Yet, as migratory numbers and aspirations have grown, reaction to migration has become particularly strident, evident in Brexit and Donald Trump’s call for a wall between the United States and Mexico, a lack of solidarity and empathy, highlighting the political ground-swell against globalisation, immigration alongside protectionism and virulent anti-immigration in Australia, marked by draconian policies towards refugees. In this

118 Contracting Margins? century, Australia has tended to cut back its liberal provisions for migration from New Zealand, as that increasingly brought Pacific islander migrants who had first stayed in New Zealand and acquired citizenship there (Hamer, 2014). Concessional schemes for Pacific islanders have had no obvious place in Australia or the United States.

Migration has never been easy and there has rarely been a good time to be a migrant but the considerable extent of global opposition to migration seems unlikely to decline in the near future. Borders are hardening and legal restrictions are increasing, at the same time as both greater demand and support for temporary migration, where flexible labour markets offer neither stable nor well-pad jobs: the basis of liquid migration. It is in this context that the present and future of Pacific migration exists. On the margins especially, few opportunities exist for PICs and their residents to establish some degree of “migration with dignity” — where migration meets a range of needs and can be suitably planned and managed — but the politics of migration will become increasingly sensitive and critical. These issues are likely to become more challenging in the face of climate change, despite uncertainties about its future impact. If PICs can develop national economies where the “rush to migration” and population growth can be slowed, and harmful environmental change mitigated and reduced, migration strategies will be rather less urgent, and less likely to end in precarity. That does not seem imminent.

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Connell John (2013) Islands at Risk. Environments, Economies and Contemporary Change, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 351 p. Connell John (2012) Population Resettlement in the Pacific: Lessons from a Hazardous History, Australian Geographer, 43, pp. 127-142. Connell John (2011) Elephants in the Pacific? Pacific urbanisation and its discon- tents, Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 52, pp. 121-135 Connell John (2010) From Blackbirds to Guestworkers in the South Pacific: Plus ça change… ?, Economic and Labour Relations Review, 20 (2), pp. 111-122. Connell John (2009) The Global Care Chain. From the Pacific to the World, London, Routledge, 197 p. Connell John (2008) Niue: Embracing a Culture of Migration, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 34, pp. 1021-1040. Connell J (1983) The End Ever Nigh: Contemporary population change on Pitcairn Island, GeoJournal, 16 (2), pp. 193-200. Connell John and Brown R.P.C. (2004) The Remittances of Migrant Tongan and Samoan Nurses in Australia, Human Resources for Health, 2 (2), pp. 1-16. Connell John and Corbett J (2016) Deterritorialisation. Reconceptualising Development in the Pacific Islands, Global Society, 30 (4), pp. 83-604. Connell John and Lutkehaus, N (2017a) Escaping Zaria’s Fire? The Volcano Resettlement Problem of Manam Island, Papua New Guinea, Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 58(1), 14-26. Connell John and Lutkehaus N (2017b) Environmental Refugees? A Tale of Two Resettlement Projects in Papua New Guinea, Australian Geographer, 48 (1), pp. 79-95. Connell John and Tabucanon G (2016) From Banaba to Rabi: A Pacific Model for Resettlement?, in S. Price and J. Singer Eds., Global Implications of Development, Disasters and Climate Change, London, Routledge, pp. 91-107. Engbersen G (2016) Floating populations, civic stratification and solidarity, Comparative Migration Studies, 4 (8), pp. 1-4. Gibson J, McKenzie D and Rohorua H (2014) Development impacts of seasonal and temporary migration: A review of evidence from the Pacific and Southeast Asia, Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, 1 (1), pp. 18-32. Hamer P (2014) “Unsophisticated and unsuited”: Australian barriers to Pacific Islander immigration from New Zealand, Political Science, 66 (2), pp. 93-118. Hau’ofa E (1994) Our sea of islands, The Contemporary Pacific, 6, pp. 147-161. Hayes G (1993) “Mirab Processes and development on small Pacific islands: a case study from the southern Massim, Papua New Guinea, Pacific Viewpoint, 34, pp. 153-178. Hooper A and Huntsman J (1973) A demographic history of the Tokelau islands, Journal of the Polynesian Society, 82 (4), pp. 366-411. Kagan S (2016a) “On the ship, you can do anything”: the impact of international cruiseship employment for I-Kiribati women, Pacific Studies, 36 (1), pp. 35-51.

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Kagan S (2016b) The Role of Remittances in Risk Management and Resilience in Tuvalu: Evidence and Potential Policy Responses, in A. MiIan, B. Schraven, K. Warner and N. Cascone Eds., Migration, Risk Management and Climate Change: Evidence and Policy Responses, Cham, Springer, pp. 175-191. Kymlicka W (2015) Solidarity in Diverse Societies: Beyond Neoliberal Multiculturalism and Welfare Chauvinism, Comparative Migration Studies, 3 (1), pp. 1-19. Le De L, Gaillard J-C and Friesen W (2013) Remittances and Disaster: A Review, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 4 (4), pp. 34-43. McAdam J (2014) Historical cross-border relocations in the Pacific: lessons for planned relocations in the context of climate change, Journal of Pacific History, 49, pp. 301-332. Macpherson C (1981) Guest-worker movements and their consequences for donor and recipient countries: a case study, in G.W. Jones and H.V. Richter Eds., Population mobility and development: Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Canberra, ANU Development Studies Centre Monograph, 27, pp. 257-277. Maude H. E. (1981) Slavers in Paradise; The Peruvian labour trade in Polynesia, 1862-1864, Canberra, ANU Press, 263 p. Mecartney S and Connell John (2017) Urban Melanesia: The Challenges of Managing Land, Modernity and Tradition, in S. McDonnell, M. Allen and C. Filer Eds., Kastom, Property and Ideology. Land Transformations in Melanesia, Canberra, ANU Press, pp. 57-84. Negin J, Coffman J, Connell John and Short S (2016) Foreign-born aged care workers in Australia: A growing trend, Australasian Journal on Ageing, 35 (4), pp. 13-17. Nunn P (2013) The end of the Pacific? Effects of sea level rise on Pacific Island livelihoods, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 34 (2), pp. 143-171. Osborne D (1966) The Archaeology of the Palau Islands, Honolulu, Bishop Museum Bulletin, 230, 182 p. Petrou K and Connell John (2018) “We Don’t Feel Free At All”. Temporary Ni-Vanuatu Workers in the Riverina, Australia, Rural Society, 27 (1), pp. 66-79. Petrou K and Connell John (2017) Rural-urban migrants, translocal communities and the myth of return migration in Vanuatu: the case of Paama, Journal de la Société des Océanistes, 144-145, pp. 51-62. Rallu J-L (1981) La dépopulation des archipels du Pacifique. L’exemple de quatre villages de l’île Malekula, Population, 3, pp. 519-540. Rasmussen A (2015) In the Absence of the Gift. New Forms of Value and Personhood in a Papua New Guinea Community, New York, Berghahn, 199 p. Shen S and Binns T (2012) Pathways, motivations and challenges: contemporary Tuvaluan migration to New Zealand, GeoJournal, 77, pp. 63-82. Shen S and Gemenne François (2011) Contrasted Views on Environmental Change and Migration: the Case of Tuvaluan Migration to New Zealand, International Migration, 49, pp. 224-242. Storey D and Hunter S (2010) Kiribati: an environmental perfect storm, Australian Geographer, 41, pp. 167-181.

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Underhill E and Rimmer M (2015) Itinerant Foreign harvest Workers in Australia: The Impact of Precarious Employment on Occupational Safety and Health, Policy and Practice in Health and Safety, 13 (2), pp. 35-46. Walda-Mandel S (2016) “There is no place like home”. Migration and Cultural Identity of the Sonsorolese, Micronesia, Heidelberg, Universitätsverlag Winter, 332 p. Wessen A (Ed.) (1992) Migration and Health in a Small Society. The Case of Tokelau, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 447 p.

122 Résumé - Abstract - Resumen

John Connell Contracting Margins? Liquid International Migration in the Pacific

In the smaller Pacific islands especially, migration has a long history. In this century international migration has become more significant in Melanesia, more diverse in terms of destinations and occupation, more valuable to national economies through remittances and more likely to be permanent. Governments of the smaller Pacific island states have become increasingly involved in negotiating migration strategies, as remittances have become more significant for national and household economies. Responding to scarce international opportunities has been particularly difficult in smaller, more remote states. In the coral island states outer islands are losing population. An economic rationale dominates migration but environmental changes are putting further pressure on the coral island states especially, and the margins of settlement in the Pacific are gradually contracting. Reversing these trends is unlikely to be imminent. Des marges qui se rétrécissent ? La migration dans les eaux du Pacifique

En particulier dans les petites îles du Pacifique, la migration a une longue histoire. Au cours de ce siècle, la migration internationale est devenue plus importante en Mélanésie, plus diversifiée en termes de destinations et d’acti- vités, plus précieuse pour les économies nationales grâce aux transferts de fonds et plus susceptible d’être permanente. Les gouvernements des petits États insulaires du Pacifique se sont de plus en plus impliqués dans la négociation des stratégies migratoires, les envois de fonds étant devenus plus importants pour les économies nationales et les ménages. Il a été particulièrement difficile de saisir les rares occasions qui se sont présentées à l’échelle internationale dans les États les plus petits et les plus éloignés. Dans les États insulaires coraliens, les îles périphériques perdent leur population. La logique économique domine la migration, mais les changements environnementaux exercent une pression supplémentaire en particulier sur les États insulaires coraliens et les marges de peuplement dans le Pacifique se contractent progressivement. Il est peu probable que l’on puisse rapidement renverser ces tendances. ¿Margen cada vez más estrecho? Migración en aguas del Pacífico

La migración tiene una larga historia, especialmente en las pequeñas islas del Pacífico. Durante este siglo, la migración internacional se ha vuelto más importante en Melanesia, más diversificada en términos de destinos y actividades, más valiosa para las economías nacionales a través de las remesas y con más probabilidades de ser permanente. Los gobiernos de los pequeños Estados insulares del Pacífico participan cada vez más en la negociación de estrategias de migración, ya que las remesas han adquirido mayor importancia para las economías y los hogares nacionales. Ha sido particularmente difícil aprovechar las pocas oportunidades internacionales que han surgido en los Estados más pequeños y distantes. En los Estados insulares de los corales, las islas perifé- ricas están perdiendo su población. La lógica económica domina la migración, pero los cambios ambientales ejercen una presión adicional, particularmente sobre los estados insulares coralinos, y los márgenes de los asentamientos en el Pacífico se están reduciendo gradualmente. Es poco probable que estas tenden- cias puedan invertirse rápidamente.

123

REMi Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 2019, 35 (1 & 2), pp. 125-147

L’association Pulaar Speaking à la croisée des chemins. Dynamiques migratoires et débats autour du sens à donner à l’action communautaire au sein du collectif migrant haalpulaaren (Mauritanie, Sénégal) aux États-Unis Olivier Leservoisier1

Si les migrations des Haalpulaaren en Afrique et en Europe ont fait l’objet de recherches approfondies (Diop, 1965 ; Adam, 1977 ; Delaunay, 1984 ; Minvielle, 1985 ; Ba, 1995 ; Bredeloup, 2007, Dia, 2009), en revanche, celles concernant les États-Unis ont peu attiré l’attention des chercheurs (Kane, 2001 ; Kane, 2011 ; Kante, 2014)2. Ce constat peut s’expliquer par le caractère récent de ces migrations qui correspondent aux nouvelles destinations choisies au milieu des années 1980 par les migrants originaires de la vallée du fleuve Sénégal, suite notamment aux crises et au durcissement des conditions d’entrée dans les pays traditionnels d’accueil (Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, France principalement). Mais il renvoie également à une tendance lourde des recherches qui abordent l’étude des migrations haalpulaaren aux États-Unis dans le cadre plus général des migrations sénégalaises, lesquelles restent très largement appréhendées à travers l’exemple des Wolofs et du cas de la confrérie mouride (Ebin,1990 ; Ebin et Lake, 1992 ; Schmidt di Friedberg et Blion, 2000 ; Babou, 2002 ; Tall, 2002 ; Ba, 2008).

Bien que partageant des expériences migratoires communes avec les Wolofs, les Haalpulaaren arrivés à New York — porte d’entrée historique des migrations sénégalo-mauritaniennes sur le territoire américain —, ont pourtant très tôt manifesté une volonté d’autonomie, tant sur le plan spatial qu’associatif. Alors que les Wolofs se sont implantés très majoritairement à Harlem où ils fondèrent

1 Anthropologue, Professeur, Université Paris Descartes, CEPED, 45 rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 Paris ; [email protected] 2 Cet article s’appuie sur cinq enquêtes de terrain aux États-Unis d’une durée totale d’environ cinq mois, effectuées depuis 2013, essentiellement à New York, mais aussi à Washington et dans l’État de l’Ohio à Columbus. Mes recherches anthropologiques anté- rieures dans les villages de la région du Gorgol en Mauritanie m’ont permis de bénéficier de recommandations qui ont grandement facilité mon insertion dans ce nouveau terrain.

125 Olivier Leservoisier

une « little senegal » (116th Street), les Haalpulaaren se sont fixés dès le milieu des années 1980 à Brooklyn, le long de Fulton Street (entre Nostrand et Utica Avenue) qu’ils rebaptisèrent « Fuuta street » ou Fuuta Town en référence à leur région d’origine, le Fuuta Toro3. C’est dans ce quartier qu’ils décidèrent en 1989, soit un an après la création de l’Association des Sénégalais d’Amérique (ASA), composée majoritairement de Wolofs, de créer une association ethno- communautaire supranationale, la Pulaar Speaking Association (PSA)4. Fondée à l’origine pour répondre au problème du rapatriement des morts au pays, cette association est devenue au fil des ans la plus grande association haalpulaar dans le monde. Selon les dirigeants en place en 2016, elle compterait près de 6 000 membres aux États-Unis, dont 3 000 à New York, répartis dans une structure fédérale unique au sein de la diaspora haalpulaar5.

C’est en partant de l’exemple de cette association et en contrepoint des travaux dominants sur les Wolofs que cet article propose de s’intéresser à la situation vécue par les migrants haalpulaaren aux États-Unis. Certes, l’histoire de PSA n’épuise pas à elle seule la diversité et l’hétérogénéité des migrations haalpulaaren dans ce pays, mais elle n’en demeure pas moins une association emblématique qui en fait une entrée incontournable pour saisir les enjeux qui se posent au collectif migrant. Dans cette perspective, et conformément à la démarche classique de l’anthropologie que rappelaient les éditeurs (Cuche et al., 2009) du numéro de la REMI consacrée à l’anthropologie des migrations, on s’attachera ici à restituer le point de vue des migrants en accordant une attention particulière à ce qu’ils « construisent socialement et culturellement »6. Il s’agira, par ailleurs, moins de s’intéresser aux « “problèmes” que formule la société d’accueil à propos de l’immigration » qu’à ceux que les migrants se posent et aux « solutions qu’ils envisagent » (Ibid. : 8). L’étude de PSA conduira ainsi à étudier le processus de construction en situation migratoire d’un Nous communautaire, indissociable des connexions avec les espaces d’origine, comme l’atteste la pratique du rapatriement des morts. L’analyse de ce processus permettra d’interroger les modalités d’organisation des migrants, ainsi que leur capacité d’entreprendre (Berthomière et Hily, 2006). Comment PSA a-t-elle pu se maintenir dans la durée et devenir la plus importante association de Haalpulaaren à l’étranger ? Comment a-t-elle géré les transformations liées à l’arrivée de nouveaux profils de migrants et à leur déploiement sur le territoire américain ? Comment fait-elle face aujourd’hui à la problématique du renouvellement de ses membres dont l’installation tend à durer ?

3 Entité historique et régionale haalpulaar de la moyenne vallée du Sénégal. 4 Celle-ci regroupe essentiellement des Sénégalais et des Mauritaniens, ainsi que quelques autres ressortissants de culture peule (Guinéens, Maliens, etc.). 5 Malgré son importance, elle n’a jusqu’ici jamais fait l’objet d’une étude approfondie. L’ouvrage récent de Kante (2014) ne fait ainsi aucune mention de cette association, confir- mant le traitement secondaire accordé aux Haalpulaaren dans l’étude des migrations sénégalaises aux États-Unis. 6 Mes enquêtes m’ont permis d’effectuer soixante-cinq entretiens, menés aussi bien auprès des dirigeants de l’association que des simples adhérents, ou de ceux ou celles qui n’en ont jamais été membres ou qui l’ont quittée. Les entretiens ont été complétés par de nombreuses discussions informelles et par des observations de réunions de sections PSA auxquelles j’ai pu assister. Les extraits d’entretiens dans le texte concernent majoritairement les hommes dont le rôle demeure largement prédominant dans le fonctionnement et les orientations à donner à l’association.

126 L’association Pulaar Speaking à la croisée des chemins

C’est au regard de ces changements que seront étudiés les débats et tensions internes au sein de l’association. Loin de tomber dans l’écueil d’une approche communautaire consensuelle, il s’agira ainsi d’appréhender cette association comme autant un espace de solidarité et de contrôle social qu’un lieu de conflits et d’expression de particularismes (Bredeloup, 1995 ; Kane, 2001). L’analyse des lignes de clivages qui traversent l’association conduira à s’intéresser plus particulièrement aux enjeux liés aux demandes croissantes parmi les adhérents d’ouverture vers la société américaine, afin de monter des projets de dévelop- pement visant à répondre à leurs besoins sur place. Au vu des travaux sur les associations de migrants internationaux qui ont traité cette problématique du développement en mettant l’accent sur les actions menées dans les villages d’origine (Quiminal, 1991 ; Daum, 1998 ; Charef et Gonin, 2005 ; Petit, 2007)7, l’originalité de l’étude de PSA sera d’attirer l’attention sur les défis d’un déve- loppement local, entendu ici dans le pays d’installation et au profit des membres de la diaspora. Cet enjeu mérite d’autant plus qu’on s’y attarde que PSA a pour singularité d’avoir toujours été réfractaire au développement, tant sur le lieu d’installation que dans l’espace d’origine. Cette position, aujourd’hui de plus en plus débattue, ne peut être comprise qu’en restituant l’histoire de l’association et les enjeux de gouvernance et de rapatriement des morts qui lui sont étroite- ment liés.

De l’installation à Brooklyn à la création de PSA

Les premiers migrants haalpulaaren, arrivés au milieu des années 1980 à New York, sont venus d’Afrique centrale et occidentale, après avoir connu plusieurs expériences migratoires. Le récit de leurs parcours relate générale- ment un départ initial des villages de la vallée du fleuve Sénégal en direction de Dakar où, après avoir pratiqué le commerce de rue, ils se sont dirigés vers divers pays africains (Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroun, Congo) pour poursuivre leurs activités commerciales. Ce sont les conditions de durcissement d’accueil dans ces pays8 qui ont décidé certains à tenter leur chance aux États-Unis qui bénéficiaient à l’époque d’une bonne réputation, du fait des possibilités d’insertion professionnelle et des facilités administratives pour s’y rendre. En effet, ces premiers migrants entrèrent aux États-Unis avec des visas touristiques dont l’obtention était à l’époque relativement aisée, ce qui permit d’ailleurs à plusieurs d’entre eux de faire des allers-retours avant de décider de s’installer9.

7 Ces travaux ont notamment porté sur l’analyse de la construction par les migrants de réseaux transnationaux, ou sur les effets des transferts financiers dans les zones d’origine, ou encore sur l’émergence de courtiers en développement. 8 On citera notamment les effets de la « gabonisation » de l’emploi en 1985, ou l’instauration au Cameroun en 1993 du visa de séjour obligatoire pour tous les étrangers (Ba, 1995), ou encore les effets du concept d’ivoirité en Côte d’Ivoire. 9 L’Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) de 1986 qui venait d’autoriser la régulari- sation des immigrants illégaux pouvant justifier leur présence sur le territoire américain depuis 1982, a pu être perçue comme une mesure positive par les migrants, même si dans le même temps, cette loi visait à lutter contre l’immigration clandestine en déclarant illégale et répréhensible l’embauche de sans-papiers. Sur l’ambivalence des politiques américaines de l’immigration, voir la synthèse de Hollifield (2016) montrant comment celles-ci sont prises dans un « paradoxe libéral » qui les fait osciller entre une ouverture économique favorable à l’immigration et une fermeture répondant à des motifs politique et sécuritaire, de plus en plus présents depuis le 11 septembre 2001.

127 Olivier Leservoisier

Peu nombreux à leur arrivée, et ne pouvant de ce fait se regrouper sur la base de leur appartenance villageoise, ces premiers migrants se sont rassemblés selon un critère ethnique et des liens communs avec le Gabon d’où ils provenaient majoritairement. C’est ainsi que par le jeu des relations d’interconnaissances, ils se retrouvèrent rapidement à Brooklyn.

« J’ai quitté le fleuve, j’ai fait deux mois et demi à Dakar et j’ai quitté Dakar pour faire trois mois au Cameroun. C’était en septembre 1986. Puis je suis parti au Gabon, retrouver mon grand frère là-bas de même père et de même mère. Il était commerçant. J’ai séjourné sept mois et j’étais dans la ville de Port gentil. Après Port-Gentil, j’ai été à Libreville, je suis resté quarante-cinq jours et mon grand frère m’a obtenu un visa pour les États-Unis. À ce moment les rumeurs des États-Unis c’était qu’on pouvait gagner de l’argent en vendant dans la rue. Au Gabon, la conjoncture était difficile. Quand j’ai eu mon visa, je suis reparti à Dakar 2 mois où j’ai pris le vol Air Afrique pour les États-Unis. Je suis arrivé à New York le 14 novembre 1987. Je fais partie des tous premiers venus... Quand je suis arrivé, je ne connaissais personne. C’était mon grand frère et mon oncle qui étaient au Gabon qui connaissaient des gens qui les avaient connus au Gabon. Quand je suis arrivé, je suis descendu la première nuit à l’hôtel 50 à Manhattan. Le lendemain, Oumar Bousso (qui deviendra le premier président de PSA), un jeune Mauritanien, c’était mon premier contact, m’a pris. Oumar qui faisait à l’époque le taxi m’a amené au 1161 un appartement à Brooklyn à Fulton street. Ceux qui étaient à Harlem, c’est ceux qui étaient venus avant nous. Ils étaient à l’hôtel 110 à Harlem. Les visas étaient d’un an. En ce moment, le visa était renouvelé sans problème. » (D. C., New York, 29 avril 2015)

« Moi je suis venu ici aux États-Unis en 1989. Je fais partie des premiers à venir. Je suis Mauritanien... de Foundu à dix-huit kilomètres de Kaédi. J’ai quitté la Mauritanie à l’âge de quatorze ans pour Dakar. J’étais vendeur de rue et je revenais à la saison des pluies au village pour travailler. Mais en 1973 avec la sécheresse, je suis retourné à Dakar. En 1977, je suis parti en Côte d’Ivoire pendant sept mois. J’ai continué sept mois au Cameroun. Je suis arrivé au Gabon à Port-Gentil en 1978. J’avais mon grand frère là-bas, près du marché à grand village. J’ai ouvert une boutique de détail, c’était une épicerie... J’ai quitté le Gabon en 1989. En 1989, je me suis décidé d’aller aux États-Unis, car il y avait des problèmes au pays, en Mauritanie. Arrivé aux États-Unis, j’ai trouvé quelqu’un qui était au Gabon, mais je ne savais pas qu’il était ici. J’ai été à Brooklyn entre Fulton et Franklin dans un appartement avec des gens venus du Congo et du Gabon. Chaque semaine, il y avait des nouveaux avec le vol Air Afrique Dakar-New York. À l’époque, il n’y avait que des hommes. Ma femme est arrivée en 1994, c’est l’une des premières. Nous qui sommes venus de l’Afrique centrale on peut vivre ensemble... Nous étions entre Haalpulaar. » (L. A., New York, 30 mars 2014)

Pour ces premiers migrants, l’adaptation à leur nouvel environnement fut rendue délicate en raison de leur non-maîtrise de l’anglais, ainsi que de leur manque de qualification et de la situation irrégulière dans laquelle se trouvaient la plupart d’entre eux après expiration de leur visa touristique. Ils n’eurent souvent pas d’autres alternatives que d’avoir recours au commerce ambulant et à des emplois non qualifiés (plongeurs dans des restaurants, distribution de flyers, manœuvres, gardiennage, etc.). Certains firent également le gypsy (taxi sans licence), tandis que d’autres, plus nantis, se lancèrent dans le commerce à distance, en envoyant par container des produits cosmétiques et électroniques à des clients résidant au Gabon, au Sénégal ou en Mauritanie. Ces précurseurs de l’immigration haalpulaar jouèrent, par ailleurs, le rôle de njaatigui (hôte)

128 L’association Pulaar Speaking à la croisée des chemins qui, selon un système bien rôdé dans les migrations des gens de la vallée (Bredeloup, 2007), consiste pour le logeur à faciliter l’insertion résidentielle et professionnelle des nouveaux venus en leur accordant l’hébergement et en leur avançant une somme d’argent ou des marchandises à vendre, à charge pour le bénéficiaire de rembourser après une période généralement de trois mois. Ces nouvelles arrivées contribuèrent au développement de l’activité commerciale dans le quartier de Fulton à Brooklyn qui se traduisit par la création, dans les années 1990, d’un marché africain et de boutiques qui contribuèrent à la visibilité des ressortissants de la vallée du Sénégal dans l’espace public. Mais avant que ne se développe ces activités commerciales, les premiers migrants durent faire face a une autre difficulté d’adaptation, liée à la forte insécurité produite par les trafics de drogues et les guerres de gangs qui sévissaient dans les années 1980. C’est dans ce contexte d’insécurité que survint en 1989 le meurtre dans la rue d’un Sénégalais, dont la mort souleva la question du rapatriement de son corps. Les Haalpulaaren présents prirent l’initiative de se cotiser pour ramener sa dépouille au pays, et c’est à la suite de cet événement qu’ils décidèrent, en juin 1989, de créer l’association Pulaar Speaking.

« On a fait appel à tous les Haalpulaar qui étaient là, quarante dollars à chacun pour rapatrier le corps, cela a coûté vers les 8 000 dollars. Ensuite, on s’est dit pourquoi pas créer l’association. On a donné le nom Pulaar Speaking parce que l’intention était culturelle. » (D. A., New York, 15 avril 2014)

PSA fut officiellement reconnue, en septembre 1990, comme association a but non lucratif, sous la section 803 of the not-for-profit corporation law de l’État de New York, en ayant ainsi pour objectifs principaux de « rapatrier en Afrique les dépouilles des membres décédés aux USA » (article 6 des statuts) et d’œuvrer en faveur de la promotion de la langue et de la culture peule. Dès sa création, PSA s’est affirmée comme une association communautaire visant à faciliter l’adaptation de ses membres, tout en leur garantissant un retour au pays, ne serait-ce qu’à titre posthume. C’est dans cet esprit que les fondateurs de l’association ont mis en place un système de protection pour tout membre en règle du paiement de sa carte d’adhérent d’un montant de vingt dollars et du versement de ses cotisations mensuelles de cinq dollars. En cas de décès, l’association prend ainsi en charge le coût du rapatriement du corps, lequel comprend également les frais versés à la personne désignée pour accompagner le corps du défunt. Celle-ci reçoit un billet d’avion aller-retour, plus 500 dollars, auxquels s’ajoutent 500 dollars et une lettre de condoléances de l’association destinée à la famille du décédé. La procédure de rapatriement est également proposée en cas de maladie grave ne laissant plus d’espoir de guérison. Ces mesures d’assistance et de solidarité se donnent également à voir dans la reprise du principe du fonctionnement du système du njaatigui. Ainsi, selon l’article 2 du règlement intérieur : « Tout nouvel adhérent qui s’est fait régulièrement enregistrer est exempté de cotisation pour les trois premiers mois ». Par cette mesure, l’association endosse le rôle symbolique de njaatigui pour tout nouveau migrant qui, en retour, se trouve placé dans une obligation morale vis-à-vis d’elle.

Cette solidarité communautaire revendiquée par l’association s’est accompa- gnée de la décision des dirigeants de PSA d’acheter, à la fin des années 1990, un immeuble au 1169 Fulton street à Brooklyn pour y établir le siège de leur organi-

129 Olivier Leservoisier

sation10 (Cf. Photographie 1). Ce building dont le paiement a été finalisé en 2012 a pour fonction de réunir les membres de la communauté et de servir de lieu pour organiser des manifestations culturelles, ou inviter des personnalités religieuses, politiques, artistiques et autres intellectuels de passage aux États-Unis. La création de cet espace de rencontre contribue ainsi à favoriser une socialisation tout en donnant le sentiment de se sentir chez soi à l’étranger. C’est dans ce but que fut également créée en 2000 la radio « Pulaar Speaking » qui, par la diffusion de messages et l’animation de débats sur la vie de la communauté, joue un rôle important comme « support et producteur d’identité » (Rigoni, 2010 : 7).

Photographie 1 : Le siège de PSA

Crédit : O. Lerservoisier, 2015.

10 Avant l’achat de l’immeuble, les réunions s’effectuaient tant bien que mal dans l’appartement de l’un des premiers migrants, au 1230 à Fulton street. À l’époque, il y a eu un appel à cotisation de 100 dollars par membre pour se constituer un capital et acheter l’immeuble.

130 L’association Pulaar Speaking à la croisée des chemins

On le voit, la vocation communautaire, loin d’être exclusive à toute forme d’intégration, apparaît en réalité comme un moyen de la favoriser, en offrant une assistance et des repères aux migrants. Ainsi, comme l’a notamment observé Timera (1996 : 25) à propos des associations soninkés en France : « L’expression identitaire, loin d’être seulement l’indice d’un choix de retour prochain, s’inscrit au contraire dans le processus d’insertion... ». C’est dans cette perspective que PSA revendique vouloir « aider les immigrés à intégrer positivement la société américaine » (article 6), comme est censé le symboliser l’emblème de l’association (cf. Photographie 2). Celui-ci est représenté « par une verdoyante carte d’Afrique, au soleil levant, un berger tenant dans ses mains une canne et une calebasse à côté d’un troupeau de vaches paissant à l’ombre d’un arbre à l’arrière-cour d’un village — représenté par deux cases — le tout encastré dans la carte des États-Unis juxtaposée à la statue de la Liberté » (article 3). Cependant, comme on le verra, l’intégration telle qu’elle est pensée positivement par les dirigeants de l’association s’apparente plus à l’idée d’adaptation à un contexte nouveau qu’à celle d’une intégration active tournée vers une participation citoyenne dans la société américaine, comme le réclament aujourd’hui de plus en plus de membres.

Photographie 2 : Emblème de Pulaar Speaking Association aux États-Unis

Crédit : O. Lerservoisier, 2016.

Il reste que la revendication identitaire a permis de rassembler les migrants présents sur le territoire américain sur une base la plus large possible, tout en affirmant une autonomie face à ce que certains qualifient de culture wolof dominante (Fall, 2003). Elle a, par ailleurs, été le moyen d’affirmer haut et fort une identité peule au lendemain des événements d’avril 198911 entre la Mauritanie et le Sénégal, lesquels ont eu pour conséquence aux États-Unis de

11 Ceux-ci furent étroitement liés aux enjeux de l’aménagement des terres de la vallée du Sénégal et aux exactions commises par le pouvoir mauritanien de l’époque contre les ressortissants haalpulaaren du sud du pays (Leservoisier, 1999), dont plusieurs milliers furent contraints de se replier au Sénégal pour vivre dans des camps de réfugiés (Frésia, 2009).

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faire venir de nombreux Haalpulaaren Mauritaniens, soit comme demandeurs d’asile, soit comme réfugiés au titre de la procédure du HCR dite de « réinstal- lation » dans un pays tiers. En comparaison des premiers émigrés, guidés par des intérêts économiques, l’arrivée de ces réfugiés s’est organisée autour de raisons avant tout politiques, en lien avec leur adhésion au mouvement des Forces de Libération africaine de Mauritanie (FLAM), en lutte contre le pouvoir mauritanien (Frésia, 2009). En outre, à la différence des travailleurs en situation irrégulière, largement représentés chez les premiers migrants, ces réfugiés sont des immigrants de plein droit. Ils présentent, par ailleurs, un profil distinct des premiers commerçants en se recrutant essentiellement parmi les intellectuels et les anciens cadres de l’administration et de l’armée mauritanienne. Disposant d’un certain capital culturel et bénéficiant à leur arrivée d’aides au logement ou de formations en anglais, la plupart d’entre eux ont trouvé un emploi dans des secteurs de service12. Selon le HCR, le nombre de ces réfugiés mauritaniens présents aux USA en 2000 était de 190013, pour une population mauritanienne estimée la même année dans le recensement américain à 5 000 contre 10 535 Sénégalais14. À défaut de statistiques existantes sur la répartition des populations haalpulaaren et wolof dans ce pays, ces données confirment les témoignages recueillis sur le terrain indiquant des arrivées massives durant la décennie 1990. Ainsi, sur les 10 535 Sénégalais recensés, un peu plus de 70 % ont déclaré être entrés sur le territoire américain entre 1990 et 2000, contre 23 % entre 1980 à 1989 et un peu moins de 7 % avant 198015. Cette hausse sensible de la population sénégalaise s’est confirmée dans les années 2000 avec l’arrivée massive de femmes, entrées sur le territoire américain en tant qu’épouse dans le cadre du regroupement familial16, ou comme célibataires avec le projet de créer leur commerce (salons de coiffure et de cosmétiques, restaurants, etc.). Leur pourcentage dans la population sénégalaise résidente aux États-Unis est ainsi passé de 30,5 % en 2000 à près de 51 % en 201017, année au cours de laquelle le nombre de Sénégalais recensés était de 3003718. À l’échelle de PSA, cette progression de la population migrante sénégalo-mauritanienne s’est traduite par une augmentation de ses membres et par leur déploiement dans les États, nécessitant la mise en place d’une organisation fédérale d’envergure.

12 Certains se sont reconvertis en travaillant auprès d’organismes d’aides aux réfugiés pour devenir traducteurs auprès d’avocats en charge de dossiers de demandeurs d’asile. 13 Stocks de réfugiés mauritaniens selon leur pays d’accueil. Source : HCR (2009) Migration en Mauritanie : Profil national, OIM. 14 http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/STP-159-senegal.pdf 15 Selon Lessault et Flahaux (2013 : 76), l’effectif de cette population en Amérique du Nord représentait 2,1 % des émigrés internationaux sénégalais en 1993 pour atteindre plus de 6 % en 2002. Les destinations par ordre d’importance durant cette dernière année sont l’Italie (19,5 %), la France (16,5 %), la Gambie (13 %), la Mauritanie (8 %). 16 Ce regroupement a été encouragé par l’immigration act de 1990 qui a augmenté les quotas d’immigration légale aux États-Unis, en les fixant à 675 000 par an et en créant de nouvelles catégories d’ayants droit. Cette loi a également instauré un système de loterie attribuant annuellement 55 000 green card. 17 United Nations database, Population Division Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015) Female migrant stock at mi-year by origin and by major area, region, country or area of destination, 2000 et 2010. 18 Source : Trends in international Migrant stock migrants by destination and origine, United Nations database, 2010.

132 L’association Pulaar Speaking à la croisée des chemins

Les mobilités internes et la création des sections

« Les Peuls sont des nomades qui sont avec leurs troupeaux, s’il n’y a plus d’eau ils vont continuer pour chercher. Pour nous c’est la même chose. Je suis ici à New York avec ma famille et mes enfants, si je vois que je ne gagne plus, je vais quelque part... ailleurs. Je suis Peul et je suis commerçant, là où cela ne marche plus je me déplace. C’est ma façon de vivre. » (Entretien L. A, New York, 30 mars 2014)

Historiquement, c’est à partir de New York que les Haalpulaaren se sont déplacés vers les villes de l’intérieur des États-Unis en quête d’opportunités professionnelles et de meilleures conditions de vie. Ces mobilités au sein du territoire américain ont été en partie motivées par les difficultés rencontrées dans la pratique du commerce ambulant face aux interventions répétées des autorités new-yorkaises. Trois épisodes, restés ancrés dans les mémoires des migrants sénégalais et mauritaniens, résument à eux seuls ces difficultés. Le premier est intervenu en 1985 lorsque les vendeurs ambulants mourides de la prestigieuse 5th avenue à Manhattan se sont vus chassés par la police, suite aux plaintes des commerçants du quartier qui s’étaient regroupés en association, sous la houlette d’un certain promoteur immobilier, du nom de Donald Trump (Ebin et Lake, 1992)19. Douze ans plus tard, en 1994, c’est au tour des vendeurs de la 125th Street d’avoir été déguerpis sur ordre du maire Rudolph Giulani, pour cause de concurrence déloyale avec les commerçants établis. Enfin, en 2003, c’est le marché africain de Fulton street, entre Franklyn et Nostrand avenue à Brooklyn qui fut fermé par les autorités pour la même raison.

Ces incidents successifs ont donc incité un certain nombre de Haalpulaaren à partir en direction d’autres villes (Columbus, Cincinnati, Philadelphie, Memphis, etc.), pour poursuivre leur commerce, travailler dans des usines ou se faire embaucher dans des entreprises de grande distribution. Ces déplacements ont été progressifs et se sont traduits au début par des allers-retours entre les États avant de décider d’une installation, une fois que les opportunités professionnelles avaient été jugées bonnes. En règle générale, les Haalpulaaren se sont implantés dans des sites à forte concentration d’Afro-Américains qui, dans le cas des commerçants, constituent leur principale clientèle. Sur ce point, les travaux pionniers de Paul Stoller sur les vendeurs ouest-africains à New York ont bien montré comment ces derniers participaient à différents festivals ou marchés afro-américains aux États-Unis pour vendre leurs produits dans des endroits où « Africa is good for business » (Stoller, 2002 : 87). C’est précisément ce qui motiva les premiers Haalpulaaren à se déplacer à Columbus, au début des années 1990. L’un d’eux y rencontra sa femme, une commerçante afro-améri- caine, avant de servir de njaatigui à de nombreux migrants venus le rejoindre.

Mais au-delà des motivations professionnelles, le choix de s’installer dans des quartiers afro-américains, le plus souvent modestes, répond également au

19 C’est ce qui faisait dire au président de l’Association des Sénégalais d’Amérique, juste après l’élection de Trump : « Nous avons été parmi les premières communautés à avoir des clashs avec Trump. Dans le passé... il tenait des discours incendiaires, disant qu’il était prêt à payer le billet d’avion une fois que la police aurait attrapé un Sénégalais. Pour vous dire que nous avons déjà vécu avec lui ce que la communauté musulmane et les Mexicains et autres minorités sont en train d’endurer » (novembre 2016). Cf. http://www. buzzsenegal.com/news/quand-trump-detestait-les-senegalais_n_11472.html

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souci d’y trouver des logements bon marché, en comparaison de ceux qu’ils ont quittés à New York. Cette préoccupation est devenue de plus en plus grande ces dernières années avec la hausse constante des prix des logements à New York dans des quartiers soumis à un processus de gentrification.

Dans l’ensemble, les Haalpulaaren qui quittèrent New York pour se rendre dans les villes de l’intérieur ont conservé leur adhésion à PSA qui leur garan- tissait des aides. En ce sens, l’association a joué dès le début de ces migrations internes un rôle important dans l’encadrement et l’accompagnement des migrants. Leur attachement à l’association n’a pas été pour autant exclusif d’autres formes de regroupement. En effet, comme ailleurs dans le monde, les Haalpulaaren ont, au fil des ans, créé de nombreuses autres associations pour faire face aux difficultés d’implantation dans un nouveau lieu. Ces regroupements se sont effectués selon les critères de la classe d’âge, du village, de la région d’origine20, ou de l’affiliation religieuse21, ou encore de l’appartenance statutaire (kinɗe)22 (Leservoisier, 2017). Il reste que PSA conserve un rôle unique dans l’adaptation aux nouvelles conditions d’accueil en assurant un espace communautaire et identitaire qui transcendent les autres regroupements singu- liers. Elle est également la seule association dont les objectifs de rapatriement des morts et des malades, ainsi que de promotion de la culture peule sont censés concerner l’ensemble des migrants. Cette spécificité explique que PSA ait pu maintenir son influence au fur et à mesure des mobilités de ses membres. Celles-ci ont néanmoins nécessité la mise en place d’une organisation complexe reposant sur la création de sections, reliées à un bureau exécutif fédéral, installé à New York23. En 2018, l’association comptait ainsi vingt-sept sections sur le territoire américain (Cf. Carte 1).

Cette organisation fédérale est censée assurer la cohésion et la solidarité entre les membres des sections qui doivent verser les deux tiers des cotisations de leurs adhérents au bureau de New York, le tiers restant étant réservé à leur budget de fonctionnement. Mais elle est aussi un moyen efficace de contrôler les adhérents qui sont tenus de respecter tout un ensemble de règles, sous peine de ne plus pouvoir compter sur l’aide de l’association. Une personne qui n’est pas à jour de ses cotisations pourra ainsi se voir refuser la prise en charge de son rapatriement en cas de décès. De même, des membres qui commettraient des actes illégaux venant ternir l’image de la communauté ne peuvent : « être assistés par l’Association » (article 64). C’est l’application de ce règlement intérieur qui fut à l’origine du conflit qui éclata, au milieu des années 1990, entre les dirigeants de l’association et certains adhérents résidant à Columbus qui avaient été arrêtés par la police pour vente illégale de cassettes vidéos. Les premiers refusèrent de couvrir les frais de justice et de payer, au nom de l’association, les cautions nécessaires à leur libération. Cet incident a conduit les proches de ces personnes

20 À l’instar de l’association Toro-Haalaayße. 21 Dans le cas des Haalpulaaren, les dahira (associations religieuses) sont majoritairement rattachées à la confrérie tijaniyya (Kane, 2011). 22 Les associations statutaires sont présentes aussi bien parmi les groupes nobles (seßße, guerriers) ; les groupes professionnels ou « castés » (neeynße : forgerons, tisse- rands, etc.) que les descendants d’esclaves (maccuße). 23 Le bureau comprend un président, un vice-président, un secrétaire général, un trésorier, plusieurs ajoints et neuf présidents de commissions techniques.

134 L’association Pulaar Speaking à la croisée des chemins Source : Geoatlas, 2011. Conception : E. Opigez (IRD/CEPED). Carte 1 : Les sections de l’association Pulaar Speaking aux États-Unis en 2018

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incriminées à créer une association dissidente portant le même nom. Colombus compte ainsi deux associations Pulaar Speaking, l’une dissidente et l’autre constituée de la section officiellement reconnue par le bureau fédéral. Ce conflit qui perdure depuis plus de vingt ans révèle les difficultés de gérer une association qui n’a cessé de s’étendre. Au fil des ans, PSA se trouve ainsi de plus en plus confrontée aux problèmes de coordination et de prise de décision collective face aux divers enjeux auxquels elle doit faire face.

Problèmes de gouvernance et lignes de clivage

L’une des difficultés majeures rencontrées par le bureau fédéral est de parvenir à concilier l’unité de l’association et le désir d’autonomie des sections qui tendent à remettre en cause le leadership historique de New York. Le dévelop- pement des sections au cours des années 2000 s’est ainsi très vite accompagné de revendications visant à une meilleure participation politique. Celles-ci ont abouti à faire modifier certains principes de fonctionnement en vigueur depuis la création de l’association. C’est ainsi qu’en 2004, les sections obtinrent pour la première fois du bureau exécutif l’organisation des assemblées générales inter- médiaires, prévues entre les années d’élections du président de PSA24.

Les dirigeants des sections les plus influentes parvinrent également à imposer la création en 2007 d’une section à New York, alors que seul le bureau exécutif existait dans la ville. Leur but était de dissocier les membres résidant à New York de ceux du bureau fédéral, tenu de représenter l’ensemble des sections sans se confondre avec les intérêts d’un site particulier. New York devenait ainsi une section au même titre que les autres. Deux ans plus tard, un membre d’une section extérieure à New York posa pour la première fois sa candidature pour la présidence de l’association. Malgré son échec, ce candidat d’Atlanta s’est de nouveau présenté aux élections de 2011, puis de 2013 qui l’opposèrent à trois autres candidats, l’un issu de la section de Cincinnati et les deux autres de la ville de New York. Même si à chaque fois le candidat de New York l’emporta, il reste que ces candidatures extérieures — à défaut de compter sur l’unité élec- torale des sections — témoignent d’une volonté largement partagée au sein de celles-ci d’être reconnues à part entière et de participer sur un pied d’égalité aux destinées de l’association. C’est dans ce contexte que, lors du comité directeur tenu en 2014 à Cincinnati, plusieurs voix se sont élevées pour réclamer la possi- bilité de transférer le siège de New York vers d’autres États occultant — sans doute par force de l’habitude de voir le bureau dans cette ville —, l’article 2 des statuts de l’association qui prévoit ce transfert « sur décision de son assemblée générale par vote à majorité des deux-tiers des présents ».

Cette montée des revendications s’explique en partie par les conflits élec- toraux récurrents entre les prétendants de New York au poste de président de l’association. Ces compétitions particulièrement vives ont en effet exaspéré de nombreux membres des sections qui acceptent d’autant moins la suprématie de New York. Mais si les élections divisent, c’est aussi plus largement parce qu’elles sont l’occasion d’importer dans l’association des problèmes extérieurs qui

24 La première assemblée organisée en dehors de New York s’est ainsi tenue à Columbus, non sans lien avec le conflit qui y existait.

136 L’association Pulaar Speaking à la croisée des chemins minent fortement les relations internes. Elles peuvent ainsi conduire à réactiver les divisions d’ordre statutaire, soit pour disqualifier une candidature, soit pour mobiliser les membres de son groupe d’appartenance. Bien que des personnes issues de groupes subordonnés aient pu être élues à la tête de PSA, il n’en reste pas moins vrai qu’elles peuvent être soumises à tout moment à des critiques portant sur leur origine.

« Le fait d’avoir décrié ma présidence parce que je suis gallunkooße25 je sais que ça ne peut pas manquer. Cela n’engage que la personne. Il y a toujours des gens qui utilisent cet argument : c’est mon grand parent qui était chef de village ou bien nous étions toujours supérieurs, cela reste toujours. » (Entretien D. D, New York, 25 avril 2015)

L’argument statutaire trouve également à s’exprimer dans les dénoncia- tions de nombreux membres qui estiment que les « marabouts veulent être au-dessus ». D’autres critères de divisions peuvent être mobilisés comme autant d’arguments politiques par les acteurs. Il en est ainsi du critère national qui est parfois utilisé par certains pour opposer les Sénégalais aux Mauritaniens. Il n’est ainsi pas rare d’entendre ces dernières années des Sénégalais accuser les Mauritaniens de vouloir prendre le pouvoir au sein de l’association, se référant au cas des deux avant-derniers présidents de nationalité mauritanienne. Il est intéressant, par ailleurs, de constater comment les événements de 1989 peuvent servir à justifier des divergences entre les Sénégalais et les Mauritaniens.

« Le Mauritanien il se dit plus Haalpulaar que le Sénégalais. Aujourd’hui il n’y a pas un Mauritanien qui parte de la Mauritanie qui est venu aux États-Unis sans passer par le Sénégal parce qu’ils ont tous été rapatriés, exilés. Quand ils sont venus, ils se sont mêlés avec les Sénégalais. Donc ils ont cette hargne de dire que les Sénégalais ne se sont pas mêlés à leur histoire mauritano-mauritanienne. Lors des élections, il y a des gens qui disent qu’il faut que nous, les Sénégalais, soyons à la tête ou bien c’est nous les Mauritaniens qui devons l’être. » (C. A., New York, 21 avril 2015)

Ces divisions nationales sont également entretenues par l’influence des partis politiques, tant sénégalais que mauritaniens, dans la vie de l’association qui se définit pourtant comme apolitique (article 5). Les compétitions entre les partis sénégalais du PRDS (Parti républicain démocrate du Sénégal) et de l’APR (Alliance pour la république), ou celles opposant les membres des FLAM, à ceux issus de leurs rangs, du Mouvement FPC (Forces progressistes du changement), peuvent ainsi se manifester à l’occasion des scrutins ou lors d’invitations de personnalités politiques au siège de PSA.

Toutes ces divisions qui se chevauchent sans forcément se recouper rendent le jeu politique particulièrement complexe. On peut ainsi être de statut ceddo (guerrier) sans pour autant soutenir un candidat ceddo, comme on peut être Sénégalais et voter pour un président mauritanien. De même, on peut rejoindre une coalition regroupant des sympathisants de sensibilités politiques diffé- rentes. Les alliances dépendent en réalité de l’équation personnelle de chacun, des aides dont on aura bénéficié durant son parcours, mais aussi des oppor- tunités du moment. C’est ce qui explique qu’en dépit d’un mécontentement

25 Ce terme qui est moins péjoratif que celui de maccuße désignant la catégorie générique des esclaves, est utilisé pour marquer une indépendance. Gallunkooße (de galle, maison : ceux qui ont leur maison).

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partagé de la suprématie de New York, les sections ne votent pas comme un seul homme contre les candidats de cette ville. Mais c’est aussi ce qui permet de comprendre les revirements d’alliances parfois spectaculaires qui se produisent entre deux tours d’élections. L’enjeu électoral révèle en définitive la manière dont les clivages sont utilisés comme ressource politique par les membres26. Ce sont ces divisions plurielles, ainsi que les rumeurs et les ragots (halaludji) qui les accompagnent qui conduisent certains à se détourner de l’association ou, pour le moins, à limiter leur engagement. Elles constituent, par ailleurs, un sérieux handicap pour gouverner l’association et rendent plus complexes les solutions pour répondre aux autres difficultés qui se posent aujourd’hui aux membres de PSA, comme celle du coût du rapatriement des morts.

La pratique du rapatriement des morts mise en question

Selon le contrat négocié par le bureau exécutif avec l’entreprise de pompes funèbres, Funeraria Juan John’s funeral Home à Brooklyn, le prix du rapartie- ment d’un mort s’élève à environ 10 000 dollars. Conformément à cet accord, la dépouille d’un membre décédé dans un État doit transiter par New York avant d’être rapatriée au pays. Cette procédure devient de plus en plus coûteuse à l’association en raison de la hausse des décès constatés ces dernières années, en lien avec le vieillissement de la population migrante.

« Il est temps que les choses évoluent et il est temps de responsabiliser les gens. Sur les 6 000 membres, nous avons peut-être 2 000 membres qui ont dépassé l’âge de cinquante ans qui vont mourir bientôt. Combien de morts on comptera par mois ? L’association ne pourra plus satisfaire les besoins. » (C. C., New York, 6 avril 2016)

Selon les estimations de Kanté (2008), 57 % des immigrés sénégalais aux États-Unis se situeraient ainsi dans la tranche d’âge quarante-soixante ans, justi- fiant les craintes des dirigeants de PSA sur le risque financier encouru à terme par l’association. Celui-ci est accentué par les difficultés de plus en plus grandes de renouvellement des membres de PSA, en partie liées à la diminution des arrivées de nouveaux migrants depuis la fin des années 2000. Selon les Nations unies, la population sénégalaise aux États-Unis est ainsi passée de 30 037 à 41 000 personnes entre 2010 et 2017, alors qu’elle avait été multipliée par trois durant la décennie précédente27. Ce recul s’explique principalement par les diffi- cultés économiques et le durcissement des politiques migratoires qui se sont traduits par des restrictions plus fortes dans la délivrance des visas, une lutte accrue contre le travail illégal, la remise en cause des régularisations des sans- papiers et par une augmentation du nombre des expulsions que l’administration Trump s’est engagée à amplifier.

26 Cette vie électorale, dont l’analyse ne peut être développée dans le cadre de cet article, mériterait d’être appréhendée de manière plus approfondie, à partir d’une approche diachronique, afin de mieux apprécier la portée de ces lignes de clivages dans la structu- ration des alliances au sein de l’association. Sur la question de la prégnance des hiérar- chies sociales des régions d’origine en situation migratoire, voir Leservoisier (2017). 27 United Nations Population division. Migrant stock by origin and destination 2017.

138 L’association Pulaar Speaking à la croisée des chemins

Face au durcissement des politiques migratoires, de nombreux migrants en situation irrégulière se voient dans l’impossibilité de retourner chez eux voir leur famille, sous peine de ne plus être autorisés à revenir sur le territoire américain28. Beaucoup ont ainsi passé plus de dix ans aux États-Unis sans avoir pu retourner dans leur pays. Ces situations vécues contribuent à faire des États-Unis une destination moins accessible que par le passé. Cependant, les contraintes posées par les politiques migratoires n’expliquent pas à elles seules la baisse sensible du nombre de nouveaux adhérents, laquelle renvoie également aux difficultés d’attirer les jeunes, nés aux États-Unis.

« Nous avons un problème de renouvellement. La plupart des membres de PSA ce sont des gens qui sont là avec leurs femmes et leurs enfants. Et jusqu’à l’âge de 18 ans, les enfants ne cotisent pas. Quand ils ont l’âge de dix-huit ans... ce sont des gens qui ont la conscience américaine, ce sont des gens qui ne croient pas tellement à la jokkera njam (la bienfaisance, le goût du groupe). Ces enfants, ils s’en foutent de cotiser pour se faire rapatrier. Ils ne veulent pas se faire enterrer au pays. Ils se feront enterrer ici, c’est pourquoi ils ne sont pas intéressés. Ils n’ont pas la même mentalité. » (F. F., New York, 6 avril 2016)

Face à ce problème de renouvellement et à ses conséquences financières des discussions de plus en plus vives se sont engagées ces dernières années sur la nécessité de trouver des sources de financement extérieurs afin que PSA conserve ses fonctions d’assurance et réponde de manière plus appropriée aux attentes d’une population migrante dont l’installation tend à durer. Beaucoup regrettent en effet que PSA ne serve, comme au premier jour, qu’au rapatriement des morts, alors que la communauté haalpulaar s’est accrue et que de nouveaux besoins se font sentir sur place.

« Moi je ne souhaite pas mourir ici, je préfère mourir chez moi. Mais il ne faut pas pour autant qu’on se focalise uniquement sur le rapatriement et que cela bloque d’autres aspects. Parce qu’avant la mort, il y a la vie, et il faut que nous vivions correctement. Penser aux morts, c’est bien, mais avant les morts il y a les vivants. » (A. N, New York, 3 avril 2014)

C’est dans ce contexte que certains marabouts ont remis en cause la pratique du rapatriement des morts en préconisant une inhumation sur place moins coûteuse. Ainsi, lors de la semaine culturelle organisée par PSA dans la ville de Cincinnati en août 2011, des marabouts prirent la parole pour affirmer que rien ne justifiait sur le plan religieux ce retour des morts. De telles interventions contribuent à questionner la priorité accordée à cette pratique et à conforter ceux qui réclament des actions pour aider les migrants dans leur quotidien.

L’enjeu du développement sur le sol américain

Parmi les propositions de développement qui sont faites au sein de l’association, certains souhaiteraient que soient créés des programmes de suivi

28 La loi sur la réforme de l’immigration illégale et la responsabilité des immigrants de 1996 a limité les possibilités de régularisation tout en accentuant les conditions d’expulsion. Elle stipulait notamment que les immigrants illégalement présents aux États-Unis pendant un an ou plus devaient subir un bannissement de dix ans.

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sanitaire visant en particulier au dépistage de maladies chroniques comme le diabète ou l’hypertension, très répandues parmi la population migrante. D’autres, notamment parmi les adhérentes, considèrent que l’association devrait organiser un système de nurserie pour aider les femmes occupées par leurs activités professionnelles. Des projets éducatifs sont également sollicités afin de mieux faire connaître aux enfants leur culture et les sensibiliser à la jokkera njam. Il s’agirait notamment de proposer, en complément des cours d’écoles coraniques actuellement dispensés, des enseignements de pulaar ou d’organiser des colonies de vacances à destination du Sénégal et de la Mauritanie afin de permettre aux plus jeunes de mieux connaître le pays de leurs parents29. Il est intéressant de constater que l’ensemble de ces projets ne concernent pas le développement des villages d’origine, pour lesquels il existe des caisses villageoises, mais sont destinés prioritairement aux membres de la diaspora.

« Nous on veut concentrer nos activités ici, mais pas au Fouta, ici même. Nous voulons aider nos membres, encadrer nos membres, aider la communauté ici à Columbus, là où on vit. Et nous voulons surtout aider les enfants dans le domaine de l’éducation, c’est-à-dire les programmes après l’École, mais aussi aider les femmes à mieux s’intégrer ici au pays, car nous avons pensé que les enfants et les femmes sont les maillons faibles de l’émigration. En offrant des cours de langue en anglais, des supports dans le domaine de la santé, par exemple faire venir des professionnels de santé pour des consultations dans la communauté, donner des conseils. Donc nous on veut surtout se concentrer ici même aux États-Unis, mais pas au village. » (A. S., Columbus, 16 avril 2016)

C’est en raison de l’inaction de l’association dans la mise en œuvre de projets sur le sol américain que plusieurs membres en viennent à dresser un constat amer sur le décalage existant entre le caractère organisé et structuré de l’association et l’utilisation qui en est faite. Leur déception est d’autant plus grande que de nombreuses opportunités existent aux États-Unis pour trouver des financements. Dans l’histoire de PSA, un seul projet susceptible d’obtenir des subventions a été véritablement mis en place au début des années 2000 dans le domaine de la santé. Il proposait aux membres de l’association un service de consultations médicales auprès de certains hôpitaux de New York. Ce projet fonctionnait sur la base du recrutement de trois membres permanents qui avaient pour charge d’accompagner les patients et de leur servir le cas échéant de traducteur. La rémunération de ces permanents au siège de PSA a été la source de tensions qui ont conduit à l’abandon du projet suite aux accusations de mauvaise gestion portées à l’époque contre l’équipe dirigeante. Cet épisode a durablement marqué les esprits et sert souvent d’argument pour justifier le refus de nouveaux projets.

« À chaque fois que les gens veulent innover, les gens répondent que PSA n’est pas faite pour cela. Pour moi, il y a beaucoup de choses à faire, mais il y a des pesanteurs. Parfois il y a de la mauvaise foi, les gens recherchent seulement le prestige d’avoir un poste à PSA. Or nous sommes là, nous vivons là, il y a des enfants qui naissent, qui partent à l’école, nous devons contribuer à construire cette société. » (A. N., New York, 3 avril 2014)

29 À défaut de prise en charge par l’association de ces questions éducatives, des familles s’organisent pour envoyer leurs enfants au pays afin qu’ils suivent quelques années de scolarisation et s’imprègnent de leur culture d’origine. Ces stratégies éducatives familiales sont étroitement liées à des enjeux de reproduction sociale (voir Grysole, 2018).

140 L’association Pulaar Speaking à la croisée des chemins

C’est pour tenter de répondre à ces enjeux que l’avant-dernier président de PSA a proposé, en vain, de créer un partenariat avec la Foundation search aux États-Unis qui s’engage, pour la somme de 8 000 dollars, à trouver des sources de financement pour des projets qui seraient initialement mis en place par l’association30. Ce partenariat, qui implique d’organiser en amont des activités, nécessite ainsi de pouvoir avancer de l’argent pour rétribuer les membres qui auraient la responsabilité d’initier des projets. Or, depuis l’échec du projet santé, l’idée de salarier des personnes n’est toujours pas acceptée par une majorité. C’est ce qui explique qu’en l’absence d’un manager permanent rétribué, le siège de PSA reste le plus souvent fermé au public et n’ouvre qu’à l’occasion des réunions du bureau fédéral ou de la section de New York, ou lors de manifestations culturelles et de visites de personnalités.

Ces difficultés à mettre en œuvre des projets sont en partie liées aux tensions existantes entre certaines sections et le bureau fédéral de New York. Ainsi, certains membres des sections ne souhaitent pas la mise en place de projets qui risqueraient de renforcer la suprématie de New York et de profiter en priorité aux membres qui y résident. Mais, au-delà des relations compliquées entre les sections et le bureau fédéral, les résistances au développement proviennent surtout des membres les plus anciens qui, dans l’ensemble, souhaitent s’en tenir aux objectifs initiaux de l’association. Cette position, loin de n’être que l’expression d’un conservatisme ou d’un refus de l’innovation, renvoie à un certain pragmatisme. En effet, face aux conflits existants, ces membres considèrent que se lancer dans des projets de développement, engageant des sommes d’argent importantes, risquerait d’exacerber les tensions. Leur choix est donc de défendre un statu quo qui offre, selon eux, la meilleure garantie pour préserver le système de solidarité de l’association. Se dessine ainsi une opposition, plus ou moins formelle selon les individus, entre d’un côté les anciens commerçants, fondateurs de l’association et, de l’autre, les membres plus instruits qui y sont entrés ultérieurement avec le souhait d’instaurer un nouveau dynamisme. Cette opposition traduit, par ailleurs, des divergences dans les projets migratoires, aussi bien collectifs qu’individuels, entre ceux qui demeurent résolument motivés par le retour et les autres qui recherchent le meilleur équilibre entre la perspective à terme d’un retour et le désir d’un ancrage plus fort aux États-Unis. La démarche de ces derniers reste néanmoins contrainte en raison de la reconnaissance que tout membre se doit d’avoir vis-à-vis de ceux qui ont fondé l’association. Le fait qu’ils aient pu compter sur leur soutien en arrivant aux États-Unis les oblige en quelque sorte à préserver une paix sociale. On mesure ici le poids de la dette communautaire et le coût de la solidarité qui pour être efficiente doit, selon les fondateurs de l’association, rester circonscrite aux objectifs premiers de l’association, au point de rejeter tout projet d’innovation qui risquerait de la menacer. Loin de l’idéal communautaire d’une solidarité comme allant de soi, on constate en réalité comment celle-ci demeure contrainte politiquement en raison des attentes différentes des acteurs et des divisions au sein de l’association. Dans ce contexte, il ressort que l’antériorité d’installation sur le territoire américain s’affirme comme un critère de légitimation sur lequel s’appuient les anciens pour exercer une autorité morale sur ceux qui les ont suivis aux États-

30 Les rares tentatives de créer via l’association des projets de développement à destination des pays d’origine (dans l’immobilier ou le secteur rural) ont connu le même échec.

141 Olivier Leservoisier

Unis. Cette autorité se trouve, par ailleurs, renforcée par l’argument d’une plus forte expérience migratoire. Ainsi, ceux qui ont fait l’Afrique centrale et qui ont traversé plusieurs pays mettent-ils en avant leur mérite d’avoir su surmonter les épreuves de l’exil en comparaison avec les jeunes venus directement de Dakar aux États-Unis, sans avoir eu à subir de réelles difficultés. Ici le critère distinctif n’est plus seulement le statut social, le niveau d’instruction ou la génération, mais celui de l’expérience acquise en migration ou de ce qui pourrait être qualifié de capital migratoire.

Ce sont ces différentes lignes de clivage et les pesanteurs sociales qui les accompagnent qui expliquent que de nombreux migrants se tiennent le plus souvent à l’écart de l’association, voire s’en détachent. Cela peut être le cas d’hommes d’affaires dont les ambitions se voient rapidement annihilées.

« Nous ne voulons pas créer une association pour créer une association. On veut une association qui produise, qui aide la communauté, on veut faire des affaires, on veut créer une clinique, on veut créer une école, alors que là c’est terre à terre. C’est pour cela que je suis parti. J’ai dit que je ne peux pas rester dans cette association qui est amorphe. On voulait d’autres buildings pour occuper tout le quartier, mais ils ont dit non. Ils m’ont accusé, ils m’ont dit que moi je suis un homme d’affaires. Je comprends un peu, car la plupart des membres ce sont des gens analphabètes. J’ai voulu faire un noyau avec les intellectuels pour pouvoir essayer de faire une pression, mais j’ai trouvé aussi que les intellectuels ne s’intéressaient pas assez, c’était pas des hommes d’affaires. » (S. D, 19 avril 2018)

Ce désintérêt peut en effet concerner ceux qui ont suivi des cursus universitaires aux États-Unis ou qui occupent des emplois de cadres. Il est ainsi signifi- catif qu’une ville comme Washington, connue dans le milieu des migrants pour abriter de nombreux cadres haalpulaaren ne comptait toujours pas de section en 2016. Il est vrai qu’à la différence des membres de PSA, ces migrants qualifiés n’ont pas eu besoin, lors de leur installation aux États-Unis, de s’appuyer sur des réseaux communautaires, leur cursus et leurs emplois fortement rémunérés leur permettant de s’intégrer individuellement sans être redevables d’une dette communautaire vis-à-vis de l’association. En outre, leur détachement de PSA renvoie à leurs stratégies individuelles tournées principalement vers la réussite de leur carrière professionnelle qui leur laisse, par ailleurs, peu de temps pour l’engagement associatif, comme le confirme le témoignage de cet ingénieur :

« Je n’ai jamais cherché à être membre de PSA. En partie c’est parce que je subviens à mes besoins, je n’ai pas besoin de service social. Mais tout dernièrement on en a discuté avec ma femme on s’est dit que par solidarité il faut adhérer à PSA. Le week-end je passe mon temps avec mes enfants, je dois m’en occuper pour les devoirs, je les emmène à l’école coranique, pour voir un film. Je suis pratiquement tout le temps avec eux. C’est pourquoi nous les relations avec les autres c’est difficile. Généralement nous les hommes, on s’occupe des enfants les week-ends, soit parce que les femmes travaillent, soit parce qu’elles doivent se reposer aussi. Ici les gens ne se voient presque pas. » (M. B., Washington, 19 avril 2015)

Il reste que les logiques d’individualisation ne sont pas exclusives à ce profil de migrants. On les retrouve à l’œuvre parmi les membres de l’association dans leurs motivations parfois très personnelles à adhérer à l’association, loin du simple argument de solidarité :

142 L’association Pulaar Speaking à la croisée des chemins

« Les gens intègrent PSA par besoin, pas par envie de voir la société grandir, mais par nécessité, pour leur protection personnelle, pour leur assurance » (C. C., New York, 3 avril 2014)

Ces processus d’individualisation, ajoutés aux effets de la dette communautaire contribuent ainsi à freiner la réalisation de projets collectifs au sein de PSA. Certains ne renoncent toutefois pas à envisager de nouvelles solutions qui consistent à penser des projets de développement à l’échelle non plus de l’association, mais de celle de chaque section.

« L’erreur que nous avons commise en tant que Fédéral c’est d’avoir cherché un programme commun pour tous les États... Récemment on a compris que tant qu’on attendait que les sections toutes ensemble décident certains programmes de grants (subventions), cela ne marcherait jamais... Maintenant avec la section de New York nous avons dit qu’on peut travailler indépendamment... On peut travailler comme section de New York... pour trouver des grants, créer des activités pour seulement la section. » (C. C., New York, 6 avril 2016)

Si cette volonté de favoriser un développement au niveau des sections peut s’avérer être une solution au blocage actuel, elle risque cependant d’accentuer le processus d’autonomisation des sections et de compliquer ainsi davantage la gouvernance de l’association. Il reste que la situation actuelle exige pour certains d’aller plus loin et de s’ouvrir à la société américaine.

« Nous sommes regroupés entre nous-mêmes ici. Pour avoir une expérience, il faut se confronter avec les autochtones. Il faut aller à l’école, il faut aller dans l’administration, il faut aller dans d’autres structures que celles de nos ressortissants de nos pays. On n’a pas besoin de cotiser pour faire vivre PSA, mais on a besoin d’investir pour faire vivre PSA. On a besoin de s’ouvrir sur des projets. » (C. A., New York, 21 avril 2015)

Cette ouverture est assurément l’un des enjeux majeurs auxquels l’association aura à répondre sous peine de voir les gens s’en détacher. L’enjeu ici est double, non seulement de savoir répondre aux demandes d’un plus grand investissement dans la société américaine, mais aussi de parvenir à attirer les nombreux cadres, intellectuels et hommes d’affaires situés en dehors de l’association et dont les compétences et les réseaux pourraient être mobilisés dans le montage de projets.

Conclusion

L’histoire de PSA aura montré comment cette association communautaire a, dès sa création, cherché à favoriser l’adaptation des migrants dans leur nouveau lieu d’installation. Cet objectif s’est traduit par la mise en place de tout un système d’assurances et par l’instauration d’une organisation fédérale structurée qui a permis d’accompagner et d’encadrer les déplacements des Haalpulaaren sur le territoire américain. Mais l’adaptation à la société américaine a également été favorisée par les repères identitaires offerts par l’association à ses membres qui ont pu y trouver un espace de socialisation et de partage autour des valeurs culturelles peules. Ainsi, comme l’ont montré plusieurs travaux sur les associa-

143 Olivier Leservoisier

tions de migrants31, il ne s’agit pas d’opposer une logique communautaire à une logique d’intégration, car cette dernière, loin de devoir répondre uniquement à une définition normative et institutionnelle de la société d’accueil, dépend en réalité du sens que les acteurs veulent en donner. En l’occurrence, l’intégration selon les fondateurs de PSA passe avant tout par la possibilité de se constituer un entre soi et de compter sur un système de solidarité afin de faciliter une adaptation à la société américaine. De même, convient-il pour les mêmes raisons de ne pas opposer les activités transnationales de l’association à toute forme d’intégration. Les circulations des morts et des malades, ou les invitations de personnalités politiques et religieuses de passage aux États-Unis, contribuent à leur tour à renforcer un sentiment de sécurité et à favoriser un vivre ensemble à l’étranger, en restant connecté au pays. Sans les remettre en cause, ce sont ces modalités d’adaptation que certains voudraient voir aujourd’hui évoluer en faveur d’une ouverture plus grande vers la société américaine. Considérant que le maintien d’une solidarité communautaire n’est en aucun cas incompatible avec un engagement citoyen dans la société d’installation (Hily et Berthomière, 2006), ces derniers regrettent que PSA n’ait pas encore su saisir l’opportunité de construire des liens concrets avec la société américaine, comme ont pu le faire d’autres collectifs migrants aux États-Unis32 ou comme ont pu le réaliser eux-mêmes les Haalpulaaren dans d’autres pays d’émigration, comme en France (Dia, 2015) ou en Italie (Riccio, 2007). Ainsi, en comparaison avec ces autres sites d’installation, la singularité de PSA renvoie moins aux problèmes rencontrés de vieillissement et de renouvellement des membres, d’autonomie des sections ou de tensions intergénérationnelles — lesquels ont pu être observés dans le cadre d’associations villageoises de développement (Kane, 2001 ; Dia, 2015) — qu’aux fortes réticences à créer des partenariats avec des ONG présentes dans la société d’accueil. Par ailleurs, en tant qu’association ethno-communautaire supranationale, le cas de PSA a également pour intérêt d’interroger les limites de l’action communautaire dans le développement à une plus large échelle que celle du village, quand bien même celui-ci fut-il « multisitué » (Dia, ibid.).

Face à ces constats, l’association semble donc bel et bien se trouver à la croisée des chemins. Il apparaît ainsi que la position aujourd’hui majoritaire en faveur d’un statu quo soit de plus en plus discutée par ceux qui considèrent que les conditions de la reproduction de PSA dépendent de la mise en place de partenariats avec des acteurs extérieurs à la communauté. Il reste que, quelle que soit l’option future choisie, l’association devra réussir à dépasser les divisions qui la traversent face aux recompositions en cours de l’expérience associative.

31 Voir les contributions de la sociologie américaine sur l’intégration (Sarfi, 2011) ou celles de l’Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) (Dumont, 2010). 32 Les Somaliens, Yéménites ou Éthiopiens sont souvent cités comme exemple par les Haalpulaaren.

144 L’association Pulaar Speaking à la croisée des chemins

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Hollifield James F. (2016) American Immigration Politics: An Unending Controversy, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 32 (3&4), pp. 271-296. Kane Abdulaye (2001) Diaspora villageoise et développement local en Afrique : le cas de Thilogne Association Développement, Hommes et Migrations, 1229, pp. 96-107. Kane Ousmane Oumar (2011) The homeland is the arena: religion, transnationalism and the integration of Senegalese immigrants in America, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 313 p. Kante Seydou (2014) La géopolitique de l’émigration sénégalaise en France et aux États-Unis, Paris, L’Harmattan, 301 p. Leservoisier Olivier (2017) Mobilités et pouvoirs chez les migrants d’origine servile de la société haalpulaar (Mauritanie-Sénégal), in Lisa Chauvet, Flore Guibert, Thibaut Jaulin et Sandrine Mesplé-Somps Éds., Les migrants, acteurs des changements politiques en Afrique ?, Louvain-la-Neuve, De Boeck, pp. 193-208. Leservoisier Olivier (1999) Les réfugiés « négro-mauritaniens » de la vallée du Sénégal, in Véronique Lassailly-Jacob, Jean-Yves Marchal et André Quesnel Dirs., Déplacés et réfugiés. La mobilité sous contraintes, Paris, IRD, pp. 283-302. Lessault David et Flahaux Marie-Laurence (2013) Regards statistiques sur l’histoire de l’émigration internationale au Sénégal, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 29 (4), pp. 59-88. Minvielle Jean-Pierre (1985) Paysans migrants du Fouta Toro (vallée du Sénégal), Paris, ORSTOM, 270 p. Petit Véronique (Dir.) (2007) Migrations internationales de retour et pays d’origine, Paris, Ceped, 208 p. Quiminal Catherine (1991) Gens d’ici, gens d’ailleurs. Migrations soninké et transformations villageoises, Paris, Christian Bourgois, 223 p. Riccio Bruno (2007) Associationnisme, capital social et potentialités de co-déve- loppement parmi les migrants sénégalais de la province de Bergame, in Sebastiano Ceschi et Andrea Stocchiero Dirs., Relations transnationales et co-développement, Paris, L’Harmattan, pp. 25-49. Rigoni Isabelle (2010) Les médias des minorités ethniques. Représenter l’iden- tité collective sur la scène publique, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 26 (1), pp. 7-16. Safi Mirna (2011) Penser l’intégration des immigrés : les enseignements de la sociologie américaine, Sociologie, 2, pp. 149-164. Schmidt di Friedberg Ottavia et Blion Reynald (2000) Du Sénégal à New York, quel avenir pour la confrérie Mouride ?, Hommes et Migrations, 1224, pp. 36-45. Stoller Paul (2002) Money has no smell: the Africanisation of New York City, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 222 p. Tall Serigne Mansour (2002) L’émigration internationale sénégalaise d’hier à demain, in Momar-Coumba Diop Éd., La société sénégalaise entre le local et le global, Paris, Karthala, pp. 549-578. Timera Mahamet (1996) Les Soninké en France. D’une histoire à l’autre, Paris, Karthala, 244 p.

146 Résumé - Abstract - Resumen

Olivier Leservoisier L’association Pulaar Speaking à la croisée des chemins. Dynamiques migratoires et débats autour du sens à donner à l’action communautaire au sein du collectif migrant haalpulaaren (Mauritanie, Sénégal) aux États-Unis

Alors que les recherches sur les migrations des Haalpulaaren aux États-Unis demeurent rares, cet article s’attache à rendre compte des expériences migratoires des ressortissants de la moyenne vallée du fleuve Sénégal, à partir de l’étude de la Pulaar Speaking Association (PSA). L’histoire de cette association, devenue aujourd’hui la plus grande association communautaire haalpulaar dans le monde, permet de s’intéresser au processus de construction d’un Nous communautaire, aux changements auxquels sont confrontés les migrants, ainsi qu’aux débats qui les animent, en particulier autour de l’enjeu d’un développe- ment aux États-Unis. Pulaar Speaking Association at the Crossroads. Migrations and Debates on the Meanings of Community among a Group of Haalpulaaren Migrants (Mauritania, Senegal) in the United States

Research on Haalpulaaren migrations in the United States is seldom. Based on a study of the organization Pulaar Speaking Association (PSA), this paper describes the migratory experiences of people originating from the middle valley of the Senegal River. While telling the history of this organization, the largest Haalpulaar association in the world, we highlight the process of community building, the changes that migrants have to face and the debates and oppositions rising between them especially on issues regarding their spreading in the United States. La asociación Pulaar Speaking al cruce de los caminos. Dinámicas migratorias y búsqueda del sentido que puede impulsar la acción comunitaria dentro del colectivo de los migrantes haalpulaaren (Mauritania, Senegal) en los Estados Unidos

Mientras que las investigaciones sobre la comunidad haalpulaaren en los Estados Unidos siguen siendo escasas, este artículo se interesa a las experien- cias migratorias de los habitantes del valle medio del río Senegal, a partir de un estudio de la Pulaar Speaking Association (PSA). La historia de esta asociación de la comunidad haalpulaar, la más importante en el mundo, es relevante tratán- dose de proceso de construcción de un sentido comunitario — un «nosotros» —, de los cambios que los migrantes tienen que enfrentar, y de los intercambios que los animan, en especial alrededor de la cuestión del desarrollo de su comunidad en los Estados Unidos.

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REMi Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 2019, 35 (1 & 2), pp. 149-169

« Le soldat n’a pas fui, il est parti chercher de la force » : explorer les imaginaires migratoires à l’aune des carrières artistiques dans le rap au Sénégal Cécile Navarro1

Encore largement inexplorée (Martiniello, 2015), l’étude des expressions artistiques en migration a permis d’affirmer le rôle important de l’art dans la vie quotidienne des migrants, encore majoritairement perçus sous la figure du « travailleur ». Martiniello et al. (2009) consacrent notamment un numéro de la Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales aux formes théâtrales, musicales, poétiques, littéraires et plastiques qui sont l’œuvre de personnes ou de milieux artistiques en circulation. Par ailleurs, le regard projeté sur des artistes, acteurs très mobiles sans pour autant faire partie d’une élite socio-économique, a apporté un nouvel éclairage dans l’analyse des phénomènes transnationaux, à l’image du numéro spécial dirigé par Kiwan et Meinhof paru dans la revue Music and Arts in Action. Les créations musicales, en tant que moyen d’expression des expériences vécues par leurs auteurs et porteuses de représentations, nous renseignent aussi sur la production d’« imaginaires migratoires », à même de valoriser la voix des migrants eux-mêmes (Canut et Sow, 2014).

Cet article tente de combiner ces différentes approches de l’art en situation de migration et de mobilité par la mise en dialogue entre pratiques, perceptions et représentations imaginaires du mouvement (Ortar et al., 2018), à partir de données issues d’un terrain ethnographique « tout-terrain »2 (Meyer et al., 2017) auprès de personnes impliquées dans la production de la musique rap

1 Post-doctorante et Chercheuse affiliée à l’Université de Lausanne, Haute École de Suisse Occidentale Valais, Institut Santé, Chemin de l’Agasse 5, 1950 Sion, Suisse, ; [email protected] La citation du titre de l’article est une traduction de la version originale en wolof « Jambaar dawul dolé ladoon wuti » (Daara J Family, 2016). 2 Par « tout terrain », les auteurs de ce dossier de SociologieS désignent le terrain ethnographique qui s’effectue au-delà d’une co-présence prolongée sur un lieu unique. L’ethnographe est par exemple de plus en plus souvent amené à suivre un phénomène qui traverse plusieurs lieux. Ma pratique du « tout terrain » s’est effectué par la fréquen- tation de différents lieux de production et d’écoute de la musique rap sénégalaise, y compris sur Internet, ainsi que par l’organisation d’une co-présence répétée avec les artistes dans différents lieux du terrain dakarois et à l’étranger, au cours d’expériences de mobilité.

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au Sénégal (artistes, producteurs, acteurs culturels). M’inspirant du « mobility turn » (Sheller et Urry, 2006), j’ai envisagé dans ma recherche doctorale (Navarro, 2019)3 les régimes de mobilité (Glick Schiller et Salazar, 2013) à l’œuvre dans la construction des carrières artistiques : si la mobilité peut donner lieu à de nouveaux modes de consécration et de réussite, son impossibilité peut aussi être productrice d’exclusion, de marginalisation et d’inégalités sociales. Par carrière artistique, il est entendu, avec Becker (1985), un processus de changement de statut et de position, qui évolue dans le temps et qui tend vers la réussite. Force est de constater, au sujet des carrières artistiques, que la mobilité de l’artiste est souvent significative d’un changement de position et de statut (Le Menestrel, 2012) ainsi que d’une accession, parfois imaginaire, à la réussite.

Dans cet article, je souhaite plus précisément montrer comment ces régimes de mobilité apparaissent à l’aune d’imaginaires migratoires diffusés par des chansons qui sont le fait d’interprètes qui ont, par eux-mêmes, fait l’expérience de la mobilité. Pour ce faire, il sera question d’envisager les imaginaires migratoires de certaines chansons de rap, non seulement à l’aide de leurs paroles et de différents supports artistiques (les clips vidéos notamment), mais aussi à partir de ce qu’elles nous révèlent de la façon dont ses interprètes mettent en scène leurs carrières artistiques comme accession à la réussite par la mobilité. La restitution des carrières artistiques est effectuée au moyen d’entretiens avec les artistes, complétés par des sources secondaires (site web de l’artiste, articles journalistiques). Avant d’entreprendre cette analyse à partir des exemples de deux groupes de rap sénégalais, Daara J Family et Wagëblë, il sera question d’envisager la façon dont le genre musical rap, et le rap au Sénégal plus préci- sément, sont des exemples particulièrement pertinents pour mener à bien cette démarche d’analyse.

Le rap, représentation fidèle d’une parole migrante ?

Fin septembre 2018, le mouvement de la jeunesse suisse romande (MJSR) diffuse sur la plateforme de vidéos YouTube le clip « Je viens de loin », réalisé lors d’un « camp hip-hop » destiné à « produire, réaliser et promouvoir l’art et la musique urbaine dans un objectif artistique et social »4. Quinze mineurs non accompagnés provenant de divers pays s’y expriment sur leurs parcours migratoires. Cette utilisation privilégiée du genre musical rap pour témoigner de l’expérience migratoire n’est pas nouvelle, et elle n’est pas non plus dénuée d’éléments problématiques. Au-delà de sa facilité d’accès à des musiciens non professionnels (Traïni, 2008), en quoi le rap serait-il un genre musical plus à même de rendre compte d’un vécu de la migration ?

Aux États-Unis, berceau du rap, le genre musical s’est longtemps affirmé comme un mode d’expression afro-américain, dernier héritier des pratiques musicales des populations africaines esclaves. Il est donc d’abord censé narrer les conditions de vie des populations les plus marginalisées du rêve américain,

3 Cette recherche, menée entre 2014 et 2018, a été menée avec le soutien du Fonds National Suisse pour la recherche scientifique (FNS), sous la direction de Monika Salzbrunn (ISSR- Université de Lausanne) et la co-direction de Heidrun Friese (TU Chemnitz). 4 https://www.20min.ch/ro/musique/news/story/Ils-racontent-leur-migration-dans-un-clip- de-rap-12928596

150 « Le soldat n’a pas fui, il est parti chercher de la force » issues de quartiers touchés par la misère, la violence et la discrimination (Rose, 1994). En France, deuxième marché de production et de consommation du rap, le genre musical a immédiatement été saisi comme un « phénomène culturel propre aux grands ensembles périphériques » (Milliot, 2006 : 180). Cette association du rap en France à la « banlieue » (Hammou, 2016), et donc à l’« immigration », en posant les rappeurs comme représentatifs de « jeunes de banlieue » d’origine immigrée, et leurs paroles comme expression directe du vécu de ces quartiers, a inscrit le rap comme signe visible du « problème des banlieues », territoires qui « symbolisent la concentration des phénomènes de l’exclusion et cristallisent les peurs face à l’insécurité » (Avenel, 2009 : 36). D’autre part, le rattachement des rappeurs eux-mêmes à certains territoires (Forman, 2000), à des vécus migratoires — comme le « rap de fils d’immigré » identifié par Clément (2015) — ou encore à des vécus criminels — qui apparaît par exemple dans la reprise récurrente du terme thug, « voyou » (Jeffries, 2011) —, vient confirmer ces catégorisations. En reprenant des assignations dépréciatives pour se les approprier, les artistes de rap contribuent paradoxalement à renforcer ces assignations et à reproduire les stéréotypes pesant sur cette pratique artistique ainsi que sur les territoires dont ils se revendiquent comme les « représentants » (Guillard, 2012). Tel que résumé par Bazin (2001), le rap est irrémédiablement associé au « ghetto » et à l’immigration.

Dans les contextes africains, le rap est en revanche majoritairement perçu comme le mode d’expression d’une rupture générationnelle (Diouf, 2002). L’étude de la pratique du rap en contexte africain déplace ainsi le regard des immigrés vers une autre catégorie sociale, les hommes jeunes, plus susceptibles d’entreprendre l’« aventure » migratoire. Les recherches qui se sont intéressées à la musique rap dans ses contextes posent ainsi la question du rôle de la musique dans la diffusion des représentations de la migration. Chez Souiah (2011), le mezoued, le rap tunisien et les chants de stade sont choisis précisément parce que, par leurs auditeurs, ces genres musicaux diffusent des représentations de la migration auprès des populations qui migrent le plus : de jeunes hommes urbains et marginalisés. Chez Salzbrunn et al. (2015), la musique populaire des harragas tunisiens, dont le rap, est explorée comme « un révélateur de l’imaginaire migratoire et de dynamiques sociales profondes » et s’articule autour de quatre thèmes : les désirs migratoires, les dangers de la traversée, la souffrance de l’exilé et des siens, l’acceptation de la volonté divine.

Au Sénégal, à la suite de l’augmentation des flux de départs en pirogue à destination des îles Canaries dans les années 2006-2007, connues sous le slogan en wolof de Barça walla Barsax (« Barcelone ou l’au-delà ») (Willems, 2008), exprimant la détermination de migrants à rejoindre l’Espagne, et donc l’Europe, au péril de leurs propres vies, de nombreux artistes de rap sénégalais diffusent au contraire des chansons dans le but de dissuader les « migrations clandestines5 » (Moulard, 2014 ; Rofheart, 2010). Comment expliquer ses représentations majoritairement négatives de la migration au sein d’un genre musical dont les auditeurs sont pourtant de façon importante eux-mêmes concernés par la migration non documentée et que les rappeurs auraient vocation à « représenter » ?

5 C’est le terme utilisé dans les créations artistiques envisagées. Je préfère en revanche utiliser le terme de « migrations non documentées » : c’est l’absence de documents et non l’acte illégal qui désigne cette migration.

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La prise en compte des conventions propres à cette pratique artistique, notamment concernant le statut donné à la parole du rappeur au Sénégal, permet de résoudre cet apparent paradoxe. La capacité pour le rappeur de « représenter », à savoir de rendre explicite ses liens avec des territoires, est en effet ce qui lui procure la légitimité pour parler au nom de ce territoire et des populations qui les habitent. Moulard-Kouka (2009) a, dans le cas du rap sénégalais, relevé l’apparition de nouvelles délimitations territoriales par l’émergence d’une nouvelle génération d’artistes se réclamant d’une appartenance territoriale à la « banlieue » dakaroise6, par opposition aux quartiers résidentiels du centre-ville dont étaient originaires les groupes pionniers du rap sénégalais. Cette appartenance à la « banlieue » leur permettait alors, selon eux, de parler des problèmes qui touchaient la population sénégalaise et que leur musique, décrite comme « hardcore », sous-entendu sans concession, se devait d’exprimer. La manière dont l’interprète revendique être le « représentant » d’un groupe est donc sujet, dans le rap, à des modes de consécration artistique basés sur des valeurs d’authenticité, de crédibilité et de légitimité.

Moulard (2014) souligne en revanche que, si les thèmes abordés dans les chansons de rap sur la migration prennent pour objet les difficiles conditions de vie des sans-papiers ou encore le péril des traversées en bateaux, leurs inter- prètes bénéficient, quant à eux, de conditions de mobilité privilégiées. L’artiste de rap sénégalais Keyti, auteur de la chanson « Eldorado » qui traite du vécu d’un migrant sénégalais en Europe, a mis en évidence, au cours de notre entretien, cet écart entre les expériences racontées dans les chansons et l’expérience propre des interprètes :

« En fait quand j’écrivais ce texte, je n’avais même jamais été en France, mais bon, après c’est ça le pouvoir du texte de rap quoi. De vraiment pouvoir s’imaginer des choses, créer des réalités. » (Entretien, Dakar, 2014)

Il m’explique avoir été inspiré par une conversation téléphonique avec un cousin vivant en France. Le rappeur peut donc se saisir de l’expérience migratoire à partir d'histoires vécues par d’autres. Pour Hammou (2005), la véracité du récit de rap tient ainsi davantage d’un « travail artistique de véridiction » que d’un « travail de véridiction » : il s’agirait de jouer, au travers de la parole artistique, sur une parole de vérité plutôt que de reproduire une parole de réalité. Autrement dit, le rap peut raconter une fiction tant qu’elle semble vraie, une démarche artistique dans laquelle s’enchâsse la violence verbale comme seule capable de porter une vérité que personne ne veut entendre. Chez Keyti, ce « travail artistique de véridiction » s’effectue par la mise en scène d’une parole migrante qui ose dire la « vérité » sur les conditions de vie vécues par les migrants dans les pays d’accueil, à l’inverse des « vrais » migrants qui, eux, entretiendraient le fantasme de la vie en Europe :

6 Le terme est utilisé pour désigner les quartiers à la périphérie de la ville de Dakar ainsi que les trois villes faisant partie de la région de Dakar (Pikine, Guédiwaye, Rufisque). Ces espaces, densément peuplés, concentrent des problèmes d’aménagements urbains — architecture anarchique, manque d’infrastructures, fréquence des inondations — qui sont, aux yeux des rappeurs, le signe du manque d’intérêt des décideurs politiques pour ces espaces et les populations qui les habitent.

152 « Le soldat n’a pas fui, il est parti chercher de la force »

« Au Sénégal c’est dur, mais ici ce n’est pas aussi facile qu’ils nous font croire Pour le savoir, tu dois venir voir par toi-même nos conditions de vie Parce que tu ne peux pas te l’imaginer Parce que ce qu’ils te font voir à la télévision n’est rien en comparaison à ce qu’ils ne te montrent pas, ils te cachent presque la vérité Mais les gars quand ils viennent en vacances vendent du rêve Et, comme tu disais, du début à la fin ils font les joyeux Ensuite, comment convaincre les gens qu’en Europe c’est difficile comme partout » (Keyti, 2003, traduction du wolof au français par Keyti)

« Représenter » n’équivaut donc pas ici à « être un exemple de », mais plutôt à « agir au nom de quelqu’un ». Comme le résume l’historien sénégalais Benga (2002 : 302) au sujet des artistes de rap au Sénégal :

« Aux yeux des artistes rap, la prise de parole est le fait d’une élite, de ceux qui ont le pouvoir de parler et la capacité de le faire. C’est pour cela que les artistes rap, lorsqu’ils s’adressent aux jeunes, parlent aussi à leur place ».

La représentation par les rappeurs des « jeunes » s’exerce ainsi par le fait de « parler » en leur nom, davantage que par le fait de refléter leurs comportements. Tout en se présentant comme « jeunes », les rappeurs n’en agissent pas moins comme de « grands frères », qui conseillent leurs auditeurs sur les comportements à adopter. De façon analogue, tout en correspondant aux profils des candidats à la migration, les rappeurs utilisent leur moyen d’expression pour mettre en lumière le risque pris par les migrants au cours de leur traversée « clandestine ».

Par conséquent, ces chansons de rap ne doivent pas être considérées uniquement comme le lieu d’expression d’un imaginaire migratoire préexistant, mais aussi comme le lieu d’un discours tenu par des artistes qui font valoir leurs posi- tionnements en accord avec une pratique artistique régie par des conventions (Becker, 2008), notamment au sujet du rôle ambivalent de la mobilité dans les carrières artistiques des artistes de rap sénégalais.

Saisir le rap sénégalais au prisme de la mobilité

À l’aune de la célébration des trente ans du « rap galsen », nom donné par ses protagonistes au rap sénégalais, décrétée par la structure de promotion des cultures urbaines Africulturban, nombreux sont ceux qui ont développé leurs carrières artistiques grâce à la mobilité. Le président d’Africulturban, Matador, a créé cette structure à la suite de tournées réalisées en Belgique avec son précédent groupe, le Wa BMG 44. Depuis la création de la structure en 2006, la réputation de son festival international, le Festa 2H, n’a cessé de s’accroître grâce aux partenariats que son directeur, Amadou Fall Ba, tisse de par le monde pour rencontrer des artistes et financer leur venue au Sénégal. Les mobilités croissantes des artistes, dans le cadre de tournées, de collaborations artistiques ou d’invitations en tout genre, ont aussi facilité la multiplication de home studio à Dakar grâce au matériel financé et acquis par les artistes au cours de leurs voyages. Les aspirations à l’« exportation » de nombreux acteurs du rap, consta- tées lors de ma recherche, correspondent aussi avec la façon dont la migration, au Sénégal, est conçue, par les candidats à la migration, comme un moyen de

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réalisation du soi (Fouquet, 2007), un moyen d’échapper aux contraintes sociales (Mbodji, 2008), ou encore un moyen d’émancipation et d’affirmation de soi (Timera, 2001).

Ces pratiques et imaginaires de l’(im)mobilité dans le rap sénégalais s’inscrivent dans la longue durée du processus de développement de ce genre musical au Sénégal et des connexions tissées, au travers de cette pratique artistique, avec le reste du monde. Selon Charry (2012), c’est aux Sénégalais qui ont émigré, en France et aux États-Unis notamment, et qui retournent au pays pour les vacances, que l’on doit l’arrivée du hip-hop au Sénégal. Certains jeunes, notamment parmi des élites dakaroises sensibles aux tendances provenant de l’étranger, commencent par imiter les pas de danse des bboys7 et à en adopter les codes vestimentaires (Herson, 2011). Pour Martin (2004), les États-Unis sont la première influence des jeunes des villes africaines :

« C’est parce que les jeunes urbains voulaient rompre avec un patrimoine rural jugé bien trop encombrant, et avec des formes européennes trop associées à l’oppression coloniale qu’ils ont choisi l’Amérique. Elle seule, dans sa diversité, pouvait donner sens à leurs expériences en manifestant de manière éclatante leur capacité de création, donc de fabrication de modernité autonome pleine de la promesse d’un avenir indépendant. »

Les premiers artistes de rap revendiquent progressivement leur expression musicale comme étant authentiquement sénégalaise, que ce soit par l’expression d’appartenances territoriales, l’usage de langues nationales (notamment du wolof) au détriment du français et de l’anglais, ainsi que par leurs prises de parole sur l’actualité politique et sociale. Selon l’historien sénégalais Diouf (2002), les premiers rappeurs sont apparus au lendemain des élections présiden- tielles de 1988, à la suite desquelles le président Abdou Diouf est réélu, malgré un antagonisme croissant d’une frange de la jeunesse. Le rap aurait été le mode d’expression privilégié d’une jeunesse déçue par les limites du modèle démocra- tique sénégalais, mais aussi d’une jeunesse désœuvrée, cherchant à s’occuper pendant l’année blanche qui suivit l’élection. Au milieu des années 1990, des artistes personnifient, aux côtés de sportifs, le mouvement Bul Faale qui tire son nom d’une chanson du groupe de rap Positive Black Soul. Ce mouvement, qui se traduit par « un processus d’individualisation » de la jeunesse sénégalaise et à une remise en cause des valeurs sociales des aînés (Havard, 2001), semble porter ses fruits lors des élections présidentielles de 2000, qui se soldent par la victoire de l’opposant à Abdou Diouf, Abdoulaye Wade, dont la campagne s’est articulée sur le thème du sopi (« changement » en wolof). Par l’appel à l’inscription des nouveaux votants sur les listes électorales puis par l’appel au vote, les artistes du Bul Faale apparaissent comme des acteurs clés de la démocratie au Sénégal, un pays dont l’alternance présidentielle pacifique apparaît alors comme une exception dans la région. À cette reconnaissance locale s’ajoute la reconnaissance internationale de groupes comme le Positive Black Soul, Pee Froiss et Daara J, qui signent des contrats avec de grandes majors internationales aux débuts des années 2000. Cependant, cet « âge d’or » ne dure pas. En premier lieu, ces groupes rompent rapidement leurs contrats et se séparent, entraînant une désillusion vis-à-vis de la possibilité pour un groupe de rap sénégalais de s’« exporter ». D’autres groupes, comme le Rap’adio et le Wa BMG 44, reconnus

7 Premiers adeptes de la danse hip-hop (Bazin, 2001).

154 « Le soldat n’a pas fui, il est parti chercher de la force » pour leur implication lors des élections de 2000 ainsi que par leur critique sans ménagement du gouvernement, se séparent après le départ de certains de leurs membres à l’étranger. Daddy Bibson, ancien membre des groupes Rap'adio et Pee froiss, s’installe en Suède, puis aux États-Unis. Au milieu des années 2000, que ce soit par la voie documentée ou non, les artistes de rap sont massivement concernés par les départs massifs : le départ à l’étranger apparaît ainsi comme une des causes majeures de séparation des groupes de rap. C’est ce qui pousse notamment le rappeur Maxi Krezy à écrire la chanson « Départ volontaire », que certains ont interprétée comme étant dirigée spécifiquement contre Daddy Bibson, un ami d’enfance. Il y raconte la façon dont il projetait avec l’un de ses amis de conquérir l’Europe grâce à sa musique, en signant un contrat avec une maison de disques, ce qui leur permettrait de gagner de l’argent puis de se marier. Mais l’ami en question ne rentre pas au délai fixé par son visa Schengen. Le troisième couplet de la chanson est assez explicite sur le sort que l’interprète réserve aux rappeurs qui ont quitté le Sénégal :

« Depuis dix ans on espère gagner de l’argent Dans le rap, chacun se demande quand le morceau percera en France Allemagne Espagne New York Tokyo on attend on ne s’est jamais arrêté yo On emmerde tout rappeur qui a fait un départ volontaire Voyager au nom du Hip-hop une fois arrivé en Europe tu te bazardes croyant que Dieu ferme tous les accès Négro tu penses que si tout le monde faisait comme toi que deviendra l’avenir du hip-hop sénégalais Les jeunes qui vous suivent et vous motivent, qui va les encourager ? Dans tous les cas, ceux qui sont restés et moi vous envoyons cette lettre Si toutefois vous avez souillé vos mains en torchant le cul des enfants blancs Ne touchez plus à nos micros vous êtes des chats qui voulaient jouer aux malins pour devenir des lions, on n’est plus potes L’aventure doit être sincère et vu que vous avez pris une autre route (...), on vous libère » (Maxi Krezy, 2003, traduction du wolof au français par El Hassan Diouf, journaliste à Rapdjolof.com)

Cette définition de l’artiste de rap comme celui qui « encourage les jeunes » et lutte pour l’avenir de son pays conduit à une conception de la migration comme un acte lâche, par lequel le rappeur abandonne le rôle qui est le sien dans la société sénégalaise et acte une rupture avec les autres rappeurs restés au Sénégal. Par conséquent, comme le fait remarquer un artiste de rap qui réside aujourd’hui à Paris avec sa femme espagnole, les désirs de migrer des artistes, bien que très présents, ne sont que rarement avoués :

« Au Sénégal 90 % des artistes qui font du hip-hop, qui font du rap, bon même s’ils le disent pas, c’est vrai que voilà quoi, c’est pour voyager. » (Entretien, Clichy-sous-Bois, 2017)

L’analyse de l’imaginaire migratoire dans les chansons de rap au Sénégal ne peut donc faire l’économie des rapports ambivalents de ces artistes avec la mobilité : source de reconnaissance artistique, la mobilité de l’artiste est présentée comme désirable tant qu’elle n’aboutit pas à un départ définitif, qui remet alors en cause la réputation de l’artiste comme attaché au devenir de son

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pays. Les représentations de la migration telles qu’elles apparaissent dans les chansons doivent alors être mises en perspective en regard de la carrière artistique et des expériences de mobilité de leurs interprètes.

La pertinence de cette mise en perspective se révèle à la lumière d’une analyse comparée entre deux groupes : un groupe internationalement reconnu, mais qui n’a jamais quitté le Sénégal (Daara J Family) et un groupe dont les membres sont partis à l’étranger, mais qui continue à faire de la musique à destination, au moins en partie, du public sénégalais (Wagëblë).

Daara J Family, « le Sénégal est ton abri »

Le groupe est composé de deux amis de lycée, Ndongo D et Faada Freddy, dont l’oncle, qui habite en France, ramène fréquemment de la musique et des cassettes dans ses valises. C’est par ce moyen que les deux amis découvrent le hip-hop au travers des enregistrements des émissions de Dj Sidney, diffusées en 1984 sur la chaîne de télévision française TF1. Ils rencontrent le troisième membre du groupe, Alaji-man, au cours d’une soirée rap organisée au Métropolis8 en 1993 et forment le groupe Daara J en 1994. Une année plus tard, le groupe publie une première cassette éponyme, qui connaît un grand succès au Sénégal avec 15 000 exemplaires vendus. Aux côtés de groupes comme Jant bi et Sunu Flavor, le groupe Daara J développe surtout des thèmes amoureux dans leur musique. Cependant, leur originalité réside dans l’expression musicale de leurs croyances religieuses, ce qui leur permet de conquérir un large public. Le terme Daara ji sert d’ailleurs au Sénégal à désigner l’école coranique.

C’est en France que le groupe se fait « découvrir » par un producteur anglais, Carlton Cigler, qui remixe les chansons de leur cassette pour la sortie de leur premier album international, publié sous le label français Déclic Communication en 1997. C’est aussi sous ce label que sort leur album suivant, Xalima une année plus tard. Cet album leur permet d’effectuer une tournée européenne (France, Belgique, Espagne et Allemagne) durant l’année 2000.

Désirant accéder à une reconnaissance internationale au-delà du marché francophone, les membres du groupe rompent leur contrat avec leur label pour signer sur la filiale anglaise de la major du disque BMG Entertainment (fusionnée avec Sony BMG pour devenir Sony Music en 2005). Le groupe publie leur troisième album international Boomerang en 2003 sur lequel ils enre- gistrent des collaborations avec plusieurs artistes de renommée internationale, dont la chanteuse malienne Rokia Traoré et le rappeur français Diziz La Peste. Le groupe entame une tournée française au cours de laquelle ils font la première partie des Rita Missouko au Grand Rex à Paris. Après des années de concerts à l’étranger, ainsi que l’obtention du prestigieux prix du BBC World Music Awards pour la catégorie « meilleur artiste africain » en 2004, la carrière internationale du groupe ne décolle pas. En 2007, Alaji-Man quitte le groupe et les deux membres restants se rebaptisent sous le nom de Daara J Family.

8 Ancienne boîte de nuit du centre-ville de la capitale, transformée en restaurant.

156 « Le soldat n’a pas fui, il est parti chercher de la force »

En 2010, le groupe publie son nouvel album School of life sous le label britan- nique Wrasse Records, spécialisé en musiques du monde. Selon Ndongo D, en les classant dans la rubrique « musique du monde », le label ne leur permettait pas d’être pris au sérieux en tant que rappeurs9, ce qui les pousse à nouveau à rompre leur contrat.

En 2013, Faada Freddy commence sa collaboration en solo au sein du label français ThinkZik !, récemment créé par le franco-sénégalais Malick Ndiaye, neveu du musicien et compositeur sénégalais Wasis Diop. Faada Freddy y produit un nouveau projet, Untitled, dont le concept est de faire interpréter tous les instruments par des voix humaines et des percussions corporelles. Une année plus tard, alors que je débute ma recherche, c’est par hasard que je croise Ndongo D au Sénégal, après avoir tenté plusieurs fois de joindre les membres du groupe, qui se rendent très fréquemment à l’étranger. Il me donne rendez-vous dans le studio de leur label indépendant Bois sakré, où je le retrouve à travailler sur les chansons de leur prochain album Foundations, qui sortira en 2016. Lors de cette séance, il me fait notamment écouter la chanson « Senegal », qu’il me présente comme étant destinée à la diaspora sénégalaise résidant à l’étranger. Je lui fais remarquer que le groupe s’est exprimé à de nombreuses reprises sur le sujet de la migration dans ses chansons. Ndongo D me répond que c’est un thème que le groupe connaît pour l’avoir expérimenté. Dans la chanson « Exodus » de l’album Boomerang, dédiée à « tous les clandestins, tous les bana bana (noms donnés aux vendeurs de rues sénégalais) qui cherchent l’eldorado en Americana », les artistes se faisaient l’écho de représentations de l’ailleurs comme « Eldorado » et comme « Terre promise » où les migrants partaient dans l’espoir d’une vie meilleure et dont ils promettaient revenir avec « les poches pleines d’or ».

En revanche, l’intentionnalité première de la chanson « Senegal » est d’encourager les migrants à revenir au Sénégal, en suscitant la nostalgie du pays, mais aussi en évoquant une issue heureuse à l’expérience migratoire. Le titre peut aussi être compris comme une démonstration de l’amour des artistes pour leur pays (« j’aime ce pays qui m’a vu grandir ») ou encore comme une campagne de promotion touristique à destination d’un public étranger10.

Dans « Senegal », les deux membres de Daara J Family expriment surtout des sentiments de nostalgie d’être « loin de chez soi » et de ses proches. Le pays est associé à une maison, à un « abri » vers lequel le migrant est appelé à rentrer tandis que la migration est présentée comme un déracinement. Le retour est vécu comme une consécration vers lequel aspire naturellement le migrant. La vie à l’étranger est alors conçue comme une parenthèse qui n’a qu’un seul but, celui de « préparer le chemin du retour ». Les souffrances vécues à l’étranger sont ainsi rendues acceptables par la promesse de rentrer en champion (Banégas et Warnier, 2001).

9 Carnet de terrain (2014) Visite à Ndongo D (Daara J Family), Grand-Yoff/Dakar, Sénégal, 10/11/2014. 10 Le clip Sénégal a été réalisé en collaboration avec l’Agence Sénégalaise de Promotion Touristique.

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Dans « Senegal », Ndongo D s’adresse au migrant en wolof :

« T’es loin de chez toi, rêves qu’on t’accueille un jour tu vas rentrer, prépares le chemin du retour saches que tu es proche de ton but, la famille, tout le monde t’attend, t’étais parti mais tu es revenu, le Sénégal est ton abri » (Daara J Family, 2016, traduction du wolof au français par El Hassan Diouf, journaliste à Rapdjolof.com)

Faada Freddy lui répond : « me revoilà chez moi, là où je me sens comme un Roi ».

En mettant en perspective l’année de sortie de ces chansons avec les étapes de la carrière artistique de Daara J puis de Daara J Family, les deux chansons acquièrent un nouveau sens. Dans la chanson « Exodus », diffusée en 2003 alors que le groupe est sous contrat avec une maison de disques qui leur fait espérer l’accession à une notoriété internationale, les membres du groupe croient en leur réussite par la migration, comme les « clandestins » auxquels la chanson est dédiée. En revanche, la chanson « Senegal », diffusée dans le cadre d’un album qui se présente comme un retour aux sources, aux « fondations » séné- galaises du groupe, et qui est produit de façon indépendante, les paroles de la chanson mettent en relief, à travers le thème du retour de migration, le retour de Daara J Family au Sénégal. La chanson « Senegal » est alors symbolique de la carrière des membres du groupe qui, après des années de carrière internationale, expriment leur attachement à un pays d’origine qu’ils n’ont jamais vraiment quitté. Comme Ndongo D me le confiait en 2014, il est important pour les membres de retourner régulièrement au Sénégal, généralement tous les six mois. Cette résonance de l’imaginaire migratoire avec les mises en scène de l’identité artistique est particulièrement mise en exergue lorsque Faada Freddy chante que « le soldat n’a pas fui, mais qu’il est parti chercher de la force ». Tout comme il s’agit de ne pas accuser le soldat de désertion, puisqu’il n’a fui que pour revenir plus fort, il s’agit de ne pas accuser les migrants, et le groupe lui-même par la même occasion, d’avoir abandonné leur pays, puisqu’ils ne l’ont fait que pour revenir plus forts eux aussi.

Début 2018, Faada Freddy rentre au Sénégal, après une série de concerts donnés en Europe pour promouvoir son album solo, et y donner deux concerts, présentés dans la presse nationale comme clôturant triomphalement la tournée internationale de l’artiste. Interrogé par Radio France International, Faada Freddy s’exprime sur son retour au Sénégal : « C’est comme renaître. À chaque fois que je viens ici, je me ressource. À chaque fois que je reviens au Sénégal, j’ai l’impression que c’est la première fois » (Thibault, 2018). Dans la carrière du groupe Daara J Family, puis celle en solo de Faada Freddy, la mythologie du retour comme accomplissement est ainsi régulièrement réactivée au profit du prestige du groupe. Par la migration, « on fait grandir son nom en s’auréolant de la valeur-prestige rattachée à l’Ailleurs et à ses accessoires et en devenant ainsi l’incarnation de l’Illusion » (Fouquet, 2007). Il s’agit alors de « partir pour grandir, revenir pour bâtir », comme le proclame le groupe en conclusion du titre « Senegal ».

158 « Le soldat n’a pas fui, il est parti chercher de la force »

Wagëblë, une migration sans retour ?

Wagëblë est un groupe formé par les rappeurs Waterflow et Eyewitness. Les deux membres se sont connus au lycée en 1994 et ont formé un premier groupe avec deux autres rappeurs avant que ces derniers ne partent à l’étranger. Wagëblë, qui signifie « du ghetto » (« wa » signifiant « du groupe de » et « gëblë » pour « ghetto ») est aussi l’acronyme de Wax Aduna Geddu Ettu Baatin Lemu Ëlek, qui signifie, en wolof, le lieu où les gens se réunissent pour parler des problèmes rencontrés. Comme leur nom le laisse supposer, le groupe s’inscrit dans la mouvance « hardcore » en utilisant le rap comme un instrument pour faire entendre « la voix des sans-voix11 ».

Les membres du groupe, originaires de Thiaroye, se présentent comme l’un des premiers groupes issus de « banlieue » et insistent sur la difficulté à se faire une place au sein d’une scène musicale alors dominée par des groupes issus du centre-ville dakarois. Selon Eyewitness, rencontré à Lausanne où il vit, c’est durant des auditions que le groupe se fait remarquer par le producteur norvégien Tom Roger du label Two Thou Entertainment au début des années 2000, alors même que le propriétaire du studio émet quelques réserves quant à leur laisser la possibilité de passer les auditions. Cette version des débuts du groupe, qui tranche avec d’autres versions, vise à mettre en lumière leurs difficultés à être reconnus, comme pour mieux justifier la distance que le rappeur a prise vis-à-vis d'autres artistes de rap au Sénégal, vers lesquels il s’est montré critique tout au long de notre rencontre.

Quoi qu’il en soit, le premier album du groupe, enregistré à Dakar avec Tom Roger, sort en 2003 et connaît un immense succès. Leur deuxième album, Sénégal, toujours enregistré par Two Thou Entertainment, est enregistré en Norvège et sort en 2005. Le groupe part en tournée internationale (États-Unis, Norvège, Suisse, Suède, France, Gambie, Guinée). Entre 2002 et 2005, pendant la période d’enregistrement de leurs deux albums et les tournées réalisées à l’étranger, le groupe voyage beaucoup, en retournant au Sénégal tous les six mois. Selon Waterflow, c’est en 2005 que les membres du groupe quittent le Sénégal pour s’installer de façon plus durable à l’étranger. Si Eyewitness s’installe très vite en Suisse après un court passage en Norvège — lorsque je le rencontre en 2014 il me dit être en Suisse depuis dix ans —, Waterflow vit d’abord quelques mois en Suisse avec Eyewitness, puis en Norvège avec des retours fréquents au Sénégal, avant de s’installer aux États-Unis quelques années plus tard, avec sa femme américaine et leur enfant âgé de quelques mois. Il devient manager dans un restaurant belge pour pourvoir aux besoins de sa famille. Malgré la distance géographique et leurs activités professionnelles, le groupe publie un troisième album, Message of Hope, en 2011 sur leur label indépendant, Nubian Spirit. Waterflow, rencontré aux États-Unis en 2015, m’explique cette rupture avec le label norvégien comme une manière d’acquérir une nouvelle autonomie. À partir de cet instant, le groupe prend en charge toutes les facettes de leur activité artistique : production, enregistrement,

11 Les rappeurs sénégalais dits « hardcore » construisent leur « engagement musical » comme le fait d’utiliser leur média, la musique, pour faire entendre les voix des populations qui ne seraient pas, selon eux, écoutées par les décideurs politiques et plus largement, seraient inaudibles dans le système mondialisé.

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mixage, mais aussi design des pochettes d’albums, management des concerts, logistique, réalisation des vidéos, développement d’une marque de vêtements. Selon le rappeur, le titre de l’album Message of Hope symbolise l’évolution du groupe comme incarnation d’un message d’espoir : celui d’avoir réussi par leurs propres moyens. Ce message c’est aussi la réussite d’une trajectoire de vie, partie « de rien, des endroits les plus pauvres » et d’avoir utilisé ce qu’ils avaient à disposition pour « être là où on est maintenant » (Entretien, Washington DC., 2015).

Cette réussite en migration est illustrée dans la chanson « African Dream » de l’album Message of Hope. Ce « rêve » n’est pas présenté que sous un jour positif puisque les deux rappeurs y partagent les sacrifices qu’ils ont dû réaliser et soulignent les difficultés pour continuer leur carrière artistique en migration. Le clip notamment, met en scène de façon explicite les tentations auxquelles le migrant est exposé pour gagner de l’argent. Il débute sur une séquence, sans musique, au cours de laquelle deux individus sont filmés en train de discuter en bas d’un immeuble, tout en roulant des joints entre leurs mains. Le premier, probablement un recruteur pour la vente de drogues demande au second, un de ses nouveaux vendeurs, s’il a bien vendu la nuit passée. Le vendeur lui répond qu’il s’est fait beaucoup d’argent et qu’il adore ce travail. Un des membres de Wagëblë, passe à quelques mètres devant eux pour rejoindre son appartement. Les deux hommes le regardent et partagent à son propos :

Le recruteur : « When you see that nigga over there man, going back and forth, back and forth, I don’t know what he do man. Do he do music man? Or something like that? » Le vendeur : « Man, music man, they don’t have any money, man » Le recruteur : « Yeah? » Le vendeur : « Leave it leave it (tchiip). Music? » Le recruteur : « That’s right man we got to do our own, we here to make some dough. We don’t do no music. »

Cette conversation laisse place à une autre séquence qui filme Waterflow dans sa salle de bain, en train de se regarder dans le miroir. La séquence qui suit présente Eyewitness, devant son ordinateur. Il est au téléphone avec un membre de sa famille à qui il explique qu’il ne sait pas quand il va rentrer au Sénégal. Il raccroche, puis regarde des photographies de son dernier séjour au Sénégal, et se met à écrire la chanson « African Dream ».

Dans leurs couplets respectifs, les deux rappeurs racontent leur envie de rentrer chez eux, mais aussi leur détermination à ne pas abandonner « la mission ». Le refrain, chanté par le musicien et chanteur sénégalais reconnu Ismaël Lo, proclame que « l’Afrique les attend ». Le groupe est filmé dans un studio de musique, puis des images les montrent au Sénégal. La fin du clip reprend la conversation du début, où les deux hommes discutent encore de Waterflow, en disant de lui qu’il n’a pas d’argent et qu’il va se faire déporter. La dernière image du clip montre les membres du groupe dos à la caméra, face à l’horizon, comme pour signifier la promesse de meilleurs lendemains.

La chanson remplit plusieurs objectifs pour le groupe : elle répond d’abord aux attentes de leur public, en expliquant les raisons pour lesquelles le groupe n’est pas encore rentré au Sénégal tout en leur signifiant que, malgré les diffi-

160 « Le soldat n’a pas fui, il est parti chercher de la force » cultés, le groupe continue à exister. La sortie de l’album était d’ailleurs censée s’accompagner d’une tournée au Sénégal, après leur participation au Festival mondial des arts nègres12 (Festman). Selon une interview réalisée par les membres du groupe à cette occasion (Senerap, 2011), le groupe aurait préféré reporter la tournée, qui n’a finalement pas eu lieu, pour des problèmes d’organisation. Leur prestation lors du Festman a aussi été révélatrice de leur perte de popularité auprès d’un public rap qui n’a pas connu le groupe avant son départ à l’étranger. Pour le groupe, ce retour se présente comme un échec, qui renforce la distance prise par le groupe vis-à-vis de leur pays.

Interrogé sur sa relation avec le public sénégalais lors de notre rencontre aux États-Unis en 2015, Waterflow me confie ne pas chercher à atteindre un public spécifique ou à correspondre aux caractéristiques d’une musique définie comme du « rap sénégalais », démarche décrite comme une fermeture :

« Si tu es sénégalais, tu te dis je fais du rap sénégalais, un rap qui est juste concentré sur la culture sénégalaise, qui parle que des problèmes des Sénégalais. Donc voilà, tu te fermes. Alors que le rap, dans son essence, c’est une culture universelle. »13

Pour autant, Waterflow se définit toujours comme un rappeur sénégalais : son origine, « c’est dans mon DNA (ADN en anglais), mais ça détermine pas où je vais vivre toute ma vie »14, me dit-il.

En disant que son origine ne détermine pas son lieu de vie, il induit une capacité de chaque individu à ne pas être contraint par les circonstances, mais à choisir son propre destin, en d’autres mots « à se développer soi-même », termes qu’il utilise pour motiver son envie de partir du Sénégal, rejoignant un imaginaire de la migration comme moyen de s’extirper des valeurs sociales qui empêchent l’individu de réussir (Mbodji, 2008). Chez Waterflow, ces valeurs sociales sont celles qui sont imposées aux artistes pour correspondre aux attentes du public sénégalais. Cet imaginaire migratoire se fond aussi dans le mythe américain du self-made-man qui se réalise par le rap à partir de rien. Cependant, tout comme l’artiste de rap qui a réussi doit rester « vrai » (Sköld, 2007), Waterflow, en tant que migrant, dit être resté le même et se revendique, malgré la distance, toujours comme « la voix des sans-voix ».

C’est finalement vers la fin de l’année 2016 que le groupe retourne au Sénégal pour la cérémonie de remise des prix des Galsen hip-hop Awards, avant la sortie de leur nouvel album qui devrait s’appeler Witness the Flow (« sois témoin du flow », jeu de mots sur leurs noms d’artistes). Sur scène, le groupe reprend ses chansons les plus connues, issues de leurs deux premiers albums, pour tenter de se reconnecter avec le public sénégalais. Le prochain album du groupe, qui n’est pas encore sorti, comporte notamment deux singles, « Jawale » et « Jambaar » qui sont sortis respectivement en aout 2016 et en octobre 2017. Dans le clip de « Jawale », les membres du groupe se filment en train de marcher

12 Le festival mondial des arts nègres de 2010, organisée sous la présidence d’Abdoulaye Wade sur le thème de la renaissance africaine, est la troisième édition du festival, après les éditions de 1966, organisée par Léopold Sedar Senghor à Dakar, et celle de 1977, organisée à Lagos (Nigéria). 13 Waterflow (Wagëblë) (2015) Entretien, Washington, États-Unis, 01/10/2015. 14 Ibid.

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sur le Hollywood walk of fame, ce trottoir sur lequel sont apposées les 2 600 étoiles de célébrités mondialement connues. Dans le clip de « Jambaar » en revanche, les membres du groupe se filment face à la mer, depuis les plages de Ngor, à l’extrémité nord-ouest de la ville de Dakar, ainsi que sur l’esplanade du Monument de la Renaissance africaine15. Cette production artistique sous-tend ainsi l’oscillation de Wagëblë entre le Sénégal et les États-Unis, entre l’image du migrant qui a réussi à l’étranger et retour au pays.

Comme chez Daara J Family, le refrain du titre « jambaar » proclame que « le guerrier est parti chercher de la force ». Chez Wagëblë, la migration est aussi expliquée par la recherche de meilleures perspectives ailleurs. Cependant, contrairement au premier groupe, l’expérience migratoire de Wagëblë ne s’est pas encore concrétisée par un retour définitif au Sénégal, ce dont rend compte les couplets des deux rappeurs. Waterflow y rappe notamment que le « vrai » soldat « travaille dur » et « s’envole », faisant ainsi preuve de sa détermination à réussir et à triompher de toutes les difficultés, malgré les critiques :

« Réussir ou mourir j’emmerde mes ennemis Bosser dur et s’occuper de mon business Fais le tour du monde je me vante si j’en ai envie Je suis impoli et assume T’as pas bien compris, il n’y a que Dieu C’est lui qui me donne du courage Je n’ai rien à craindre » (Wagëblë, 2017, traduction du wolof au français par El Hassan Diouf, journaliste à Rapdjolof.com)

La figure du « jambaar », entre imaginaire migratoire et positionnement artistique

Les représentations de la migration chez les deux groupes de rap envisagés font appel à des éléments de l’imaginaire migratoire. Dans ces chansons, ces artistes motivent la migration par une recherche de meilleurs lendemains qui doit se solder par un retour dans le pays d’origine. Cependant, les paroles de ces chansons permettent aussi, de façon implicite, de lire la carrière artistique des artistes en rapport à une réussite internationale. L’emphase mise par les deux groupes sur la figure du jambaar (« guerrier » en wolof) est aussi notable, notamment vis-à-vis de l’absence du registre lié à l’« aventure », que de nombreuses recherches ont relevée dans l’imaginaire migratoire en Afrique subsaharienne, notamment dans la littérature.

Dans Les Mots du Patrimoine, la figure de l’« aventurier » apparaît sous la forme de l’expression « partir à l’aventure » qui désigne le fait d’« aller tenter sa chance, chercher fortune dans une autre ville ou à l’étranger ». Selon Mazauric (2012 : 58), ce n’est pas un hasard si les récits de fiction privilégient la dimension aventureuse, puisque l’aventurier a une forte dimension romanesque. Il est

15 Le monument est une statue de cinquante-deux mètres de hauteur représentant un homme africain enlaçant une femme et portant un enfant dans son bras gauche. L’enfant pointe son doigt vers ce qui, au-delà de l’horizon, mène aux côtes américaines, symboli- sant une Afrique qui renaît en se dressant vers le ciel et vers l’ouest.

162 « Le soldat n’a pas fui, il est parti chercher de la force » celui qui « a rompu avec le cours des jours ordinaires, qui a choisi une autre vie, plus fertile en péripéties, en risques, voire en dangers, que le banal quotidien » et échappe au statut de victime pour être le maître de son propre destin. L’expression aurait été utilisée dès le milieu du XXe siècle pour désigner les voyages entrepris par de jeunes ouest-africains afin d’acquérir l’expérience nécessaire au passage à l’âge adulte. Pian (2009 : 11-12) définit « les aventuriers » comme ceux « désireux de partir à la découverte du monde et cherchant à s’émanciper des contraintes familiales et communautaires ».

Cependant, tous les migrants d’Afrique subsaharienne n’utilisent pas la figure de l’« aventurier » pour se décrire eux-mêmes, cette figure agissant même parfois comme repoussoir, en désignant des individus peu scrupuleux, qui recherchent une réussite rapide à tout prix. Chez Bredeloup (2008 : 289) par exemple, les « aventuriers » sont des trafiquants de diamants pour qui « la réalisation de soi prime sur le projet économique » en accord avec de nouveaux modèles de réussite correspondant à une « nouvelle économie morale impré- gnant les imaginaires de l’État qui valorise et légitime les parcours fulgurants, les combines et les escroqueries, autrement dit tous les registres hétérodoxes de promotion individuelle quels qu’ils soient » (Ibid. : 291). À l’opposé, Havard (2001) soulignait l’émergence d’un « éthos Bul Faale » au Sénégal, promu par des rappeurs et des lutteurs, comme un modèle de réussite basé sur une éthique de l’effort et du travail. Ainsi, l’« aventurier », comme celui qui part chercher fortune ailleurs par tous les moyens, et le membre du Bul Faale, qui grâce à ses efforts parvient à surmonter les obstacles posés par la société, se présentent-ils comme deux figures de réussite a priori contradictoires.

Parmi les nombreuses chansons de rap sénégalaises portant sur la migration, très rares sont les mentions faites à l’« aventure ». En revanche, un vocabulaire guerrier est très présent au travers de références au « combat » ou à la « mission » ainsi qu’à la « guerre » et à la « bataille ». Les figures utilisées renvoient au « guerrier », mais aussi au « militaire », au « tirailleur » et au « soldat » ainsi qu’aux « ennemis ». Il s’agit de « contrer », « combattre », « bruta- liser », « anéantir », « crier », « envahir », « tuer », « calciner », avec « force », « courage », « détermination », « soif de vaincre ». Finalement, le guerrier a des « armes », est « blindé comme un tank » et donne des « coups ». Cette rhétorique guerrière n’est en soi pas surprenante. Bazin (2001) soulignait déjà comment l’artiste de rap s’inspirait de l’imagerie guerrière et considérait le rap comme une arme, une métaphore souvent rattachée à la naissance du rap aux États-Unis. Le slogan « Love, peace and Having fun » du mouvement de la Zulu Nation illustre la manière dont la pratique du hip-hop se présentait comme une alternative à la violence des gangs : plutôt que de pratiquer la violence physique, les membres des gangs s’affronteraient autour de batailles de danse, de djing et de rap. Au Sénégal, la métaphore guerrière est importante dans le rap dit hardcore et son association avec des conditions de vie précaires. Le rappeur hardcore est « engagé et conscient », mais par extension c’est aussi un « dur à cuire » ou autrement dit, un « Jambaar » (Moulard-Kouka, 2008). D’autre part, la figure du « soldat » est citée par quelques travaux sur l’imaginaire migratoire. Ainsi, si Bredeloup (2008) insiste sur la figure de l’« aventurier », perceptible à travers le vocabulaire de la débrouille, l’astuce ou la chance, elle souligne que l’aventure renvoie aussi à une perspective guerrière, car le migrant doit être amené à surmonter des épreuves grâce à son courage, sa témérité, sa bravoure

163 Cécile Navarro

et sa fierté. Dans un texte diffusé en 2018, Mourre montre comment la figure du tirailleur est mobilisée dans la fabrication de l’imaginaire migratoire, notamment au travers de la mémoire collective de la « dette de sang ». Le sacrifice des tirailleurs durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale est vengé par des migrants qui viennent réclamer cette dette, un thème que l’on trouve dans de nombreuses chansons de rap sénégalaises. À la lumière des carrières artistiques des artistes envisagés, ainsi que des éléments avancés précédemment au sujet de l’accusa- tion de trahison des artistes qui partent de la part des artistes restés au Sénégal, je défends néanmoins que la figure du guerrier peut être analysée comme une alternative à celle de l’« aventurier ».

D’abord, contrairement à l’« aventurier », qui part « tenter sa chance » et « découvrir le monde », avant tout guidé par sa quête d’exotisme et son désir d’argent, le « soldat » a une « mission » : il ne fuit pas son pays, il part simple- ment ailleurs pour « chercher de la force » et ramener cette force au Sénégal. Ensuite, contrairement à l’« aventurier », dont la réussite n’a pas de prix, le soldat conserve un sens du devoir et de la dignité (jom en wolof). Dans le clip « african dream », la cinématographie a pour objectif de mettre en scène les efforts entrepris par les membres de Wagëble pour ne pas se détourner de leur « mission » première, faire évoluer leur musique, face à la tentation d’activités illégales plus rémunératrices comme la vente de drogue. La « guerre » que mène le rappeur est ici une guerre interne, contre ses propres impulsions de se détourner du « bon chemin ». Cette guerre interne peut se rapprocher de la notion de jihad telle que développée par l’Islam soufi, et notamment par Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba, chef religieux sénégalais fondateur de la confrérie mouride (Babou 2007). Selon Lamchichi (2005 : 29), pour le soufisme, « le combat le plus important se situe au niveau intérieur, au niveau de l’ascèse, du jihad majeur (moral ou spirituel) que doit livrer le croyant d’abord contre lui-même, “à l’aide de son cœur”, pour expulser de soi les pulsions négatives ». Contrairement à l’« aventurier », le « soldat » ne sacrifie pas sa dignité au nom de la réussite. Pour reprendre l’expression utilisée par Maxi Krezy, le rappeur doit montrer qu’il n’est pas parti « torcher le cul des enfants blancs » et par conséquent, qu’il est encore digne de tenir le micro.

En se présentant comme des soldats en migration, ces artistes affirment ainsi ne pas avoir abandonné leur « mission » en tant que rappeurs et récusent les soupçons d’activités illégales associés à leur migration, leur permettant alors de négocier la continuité de leur appartenance au rap sénégalais, malgré leur expérience migratoire.

Conclusion

Cet article s’est attaché à aborder les imaginaires migratoires présents dans des chansons de rap sénégalaises, par leur mise en perspective avec les carrières artistiques de leurs interprètes, eux-mêmes insérés dans des trajectoires de mobilité. La création musicale n’est alors pas uniquement révélatrice d’imaginaires sur la migration, et le rap une représentation fidèle de la parole migrante. L’imaginaire migratoire doit en effet être relu à travers les processus de création musicale, qui impliquent un ensemble d’acteurs partageant un certain nombre de conventions. Par conséquent, chaque genre musical peut aussi être le lieu

164 « Le soldat n’a pas fui, il est parti chercher de la force » d’un renouvellement des significations apposés à ces imaginaires migratoires. Au Sénégal, les rappeurs se sont ainsi largement positionnés contre la migration « clandestine », en déconstruisant les fantasmes sur l’Europe, et ont, en quelque sorte, cherché à contrecarrer un imaginaire migratoire existant, notamment en dénonçant l’idée de migration comme seul moyen d’accomplissement social, occultant dans ce sillage les intenses désirs de migrer et les rapports ambivalents entretenus vis-à-vis d’un Occident à la fois critiqué et admiré par les artistes de rap sénégalais. L’acte de rester au Sénégal fonde l’accomplissement de la « mission » d’un rappeur qui se doit de lutter pour l’avenir de son pays, malgré le rôle crucial joué par les mobilités dans les carrières d’un nombre croissant d’artistes. L’exploration de ces imaginaires à l’aune des carrières de leurs interprètes éclaire ainsi des processus d’inclusion et d’exclusion au sein des processus de création musicale : pour ceux dont l’expérience migratoire, et le retour, ne se justifient pas par la réussite, l’expérience migratoire devient une « source d’altérisation et d’exclusion entre de supposés “vrais” et de supposés “faux” » (Timera 2014 : 47). L’utilisation de la figure du « guerrier », en se présen- tant comme une alternative à celle, décriée, de l’« aventurier », devient alors une manière de détourner ces processus d’inclusion et d’exclusion, en revendiquant un attachement continu au rap sénégalais, malgré l’expérience migratoire.

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Mazauric Catherine (2012) Mobilités d’Afrique en Europe : récits et figures de l’aventure, Paris, Karthala, 383 p. Mbodji Mamadou (2008) Imaginaires et migration : le cas du Sénégal, in Momar- Coumba Diop, Le Sénégal des migrations : mobilités, identités et sociétés, Paris, Karthala, pp. 305-320. Meyer Michaël, Adeline Perrot et Isabelle Zinn (2017) Entre ambition « tout-terrain » et impossible ubiquité : les ethnographes en mouvement, SociologieS, [en ligne] consulté le 04/01/2018. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/sociologies/6521 Milliot Virginie (2006) The « French Touch » : le hip-hop au filtre de l’universa- lisme républicain, Anthropologie et sociétés, 30 (2), pp. 175-97. Moulard Sophie (2014) Le regard entre deux rives. La migration et l’exil dans le discours des rappeurs sénégalais, Cahiers d’Études Africaines, 213/214, [en ligne] consulté le 01/07/2014. URL : https://www.academia.edu/7500056/Le_regard_ entre_deux_rives._La_migration_et_lexil_dans_le_discours_des_rappeurs_sene- galais_Cahiers_detudes_africaines_2014 Moulard-Kouka Sophie (2009) Le rap à Dakar. Mise en perspective du local et du global dans une culture populaire urbaine au Sénégal, in Yves Raibaud Éd., Comment la musique vient aux territoires, Pessac, Publications de la Maison des sciences de l’homme d’Aquitaine, pp. 153-163. Moulard-Kouka Sophie (2008) « Senegal yewuleen ! » Analyse anthropologique du rap à Dakar : liminarité, contestation et culture populaire, Thèse d’anthropologie, Université Victor Segalen-Bordeaux II, 575 p. Mourre Martin (2018) Mémoire des tirailleurs et institutions des imaginaires migratoires au Sénégal dans les années 2000, Africa, 88 (3), [en ligne] consulté le 12/08/2018 URL : https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/african- colonial-soldiers-memories-and-imagining-migration-in-senegal-in-the-twen- tyfirst-century/57572DEDD31827E4DEAA5CB6A1CFDD8A# Navarro Cécile (2019) « Ce n’est pas le rap qui nous fait voyager, c’est nous qui faisons voyager le rap galsen » : Pratiques et Imaginaires d’(im)mobilités au sein d’une scène musicale translocale au Sénégal, Thèse en sciences sociales, Université de Lausanne, 468 p. Ndiaye Corréard-Geneviève (Dir.) (2006) Les Mots du Patrimoine. Le Sénégal, Paris, Éditions des Archives Contemporaines-AUF, 600 p. Ortar Nathalie, Monika Salzbrunn et Mathis Stock (2018) Migrations, circulations, mobilités. Nouveaux enjeux épistémologiques et conceptuels à l’épreuve du terrain, Aix-en-Provence, Presses Universitaires de Provence, 230 p. Pian Anaïk (2009) Aux nouvelles frontières de l’Europe : l’aventure incertaine des Sénégalais au Maroc, Paris, La Dispute, 237 p. Rofheart Mahriana (2010) Don’t abandon “our boat”: shifting perceptions of emigration in contemporary Senegalese literature and song, Thèse en philosophie, Rutgers University/Graduate School, New Brunswick, 204 p. Rose Tricia (1994) Black noise: Rap music and black culture in contemporary America, Hanover, NH, Wesleyan University Press, 237 p. Salzbrunn Monika, Souiah Farida et Simon Mastrangelo (2015) Les « brûleurs » de frontières dans la musique populaire tunisienne, Afrique Contemporaine, 2 (254), pp. 37-56.

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Senerap (2011) Wagëblë: Exclusive Interview, Skyrock (blog), [en ligne] consulté le 21/02/2018. URL: https://senerap.skyrock.com/3032599760-WAGEBLE-EXCLU- SIVE-INTERVIEW.html Sheller Mimi and John Urry (2006) The New Mobilities Paradigm, Environment and Planning A, Economy and Space, 38 (2), pp. 207-226. Sköld David (2007) Makin’ It, by Keeping It Real. Street Talk, Rap Music, and the Forgotten Entrepreneurship from “the ’Hood”, Group and Organization Management, 32 (1), pp. 50-78. Souiah Farida (2011) Musique populaire et imaginaire migratoire en Algérie, Diversité, 164, pp. 27-33. Thibault Guillaume (2018) Faada Freddy de retour au Sénégal, RFI Musique. fr, [en ligne] consulté le 16/04/2018. URL : http://musique.rfi.fr/musique- africaine/20180112-faada-freddy-retour-senegal Timera Mahamet (2014) Mots et maux de la migration. De l’anathème aux éloges, Cahiers d’études africaines, 213-214, pp. 27-47. Timera Mahamet (2001) Les migrations des jeunes Sahéliens : affirmation de soi et émancipation, Autrepart, 18, pp. 37-49. Traïni Christophe (2008) La musique en colère, Paris, Les Presses de Sciences Po, 122 p. Wagëblë (2017) Jambaar, Nubian Spirit, [en ligne] consulté le 09/10/2017. URL : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kfzI28pBd8g Wagëblë (2016). Jawale, Nubian Spirit, [en ligne] consulté le 28/08/2016. URL : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LHnVLjw9ScQ Wagëblë (2011) African Dream (Wagëblë Feat. Cheikh Lô), Message of Hope, [en ligne] consulté le 29/11/2014. URL : https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=SLd4qm5_W_Q Willems Roos (2008) Les « fous de la mer » : les migrants clandestins du Sénégal aux Îles Canaries en 2006, in Momar-Coumba Diop Éd., Le Sénégal des migrations : mobilités, identités et sociétés, Karthala Éditions, pp. 277-303.

168 Résumé - Abstract - Resumen

Cécile Navarro « Le soldat n’a pas fui, il est parti chercher de la force » : explorer les imaginaires migratoires à l’aune des carrières artistiques dans le rap au Sénégal

De l’étude des imaginaires migratoires à l’étude des mobilités artistiques, la prise en compte de l’expression artistique a considérablement renouvelé l’approche des migrations. Les productions musicales ont notamment été considé- rées comme une manière privilégiée de recueillir les imaginaires migratoires. La musique, et notamment le rap, n’est-elle alors que la représentation fidèle d’une parole migrante ? Par la mise en perspective des imaginaires migratoires avec le vécu des mobilités au cours de carrières artistiques, à partir des exemples des groupes de rap sénégalais Wagëblë et Daara-J Family, l’article montre comment des artistes peuvent faire appel à un imaginaire migratoire particulier, celui du « soldat » plutôt que celui de l’« aventurier » pour mettre en scène leurs parcours artistiques, en fonction des conventions propres au genre musical auquel ils souhaitent appartenir. “The Soldier didn’t Run Away, He Went Looking for Strength”: Exploring Migration Imaginaries through Artistic Careers in Rap in Senegal

From the study of migration imaginaries to the study of artistic mobilities, taking into account artistic expression has considerably renewed the approach of migrations. In particular, musical productions have been considered as a privileged way of collecting migration imaginaries. Is music, and especially rap, only then the faithful representation of a migrant voice? By putting migration imaginaries in perspective with the lived experiences of mobility during artistic careers, developing on the examples of Senegalese rap groups Wagëblë and Daara-J Family, the article shows how artists can appeal to a particular migration imaginary, that of the “soldier” rather than that of the “adventurer” to stage their artistic career, according to the conventions specific to the musical genre to which they wish to belong. «El soldado no escapo, se fue a buscar fuerza»: explorar los imaginarios migratorios a través de las carreras artísticas en el rap en Senegal

Del estudio de los imaginarios migratorios hasta el de las movilidades artís- ticas, tener en cuenta la expresión artística ha considerablemente renovado el enfoque de las migraciones. En particular, las producciones musicales han sido consideradas como una forma privilegiada de reunir imaginarios migratorios. ¿Es la música, y especialmente el rap, entonces solo la representación fiel de una palabra migrante? Al poner la imaginación migratoria en perspectiva con la experiencia de la movilidad durante carreras artísticas, utilizando los ejemplos de los grupos de rap senegaleses Wagëblë y Daara-J Family, el artículo muestra cómo los artistas pueden apelar a un imaginario migratorio particular, el de “soldado” preferablamente al de “aventurero”, para poner en escena su carrera artística, de acuerdo con las convenciones específicas del género musical al que desean pertenecer.

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REMi Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 2019, 35 (1 & 2), pp. 171-190

Financiarisation du social et formes d’appartenance. Les émigrants portugais en France et la crise de 2008 Dominique Vidal1

De longue date, on le sait, les migrations ont été sur le continent européen une réponse aux difficultés des populations2. Au dix-neuvième et au vingtième siècles, les périodes de crise ont vu partir des femmes et des hommes qui percevaient ailleurs la promesse d’une vie meilleure (Oriol, 2000 ; Green, 2002 ; Rygiel, 2007). Ce fut, entre autres, le cas des Portugais qui, à différentes époques, ont quitté leur pays en nombre pour s’installer aux quatre coins de la planète3. Il n’est donc guère surprenant que la crise de 2008 se soit traduite au Portugal — dont le ralentissement de l’économie avait commencé en 2002 — par des départs massifs, notamment vers l’Angola, le Brésil et l’Europe de l’Ouest (Pires et Santo, 2016). Ceux-ci s’inscrivent dans l’ensemble des phénomènes migratoires dont la physionomie a considérablement changé en Europe depuis la fin de la Guerre froide (King, 2002 ; Wihtol de Wenden, 2016). Les Portugais désireux de fuir le chômage et la précarité ont bénéficié de la facilitation des mobilités au sein de l’Union européenne, tandis que l’accès au continent a été progressivement rendu de plus en plus difficile pour les ressortissants des anciens Empires coloniaux (Baganha, Marques et Góis, 2005). Comme souvent en matière de migrations, les chiffres à ce propos sont l’objet de controverses (Dos Santos, 2013). De manière indiscutable, on enregistre néanmoins jusqu’en 2007 un taux d’émigration aussi élevé qu’entre 1965 et 1975, décennie des départs massifs vers la France. Si, à partir de 2008, l’émigration décline dans un premier temps en raison de la raréfaction des débouchés dans les autres économies, elle s’envole entre 2011 et 2014 lorsque le gouvernement portugais se voit imposer par la Troïka4 plusieurs sévères programmes d’ajustement struc- turel. Et, aujourd’hui, en dépit d’une amélioration sensible de l’économie portugaise à partir de 2017, plus de 22 % de la population nationale vit en dehors d’un

1 Professeur de sociologie, Université de Paris, URMIS, Université Côte d'Azur, IRD, CNRS, F-75013, Paris, France ; [email protected] 2 L’auteur remercie les lecteurs anonymes qui lui ont permis d’améliorer une version préalable de ce texte. 3 L’étude de l’émigration portugaise vers le reste du monde a suscité de nombreux travaux au Portugal et dans les pays concernés par celle-ci. Pour une bibliographie presque exhaustive sur la production depuis 1980, on se reportera à Candeias, Góis, Marques et Peixoto (2014). 4 La Troïka est le nom donné à l’ensemble formé par la Commission européenne, la Banque centrale européenne et le Fonds monétaire international.

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pays qui, en raison des effets combinés d’une faible natalité et de la reprise de l’émigration, connaît un déclin démographique depuis 2010.

Cet article se propose d’examiner plusieurs effets de la crise sur les émigrants portugais en France. Il se situe ce faisant dans le prolongement des travaux qui ont été menés sur ce courant depuis les années 1970, lorsque son importance a suscité l’attention de chercheurs5. Après avoir connu un ralentissement consécutif à la diminution de l’émigration portugaise en France, ce domaine de recherche connaît maintenant un nouvel essor depuis que des centaines de milliers de Portugais quittent à nouveau leur pays6. Toutefois, depuis la crise de 2008, cette migration a reçu peu d’attention hors du cercle étroit des chercheurs s’intéressant aux déplacements humains entre les deux pays. Sans l’ignorer totalement, la recherche sur les migrations en Europe s’est effectivement bien davantage intéressée, non sans raison évidemment, aux mobilités entre l’Europe de l’Est et l’Europe occidentale et, plus largement, des pays du Sud vers les pays du Nord (Tilly, 2011 ; Castles, 2011 ; Paradiso, 2018).

Or, au-delà du cas des migrations du Portugal vers la France, étudier ce qui se joue dans ces flux depuis la crise permet de contribuer aux débats en cours sur les phénomènes migratoires en Europe, les transformations des sociétés du continent et l’immigration européenne en France, aujourd’hui notoirement sous- étudiée (Lillo, 2014). Pour contribuer à ces discussions, on montrera, d’abord, la complexification des déplacements entre les deux pays, l’hétérogénéité croissante des situations individuelles et le changement du sens donné au projet migratoire par les émigrants d’aujourd’hui7. On s’intéressera ensuite aux consé- quences de la crise sur différentes formes d’appartenance comme les groupes de parenté, la nation et l’Union européenne. On soulignera en particulier comment la crise agit sur les liens entre les émigrants et leur pays d’origine sur un mode différent de celui observé durant la principale période de l’immigration portugaise en France, de la fin des années 1950 au début des années 1970. Entre ces deux périodes, le Portugal a en effet connu de nombreux changements, parmi lesquels la financiarisation du social, dont la crise a accentué les effets.

5 Parmi ces recherches, on peut notamment citer, entre autres, Rocha-Trindade (1973), Brettell (1982), Oriol (1985), Cordeiro (1989) Hily et Oriol (1993), Leandro (1995), Volovitch- Tavares (1995), Charbit, Hily et Poinard (1997), Callier-Boisvert (1999) et Almeida (2008). 6 Voir, notamment, Santos (2010, 2013), Silva (2011), Branco (2013), Santo (2013), Pereira (2012), Lopes (2014), Lopes et al. (2015). 7 La différenciation accrue de l’émigration portugaise vers la France rend difficile sa description à partir de catégories stabilisées. Un terme comme « migrant de retour » ne rend par exemple pas compte de la diversité des situations de ceux qui, à un moment ou un autre, sont revenus vivre au Portugal. À la diversité des motifs avancés et de leur combinaison fréquente s’ajoutent, d’une part, les contextes socio-économiques différents selon les années de retour et, d’autre part, le fait que certains retours, initialement pensés comme définitifs, ont donné lieu à un nouveau départ en migration. Sur la question des retours plus généralement, voir, entre autres, Poinard (1983), Amaro (1985), Dos Santos et Wolf (2010). Dans le même ordre d’idées, Irène dos Santos a également souligné l’insuffisance heuristique de catégorisations comme « deuxième génération », « troisième génération » ou « issues de l’immigration portugaise » pour décrire la diversité des situations parmi les enfants de Portugais ayant un jour migré en France. Certains d’entre eux sont partis en France en même temps que leurs parents ; d’autres, élevés par leurs grands-parents, les y ont rejoints par la suite ; d’autres, encore, ont fait plusieurs aller-retour entre les deux pays au gré de la situation du couple parental (Domingues dos Santos, 2010).

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Méthodologie

Cet article s’appuie sur une enquête commencée début 2015 sur l’immigration portugaise en France. Celle-ci repose à ce jour sur cinquante entretiens en profondeur menés dans la province de Trás-os-Montes (n =19) et en Île-de-France (n =31), ainsi que sur des observations lors de fêtes, dans des cafés de ces deux régions et pendant trois aller-retour en bus entre Paris et Braçança. Les entretiens ont eu lieu en portugais au Portugal et en français ou en portugais en France. Les personnes interviewées (vingt-six hommes et vingt-quatre femmes) m’ont été pour dix d’entre elles présentées par des connaissances communes et, pour les autres, soit connues dans des lieux de sociabilité portugaise (cafés, fêtes, associations), soit recommandées par des interviewé·e·s rencontré·e·s dans le cadre de cette enquête. Vingt-et-une de ces personnes ont été rencontrées à au moins deux reprises et, parfois, jusqu’à cinq. J’ai donc suivi une méthode d’échantil- lonnage par boule de neige, en m’efforçant de respecter la diversité de la population étudiée. De ce fait, les individus interrogés appartiennent aussi bien à la génération la plus ancienne des émigrants portugais, arrivés à partir de la fin des années 1950, qu’à la plus récente, venue avec la crise. Ces derniers ont occupé ou occupent toujours pour la plupart des emplois faiblement qualifiés dans le bâtiment, l’industrie et les services, secteurs où s’est historiquement concentrée l’immigration portugaise. Neuf d’entre eux ont toutefois fait des études supé- rieures et gagnent leur vie dans des professions artistiques et de santé, ainsi que dans l’ingénierie et l’encadrement en entreprise. Cet article n’aborde pas toutefois la question des travailleurs détachés, les plus mobiles des migrants, pour lesquels je ne dispose à ce jour que d’un seul cas. On pourra néanmoins lire à ce sujet l’article de Thoemmes (2014). En Île-de-France, les entretiens ont été menés dans des lieux très variés, depuis des loges de concierge à Paris à des maisons dans des lotissements périurbains de la Grande couronne, en passant par des cafés et des logements HLM de la proche banlieue. J’ai rencontré quatre de ces Portugais résidant en Île-de-France dans des manifestations parisiennes du Mouvement des émigrants lésés créé pour protester contre le gel de leur épargne après la faillite de la banque Espírito Santo. Dans la province de Trás- os-Montes, j’ai interviewé dix des dix-neuf interviewés dans la ville de Bragança, son chef-lieu, qu’ils y résident ou soient en vacances dans leur village aux alentours. Reliés presque tous par des liens de parenté ou de voisinage, les neuf autres vivaient ou étaient de passage, l’été, dans un village situé à dix kilomètres de Macedo de Cavaleiros que j’ai choisi d’anonymiser sous le nom Timbaú.

Des situations de plus en plus hétérogènes

La période qui va de 1956 à 1974 représente la principale période de l’immigration portugaise en France (Volovitch-Tavares, 2016). Ces immigrés viennent pour la plupart des zones rurales du nord du pays, où ils travaillaient le plus souvent dans l’agriculture. Dans un ouvrage de référence, Charbit, Hily et Poinard (1997 : 95) ont montré, à partir d’une recherche menée au début des années 1990, que l’inscription dans la sociabilité villageoise, loin d’entraver l’adaptation au pays d’accueil, en est alors, selon leurs termes, le « régulateur ». Les liens avec le village, notamment lors des retours au mois d’août, encadraient la logique toujours individualiste de l’émigration par la prégnance des normes collectives de la société de départ. Les auteurs relevaient toutefois que cet

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équilibre entre l’individu et le groupe villageois, même s’il était encore maintenu et parvenait à s’adapter au changement social, n’en était pas moins fragile. L’émigration massive et l’installation des ruraux dans les zones urbaines avec la modernisation rapide du Portugal ont depuis modifié en profondeur la physionomie des campagnes du nord du pays. Il n’est donc guère surprenant que, un peu plus de deux décennies après cette enquête, le village, sans avoir perdu son rôle de repère pour beaucoup d’immigrés et leurs descendants, n’assure plus la fonction de régulation qu’il jouait pour les villageois partis en France entre la fin des années 1950 et le début des années 19708.

Ni les changements qu’a connus le Portugal avec l’urbanisation de sa population et la désertification des campagnes, ni les conséquences de son entrée dans l’Union européenne et de l’élévation du niveau d’instruction, n’en sont pourtant les seuls facteurs. Les effets en cascade de la crise des années 2000 placent aussi les émigrants portugais dans des situations de plus en plus hétérogènes qui en empêchent aujourd’hui beaucoup, anciennement ou récemment arrivés en France, de pouvoir attribuer un sens à leur projet migratoire en l’insérant dans une histoire collective vécue positivement. La différenciation accrue de l’émigration portugaise

Pour se faire une première idée des effets de la crise sur les Portugais venus en France, intéressons-nous pour commencer aux motifs avancés pour justifier l’émigration. Une difficulté bien connue des études migratoires consiste à identifier les véritables raisons qui ont conduit un individu à émigrer. Face au discours qu’il tient à ce sujet, le chercheur aurait tort, comme il a été abondam- ment établi, de s’en tenir à la valeur faciale des propos exprimés. Ce qui conduit à partir ou à rester au pays tient, dans les faits, à une multiplicité de facteurs qui ne sauraient se réduire à une explication de portée générale du type « Je voulais une vie meilleure ». Quelle que soit l’époque où ils ont quitté le Portugal pour la France, les Portugais n’échappent pas à ce constat. Si l’immense majorité d’entre eux disent avoir émigré dans la perspective de mieux gagner leur vie, leur décision a souvent d’autres motifs qu’il a parfois fallu plusieurs entretiens pour saisir. On apprend ainsi au détour d’une narration que, entre autres témoi- gnages recueillis, « Ma femme ne voulait pas habiter dans la même maison que ma mère », « Mon père était un homme très rude » ou « Je n’étais pas d’accord avec mon frère ». De même, pour les Portugais partis depuis la moitié des années 2000, la décision d’émigrer résulte rarement du seul calcul économique. C’est en effet souvent dans un événement spécifique que l’on attribue ce qui a finalement donné lieu au départ. Il peut s’agir, situations fréquemment mention- nées, d’une remarque désobligeante d’un proche. Maria Helena, vingt-six ans, serveuse dans un restaurant de la banlieue parisienne, décide, par exemple, dans les premiers jours de 2011, de quitter Setúbal après que, sans emploi suite à une formation de prothésiste dentaire, elle entend, lors d’un repas de Noël, ses tantes qui parlaient des « jeunes qui ne se bougent pas comme nous on se bougeait ». C’est pareillement sa femme qui lui dit un jour abruptement « Et toi,

8 Les villages du nord du Portugal n’ont bien sûr rien d’une réalité homogène, certains ayant perdu la quasi-totalité de leurs habitants quand d’autres conservent leur dynamisme ou bénéficient des politiques de développement du tourisme rural. Voir, à ce sujet, Callier-Boisvert (1999).

174 Financiarisation du social et formes d’appartenance qu’est-ce que tu vas faire ? » qui, en 2012, conduit Francisco, trente-sept ans, qui a perdu son emploi de chauffeur routier quatre mois plus tôt, à faire appel à un cousin né en France, lequel l’embauche comme manœuvre dans sa petite entreprise de bâtiment.

La différenciation de l’émigration portugaise n’a certes pas commencé avec la crise des années 20009. Les vicissitudes de l’existence ont conduit beaucoup de ceux arrivés en France dès la fin des années 1950 à s’y installer de façon durable. Une différence majeure distingue toutefois, au vu des propos recueillis, les Portugais partis en France pour fuir la crise dans les années 2000 de ceux des époques précédentes. Elle tient dans la plus grande diversité des situations au moment de l’émigration. Ceux qui venaient de familles de paysans pauvres du nord du Portugal, loin de penser s’établir définitivement à l’étranger, enten- daient revenir une fois passée la perspective d’un long service militaire dans les colonies africaines ou après avoir épargné pour construire une maison, ou acheter de la terre. Or, depuis 2003, la dégradation de l’économie portugaise conduit en France un nombre croissant d’urbains et de travailleurs plus qualifiés, même si ceux-ci n’ont très souvent accès qu’à des emplois requérant un faible niveau de qualification10.

Une recherche récente par questionnaires auprès des Portugais ayant émigré avec la crise a ainsi montré qu’un tiers d’entre eux — 15,6 % dans le cas de ceux résidant en France — n’envisageaient pas de revenir vivre au Portugal (Peixoto et al., 2016). Bien qu’elle porte sur un nombre limité d’individus, les résultats de mon enquête indiquent de même que la perspective du non-retour fait désormais partie de l’ordre des possibles, y compris chez les Portugais installés de longue date en France11 . Les conséquences de la crise reviennent fréquemment dans les raisons avancées à ce sujet. Bien sûr, une campagne d’entretiens réalisés pour la plupart avant que l’économie portugaise ne commence, début 2017, à donner des signes tangibles de redressement ne suffit pas pour indiquer une tendance robuste12. L’incapacité ou la difficulté à envisager une réinstallation au Portugal semble toutefois traduire un changement notable avec la volonté de retour qui

9 Dans une étude historique qui a fait date, Caroline Brettell avait du reste déjà claire- ment établi l’importance des stratégies individuelles et des effets sur les villages du Portugal qu’avait produite, dès le XVIIIe siècle, l’émigration vers le Brésil (Brettell, 1986). 10 Les diplômés de l’enseignement supérieur ne représentent néanmoins qu’à peine plus de 10% des Portugais ayant émigré avec la crise, contrairement à l’idée largement répandue au Portugal d’une « fuite des cerveaux ». L’écho suscité par ce thème doit largement aux médias qui s’appuient pour le relayer sur les résultats de recherches sur l’« émigration qualifiée », beaucoup mieux financées que celles sur d’autres formes d’émigration sans pour autant toujours répondre à des critères de scientificité indiscu- tables. On peut lire à ce propos Gomes (2015), Lopes (2014) et le compte-rendu critique que Pereira donne de ce dernier ouvrage (Pereira, 2015). 11 Dans une enquête par entretiens auprès de Portugais âgés de vingt-cinq à cinquante- cinq ans résidant à l’étranger, Correia a également montré que la grande majorité d’entre eux — vingt-sept sur trente-deux très exactement — ne pensaient revenir vivre au Portugal, en raison principalement du meilleur niveau de vie qu’ils avaient atteint en émigrant (Martins, 2015). 12 Si le gouvernement d’António Costa a annoncé, fin août 2018, des mesures fiscales favorables pour inciter au retour les migrants qualifiés ayant émigré au cours de la période 2010-2015, il est encore trop tôt pour en savoir les effets sur ce flux migratoire.

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avait jusque-là dominé chez les immigrés portugais en France13. Considérons pour cela le projet migratoire qu’ils expriment en tant, comme le définit Ma Mung (2009 : 31), de « projection dans l’avenir ayant ainsi une dimension tempo- relle fondamentale dont le contenu, par là-même, est en redéfinition constante en fonction de l’histoire, des parcours et de l’expérience migratoire ». Qu’ils soient arrivés en France dans les années 1960 ou au début des années 2010, très peu des femmes et des hommes que j’ai rencontrés envisageaient sur le mode de l’évidence de retourner définitivement vivre et travailler au Portugal. José, trente-deux ans, aujourd’hui coffreur dans une petite entreprise de BTP du Val-de-Marne, après avoir travaillé jusqu’en 2010 dans le même secteur à Porto, exprime dans des termes clairs la façon dont il envisage l’avenir :

« Le Portugal est un beau pays, un pays que j’aime beaucoup, un pays que j’aime par- dessus tout, c’est un pays où j’aime toujours aller, un pays où j’ai ma famille, mais c’est un pays foutu, les jeunes n’y ont plus d’avenir. Il n’y a pas de travail, tu payes cher pour te soigner, tu payes cher pour étudier. Je préfère rester en France. La France n’est pas le paradis, mais il y a des choses que je n’aurai jamais au Portugal. Mon fils pourra être bien soigné à l’hôpital, il pourra aller dans une bonne école. »

Amélia, soixante-cinq ans, arrivée en France avec ses parents en 1970, explique de même avoir renoncé, il y a peu, à prendre sa retraite dans le village près de Bragança dont elle est originaire avec son mari. La construction de cette maison à flanc de coteau avait pourtant représenté des années de « sacrifices » pour cette employée de maison et cet agent de maîtrise d’une petite usine de l’Essonne. Pourtant, comme elle le dit :

« Aujourd’hui, il n’y a plus rien au Portugal. Il n’y a que des vieux au village, il n’y a pas de médecin, l’hôpital est loin. On va rester en France. On pensait revenir vivre là-bas, on pensait venir voir nos enfants et nos petits-enfants pour Noël, à Pâques, mais c’est mieux de rester ici, le Portugal a sombré. On a toujours la maison pour l’été, et on sera tous là-bas en août, mais le reste de l’année, c’est mieux de vivre en France. Je n’aurais jamais imaginé que je ne reviendrais pas finir ma vie dans mon pays. » La mise en échec d’une représentation du futur

La crise a en effet brisé une représentation du futur largement partagée où, quelles que soient les difficultés que ces femmes et ces hommes connaissaient sur un plan personnel, le Portugal paraissait inexorablement aller vers un mieux et constituer un lieu où envisager un avenir meilleur14. La Révolution des Œillets, le 25 avril 1974, avait mis fin à la dictature, entraîné la fin de guerres coloniales désastreuses et conduit à des réformes qui avaient vu la situation sociale du pays s’améliorer. En 1986, l’entrée dans la Communauté économique européenne inscrivait le pays dans un ensemble plus large, facilitait la mobilité de ses ressortissants sur le continent et lui ouvrait l’accès à des financements

13 Sur cette question, voir notamment Poinard (1983), ainsi que Domingues dos Santos et Wolf (2010). 14 On lira notamment sur ce point une enquête sociologique récente sur les jeunes nés autour de 2000 (Ferreira, Costa Lobo, Rowland et Rodrigues Sanches, 2017). Ce travail, résultat d’une enquête par questionnaires, montre minutieusement les effets de la crise économique et le contraste entre les représentations et les pratiques de ces jeunes avec celles des générations ayant grandi après la Révolution des Œillets.

176 Financiarisation du social et formes d’appartenance communautaires nécessaires à l’amélioration de ses infrastructures routières15. De 1985 à 2001, un taux de croissance économique moyen supérieur à 3,7 % par an modifie en profondeur les conditions de vie au Portugal, notamment dans les campagnes pauvres dont sont issus la majorité des Portugais venus en France. La perte du sens de l’avenir n’a évidemment rien de spécifique au Portugal ; on l’observe dans de très nombreuses sociétés contemporaines dont elle est une caractéristique majeure (Martuccelli, 2017). Chez les migrants qui ont, un jour ou l’autre, pris le chemin de la France, la force de son impact y a cependant bouleversé le sens que l’on donne au passé, la façon dont on vit le présent et la perception de l’avenir.

Ce changement se manifeste notamment dans les comparaisons auxquelles se livrent les Portugais, installés en France ou revenus au Portugal. Sur un ton grave, beaucoup, notamment chez les plus âgés, se demandent s’ils ne se sont pas trompés en prenant telle ou telle décision à un moment à un autre. Donnons-en un exemple. Hernani et Filomena, soixante-deux et soixante ans respectivement, regrettent par exemple d’être revenus à Macedo de Cavaleiros en 2000, après vingt-deux années passées à Versailles. Leur situation en France s’était pourtant améliorée au fil des années :

« On était bien, on avait un appartement, les filles étudiaient dans une bonne école, on avait une belle voiture, on passait tous les mois d’août au Portugal. »

Un temps employé à la plonge dans un restaurant, Hernani était vite devenu commis de cuisine, avant d’apprendre à faire des pizzas. En travaillant plus de dix heures par jour, six jours par semaine, il gagnait 17 000 francs français (environ 2 600 €) par mois au moment où avec sa femme, qui complétait les revenus du couple en faisant des ménages, ils décident de revenir au Portugal avec leurs deux filles, de seize et treize ans, qui, affirment-ils, faisaient l’admiration de leurs enseignants français. Le refus d’un prêt bancaire qui lui aurait permis de reprendre une pizzeria pour se mettre à son compte est, selon Hernani, à l’origine de sa décision de quitter la France, alors que, comme Filomena tient à le rappeler :

« Moi, je ne voulais pas ! C’est toi qui as voulu. Je ne voulais pas, pour les filles, elles étaient dans une très bonne école. On aurait mieux fait de rester. Ceux qui sont restés sont mieux que nous. »

Quinze ans plus tard en 2015, ils constatent effectivement, non sans amertume, qu’il leur aurait sans doute mieux valu rester à Versailles. Hernani va d’abord perdre ses économies dans une opération immobilière à Porto qui les conduit à « repartir de zéro ». Leurs filles subissent à l’école l’hostilité fréquente dont est l’objet les enfants d’emigrantes (« On est des immigrés en France, et on est des émigrés au Portugal. Les Portugais sont les pires avec les Portugais. ») Le couple ne se décourage pas et ouvre un restaurant avec deux frères d’Hernani, où ces derniers apportent le capital et, sa femme et lui, leurs compétences culi- naires. Après avoir connu un franc succès, l’affaire périclite avec la diminution de la clientèle entraînée par la crise. Il s’ensuit une fâcherie au sein de la fratrie,

15 Santo a également montré que, sans changer la condition d’immigré des Portugais, l’attribution de la citoyenneté européenne était venue renforcer leur place au sein des hiérarchies différenciant les populations immigrées en France (Santo, 2013).

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et Hernani parle, la larme à l’œil, d’une situation dégradée au point de « voir un frère faire trébucher son propre frère ». Hernani et Filomena ont toutefois vite retrouvé du travail, en se mettant au service du restaurant d’un hôtel dont ils sont salariés. En s’épuisant au travail, ils gagnent assez, disent-ils, pour vivre « décemment, […] sans manquer du nécessaire » et soutenir leurs filles, toutes deux sans emploi stable, après avoir fait des études d’infirmière pour lesquelles elles ont dû s’endetter. Filomena estime néanmoins que :

« Heureusement, elles parlent le français, et, si elles le veulent, elles pourront travailler en France. Espérons qu’elles ne feront pas les mêmes erreurs que nous. »

Comme Hernani et Filomena, une grande majorité des Portugais que j’ai rencontrés évaluent leurs parcours en spéculant sur ce qui se serait passé s’ils avaient fait tel ou tel choix à un moment donné et en se comparant à d’autres. Sebastião, vieux garçon de cinquante-sept ans, aurait aimé partir comme l’ont fait ses frères aînés, plutôt que de rester au village travailler la terre avec ses parents aujourd’hui disparus. Ce n’est pourtant pas le fait de ne pas être devenu à son tour un emigrante qui le désole rétrospectivement, car il sait bien, dit-il, que « la vie de l’emigrante est très dure ». C’est bien davantage, selon lui, la tristesse qui s’est abattue sur Trás-os-Montes avec ses villages déserts dix mois sur douze et sa population rurale qui ne bénéficie pas d’un soutien des autorités à la hauteur de ses difficultés. De leur côté, Alberto et Maria da Conceição, respectivement ouvrier qualifié et agent d’entretien dans le Val d’Oise, regrettent à cinquante-neuf ans d’avoir consacré une partie importante de leur épargne à l’achat d’un petit appartement de vacances à Póvoa de Varzim. Leurs enfants, devenus adultes, ne souhaitent plus y aller, et sa valeur a considérablement diminué, au point qu’ils ont renoncé à le vendre. Comme le dit Alberto, « avec l’argent, on pourrait les aider à s’installer en France ». Certains se rassurent évidemment parfois en comparant leur sort avec celui de parents, d’amis d’enfance ou de collègues qui ont connu bien plus mauvaise fortune après être rentrés au Portugal. Les exemples ne manquent pas, mais ils ne permettent jamais bien longtemps de masquer les effets de la crise sur les destins personnels. Qu’il attribue la situation à la politique de l’Union européenne, aux dirigeants politiques portugais et à ses propres choix, l’individu se trouve alors face aux effets d’une crise qui l’empêche de se projeter solidement dans l’avenir. Et, comme on va le voir, sa situation dépend en grande partie de ses appartenances, lesquelles ont souvent été directement affectées par la situation économique, que ce soit pour en réaffirmer la vigueur ou en révéler l’affaiblissement.

Des appartenances mises à l’épreuve

La crise ne correspond pas seulement à une perte du sens de l’avenir pour les émigrants portugais et ceux qui sont restés au Portugal ou sont revenus y vivre. Elle se manifeste aussi dans les groupes de parenté et chez les individus eux-mêmes par une modification des relations sociales et du rapport à soi. Selon les contextes, la crise réactive des formes de solidarité familiale ou éloigne les parents, mais, toujours, elle individualise les individus, en faisant notamment de l’argent un indicateur de la valeur sociale.

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Le prisme des groupes de parenté

La dégradation du contexte socio-économique au Portugal a touché sous des formes diverses de nombreux groupes de parenté dont une partie des membres réside en France. Elle a rendu saillante les différences de réussite et créé des tensions parfois fatales à des parents qui travaillaient ensemble, comme l’a montré l’exemple précédemment cité de la fratrie d’Hernani. Elle a aussi révélé, dans certains cas, les limites de la solidarité interfamiliale et s’est quelquefois traduite par des formes d’exploitation sans vergogne. Felipe et Graça, soixante et quarante-huit ans, arrivés en France en 2003 après que le premier a perdu son emploi de mécanicien à Viseu, racontent, amers, comment des cousins de cette dernière les ont fait travailler sans relâche dans le garage et le restaurant qu’ils tiennent dans l’Aisne. Graça est pourtant renvoyée sans ménagement dès que sa grossesse ralentit sa productivité, et Felipe démissionne deux semaines plus tard après, dit-il, en être venu aux mains avec son cousin de patron. Leurs économies et un prêt à la consommation arraché à une banque leur permettent toutefois d’ouvrir un café à quelques kilomètres de là, sans pour autant qu’ils en tirent des revenus suffisants pour rembourser leur emprunt.

La crise n’a cependant pas révélé que la face sombre des groupes de parenté. Beaucoup de Portugais touchés par la crise ont pu trouver à s’employer en France dans de bonnes conditions dans des entreprises où travaillaient des parents. João, quarante-quatre ans, dit ainsi vouer une éternelle reconnaissance à un cousin de son âge qui lui a proposé de venir travailler à ses côtés dans la pose de plaques chauffantes. Auparavant plâtrier au Portugal, il a appris peu à peu son nouveau métier et fait venir sa femme, qui a trouvé des heures de ménage, et ses deux filles, scolarisées, dit-il, dans « une école bien meilleure qu’au Portugal ». Inês, trente-trois ans, a trouvé une loge de concierge dans le 6ème arrondissement de Paris sur la recommandation de sa tante, elle-même gardienne d’immeuble, qu’un syndic avait sollicité pour lui demander si elle ne connaissait pas quelqu’un pour prendre une place qui se libérait. Née en France, elle est l’aînée d’une fratrie de deux filles et deux garçons. Après avoir passé les vingt-cinq premières années de sa vie dans l’Essonne, elle était repartie au Portugal en 2000 avec ses parents et sa sœur cadette après qu’un accident du travail a rendu son père invalide. Elle y a ouvert un petit commerce dans une bourgade du Nord près du village dont sa famille est originaire et s’est mariée avec Marcos, un ouvrier du bâtiment qu’elle a rencontré dans une fête locale. La baisse de sa clientèle, ajoutée aux difficultés de l’entreprise de son époux, conduit le jeune couple à se saisir de la proposition de la tante d’Inês pour revenir en France. Après avoir pris contact avec un parent éloigné, Marcos trouve rapidement à se faire embaucher sur des chantiers. Aucun n’imagine repartir maintenant qu’ils ont trouvé un équilibre en France. Leurs deux enfants sont d’ailleurs nés à Paris, et ils considèrent qu’ils auront accès à des écoles et un système de santé bien meilleurs qu’au Portugal.

La venue ou le retour en France de Portugais que la crise a conduit à quitter leur pays modifie aussi le regard sur les positions au sein des groupes de parenté. Ce sont fréquemment ceux qui étaient au village au bas de la hiérarchie sociale qui ont émigré et, aujourd’hui, aident à trouver du travail en France. Maria, soixante ans, arrivée en France adolescente, se souvient de son village où, explique-t-elle, « il y avait juste de quoi manger et on avait des souliers en

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carton ». Au cours des dernières années, elle a été régulièrement sollicitée pour accueillir des jeunes sans emploi au Portugal et en a logés plusieurs le temps qu’ils trouvent du travail en France. Elle y voit une parabole de la vie :

« La vie, c’est dur, la vie, c’est comme ça. Vous croyez que tout va bien, parce que vous avez un peu plus, et puis, patatras, tout change, et il vous faut demander à qui vous n’auriez jamais pensé demander. »

Mario, trente-huit ans, a, lui, de son côté, pu se faire embaucher comme soudeur dans une entreprise de l’Essonne après avoir vécu un temps chez son oncle et sa tante, arrivés en France en 1973. Ce sont eux, me dit-il, qui non seulement l’ont hébergé à son arrivée de Porto en 2009, mais l’ont aussi aidé à apprendre des rudiments de français, langue dans laquelle il s’exprime aujourd’hui sans difficultés. Il leur en voue une grande reconnaissance et se demande si, lui, aurait fait ce qu’ils ont fait pour lui pour un neveu qu’il connaissait peu. Son oncle et sa tante, parents de deux enfants handicapés moteurs, ne fréquentaient plus le village depuis de longues années et préféraient passer le mois d’août dans un appartement de Bragança. Mario raconte, presque en colère, les ragots qui circulaient sur leur compte dans la famille :

« Je me rappelle, on disait qu’ils avaient voulu avoir des enfants alors qu’elle [la tante de Mario] savait qu’il y avait des risques, parce qu’il y avait eu des enfants pas normaux dans sa famille à elle. C’est vraiment de la méchanceté, je m’en rends compte. Qu’est-ce que j’aurais fait sans eux ? Je ne serais rien, je n’aurais pas réussi en France. Quand je pense à ce que j’ai pu entendre sur eux, je le dis, j’ai honte, mais pour qui ils se prennent ceux qui les jugeaient comme ça, sans savoir les bonnes personnes qu’ils sont, ce qu’ils ont fait pour moi. »

L’émigration vers la France et la désertification des campagnes du nord du Portugal restent pourtant loin d’avoir mis fin à la casa, que l’on peut traduire par maisonnée, cet élément de base de l’organisation sociale paysanne abon- damment étudié par l’anthropologie sociale (Pina-Cabral, 1986 ; Callier-Boisvert, 1999). Dans les villages de ce monde rural, la casa désigne indissociablement la terre qui permet de vivre et les membres du groupe de parenté qui l’exploitent. Elle correspond souvent à une famille nucléaire, mais aussi au regroupement de plusieurs générations et de proches parents. Les transformations majeures de la société portugaise au cours des dernières décennies se sont certes traduites par une pluralité croissante des formes de vie conjugale et familiale (Aboim et Wall, 2002). La casa elle-même, avec les départs massifs des ruraux vers d’autres pays européens et les grands centres urbains portugais, n’a plus aujourd’hui la centra- lité qu’elle avait autrefois dans la vie villageoise. La crise rappelle néanmoins son importance. Beaucoup de ses membres qui avaient quitté la campagne sont revenus y vivre et prennent leur part aux travaux des champs et à la garde du bétail. Ils trouvent là une forme de reconnaissance et d’insertion dans des réseaux sociaux, à l’instar des vieux agriculteurs (Fragata et Portela, 2000). Il peut s’agir de ceux qui, frappés par le chômage en ville, reviennent participer aux tâches collectives dans leur village d’origine, ou d’anciens émigrants qui, même forts d’une pension de retraite, trouvent une raison sociale, et souvent du plaisir, à se joindre aux activités agricoles. Car, comme l’a montré Laurence Loison sur le rôle de la famille au Portugal, participer à ces activités collectives joue un rôle intégrateur, en permettant l’entretien de liens sociaux (Loison,

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2004). À une dizaine de kilomètres de Macedo de Cavaleiros, le village de Timbaú compte ainsi plusieurs maisonnées où travaillent ensemble dans les champs des hommes et des femmes aux trajectoires bien différentes. Certains n’ont jamais émigré, ou seulement pour de courtes périodes, des émigrants sont revenus vivre sur les lieux de leur enfance, d’autres, sans emploi en ville, se sont rabattus sur le village, et un jeune adulte, qui a grandi en France, y a été envoyé par ses parents après avoir connu des ennuis judiciaires en région parisienne. Les revenus de ces maisonnées ne reposent pas seulement aujourd’hui sur le seul produit du travail agricole, mais sur la combinaison de plusieurs activités (Fiúza, Pinto et Braga, 2014). Ils proviennent aussi des pensions de retraite, souvent incomplètes pour beaucoup de ceux qui n’ont pas cotisé suffisamment longtemps en France, et des aides sociales auxquels un nombre croissant de Portugais ont eu accès après la Révolutions des Œillets de 1974 (Carmo et Barata, 2014). L’essentiel semble pourtant de participer à la vie collective, ponctuée pour les hommes par au moins un passage au café dans la journée. Ceux-ci insistent d’ailleurs, comme António, 64 ans, sur le fait que le travail des champs, s’il alimente surtout une « économie de subsistance » selon lui, requiert d’aller tous les jours aux champs. Ainsi, au nord du Portugal, le village, au-delà de ses transformations, offre toujours à ceux qui n’ont pas rompu avec lui l’occasion de trouver un support identitaire dans une sociabilité organisée à partir des groupes de parenté (Carmo, 2010 ; Afonso, 2013). Il n’empêche que, même réinséré dans l’ordre villageois, l’ancien émigrant conserve généralement des liens avec la France, où il retourne à l’occasion visiter ses enfants qui y vivent et se faire soigner quand, titulaire d’une pension de retraite, il est resté assuré à la sécurité sociale. Les coupes budgétaires qui ont durement touché les services publics au Portugal ont d’ailleurs accentué la différence entre la qualité de l’offre médicale dans le pays, où le coût des soins est souvent élevé, et celle proposée en France, gratuite ou peu onéreuse. La crise, en cela, distingue jusqu’au sein des maisonnées ceux qui disposent de la possibilité de retourner momentanément en France pour entreprendre des soins de ceux qui ne peuvent compter que sur un système de santé que tous jugent profondément déficient, notamment dans les campagnes. Hier et aujourd’hui : ce que gagner de l’argent veut dire

Les recherches en sciences sociales sur l’argent et la parenté ont montré que, contrairement à ce qu’en disait Simmel (1900), l’argent n’est pas un medium neutre facilitant les échanges, mais, selon les contextes où il circule, possède diverses significations culturelles, sociales ou affectives (Zelizer, 1994 ; Dufy et Weber, 2007). Le rapport à l’argent des émigrants portugais de la grande vague d’émigration des années 1960 a également suscité de longue date l’intérêt de nombreux chercheurs (Rocha-Tindade, 1973 ; Moulier, 1981 ; Brettell, 1982 ; Leandro, 1995). Ceux-ci ont documenté l’acharnement au travail, caractérisé par la recherche d’heures supplémentaires dans le bâtiment et les ménages, ainsi que l’importance de l’épargne destinée à l’achat d’une maison et de terres au pays. Ils ont aussi souligné la confiance en soi que procurait la simple posses- sion d’argent liquide pour des ruraux qui avaient jusque-là vécu dans une grande pauvreté et n’avaient jamais connu les joies de la consommation par l’acquisition de biens, signes de statut lors du retour annuel au village. S’ils ont diminué au fur et à mesure que les Portugais prenaient la décision de s’installer durablement en France, ces comportements n’ont pas disparu. Le mois d’août

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reste le mois de vacances qui voient les émigrants dépenser généreusement au pays, recevant parents et amis à leur domicile, sortant en famille au restaurant et exhibant des voitures de marque immatriculées dans le pays où ils résident. De même, les différences de salaire importantes entre la France et le Portugal, où le salaire minimum est de 580 € en 2018 après être resté longtemps juste au-dessus de 500 €, réduisent souvent le pénible sentiment de frustration qu’éprouvaient dans leur pays les Portugais arrivés avec la crise. Dans les bus qui relient la région parisienne et le nord du Portugal, les conversations entre voyageurs qui ne se connaissaient pas tournent rapidement, par exemple, sur les salaires payés en France et ce qu’ils permettront de faire plus tard. Interrogée chez elle dans le 19ème arrondissement de Paris, Margarida, cinquante-deux ans, agent d’entretien dans une école d’une petite bourgade au nord de Porto, a choisi, en 2016, de se mettre en disponibilité pour venir en France avec son mari, de vingt ans son aîné, titulaire d’une petite retraite d’ouvrier. Dans les premiers temps, elle a pu compter sur sa sœur, aujourd’hui concierge, arrivée trente-cinq ans plus tôt, qui avait entendu parler d’une famille de Vaucresson qui cherchait une employée de maison à temps plein. Dans l’école où elle travaillait, Margarida ne supportait plus, explique-t-elle, le mépris social des enseignantes de l’école qui exigeaient de se faire appeler « Docteure ». Elle le vivait d’autant plus mal que, en suivant des cours du soir, elle avait « avec beaucoup de sacrifice » atteint le diplôme de fin d’études secondaires, sans pour autant que cela lui ouvre une quelconque perspective de mobilité au Portugal. Margarida a donc décidé de venir à Paris, où elle accumule les heures de ménage et repasse chez elle des chemises d’homme, un travail dorénavant facilité par l’acquisition d’une centrale à vapeur, un « investissement » selon ses termes. Elle vit maintenant avec son mari et leur fille de vingt-sept ans, arrivée il y a peu et toujours sans emploi, dans un modeste deux-pièces en rez-de-chaussée du 13ème arrondissement. Le Portugal ne lui manque pas, car, insiste-telle :

« Je n’avais pas d’argent pour partir en vacances, je comptais l’argent sou par sou. Aujourd’hui, je ne le gaspille pas, mais si je veux m’acheter un pantalon neuf, je me l’achète. Si je veux acheter des fruits plus chers, je les achète. Si je veux m’acheter quelque chose, je n’en suis pas à me demander si j’ai vingt euros dans le porte-monnaie, alors que, au Portugal, si je dépensais vingt euros pour les courses, alors là, mon Dieu, c’en était fini de mon budget du mois. Il fallait vraiment que je gère très bien pour aller au bout du mois. »

Gagner au prix d’un travail acharné (« Je travaille du matin au soir ; j’aime travailler ») autour de 1 200 euros par mois, soit plus du double de son dernier salaire au Portugal, a donné à Margarida une nouvelle place dans l’économie familiale, puisque c’est désormais de ses revenus que son mari et sa fille dépendent pour vivre à Paris. Elle présente d’ailleurs sa volonté d’émigrer comme le résultat d’une volonté personnelle (« Il ne voulait pas ») et le refus de la vie étriquée qu’elle était contrainte de mener dans son pays d’origine.

Avec l’émigration de masse qu’a connue le nord du Portugal à partir de la fin des années 1950, les campagnes n’ont pas seulement connu, à un rythme accéléré, la monétarisation, ce grand changement qui, au même titre que l’in- dustrialisation et l’urbanisation, a marqué les sociétés occidentales au long du XIXe siècle (De Blic et Lazarus, 2007). Elles ont aussi été touchées très vite par la financiarisation de l’économie qui, dès la seconde moitié des années 1970, a

182 Financiarisation du social et formes d’appartenance conduit beaucoup de ces émigrants, une fois achetée une maison au Portugal, à préférer placer leur épargne dans des produits financiers plutôt que d’acheter des terres16. Les banques commerciales portugaises ont largement stimulé ce processus avec l’assentiment de l’État qui voit l’économie nationale bénéficier de ces transferts d’argent venus de l’étranger (Leeds, 1983 ; Pereira, 2012). En France et au Portugal, leurs camionnettes parcourent les zones où résident les migrants et les familles restées au village, avant que l’ouverture d’agences assure le maillage bancaire dans les deux pays. Comme en France, la bancarisation de la population portugaise entraîne, pour reprendre les termes de Lazarus (2012 : 68), « la naissance d’un nouvel ethos de l’argent ». Lorsque les banques portugaises proposent aux émigrés des taux d’intérêt avantageux pour attirer leur épargne, beaucoup d’entre eux, considérant le rendement que procurent les produits financiers, préfèrent ce type de placements à l’investissement dans l’agriculture et les petites industries locales17. D’autres, encouragés à souscrire des emprunts immobiliers intéressants, achètent à crédit des appartements dans les villes et les stations balnéaires du littoral, espérant sinon en tirer des revenus locatifs, tout au moins se constituer un capital18.

Sans estomper totalement l’attachement aux valeurs rurales chez les émigrants originaires des campagnes, la monétarisation de l’économie, accentuée avec la financiarisation, a néanmoins eu les mêmes effets que partout ailleurs où elle a été observée. Elle a notamment stimulé un processus d’individualisation, en permettant aux individus de se soustraire à l’emprise des liens personnels qui caractérise les groupes régis par le respect d’obligations morales (De Blic et Lazarus, 2007). C’est une des raisons qui au Portugal, hier comme aujourd’hui, vaut aux émigrants d’être l’objet de jalousies de toutes sortes et d’être accusés de ganância, soit de « cupidité ». C’était notamment en ces termes que, au café de Timbaú, les hommes qui étaient restés au village ou y étaient revenus sitôt après avoir accumulé de quoi acheter de la terre, jugeaient, en août 2015, les Portugais qui avaient perdu tout ou partie de leurs économies avec la restructuration de la Banque Espírito Santo. Cette banque commerciale qui, jusqu’en 2014, était pour tous un établissement bancaire sûr, proposait aux Portugais de France des produits financiers aux taux plus élevés que les livrets d’épargne français, en garantissant la disponibilité des revenus placés. La découverte d’irrégularités comptables allait pourtant conduire les autorités portugaises à ne sauver que les actifs jugés sains de la Banque Espírito Santo, en injectant 3,9 milliards d’euros pour créer un nouvel établissement bancaire, la Banque Nouvelle (Banco Novo). L’épargne de près de cinq mille Portugais, installés principalement en France, en Suisse et au Luxembourg, s’en est trouvée gelée, son remboursement n’étant envisagé alors que trois décennies plus tard, soit une catastrophe pour ceux qui comptaient dessus pour leurs vieux jours ou pour aider leurs enfants à financer

16 Dans son étude sur un hameau de Trás-os-Montes, O’Neill a relevé ce moment où, avec l’émigration, l’argent a remplacé la terre comme indicateur du statut socio-écono- mique (O’Neill, 1989 : 63). 17 Entretien avec José Pereira, quatre-vingt-trois ans, ancien gérant d’agence bancaire à Macedo de Cavaleiros, 8 août 2015. 18 Ibid.

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un projet immobilier19. Alors qu’il était apparu très vite que la Banque Espírito Santo avait trompé ses clients en présentant comme des produits d’épargne sûrs des placements financiers risqués, ces derniers ont souvent fait preuve de jugements sévères dans la population portugaise dont une partie a reconnu en eux la figure de l’émigrant âpre au gain. C’est d’ailleurs ce type de réactions, où le mépris l’emporte sur l’indifférence, qui a considérablement affecté les femmes et les hommes qui avaient été trompés par des conseillers bancaires qu’ils connaissaient parfois de longue date. Alfonso, un agent de maîtrise de cinquante-neuf ans arrivé en France depuis presque quarante années, a, dit-il, « tout perdu » maintenant que 120 000 euros placés sont bloqués. Outre le préjudice financier, il en veut au gouvernement portugais qui a, selon lui, fait le choix de « laisser tomber les émigrants qui ont contribué à l’économie » et à ses compatriotes que leur sort amuse ou indiffère :

« Au Portugal, il y a beaucoup d’envie. Les Portugais de là-bas n’aiment pas les émigrants. Ils croient qu’on a la belle vie. Ils ne savent pas comme on a souffert et comme on souffre toujours. Ils croient être les seuls à souffrir avec la crise. »

Les remises d’argent, encouragées par les banques portugaises qui démarchent régulièrement au téléphone les Portugais vivant en France, consti- tuaient en effet une forme de lien entre la population émigrée et son pays d’origine. Le thème de la fidélité au Portugal par la participation au financement de son économie a d’ailleurs fait partie des arguments utilisés par les banques autant à l’époque de la bancarisation des émigrants que lors de la vente de produits financiers par la banque Espírito Santo. Il n’est alors guère surprenant que les membres du Mouvement des émigrants lésés (Movimento dos emigrantes lesados) aient souvent manifesté au Portugal en brandissant des drapeaux français et en criant « Vive la France ! » pour signifier le sentiment d’abandon qu’ils éprouvaient.

La financiarisation n’a de ce fait pas seulement isolé ceux qui pâtissent de l’échec d’une stratégie d’épargne. En plus de mettre une fin brutale au projet de retraite longtemps imaginé, elle modifie également pour ses victimes le rapport au Portugal que, plusieurs décennies durant, ils étaient parvenus à maintenir, coûte que coûte précisément, en confiant leurs économies à une banque de leur pays natal. La crise portugaise illustre terriblement en la manière la « violence sociale de la banque [qui] vient du fait qu’elle disloque le socle des dispositions économiques traditionnelles du capitalisme, n’en propose pas d’autres, et exige en même temps de ses clients une autonomie de gestion, seule capable d’en faire des partenaires commerciaux » (Lazarus, 2012 : 368). Ce n’est pourtant pas, en l’occurrence, la dislocation de la communauté villageoise que provoque la financiarisation ; c’est bien davantage un doute sur la protection que devraient normalement leur assurer les autorités portugaises qu’elle entraîne chez ces porteurs de créances douteuses qui se sentent abandonnés par l’État dont ils sont des ressortissants. Or aucune autre forme d’appartenance ne vient se substituer chez eux à la nationalité. En France, ils se sentent toujours Portugais, parfois près

19 En août 2018, après une importante mobilisation et l’arrivée d’un gouvernement de gauche, des négociations s’étaient néanmoins engagées entre les différentes parties, et les émigrants trompés par la Banque Espírito Santo pouvaient désormais espérer récupérer au moins une partie de l’épargne placée.

184 Financiarisation du social et formes d’appartenance de cinquante ans après avoir émigré. De son côté, l’Union européenne, pourtant longtemps vue comme un horizon heureux par les Portugais, ne suscite pas plus parmi eux d’identification que chez les autres ressortissants de ses États- membres. Beaucoup de ceux qui ont émigré comme de ceux qui sont restés ou sont revenus au pays ne ménagent d’ailleurs pas leurs critiques à son encontre, accusant ses institutions d’avoir précipité le Portugal dans la crise20. Pour eux, gagner en France plus d’argent que dans leur pays d’origine, le dépenser de façon ostentatoire quand ils y reviennent et épargner le plus possible pour réaliser un projet immobilier ici ou là-bas constituent des comportements que l’on retrouve dans les différentes générations. Ceux-ci n’ont néanmoins ni le même sens selon l’âge, ni le même contexte que dans les années 1960. Plus que jamais pourtant, ils révèlent l’importance prise par l’argent gagné dans la valeur sociale d’un individu lorsque diminue la force intégratrice des appartenances dans lesquelles il est engagé.

Conclusion

Pour montrer ce qui se joue aujourd’hui dans les migrations du Portugal vers la France, cet article s’est employé à articuler l’expérience migratoire avec ce qu’émigrants et anciens émigrants vivent dans l’un et l’autre pays. Nous avons insisté sur les effets de la crise et de la financiarisation du social au Portugal pour comprendre les pratiques de ces émigrants portugais, hier et d’aujourd’hui. On rejoint ici le souci de Waldinger (2015 : 184) de considérer le domaine des migrations internationales comme un « champ d’étude spécifique », capable de rendre compte conjointement de dynamiques qui relèvent aussi bien de l’étude de l’émigration que de l’étude de l’immigration, domaines dialoguant peu dans les faits. C’est pourquoi il s’est agi, pour nous, d’analyser ce qui continue à rapprocher l’émigrant de son pays d’origine et ce qui l’en distancie au fil du temps.

Car, en dépit de la proximité géographique du Portugal et la facilité de s’y rendre, les Portugais et les descendants de Portugais connaissent cette distan- ciation progressive produite par le temps. Réalisée en 2008 et 2009, l’enquête Trajectoires et Origines (TeO) a produit à ce sujet un résultat contre-intuitif particulièrement intéressant. En effet, les immigrés européens en France, parmi lesquels les Portugais, se rendent plus fréquemment dans leur pays d’origine que les immigrés non européens, tout en ayant un plus faible taux d’activités transnationales, entendues au sens d’activités économiques, politiques, culturelles ou religieuses pratiquées au-delà des frontières de l’État où réside un immigré21. Or les Portugais constituent à cet égard un cas emblématique. La baisse du coût des transports aériens a facilité les courts séjours au Portugal, et sa vie moins chère, associée à la certitude d’un été ensoleillé, entretient aujourd’hui encore l’habitude de passer le mois d’août au Portugal, en partie ou en totalité dans une maison familiale dans le village d’origine. Pourtant, les activités proprement

20 L’analyse économique donne une vision beaucoup moins tranchée de l’entrée du Portugal dans l’Union européenne, et plus particulièrement dans la zone euro. Le rempla- cement de l’escudo par l’euro a certes coïncidé avec le début d’une décennie de faible croissance et de divergence avec l’Union européenne, mais l’appartenance du Portugal à la zone euro a également contribué à protéger son économie. Voir à ce sujet Aguiar- Conraria, Alexandre et Correia de Pinho (2012). 21 Voir Beauchemin, Lagrange et Simon (2015).

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transnationales des Portugais restent limitées et ont déclinées avec les jeunes générations qui ne cherchent plus à utiliser l’essentiel de leur épargne au pays.

Depuis les années 2000, l’intensité de la crise a par ailleurs oblitéré la possibilité d’une retraite tranquille au pays pour les émigrants, insécurisé ceux d’entre eux qui y ont leur épargne et limité les perspectives d’avenir des jeunes générations. De ce fait, l’emigrante portugais s’apparente plus à un entrepreneur de soi-même malgré lui qu’à l’individu audacieux qui, comme autrefois, affirmait son individualité en restant lié à son village.

À ce titre, les questions migratoires qui concernent le Portugal constituent un analyseur des effets des politiques néo-libérales susceptibles de contribuer aux discussions sur l’Europe. On ne peut cependant que regretter le faible intérêt pour ce pays, surtout si l’on compare la place qu’occupent ses problématiques dans le débat académique international par rapport à celles des États de l’Europe de l’Est anciennement socialistes ou de ceux de l’Europe du Sud touchés par l’arrivée massive de migrants non européens (Ther, 2016 ; Krastev, 2016).

Références bibliographiques Aboim Sofia, Wall Karin (2002) Tipos de família em Portugal: interacções, valores, contextos, Análise social, 37 (163), pp. 475-506. Afonso Ana Isabel (2013) Sendim. Planalto mirandês. Valores em mudança no final do século XX, Lisboa, Edições Colibri, 266 p. Aguiar-Contraria Luís, Alexandre Fernando, Correia de Pinho Manuel (2012) O euro e o crescimento da economia portuguesa: uma análise contrafactual, Análise Social, 203 (47), pp. 298-321. Almeida Aníbal (2008) Les Portugais en France à l’heure de la retraite, Paris, Éditions Lusophone, 535 p. Amaro Rogério R. (1985) Ei-los que voltam: problemas e desafios do regresso dos emigrantes, Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais, 15/16/17, pp. 351-373. Baganha Maria Ioannis, Marques José Carlos, Góis Pedro (2005) International migration from and to Portugal: what do we know and where are we going?, in Klaus F. Zimmermann Ed., European Migration. What do we Know?, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 415-457. Beauchemin Cris, Lagrange Hughes, Simon Patrick (2015) Liens transnationaux et intégration : entre ici et là-bas, in Cris Beauchemin, Christine Hamel et Patrick Simon Éds., Trajectoires et origines. Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France, Paris, INED Éditions, pp. 87-115. Branco Jorge Portugal (2013) Implantação geográfica dos portugueses em França: evolução observada entre 1990 e 2009, Sociologia, 26, pp. 209-226. Brettell Caroline B. (1995) We Have Already Cried Many Tears. The Stories of Three Portuguese Migrant Women, Prospect Heights (Illinois), Waveland Press, Inc. Brettell Caroline B. (1986) Men who Migrate, Women who Wait. Population and History in a Portuguese Parish, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 356 p.

186 Financiarisation du social et formes d’appartenance

Brubakers Roger (2002) Ethnicity without groups, Archives européennes de sociologie, 43 (2), pp. 163-189. Callier-Boisvert Christine (1999) Soajo entre migrations et mémoire. Études sur une société agro-pastorale à l’identité rénovée, Paris, Centre culturel Calouste Gulbenkian, 317 p. Candeias Pedro, Góis Pedro, Marques José Carlos e Peixoto João (2014) Emigração portuguesa: bibliografia comentada (1980-2013), Socius Working Papers, 1, [online]. URL: http://www.ces.uc.pt/myces/UserFiles/livros/1097_WP01.2014.pdf Carmo Renato M. (2010) A agricultura familiar em Portugal: rupturas e continui- dades, Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural, 48 (1), pp. 9-22. Carmo Renato M. y Barata André (Eds.) (2014) Estado social. De todos para todos, Lisboa, Edições tinta-da-china, 248 p. Castles Stephen (2011) Migration, crisis, and the global labour market, Globalizations, 8 (3), pp. 311-324. Charbit Yves, Hily Marie-Antoinette et Poinard Michel (1997) Le va-et-vient identitaire. Migrants portugais et villages d’origine, Paris, PUF/INED, 144 p. Cordeiro Albano (1989) Le paradoxe de l’immigration portugaise, Hommes et Migrations, 1123, pp. 25-32. De Blic Damien et Lazarus Jeanne (2007) Sociologie de l’argent, Paris, La Découverte, 128 p. Domingues dos Santos Manon et Wolf François-Charles (2010) Pourquoi les immigrés portugais veulent-ils tant retourner au pays ?, Économie&Prévision, 195-196, pp. 1-14. Dos Santos Irène (2013) L’émigration au Portugal, avatar d’un pays « semi-péri- phérique », métropole postcoloniale, Hommes et migrations, 1302, pp. 157-161. Dos Santos Irène (2010) Les « brumes de la mémoire ». Expérience migratoire et quête identitaire de descendants de Portugais de France, Thèse de doctorat, EHESS, 497 p. Dufy Caroline et Weber Florence (2007) L’Ethnographie économique, Paris, La Découverte, 128 p. Ferreira Vítor Sérgio, Costa Lobo Marina, Rowland Jussara e Rodrigues Sanches Edalina (2017) Geração Milénio? Um retrato social e politico, Lisboa, Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 171 p. Fiúza Ana L., Pinto Neide M. e Braga Gustavo B. (2014) Os modos de vida dos agricultores pluriativos nas aldeias minhotas do noroeste de Portugal, Ciência rural, 12, pp. 2279-2285. Fragata António e Portela José (2000) Agricultores idosos de Trás-os-Montes: exclusão e reconhecimento, Análise social, 35 (156), pp. 721-737. Gomes Rui M. (2015) Fuga de cérebros. Retratos da emigração portuguesa, Lisboa, Bertrand, 296 p. Green Nancy L. (2002) Repenser les migrations, Paris, PUF, 139 p. Hily Marie-Antoinette et Oriol Michel (1993) Deuxième génération portugaise : la gestion des ressources identitaires, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 9 (3), pp. 81-93.

187 Dominique Vidal

King Russell (2002) Towards a new map of European migration, International Journal of Population Geography, 8, pp. 89-106. Krastev Ivan (2016) After Europe, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 128 p. Lazarus Jeanne (2012) L’épreuve de l’argent. Banques, banquiers, clients, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 418 p. Leandro Maria-Engracia (1995) Au-delà des apparences. Les Portugais face à l’insertion sociale, Paris, CIEMI-L’Harmattan, 350 p. Leeds Anthony (1983) Agricultura, política nacional, subdesenvolvimento e migração em três regiões de Portugal, Análise Social, 19 (77-78-79), pp. 1023- 1043. Lillo Natacha (2014) L’immigration européenne en France, angle mort de la recherche, in Migrations et mutations de la société française. L’état des savoirs, Paris, La Découverte, pp. 85-93. Loison Laurence (2004) La famille-providence au Portugal. Faire face aux consé- quences du chômage, European Journal of Sociology, 45 (2), pp. 189-205. Lopes José T. (2015) Socialização e percursos (e)migratórios em Portugal: uma análise a partir de retratos sociológicos, Revista Cadernos de educação, 51, pp. 1-21. Lopes José T. (2014) Geração Europa? Um Estudo sobre a Jovem Emigração Qualificada para França, Lisboa, Mundos sociais, 105 p. Ma Mung Emmanuel (2009) Le point de vue de l’autonomie dans l’étude des migrations internationales : « penser de l’intérieur » les phénomènes de mobilité, in Françoise Dureau et Marie-Antoinette Hily Éds., Les mondes de la mobilité, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, pp. 25-38. Martins Gabriela (2015) Motivações para um eventual regresso de emigrantes, Revista Migrações, 12, pp. 39-67. Martuccelli Danilo (2017) La condition sociale moderne. L’avenir d’une inquié- tude, Paris, Gallimard, 768 p. Moulier Yann (1981) Les Portugais, in Jean-Pierre Garson et Georges Tapinos Éds., L’argent des immigrés. Revenus, épargne et transferts de huit nationalités immigrées en France, Paris, PUF, pp. 173-218. O’Neill Brian (1989) Célibat, bâtardise et hiérarchie sociale dans un hameau portugais, Études rurales, 113-114, pp. 37-86. Oriol Michel (1985) L’ordre des identités, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 1 (2), pp. 171-185. Oriol Michel (1981) Bilan des études sur les aspects culturels et humains des migrations internationales en Europe occidentale, 1918-1979, Strasbourg, Fondation européenne de la science, 232 p. Paradiso Maria (2018) Mediterranean Mobilities: Europe’s Changing Relationships, E-Book (ISBN: 3319896318), 221 p. Peixoto João, Marques José Carlos, Góis Pedro, Oliveira Isabel T., Azevedo Joana e Malheiros Jorge (2016) Regresso ao futuro: a nova emigração e a sociedade portuguesa, Lisboa, Gradiva.

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Pereira Victor (2016) Um estudo sobre a jovem emigração qualificada, Análise social, l (3), pp. 668-671. Pereira Victor (2012) La dictature de Salazar face à l’émigration. L’État portugais et ses migrants en France, Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 456 p. Pina-Cabral João (1986) Sons of Adam, Daughters of Eve. The Peasant Worldview of the Alto Minho, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 304 p. Pires Rui P. e Santo Inês E. (2016) Saldos migratórios 2000-2013, OEm Fact Sheets, Lisboa, Observatório da Emigração, CIES-IUL, ISCTE-IUL. Poinard Michel (1983) Emigrantes portugueses: o regresso, Análise social, 19 (75), pp. 29-56. Rocha-Trindade Maria Beatriz (1973) Immigrés portugais. Observation psycho- sociologique d’un groupe de Portugais dans la banlieue parisienne (Orsay), Lisboa, Ed. Instituto superior de ciências sociais e política ultramarina, 162 p. Rygiel Philippe (2007) Le temps des migrations blanches. Migrer en Occident (1850-1950), Paris, Aux lieux d’être, 208 p. Santo Inês E. (2013) Du clandestin au citoyen européen. Quand les immigrés portugais font figure de travailleurs (France, 1962), Thèse de doctorat, EHESS. Silva Marta (2011) Os trilhos da emigração. Redes clandestinas de Penedono a França (1960-1974), Lisboa, Colibri. Simmel Georg (1987 [1900]) Philosophie de l’argent, Paris, PUF. Ther Philipp (2016) Europe Since 1989. A History, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 440 p. Thoemmes Jens (2014) Le travail détaché. Le cas des travailleurs portugais dans le secteur de la construction en France, Les mondes du travail, 14, pp. 39-55. Tilly Chris (2011) The impact of the economic crisis on international migration: a review, Work, Employment, and Society, 25 (4), pp. 675-692. Volovitch-Tavares Marie-Christine (2016) 100 ans d’histoire des Portugais en France, Paris, Michel Lafon, 190 p. Volovitch-Tavares Marie-Christine (1995) Portugais à Champigny, le temps des baraques, Paris, Autrement, 155 p. Waldinger Roger (2015) The Cross-Border Connection. Immigrants, Emigrants and their Homelands, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 240 p. Wihtol de Wenden Catherine (2016) Migrations, une nouvelle donne, Paris, FMSH Éditions, 184 p. Zelizer Viviana (2005 [1994]) La Signification sociale de l’argent, Paris, Seuil, 348 p.

189 Résumé - Abstract - Resumen

Dominique Vidal Financiarisation du social et formes d’appartenance. Les émigrants portugais en France et la crise de 2008

Cet article examine plusieurs effets de la crise de 2008 sur les émigrants portugais en France. Il montre d’abord la complexification des flux entre les deux pays et le changement du sens donné au projet migratoire par les émigrants d’hier et d’aujourd’hui. Il s’intéresse ensuite aux conséquences de la crise sur différentes formes d’appartenance. Il souligne comment la crise modifie les liens sur un mode spécifique qui est l’aboutissement des nombreux changements qu’a connus le Portugal, notamment la financiarisation du social. Financialization of the Social and Forms of Belonging. The Portuguese Emigrants in France and the 2008 Crisis

This article examines several effects of the 2008 crisis on Portuguese emigrants in France. First, it shows the complexification of flows between the two countries and the change in meaning given to the migration project by yesterday and today’s emigrants. Second, it analyzes the consequences of the crisis on different forms of belonging. It underlines how the crisis modifies ties in a specific way that is the culmination of the many changes that Portugal has undergone, notably the financialization of the social. Financierización de lo social e formas de pertenencia. Los emigrantes portugueses en Francia y la crisis de 2008

Este artículo examina varios efectos de la crisis de 2008 en los emigrantes portugueses en Francia. Muestra, en primer lugar, la complejidad de los flujos entre los dos países y el cambio en el significado dado al proyecto de migración por los emigrantes de ayer y hoy. Luego está interesado en las consecuencias de la crisis sobre las diferentes formas de pertenencia. Subraya cómo la crisis modifica los vínculos de una manera específica que es la culminación de los muchos cambios que Portugal ha experimentado, en particular la financiariza- ción de lo social.

190 REMi Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 2019, 35 (1 & 2), pp. 191-214

Securitization Theory and the Relationship between Discourse and Context: A Study of Securitized Migration in the Canadian Press, 1998-2015 Elsa Vigneau1

Securitization theory, as initially developed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies (Waever, 1989 and 1995; Buzan et al., 1998) and subsequently reconceptualized as sociological by Balzacq (2011), elaborates the insights that fundamental distinctions can be made between a social object or condition, a political problem and a security problem, and that no object is essentially (i.e. before any social interaction) a security threat. Hence, it offers an interesting alternative to the traditional dual conception of security as both an objective (security as the absence of threat to a referent object) and subjective condition (security as the absence of fear that the object be attacked) (Wolfers, 1952: 485) and proposes an understanding of security as the result of intersubjective interactions between social agents. The security status of an object is neither predefined nor permanent, it is continually constructed by the two-way relationship between agents claiming to have authority to assert the security quality of an issue (securitizing agents) and agents determining the issue of this security move by deciding to comply to it or to reject it (audiences), in a specific context. Security rests between the agents rather than in any innate threatening quality of the object. The concept of securitization can therefore be defined as the intersubjective process, intentional or unintentional, by which an object is, through the combined effect of discourse, practices and context, constituted as a security issue requiring the prompt use of defense or control mechanisms, or, more simply, as the process by which a security problem comes into being.

Following Buzan, Waever and De Wilde (1998: 25), we understand the specific character of security as relying on three distinctive features: the existential quality of the identified threat, a sense of urgency and the necessity to undertake exceptional measures to tackle the said threat. The process of securitization can be distinguished from that of politicization, which refers to the process by which an object is acknowledged as subject to public deliberation and enters the field

1 Recent graduate from the MA in Applied Political Studies, Université de Sherbrooke, 2500 boul. de l’Université, Sherbrooke, Canada; [email protected]

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of public policy action. Securitizing an issue is a particular way of turning it into a political problem, which involves the presence of the aforementioned criteria (survival, urgency and exception). It is simultaneously an extreme form of politicization (one that calls for a specific register of policy responses, that is, security measures, which often imply the use of force and restriction of civil liberties) and its functional opposite (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-29). Indeed, if the politicization of an issue means its opening to policy debate, its securitization implies, more often than otherwise, its withdrawal of public space by calling to different kinds of emergency actions and secrecy precautions. Security is not only a state or a feeling, it represents a distinct field of state and non-state action, administered by designated actors: armed forces, police forces, secret services, private security firms, and so on (Bigo, 2002: 75). It is a special kind of politics that allow, on the ground of urgency, the breaking of the regular rules of politics.

An object can — at a given time and place — be situated in different places on a contiguum2 ranging from non-politicized (the object is not a subject of public debate, but rather considered a technical or personal matter), to politicized (it is open to debate and invest the agenda of public policy), then securitized (it is conceived as an existential and imminent threat, requiring prompt and exceptional action) (Buzan et al., 1998: 23). Politicization and securitization are distinct processes, calling for distinct coping mechanisms. However, they are neither mutually exclusive nor linked in a linear manner; an object can simultaneously be politicized and securitized as it can be securitized without being previously politicized and de-securitized without being in return politicized (Bourbeau, 2013b). In a similar fashion, recent developments in the field (McInnes and Rushton, 2011: 117; Bourbeau, 2011: 42; Lupovici, 2014: 405) point to further consideration of variation in scale of securitization, which can vary in intensity over time (intra-case variation), across cases (inter-case variation) and between audiences within the same spacetime frame (multi-level securitization). Securitization is neither a finite nor irreversible state of affairs: it is a highly relational process in constant need of reaffirmation and can always be intensified or minimized. While an accumulation of security moves can accentuate the degree of securitization of an object, repeated de-securitization moves or considerable decrease in the frequency or strength of security utterances can result in its relative de-securitization. However, de-securitization, defined as the process by which securitization is reversed and an issue is moved out of the threat-defense sequence (Buzan et al., 1998: 29), is not a perfect mirror reflection of securitization. The two processes are said to be in fact asymmetrical, a circumstance that Swarts and Karakatsanis explain by a security bias in the human psyche, which makes it easier to become afraid than to return to a feeling of safety once scared (2013: 109). Securitization is hence apprehended as inducing a certain pressure toward inertia (once an object is recognized as dangerous, its security framing tends to persist in time) and, moreover, as provoking a domino effect pushing towards continual intensification.

2 The term is coined by Bourbeau (2013, 136) to render the non-linearity of the relationship between politization and securitization and their possible spatial and temporal overlap. In contrast, the term of continuum, while accounting for the unlimited number of levels between established stages, evokes a linear progression between these points.

192 Securitization Theory and the Relationship between Discourse and Context

With this comes the problem of the temporal unfolding of securitization: How does the securitization of an object progress over time? Providing that it intensifies, does it follow a linear trend? This question is intimately linked to an important theoretical debate of securitization literature: that of the underlying driving logic of securitization (Bourbeau, 2014). It opposes those who, loyal to the framework designed by the Copenhagen School, understand securitization as following a logic of exception, which focuses on the punctual security performances of agents during key moments, to those who comprehend it as responding to a logic of routine and think security as a routine process repro- duced in everyday discourse and practices. Bigo, whose work emphasis the role of security professionals and their continuous struggle to reproduce the need for their own expertise and position as providers of protection, is a strong advocate of the latter. He contends that security is not about survival nor urgency, but rather represents a mode of governmentality depending on the diffusion of a growing sense of insecurity and social unease (Bigo, 2002).

While most empirical work tends to emphasize one logic or the other, we seek to reconcile them by inscribing both logics in a sole framework. Drawing on the suggestion made by Bourbeau of a cohabitation and complementarity of the two logics, we contemplate the possibility that securitization be operating concurrently in exception and in routine. Only then, he argues, will we be able to account for elements of both continuity and change in securitization process (Bourbeau, 2014: 6).

In a preliminary assessment (Figure 1), we foresee three alternative scenarios for the temporal deployment of securitization: 1) a security discourse occurring solely in conjunction with exceptional events offering windows of opportunity for security endeavor (logic of exception), 2) a security discourse following a linear intensification trajectory (logic of routine) and 3) a middle option showing a general increase coupled with growth peaks associated with significant events. These scenarios, which attempt to visually summarize the different approaches found in the literature, are however provisional and will be revised in view of the results of this research.

Figure 1: Securitization over time

On another note, we would like to put forward a deconstruction of securitization in three analytical levels: 1) the agents, 2) their actions and 3) the context. The first level refers to who plays a role in the securitization process. It can be subdivided in two functional categories: securitizing agents and audiences. The term of “securitizing agent” designate the agent who formulates — in words or acts — a security move, asserting the danger conveyed by an object (Bourbeau,

193 Elsa Vigneau

2013a: 23). Securitization studies have generally recognized three main types of securitizing agents: political agents, bureaucratic agents and media agents. This list is however non-exhaustive: the definition of securitizing agent heavily relies on the notions of authority and social power (Buzan et al., 1998: 31) since they impact the credibility of its move and its chances of success and remains in principle an open category. Similarly, the audience, which is responsible for the acceptance or rejection of the security move, is not a fixed entity. Its composition is defined by the internal context of the security interaction. Besides, it is multiple and can be desegregated in plural audiences depending on its current composition, be it decision-makers, security specialists, academics or the general population (Léonard and Kaunert, 2011: 61-67). We advocate here for an understanding of securitizing agent and audience as functions rather than identities. In that regard, the same individual or institution can act both as a securitizing agent and an audience, performing a security act while being currently influenced by those of other agents. For this reason, it appears little useful to try to pinpoint the sole or main responsible of securitization, let alone to understand its intentions. It is its actions rather than the agent itself which ought to be placed at the center of securitization analysis. The actions relevant in the context of securitization analysis are: the discourse or material practices of the securitizing agents and the moral or formal support of the audiences. The audience may grant (or not), explicitly or implicitly, two types of support to the security move: moral support or, if the audience is an institution with direct causal link to the proposed action, formal support (Balzacq, 2011: 9). Finally, the context in which these actions take place is constituted of events, sedimented practices, that is, practices that do not anymore pertain to the exceptional but have been integrated to the security infrastructure (Buzan et al., 1998: 205), and dominant ideas, which are understood as a diffuse set of beliefs, values and ideals that dominate and structure public thinking in a given society at a given time (Nossal et al., 2015: 135). The context is in a co-dependent relationship with the agent’s actions: it facilitates or constrains the security move, but a successful security move modifies the context.

As stated above, we understand discourse, practices and context as the three equally important and mutually constituted driving components of securitization process. It is by their combined effect that securitization happens. Context plays, as reminded by Balzacq (2011) and Bourbeau (2011: 98), a fundamental role in securitization, which has been, comparatively to discourse and material practices, little explored by scholars of securitization. We consequently intend to tackle the question of the role of context in securitization by observing its interaction with discourse in the context of an original empirical study on the securitization of one peculiar issue: immigration.

The concept of securitization has been applied to a large range of objects, spanning from nuclear proliferation (Buzan, 2008: 556) to environmental degradation (Floyd, 2010) or HIV/AIDS (McInnes and Rushton, 2011). While in principle perfectly apt to study traditional (i.e. military) security issues, more often than otherwise has it been used to study how non-traditional security issues are framed as security threats (Lupovici, 2014: 401). Amongst these “new” threats, migration is one of the primary thematic focus of securitization studies. An abundant body of literature — which almost represents an autonomous sub-field of securitization studies — has proliferated around the common purpose of understanding the process by which the

194 Securitization Theory and the Relationship between Discourse and Context movement of people across national borders is integrated into a field of practices centered on defense and control (Messina, 2014: 531; Bourbeau, 2013a: 22).

Throughout this paper, we examine the security framing of immigration in two Canadian newspapers with important readership. The Canadian case appears as particularly interesting for three reasons. First, its immigration policy has been singularly little studied in the light of securitization theory. Securitization theory being essentially European-centered regarding its academic institutionalization as much as its empirical focus (Lupovici, 2014: 391), the selection of a case external to the European continent yield strong interest in terms of empirical confrontation of theoretical developments. The consistency of European-driven conclusions with patterns observed elsewhere is indeed promising when attempting to infer a general trend. Secondly, it presents original demographic, historic and geographic features: its low population density and slowing population growth, its historical reliance, as a European colonized country, on external population influx and its relative geographical isolation, which resulted in the curious combination of a large-scale yet highly selective immigration policy. Due to geographic, economic and cultural proximity to the United States, Canada is, finally, especially likely to have been affected by the attacks of September 11, 2001, thereby permitting us to test empirically the hypothesis of a strong impact of this event on immigration representations. The extended timeframe, which covers an 18-year period, allows us to place security discourse in its broader historical context, in order to capture the ups and downs of its temporal evolution. The choice to study media discourse rather than political or bureaucratic discourse or practices is external to this article. Amid scholarly work addressing securitized migration in the Canadian context, we find certain gaps and contradictions concerning the role of media in the process. While Bourbeau, in a study of editorials published by La Presse and The Globe and Mail over the period 1989-2005, finds little to no evidences of media security moves (2011: 81-90), others have in different occasions recorded strong and frequent security utterances emanating from the Canadian press (Bauder, 2008: 289; Ibrahim, 2005: 173; Bradimore and Bauder, 2011: 647). This object has thus been chosen first and foremost to enlighten a case-specific debate related to the role played by media agents in the securitization process taking place in Canada. It however nicely serves the purposes of the present demonstration by allowing us to develop an empirical and quantitatively computable indicator of securitized migration, which facilitates comparative assessment over time. In contrast, it is rather harder to provide such indicator for material security practices, which can take various forms (e.g. legislation, international agreements, administrative directives, increase in resource allocation, stricter enforcement of existing rules), making it difficult to weight them one against the other.

While the current trend of securitizing immigration in Canada is mainly understood as having arisen in the aftermath of the Cold War as a result of growing human mobility joint to the disappearance of the bipolar superpower clash formerly structuring the global security environment (Bourbeau, 2013a: 21; Ibrahim, 2005: 167; Bigo, 2002: 77), there is also a largely shared assumption that it has been further intensified following the events of September 11, 2001 (Antonius et al., 2007; Ibrahim, 2005: 173; Messina, 2014: 531-532). However, we find in the existing literature little empirical evidence to support the claim of a lasting effect of the 9/11 attacks on the securitization of immigration.

195 Elsa Vigneau

In another portion of our work (Vigneau, 2017), we have demonstrated that both La Presse and the National Post have contributed, by regularly including security statements in articles dealing with immigration, to construct this object as a security threat to Canada over the period 1998-2015. They have both played a part in the process of securitizing migration to Canada and can on that account be understood as securitizing agents. In this paper, we pursue the following questions: How does the security discourse of the two newspapers fluctuate over time? Is immigration increasingly depicted as posing an imminent threat to the physical well-being of the Canadian state or its population? How do the security moves of the media interact with context? Is the intensification of security discourse related to the occurrence of major migratory events? The goals of this article are thus three-fold: 1) First, it aims to produce empirical data on the saliency of security discourse on immigration in the Canadian press over an eighteen-year period. 2) Then, it investigates the strength of the relationship between major events and the frequency of security moves in the written press. 3) Finally, it intends to inform the debate between the proponents of a logic of exception and those of a logic of routine by establishing if the variations in the frequency of security discourse in La Presse and the National Post respond to exceptional impulses or rather operate in a linear way. Besides the question of context, it thus also deals with the issues of intensity and temporal unfolding of securitization.

Research Design

To achieve these goals, our first task rests in the generation of reliable data reporting on the security framing of immigration by the written press for the concerned time span. These data constitute the prime material of this empirical inquiry into securitized migration. The chief research strategy employed for this matter is that of a thematic content analysis of a set of 4,464 newspaper articles published by La Presse (n=1,203) and the National Post (n=3,261) on the topic of international immigration to Canada between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 2015. These articles, all available online, were located through an automated keyword search in the Eureka.cc and Canadian Newsstand search engines. The databases were searched for all news articles, editorials, columns, op-eds or letters to the editor from the two newspapers containing in their headline or lead paragraph the words “migrant”, “immigrant”, “immigration”, “refugee”, “asylum seeker”, “asylum claimant”, and their declensions and equivalents in French. A preliminary reading then permitted to identify and retrieve only those articles actually dealing with immigration to Canada.

The choice to include both news articles and opinion pieces directly relates to our conceptualization of the securitizing agent as a function, which urges us to avert a focus on the agent itself and its intentions for the benefits of an indiscriminate analysis of the content it produced. May its role be active (when expressing his own opinions) or passive (when relaying the words of another agent), we reckon that the media agent, when naming immigration a public safety problem and contending that it be swiftly addressed by the security apparatus of the state, acts as a securitizing agent in the immigration field, and that, thanks to its power as primary provider of information and its consequent role of selection and framing of the news. As such, it is not only the standpoints

196 Securitization Theory and the Relationship between Discourse and Context deliberately promoted by the newspapers that interest us, but rather the entire content published within their pages and to which the readers are exposed.

The two newspapers were selected on account of: 1) their status of national newspaper, 2) the size of their readership, 3) their geographical location, 4) their language of publication, and 5) their ideological leaning. The criterions of language and geography were deemed especially important with regards to the division of the Canadian population, and, incidentally, newspaper readership, in two major linguistic communities, which are in turn geographically segregated, with the French-speaking population mainly concentrated in the province of Quebec. La Presse is, between 1998 and 2015, the most widely read French- Canadian newspaper. While being mostly distributed in Quebec, the Montreal- based newspaper is available to francophone communities across Canada. It is generally regarded as close to the Liberal Party of Canada. The National Post stands as the second biggest national daily in Canada3. The conservative English-written newspaper, headquartered in Toronto (Ontario), is distributed all over Canada. Since it pertains to Postmedia Network Canada Corporation, a press conglomerate owning prominent west-located papers such as The Vancouver Sun and the Calgary Herald, it also regularly relays articles from other dailies of the network, thus reflecting, unlike La Presse which mainly embodies Francophone Quebec, the particularities of Canada’s western provinces. Taken together, these two daily sheets provide an interesting overview of the divergent realities of Eastern and Western Canada, of the French-English duality and of the liberal and conservative political ideologies. The sampling period was designed to include the events of September 11, 2001, regarded by many as a major turning point in securitizing migration to the North American continent, as well as a buffer period before this event making it possible to isolate its impact. The year 1998 also marks the beginning of a period of intensive public questioning of Canada’s immigration legislation, which culminates in 2001 with the passing of Bill C-11, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, into law.

Once the corpus assembled, we proceeded with the content analysis and the coding operation at its core. Each of the articles was systematically read and searched for the presence in its midst of a security move on immigration, based on the coding instructions specified in table 1. It was then assigned a binary value, 1 when containing a security discourse and 0 when exempt of it. Following the coding instructions, an article was coded as comprising a security discourse when it either made an overt reference to physical danger or crime or to the actual or planned use of control and defense measures. The security narrative can be divided in two categories of tone: positive (when asserting that immigration is a security problem requiring the prompt adoption of security measures) and negative (when negating the danger conveyed by immigration or the necessity of security responses). Both sub-categories were however regarded as manifestations of security discourse when coding the main variable.

3 In 2015, the biggest Canadian national newspaper in terms of circulation is the Globe and Mail, with an average weekly print of 2,018,923 copies, against 1,116,647 for the National Post (News Media Canada, 2015). Initially comprised in our sample, it was finally excluded because of time constraints. Its exclusion however permitted us to respect at best the criteriums of geography, language and ideology.

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After attributing values to the whole corpus, these raw data were added up and translated into annual frequencies informing on the intensity of security narrative on immigration within the two newspapers. The computation unit is the individual article. As such, we are interested with the number of articles engaging with one peculiar depiction of immigration (immigration as a security concern), rather than in measuring the saliency of this representation within the articles.

Table 1: Coding instructions for the variable “security discourse”

I/ Is immigration addressed from a public safety perspective (i.e. as a threat to the physical safety of the receiving country or its population)? II/ Is the article reporting on crime involving immigrants? Is it using terms Security discourse pertaining to the criminal register (e.g. detention, arrest, illegality, fraud)? III/ Is the article reporting on control and defense measures taken to deal with immigration?

Once the database created and aggregated, we pursue our verification process by assessing the strength of the relationship between our two main variables of concern: the occurrence of major migratory events (x) and the annual frequency of security discourse (y). To do so, we first perform a simple mean comparison, confronting discrepancy in frequency values for years with and without major events. We then proceed to an estimation of the impact size and persistence in time of each event, an operation allowing us to separate exceptional security moves from routinized discourse.

To assess the reliability of the coding procedure and of the resulting data, a sample of twenty articles from La Presse have been separately coded by two coders, allowing us to measure inter-coder agreement. Given the simplicity of the coded variable — a dichotomic value (1 or 0) attributed following the presence or absence of a said quality (security discourse) in the article — and the small number of observers, Krippendorff’s alpha was computed in its most basic form:

Do corresponding to the observed disagreement between the values assigned by

the coders and De being the expected disagreement, that is, the disagreement that would have been produced by a random attribution of values (Krippendorff, 2011). The resulting reliability coefficient was =0.79, which is satisfying considering the small number of articles included in the test sample. In general, a

minimal score of ≥0.67 is expected to consider a set of data reliable, while a result exceeding 0.80 is optimal (Krippendorff, 2004: 241). In order to ensure the uniformity of the coding operation, the current coding has also been regularly compared with the coding previously carried out to make sure that the same article be coded the same way throughout the complete categorization effort, which spanned a nine-month period.

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Security Discourse in La Presse and the National Post, 1998-2015

Security discourse, in the context of late Canadian media depiction of immigration, frame immigration as a public safety concern for Canada, that is, as a liability to the physical integrity of the state or its population, which must be dealt with by the security apparatus of the state. We understand the concept of public safety in a rather broad fashion as comprising issues of civil and national security. It however excludes the dealing with threat to non-material features of the national body such as identity. Based on the recurring themes encountered in the data, security discourse can be divided into three sub-narratives. First, it is characterized by an association between immigrant status and crime (e.g. fraud, robbery, drug trafficking, murder, war crime) or terrorism. Secondly, it manifests itself through the mention of control or defense measures taken against individual immigrants (such as arrest, detention or removal) or designed to secure immigration flow more generally, for example, security screening by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Bell, 2000) or carrier sanctions (Honore, 2000). At last, the security narrative comprises a public health dimension, which ranges from the voicing of worries concerning eventual diseases transported by immigrants to the proposition of mandatory detention and medical examination of all incoming migrants to protect the local population (Francis, 1999).

Figure 2 displays the main results of our data collection. It shows the annual relative frequency of security discourse in La Presse and the National Post, that is, the percentage of articles retrieved for each year that comprised a security move, computed as a simple division of the number of security-coded articles by the total number of articles for the year. For example, amongst the 328 articles of the National Post discussing international migration to Canada in 2001, 228 articles contain an expression of security discourse, which results in an annual relative frequency of security discourse of 69.5% for 2001. We opt here for relative frequencies rather than absolute frequencies because of considerable variation in the size of our corpus over time. As a matter of fact, the National Post issues a maximum of 328 articles on the topic of Canadian immigration in 2001, against a minimum of seventy-one in 2014. The number of articles reporting on immigration in La Presse, on the other part, culminates to 133 in 2015 and drops to thirty-one in 2014. In addition, the National Post, with an average of 181 articles per year and a total of 3,261 articles, allocates more space to the topic than La Presse, which publishes an average of sixty-seven articles on immigration annually, for a total of 1,203 articles between 1998 and 2015. The display of security discourse as a proportion of total press coverage of immigration is thus essential to a comparative assessment of security discourse both over time and between the two newspapers. The graph presents three sets of results for each year: the relative frequency of security discourse measured in La Presse, that measured in the National Post, and the average frequency, which is a mean of the two previous.

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Figure 2: Annual relative frequency of security discourse, 1998-2015

Interestingly, we observe that the two main curves (that for La Presse and that for the National Post) follow a similar temporal trajectory, sharing a correlation coefficient (Pearson’s r) of 0.58, a value expressing a strong4 and positive linear relationship between the two series. A general tendency seems to emerge, which outweighs the divergences due to individual particularities affecting news coverage (ideological leaning, institutional culture, material constraints, etc.). This convergence reinforces the relevance of hypothesizing an impact of context on discourse: the security discourse of the two dailies appears to fluctuate according to a common context, external to their editorial conditions.

However, a considerable gap persists between the two newspapers. The annual relative frequency of security discourse is on average 23.9% higher in the National Post than in La Presse. This continuous discrepancy is at its lowest in 2012 as security narrative attains a level well above average in La Presse while Bill C-31, Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, is discussed and at its highest in 2011 and 2014 as security discourse touches unprecedent low levels in La Presse while maintaining relatively high frequencies in the National Post.

On the other hand, security discourse does not follow a linear intensification path. We were unable to observe a significant correlation between the average frequency of security narrative and the time passed. The intensity of security moves in the newspapers does not know a regular growth over this 18-year period, nor does it follow a linear decreasing trajectory. Security discourse appears more sporadic than progressive and faces an important variation over the period. At its highest level in 2001 (59.4%), a year marked by deadly attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and by a subsequent intensification

4 This qualification is based on the general markers laid down by the statistician Jacob Cohen to evaluate the strength of an effect size, which are set at 0.10, 0.30 and 0.50 for the correlation coefficient (r) of Pearson. Between 0.10 and 0.30, the relationship is considered small, between 0.30 and 0.50 medium and strong when greater than 0.50 (Guay, 2014: 115).

200 Securitization Theory and the Relationship between Discourse and Context of public debate on Bill C-11, it experiences an average decline of 5% per year between 2001 and 2008 to touch its lowest point in 2008 (19,1%). It then reaches new heights in 2010 (44.6%), 2012 (42.9%) and 2015 (46.5%).

Similarly, the effect of September 11 on the relative frequency of security discourse on immigration appears limited in time. Indeed, while the year 2001 is singled out by a particularly high incidence of security discourse and represents the culmination of a short period of growth, the events of 9/11 do not seem to have a lasting impact on the saliency of security narrative in the press and rather initiate a period of relative decline. The event does not seem to be, as suggested by Antonius et al. (2007), Ibrahim (2005: 174) and Messina (2014), the triggering event of a renewed intensification trend of security performances. All the same, further inquiries are required to adequately assess the width of its impact. It is in this regard also important to note the high frequency of security discourse in 1999 (43.8%) and 2000 (50.3%), that is, prior to 9/11. After 2003, it takes seven years and the arrival on the West Coast of the MV Sun Sea, a cargo ship carrying 492 Tamil asylum seekers quickly and widely portrayed as potential members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, an organization deemed terrorist by Ottawa, to see the average frequency of security discourse exceed in 2010 the level of 1999. New peaks are then observed in 2012, as Bill C-31 proposes to crack down on grouped irregular arrivals of refugee claimants, and in 2015, as most articles reporting on the resettlement of Syrian refugees, although generally supportive of the humanitarian merits of the initiative, express fears about possible infil- tration of terrorists among the refugees and insist on the necessity of security screening.

On the Relationship between Security Discourse and Events in the Canadian Press

As justly put in by Balzacq (2011: 36), the discourse and practices of securitization do not occur in a social vacuum. On the contrary, they happen in a specific context. As such, they are both products of the current context and producers of a new context. The intersubjective relationship between the security move of a securitizing agent and its reception by its audience(s) cannot be isolated from the contextual environment in which it takes place. Amongst the three components of context earlier proposed (events, sedimented practices and dominant ideas) we retain here the one best suited for an empirical verification, that is, major migratory events. For the purpose of this research, an event is a punctual fact, circumscribed both in time and space, which attract considerable public attention. The event is intersubjectively constituted. It is the recognition by social agents of the importance of an object that makes an event (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 55). Thus, a major event is, in the context of media coverage of Canadian immigration, an event attracting substantial media attention, the minimum threshold of which is set at ten articles dealing with the event in the two newspapers under study. For the period 1998-2015, six events meet this criterion: the Kosovar refugees’ resettlement of 1999, the Chinese summer, the millennium bombing plot, the 9/11 attacks, the Tamil boats of 2009-2010 and the Syrian refugee “crisis”.

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During the spring of 1999, the Yugoslavian Wars emerge as an issue of Canadian public policy as the country commits itself, on April 6, to temporarily host 5,000 Kosovar refugees. The announcement responds to an international appeal for assistance emitted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) following the exodus of more than a million Albanian Kosovars in Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro. On May 2, the first chartered flight lands in Canada with refugees aboard. The operation permits the resettlement of about 5,500 Kosovars over a period of four months (National Defence, 2008). It is commented in twenty-nine articles from La Presse and forty-four articles from the National Post.

The expression “Chinese summer” is used to designate the high-profile arrival of Chinese asylum seekers by sea on Canada’s West Coast during the summer of 1999. Between July and September 1999, four boats carrying a total of 599 migrants from the Chinese province of Fujian are intercepted in Canadian territorial waters by the Canadian Coast Guard, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Armed Forces. The passengers are successively arrested and taken to Esquimalt Naval Base, where they are subject to extensive security checks and held for a few weeks (La Presse, 1999a; Hasselback and Bell, 1999; La Presse, 1999b). From the 599 migrants, 577 submit an asylum application. Most are ultimately repatriated to China (National Post, 2000). The sequence of arrivals is reported in twenty-three and 101 articles from La Presse and the National Post respectively.

The arrest of Ahmed Ressam on December 14, 1999, at the Canadian-US border is another milestone of Canada’s late immigration historic. The Algerian asylum seeker, intercepted in Port Angeles by an U.S. Customs officer while trying to enter the State of Washington on a ferry from Victoria (B. C.) with explosives in the trunk of his car is charged and found guilty of orchestrating a plot to blow up Los Angeles International Airport on New Year 2000 (Adelman, 2002: 7; Bell, 2001). Seven articles from La Presse and thrirty-one articles from the National Post discuss this event.

On September 11, 2001, four airliners are diverted from their course and redirected towards the two towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Resulting in a total of 2,973 deaths (9/11 Commission, 2004: 311), the event causes a shock wave and marks — according to a widely shared view — the beginning of a new era characterized by the rise of terrorism as a prime security concern in Western societies (Bigo and Walker, 2008: 13). As it appears afterwards, the suicide attack was perpetrated by a group of ninteen men who entered the US with American visas (9/11 Commission, 2004: 215-241). In the immediate aftermath of the event, however, the idea that a number of these terrorists may have transited through Canada to enter the US illegally is widely broadcasted. The hypothesis is quickly belied, but still foster a feeling of vulnerability associated to a perception of the US’ northern border as porous to irregular entrances and a vector of terror risk for the US. Although not per se a migratory event for Canada, the event is widely interpreted as such. Indeed, we register eleven and forty articles explicitly dealing with the event amongst articles from La Presse and the National Post discussing Canadian immigration in 2001.

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The double arrival of the MV Ocean Lady (October 17, 2009) and the MV Sun Sea (August 13, 2010) is another major migratory event for Canada. On May 17, 2009, the civil war opposing since 1983 the Sri Lankan government and the independence insurgency of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) officially ends with a military defeat of the LTTE. Four months later, a ship hailing from India, the MV Ocean Lady, is intercepted by the RCMP with seventy-six Tamil Sri Lankans on board (Bell, 2009). Nearly a year later, it is followed by a second boat, the MV Sun Sea, a Thai cargo ship carrying 492 Tamil migrants (Nicoud, 2012). In sum, the two arrivals produce sixteen articles in La Presse and sixty-five in the National Post.

The 2015 Syrian refugee “crisis” refers to the major population displace- ments caused by the Syrian civil war and their extension to the European continent. While the “crisis” predates 2015 in many ways, it is really from 2015 on that it begins to take shape on the Canadian political and media scene. The subject becomes an issue of the federal election of October 19, 2015, as the three main political parties disagree on the number of refugees to be resettled. The Liberal Party of Justin Trudeau wins the election with the promise to welcome 25,000 Syrian refugees before the end of 2015, a target finally reached on February 29, 2016. The humanitarian effort permits — as of January 29, 2017 — the resettlement in Canada of 40,081 Syrians selected by Canadian authorities in refugee camps in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan (Government of Canada, 2017). The event attracts an important amount of media attention: eighty-nine articles from La Presse and eight-four articles from the National Post focus on the Syrian refugee “crisis” in 2015.

In short, five years show event occurrences: 1999, 2001, 2009, 2010 and 2015. While the year 1999 features three separate events, all four other years stand for one single event. When confronting the annual frequency of security discourse measured in the articles published by La Presse and the National Post on the topic of international immigration to the presence of major migratory event(s) in the year, preliminary inquiries reveal a positive link between the two variables. As intuitively foreseen when inspecting Figure 2, security discourse tends to display higher frequency on years marked by events. As it happens, the relative frequency of security discourse in La Presse is on average 35.1% for years characterized by the incidence of at least one event and 24.7% for years for which no event is registered, for a difference of 10.4 percentage points between the two groups. This difference goes down to 5% in the National Post (Figure 3). The strength of this relationship, as measured by Cohen’s d, which is calculated by dividing the difference between the average value for the two groups compared (years with event(s) and years without event) by the common standard deviation (m1-m2/sd), is very strong for La Presse (d=0.99) and small for the National Post (d=0.46) (Guay, 2014: 115). Events appear to have an enabling effect on the security framing of immigration by the Canadian written press, which is expected to be more important in La Presse than in the National Post. Due to a small sample size (n=18), further divided in two sub-samples of five and thirteen years following the presence or not of events, these differences are however not statistically significant with 95% of confidence for the two newspapers, the p-value being p=0.03 for La Presse, which is satisfactory, but only p=0.2 for the National Post. Current results for the National Post shall therefore be regarded with caution and further probed.

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Figure 3: Annual relative frequency of security discourse, mean per group

As each event may unevenly affect securitization, we then consider the differentiated impact size of the six events on security narrative. To do so, we searched our database for articles containing security discourse that were also registered as discussing one of the events. These occurrences — summed up for each event — traduce the direct impact of the event on the security performances of the press. If an article raises security concerns while reporting on a specific migratory event, we take that the two occurrences will most of the time be meaningfully related. However, this indicator does not render the indirect impact of events in the medium term, and, as such, offers an incomplete evaluation of the effect of events on security moves in La Presse and the National Post. We indeed contend that the impact of major events such as the reception of 5,500 Kosovar refugees (1999), the Chinese Summer (1999), the millennial bombing plot (1999), the 9/11 attacks (2001), the arrival of the MV Ocean Lady (2009) and MV Sun Sea (2010) and the resettlement of 25,000 Syrian refugees (2015) on the framing of immigration as a security problem is greater than the number of articles openly discussing them. These events, by catalyzing a significant portion of media and public attention toward immigration, constitute critical junctures capable of shaping both present and future perceptions of the issue, thus entailing the potential to stimulate or hinder its apprehension from a security angle. For this reason, the medium-term indirect impact of events must be taken in account. We also estimate the persistence in time of the influence of the events on the frequency of security discourse, postulating that it declines according to an exponential trajectory5. The impact of each event is, ultimately, comprised as the sum of the number of security articles explicitly dealing with the event (direct impact) and its estimated temporal persistence (indirect impact), which is calculated by applying an exponential decay function to the immediate prominence of the event. This equation takes the form y=a*exp(-k*t), where a is the direct impact of the event at t=0, k is the decay coefficient and t the time passed since the event.

Once the impact of all six events computed, their respective impacts were summed up to create a single indicator: the event-driven variation. The latter was then subtracted from the observed annual frequency of security discourse

5 We concur on this matter with the “accumulated declining coverage effect” model proposed by Watt et al. to account for the exponential memory decay process of individuals in the context of agenda-setting research. Drawing on social cognitive research, they contend that the effect of media coverage on the perceived prominence of an issue decays exponentially over time (Watt et al., 1993).

204 Securitization Theory and the Relationship between Discourse and Context to obtain an estimation of the frequency of security discourse in the absence of event. For the current analysis, the frequency of security discourse is presented in terms of absolute frequency, which can easier relate with the absolute number of security utterances attributed to each event. Later transposition of the calculated data in percentage appear both unnecessary and potentially confusing. Figures 4 and 6 present the results of this operation, the former for La Presse and the latter for the National Post. They display three separate curves: the observed trend, the event-driven variation and the background trend, which should express routinized security discourse.

Since we aim to assess and isolate the explicative power of the logic of exception (understood as event-driven) for later gauging that of the logic of routine, we want here to maximize the hypothesis that the fluctuations in the frequency of security discourse are essentially function of events. We have therefore adjusted the persistence time of the events’ impact to better match the observed curve of security discourse. For La Presse, the optimal model takes that 1/e = 2.5, that is to say that after two and a half years, the impact of an event is reduced to 36.7% of its initial size6. For example, in addition to the thirteen security moves directly attributable to the arrival of the MV Sun Sea in 2010, it is estimated that the event also indirectly provoked 8.7 security articles in 2011, 5.8 in 2012, 3.9 in 2013, and so on.

As shown in Figure 4, the variation range of the estimated background trend for La Presse is considerably smaller than that of the observed trend, which indicates a greater data stability over time once the direct and indirect impact of the events is removed. Without event, the frequency of security discourse in La Presse would experience lower variation. While the observed trend, spanning from a minimum of four security-coded articles in 2014 to a maximum of forty-six articles in 2015 has a range of forty-two, the background trend varies between -3.5 in 2011 and 21.6 in 2012, for a total range of 25.1. The magnitude of security discourse is thus lessened to 60% of its original size. We were also able to reduce the above average frequencies of security discourse observed over the period 1999-2003 and to eliminate the peaks of 2010 and 2015, which can be compre- hended as mainly event-driven and imputed to the arrival of the MV Sun Sea and to the Syrian refugee “crisis”. The high points of 2007 and 2012 remain however unexplained and are to be attributed to factors other than events. The negative frequency predicted for 2011 suggests that our model slightly overestimates the durability of the impact of the Tamils’ arrival. In fact, the year 2010, which features a high frequency of security discourse (twenty-one articles) is followed by a very low frequency in 2011 (six articles). Over- or underassessments of this order are however to be expected since we compute a uniform decay coefficient (k=0.4) even though the effect size of each event is — as they are highly different in nature — very likely to differ.

6 The number e is a mathematical constant equal to 2.71828 used in the calculation of exponential functions.

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Figure 4: Decomposed trend, La Presse

In order to evaluate the capacity of our model to explain the variation of the observed trend (y) by the event-driven variation (x), we then perform a simple linear regression analysis. Figure 5 offers a graphic representation of the relationship between the two variables. It also indicates the regression line, equation, and coefficient of determination (R2). According to this model, the impact of events would explain up to 72% of the variation of security discourse observed in La Presse.

Figure 5: Relation between event-driven variation and observed trend, La Presse

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For the National Post, we must, to boost the explicative potential of events, favor a lower decay coefficient (k=0.25) and, accordingly, a longer persistence time, that is, 1/e=4. This means that an event such as the Chinese summer, producing sixty-nine security articles in the National Post in 1999, has an indirect impact of 49.7 articles in 2001, 30.1 in 2003 and 10.1 in 2007. The high frequency of security moves in 2001 (228 articles) can thus not solely be explained by the immediate effect of 9/11, which generates a limited number of security articles (33 in 2001, 26.7 in 2002, 20.7 in 2003, etc.), but also by the lasting influence of the events of 1999, which, together, are taken to be responsible for 53.2 instances of security discourse in 2001.

Even after subtraction of the event-driven variation, Figure 6 reveals a background trend which remains quite irregular, with reduced yet enduring submits in 1999, 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2009. The variation range falls here from 214 for the observed trend down to 130 for the background trend, that is, to 61% of its original magnitude. This persisting variability is problematic with regards to our initial conceptualization of routinized security practice as progressive and linear (Figure 1). While the remaining peaks of 1999, 2001 and 2009 can be easily explained by a slight underestimation of the prominence of some events, which could be higher than the number of articles directly addressing them, frequencies of 2004 and 2006 are more troublesome for the hypothesis of a mainly event-driven fluctuation. This model is however apt to explain 65% of the variation in the frequency of security discourse in the National Post (Figure 7).

Figure 6: Decomposed trend, National Post

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These results considerably differ from our expectations regarding routinized security discourse, which is in both cases neither linear nor following a growth trajectory (see background trend in Figures 4 and 6). They thus allow us to reject for good the hypothesis of a continuous and progressive intensification of security moves encountered many times in the Canadian and European literature on securitized migration. Furthermore, they permit us to put the impact of 9/11 on security framing of immigration into perspective. Contrary to popular views, the event did not provoke a sustained acceleration of security discourse in the press. Its impact on the frequency of security moves in the analyzed newspapers decreases rapidly. Moreover, the peak observed in 2001 in La Presse (49.2%) as in the National Post (69.5%) have more to do with the persistent impact of the Chinese summer of 1999 than with the direct impact of September 11.

Figure 7: Relation between event-driven variation and observed trend, National Post

Our results also outline noteworthy disparities between the two newspapers. First, the relationship between the event-driven variation and the observed frequency of security discourse is stronger in La Presse (R2=0.72) than it is in the National Post (R2=0.65). As foreseen in our first evaluation, event occurrences can more closely account for changes in the size of security framing in La Presse. Likewise, the number of security articles classified as not event-driven is higher for the National Post than for La Presse. Indeed, it is in La Presse 174 articles (i.e. 50.7% of the total number of security articles published between 1998 and 2015) that can be attributed to the impact of major migratory events while the remaining 169 (49.3%) are imputed to everyday journalistic practices. In the National Post, 788 security articles (45.6%) are associated with events and 941 (54.4%) belong to routinized discourse. Explanations for the overall higher frequency of security discourse measured in the National Post as well as for the lower variability of security discourse between 2010 and 2015 for this newspaper can thus be found in a stronger embedment of security preoccupations into its everyday reporting on immigration. While La Presse, consistent with its liberal leaning, maintains an editorial line generally favorable to immigration, the

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National Post adopts a more critical stance toward the issue, which is illustrated by the considerable space given to polemicist journalists such as Stewart Bell and Diane Francis, who regularly advocate for reduction of immigration level.

Conclusion

Drawing on the analysis of 4,464 articles published by La Presse and the National Post about international immigration to Canada over the period 1998- 2015, this article proposes further conceptualization of the cohabitation and complementarity of the logics of exception and routine within securitization theory and reaches the conclusion that securitization is constituted of both emergency responses and routinized practices. It reveals a high level of security discourse emanating from the press, which fluctuates importantly over time and is strongly impacted by the occurrence of major migratory events. Security discourse on immigration in the two newspapers do indeed incur quantitative intensification in the advent of events. In particular, the frequency of security moves experiences a marked increase from 1999 to 2001 under the impetus of the Chinese summer and, more marginally, of the millennium bombing plot and 9/11 events. It also reaches peaks in 2010 following the arrival on the West Coast of the MV Sun Sea, a boat carrying 492 Tamil migrants, and in 2015 in relation with the resettlement of refugees displaced by the Syrian civil war. The conjunct impact of these events can explain up to 72% and 65% of the variation in security discourse observed in La Presse and the National Post respectively. These results hence underline, on one part, the facilitating role played by events in the process of securitizing immigration to Canada and, on the other, the co-dependency of discourse and context. As it happens, the two constitutive components of securitization do not operate independently, but rather continually interact and reinforce one another.

It also demonstrates, on a more general note, the crucial role of the press in the construction of immigration in a security problem. Indeed, close to one third of the articles from La Presse and more than half of those from the National Post reported on international immigration from a public safety perspective. Doing so, the media acted as securitizing agents and participated in the production and reproduction of a security understanding of immigration.

Regarding the temporal unfolding of the process, we were unable to infer a general intensification in the security moves of the dailies. While immigration is frequently addressed as a security problem in the articles under study, we find no evidence that it is increasingly the case since 1998. This finding, which contradicts a postulate often encountered in the literature, demonstrates the relevance of quantitative assessments of securitization. We must equally quash our previous conceptualization of routinized security discourse as linear. Even after the deduction of the event-driven variation from the observed trend of security discourse, the background trend remains quite irregular. As a result, we would like to bring forward an improved version of the tripartite figure proposed above (Figure 1), that now offers an empirically-informed yet highly case-reliant formalization of the logics underlying securitization. The two logics — exception and routine — are to be understood as complementary. Henceforth, the two illustrations must be seen as two facets of a whole, which can in principle be

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isolated from one another, but in practice operate more or less simultaneously, rather than as alternative possibilities. For the current study, the security moves of the newspapers appear rather evenly distributed between exception and routine. This configuration could however vary and will have to be validated through other case studies.

In this new figure (Figure 8), the logic of exception mirrors the hypothesized exponential decreasing effect of critical junctures while the logic of routine is illustrated as irregular yet overall relatively stable, a pattern consistent with the thesis of a relatively advanced stage of securitization. The process — initiated at the beginning of the twentieth century (Messina, 2014: 538) but really reaching considerable height since 1989 (Bourbeau, 2011: 1) — now appears to be irregular but permanent. It is no longer in an emergence phase. Security, in Canada, has been successfully integrated into the everyday discourse on immigrants. In this regard, the conclusions drawn for the Canadian case agree, despite differentiated historical and demographical features, with the high level of securitization of immigration observed in several European countries (Buonfino, 2004; Caviedes, 2014) and vouch for the hypothesis of a supranational securitization trend.

Figure 8: Securitization over time

Finally, we reckon that our modelling of the impact of events on journalistic practices following an exponential decay trajectory have proven quite efficient in explaining the main high frequencies of media security discourse. However, it fails to account for some 30% of the total fluctuation of our dependent variable. The remaining variation observed in the routinized security discourse on immigration cannot be understood by the parameters included in the present study. Nevertheless, it opens the door to future research into factors apt to explain non-event fluctuations of the security moves of the press. In this regard, development of indicators reporting on the other material component of securitization process, security practices, as well as comparison of media discourse with its political and institutional counterparts could provide precious insight and contribute shedding further light on the complex and intertwined relationship between external context, discourse and practices of securitization.

210 Securitization Theory and the Relationship between Discourse and Context

References Adelman Howard (2002) Refugees and Border Security Post-September 11, Refuge, 20 (4), pp. 5-14. Antonius Rachad, Labelle Micheline and Rocher François (2007) Canadian Immigration Policies: Securing a Security Paradigm?, International Journal of Canadian Studies, 1 (36), pp. 197-212. Balzacq Thierry (2011) Securitization Theory: How security problems emerge and dissolve, New York, Routlegde, 258 p. Bauder Harald (2008) Immigration Debate in Canada: How Newspapers Reported, 1996-2004, Journal of International Migration and Integration, 9 (3), pp. 289-310. Bell Stewart (2009) Ship left India last month, records show: Migrant vessel: One passenger had rebel tattoo, National Post, October 23, A10. Bell Stewart (2001) Ressam convicted of terrorism: Algerian linked to Montreal cell caught at U.S. border with powerful explosives, National Post, April 7, A1. Bell Stewart (2000) CSIS told to improve immigrant screening, National Post, Mai 11, A8. Bigo Didier (2002) Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease, Alternatives, 27 (1), pp. 63-92. Bigo Didier and Walker Rob B. J. (2008) Le régime de contre-terrorisme global, in Didier Bigo Éd., Au nom du 11 septembre, Paris, La Découverte, pp. 11-35. Bourbeau Philippe (2014) Moving Forward Together: Logics of the securitization process, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 43 (1), pp. 7-206. Bourbeau Philippe (2013a) Processus et acteurs d’une vision sécuritaire des migrations : le cas du Canada, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 29 (4), pp. 21-41. Bourbeau Philippe (2013b) Politisation et sécuritisation des migrations internationales : une relation à définir, Critique internationale, 4 (61), pp. 127-145. Bourbeau Philippe (2011) The Securitization of Migration: A study of movement and order, New York, Routledge, 166 p. Bradimore Ashley and Bauder Harald (2011) Mystery Ships and Risky Boat People: Tamil Refugee Migration in the Newsprint Media, Canadian Journal of Communication, 36 (4), pp. 637-661. Buonfino Alessandra (2004) Between unity and plurality: the politicization and securitization of the discourse of immigration in Europe, New Political Science, 26 (1), pp. 23-49. Buzan Barry (2008) The Changing Agenda of Military Security, in Hans Günter Brauch et al. Eds., Globalization and Environmental Challenges, Berlin, Springer, pp. 553-560. Buzan Barry and Hansen Lene (2009) The Evolution of International Security Studies, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 384 p. Buzan Barry, Waever Ole and De Wilde Jaap (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 239 p.

2 11 Elsa Vigneau

Caviedes Alexander (2014) An Emerging “European” New Portrayal of Immigration, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41 (6), pp. 897-917. Floyd Rita (2010) Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 215 p. Francis Diane (1999) These refugees and immigrants can be deadly: Adequate medical screening process doesn’t exist, National Post, August 21, D3. Government of Canada (2017) #WelcomeRefugees: Key figures, [online] last checked on 26/01/2018. URL: https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees- citizenship/services/refugees/welcome-syrian-refugees/key-figures.html Guay Jean-Herman (2014) Statistiques en sciences humaines avec R, Québec, Presses de l’Université Laval, 238 p. Hasselback Drew and Bell Stewart (1999) “Rustbucket” ship ferries 190 migrants from China: Third smuggling vessel to arrive this summer, National Post, September 1, A1. Honore Carl (2000) Airlines weeding out illegals: Surrogate border guards Series: Underground to Canada, National Post, March 31, A8. Ibrahim Maggie (2005) The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse, International Migration, 43 (5), pp. 164-187. Krippendorff Klaus (2011) Computing Krippendorff’s Alpha-Reliability, [online] last checked on 25/01/2018. URL: http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/43/ Krippendorff Klaus (2004) Reliability in Content Analysis: Some Common Misconceptions and Recommendations, Human Communication Research, 30 (3), pp. 411-433. La Presse (1999a) Les immigrants illégaux ont voyagé dans des conditions cauchemardesques, La Presse, July 22, A9. La Presse (1999b) Un autre navire d’immigrants illégaux, La Presse, September 11, B9. Léonard Sarah and Kaunert Christian (2011) Reconceptualizing the audience in securitization theory, in Thierry Balzacq Ed., Securitization Theory: How security problems emerge and dissolve, New York, Routledge, pp. 57-76. Lupovici Amir (2014) The Limits of Securitization Theory: Observational Criticism and the Curious Absence of Israel, International Studies Review, 16 (3), pp. 390-410. McInnes Colin and Rushton Simon (2011) HIV/AIDS and securitization theory, European Journal of International Relations, 19 (1), pp. 115-138. Messina Anthony M. (2015) Securitizing Immigration in the Age of Terror, World Politics, 66 (3), pp. 530-559. National Defence (2008) Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation PARASOL, [online] last checked on 26/01/2018. URL: http://www.cmp-cpm.forces. gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?intlopid=196&cdnopid=236 National Post (2000) British Columbia: Chinese migrants deported, National Post, October 14, A4.

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News Media Canada (2015) Daily Newspaper Circulation Report, [online] last checked on 26/01/2018. URL: https://nmc-mic.ca/about-newspapers/circulation/ daily-newspapers/ Nicoud Annabelle (2012) Le cauchemar des réfugiés tamouls, La Presse, February 6, A2. Nossal Kim Richard, Roussel Stéphane and Paquin Stéphane (2015) The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, Kingston, Queen’s University Press, 424 p. Swarts Jonathan and Karakatsanis Neovi M. (2013) Challenge to Desecuritizing Migration in Greece, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 15 (1), pp. 97-120. Vigneau Elsa (2017) Immigration et sécuritisation au Canada : étude de La Presse et du National Post, 1998-2015, MA, Université de Sherbrooke, 147 p. Waever Ole (1995) Securitization and Desecuritization, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz Ed., On Security, New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 46-86. Waever Ole (1989) Security, the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of a Word, Centre of Peace and Conflict Research, Draft Paper, 56 p. Watt James, Mazza May and Snyder Leslie (1993) Agenda-Setting Effects of Television News Coverage and the Effects Decay Curve, Communication Research, 20 (3), pp. 408-435. Wolfers Arnold (1952) “National Security” as an Ambiguous Symbol, Political Science Quarterly, 67 (4), pp. 481-502. 9/11 Commission (2004) The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the Unites States, 567 p.

213 Résumé - Abstract - Resumen

Elsa Vigneau Securitization Theory and the Relationship between Discourse and Context: A Study of Securitized Migration in the Canadian Press, 1998-2015 This article addresses the problem of the significance of empirical variation in security moves towards immigration and the consequent question of the role of context in securitization theory. Drawing on the analysis of a set of 4,464 newspaper articles published by La Presse and the National Post on the subject of international immigration to Canada between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 2015, it investigates the link between the frequency with which these two Canadian broadsheet dailies depict immigration as a threat to the physical well-being of the state or its population and the occurrence of six major migratory events. It finds that the saliency of security discourse on immigration in the written press is strongly and positively impacted by the incidence of such events. The paper also proposes further conceptualization of the cohabitation and complementarity between exceptional and routinized securitization practices. La théorie de la sécuritisation et la relation entre discours et contexte : une étude de la sécuritisation de l’immigration dans la presse canadienne, 1998-2015 Partant de l’observation d’importantes variations empiriques dans les tentatives de sécuritisation à l’égard de l’immigration, cet article s’intéresse au rôle du contexte dans la théorie de la sécuritisation. S’appuyant sur l’analyse de 4 464 articles de journaux publiés par La Presse et le National Post sur le thème de l’immigration internationale à destination du Canada entre le 1er janvier 1998 et le 31 décembre 2015, il étudie le lien entre la fréquence avec laquelle ces deux quotidiens canadiens portraient l’immigration comme une menace pour le bien-être physique de l’État ou de sa population et l’incidence de six événements migratoires majeurs. Il constate que la saillance du discours sécuritaire sur l’immigration dans la presse écrite est fortement et positivement influencée par la conjoncture événementielle. L’article propose également une conceptualisation plus poussée de la cohabitation et de la complémentarité entre les pratiques de sécuritisation exceptionnelles et routinières. La teoría de la securitización y la relación entre el discurso y el contexto: estudio sobre la securitización de la inmigración en la prensa canadiense, 1998-2015 Este artículo aborda el problema de las importantes variaciones empíricas observadas en las tentativas de seguridad hacia la inmigración y la cuestión consiguiente del papel del contexto en la teoría de la securitización. Basándose en el análisis de un conjunto de 4.464 artículos periodísticos publicados por La Presse y el National Post sobre el tema de la inmigración internacional a Canadá entre el 1 de enero de 1998 y el 31 de diciembre de 2015, se investiga la relación entre la frecuencia con que estos dos periódicos canadienses describen la inmi- gración como una amenaza para el bienestar físico del estado o de su población y la ocurrencia de seis eventos migratorios mayores. Encuentra que la incidencia de tales eventos impacta fuerte y positivamente en la intensidad del discurso de seguridad sobre la inmigración en la prensa escrita. El papel también propone una conceptualización más avanzada de la cohabitación y complementariedad entre las prácticas de securitización excepcionales y rutinarias.

214 REMi Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 2019, 35 (1 & 2), pp. 215-237

Othering and Recognition: National Ideologies in Donor-Recipient Encounters in Hungarian Co-Ethnic Philanthropy Ildikó Zakariás1

In the case of Hungary, the working of national ideologies in current contexts of minority — kin-state relations have been described on two major terrains. Firstly, policies of the Hungarian state targeting ethnic Hungarian minorities have been thoroughly analysed, including their effects on minority communities (Kiss, 2015; Pogonyi, 2017). Authors of these texts often adopted the top-down framework proposed by Brubaker (1995) who emphasized the triangular relationality: of ethnic minority elites, of the host states’ political actors as well as of the elites of kin-states claiming cultural/ethnic sameness with these minorities. Overlapping with these, migration-related phenomena have also been in the focus of scholarly attention: arrival of refugees and permanent immigrants from Romania and later from Yugoslavia in the 1990s, as well as circular labour migration between Hungary and neighbouring countries became hot topics in the research of co-ethnic relations (Fox, 2007; Pulay, 2007). In the field of policy research, ideas related to nationhood and nationality are understood as the result of reconfigurations of elite- level political arenas during and after the transition; while in the context of migration, notions and categories around the nation are understood as individual and collective reactions to structural constraints and possibilities created by the post-socialist states of the region and the labour market.

Compared to these major streams of research, some recent approaches demonstrate a heightened role of national ideologies in relatively unexplored arenas of co-ethnic interactions. Following Gingrich and Banks (2006) and Holmes (2000) Feischmidt et al. (2014) emphasize a heightened popularity of national ideologies among large segments of the Hungarian population, that is triggered not only by top-level politics, or a minority position, but may be deci- phered as a popular reaction to new types of deprivations and perceptions of

1 Sociologist, Research fellow, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences, Institute for Minority Studies, 1097 Budapest, Tóth Kálmán u. 4, Hungary; [email protected]

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uncertainties induced by globalisation and transnationalisation. The perception of threatened social status and identities together with the elevated desire for strengthening community ties appear among large segments of the “majority”, “autochthonous” population in Hungary, which bestows national ideologies, identities and belonging to the national community with primary importance. This implies a readiness and receptivity to relate to these ideologies not only in exceptional moments, but in the everyday life as well, through everyday actions and practices, such as consumption, tourism or philanthropy (see also Feischmidt-Pulay, 2016; Ilyés, 2011).

These practices share several common features. 1) Relatively independent from legal institutions and the Hungarian state, they might be described, to some extent, as part of the institutional sphere of the voluntary sector.2 2) They are built upon national mythology emphasizing a national unity of all Hungarians and a heroic national past, and aim to formulate forceful visions of a heroic national future. 3) These ideologies assign certain members and communities of ethnic Hungarian minorities a special role: an elevated national identity and belonging are assumed, which constitute them as authentic (“true”) Hungarians, in comparison with the “ordinary” residents of Hungary. These gradations of national belonging on the level of ideologies offer special positions for ethnic Hungarian minority communities in such activities, programs and organisations. In this paper, I attempt to deepen scholarly reflection on co-ethnic interactions in the context of voluntary activities. Specifically, the institutional context of philanthropy, donating and volunteering and, on the other side, acceptance of donations will be the focus of my analysis.

Philanthropy as an institutional context has its own specificities that distinguish it from other institutions outside and within the third sector. Two types of boundary-making are inherent in these contexts. Firstly, philanthropy may require an ideology3 that implies a certain connection between the helpers and the helped, which prescribes the “worthiness” of the receiver, and often distinguish them from those who are viewed as “less worthy” or “unworthy”. Secondly, philanthropy prescribes dual positions: suffering and needs are emphasised on one side, while capacities and resources are stressed on the other. The binary roles of the helpers and the helped imply that boundaries, hierarchy and power relations are created involving the two sides.

National ideologies and discourses available in Hungary, as well as national discourses in ethnic Hungarian minority communities enable a helping relationship — by making it reasonable and legitimate — between such minority societies and the kin-state. By the use of national categorisation, national ideologies classify people according to their belonging to the national community, and as such create sameness between different categories, groups, communities, societies considered as ethnic Hungarian. Based on common belonging, they also claim responsibility and solidarity toward co-ethnics and the nation as a whole; and describe common values the preservation of which is a common

2 These activities have also an important institutional background embedding them into economic mechanisms and the market (Feischmidt, 2014: 8). 3 Ideology is understood here in Geertzian terms, as a pre-existing set of interconnected notions and statements, without the connotations of being tools of power and domination (1973).

216 Othering and Recognition duty of all members of the nation. However, as we will describe it below, the national imagery has several further layers that assign different characteristics to different groups and communities (within the Hungarian national/ethnic community), providing grounds upon which asymmetric roles of helpers and recipients may be built. These asymmetries and hierarchies have the potential of creating distance between the two positions. In this paper co-ethnic relationships will be examined from this angle, with the aim of answering the following questions. How do co-ethnic relationships unfold in the context of philanthropic institutions built upon national ideologies? What are the categories and identity positions offered in such encounters for different parties? What are the sources of ambiguities and tensions arising in these interactions? How are these tensions handled by the parties involved, and how do they shape narratives of national identification and categorisation?

Mainstream research on minority — kin-state relations has to date dedicated limited attention to philanthropy. While philanthropic activity organised from kin-state towards kin-minority or diaspora communities is almost entirely neglected by social scientists4, an emerging field of study labelled as diaspora-philanthropy is focusing on help initiated by diaspora communities and directed towards the country of origin. The majority of this latter research, however, often follows a non-profit management or public policy perspective, and thus focuses on motivations, mechanisms and benefits of diaspora philanthropy; while critical sociological perspectives, adopting an epistemological, social constructionist lens, or engaging in questions of hierarchies, power and exclusions are yet relatively missing from the field (Newland et al., 2010; Flanigan, 2016).

An important exception is provided by the historical sociological work of Lainer-Vos. In his work on Jewish diaspora-homeland relations in the first half of the twentieth century, Lainer-Vos describes these philanthropic initiatives as phenomena uniting national ideologies and the intention of helping (Lainer-Vos, 2014). Gift-giving and philanthropy in his perspective unfold as the terrain of constructing and remaking national categories and sentiments, identities and the national collective. Moreover, he reveals how the reconstruction of the Jewish nation, imagined through its internal differences, is related to donor-recipient asymmetric relationships. The phenomenon at the centre of my attention invites a similar perspective. Building upon recent waves of nationalism research, I depart from the assumption that nationhood and related categories, sentiments and practices are not only elite-driven top-down processes, but everyday accomplishments achieved by ordinary actors in their everyday activities. Circumscribing goals and activities in national terms allows donors and recipients to engage in “doing the nation”, that is to perform national roles and ideas, effectuate national choices, or talk using national categories (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008; Brubaker et al., 2006).

At the same time, in the context of philanthropy, I intend to analyse the role of national ideologies and the reproduction of nationhood and national belonging

4 For an exception, see Cramer (2016), on ideological transformations in the mission of Gustav Adolf Association in interwar Germany aiming to help minority German speaking communities in East and Central Europe.

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as intimately related to helper-recipient binary positions. As it will be shown, differences, hierarchies and power constitute core phenomena in understanding the working of national categories. The interactionist analytical lens, its concepts and theories enabling us to do so will be summarised in the following chapter.

Discourses, Power and Recognition in Philanthropy and Volunteering

Post-colonial analyses of helping relations oriented from the “first world” towards the “third” emphasize the role of ideologies and discourses behind philanthropic giving. These analyses show how helping relations (in international development, or humanitarian aid), instead of emancipation, contribute to the maintenance of discourses of power and domination (Heron, 2007; Kapoor, 2005). In this perspective domination refers to three major phenomena: 1) “epistemic violence” means the dominance of Western/Northern notions, categories and knowledge hindering the expression and articulation of the knowledge of supported communities from the “South”; 2) Othering refers to negative stereotyping and denigration of the supported communities, or individuals; and 3) domination also means that helping activities and programs serve Western/Northern “interests” of control, instead of “interests” of recipients of support (Spivak, 1988; Hall, 1992). This perspective emphasizes the effects of helping relations to recreate donor-recipient power hierarchies.

Some authors, however, widen the scope of their models and allow for the potential birth of mutual respect and recognition in the act of philanthropic giving. Giving, in their perspective, may also create honour and status not only for the giver, but for the recipient as well. According to them, giving is often coupled with identification with the recipient, assigning “deservingness” and “worthiness” to them, which are acts of recognition, recognition of the value, status, identity of the receiver. Komter as well as Caillé devotes attention to recognition towards recipients of gifts, although none of them develop exten- sively in this direction. Komter emphasizes the moments of “recognition, acceptance and estimation of the recipient”, which in turn “confirms the self-identity and self-esteem of the recipient” (Komter, 2005: 44). Caillé also invites to investigate giving (voluntary work, among others) with its aspects of “ethical and identity-related ends” (Lazzerri and Caillé, 2006), and to reconceptualise giving as an act of mutual recognition of participants.

These authors, by suggesting the term “recognition” refer to the theoretical frameworks developed by Honneth and Fraser (Honneth, 1992; Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Honneth’s theory considers the conditions of the development of the autonomous subject. Subjectivity in his approach does not preclude communication and intersubjectivity, but instead is constituted in interactions. Recognition is an ideal-typical (mutual) relationship which enables that an individual perceives herself profoundly equal with the other, and distinct from the other, at the same time. Deprivation of this state — named as misrecognition — becomes thus criticised by Honneth as hindering the development of autonomous subjectivity. Besides love and rights, solidarity in this model is conceived of as the third type of recognition, which allows for the recognition of individuals according to their ‘merits’, their contributions to the wellbeing

218 Othering and Recognition of the community. This type of recognition differentiates between individuals: according to their performance, assigns symbolic and material resources to them, and important for our paper, prescribes an active helping relationship towards these recognised individuals. Recognition or misrecognition, from this perspective, is also mirrored in the emotional state of the person: the former implies self-respect, while the latter implies shame and humiliation.

Criticising Honneth for its excessive focus on psychological states, Fraser aims to underline the importance of discourses and economic-material precon- ditions in recognition processes. According to her relational, justice-based approach, every human has the right to participate in interactions equally with others (Fraser, 2001 and 2003). “Participatory parity”, according to Fraser, rests on two conditions: first, according to the redistributive condition, material-economic resources are required that enable the individual to act and to have a voice in interactions. Second, according to the recognition condition, just and equal participation assumes that statuses (“institutional patterns of cultural values”) allow equal positions for acting and speaking for all participants.

In this paper we aim to analyse our empirical data according to Honneth’s model on solidarity complemented with Fraser’s principle of participatory parity. 1) In line with Fraser’s framework, we depart from the assumption that the discursive background of such encounters deeply affect and confine inequalities of action through recognition processes, that is through unequal statuses offered by these discourses to the participants. Our enquiry thus will address inequalities of freedom of action, and freedom of expressing own perspectives of participants in philanthropic interactions. Asymmetries and inequalities of action and speech will be analysed as embedded into economic and material inequalities, as well as in discourses of worth, merits and deservingness assigned to specific groups and categories. 2) Such inequalities and asymmetries will be identified through the emotional states of the recipients of help, such as self-confidence, pride, or shame, humiliation, frustration and the state of paralysis. We inquire on these emotions from a Honnethian perspective, as carrying primary importance in shaping, confining or broadening possibilities for action and for speech.

The paper first presents main ideologies characteristic in co-ethnic philanthropy in Hungary, as well as the applied methods and empirical data. In the second half of the paper we show how these ideologies may function as the discursive backgrounds for donor-recipient interactions, defining the statuses of different participants that is their conditions for acting and having a voice in philanthropic interactions. However, instead of treating these discursive spaces as fixed and given, in line with our interactionist perspective we also aim to show how participants attempt to use, alter and reshape meanings attached to these ideologies, in order to acquire better positions in these interactions.

Supporting Ethnic Hungarian Minority Communities: Institutionally Embedded Ideologies and Discourses

A characteristic form of philanthropy in Hungary is closely linked to the working of national ideologies, more specifically the imperative of helping ethnic Hungarian minorities of neighbouring countries of Slovakia, Ukraine,

219 Ildikó Zakariás

Romania and Serbia. One layer of meanings around this helping imperative is based on the idea of minority societies and their national Hungarian culture being under constant threat. This discourse uses a historically and culturally unified, homogenous concept of the nation that includes Hungarian communities living in neighbouring states, and ignores the diversified history of these minority communities as well as advancing processes of assimilation into the majority society in some of these communities. According to this discourse on cultural threat and the survival of the nation, these Hungarians are characterized by a national authenticity: are actively guarding the most ancient and most valuable elements of the Hungarian culture; and are under the constant pressure of assimilation on the part of the majority society. Based on this discourse, these minority groups need the help of the kin-state (Hungary) and its population in maintaining the Hungarian national culture and resisting assimilation (Kürti, 2002; Feischmidt, 2005).

The alternative of the discourse of national survival of these minority communities is a modernisation discourse. The discourse constructed as a global hierarchical classification system measures positions of regions and societies according to their level of modernisation and civilization (Melegh, 2006). The system has an idealised Western Europe as a reference point, while all other positions are measured according to their distance to this reference along the modernisation axis. This modernisation hierarchy is also projected within the Hungarian nation, creating internal East-West hierarchies: it assumes economic and cultural underdevelopment and lack of civilisation of ethnic Hungarian minority communities residing in “less modernised” countries of Ukraine, Romania, Serbia. If extended to benevolent intentions based upon national solidarity, besides cultural support, the modernisation ideology also implies material support, modernisation and development to be offered to these communities.

The outlined discursive field is in great part produced and maintained by assistance policies of the Hungarian state (Bárdi, 2013; Zombory, 2012). Besides the diversity of their actual form and content, different governments all have agreed around the necessity of such support. The double-layered helping discourse operates in spheres outside the state as well: private individuals and formal or informal voluntary associations are implicated in its use. Large philanthropic organisations, such as the Maltese and the Hungarian Red Cross often have their specific division or programmes directed towards Hungarian minority communities in neighbouring states, and there is a multitude of smaller associations, or informal family, church, workplace communities that organise such support on a civic/voluntary basis.5

Methodological Background and Empirical Data

The paper is based on qualitative research conducted on three such philanthropic programs: two voluntary school partnerships initiated by teachers at two

5 According to my estimations based on the 2014 official register of civic organisations in Hungary, out of 112,000 civil organisations registered between 1989-2014, the magnitude of those mentioning some support for ethnic Hungarians living in minority position in their official descriptions has been about 1,600 (including the liquidated ones as well) (Zakariás, 2016).

220 Othering and Recognition schools (one in Budapest and one in the nearby town of Budaörs), and a child sponsorship network, all three designed to support different ethnic Hungarian or Hungarian-speaking schools, students and teachers in Romania and Ukraine.

The first program is a twin-school partnership, organized between a school in Budaörs, a suburban town of Budapest, and a Hungarian–language school in a small village in Transcarpathia, Ukraine. The program’s major aim is to help preserve Hungarian national identities and national solidarities both among students in Transcarpathia and in Hungary. Since it was founded in 2009, the program has mainly consisted of visiting each other once a year. The program also includes material donations on the part of teachers and students, and their families in Budaörs: they offer food and lodging in their homes for students and teachers visiting from Transcarpathia, organize programs and offer gifts to them.

The second program was organised by teachers at a Budapest secondary school, and aims to preserve the use of the Hungarian language where it is in a minority. The first “native language camp” was organised for Transcarpathian children in 1989. After a flood in the region, the Budapest school hosted children in Budapest and the program helped with the reconstruction of schools in these settlements. In the mid-2000s, the program was enlarged to involve ethnic Hungarian children from Slovakia, Serbia and Romania and the native language camps were launched in the Eastern-Romanian region of Moldavia among the Csángó (Ceangai) communities. Offering food and lodging in their homes in Budapest for students from Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania and Serbia, offering donations and volunteer work to partner schools, and supporting the Transcarpathian children from Ukraine who study in Budapest is also part of their activities.

The third program, the “God-parent program” founded in 2007 aims to support Hungarian language education in Csángó villages in Moldavia, Romania, inhabitants of whom are considered by national discourses in Hungary as part of the historical Hungarian nation. The program seeks donations for Hungarian-language education in Moldavian csángó settlements by establishing a long-term quasi-familial relationship between the donor and recipient: the former becomes the symbolic god-parent of a Csángó child, the relationship is maintained through letters, gifts, and trips between Hungary and Moldavia. Less active god-parents may only restrict their activities to paying a certain sum of money to support Hungarian language education; however, god-parents are also expected to pay visits to summer-camps organized for these children in Hungary, or directly in their home villages in Moldavia.

Participant observation of encounters between the helpers and the helped (three one-week-long participant observation during three summer camps in school programs, and three trips with god-parents to Moldovan villages) and around forty semi-structured interviews with active participants (organising teachers in Hungary, Ukraine and Romania, volunteering parents, god-parents and god-children and their parents) were carried out, mainly in the years 2009, 2010 and 2014.

In the empirical analysis in the following chapters, we will show how different layers of discourses on ethnic Hungarian minority communities are

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mobilised by charity actors, donors and volunteers, as well as recipients of the support.6 Emotional reactions of the latter that is shame vs. self-confidence allow us to empirically capture these encounters as places enabling recognition or misrecognition. It will be shown that while the mobilisation of modernisation discourse dominantly implies misrecognition, the working of national ideologies, depending on the social context of their use, has much more heterogeneous implications. Misrecognition along the Modernization Discourse

The initiators of such philanthropic actions are middle-class health, education, cultural professionals, entrepreneurs, managers all being able to afford to participate in the program. They have the financial means to offer donations, they have free time to do fund-raising and voluntary work, they have the material means and free time to offer accommodation in their homes, and to travel to great distances to visit the supported communities in their settlements. Encounters between donors and recipients all depend upon such material and time offers of the donors. The majority of the recipients are less wealthy: they are less educated, living in economically depressed rural areas in Romania and Ukraine, the majority of adults working on the secondary labour market, being able to afford large distance travels only as part of labour migration to Western Europe or Ukrainian and Russian industrial areas.

The perception of such economic and educational inequalities between donors and recipients resonate well with discourses of regional or national differences along the East-West slope of modernization and civilization. Apart from the national ideology ubiquitous in formal spaces and places (organisational documents, formal events and interactions), in volunteer-recipient informal encounters, in more informal organizational events and spaces, and at a limited extent in formal organisational documents the modernization discourse gains emphasis. East-West, rural-urban, developed vs. undeveloped, civilized vs. unci- vilised dichotomies are projected upon each other, affecting the ways volunteers perceive the recipients of their actions.

6 As highlighted also by the widely cited triangular model of Brubaker (1995) on East- Central European post-socialist societies, support of the kin-state towards national minorities (political, cultural or economic), as well as its counterparts in the voluntary sector is often understood by elite political actors as embedded in a “triadic relational interplay among national minorities, nationalising states, and external national homelands”. (Host) state-related actors thus not only may be perceived as assimilationist towards national minority communities residing on their territories (as through the lens of the ideology of national survival), but may also openly express and formulate their policies in nationalizing — assimilationist — terms. Such explicit nationalizing agenda more typical of the sphere of politics and cultural policies do not necessarily connect and translate to everyday spaces of these philanthropic and voluntary programs; in some specific cases, however, such as the Csángó villages of Moldavia, local state actors may heavily interfere on these grounds with the organization of such philanthropic activities (Peti, 2011; Tánczos, 2012; Simon, 2012). Besides antagonism between host-state and kin-state actors, other relations, such as cooperation also may unfold, depending on the regions and countries, and the scale of actors concerned (whether national or local). State and civic support of ethnic Hungarian minorities initiated from Hungary may also be perceived by host state actors as complementing their duties in the educational and social welfare sectors (see for example the case of kin-state support directed to Transcarpathia: Tátrai et al., 2017). The present paper, focusing on recognition processes between donors and recipients should be enlarged in future research to incorporate host- state perspectives and their influence on donor-recipient relations.

222 Othering and Recognition

Donor behaviour reflecting these Othering regards may remain non-intentional facial and bodily gestures, or maybe explicitly expressed and discussed in the presence of recipients. Bodily hygiene, the living conditions (such as lack of a bathroom, or toilet), or the poverty of the supported families are often part of conversations — usually unintentionally in front of recipients, but sometimes even with them.

“A couple of friends, all god-parents have visited the supported community and their god-children in Moldavia. While discussing the local habits of rare washing with a mocking and sarcastic tone among themselves, one god-parent turned to a fifteen- years-old local boy, also present at the discussion and asked: ‘Mihai, how many times do you have a bath a week?’ No answer followed, just a blushing and embarrassment.” (Extract from field notes)

Such potential gestures, talks, categorisations imply the emotions of shame and humiliation for those witnessing them, and as such result in an elevated state of distrust and suspicion towards donors and volunteers. In moments of such humiliation, as a result of shame and the feeling of inadequacy the addressees usually are defenseless, remain mute, without any immediate reaction.

“There was a couple who were not so kind. [...] They talked like ‘oh my god, what a poverty’. It happened once, I don’t want to talk about it. They didn’t tell it to me, I just happened to overhear how they talked between themselves.” (Mother of god-child in a Moldavian village, accommodating god-parents and other voluntary tourists at their house on a regular basis)

The threat of such hierarchical perceptions may undermine interactions of donating and gift-giving aimed at some kind of poverty alleviation. Volunteers often aim to bring or send substantial amounts of gifts and donations to their supported families and communities, such as clothes, food, books, and computers. However, the frequent question “What do you need that we could bring along?” is usually turned down by the addressees of such questions, who rather choose to maintain their status in the interaction by refusing the position of the “needy”.

National Ideologies in Organisational and Individual (Donor) Narratives

Organisational ideologies as objectified in public founding documents, statutes, mission statements, and often appearing in formal organizational events and actions all have a focus on national identity, culture and common national belonging. The Hungarian ethnicity of various minority communities, their national authenticity, ethnically framed folkloric culture and traditions, the domination and assimilation pressures on the part of the majority nation- states, as well as conscious struggles against the latter constitute central elements of institutional ideologies of these three programs.7 These ideologies

7 A detailed description of national narratives in documents and official programs of the two school-partnerships may be found in Zakariás (2014).

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are also evoked in personal interactions between donors and recipients. The former perceive the latter in these terms, and search for evidence supporting these assumptions of national authenticity. Performance of folkloric behavior (dressing up in folk-costumes, dancing and singing folk-songs), the use of Hungarian language, or the expression of Hungarian identity through adherence to educational-cultural institutions are all thoroughly observed.

These perceptions are not confined, however, to passive sensitivities of donors and volunteers: they also imply donor practices that evoke or provoke such recipient activities and behaviour. Openly asking the supported students or their families to show their folk-costumes, often by wearing it, asking them to cite Hungarian poems, verses, songs, asking explicitly their national/ethnic identities may all constitute such attempts. The following extract was recited during the opening ceremony, as part of the speech of a main organizer of the Budaörs program:

“When I came into this classroom I asked your [the Transcarpathian guest children’] names. And you know, so many beautiful Hungarian names you have. I’ve felt real Hungarian among you. Please, do feel yourselves Hungarian, when being with us.”

These explicit invitations and expectations to perform roles related to the preservation of the Hungarian identity, culture and community have diverse consequences regarding recognition or misrecognition of recipients of support that we will analyse in the following sections.

National Ideology as Means of Recognition

The “front layer” of philanthropic activities directed towards ethnic Hungarian minorities is crystallized around the notions of Hungarian national culture, belonging and identity. As described in the introduction, the choice of such ideologies may reflect donors’ desires for authenticity, belonging and the enhancement of community ties. This layer of meanings, however may also become a tool, for the recipients as well as the donors, to suppress and conceal derogatory meanings linked to the modernization discourse. Instead of material-economic needs and civilization backwardness, national sameness, common national identities and values, national bonds and national community become the corner- stones of framing philanthropic actions. Giving and helping are interpreted as supporting the fight against assimilation, while instead of poverty and material-cultural belatedness, needs of the recipients are understood as needs for support in this cultural fight for the common national culture. Instead of being stigmatized as poor and uncivilized, addressees of support are categorized as even more active, competent and worthy social actors than their co-ethnics who support this heroic struggle from afar, from the safe and sheltering “mother- country”.

In all three programs the needs and resources linked to the preservation and fight for the common national identity and values are strongly emphasized by the donors and volunteers. In the twin-school program organized from Budaörs (Hungary) towards a Transcarpathian border-settlement in Ukraine discursive emphasis on aims of experiencing common cultural and national community, and the preservation of national identities enables that meanings around

224 Othering and Recognition economic-civilizational difference are almost entirely eliminated from interactions between initiators and addressees of support. In this twin-school program, and partly in the Budapest program recipients are socialized — in private as well as school environments — to know and identify with the roles and meanings assigned to them by these national ideologies. They themselves mobilize such meanings, or, when evoked by donors and volunteers, they respond actively and willingly. In such interactions the preservation of and fight for the Hungarian national culture is understood as merit and worthiness that is honored — recognized — by symbolic as well as material rewards.

The story of the Transcarpathian organizer of the Budapest program illus- trates how philanthropic giving may be embedded in such national framing. The teacher accompanied her students to a Hungarian folklore contest to Budapest.

“There was this exhibition [in Budapest], our grandmothers’ clothes in contemporary fashion. I have tried some clothes on, they fitted quite well. It suits you, buy it, the [sales] man told me. I said, I can’t afford it, […] How about half of the price, he asked. I said, no, I can’t afford it. Thanks for letting me try it on. Later I went back, and tried on another one. In the meantime my students I came with started to chat with the wife of the salesman. […] And then we started to talk, that I teach in a Hungarian school [in Ukraine], and so on, and she started to pack some things. And then, imagine, she took the robe, folded it, put it in a bag, and handed it over. I said, I just can’t buy it. She said, no need for that, it’s a gift. My tears started flowing, really, it was so touching. Then I asked if I can give her a kiss, and she hugged me so lovingly. And she said, this is worth for me, you speak Hungarian so perfectly, in Transcarpathia, and she said, I talked to the children, and you are working on the development of the Hungarian culture on such a level, and they know Hungarian folk songs on such a level. […] I was almost crying. A robe worth a fortune, ok, maybe not for them, but definitely it was for me. And I’m still wearing that robe, and I’m showing off that I got it, because I am Hungarian [laughing].” (Budapest program, organizer from Transcarpathia, Ukraine)

In this encounter it is sharply revealed how the two ideological layers, one on national solidarity and heroic fight for the common national culture, the other on economic-modernization differences are strongly interwoven in such philanthropic gestures. The idea of heroic fight for national identity, culture and community provide a motivational ground and legitimate framework for donors to exercise their generosity. Expressed material desires of those admired and respected, together with the working of the modernisation discourse that states the poverty of Hungarians in Ukraine offer a way for donors to express their solidarity in concrete actions. Meanwhile, the othering effects of the modernisation discourse are suppressed, and thus the potential denigrating effects of gift-giving and helping are concealed by this very same national ideology.

The ideology of “national worth” of certain ethnic Hungarian minority communities offers a way to eliminate denigrating effects of the modernization discourse behind such philanthropic actions. It requires, however, that the addressees of help understand and identify with this ideology. There are cases when they perceive the evoking of such ideologies as confining them into alien roles and categories, as their objectification and instrumentalization to fulfill visions and desires of the initiators of such actions. Such interpretations may frequently appear in philanthropic encounters, when the recipients are members

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of communities in a late phase of assimilation into the majority Romanian, or Ukrainian society.

Misrecognition along National Ideologies

In the analysed programs in the case of Csángós of Moldavia (in the Budapest and God-parent program) and in the case of some Transcarpathian students and teachers, all living in communities of late phases of assimilation, roles related to the ideology of national survival are less familiar. Donor perspectives conceptually setting minority resistance against assimilationist states of Romania and Ukraine fail to understand that these recipients’ strategies of social mobility (education, employment) may be closely tied to the host state (Romania, or Ukraine), and to ethnically heterogeneous networks of labour migration, towards Western European or Ukrainian and Russian central regions. The ideology of national survival thus may stay blind towards processes of language-shift, language-change, identity change, as all related to such structural processes, social mobility perspectives and strategies8.

Among such circumstances, the goals of supporting minority struggles for Hungarian culture and identity are extremely difficult to translate into actions and interactions. If the logic stating the respectability and deservingness of the potential recipients is intelligible only for the initiators of support, deep suspicion and lack of trust follows on the part of potential recipients, which might hinder the act of accepting the gifts offered to them. Fear of the possible Othering regards (along the modernization slope), as well as of indebtedness both contribute to the distrust and the refusal to participate.9

Peter on his first visit to Moldavia requested to have a god-son. At the end of his twenties, after a decade of partying, “living free”, without responsibilities, he aimed to start a new, meaningful and responsible period of his life by “doing good”, taking part in a philanthropic program.

“Together with the local Hungarian language teacher, they visited a family, where the teacher announced that Tiberiu, one of the boys may become the god-son of Peter. When remaining alone with him after the ritual declaration, Tiberiu’s father, in a suspicious and uncomprehending tone, asked Peter point-blank what does he want from them, and why does he engage in such a relationship. Peter remained deeply puzzled by the ambivalent reception of his good will.” (Extract from my diary, after an informal interview with Peter)

Even if the relationship is established, ideologies of (national) sameness and worthiness, incomprehensible for the recipients, become an obstacle in philanthropic encounters. Supported children and their families occasionally or never use Hungarian in their everyday lives, and they attend Romanian and Ukrainian language public schools. Thus, they are not acquainted with Hungarian national

8 In case of Moldavian Csángó communities see chapters in Peti-Tánczos (2012). In case of Transcarpathia, Ukraine, related to linguistic strategies in the context of education, see Ferenc (2013) and Papp (2014). 9 On gift-giving implying recipients’ gratitude and indebtedness, and thus resulting in their subordination, and the reproduction of power and status hierarchies, see Bourdieu (1998).

226 Othering and Recognition discourses and the associated symbols and narratives, and they lack the knowledge of how to act according to roles prescribed by this ideology.

The initial aims of support and helping become gestures of control that may be labeled as “ethnic scolding”: continuous vigilance on the part of volunteers to promote and often enforce Hungarian language use and identification. Frequent inquiries on the identities and language use, as well as continuous attempts to persuade the recipients about their Hungarianness (Csángó students or some Transcarpathian students in the Budapest program, Csángó god-children and their families in the god-parent program) are typical of these encounters. Explicit calls to speak Hungarian, try on and wear folk costumes, sing archaic folk songs in these cases often evoke embarrassment, shame and frustration in the targeted persons, and place them in a mute and passive position in the interaction.

Reacting to Misrecognition: Exit, Strategic Actions, Resistance

As we have seen, the threat of being Othered by the discourse of the East-West slope of modernization is ubiquitous in the analyzed philanthropic encounters. This discourse may be suppressed and concealed from donor-receiver interactions by and through the use of the national ideology, that admires members of the target communities as heroic defenders of the Hungarian national culture, language and identity. However, in certain situations and communities such ideologies do carry the threat of further withdrawal of recognition. If the logic of giving and receiving and subsequent roles and behaviour are incomprehensible, or contradict identities and positions embraced by recipients, these interactions may lead to serious misrecognition. The pressure to act and identify themselves according to scripts alien to their selves, implies confinement of spaces of action and undermine self-confidence and autonomy by a deep feeling of frustration and humiliation.

A possible reaction on the part of recipients is to avoid such philanthropic encounters with donors or volunteers. This might take the form of refusing participation in the programs when the latter is present — as it is often the case with children hiding from god-parents visiting for a short time. Or may take the form of rejecting participation entirely, or quitting programs after some time. This refusal to participate has important structural consequences: misrecognition implied by discourses on underdevelopment and poverty, or epistemic violence caused by one-sided references to the ideology of national survival may be tolerated only by those children and families, who cannot afford to refuse the material and economic resources available through participation. In this way the poverty of recipients and their communities claimed by the discourse of the East-West modernization slope become empirically confirmed in these encounters, contributing to the reconstruction of such socio-geographic imaginaries. This mechanism partly accounts for the fact that children and schools in rural settlements and small towns are targeted by the analysed programs; and also explains why children from lower socio-economic background (parents working in agriculture, often pursuing labour migration on the secondary labour market of Western-European states) are included in these programs.

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However, if the addressees of help aim to benefit from the material and symbolic resources offered (for example if they cannot afford to reject them), they need to stay, and maintain the links with philanthropic actors and volunteers. A major consequence of participating in these programs is to send children to summer camps in Hungary (often to Budapest or to Lake Balaton) that these families could otherwise never afford. These journeys to Hungary, as well as the Hungarian language programs organized in the localities of their residence in Moldavia or Transcarpathia are often perceived by the recipient families as creating or broadening mobility paths for their children. In the words of an organizing teacher from Ukraine in the Budapest program:

“The language teaching part is important for the Moldavian csángós, or kids from assimilated Hungarian Diasporas in Ukraine. For us, instead, it is more important that kids have a learning experience different from that at home, they see Budapest, they see the Balaton. It is a very important starting point for us. Everyone, who achieved something in their lives [in our village], lawyers, musicians, they all participated in these language camps. They came here and saw perspectives, to study design, or to become a priest. Many families in Hungary support them, often for years.”

Such benefits may imply accommodating to donors’ expectations in the form of strategies: that is participating in the programs intentionally for the sake of benefits, while distancing themselves from the roles prescribed by the helping interactions. When acting strategically, potential recipients attempt to present themselves according to donor and volunteer expectations. In these cases, the “redistribution” component of Fraser’s participatory parity model is distorted: the actions and voice of recipients of help are confined by their material needs and their material dependence on donors. In the following extract a god-parent talks to his god-daughter and her neighbor in front of their house in the Moldavian csángó village.

“The woman tells half-ironically that she would enroll herself to the Hungarian language school, if she were given donations of clothes. She seems to be embarrassed at every word she utters in Hungarian, but always concludes by claiming how well she speaks Hungarian. After a time she seems to become aggressive and angry.” (Extract from field notes)

Such strategic actions of fulfilling donor expectations could be observed in some cases along the national ideology, recipients playing the roles of authentic Hungarians, fighting heroically against assimilation. However, such strategic actions were much less frequent along the modernization axis. Roles prescribed by discourses on poverty and underdevelopment have not been initiated by recipients in these programs, on the contrary, the majority of beneficiaries aimed at performing higher positions regarding their “levels of civilization”, as well as higher socioeconomic statuses. The East-West slope of modernization, the rural- urban, past-future, poor-wealthy oppositions projected upon each other are not only echoed by these programs, but are ubiquitous in other social spaces as well, deeply sewn into the local lifeworlds of recipients. The constant threatening discourse of underdevelopment present in the everyday lives of beneficiaries hinders that these positions could be distanced from the selves of beneficiaries, and thus hinders that these roles be occupied strategically.

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Apart from strategic accommodation to the ideologies of national survival, philanthropic encounters may also become terrains for resistance, that is, places of struggles for recognition. In what follows, we will briefly outline such interpretative strategies that contribute to counterbalance and suppress the threat of misrecognition. Ethnic scolding may thus often result in simply ignoring respective volunteer efforts. In the following extract irony and humour are used as possible tools to refuse such disciplining attempts.

“On the beach at Balaton: a student from Budapest volunteering in the program has scolded a girl from Transcarpathia that she is supposed to only speak Hungarian in the camp. The girl refused to attempt to speak Hungarian, and instead has asked, in a mocking manner, if she can use Ukrainian language at least in writing, with a piece of paper, while conversing with her friend sitting nearby. She asked it in Ukrainian, her friend translated. The two girls from Transcarpathia were laughing, the volunteer guy from Budapest tried to stay serious, with little success.” (Extract from field notes, Budapest program)

In the Budapest Program and even more in the God-parent Program supported children and their parents often openly formulate a critical stance towards the ideology of national survival. Adherence to Ukrainian or Romanian language use, the use of English as a common language with donors and volunteers (as a purposive action), or explanations on the secondary importance of Hungarian language and Hungarian identity are major gestures of this kind. One of my interviewees even before starting the interview, without me asking anything, has put a short claim on the topic (in Hungarian):

“I’ve told this several times, we will never become Hungarian Hungarians. [..] Because it’s not nice, as it is [the Hungarian csángó dialect]” Me asking: “Why do you say it’s not nice?” “Er, we are Romanian, we lived as Romanians, we were born as Romanians, we are Romanians. But this language, if we have this language, the Hungarian csángó language, we may speak it as any other language, can’t we? I speak English, I speak French, do I? It is like these, a second language.”

Rather than statements on essentialist ethnic or national identities that sociologists often seek for, these claims and declarations may be better understood as speech-acts on the part of potential beneficiaries of assuring a “safe-space” for the interaction: if listeners do not retreat from the discussion, and accept such claims, then the threat of ethnic scolding and misrecognition may be decreased, giving space for an interaction among more autonomous participants.

Another reaction of a smaller proportion of local inhabitants in Moldavia is to (re)interpret philanthropic activities in terms of tourism. For these women who are able to accommodate volunteers and donors in their homes on pay and stay basis, a market-exchange relationship is established. From this perspective volunteers’ aims of travelling to Moldavia seem hedonistic and self-directed: visiting interesting places, and being accommodated in nice and comfortable ways. Helping, philanthropic intentions of the visitors become entirely invisible, the market-based service provision offering more advantageous positions than the philanthropic relationship; at the same time national ideologies also become irrelevant.

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“They [people from Hungary] come because good people live here. They like to be here, we treat them well, so that they feel comfortable. You have to behave properly to them. Neither to talk too much to them, nor too little. They feel good staying at my place. And they also come to see the beautiful monasteries.” (Erzsike, mother of a god-child, accommodating visitors on a regular basis)

The frequent arrival of god-parents or other visitors from Hungary becomes a source of pride and recognition, while hierarchic relations of support entirely disappear from such interpretations. Also, ambiguities and misunderstandings of ethnic categories and national identifications and categorizations are eliminated through these interpretations.10

Summary and Discussion

In the present paper, we analyzed co-ethnic interactions initiated from Hungary towards minority communities considered as “ethnic Hungarian”, in the institutional context of philanthropy and volunteering. Interpretative processes built upon national ideologies have been the focus of our research. Specifically, we aimed to unearth the relationship between national categorizations embedded into national ideologies and the logic of hierarchies operating at the core of philanthropic projects. With a major emphasis on the interactive character of giving and accepting help and donations we aimed to synthesize the postcolonial discursive critique of philanthropy and volunteering with critical theoretical approaches of recognition. The use of the latter enabled us to understand the working of power through a phenomenological lens with a major focus on the experience of the recipients in philanthropic interactions.

In this comparative study on three voluntary programs aiming to support ethnic Hungarian communities in the regions of Moldavia (Romania) and Transcarpathia (Ukraine), the working of a modernization discourse coupled with national ideologies has been shortly described. Desires for community and belonging select certain sub-categories within the unitary nation that are associated with a heightened “Hungarianness” and enhanced national authenticity. An anti-global, anti-Western, anti-EU orientation of such quest for belonging links national authenticity with traditional and non-modern livelihoods, and thus implies that peripheral, often rural regions attract the attention of potential donors.

The fact that philanthropic connections will be formed with heavily deprived regions stems partly from such romantic longing for authenticity as a lack of modernity. However, as our focus on recognition reveals, it is also tied to the working of hierarchies at the heart of philanthropic relations: only those individuals and communities will risk the potential threats of Othering and denigration, that is misrecognition, who are more deprived of other forms of economic

10 This strategy of accumulating material and symbolic capital presumably affects only a narrow social stratum in these villages: women and families wealthy enough to afford accommodating guests for multiple days. Material-economic position sharply differen- tiate between families of god-children who may offer food and lodging to god-parents and other visitors related to the Hungarian language teaching program, and those who may host their supporters only for very short visits (see Zakariás, 2016).

230 Othering and Recognition and symbolic resources and capital, and whom would accept their subordinate position in return for resources offered by philanthropic programs and actions.

This paper aims to reveal interpretative processes in place that accompany such encounters, characterized by asymmetries of economic resources on one hand, and the double-layered ideological embeddedness, on the other. A previous paper (Zakariás, 2015), focusing mainly on donor perspectives, has shown how the hierarchic structure of philanthropy and its ideological premises produced and reinforced narratives of difference and devaluation either in the framework of “civilizational belatedness” or in some communities, related to national belonging and identity. The desire for community membership and belonging, however, make donors interested in maintaining philanthropic relations which in turn implies continuous efforts on their part to produce narratives of sameness and worthiness capable of incorporating the experience of difference. In this paper I intended to focus on the other side of such interactions. By referring to the theoretical apparatus offered by the post-colonial critique of volunteering and philanthropy, as well as to the theories of recognition elaborated by Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser my aim has been to provide a critical account of philanthropic interactions built upon multi-layered national ideologies operating in Hungary. Through the experience of restricted voice of recipients, either resulting from dependence on material donations, or from statuses undermined by Othering discourses, I intended to show the working of power and domination. Such a theoretical lens also enabled to reveal mechanisms of emancipation operating in these philanthropic interactions.

Othering and denigrating effects of the modernization discourse may be overwritten in those encounters, where the recipients of philanthropic actions understand and identify with ideologies of national sameness and authenticity. These national ideologies offer a means for the addressees of help to find themselves in admired and “worthy”, “deserving” positions, that is, as receiving recognition. These statuses, while limiting their identification choices, allow recipients to accept material donations without becoming indebted — that is restricted in their future actions. Furthermore, by emphasizing national deeds, the hierarchies of modernization and civilizational belatedness become covered and hidden in donor-recipient interactions. Such meanings, however, are hindered in encounters with members of communities in late phases of assimilation. In these interactions domination and denigrating hierarchies may be built upon the very same national ideologies. A possible act of resistance on the part of the recipients may be to ignore, or openly criticize references and disciplining attempts (labelled as ‘ethnic scolding’ in this paper) along national ideologies; another is the reinterpretation of philanthropic actions in terms of (touristic) exchange, in such a way that encounters become understood as equal relations, and become a source of pride and recognition.

The close-up on recognition processes contributes to revealing not only the implications of national ideologies and discourses at the heart of these philanthropic interactions, but also helps to understand national ideologies (ideas, concepts, emotions) as the outcome of these interactions. Through the case of Jewish diaspora philanthropy Lainer-Vos revealed how internal boundaries within the unified category of the nation are constructed and reconstructed in benevolent actions, thus showing how — apart from similarity and homoge-

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neity — the difference is produced while giving and receiving help. Lainer-Vos emphasized the internal boundaries in creating what he called “attachments” between the donor and the receiver, something similar to what we termed as “worthiness” in our philanthropy model.

In the case of philanthropy and volunteering towards minorities regarded as “ethnic Hungarian” this paper too has shown the (re)production of difference — the gradations of national belonging in the national imagery — in the center of philanthropic relations. However, the recognition lens allowed us to complement the model: to understand how such concepts of difference, besides “attachments” and “worthiness” are also related to another aspect of the philanthropic endeavor. Hierarchies, and the idea of needs and absences are paradoxically indispensable in the organization of such relations; and at the same time — through processes of misrecognition — constitute a continuous threat for the philanthropic project. The management of these meanings and interpretations with the aim of reducing the threat of misrecognition are thus crucial in maintaining the actions and programs. Reconstructing, strengthening or altering preexisting concepts of nationhood and national belonging become visible and comprehensible as closely tied to these processes.

Motivations for community and belonging stemming from globalization and transnationalization make large segments of the population in Hungary receptive towards national ideologies, and shift their socializing and benevolent capacities towards certain minority communities considered as “ethnic Hungarian” of high symbolic status in the Hungarian national imagery. However, instead of becoming terrains of performing “banal nationalism” as described by Michael Billig, in a non-reflected and self-explanatory manner, philanthropic initiatives and particularly personal encounters and interactions turn into struggles for recognition, and consequently set in motion ideas, notions and identities related to nationhood and ethnicity. The effect of such recognition struggles on public narratives, ideologies and discourses, their changes, or the lack thereof, has to be further studied.

References Bárdi Nándor (2013) Different Images of the Future of the Hungarian Communities in Neighbouring Countries, 1989-2012, European Review, 21, pp. 530-552. Bourdieu Pierre (1998) Practical Reason: on the Theory of Action, Cambridge, Polity Press, 153 p. Brubaker Rogers (1995) National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe, Daedalus, 124 (2), pp. 107-132. Brubaker Rogers, Feischmidt Margit, Fox Jon and Grancea Liana (2006) Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town, Princeton University Press, 439 p. Cramer Kevin (2016) Philanthropy, Race, and Religion: The Gustav Adolf Association and National Socialism, in Gergory Witkowski and Arnd Bauerkämper Eds., German Philanthropy in Transatlantic Perspective, Cham, Springer, pp. 57-74.

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Feischmidt Margit (2005) The localization of Hungarian discourses on authenticity to Transylvania. Introduction. [A magyar nacionalizmus autenticitás diskurzusainak szimbolikus térfoglalása Erdélyben], in Margit Feischmidt Ed., Deconstructing Transylvania [Erdély-(de)konstrukciók], Ethnographic Museum, Budapest, Dep. of Communication and Media Studies University of Pécs, pp. 5-28. Feischmidt Margit, Glózer Rita, Kasznár Katalin, Ilyés Zoltán and Zakariás Ildikó (2014) Nationhood in Everyday Life. The popular culture of neonationalism [Nemzet a mindennapokban. Az újnacionalizmus populáris kultúrája], Budapest, L’Harmattan, 473 p. Feischmidt Margit and Pulay Gergely (2016) Rocking the nation’: the popular culture of neo-nationalism, Nations and Nationalism, 23 (2), pp. 309-326. Ferenc Viktória (2013) School choice in Subcarpathia: The case of Beregszász (Berehovo), Minority Studies: Demography, Minority Education, Ethnopolitics, 15, pp. 161-184. Flanigan Shawn Theresa (2016) Crowdfunding and Diaspora Philanthropy: An Integration of the Literature and Major Concepts, VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 28 (2), pp. 492-509. Fox Jon (2007) From national inclusion to economic exclusion. Ethnic Hungarian labour migration to Hungary, Nations and Nationalism, 13 (1), pp. 77-96. Fox Jon and Miller-Idriss Cynthia (2008) Everyday Nationhood, Ethnicities, 8 (4), pp. 536-576. Fraser Nancy and Honneth Axel (2003) Redistribution or recognition? A philo- sophical exchange, London, Verso, 276 p. Geertz Clifford (1973) Ideology as a Cultural System, in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, New York, Basic Books, pp. 193-233. Gingrich Andre and Banks Marcus (2006) Neo-nationalism in Europe and beyond: perspectives from social anthropology, New York, Berghahn Books, 303 p. Hall Stuart and Gieben Bram (1992) Formations of modernity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 352 p. Heron Barbara (2007) Desire for Development-Whiteness, Gender and the Helping Imperative, Waterloo, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 191 p. Holmes Douglas R. (2000) Integral Europe: Fast-Capitalism, Multiculturalism, Neofascism, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 280 p. Honneth Axel (1992) Integrity and Disrespect, Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on the Theory of Recognition, Political Theory, 20 (2), pp. 187-201. Ilyés Zoltán (2011) The Csángós of Moldavia, in Bárdi, Nándor és Fedinec, Csilla és Szarka, László Eds., Minority Hungarian communities in the twentieth century. East European Monographs, 774, New York, Boulder, Columbia University Press, 859 p. Kapoor Ilan (2005) Participatory Development, Complicity and Desire, Third World Quarterly, 26 (8), pp. 1203-1220. Kiss Tamás (2015) Increasing Marginality, Ethnic Parallelism and Asymmetric Accommodation. Social and Political Processes Concerning the Hungarian Community of Transylvania, Minority Studies, 18, pp. 33-69.

233 Ildikó Zakariás

Komter Aafke (2005) Social Solidarity and the Gift, New York, Cambridge University Press, 234 p. Kürti László (2002) The Remote Borderland - Transylvania in the Hungarian Imagination, New York, State University of New York Press, 259 p. Lainer-Vos Dan (2014) Brothers’ keepers: gift giving networks and the organization of Jewish American diaspora nationalism, Socio-Economic Review, 12 (3), pp. 463-488. Lazzeri Christian and Caillé Alain (2006) Recognition Today. The Theoretical, Ethical and Political Stakes of the Concept, Critical Horizons, 7 (1), pp. 63-100. Melegh Attila (2006) On the East/West Slope. Globalization, Nationalism, Racism and Discourses on Central and Eastern Europe, New York, Budapest, CEU Press, 220 p. Newland Kathleen, Terrazas Aaron and Munster Roberto (2010) Diaspora Philanthropy: Private Giving and Public Policy, Washington, D. C., Migration Policy Institute, [online]. URL: www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/diasporas-philanthropy.pdf Papp Z. Attila (2014) Selecting a Majority-Language School by Hungarian Minority Students, or From PISA Results to Discourses in the Carpathian Basin, Minority Studies: Demography, Minority Education, Ethnopolitics, 17, pp. 89-101. Peti Lehel (2011) “Wearied respondents”. The Structure of Saving the Csángós and its Effects on their Identity Building Strategies, in Barszczewska Agnieszka and Lehel Peti Eds., Integrating Minorities: Traditional Communities and Modernization, Cluj-Napoca, The Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities - Kriterion, pp. 243-267. Peti Lehel and Tánczos Vilmos (2012) Language Use, Attitudes, Strategies: linguistic identity and ethnicity in the Moldavian Csángó villages, Cluj-Napoca, The Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities, 286 p. Pogonyi Szabolcs (2017) Extra-Territorial Ethnic Politics, Discourses and Identities in Hungary, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 200 p.

Pulay Gergő (2006) Ethnicity, citizenship, labour market categorization [Etnicitás, állampolgárság és munkaerőpiaci kategorizáció], Regio, 3, pp. 25-42. Simon Boglárka (2012) How do the Csángós “get ahead”? The linguistic strategies of avowal versus identity concealment in a Moldavian community, in Lehel Peti and Vilmos Tánczos Eds., Language Use, Attitudes, Strategies. Linguistic Identity and Ethicity in the Moldavian Csángó Villages, Cluj-Napoca, The Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities, pp. 203-232. Spivak Gayatri (1988) Can the Subaltern Speak?, in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg Eds., Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Urbana, University of Illinois, pp. 271-313. Tánczos Vilmos (2012) Csángó language ideologies, in Lehel Peti and Vilmos Tánczos Eds., Language Use, Attitudes, Strategies. Linguistic Identity and Ethicity in the Moldavian Csángó Villages, Cluj-Napoca, The Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities, pp. 203-232.

Tátrai Patrik, Erőss Ágnes and Kovály Katalin (2017) Kin-state politics stirred by a geopolitical conflict: Hungary’s growing activity in post-Euromaidan Transcarpathia, Ukraine, Hungarian Geographical Bulletin, 66 (3), pp. 203-218.

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Zakariás Ildikó (2016) Solidarity and Power In Voluntary Programs of Hungarian Ethnic Kin Support [Szolidaritás és hatalom a kisebbségi magyarokra irányuló jótékonyságban], PhD Dissertation, Budapest, Corvinus University of Budapest. Zakariás Ildikó (2015) The Production of Solidarity: A Case Study of Voluntary School Programs of Ethnic Kin Support, in Jochen Kleres and Yvonne Albrecht Eds., Die Ambivalenz der Gefühle: Über die verbindende und widersprüchliche Sozialität von Emotionen, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 145-169. Zombory Máté (2012) Maps of Remembrance: Space, belonging and politics of memory in Eastern Europe, Budapest, L’Harmattan, 312 p.

235 Résumé - Abstract - Resumen

Ildikó Zakariás Othering and Recognition: National Ideologies in Donor- Recipient Encounters in Hungarian Co-Ethnic Philanthropy

The paper analyses minority — kin-state relations in the context of philanthropy initiated from Hungary, supporting ethnic Hungarian minority communities abroad. It focuses on the role of national ideologies and their reproduction in philanthropic interactions. Relying upon postcolonial theories of giving and helping, as well as theories of recognition it shows that the working of such national ideologies are intimately tied to donor-recipient binary positions, hierarchies and power relations. By providing the value system behind solidarity, national ideologies may carry the potentials of recognition of recipients. However, such ideologies simoultaneously offer assymmetric positions for participants of helping interactions, Othering recipients, and implying their misrecognition. These processes, with a major emphasis on recipient perspectives will be described in the paper, based on qualitative data collected between 2009 and 2014 in three philanthropic programs, promoting Hungarian language education, and supporting Hungarian language teachers, schools and children and their families in Moldavia (Romania) and Transcarpathia (Ukraine).

Altérisation et reconnaissance : les idéologies nationales dans les rencontres donateurs-bénéficiaires en philanthropie co-ethnique hongroise

L’article analyse les relations entre les minorités et leur mère patrie dans le contexte de la philanthropie initiée en Hongrie, visant à soutenir les minorités ethniques hongroises à l’étranger. Il met l’accent sur le rôle des idéologies nationales et leur reproduction dans les interactions philanthropiques. En s’appuyant sur les théories postcoloniales et les théories de la reconnaissance, il montre que le fonctionnement de telles idéologies nationales est intimement lié aux positions binaires, aux hiérarchies et aux relations de pouvoir entre donateurs et bénéficiaires. En fournissant le système de valeurs qui sous-tend la solidarité, les idéologies nationales peuvent porter le potentiel de reconnaissance des bénéficiaires. Cependant, ces idéologies offrent simultanément des positions asymétriques aux participants des interactions d’aide, impliquant leur méconnaissance. Ces processus seront décrits dans cet article, sur la base de données qualitatives recueillies dans trois programmes philanthropiques, visant à promouvoir l’enseignement de la langue hongroise dans les communautés minoritaires hongroises en Roumanie et en Ukraine.

236 Résumé - Abstract - Resumen

Alterización y reconocimiento: ideologías nacionales en los encuentros entre donantes y receptores en la filantropía coétnica húngara

El artículo analiza las relaciones entre las minorías y su patria en el contexto de la filantropía iniciada en Hungría, destinada a apoyar a las minorías étnicas húngaras en el extranjero. Se centra en el papel de las ideologías nacionales y su reproducción en las interacciones filantrópicas. Basándose en teorías postcoloniales y de reconocimiento, muestra que el funcionamiento de estas ideologías nacionales está íntimamente ligado a posiciones binarias, jerarquías y relaciones de poder entre donantes y beneficiarios. Al proporcionar el sistema de valores que sustenta la solidaridad, las ideologías nacionales pueden aportar el potencial para el reconocimiento de los beneficiarios. Sin embargo, estas ideologías ofrecen simultáneamente posiciones asimétricas a los participantes en las interacciones de ayuda, lo que implica su falta de reconocimiento. Estos procesos se describirán en este artículo, basado en datos cualitativos recogidos en tres programas filantrópicos, destinados a promover la enseñanza de la lengua húngara en las comunidades minoritarias húngaras de Rumania y Ucrania.

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REMi Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 2019, 35 (1 & 2), pp. 239-250

Chronique juridique

Refugee Protection in Australia: Policies and Practice Mary Crock1

A Study in Contrasts

Australia remains a “New World” country in the sense that its population base and continuing growth is built on immigration. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) reports that in the 2016 census over 28% of Australians were born overseas. Australia is in a tiny minority of states that accepts refugees for resettlement through United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) programs. Since World War II the country has accepted for resettlement almost 1 million refugees. However, the generosity of its formal admission programs contrast sharply with its treatment of asylum seekers and irregular migrants, most particularly those who arrive by boat without authorisation. In recent years, Australia’s policies and practice in this area have become increasingly extreme, attracting sustained criticism in various international fora.

In Australia’s case, undocumented maritime migrants have almost always presented as asylum seekers rather than as irregular migrants per se. This means that “irregular maritime arrivals” (IMAs) arrive typically in search of protection as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and subsequent Protocol. Historically, the vast majority have been found to be persons who are actually owed protection under the Refugee Convention.2 In other words, most IMAs in Australia come in search protection rather than lifestyle improvement. This fact seems to have had little bearing on successive governments who have seen electoral advantage in the adoption of regressive and constrictive policies.

In recent years Australia has become perhaps the leading exponent amongst developed states of interdiction and offshore processing and warehousing of refugees. The policy is predicated on “breaking the business model” of people smugglers by denying refugees access to Australian territory. Refugees and asylum seekers transferred to the tiny Pacific state of Nauru and Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) Manus Island have languished for years in primitive, challenging

1 Professor of Public Law, Law School, The University of Sydney, Law School Building (F10), Eastern Ave, Camperdown NSW 2006, Australia; [email protected] 2 For example, in 1998-1999, approximately 97% of Iraqi and 92% of Afghan applicants, the vast majority of whom had arrived by boat, were granted refugee status.

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environments.3 Suffering all manner of hardships and privations, a number have succumbed to violence, suicide and preventable illnesses.

In one of his first phone calls to foreign leaders in 2017, President Trump had the following exchange with then Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull (who was trying to persuade the President to honour a refugee swap deal between the United States and Australia):

TRUMP: “Why haven’t you let them out? Why have you not let them into your society?” TURNBULL: “Okay, I will explain why. It is not because they are bad people. It is because in order to stop people smugglers, we had to deprive them of the product. So we said if you try to come to Australia by boat, even if we think you are the best person in the world, even if you are a Noble [sic] Prize winning genius, we will not let you in. Because the problem with the people.” TRUMP: “That is a good idea. We should do that too. You are worse than I am.”

Some of those caught by Australia’s restrictive measures are, indeed, extraordinary people. As I was writing this piece, Australia’s richest writing prize was awarded to a stateless Kurd incarcerated on Manus Island for more than five years. Behrouz Boochani’s work is a lengthy prose poem that documents the experience of Australia’s exiles. It was written using a mobile phone and short text messages sent to his Australian translator (Boochani, 2018).

In this piece I offer a reflection on how Australia has come to adopt asylum policies and practices that are mutually conflicting, cruel and confusing. Some elements in the Australian story suggest an alignment with Asian Pacific approaches to human rights. At the same time, the deterioration in its treatment of irregular migrants has been reflective of a more global decline in respect for the rule of international law in the face of political expediency.

The essay begins with a brief account of IMA migration flows in Australia’s region to give context to the discussion. There follows an overview of the international and domestic legal frameworks and how these have been changed in response to different migration events. In the process, I explore the arguments made by Australia in defence of its punitive policies and practice. The reflection concludes with some comments on the political discourse in Australia, and on the potential for practical reform going forward.

Australia and Irregular Migration Flows in the Asia Pacific

By luck or good fortune, Australia’s experience of migration has traditionally been a controlled affair. As an island continent geographically remote from major populations of people on the move, it has avoided many of the problems

3 In mid-2014 2,450 asylum seekers were detained on Nauru and Manus Island, 220 of them children. By early 2019 1,000 remained in custody, with all children removed to either Australia or the United States under an agreement brokered with out-going President Obama, honoured reluctantly by President Trump. See Bevan Shield, “All refugee Children off Nauru within days”, The Sun-Herald, 3 February 2019, 1 and 12. See further, https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/research-briefs

240 Refugee Protection in Australia associated with land borders. Against a population of just over 27 million and cross border movements exceeding 4 million, annual estimates of the number of migrants in the country without appropriate authorisation have remained remarkably constant at between 50,000 and 60,000.4 Most of these are “over- stayers”, individuals who have entered the country on valid temporary visas and then overstayed their allotted time. Such people may be in the country unlaw- fully but to a certain extent they are a known entity.

Apart from early conflicts with the nation’s First peoples, Australia’s experience of war has been vicarious (Reynolds, 1982; Connor, 2002). Its soldiers have largely fought abroad, or it has felt the effects of conflict through those given refuge on its shores. Ordinary Australians have not had to live in fear of bombardments or the deprivations of famine. Whether this privileged existence has produced a “empathy” deficit in Australians is an open question. In historical terms the country has certainly embraced migration, but on its own terms. The racially selective immigration policies that dominated until the early 1970s were reflective, at least in part, of white Australians’ feelings of cultural isolation, if not fear.

What is clear is that the arrival of boats carrying undocumented migrants engenders extraordinary concern in Australia. “Boat people” — a phrase coined in response to the outflow of refugees from Vietnam in the 1970s — almost invariably attract shrill media responses, reflective perhaps of a long-held phobia of invasion by sea.

Australia’s experience of maritime asylum seekers has been episodic. Together with my colleague Daniel Ghezelbash, I have identified at least five “waves” of irregular boat arrivals in Australia starting with the end of the war in Vietnam. We argue that each wave has been marked by clearly identifiable “push factors” in the form of crises that have encouraged departures at particular points in time. Because arrivals have presented as asylum seekers, with specific protection claims made against their countries of origin, identifying common complaints or concerns is relatively easy. The number of IMAs in each wave also reflects the efficacy of measures taken to stem or control the exodus of people in each instance.

For example, a little more than 1,000 refugees arrived in Australia by boat from Vietnam between 1978 and 1980. Incidentally, because of Australia’s alignment with the losing side in this war, all of those arriving by boat were offered protection almost immediately (Crock and Berg, 2011).5 This relatively small number of arrivals can be explained by the multi-lateral management plans devised by the coalition of countries involved in the war in Vietnam. These included the Orderly Departure Program (devised in conclusion with the new government in Vietnam) and the regional resettlement plan known as the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) (Robinson, 2004; Helton, 1993).

4 Government reporting methods after 2016 make it very difficult to determine overstay rates because of the almost complete absence of published statistical data. 5 Note, however, that the experience of the boat arrivals was a factor leading to the establishment in Australia of the first formal mechanisms for the determination of refugee status.

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Almost ten years were to pass before the second wave of IMAs in Australia. Between November 1989 and 1991 235 mostly Sino-Vietnamese asylum seekers travelled from Cambodia by boat, once again landing in the North of Australia in and around Darwin. The arrivals coincided not so much with the genocide in Cambodia but with the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from that country, the organisation of elections and the repatriation to Cambodia of thousands of refugees from neighbouring countries. The tiny number arriving in Australia on this occasion met with a decidedly hostile reception. It is from this period on that policies in Australia to detain and deter “irregular” migrants were established and then entrenched. These events also marked the beginning of an era of extraordinary conflict between the executive government in Australia and the Courts over who should control immigration (Crock, 1993: chap. 4).

The third wave of IMAs followed immediately, reflecting first China’s crushing of pro-democracy advocates and then initiatives in China and across the region to resolve the situation of exiles from Vietnam who were living in camps or in shanty towns. This period saw the rise of regional people smugglers in China and South East Asia known as “Snake Heads”. For the first time IMAs in Australia presented as more of a mixed group comprising both refugees and individuals seeking economic advancement who were not found to be in need of protection under international law.

In the mid-1990s, the Asia Pacific went from being a host and source region for (local) refugees to a transit point for irregular migrants from around the globe. The shutting down of traditional migration routes throughout Europe brought about by tougher (and harmonised) policies within the European Union may have been one factor in the rise of unauthorized migration in the Asia Pacific. The network effect of migrants in Australia and Australia’s engagement in conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Middle East generally may have been other influences (Beine et al., 2015). Whatever the cause, by 1999 Australia was receiving most of its IMAs from outside the Asia Pacific.

This fourth wave of IMAs coincided with the start of the second war in Iraq, increases in the persecution of Kurdish and Shia minorities by the Bathist regime of Saddam Hussein and the excoriating effect of the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations (UN).6 Many of the IMAs from Afghanistan were ethnic Hazara who were facing persecution at the hands of the Taliban in that country (Sparrow, 2005).

In many instances, IMAs were using countries in the region — in particular Indonesia and Malaysia — as transit points. People smuggling operations had become both more extensive and global in their reach and operations. This became a major problem for Australia. Indonesia became the main staging point for boat departures and instead of heading for mainland Australia, smugglers began delivering their human cargo to Australian Indian Ocean territories such as Christmas Island and Ashmore Reef. Whereas earlier waves involved IMAs arriving in groups of thirty or less, as the 1990s wore on the smugglers became more and more commercialised and audacious. When boats began arriving carrying close to 500 IMAs, it was clear that the problem had reached crisis proportions.

6 UN Security Council Resolution 661 and 666.

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In Australia this fourth wave peaked with the interception of the MV Tampa, a Norwegian flagged cargo ship that had responded to distress calls by an Indonesian ferry, the Palapa V which was sinking in the High Seas with 433 passengers and crew on board. When the Tampa attempted to deliver its “rescuees” to Australian authorities on Christmas Island, the government closed the ports and sent its military to board and secure the vessel. If these actions were not themselves dramatic enough to attract global interest, the ensuing battle in the Australian courts coincided exactly with the terrorist attacks in North America on 9 September 2011. These events marked the beginning of a suite of interdiction and deflection policies known variously as the Pacific Solution or Strategy described in Part 3. They also saw a shift towards the re-characterisa- tion of asylum in Australia as an issue of national security. This was in spite of the fact that the “rescuees” on board the Tampa were overwhelmingly confirmed over time to be Convention refugees. That is, they were found to be persons fleeing the terrors of persecution (Marr and Wilkinson, 2003).

The fifth wave of IMAs to Australia shared many of the characteristics of the fourth wave. The short story is that initiatives taken following the Tampa Affair were successful in stopping irregular maritime migration for a period. With the change of government in 2007, however, the smugglers resumed their trade. On this occasion push factors included ongoing strife in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka and (later) troubles in Myanmar. However, the identity of asylum seekers passing through the Asia Pacific region became truly global, with people seeking asylum from Sudan and Somalia as well as from the Middle East and later from Syria. The flow of IMA boats was halted with the re-introduction of interdiction and push-back operations. Since 2013, virtually all boats carrying IMAs have been returned to their ports of departure. As I explore in the following section, these actions have been one part only of a suite of measures that have placed Australia in an increasingly uncomfortable relationship with international human rights law.

Legal Frameworks and Practical Gaps in the Protection of Migrants and Refugees in Australia

Australia’s legal and cultural heritage lies with England and Europe. For an antipodean colonial outpost, it is has pulled above its weight in international affairs and the creation of international humanitarian law. It was a driving force behind the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the so-called International Bill of Rights.7 Australia’s accession to the Refugee Convention brought the instrument into force. It has since become party to most of the key international human rights conventions.8 Australia has supported the work of UNHCR and developed sophisticated mechanisms for determining refugee status in individuals seeking protection. These recognise the central tenet of the Convention that “refugees” as defined should not be returned (or

7 Which include in addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). 8 Exceptions include those relating to migrant workers.

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“refouled”) to a place where they face persecution on one of the five Convention grounds. It has signed on to Protocols that allow individuals to bring complaints against it under the ICCPR, The Convention Against Torture and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, to cite a few examples.

What sets the country apart, however, is that Australia has never enacted a national Bill of Rights or otherwise enshrined the main tenets of its international human rights obligations into its domestic law. The Migration Act 1958 does provide for a form of complementary or subsidiary protection for persons fearing return to torture or other serious abuse of human rights but it has not otherwise formally enacted the provisions of the core conventions into domestic law. Another defining aspect of the Australian human rights story is that it is situated in a region where few countries have signed on to the international regime governing refugee protection. In the Asia Pacific no regional system exists for the recognition and protection of human rights.

In this part I will trace the changes made over time to Australian law and policy relating to refugees and migrants. Over the years, the legislative and policy response to irregular migration in general and IMAs in particular suggests increasingly dissonance with its international legal commitments.

While younger Australians see the Tampa Affair as the starting point for modern refugee law in Australia, the move towards harsh and restrictive policies really dates back to the 1980s and the decision to withdraw the welcome mat from the IMAs arriving from Cambodia at the end of that decade. Then Prime Minister Bob Hawke captured the mood of his (Labor) government when he addressed the asylum seekers with this quip: “Bob’s not your uncle on this issue. We are not going to allow people just to jump that queue”.9

Under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) it had always been possible to detain persons who entered the country without permission or who infringed the law and became liable for deportation. However, these laws were used sparingly and individuals rarely spent lengthy periods in detention. Moreover, the law allowed for regular oversight of the detention process. The Cambodians, however, were taken into custody in 1989 without the involvement of the judiciary. Nor were they given immediate access to legal or other advice. The government argued that because the group had not gone through an immigration clearance process they were deemed not to have entered the country such that the usual legislation did not apply. When these arguments failed in courts of law, the government decided to put physical space between the asylum seekers and their supporters. The Cambodians were moved from Melbourne to Sydney, then to Darwin. In 1991 the first remote detention facility was established at a disused mining camp at Port Hedland. These arrangements allowed the government to control closely who had access to the detainees.

A legal challenge brought on behalf of 15 of the Cambodians prompted legislative change to the Migration Act 1958 which was upheld by the High

9 Interview with Jana Wendt, 6 June 1990, cited in Frank Brennan (2003) Tampering with Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem, UQP, 36.

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Court.10 The amendments mandated the detention of IMAs arriving in Australia between specified date for a period of 273 days. It is worth noting that the High Court showed no interest in arguments based on Australia’s obligations not to arbitrarily detain individuals under the ICCPR. The Cambodians became the first of a long line of refugees and asylum seekers who have had complaints against Australia upheld by the United Nations Human Rights Committee.11 In recent years, Committee criticisms have been roundly ignored (Crock and Ghezelbash, 2010: note 86ff).

The bizarre and confusing treatment of the Cambodian IMAs12 set the scene for humanitarian migration policy in Australia for some time. After the crackdown on pro-democracy activists in China in 1989, Australia found itself host to nearly 40,000 young Chinese students. This time Prime Minister Bob Hawke went on national television to denounce the Chinese government, declaring that no Chinese student would be forced to go home. At a policy level, however, his government moved to grant the students who had arrived in the “regular” way (by plane) temporary protection visas. In 1993, this foray into temporary status was abandoned and virtually all of the Chinese asylum seekers were granted status under a formal amnesty program.

IMAs, however, continued to be detained pending determination of their asylum claims, in increasingly remote detention centres. In 1994, amendments to the Migration Act 1958 made detention mandatory and universal for all migrants in Australia who did not hold a visa or other authority to be in Australia. Critically, the post 1994 regime operated entirely without oversight from any judicial authority. Previous provisions were removed which had required suspected unlawful migrants to be arrested and brought before a magistrate within fourty-eight hours (and after arrest, every seven days until their status was determined). It is no coincidence that the same amending legislation also introduced dramatic changes to judicial oversight of migration decision making, with provisions that constrained the grounds on which the Federal Courts could review migration decisions.13 Because the Constitution guaranteed access to the High Court, within a few years this court had assumed a paralysing burden of judicial review applications involving migrants and refugee claimants, many of the latter being IMAs.14

By the end of the 1990s, with political and practical pressures around the treatment of IMAs coming to a head, the then conservative Coalition government re-introduced temporary protection visas. The government was languishing in

10 Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 172 CLR I. 11 A v Australia Communication No 560/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (30 April 1997). 12 The Cambodians would eventually spend some four years in detention before arrangements were made to first return them to Cambodia for a period of twelve months, after which they were all sponsored for re-entry into Australia. Within the context of South East Asian politics, it should be acknowledged that the situation in Cambodia was extremely complex. The asylum seekers arriving in Australia were among many who had fled the country to seek protection in the region. 13 See Migration Act 1958, s 474 ff. 14 Ibid.

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the polls and seemed almost certain to be defeated in the elections due in October 2001. The arrival of the Tampa operated as a political circuit breaker. Then Prime Minister John Howard gained considerable political capital by adopting strong-man tactics, denying entry to the asylum seekers on board the rescue vessel.

It is worth noting that Howard was in Washington DC at the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. His ensuing decision to conflate border control with national security therefore had a personal aspect to it. The stand-off with the MV Tampa was resolved through the intervention of UNHCR and arrangements with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Nauru, Papua New Guinea (PNG), New Zealand and Norway. The Tampa asylum seekers, along with others intercepted at sea around the same period, were transferred to Nauru or PNG’s Manus Island, with some families and unaccompanied children accepted for immediate resettlement in New Zealand and Norway. At the same time, “Operation Relex” was instituted to intercept asylum seeker boats at sea, where possible returning them to Indonesia. All of these measures were hugely controversial at the time, attracting vociferous protest in some quarters but enjoying equal and opposite support from popularist media commentators — and the silent majority (Marr and Wilkinson, 2003). Legal challenges failed in the superior courts (Crock and Berg, 2011: chap. 4).

In the wake of the Tampa Affair the conservative Coalition prevailed at the Federal election in October 2001. The government also won bi-partisan support for a suite of legislative and policy measures that placed increasing distance between Australia’s domestic laws and its international legal obligations. These included legislation to legitimate retrospectively all actions taken in the course of the Tampa Affair and the establishment of Operation Relex, as well as laws “excising” territories outside mainland Australia from the “migration zone”. The interdiction and “offshore processing” scheme adopted by Australia was extraordinary but not unique in terms of state practice. The system was modelled largely on similar practices adopted by the United States in the 1990s to deny asylum seekers from Haiti access to US territory, with a holding and processing centre established at Guantanamo Bay (Ghezelbash, 2018). The parallels between Australian and US practice since that time have only increased over time. The aim in both countries has been to create “exceptional” spaces in the law where the Rule of Law would not apply. In both instances the attempts have enjoyed some but not complete success.

In 2004 a series of legal challenges were made to the mandatory detention laws in the High Court. The Court affirmed the power in government to detain non-citizens whatever their age, the length of their detention and whatever the conditions in which they were kept. However, the judiciary did push back against legislative attempts to restrict access to judicial oversight either directly or indirectly through artificial constructions of territory and decision making structures (Crock and Berg, 2011). In 2012, a (Labor) government also suffered a significant defeat when a challenge was made to a regional arrangement to transfer IMA asylum seekers to Malaysia in exchange for refugees processed in that country by UNHCR (Kneebone and Pickring, 2007).

246 Refugee Protection in Australia

In more recent years the general trend in the courts to support government policy relating to asylum seekers and refugees has strengthened (Gleeson, 2016). Regrettably, the overall effect has been that domestic legal challenges have become less and less relevant. The battle lines in the human rights law have been drawn increasingly between the politicians and between the political classes and civil society.

In between, there can be little doubt about the human impact of Australia’s policies. Wherever Australia has held asylum seekers over time and in remote locations, human rights abuses have followed. Detainees have committed suicide, engaged in self-harm and in harmful actions towards each other. They have suffered abuse at the hands of their guards. Women and children have been sexually and physically abused; children have developed resignation syndrome, some becoming unresponsive and even catatonic. This has been the case both in the detention centres established across Australia and on the Australian territory of Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean. It has been equally true of the centres established abroad which have been run at Australia’s behest under the ostensible authority of Nauru and PNG (Gleeson, 2016).

The Politics of Refugee Protection in Australia

In some instances, victory for the government in the courts has provided political space for insiders to push for more compassionate treatment. For example, in 2005, pressure from within the government lead to the release of many long term detainees who were (eventually) granted permanent resident visas.15 The Migration Act was amended to provide that the incarceration of children should be a measure of “last resort”; Manus Island and the camps on Nauru were closed. The last of the Tampa era refugees had been granted residence in Australia by the time Labor came to power in 2007.16

In my view, the most damaging aspect of this history, however, is the extent to which the containment of IMAs became a vehicle for political point scoring. In 2001, the strong arm tactics against the Tampa helped build the electoral fortunes of a government struggling in the polls. When the conservative Coalition lost power in 2007 and boats carrying IMAs began again, it found electoral capital in urging a return to policies and practices known to be contrary to basic tenets of humanitarian law. In the face of a concerted campaign that it had gone “soft” on border control the Labor government executed a series of backflips. It re-introduced de facto temporary protection in the form of suspen- sion in the processing of refugee claims by asylum seekers from Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. A rather ham-fisted attempt was made to emulate the Coalition’s push-back policy with the return to Indonesia a group of asylum seekers inter- dicted en route to Australia.

15 Mr Al-Kateb was granted a subclass 695 “Return Pending visa” which allowed him to leave detention but with no right to work or to medical or other benefits. He was granted permanent residence in December 2006. 16 ABC News (2004) Last Detainee Leaves Manus Island, May 30, [online]. URL: http:// www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2004/05/30/1119172.htm

247 Mary Crock

The irony of the situation is that the so called “softening” of asylum policy after the election of the Labor government in 2007 was more about perceptions than substantive change to law and policy. The changes made by Labor were neither radical, nor did they alter the mainstays of the structures set up under the Coalition. At the same time, they were made in the context of a period of increasing internal political dysfunction. By the time the government changed again in 2013, Labor had changed its leadership twice in the space of three years (Gleeson Kaldocentre). The failure to manage the influx of IMAs arguably played into this chaos.

After 2013, the harshness of Australia’s treatment of IMAs increased exponentially as the Conservative government doubled down on its electoral promise that it would “Stop the Boats”. While it was Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd who decreed that no IMA should ever be allowed to resettle in Australia, it was successor, conservative, Prime Ministers who prosecuted this policy, albeit unevenly. As Nauru and Manus Island had very small capacities not all IMAs could be transferred. Who was chosen for exile became highly arbitrary, which in itself provided scope for cruelty in the form of arbitrary separation of family groups.

Two signature changes were made to government policy and practice in and after 2013. The first was the adoption of turn-back and return policies. In the early days this included using high visibility orange inflatable boats on to which IMAs rescued at sea were loaded and then returned to Indonesia (Kaldorcentre). The second and equally important initiative was that the Conservative government “shut down the shipping news”, taking complete control over what information was made public about “on-water operations”, who was arriving and what was happening to IMAs. The effect was to create both the appearance of and the framework for control. And it worked.

The simple point to make is that international human rights and the Rule of Law ceased to be so much part of the discourse in Australia. To the extent that politicians were prepared to acknowledge the harm being done to detainees and to the IMAs transferred offshore, the almost universal justification became the assertion that the measures were necessary to save deaths at sea. These arguments persisted even as a succession of IMAs transferred to Nauru and Manus Island died or suffered injuries of sufficient gravity to require medical evacuation to Australia.

Interestingly, the Minister charged with developing and implementing the turn back and offshore processing strategies came from a background in commercial advertising. He was succeeded by a more traditional “strong-man” personality who actively promoted bureaucrats who would weed out the “care bears”. Minister Dutton oversaw a major re-structuring of government functions with the amalgamation of immigration, customs and national security into the one super-department of Home Security. What had been the Department of Immigration and Citizenship became the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. It is a measure of the political power accrued in this space that when the Conservatives succumbed to their own internecine dysfunction in 2018, the two contenders (Peter Dutton and Scott Morrison) who emerged for the position of Prime Minster were both past or present Ministers with responsibility for immigration.

248 Refugee Protection in Australia

Whether its geopolitical location has contributed to Australia’s pursuit of laws and policies that are plainly at odds with its obligations under human rights law is an open question. What is clear is that not all of the policies claimed as effective in “Stopping the Boats” are sustainable. The maintenance of holding and processing centres on Nauru and Manus Island has been hugely expensive in terms of fiscal and human cost. Offshore processing is reputed to cost Australia in excess of three billion Australian dollars a year, while its policies had been linked to a disturbing number of at least twelve deaths by 2019. While the swap agreement with the United States has seen some transferees released to a new life, resolution has been painfully slow and incomplete. With the prospect of a change of government in the 2019 Federal election, the resolution of the situation of the thousands of IMAs affected by Australia’s restrictive policies (both offshore and in the country) should have been a matter of pressing concern. The fact that the issue did not feature in the campaign underscores the political sensitivity of the issue. In fact, the conservatives were re-elected with a slim majority. For detainees in Australia and for those warehoused offshore, the cruel uncertainty has continued even as refugees have slowly been resettled in the US or transferred to Australia for medical treatment.

References Alnasrawi Abbass (2000) Iraq: Economic Embargo and Predatory Rule, in E. Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart and Raimo Väyrynen Eds., Hunger, and Displacement: The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies, Volume 2, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 516 p. Beine Michel, Docquier Frédéric and Ozden Caglar (2015) Dissecting Network Externalities in International Migration, Journal of Demographic Economics, 4, pp. 379-408. Boochani Behrouz (2018) No Friend but the Mountains: Writing from Manus Prison, Sydney, Picador, 374 p. Connor John (2002) The Australian frontier wars, 1788-1838, Sydney, UNSW Press, 175 p. Courtland Robinson W. (2004) The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989-1997: Sharing the Burden and Passing the Buck, Journal of Refugees Studies, 17 (3), pp. 319-333. Crock Mary (1993) A legal perspective on the evolution of mandatory detention, in Mary Crock Ed., Protection or Punishment: The Detention of Asylum Seekers in Australia, Sydney, Federation Press, pp. 25-40. Crock Mary and Berg Laurie (2011) Immigration, Forced Migration and Refugee: Law, Policy and Practice in Australia, Sydney, Federation Press, 698 p. Crock Mary and Ghezelbash Daniel (2010) Do Loose Lips Bring Ships? The Role of Policy, Politics and Human Rights in Managing Unauthorised Boat Arrivals, Griffith Law Review, 19 (2), pp. 238-287 Ghezelbash Daniel (2018) Refuge Lost: Asylum Law in an Interdependent World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 225 p.

249 Mary Crock

Gleeson Madeline (2016) Offshore: Behind the Wire on Manus and Nauru, Sydney, New South Publishing, 510 p. Helton Arthur C. (1993) Refugee Determination under the Comprehensive Plan of Action: Overview and Assessment, International Journal of Refugee Law, 5 (4), pp. 544-558. Kneebone Susan and Pickering Sharon (2007) Australia, Indonesia and the Paciﬁc Plan, in Susan Kneebone and Felicity Rawlings-Sanaei Eds., New Regionalism and Asylum Seekers: Challenges Ahead, New York, Berghahn Books, pp. 167-175. Marr David and Wilkinson Marian (2003) Dark Victory, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 350 p. Reynolds Henry (1982) The Other Side of the Frontier: Aboriginal Resistance to the European Invasion of Australia Ringwood, Sydney, Penguin Books Australia, 255 p. Robinson Courland W. (2004) The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989-1997: Sharing the Burden and Passing the Buck, Journal of Refugee Studies, 17 (3), pp. 319-333. Sparrow Phil (2005) From under a Leaky Roof: Afghan Refugees in Australia, Sydney, Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 160 p.

250 Notes de lecture

Charef, Mohammed sociales de ces transferts et en particulier L’État, le rôle et la place des Marocains du les mutations dans l’habitat et dans l’archi- monde dans la région de Souss-Massa. – tecture. L’auteur, géographe, s’était révélé Rabat : CCME, 2008. – 331 p. historien dans le chapitre 2. Ici le spécialiste ISBN : 978-9954-669-38-9 de l’urbanisme se fait sociologue. En effet il restait dans ce chapitre à ne pas oublier Le livre se compose de six solides les acteurs. Il nous montre la richesse et la chapitres qui associent réflexion théorique diversité des migrants investisseurs dans de haut niveau et données empiriques le domaine du commerce et dans d’autres recueillies grâce à un très riche travail de secteurs. Ces entrepreneurs ont contribué terrain. Il faut souligner d’emblée l’impor- à « moderniser l’économie régionale » ce tance de ce type d’étude régionale, qui dont témoigne une « success story ». permet de mieux comprendre la réalité profonde des choses, dans la mesure Le chapitre 4 consacré aux associations où les migrations s’inscrivent dans une de migrants pose le problème de leur rôle identité régionale très forte. dans le développement régional. Il s’ouvre par une riche réflexion sur la participation Le chapitre 1 discute d’abord la relation citoyenne et la démocratie représentative entre migration et développement. Il au Maroc. Ce chapitre montre en particulier montre bien la diversité et la complexité le dynamisme du monde associatif dans des notions en jeu et surtout il pose une la région par rapport aux autres (voir le question cruciale : le développement spectaculaire graphique 6 en page 187). permet-il réellement d’arrêter l’immigra- Dans le cas du Douar Ouled Mimoun, ce tion ? À cet effet, il propose une fine analyse douar « presque ordinaire », la vie a été critique du concept de co-développement. profondément changée par les migrants et Le chapitre 2 consacré aux migrations leur association créée en 1994. dans la région Sousse massa « des temps et des lieux » est particulièrement remar- Le chapitre 5 s’attache à d’autres asso- quable. Il propose une passionnante ciations particulièrement importantes plongée dans l’histoire pluriséculaire de par le rayonnement et par leur action. La ce courant migratoire des origines jusqu’à première est Migration et développement aujourd’hui. Il montre la diversité des créé en 1986 et qui a une approche en acteurs, des profils et des destinations, quelque sorte horizontale du développe- en accordant une attention particulière à ment. Elle se préoccupe du genre, de l’envi- l’impact des deux conflits mondiaux sur les ronnement, de la gouvernance locale, des flux migratoires. activités génératrices de revenus, d’édu- cation et même de formation à la gestion Le chapitre 3 intitulé avec humour associative. Dans le cas de la commune « Migrant marocain et développement ou rurale de Arbaa Sahel, le témoignage du quand les migrants se mêlent du déve- président de la commune rurale, Brahim loppement » équilibre les trois niveaux, Safini, met en valeur le rôle des émigrés de national régional et local quant à l’impact la diaspora économique. Enfin, le chapitre des migrations. À côté de la présentation souligne les apports des associations des des flux de transferts d’argent, il procède à Marocains résidents à l’étranger et leur une excellente analyse des conséquences perception positive par les acteurs locaux.

251 Le chapitre 6 s’attache à la question avec lequel l’auteur parvient à mobiliser de la territorialisation et, à travers elle, de manière extraordinairement convain- à une réflexion sur la politique locale cante les échelles spatiales (du niveau local et régionale : en quoi et comment les au régional et au national), les échelles structures étatiques mobilisent-elles les temporelles (court terme, moyen terme et Marocains résidant à l’étranger dans le long terme) et enfin les échelles sociales, développement local ? Sont décrits les puisque l’analyse du migrant n’est jamais rôles du Centre régional d’investissement dissociée de sa famille, de sa commu- de la région, de la Chambre de commerce nauté d’appartenance des associations d’industrie de services, de l’Agence de auxquelles il participe, et bien évidem- développement social de la région, de ment de la dialectique entre les acteurs l’Agence nationale de la promotion de individuels, la société civile et les institu- l’emploi et des compétences. Tout ceci tions politiques, que ce soit l’État ou la conduit l’auteur à faire des proposi- région. Ce livre important sera sans doute tions concrètes notamment à propos de une référence pour la connaissance de Taroudant et de Tiznit. cet enjeu majeur qu’est le développement local et il est à souhaiter que des études La conclusion de l’ouvrage interroge comparables soient réalisées sur d’autres à juste titre sur la complexité des liens régions afin d’avoir une vue d’ensemble actuels, qui dépassent la seule question de la relation entre migration et dévelop- des transferts d’argent. Elle insiste sur les pement au Maroc. risques liés à la politique migratoire des Yves Charbit pays d’installation, qui pourrait aboutir à Démographe, Professeur émérite une fragilisation des communautés maro- CEPED, Université Paris Descartes/IRD caines vivant l’étranger. Aussi l’auteur plaide-t-il pour le renforcement des liens avec la société d’origine alors que les migrants de la première et deuxième géné- Séraphin, Gilles (éd.) ration montrent peu d’empressement dans Famille et migration, Recherches fami- l’investissement productif. À ses yeux l’un liales, 13. – Paris : Union Nationale des des enjeux majeurs du développement Associations Familiales, 2016. – 145 p. durable au Maroc est d’arriver à utiliser La migration, même lorsqu’elle ne au mieux les capacités des associations concerne qu’un membre de la famille, de migrants. Le bilan est certes positif et « marque tout autant le vécu de l’ensemble l’implication des MRE dans développe- de la famille » (p. 3). Gilles Séraphin, par ment local a été indéniable qu’il s’agisse ces mots, insiste sur l’importance de de l’électrification, de l’abduction d’eau, de s’intéresser aux acteurs de la migration, l’éducation, de la santé, voire du renfor- migrants et non migrants et notamment cement de l’identité locale. Le livre se à la famille où chaque membre voit sa termine par quelques recommandations place évoluer par la migration par une qui sont en réalité de véritables proposi- « restructuration familiale au moins sur tions d’une politique du développement le plan symbolique » (p. 3). Et à l’instar local qui se donnerait les moyens d’asso- d’ouvrages récents (Imbert et al., 2018 ; cier les migrants. Kraler et al., 2011), la famille est au cœur Ce rapide survol de cet ouvrage aura de l’attention de plusieurs auteurs réunis montré son extraordinaire richesse et dans ce dossier thématique « Famille et son authentique dimension interdiscipli- Migration ». Pour ce treizième numéro naire, car il associe géographie humaine, de Recherches familiales, l’introduction économie, histoire, science politique, de Gilles Séraphin pose les bases de la ethnographie. Il faut souligner le brio réflexion sur la relation entre famille et

252 migration qui sera le fil conducteur des familiales, avec une diversité de situa- six articles francophones. Le dossier est tions aujourd’hui qui peuvent affecter pensé en trois parties énoncées dans la les relations intergénérationnelles entre partie introductive : « La migration dans le enfants partis et parents restés. Deux roman familial : la construction de l’iden- articles évoquent ces questions de géné- tité », « Migration et relations familiales » et ration et de distance au sein de la famille. « Migration, droit et institution ». Ainsi, le texte de Carole Beaugendre, Didier Breton et Claude-Valentin Marie donne La première partie aborde ainsi l’his- l’exemple de migrations d’outre-mer à toire et l’identité familiale forgée à travers la métropole et évoque une des consé- la migration et surtout son énoncé après la quences du départ sur les populations migration. Cette partie aborde notamment restées. En effet, à partir d’un travail sur les questions d’identité que se posent les l’Enquête Migration, Famille, Vieillissement descendants de migrants. Ainsi, le premier (2009-2010) et des données du recense- article d’Anne Tatu-Colasseau, aborde la ment, les trois auteurs montrent « l’impor- transmission de la mémoire et de la culture tance de l’éclatement des familles des dans des familles maghrébines et son rôle natifs des DOM » (p. 51) avec le départ dans l’intégration sociale des enfants. Les des plus jeunes. Face à cet éclatement, deux sont liés ici, car « pour se soumettre à l’enjeu principal est la prise en charge l’injonction de réussite sociale, les descen- des personnes âgées dans des territoires dants ont besoin de garder les “pieds où le vieillissement est important et où trempés” dans les références d’origine, le nombre « d’enfants-aidants » tend à invalidant l’hypothèse d’une assimilation diminuer par la migration et la baisse de par la rupture culturelle » (p. 20). Anne Tatu- la fécondité. L’inquiétude est d’autant plus Colasseau conclut son article en soulignant forte que les auteurs rappellent que « les l’importance des transmissions féminines. DOM sont particulièrement déficitaires en La mère « se révèle actrice pivot des trans- équipement d’accueil de ce public » âgé. missions décisives » (p. 20) et les filles Mathilde Plard poursuit le thème de l’inter- seront plus réceptives à ces transmissions générationnel avec l’article suivant. Elle culturelles et mémorielles, moteur pour explique comment la décohabitation des elles de leurs projets d’ascension sociale. enfants et parents crée une nouvelle orga- Ce lien parents-enfants est poursuivi dans nisation dans les relations de care et donc l’article suivant d’Elsa Lagier. La socio- une prise en charge à distance pour des logue lie le roman familial avec l’intérêt familles transnationales brahmanes. Ces et l’engagement politique des enfants enjeux de prise en charge des populations d’immigrés et constate que « le parcours âgées au pays d’origine ont d’ailleurs été migratoire des parents influence la sociali- rappelés dans un ouvrage récent (Nowik sation politique de leurs enfants à partir du et Lecestre-Rollier, 2015) où Mathilde Plard moment où l’histoire personnelle familiale évoque également le cas des familles des parcours concrets se trouve réinscrite transnationales indiennes, mais où était dans une histoire plus collective qui lui aussi évoquée la situation de Mayotte dont donne du sens » (p. 33). Les enfants mobi- on peut faire des rapprochements avec lisent, consciemment ou non, cette histoire celle des Antilles ou de La Réunion. familiale dans leur rapport à la politique et donnent un sens à leurs situations à Enfin les deux derniers textes sont de travers cette histoire. nature plus juridique et institutionnelle et abordent la famille au cœur du droit et des La deuxième partie se focalise sur les institutions françaises. Le premier, d’Anne relations familiales au sein de la migration. Wyvekens se base sur une enquête faite Gilles Séraphin évoque la double absence dans deux tribunaux de grande instance de l’émigré qui modifie les relations et place le droit familial en contexte de

253 migration. L’auteure montre comment de cas permettent d’enrichir la réflexion la justice familiale face à des justiciables autour d’un champ d’études des migra- immigrés ou d’origine immigrée met en tions encore en construction. scène une double appartenance produite par la migration plutôt que des « conflits Références bibliographiques de normes » qui opposeraient « le droit du pays d’accueil et les systèmes de valeurs Imbert Christophe, Lelièvre Éva et Lessault de populations venues d’ailleurs » (p. 76). David (2018) La famille à distance : Pour les magistrats, l’examen individuel mobilités, territoires et liens familiaux, doit se faire de manière pragmatique face Paris, INED, 376 p. à la dimension collective qu’est l’immi- Kraler Albert, Kofman Éléonore, Kohli gration, ils « voient les individus, leur Martin and Schmoll Camille (2011) Gender, réalité immédiate […] avant ce qu’ils repré- Generations and the Family in International sentent socialement » (p. 77). Enfin le Migration, Amsterdam, Amsterdam dernier article de Myriam Hachimi Alaoui, University Press, 404 p. évoque les politiques publiques d’intégra- Nowik Laurent et Lecestre-Rollier Béatrice tion destinées à « inculquer un socle de (2015) Vieillir dans les pays du sud. Les “valeurs” aux “nouveaux entrants” dans solidarités familiales à l’épreuve du vieillis- la communauté politique » (p. 92). Elle sement, Paris, Karthala, 312 p. revient sur les différentes étapes de cette réglementation de l’immigration familiale Jordan Pinel et met la focale sur les « femmes d’immi- Géographe, Doctorant grées » vue comme « pivot de l’intégration Migrinter/Université de Poitiers des familles » (p. 83). En parallèle des discours autour de la mise en place de cette politique d’intégration, elle dresse le Arab, Chadia portrait des dispositifs pour intégrer les Dames de fraises, doigts de fée, les invi- familles migrantes, notamment des forma- sibles de la migration saisonnière marocaine tions civiques qui y sont associées. Face à en Espagne. – Casablanca : En toutes lettres, des « valeurs » souvent déconnectées de 2018. – 185 p. la vie de ces migrants, les tentatives pour ISBN : 978-9954-987-90-2 les « inculquer » semblent vaines, voire parfois contreproductives. Chadia Arab (Géographe, CNRS-ESO) rend compte du phénomène de migration Nous pouvons regretter le manque circulaire de femmes marocaines entre le d’éléments conclusifs et liants pour clore Maroc et l’Espagne en mobilisant diffé- ce dossier et développer une dimension rentes enquêtes de terrain réalisées, prin- plus globale sur les rapports familiaux cipalement des interviews des acteurs en migration. Cependant, la partie intro- concernés par ce phénomène, entre 2008 ductive de Gilles Séraphin a apporté en et 2017. amont quelques éléments de réflexion sur l’évolution familiale au cœur des migra- Le style de rédaction tranche avec tions, tout en résumant parfaitement les des écrits académiques classiques — à différents articles. Dans tous les cas, le mettre en lien avec le format usité par dossier remplit l’objectif d’« étudier ce la maison d’édition choisie — puisqu’elle que la migration d’une unité familiale ou nous propose une ethnographie sous la de l’un de ses membres […] construit forme d’investigation permettant un accès comme pratiques familiales » (p. 7) et plus au plus grand nombre. largement comme mémoire et identité L’ouvrage est divisé en six chapitres familiales et sociales. Les différentes études abordant à la fois l’aspect institutionnel

254 de ce type de migration, et le parcours La division sociosexuée du travail est des femmes actrices principales. L’auteure au cœur du phénomène circulatoire, car montre tout d’abord quels types de ne concerne que des femmes embau- femmes sont concernés, et les change- chées pour leur minutie, et leurs « doigts ments que cette migration a amenés de fées ». tant dans leur gestion du quotidien, que dans leur perception de l’avenir. Ensuite L’État espagnol observe de son côté, elle indique comment ce programme de cette migration comme une opportunité migration circulaire a été mis en place dans face à la diminution de la population dans le but de lutter contre la migration illégale, cette région, amenant une baisse de main- tout en annonçant de manière concise les d’œuvre féminine peu qualifiée. méfaits de cette migration institutionna- Le programme de « gestion éthique de lisée, sur ces femmes. l’immigration saisonnière » matérialise la Chadia Arab suit une méthodologie migration circulaire et consiste à faire venir aussi riche que rigoureuse puisqu’elle des femmes marocaines quelques mois procède principalement à des interviews en Espagne en leur octroyant des visas et immersions et non uniquement à des prévus à cet effet, puis à les renvoyer chez observations espacées dans le temps, elles le reste de l’année. pour étudier ce phénomène. Selon l’auteure, ce programme a pour À l’aide de multiples témoignages, but de pallier les besoins économiques l’auteure objective ce nouveau de type espagnols, de contrôler la migration vers de migration institutionnalisée dite « circu- l’Union européenne, mais également de laire » permettant à certaines femmes développer les pays d’origine des femmes marocaines de migrer pour travailler en grâce aux flux de devises. Appartenant Espagne. au programme européen AENEAS (Programme d’assistance technique et L’auteure explicite au fur et à mesure financière à des pays tiers dans le domaine des chapitres comment ces dernières de l’émigration et de l’asile) de l’UE, ce ne furent pas passives, mais pleinement programme de migration a pour but de actrices dans le processus, afin de tenter lutter contre la migration clandestine. d’améliorer leurs conditions de vie quotidienne, mais également celles des familles Le Maroc ayant des relations étroites restées au Maroc. avec l’UE, dans le cadre de ces migrations circulaires, il a avec l’Espagne créé deux Dans un premier chapitre, Chadia Arab institutions clés : l’ANAPEC embauchant les explicite dans quelle mesure la migration femmes au Maroc selon les demandes des de femmes marocaines à Huelva fut une coopératives et organes de centralisation opportunité pour sortir des grandes diffi- des informations, et la FUTEH en liaison cultés sociales et économiques, tout en avec la Mairie de Cartaya (en Espagne), n’omettant pas de rendre compte des organisme d’accompagnement. Ces orga- méfaits qu’implique cette mobilité. Cette nismes ont été mis en place dans un province située au sud de l’Espagne est but de transparence du système, créant surnommée « la province de l’or rouge », des étapes institutionnalisées entre l’em- pour évoquer les fraises. Chaque année, bauche au Maroc et le travail en Espagne. des coopératives espagnoles embauchent Ce type de migration est donc contrôlé : des milliers de femmes, majoritairement toutes les femmes ne peuvent pas être d’Europe de l’Est (Pologne, Roumanie) et du éligibles au contraire. Maghreb (Maroc) pour planter et cueillir les fraises, moteur économique de cette région.

255 L’auteure avance avec précision les Cependant il faut prendre en compte différentes conditions préalables à cette la subjectivité des réponses aux question- circulation : femmes marocaines rurales naires qui peuvent alors être erronées, puisque considérées comme plus dociles. car ces femmes subissent une certaine Cette circulation est encadrée tant par pression de leur employeur, et du système l’État de départ que par l’État d’arrivée : lui-même, car redoutent de ne plus être chaque étape de la migration encadrée rappelées. par l’ANAPEC au Maroc puis la FUTEH en Espagne. D’un point de vue économique, l’auteure remarque que ces dames de Ce type de migration se signale fraises par leur rémunération et expérience pour son aspect temporaire et incertain. en Espagne sont plus autonomes et libres. L’employeur a droit de regard sur la fin L’autonomie financière en est la preuve la du contrat de travail et l’expulsion de la plus marquante, car leur permet d’acquérir travailleuse. un certain pouvoir décisionnel dans la famille. Cette migration leur permet d’être Une des forces de ce travail est de plus mobile une fois au Maroc, et plus à toujours considérer l’imbrication des l’aise, lorsqu’entourées d’hommes. Elles rapports de pouvoir comme organisateur passent d’un rôle plus traditionnel féminin central de la circulation des femmes concer- (lié à l’injonction à la maternité) au rôle de nées ; grâce notamment aux données de la cheffes de famille et actrices économiques. municipalité de Cartaya. En outre, ces femmes marocaines choisies pour leur précarité ont prouvé leur force Les femmes s’inscrivant à ce type de face au travail et à l’éloignement, on parle migration sont issues de milieux paupé- de « zoufria » (femmes capables). risés de la société marocaine et plus parti- culièrement ruraux. Toutes les concernées Cependant, cet ouvrage n’omet pas les sont âgées entre trente et cinquante ans, aspects plus négatifs. La plupart retrouvent ont des enfants à charge, parfois analpha- leur rôle de « femme » au sein de la bétisées. famille, la division sexuelle du travail se recompose dès qu’elles rentrent chez elles. Chadia Arab rappelle avec justesse que Cette soumission est même présentée les femmes choisies pour la réussite de comme institutionnalisée, car elles néces- ces programmes sont des femmes qui sitent un accord masculin pour participer n’avaient jamais quitté leur village. Cela à ces programmes de migration. Le choix facilite leur renvoi après les récoltes en de migrer est potentiellement rarement pariant également de leur docilité. personnel, mais répond aux besoins des Ces départs ne se font pas sans diffi- familles. culté puisque l’auteure narre les difficultés Cette « émancipation » est donc initiales rencontrées par ces femmes. Cela réelle, mais temporaire. L’image renvoyée concerne la somme d’argent nécessaire de ces femmes au Maroc est loin d’être pour compléter leurs dossiers adminis- aussi positive, en effet on les assimile à tratifs qui mène à un endettement, et les de mauvaises mères, voire déstabilisa- négociations avec les familles pour l’auto- trices, de la valeur familiale, en se voyant risation de partir à l’étranger seules. accusées de prostitution en Espagne. Malgré cela, questionnaire à l’appui, Enfin, dans les deux derniers chapitres Chadia Arab explique que les candidates Chadia Arab explique les effets pervers trouvent un intérêt humain à avoir quitté de cette immigration circulaire ; puisque le Maroc, et ce malgré des conditions de travail plus que difficiles.

256 la frontière entre celle-ci et l’immigration Ce processus de migration circulaire clandestine est ténue. fut établi dans le seul but de pallier le besoin économique des deux pays Loin d’être un processus gagnant- concernés et de lutter contre l’immigration gagnant comme imaginé de jure, ce clandestine. Les conditions de vie de ces dernier est un moyen d’éviter toute volonté femmes et leurs précarités ne sont utilisées d’installation de ces femmes en Espagne ; qu’à des fins économiques et politiques. au risque de devenir « sans-papières ». Cependant, et malgré des conditions de travail et vie indignes, l’ouvrage visibilise L’auteure s’efforce donc à mettre en au mieux les espaces interstitiels de liberté avant les répercussions sociales de ce et le certain bénéfice social et économique phénomène économique. Cette migration que ces femmes retirent de ces emplois institutionnalisée est fortement critiquée saisonniers. négativement par des organismes agissant pour les droits humains au Maroc. Ils Nouri Rupert dénoncent l’exploitation de ces femmes Sociologue LCSP-CEDREF/Université Paris Diderot précaires et l’atteinte aux droits humains (comme l’attente au droit de circulation).

L’auteure explicite que ce système Arab, Chadia institutionnalisé sous le regard de l’Union Dames de fraises, doigts de fée, les invi- européenne est à même de créer des sibles de la migration saisonnière marocaine Harragas (migrant·e·s clandestin·e·s). En en Espagne. – Casablanca : En toutes lettres, n’employant les femmes que sur des 2018. – 185 p. périodes courtes, les employeurs peuvent ISBN : 978-9954-987-90-2 diminuer les effectifs des coopératives d’une année à l’autre. Ceci impacte la Nous sommes tou·t·es des #DamesDeFraises, précarité de ces femmes qui, n’ayant Mediapart : Le blog de Chadia Arab, 2018. – pas les moyens de reconstituer leurs [en ligne]. URL : https://blogs.mediapart.fr/ dossiers chaque année, préfèrent rester chadia-arab/blog/130618/nous-sommes-tou- sur place malgré l’interdiction juridique. te-s-des-damesdefraises Ce phénomène est paradoxal, car allant Entre 2008 et 2010 les autorités consu- à l’encontre de l’esprit de la migration laires commerciales espagnoles et maro- circulaire. Ces dernières se retrouvent dans caines développèrent l’idée de réglementer des situations de contraintes concrètes. une migration circulaire entre les deux Elles tentent d’acheter leurs contrats de nations pour les saisonnières de récoltes travail pour parvenir à la régularisation agricoles des immenses cultures de fraises tandis que d’autres cherchent une protec- de la Huelva, dans l’Ouest andalou, proche tion masculine en tentant de contracter de l’Algrave portugais : ce programme mariage, bien souvent sans succès. éthique mis au point devait éviter les Chadia Arab conclut son ouvrage par aventures des sans-papiers et les diverses un ultime chapitre au titre évocateur « une formes de leurs exploitations qui ponctuent immigration jetable ». Loin de créer une les conflits entre travailleurs·euses migration sociale et éthique, l’Union euro- marocain·e·s et propriétaires agricoles à péenne et le Maroc ont mis en place lest de l’Andalousie, dans la province d’Al- un système de « migration jetable » où meria-El Ejido, dans la « mer des serres ». les femmes sont sollicitées seulement Deux structures furent concernées : au si besoin, et en fonction des conditions Maroc, le ministère de l’Emploi confia à économiques espagnoles. Les employeurs l’ANAPEC (Agence Nationale de promotion peuvent librement choisir leurs effectifs. de l’emploi et des compétences) la charge d’accueillir les candidates aux activités

257 agricoles saisonnières, de les orienter et achats productifs de terres et de biens ; de les accompagner. En Espagne c’est la nous sommes typiquement dans un cas FUTEH (Fundacion para trabajadores de opposé à ceux présentés par Sayad, et estranjeros en Huelva) localisée dans la développé plutôt par Lamia Missaoui en mairie de Cartaya qui réalisait l’accueil et la 1995, « le migrant et d’ici et de là-bas et de répartition des « doigts de fées », surnom l’entre deux », riche analyse triadique qui des cueilleuses proposé par Chadia Arab contribuera à sa définition de « l’étranger recueillant une unanimité de témoignages de l’intérieur ». L’« entre deux », parcours sur leur délicatesse dans la cueillette des social, économique, moral, transnational, fraises. malgré la cohérence de son montage politico-administratif, opère comme un incita- Il s’agissait d’une régulation des teur à la dérogation, à la relative libération mouvements saisonniers qui devait de leur condition par ces jeunes femmes : maintenir ces femmes dans un statut la proximité d’autres transmigrants n’y permanent de migrantes circulaires, enri- est pas pour rien, femmes polonaises qui chissant les familles restées au Maroc, et se réclament de leur européanité pour évitant dans le Sud espagnol les immigra- diverses revendications, hommes sub- tions définitives liées au droit du travail des sahariens, qui ont pris de l’ascendance sur travailleurs temporaires. leurs patrons et courtisent les Marocaines, etc. C’était oublier et, de fait, renforcer, les processus de domination auxquels les Chadia Arab nous introduit finement, femmes marocaines étaient soumises : anthropologiquement (la danse des célibataires avec enfants, divorcées en « alters »), dans la première partie de son charge de famille, mariées avec des époux ouvrage, aux histoires de vie liées à ces sans travail, étaient nombreuses parmi cheminements transnationaux puis elle ces Marocaines de trente-cinq à quarante- nous livre (pp. 85-106) une enquête socio- cinq ans astreintes à un travail méticuleux graphique méticuleuse sur les origines, les de cueillettes en plusieurs passages et localisations, les contours, fratries, revenus accroupies dans l’humidité de l’arrosage familiaux, etc. qui complète l’enquête constant et la chaleur des champs sans par proximité, par accompagnement, et arbres. Dominations de genre, au Maroc, permet de situer les enjeux sociétaux de où le statut de la femme rurale est défini cette migration circulaire de femmes maro- par toutes sortes de soumissions, et en caines. Espagne, embauchées par des hommes, les propriétaires, et constamment surveillées Il est rare de lire une recherche de par des contremaîtres espagnols, pendant terrain aussi sensible et précise, nouant leur travail et durant leurs pauses et leur sans arrêt un continuum entre trajectoires vie nocturne dans des hangars-dortoirs. individuelles et collectives, voguant du Cette migration genrée en situation de plus sensible, empathique, rapport aux dépendance économique totale voyait se personnes aux plus distantes récollections démultiplier les rapports de domination collectives de l’enquête intensive. masculine. Chadia Arab signale à quel point le « ni d’ici ni de là-bas » de l’immi- L’information contextuelle concerne grant, formulé en 1999 par Abdelmalek surtout le Maroc. Il faut resituer cette Sayad prend une forme paroxystique… recherche dans une suite de travaux concer- avec une singulière exception dans un des nant le Levant espagnol, de la frontière du premiers portraits de transmigrantes circu- Perthus à l’Ouest andalou. Des enquêtes, laires présenté comme emblématique : en collaboration, de David Sempere, Oriol elle décrit la réussite d’une jeune mère Romani, Lamia Missaoui, Alain Tarrius de enrichissant sa famille au Maroc par des 1999, ont mis en évidence les modalités

258 de développement de réseaux marocains Tarrius Alain (2002) La mondialisation par le long du Levant ibérique, incluant la le bas. Les nouveaux nomades de l’éco- « traite des travailleurs saisonniers » et nomie souterraine, Paris, Balland, 175 p. les premières révoltes des Marocains Péraldi Michel (Éd.) (2001) Cabas et contai- ners. Activités marchandes informelles et d’El Ejido travaillant sous serre, celles de réseaux migrants transfrontaliers, Paris, Swanie Potot, 2003, concernent les travail- Maisonneuve et Larose, 361 p. leuses roumaines dans les serres anda- Potot Swanie (2005) La place des femmes louses, celles encore de Fatima Lahbabi et dans les réseaux migrants roumains, Pilar Rodriguez Martinez (2002-2004) sur la Revue Européenne des Migrations prostitution massive de jeunes Marocaines Internationales, 21 (1), pp. 243-257. en Andalousie, et enfin celles d’Olivier Alain Tarrius Bernet et d’Alain Tarrius sur les trafics Sociologue et anthropologue, de femmes balkaniques vers le Levant Professeur émérite espagnol (2011-2015). LISST, Université de Toulouse le Mirail/CNRS

L’expérience relatée par Chadia Arab se voulait « réparatrice » des tensions révélées par les précédentes études. La chercheure montre l’inanité des figurations de maîtrise administrative des frontières politiques : d’autres frontières, morales, s’imposent rapidement, générées entre autres par la rigidité administrative des montages internationaux, ignorants des désirs, aspirations, soumissions et consciences de ces phénomènes permis par l’entre-deux transmigratoire…

Références bibliographiques Lahbabi Fatima y Rodriguez Martinez Pilar (2005) Migrantes y trabajadoras del sexo, Del Blanco, 214 p. Missaoui Lamia (1995) Généralisation du commerce transfrontalier : petit ici, notable là-bas, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 11 (1), pp. 53-75. Missaoui Lamia, Sempere Juan David et Oriol Romani (2000) Apparition des comptoirs, et des réseaux souterrains marchands, marocains le long du Levant Ibérique, Rapport de recherche DG12 Europe (5ème PCRD), 132 p. Sayad Abdelmalek (1999) La double absence. Des illusions de l’émigré aux souffrances de l’immigré, Paris, Seuil, 437 p. Tarrius Alain (2014) Transmigrations euro- péennes de travailleuses du sexe balkaniques et caucasiennes accompagnées de parentèles féminines, Revue Tiers Monde, 217 (1), pp. 25-43.

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Alduy, Jean-Paul de cultures différentes pour aborder la Tarrius, Alain complexité des phénomènes traités. Perpignan, laboratoire social et urbain. [Éditeur] Modernisation d’une ville pauvre et cosmopolite. – La Tour d’Aigues : Éditions de l’Aube, 2018. – 179 p. (Bibliothèque des territoires) ISBN : 978-2-8159-3041-3 De Bock, Jozefien Parallel Lives Revisited: Mediterranean Ce livre est un dialogue entre Guest Workers and their Families at Work in Jean-Paul Alduy, ancien sénateur-maire de the Neighbourhood, 1960-1980. – New York : Perpignan — ville des records nationaux Oxford ; Berghahn, 2018. – 206 p. de pauvreté, de chômage, de criminalité, ISBN : 978-1-78533-778-9 de diversités culturelles —, et le sociologue Alain Tarrius, qui étudie les formes et Le concept de « vies parallèles » a les destinées de la mosaïque cosmopolite été créé en 2001 dans un rapport sur les de cette ville. La ville de Perpignan est tensions raciales au Royaume-Uni : il est abordée sous toutes ses coutures, « par devenu familier dans le discours européen le haut » (réseaux culturels mondialisés, sur l’intégration des immigrants. Là, on développement culturel, transformations parle de ce qui est perçu comme la ségré- urbaines) et « par le bas » (économies gation des populations immigrantes par souterraines, trafics de drogue). Un livre rapport au reste de la société. Cependant, passionnant pour comprendre les enjeux les racines historiques de cette ségrégation de cette ville du Sud, mais aussi pour s’in- présumée font rarement l’objet de discus- terroger de façon plus large sur l’ensemble sions. Combinant l’analyse quantitative, des sujets évoqués et leur impact sur la recherche archivistique et plus d’une un certain nombre de communes euro- centaine d’entrevues, cet ouvrage explore péennes. [Éditeur] la vie des immigrants de six pays médi- terranéens dans une ville belge d’après- guerre pour fournir un récit fascinant de la façon dont leurs expériences d’intégra- Costa-Fernandez, Elaine (dir.) tion ont changé au travail et dans leurs Denoux, Patrick (dir.) quartiers à travers deux décennies. Lescarret, Odette (dir.) Mobilités, réseaux et interculturalité. Nouveaux défis pour la recherche scientifique et la pratique professionnelle. – Paris : Fleury Graff, Thibaut L’Harmattan, 2018. – 314 p. (Espaces inter- Marie, Alexis culturels) Droit de l’asile. – Paris : Presses universi- ISBN : 978-2-343-12691-3 taires de France, 2019. – 346 p. (Droit fonda- mental) Dans un contexte international marqué ISBN : 978-2-13-079530-8 par une mondialisation généralisée et une amplification de la communication, les Manuel universitaire qui traite de l’asile mobilités deviennent des enjeux centraux, et de l’accès au territoire, du statut des qu’elles soient géographiques ou socio- demandeurs d’asile et de l’examen de ces professionnelles, choisies ou subies. Cet demandes. Il n’oublie pas les conditions ouvrage réunit des travaux d’auteurs issus d’octroi d’une protection et l’exclusion de

261 cette protection et s’achève par le statut Lendaro, Annalisa (dir.) des personnes protégées. Rodier, Claire (dir.) Vertongen, Youri Lou (dir.) La crise de l’accueil : frontières, droits, résistances. – Paris : Éditions la Découverte, Hoeften Rosemarijn (ed.) 2019. – 314 p. (Recherches) Meel, Peter (ed.) ISBN : 978-2-348-04284-3 Departing from Java: Javanese Labour, Migration and Diaspora. – Copenhagen, Pourquoi la question migratoire est-elle Danemark : NIAS Press, 2018. – 288 p. (NIAS aujourd’hui réduite, en Europe, à cette Studies in Asian Topics ; 66) notion de crise ? Dans un contexte de ISBN : 978-87-7694-245-8 tensions politiques, de débats média- tiques véhiculant souvent des catégo- Ce volume retrace les différentes façons ries d’analyse impropres ou erronées, dont les migrants javanais et les commu- l’ouvrage se propose de faire le point nautés migrantes sont connectés dans sur les enseignements que ladite crise a leur société d’accueil et avec Java comme révélé en termes de nouvelles pratiques, source réelle ou imaginée de normes, et de logiques latentes. Les événements de valeurs et de loyautés faisant autorité. survenus en Méditerranée au cours de Il souligne l’importance de la diaspora l’année 2015, communément qualifiés de en tant que processus pour comprendre « crise des migrants », ont bien constitué le l’évolution des notions à travers le temps révélateur d’une crise profonde en Europe. et l’espace. Même si Java comme point de Mais de quelle « crise » parlons-nous ? départ relie les différentes contributions, [Extrait] leur accent est plus sur le processus de migration et les expériences des migrants javanais dans les pays de destinations. Mahut, David Le déclassement dans la migration : ethnographie d’une petite bourgeoisie bamakoise Kalini, Christelle installée à Paris. – Paris : L’Harmattan, La diversité en France : un nouvel enjeu de 2017. – 280 p. (Populations) société. – Paris : L’Harmattan, 2017. – 211 p. ISBN : 978-2-343-13512-0 (Espaces interculturels) ISBN : 978-2-343-13632-5 Issu d’une thèse de doctorat de sociologie, à partir d’une enquête ethnogra- C’est à travers les thématiques de phique conduite entre 2007 et 2012, ce discrimination et de diversité profession- livre reconstitue les trajectoires sociales de nelle que l’auteur nous conduit à revisiter migrants bamakois résidant à Paris, issus le statut d’immigré : elle fait alors le lien de la petite bourgeoisie urbaine, maîtrisant entre le capital, le monde du travail et la la langue française et ayant obtenu leurs mondialisation de l’économie. Elle conclut diplômes au Mali, du baccalauréat général sur l’idée que l’immigration active se au doctorat. En France, ils sont ouvriers, traduit par l’arrivée en France de personnes employés ou se rapprochent des catégo- qualifiées et/ou en cours de qualification à ries professionnelles intermédiaires bien fort potentiel, faisant évoluer les politiques que leurs parcours scolaires les avaient publiques. destinés à d’autres emplois. De Bamako à Paris, que s’est-il passé ? L’auteur offre un éclairage macrosociologique novateur sur l’importance des origines sociales dans les itinéraires migratoires.

262 Manaï, Bochra L’ouvrage les interroge dans une pers- Les Maghrébins de Montréal. – Les Presses pective pluridisciplinaire en proposant de l’Université de Montréal, 2018. – 156 p. une réflexion épistémologique autour des (Pluralismes) termes « mobilité » et « migration » et de ISBN : 978-2-7606-3874-7 leurs relations afin d’interroger les présup- posés des mobilities studies. [Éditeur] Quelle est la place des groupes venus d’ailleurs dans la société québécoise ? Quels liens tissent-ils avec leur nouveau pays ? Comment les deuxièmes généra- Prum, Michel (dir.) tions d’immigrants, notamment maghré- Catégoriser l’autre : aires anglophone et bins, s’adaptent-elles à leur pays ? Qu’en lusophone. – Paris : L’Harmattan, 2017. – est-il vraiment des ghettos que les immi- 209 p. (Racisme et eugénisme) grants musulmans auraient construits ISBN : 978-2-343- 13300-3 dans une ville comme Montréal ? Grâce à un travail statistique, cartographique et Catégoriser l’Autre du point de vue ethnographique inédit, l’auteure de ce livre de l’ethnicité, c’est se placer soi-même analyse l’immigration en milieu urbain en au-dessus de toute catégorisation et déconstruisant au passage le mythe du assigner celui-ci à des particularismes ghetto musulman. Elle interroge la relation dont on serait exempt. Le « majoritaire » entre l’ethnicité et ses frontières et définit s’arroge ainsi le droit de nommer et de ainsi la « maghrébinité » dans le contexte classer les « minoritaires » ; il est la norme québécois. [Éditeur] non dite à partir de laquelle s’inscrit la diffé- rence. Les neuf contributions de ce volume renvoient à ces catégorisations, pour huit d’entre elles dans l’aire anglophone Ortar, Nathalie (dir.) (Grande-Bretagne, États-Unis, Afrique Salzbrunn, Monika (dir.) du Sud, Kenya, Australie), la dernière Stock, Mathis (dir.) dans l’aire lusophone (la République du Migrations, circulations, mobilités : nouveaux Cap-Vert). [Éditeur] enjeux épistémologiques et conceptuels à l’épreuve du terrain. – Aix-en-Provence : Presses universitaires de Provence, 2018. – 238 p. (Sociétés contemporaines) Tognetti Bordogna, Mara ISBN : 979-10-320-0173-8 Femmes de la migration : pour une sociologie des dynamiques de population. – Paris : Au cours de la dernière décennie, L’Harmattan, 2017. – 277 p. (Logiques l’usage du terme mobilité, porté par le sociales) mobility turn, s’est progressivement ISBN : 978-2-343-13467-3 substitué à migration dans la sphère politique et dans la recherche sans que Traduit de Donne e percorsimigratori: ce glissement conceptuel n’ait réellement per una sociologia delle migrazioni, cet fait l’objet d’un questionnement appro- ouvrage met en relief la complexité, la fondi. Ont ainsi été intégrées au sein d’un croissance dynamique et systématique de même corpus analytique toutes les formes la présence des femmes migrantes en de déplacement physique des personnes, Italie. Il accorde une attention particulière les mobilités imaginaires, virtuelles et de aux thèmes des transformations identi- communication comme celles des objets. taires, de l’insertion des femmes dans le marché du travail ainsi que de leur santé.

263 Vermeren, Hugo Italiens au peuplement européen de Les Italiens à Bône (1865-1940) – Migrations l’Algérie, au développement de ses villes méditerranéennes et colonisation de peuple- portuaires et des activités maritimes, est ment en Algérie. – Rome : École française encore aujourd’hui méconnue. Le cas de de Rome, 2017. – 628 p. (Collection de l’École Bône et de ses pêcheurs italiens est à française de Rome ; 546) ce titre éclairant. Il inscrit les migrations ISBN : 978-2-7283-1274-0 italiennes dans des pratiques de longue Issu d’une thèse de doctorat, à l’appui durée et des stratégies bien déterminées, d’archives inédites conservées en France, contrastant avec l’image récurrente de en Italie et en Algérie, cet ouvrage retrace migrants poussés par la faim et la misère. les parcours des immigrants italiens qui se Gilles Dubus sont installés à Bône (Annaba) du milieu MIGRINTER du XIXe siècle au début de la Seconde CNRS/Université de Poitiers Guerre mondiale. La contribution des

264 REMi Note aux auteur·e·s Les contributions proposées (articles, notes de recherche, chroniques et notes de lecture) sont à envoyer au secrétariat de rédaction de la REMI par courriel ([email protected]). Les textes (en français, anglais ou espagnol) doivent être inédits. Ils seront soumis anonymement à l’appréciation de trois évaluateur·trice·s. La décision du Comité de rédaction (acceptation, propositions de corrections, rejet) sera donnée dans les six mois suivant l’envoi. Conformément à l’usage, l’auteur·e s’engage à ne pas soumettre son texte à une autre revue avant d’avoir reçu une réponse de la rédaction. L’article doit être compris entre 55 000 et 70 000 caractères. La note de recherche doit être comprise entre 30 000 et 45 000 caractères. Elle se donne pour objectif de valoriser des travaux non aboutis, de souligner une démarche empirique, des méthodologies innovantes, une analyse de productions statistiques ou une question d’actualité. La note de lecture, ou compte-rendu d’ouvrage, doit être comprise entre 6 000 et 8 000 caractères. La chronique (juridique, d’actualité ou statistique) doit être comprise entre 10 000 et 20 000 caractères. Le nombre de caractères indiqués (avec espaces) comprend la bibliographie, les notes de bas de page, les figures, les résumés et les annexes. Chaque texte doit être accompagné de mots-clés traduits en français, anglais et espagnol et de son titre traduit dans ces trois langues. Les articles et notes de recherche sont accompagnés de trois résumés en français, anglais et espagnol (1 000 caractères maximum chacun). Présentation des textes Coordonnées. L’auteur·e indique son nom, son prénom, sa qualité, sa spécialité, son adresse professionnelle et son courriel. Le texte est saisi sans tabulation (Word ou Open Office) ; la police utilisée est Times New Roman 12. Les notes sont infrapaginales (Times New Roman 10). Les majuscules sont accentuées. Les diverses subdivi- sions sont numérotées « en arbre » : I/ ; I/ 1. ; I/ 1. 1. ; II/, etc. Les chiffres sont notés en toutes lettres jusqu’à quatre-vingt-dix-neuf. Les appels bibliographiques apparaissent dans le texte entre parenthèses sous la forme suivante : (Nom, date de parution : pages). À partir de trois noms d’auteur·e·s, il faut écrire le premier nom suivi par « et al. ». Ex. : (Papail et Arroyo, 1972 : 45-56) ou (Lessault et al., 2015 : 10-35). Les références bibliographiques sont placées à la fin du texte. Seules les références des ouvrages ayant fait l’objet d’un appel bibliographique doivent apparaître. Elles sont présentées selon les normes suivantes : • Pour un ouvrage Nom Prénom (date de parution) Titre, Ville, Éditeur, nombre de pages. Duchac René (1974) La sociologie des migrations aux États-Unis, Paris, Mouton, 566 p. • Pour un extrait d’ouvrage collectif Nom Prénom (date de parution) Titre de l’article, in Prénom Nom Éd., Titre de l’ouvrage, Ville, Éditeur, pages de l’article. Knafou Rémy (2000) Les mobilités touristiques et de loisirs et le système global des mobilités, in Marie Bonnet et Dominique Desjeux Éds., Les territoires de la mobilité, Paris, PUF, pp. 85-94. • Pour un article de revue Nom Prénom (date de parution) Titre de l’article, Titre de la revue, volume (numéro), pages de l’article. Simon Gildas (1996) La France, le système migratoire européen et la mondialisation, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 12 (2), pp. 261-273. • Pour un extrait de site Internet Nom Prénom (date de parution) Titre, [en ligne] date de consultation. URL : http://… Even Marie-Dominique (1996) Un entretien avec Dj. Enkhsaïkhan sur la politique extérieure de la Mongolie, [en ligne] consulté le 01/01/2012. URL : http://www.anda-mongolie.com/propos/politique/enkhsai20.html Les auteur·e·s doivent s’assurer que tous les liens hypertextes sont valides au moment de la soumission. Un texte plus détaillé de ces normes est disponible sur le site de la revue, notamment en ce qui concerne les figures, cartes, tableaux et photographies : https://journals.openedition.org/remi/5848

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Revue Hommes & Migrations | juillet-septembre 2019 |N°1326 | 15€ Londres et ses migrations. Les affiches vaCa niol entrent au Musée Revue trimestrielle n° 1326 juillet-septembre 2019

Le point sur ■ ENTRETiEN «Les Algériens manifestent un grand sens politique» Entretien avec Benjamin Stora, réalisé ■ Londres, ville globale d’hier à aujourd’hui Thomas par Marie Poinsot Lacroix ■ «Me voir comme un écrivain m’a vraiment aidé à façonner mon identité.»entretien avec ■ REPéRAgE La Galerie des dons, objet muséal total Hanif Kureishi. «Génération rebelle», musique élisabeth Jolys-Shimells et recherche. entretien avec paul Gilroy Entretiens ■ réalisés par Martin Evans ■ Colin Macinnes LiTTéRATuRE «J’ai voulu raconter l’histoire (1914-1976), emblème de la culture rétro Lucy de France par les migrations» Entretien avec omar Benlaâla, réalisé par Nihad Jnaid Robinson ■ «it Dread inna inglan», une chronique des luttes des Antillais au royaume-uni dans ■ iMAgES Documenter les luttes les poèmes de Linton Kwesi Johnson David

de l’immigration. regards croisés entre la France tions Bousquet ■ Le Brexit et l’immigration européenne et l’Angleterre Entretien avec Mogniss Abdallah à Londres Catherine Wihtol de Wenden ■ Causes des et Ken fero, propos recueillis par Anne Volery ra migrations et conséquences du Brexit sur le marché du travail Zovanga Kone et Carlos Vargas-Silva ■ Le Hommes & Migrations, rôle de l’intégration sociale dans les politiques CHAMps LiBres mises en œuvre par l’Autorité du Grand Londres ■ entre 2016 et 2019 Jacqueline Broadhead «Londres ■ iNiTiATiVES MuSéALES Le Musée des la revue du Musée national de l’histoire ou rien» : rites de passage chez les jeunes civilisations noires a ouvert ses portes à Dakar Australiens de Londres Erica Consterdine et Michael Mohamed Mbougar Sarr ■ trois musées face ■ Collyer Londres : un refuge pour les exilés du à leur passé colonial: Bruxelles, Amsterdam de l’immigration prend un nouveau virage ■ Bahreïn Claire Beaugrand Londres 1962-1989 : et paris Hélène Bocard histoires de médias par et pour les immigrés Nina Lostis ■ sistermatic, une boîte de nuit pour ■ KioSquE et si la musique ne faisait pas lesbiennes et queers noires Martin Evans qu’adoucir les mœurs? Mustapha Harzoune Londres et ses mig éditorial et graphique

■ LiVRES Le syrien du septième étage (Fawaz Au Musée Hussain) ■ Œuvres poétiques (Jean Sénac) ■ Ave Maria (Sinan Antoon) Mustapha Harzoune ■ PoRTfoLio Collectionneur de mots, les Tout en conservant sa mission de diffusion des maux du collectionneur Hubert Cavaniol ■ Faire ■ MuSiquE Ben Mandelson Propos recueillis Collection. La donation d’Hubert Cavaniol au Musée par françois Bensignor connaissances sur les migrations internationales, national de l’histoire de l’immigration Stéphanie Alexandre ■ Les affiches vaCa niol entrent au ■ CiNéMAWardi, le cinéma d’animation à hauteur Musée Stéphanie Alexandre d’Histoire Nadia Meflah Londres et la revue ouvre de nouveaux chantiers en lien avec ses migrations la programmation scientifique, patrimoniale portfolio: les affiches vaCa niol entrent au Musée et culturelle du musée. 9:HSMJLJ=UYUY[^: Revue disponible en librairie, à la billetterie du Palais de la Porte Dorée et sur abonnement.

À l’occasion de l’exposition Paris-Londres, Au sommaire de ce nouveau dossier Music migrations, la revue explore la manière Point Sur : Le Brexit annonce un retrait du système dont Londres, ancienne métropole d’empire est migratoire européen au profit d’une ouverture devenue un des principaux carrefours migratoires de Londres sur le monde. Cette partie du dossier de l’Europe. Ce glissement progressif d’une fait le point sur les migrations actuelles et revient immigration coloniale vers une immigration sur l’histoire des migrations dans cette ancienne européenne plus qualifiée est analysé sous métropole d’empire. l’angle de la cartographie des quartiers, la Au Musée : Les affiches de cinéma du collectionneur sociologie des flux migratoires, de l’insertion sur Hubert Cavaniol entrent au Musée. Pour aborder le marché du travail et des politiques publiques. l’histoire de l’immigration autrement, une sélection d’affiches commentées est présentée dans cette Le Brexit annonce un retrait du système partie. Suivent, entre autres, les entretiens de migratoire européen au profit d’une ouverture de Benjamin Stora sur les événements en Algérie, de Londres sur le monde. Omar Benalaâla, lauréat du Prix littéraire de la Porte Dorée, et un entretien croisé France-Angleterre sur les Coordination : Thomas Lacroix, directeur de recherche, luttes de l’immigration dans les années 80. Cnrs, Maison française d’Oxford. Champs Libres : Initiatives muséales – Le Kiosque – et l’actualité sur les Livres, les chroniques Musique et Cinéma.

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Introduction. Les modalités des dispositifs d’état d’urgence Didier BIGO La fabrique législative de l’état d’urgence : lorsque le pouvoir n’arrête pas le pouvoir Stéphanie HENNETTE VAUCHEZ Pénaliser l’idéal ? L’État français confronté au volontariat combattant de ses ressortissants durant la guerre civile espagnole Édouard SILL État d’urgence et involution autoritaire en Turquie : l’exemple des Universitaires pour la paix Gülsah KURT Les recours à l’état d’exception sous le régime franquiste (1956-1975) Emmanuel-Pierre GUITTET Logiques d’(in)sécurité en Hongrie. Gouverner par le droit et par l’exclusion dans un régime illibéral Ákos KOPPER, Zsolt KÖRTVÉLYESI, Balázs MAJTÉNYI et András SZALAI

Cultures & Conflits Bureau F515 - UFR SJAP - Université de Paris-Ouest-Nanterre [email protected] 92001 Nanterre cedex Et aussi... Vers un imaginaire démocratique radical : réaffirmer les droits à la mobilité et à l’hospitalité Entretien avec Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp réalisé par Pauline Brücker, Daniel Veron et Youri Lou Vertongen

Prochain Thema La fabrique et le gouvernement des crises Sous la responsabilité de Sara Angeli Aguiton, Lydie Cabane et Lise Cornilleau

Politiques de la « mise en crise » par Sara Angeli Aguiton, Lydie Cabane et Lise Cornilleau

Répondre aux crises financières et nucléaires : les stress tests européens par Brice Laurent, Başak Saraç-Lesavre et Alexandre Violle

L’extension du domaine de la crise ? Les exercices de gestion de crise dans la gouvernance de la filière nucléaire française par Olivier Borraz et Elsa Gisquet avec la collaboration de Sébastien Kapp

Quand une crise en cache une autre : la « crise des terres rares » entre géopolitique, finance et dégâts environnementaux par Soraya Boudia

Définir et gouverner les crises alimentaires mondiales. Le Comité de la Sécurité alimentaire mondiale de l’ONU, d’une crise à l’autre (1974-2008) par Lise Cornilleau

Entretien avec Janet Roitman : Anti-Crisis : Penser avec et contre Diffusion/distribution CDE/SODIS ISBN 978-2-7246-3583-6 les crises ?

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Rédaction Ventes et abonnements Presses de Sciences Po Critique internationale http://www.pressesdesciencespo.fr CERI 56 rue Jacob - 75006 Paris Librairie des sciences politiques Tél. : 01 58 71 70 77 - Fax : 01 58 71 70 91 30 rue Saint-Guillaume - 75006 Paris [email protected] [email protected] Ethnologie Française Juillet 2018 Tome XLVIII n° 3 VIEILLIR EN EUROPE

ÉDITEURS INVITÉS : Dolors Comas-d’Argemir et Xavier Roigé

• Dolors Comas-d’Argemir et Xavier Roigé Introduction. Les nouveaux visages du vieillissement en Europe • Michel Bozon, Joëlle Gaymu et Eva Lelièvre Âge subjectif et genre • Lucie Galcˇanová and Marcela Petrová Kafková Self-perception during the Transition to the Fourth Age in Czech Republic • Paola Sacchi and Pier Paolo Viazzo Families and the Elderly along the Shores of the Mediterranean • Chiara Saraceno Aging Women under Pressure in Italian Families • Dolors Comas-d’Argemir, Natalia Alonso et Blanca Deusdad Genre, générations et politiques publiques en Catalogne • Xavier Roigé et Montserrat Soronellas-Masdeu ’augmentation de la part des personnes âgées est l’un des phénomènes démographiques les plus importants Vieillissement, divorce et recomposition familiale en Lau sein des sociétés européennes contemporaines. Elle Catalogne a de profondes répercussions sur nos existences quotidiennes • Jacques Barou et notre environnement social : l’allongement de la vie modifie Vieillir en terre étrangère les expériences de la vieillesse, transforme la relation entre • Maria Offenhenden et Yolanda Bodoque- les générations et conduit à des ajustements des politiques Puerta publiques nationales. Travail à domicile et soins des personnes âgées ourri d’études de terrain réalisées dans différents • Alessandro Gusman pays européens, ce dossier questionne l’évolution de La médicalisation du domicile en Italie Nla perception du vieillissement au sein des familles, • Anja Hiddinga et Collectif de recherche les nouvelles formes de solidarité intergénérationnelles qui Beyond hearing. Culture Overlooked en découlent, et les transformations des politiques publiques. Les personnes sourdes en institution aux Pays-Bas Des perspectives qu’ouvre le fait de vieillir en bonne santé. • Martine Segalen Les difficultés liées à la vulnérabilité, au déclin des corps et Auto-ethnographie. Privation de vieillesse des esprits, en passant par les diverses façons – de la famille à l’État – de prendre soin des personnes en fin de vie, ou encore les renégociations des places et des rôles que vieillir LECTURES SUR LE THÈME entraîne au sein des familles sont quelques-uns des thèmes abordés dans les articles rassemblés ici. Mieux connaître les VARIA nouvelles formes du vieillissement dans nos sociétés et leurs COMPTES RENDUS implications dans les vies des individus, des couples, des familles élargies est indispensable pour en cerner les enjeux sociaux, économiques et politiques.

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