sign in sign up
<<
Home , Bruno Kaiser, Franz Josef Strauss, Helene Wessel, Hermann Ehlers, Jakob Kaiser, Karl Schiller

2 Between Concentration Movement and People’s Party: The Christian Democratic Union in

Ulrich Lappenküper

SOCIETAL BASIS AND THE RELATIONSHIP TO THE

The German Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU) is nowadays regarded as a ‘prototype’ of a people’s party. 1 It came into existence after the Second World War on a regional level, uniting political Catholicism and protestant liberals and conservatives. It can be seen as one of the few really new parties to have been founded in Germany. 2 I t was not easy for the CDU in the early days. After a narrow victory in the first parliamentary elections in 1949 the party had to cope with an enormous loss of support in the regions and a rapid drop in membership of 400,000. 3 The Federal Republic’s ‘founding crisis’ 4 greatly affected the party, which lost important regional elections and many members. The downward trend was stopped in 1953 by the ‘consolidation and concentration processes’ 5 in the party system resulting from the introduction of the 5 pe r cent clause. In 1954 the CDU had 215,000 members, in 1956 the number had risen to 245,000. 6 One year later, it achieved an absolute majority in the parliamentary elections for the first time in a coalition with the Bavarian Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU). In 1961, the CDU, which had in the meantime come to see itself as a ‘state party’, 7 suffered a slight loss of support but remained in power. Four years later in 1965, support increased once again and the CDU, under the leadership of , achieved their second best result ever. Despite the break-up of the coalition with the liberal Free Democrats (FDP) a year later, the CDU/CSU managed to retain its leading position in 1969. As the Liberals entered into coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD), however, the Christian Democrats in Parliament found themselves in opposition for the first time since 1949. 8 The CDU initially had the characteristics of a ‘concentration movement’ 9 with a strongly decentralized organization and a not very efficient party apparatus, which appeared to dissolve the old social, political and confessional contradictions. It was forged from diverse ideological and regional party traditions as well as the spirit o f opposition to the National Socialist dictatorship. In the relationship with the government and the parliamentary party the party had ‘hardly any independent political role’ 10 fo r quite some time. It operated rather in the shadow of the chancellor and party leade r , who became the figurehead of the party. Only after the establishment of the post of secretary-general in 1967 did the party establish itself as a ‘federal party capable of independent action’. 11 in Europe since 1945 22 In its own self-image, the CDU was a people’s party.12 In the 1950s, however, the social structure of the party was characterized by an under-representation of workers and the dominance of self-employed people and the so-called old middle class. Only at the start of the 1960s did the CDU begin to move towards being a ‘membership party’. 13 There was also an imbalance in its confessional structure. It saw itself as being inter- confessional, but had far more Catholic members. Leading Christian Democrats tried to break out of the ‘confessional ghetto’ 14 by gaining support from protestant laymen and clerics. Their efforts met with some success, even if some protestants kept their distance from the CDU in against Adenauer’s policy of Western integration. 15 For the Catholics, the confessional aspect of politics counted far more than the national one. The Catholic Church, despite early scepticism, helped the party enormously. 16 When at the end of the 1950s the importance of the Christian dimension disappeared in the CDU programme and politics, a ‘dogmatic debate’ about the Christian foundation of the party flared up among the Catholics. 17 Adenauer, although a practising Catholic, had stressed the importance of the separation of politics and religion. 18 The confessional divide deepened in 1963 with the election o f Erhard as chancellor, a man who was a ‘frightful figure of the first degree’ 19 for the Catholic Church, and with the appointment of other protestant ministers such as Kai-Uwe von Hassel and Gerhard Schröder. Representatives of the Catholic camp under the leadership of initiated a debate about the role of the ‘C’ or the Christian dimension of the CDU, and in so doing hoped to reformulate what Christian politics was about. Their ideas were opposed by many Catholics, however, as the CDU was not a Gesinnungspartei in their eyes, but a Christian, social, conservative and liberal people’s party. 20 The discussion about the ‘capital C’ in the party ceased for a while when the party passed the Programme in 1968. It continued to base itself on Christian values, while remaining open to non-Christians. 21 The confessional divide was also reflected in the party’s structure. Membership afte r years of stagnation rose to 280,000 after 1963 and—after another phase of stagnation—to 300,000 in 1969. 22 Protestant under-representation decreased after the end of the 1950s; their proportion rose to 36.7 per cent in 1963. 23 The predominance of Catholics among the CDU voters was even less pronounced, so that by the mid-1960s the CDU had achieved a degree of inter-confessionalism it had never had before. This was soon to disappear again, however. 24

CHRISTIAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL ORDER

After the Second World War, the Christian Democrats carried on the old German political Catholicism tradition of operating without ‘far-reaching theorems’. 25 Characteristic of their programme was its basis in Christian values and flexibility on concrete policy issues. Central to the new beginning was the condemnation of National and the abandoning of and centralism. Christian democracy was seen to be strongly rooted in the belief in the dignity and inalienable rights of the individual. 26 With respect to economic and social policy, the party first aimed at the middle ground between liberal individualism and Christian socialism, 27 as in the 1947 Between concentration movement and people's party 23 Ahlen Programme of the North -Westfalian CDU. 28 In 1948, however, there was a turnabout under the influence of the Economic Council and Ludwig Erhard towards the so-called social which strove to combine classical with social responsibility. 29 After controversial debate the change of course in 1949 led to the Düsseldorfer Leitsätze, which defined the new direction as ‘the socially responsible version of the market economy’. While the plea for social fairness and social security for the economically weak remained valid in the Ahlener Programm, the socialization tendencies and the plea for a corporatist economic order were largely abandoned. 30 In , at the first West German federal party congress in Goslar, the CDU defined its ‘historic mission’ as cultural, European and social. It emphasize d ‘the God-given right to a homeland’, the aim of overcoming the division of Germany, the need to eradicate social suffering and ‘Europe’ both as an idea and as a political and economic force. 31 At the beginning of the 1960s, the party entered a new phase of domestic, societal and economic programmatic development against the background of radical political changes. Responding to the challenges of the time, Chancellor Erhard combined the ‘tried and tested’ with the completely new. With his ‘politics of the centre’ 32 he reverted to his 1957 motto, ‘prosperity for all’, 33 warning, however, against escalating materialism. At the CDU congress in , he announced his idea of an ‘organized society’ (formierte Gesellschaft) making the demands of organized interests compatible with the economically viable and stemming the power of interest groups, which he blamed for the deficiencies of pluralistically organized democracy. Conceived as a further development of the , it was designed as a new vision for modern industrial society that would fend off the destructive force of pluralism and avoid ideological and interest group-based fragmentation. The aims were a long-term budgetary policy, the activation of parliamentary work, the paring down of the influence of interest groups and the redirection of social policy. 34 The diffuse plan, which reflected the party’s anti- pluralistic prejudices, 35 did not get beyond the planning stage, however, due to the republic’s economic and foreign policy issues fully absorbing the chancellor’s attention. After the collapse of his government in autumn 1966, the CDU quickly distanced itsel f from Erhard’s visions and took on the long overdue task of giving the party a new basis, relevant to the time. After years of little programmatic debate, the party drafted a plan o f action which they passed in Berlin in 1968. In economic and fiscal policy, it distanced itself from the basic premises of Erhard’s economic philosophy and aligned itself to the ideas of the SPD, with which it had entered into coalition in December 1966. Convinced that the complexities of modern economies demanded careful planning of economic and budget development, the CDU now supported an active structural, cyclical and fiscal policy for the state. 36 The magic catchphrases, ‘global control’ (Globalsteuerung), ‘medium-term budgetary planning’, and ‘concerted action’, helped to chase away the shadow of the recession. 37

THE IDEA OF EUROPE AND PRACTICAL EUROPEAN POLITICS

At the end of the 1960s, a similar alignment of the CDU with can be Christian democracy in Europe since 1945 24 observed in European policy. From 1945 to 1969, this policy, which can be divided into six phases: the ‘Rhenish’ phase of 1945–50, dominated by Adenauer and strongly directed to the Federal Republic’s West European neighbours; the European federalist phase of 1950–54 with the aim of a politically united Europe; the French period of 1955 – 58 in which economic integration was continued in close co-operation with ; the ‘Gaullist’ epoch, which lasted until 1963, in which Konrad Adenauer viewed the Franco- German alliance as the nucleus of a West European federation; the transatlantic phase o f 1963–66, in which Erhard and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder endeavoured to create a European partnership with the USA and the phase of the avoided foreign policy options of 1966–69, in which Erhard’s successor tried to mediate loyally between Washington and Paris. 38 These ideas were often challenged in the CDU, which gave itself the image of a ‘European party’ in . 39 In the first years after the Second World War, the focus of the conflict was whether to opt for integration with the West European powers. While some Christian Democrats, such as , allotted Germany the function o f a bridge between East and West, 40 Adenauer wanted the Federal Republic to be accepted as ‘a member of the European federation, with the same rights and the same obligations’. 41 Europe had to rally together to overcome nationalism and as a ‘third worl d power’ it should neither become totally dependent on the new world powers, nor fall victim to the threats coming from the East. 42 He saw no contradiction to the imperative for re-unification in the basic law constitution as the unity of the state was, in his opinion, attainable only in the context of a unified Europe. When in 1950 the idea of European integration began to take off with the plans for the Coal and Steel Community and common defence, dissent broke out in the CDU on another level. Alongside the conflict about the relationship between reunification and Western integration, came the liberal free trade internationalism advocated by Erhard. 43 Even the minister of saw Europe as a unit bound spiritually and in its customs and traditions; the exclusive emphasis on economic collaboration was not enough, even for him. His European concept was, however, fundamentally different from that o f Adenauer. Erhard had, first of all, a completely different attitude to power that seemed only ‘brutal and silly’ to him. 44 Furthermore, he saw economics, not politics, as being decisive for Western cohesion, and the solution of global problems in the realization o f free world trade. In 1952, the CDU (with the exception of some parliamentary party rebels), approved o f the Western treaties concerning the European Defence Community (EDC) and West German sovereignty. Their hopes for an integrated Europe, though, were destroyed with the failure of the EDC in 1954. They soon turned their attention once again to European politics, however, and the old arguments about the direction of European policy flared up again with renewed vigour. While Erhard pushed for a functional integration concept, Adenauer was on the side of the ‘institutionalists’ led by new Foreign Minister and State Secretary , who strove towards an institutionally secured fusion of national economies. 45 In view of the ‘impotence of Europe’, 46 which was becoming evident in the , the new integration project which now comprised a European common market and atomic energy authority took on an increasingly global dimension for the party leader. The continent of Europe had to hold Between concentration movement and people's party 25 its own against the world powers, necessitating greater internal cohesion. To achieve such cohesion, Adenauer mutated into a protagonist of intergovernmental collaboration. As new French President backed him up in the Berlin crisis since 1958, and supported European integration in a ‘Europe of states’, Adenauer agreed to de Gaulle’s idea for Europe in July 1960, which amounted to a ‘return’ to a ‘more or less nation-state centred politics of the European nations’. 47 When in 1962 the Fouchet Plan, which had been heavily criticized within the CDU, broke down because of the opposition of the Benelux states, the chancellor concentrated on an exclusive alliance with France out of mistrust of the USA and Britain. This brought polarization within the CDU to a head. The majority of the CDU, by passing an ‘Atlantic’ preamble to the Franco-German friendship treaty signed in , effectively torpedoed Adenauer’s policy an d undermined his authority. 48 Adenauer resigned from the chancellorship in mid-Octobe r and passed the baton on to Erhard, whom he had unsuccessfully tried to prevent from succeeding him. The struggle to find a direction for the party’s foreign policy continue d in the same vein. In his foreign policy, the new chancellor combined a desire for continuity with the courage to set his own accents. He stressed the security partnership with the USA, extolled France as the irreplaceable partner for German European policy and committed himself to achieving progress in European integration. His tactic was to ‘buy’ support through unilateral concessions to France on issues related to the development of the Common Agricultural Policy. As the chasm between his concept of a ‘Europe of free and equals’ 49 and de Gaulle’s ‘European Europe’ 50 did not diminish, open disputes broke out within the CDU. Adenauer, who was still party leader, and the ‘Adenauer wing’ 51 in the CDU pressurized the government in the summer of 1964 to become more proactive ove r Europe. Yet Erhard rejected the bilateral alliance that the French proposed as the nucleus of a later federation. He also did not rise to the bait of German participation in the French nuclear force de frappe .52 Although Erhard’s power to determine general policy direction was from this point on questioned, Erhard persisted in his course and resisted de Gaulle’s attempts to Europeanize the German question. 53 His hope of winning over the general to his concept for Europe with politically motivated agricultural concessions was not fulfilled. At the end of 1965, de Gaulle played his trump card against the backdrop of an initiative on the part of the EEC commission for political integration and ended his French co-operation with the EEC institutions. The so-called ‘empty chair crisis’ came at a most inconvenient time for the CDU, which was in the throes of the parliamentary election campaign. While the ‘Atlanticists’ demanded a hard line, the ‘Gaullists’ called for restraint. Despite the triumphal election victory in September, Erhard could not strengthen his position within the party, even after controversy between the EEC states had been resolved in January 1966 and he was elected party leader in March. 54 In ostensible awareness of his mission, the ‘people’s chancellor’ with ‘charisma without authority’ 55 had believed that he could combine the cultivation of the German- American friendship with the intensification of relations with France. In actual fact, relations with the USA and France reached a dangerous low. The well-meant slogan, ‘Europe of the free and the equal’, turned out to be utopian. At the end of Novembe r 1966, when the Federal Republic was in danger of becoming more and more isolated, the Christian democracy in Europe since 1945 26 CDU withdrew its confidence in the chancellor. 56 Convinced that West Germany’s security was dependent on NATO, Franco-German relations and the European Community, the new chancellor, Kiesinger, energetically began to work at improving the worn-down relationship with Paris and Washington. As he saw the Federal Republic as being in a ‘triangular relationship’ with respect to its loyalties to these most importan t alliance partners, 57 he was careful to commit himself entirely neither to the ‘Atlanticist’ nor the ‘Gaullist’ option. A return to the one-sided emphasis on the relationship with France as had been supported by Adenauer, was just as out of the question as Erhard’s fixation with the USA. Kiesinger succeeded, together with SPD Foreign Minister , in patching up the worn-down relationship with the Western alliance partners. He was not able to really advance European integration, however, because of the rivalry between France and Britain. 58

INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The unexpected loss of power after the end of the Great Coalition in 1969 forced the CDU to address urgent questions regarding intra-party reform. It had to reduce its ‘deficit of modernity in questions of domestic and societal politics’ 59 and improve the efficiency of the party organization. From an organizational point of view the party achieved its aims to a great extent. Membership numbers rose remarkably, peaking in 1983 at 735,000. Its social and confessional composition also changed without entirely mirroring the structure of the population. 60 The party, lamed by the ‘shock of opposition’, 61 came to terms with its new role only with some difficulty. The intra- party dispute about the Eastern treaties, the defeat of the new party leader Rainer Barzel in the constructive vote of no confidence against Chancellor Willy Brandt in 1972, the unfulfilled wish of , who was party leader from 1973, to achieve a political turnaround at the 1976 elections, ’s attempts to establish the CSU on a national level, and his overwhelming defeat as candidate for chancellor of the CDU/CSU at the elections in 1980, made this all the more clear. The Christian Democrats were forced to develop long-term political concepts. The CDU gave itself, for the first time in its history, a comprehensive base for its political values and philosophy with its programme of 1978. After having shifted the emphasis since the end of the 1960s from its earlier profile as a Christian integration party to a pluralistic people’s party, 62 the new programme marked a return to its Christian social roots, without giving Christian politics an exclusive character. The CDU described itsel f as a people’s party with social, liberal and conservative elements and laid emphasis on family policy, the further development of the social market economy and European integration. 63 When, in October 1982, the Christian Democrats took over power after 13 years in opposition to the Liberals, a return to neo-conservative policy seemed to be in the offing. The party leader and Chancellor Kohl took up office with the ambition of achieving a Wende, or ‘intellectual and moral turning point’. This ambition was not realized, however. Kohl concentrated much more on continuity in economic, social and foreign policy, without closing himself off from the search for answers to the new challenges o f Between concentration movement and people's party 27 the time, for example in environmental policy. 64 German citizens honoured his achievements, especially in reuniting Germany in 1990, by re-electing him as chancellor four times. In 1998, however, the tables were turned and the Christian Democrats suffered the worst defeat in their history. The Kohl era had ended. There was once again a call within the party for fundamental programmatic renewal, but before the discussion could really get off the ground it died out. After a new generation took over the party leadership in November 1998, with Wolfgang Schäuble as party leader and as secretary-general, the CDU experienced an amazing surge in support in 1999. Facilitated by the poor start of the ‘red-green’ coalition unde r Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and the spectacular resignation of Finance Minister Oska r Lafontaine, the CDU/CSU achieved outstanding results in various regional, local and European elections. These successes appeared to lessen the need for reform, and intra- party debate on programmatic issues languished. 65 After months of being on an unrealistic high, the CDU unexpectedly got into great difficulties at the end of 1999. After the revelations about former Treasurer Walter Leisler Kiep’s illegal dealings with donations to the party, Helmut Kohl had also to publicly admit to not having properly accounted for many millions of deutsch-marks. As he refused to name the anonymous donors, he was suspected of having been influenced by them in crucial political decisions during the period of his chancellorship. When the CDU in Hessen had to admit to the existence of undeclared funds in banks in and Liechtenstein that it pretended were donations from Jewish emigrants, the scandal threatened to turn into an existential crisis. 66 The new party leader promised unreserved explanation, but it was slow and rathe r lame. This was especially true as Kohl put his ‘dishonest word of honour’ 67 above the rule of law and hindered the investigations. In a newspaper article, Angela Merkel demanded that the party distance itself from the honorary party leader Kohl. 68 Although her attack was at first taken badly by sections of the party leadership and membership, it was decisive in allowing Merkel to come out of the crisis with shining colours. While she gained in stature from her uncompromising stance, Wolfgang Schäuble sank even deepe r into the bog of the donation scandal. He resigned from office as party leader in mid- February 2000 after he was implicated in a 100,000 deutschmark donation scandal, ‘an intra-party intrigue…with criminal elements’ 69 according to Schäuble, which had apparently been launched by Helmut Kohl. The search for a new leader soon focused on the question of whether the CDU should appoint a provisional leader from the ranks o f the senior former Christian Democratic minister presidents or rather one from the younger generation. In mid-April Angela Merkel was chosen at the party congress in Essen. After Kohl’s 25 years as leader and the interim period under Schäuble, the Christian Democrats chose what was a novelty in German history—a protestant woman in her mid-forties with no strong regional support in the party, a natural scientist and newcomer from the former —and thus broke with the previous months o f disorientation. Nevertheless, the CDU/CSU nominated the Bavarian CSU leader and Minister President Stoiber for the chancellorship in 2002, but narrowly lost the general election despite having been in front in opinion polls until shortly before September. Schröder’s government was apparently saved by the threat of war in Iraq and the flood disaster in August. The Social Democrats suffered disastrous defeats in subsequent Christian democracy in Europe since 1945 28 regional elections, however, and the CDU won Schröder’s home state of Lower Saxony and with it also a majority of the Bundesrat, the Second Chamber, in February 2003. After the Second World War, the party had put forward old ideas that looked new: the breaching of the gap between Catholics and protestants; a’third way’ between and socialism and the abandoning of national sovereignty in the context of European integration. If, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the party wants to disprove those who predict the ‘end of the Christian Democratic age’, 70 then it must once again find creative answers. It must find answers to the erosion of the middle-class and Christian Democratic milieus, falling membership numbers and the decreasing binding force of . It must also address the ‘threatening social divisions in post- industrial knowledge-based society’ in which the market economy loses its middle-class character, and likewise the future of European integration and the nation-state. 71

NOTES

1 Peter Haungs, ‘Die CDU: Prototyp einer Volkspartei’, in Alf Mintzel and Heinrich Oberreuter (eds), Parteien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ( 1990), pp. 158–98, here p. 158. 2 Winfried Becker, CDU und CSU 1945–1950, Vorläufer. Gründung und regionale Entwicklung bis zum Entstehen der CDU-Bundespartei (Mainz 1987); Günter Buchstab and Klaus Gotto (eds), Die Gründung der Union. Traditionen, Entstehung und Repräsentanten ( 1981). 3 Hans-Günter Hockerts, ‘Integration der Gesellschaft: Gründungskrise und Sozialpolitik in der frühen Bundesrepublik’, Zeitschrift für Sozialreform, vol. 32 (1986), pp. 25–41, here p. 25. 4 Hans-Otto Kleinmann, Geschichte der CDU 1945–1982 ( 1993), p. 135. 5 Rudolf Morsey, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1969, 4th edn (Munich 2000), p. 53. 6 See Haungs, CDU, p. 159; Kleinmann, CDU, pp. 136, 202, 268 and 495. 7 Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Ära Adenauer. Au !enpolitik und innere Entwicklung 1949–1963, 2nd edn (Darmstadt 1988), p. 148. 8 See the election results in Kleinmann, CDU, pp. 496–7. 9 Ibid., p. 15. 10 Haungs, CDU, p. 160. See also Helge Heidemeyer, ‘Einleitung’, in idem, Die CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen , Sitzungsprotokolle 1949–1953 (Düsseldorf 1998), pp. xiii–cii, lxxxi–lxxxiv. 11 Wulf Schönbohm, Die CDU wird moderne Volkspartei. Selbstverständnis, Mitglieder, Organisation und Apparat 1950–1980 (Stuttgart 1985), p. 68, and Haungs, CDU, pp. 160–1. 12 Kleinmann, Geschichte, pp. 95–6, Schönbohm, CDU, p. 17. 13 Kleinmann, Geschichte, p. 258. 14 Geoffrey Pridham, Christian Democracy in Western Germany. The CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945–1976 (London 1977), p. 27. 15 See Andreas Meier, , Leben in Kirche und Politik (Bonn 1991); Between concentration movement and people's party 29 Frederic Spotts, Kirchen und Politik in Deutschland (Stuttgart 1976), pp. 205–31; Johanna Vogel, Kirche und Wiederbewaffnung. Die Haltung der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland in den Auseinandersetzungen um die Wiederbewaffnung der Bundesrepublik 1948–1956 (Göttingen 1978). 16 See Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Katholizismus und Wiederbewaffnung. Die Haltung der deutschen Katholiken gegenüber der Wehrfrage 1948–1955 (Mainz 1981); Spotts, Kirchen, pp. 205–31. 17 See Dorothee Buchhaas, Die Volkspartei. Programmatische Entwicklung der CDU 1950–1973 (Düsseldorf 1981), pp. 235–42; Spotts, Kirchen, pp. 171–2. 18 See Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, ‘Rheinischer Katholik im Kalten Krieg. Das “christliche Europa” in der Weltsicht Konrad Adenauers’, in Martin Greschat and Wilfried Loth (eds), Die Christen und die Entstehung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Stuttgart, Berlin, and 1994), pp. 237–46, here pp. 237–8; Heinz Hürten, ‘Der Beitrag Christlicher Demokraten zum geistigen und politischen Wiederaufbau und zur europäischen Integration nach 1945: Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, in Winfried Becker and Rudolf Morsey (eds), Christliche Demokratie in Europa. Grundlagen und Entwicklungen seit dem 19. Jahrhundert (Cologne and Vienna 1988), pp. 213–23, here p. 214. 19 Spotts, Kirchen, p. 273. 20 See Buchhaas, Volkspartei, pp. 298–303; Schönbohm, Volkspartei, pp. 70–5. 21 See Kleinmann, CDU, pp. 271–2. 22 Ibid., pp. 202 and 268. 23 Ibid., pp. 137 and 246. 24 See Spotts, Kirchen, pp. 275–6. 25 Hürten, Beitrag, p. 213. 26 See Adenauer’s speech given at Cologne University, 24 March 1946, in Hans-Peter Schwarz (ed.), Konrad Adenauer. Reden 1917–1967 (Stuttgart 1975), pp. 82–106. 27 See Rudolf Uertz, Christentum und Sozialismus in der frühen CDU. Grundlagen und Wirkungen der christlich-sozialen Ideen in der Union 1945–1949 (Stuttgart 1981); see also Werner Conze, Jakob Kaiser. Politik zwischen Ost und West 1945– 1949 (Stuttgart, Berlin, Cologne and Mainz 1969), pp. 29–41. 28 ‘Ahlener Programm’, 3 February 1947, in Christliche Demokratie in Deutschland. Analysen und Dokumente zur Geschichte und Programmatik der Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands und der Jungen Union Deutschlands (Melle 1978), pp. 732–40. 29 See Volkhard Laitenberger, Ludwig Erhard. Der Nationalökonom als Politiker (Göttingen and Zurich 1986), pp. 62–76; Andreas Metz, Die ungleichen Gründerväter. Adenauers und Erhards langer Weg an die Spitze der Bundesrepublik (Konstanz 1998), pp. 95–100 and 109–41. 30 ‘Düsseldorfer Leitsätze’, 15 July 1949, in Christliche Demokratie in Deutschland, pp. 742–61, here p. 742: see also Uertz, Christentum, pp. 185–204. 31 ‘Resolution des CDU—Bundesparteitags’, 22 October 1950, in Christlich- Demokratische Union Deutschlands. Erster Parteitag der CDU, Goslar, 20.–22. Oktober 1950 (Bonn 1950), pp. 147–9; ‘Statut der gesamtdeutschen CDU’, in ibid., pp. 174–6. Christian democracy in Europe since 1945 30 32 ‘Regierungserklärung Erhards’, 18 , in Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte, 4. Wahlperiode, vol. 53 (Bonn 1963), pp. 4192–208, here p. 4192. 33 Ludwig Erhard, Wohlstand für alle (Düsseldorf 1957). 34 ‘Rede Erhards auf dem 13. Bundesparteitag der CDU’, 31 March 1965, in Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands, 13. Bundesparteitag, Düsseldorf, 28.–31. März 1965 (Bonn 1965), pp. 700–21. 35 Buchhaas, Volkspartei, p. 304. 36 See ‘Berliner Programm’, November 1968, in Christliche Demokratie in Deutschland, pp. 778–96; Kleinmann, CDU, pp. 269–73; Schönbohm, Volkspartei, pp. 77–84. 37 See Klaus Hildebrand, Von Erhard zur Grossen Koalition 1963–1969 (Stuttgart- Wiesbaden 1984), pp. 283–301; Reinhard Schmoeck and Bruno Kaiser, Die vergessene Regierung—Die gro !e Koalition 1966 bis 1969 und ihre langfristigen Wirkungen (Bonn 1991), pp. 289–327. 38 See Winfried Baumgart, ‘Adenauer’s Europapolitik 1945–1963’, in Günter Rinsche (ed.), Frei und geeint. Europa in der Politik der Unionsparteien . Darstellungen und Dokumente zum 40. Jahrestag der Unterzeichnung der Römischen Verträge (Cologne, Weimar and Vienna 1997), pp. 13–16; Ulrich Lappenküper, ‘Die Europapolitik Ludwig Erhard’s’, in ibid., pp. 37–45; idem, Die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Frankreich 1949–1963. Von der ‘Erbfeindschaft’ zur ‘Entente élémentaire’ (Munich 2001); idem, ‘“Ich bin wirklich ein guter Europäer.” Ludwig Erhard’s Europapolitik 1949–66’, Francia, vol. 19 (1992), pp. 85–121; Schmoeckel and Kaiser, Regierung, pp. 203–30; Hans-Peter Schwarz, ‘Adenauer und Europa’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol. 27 (1979), pp. 471–523; idem, ‘Das aussenpolitische Konzept Konrad Adenauers’, in Rudolf Morsey and Konrad Repgen (eds), Adenauer Studien I (Mainz 1971), pp. 71–108. 39 Kleinmann, CDU, p. 481. 40 See Hans-Peter Schwarz, Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik. Deutschland im Widerstreit der aussenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft 1945–1949 (Stuttgart 1980), pp. 297–344. 41 Adenauer to , 27 August 1949, in Hans-Peter Mensing (ed.), Adenauer, Briefe 1949–1951 (Berlin 1985), p. 97. 42 ‘Rede Adenauers in der Zonenausschusssitzung der CDU der britischen Zone’, 19 October 1948, in Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (ed.), Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der britischen Besatzungszone 1946–1949. Dokumente zur Gründungsgeschichte der CDU Deutschlands (Bonn 1975), pp. 492–9, here p. 499. 43 See Hanns Jürgen Küsters, ‘Der Streit um Kompetenzen und Konzeptionen deutscher Europapolitik’, in Ludolf Herbst, Werner Bührer and Hanno Sowade (eds), Vom Marshallplan zur EWG. Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt (Munich 1990), pp. 335–70. 44 ‘Rede Erhards vor der 14. Handelshochschule St. Gallen’, 15 January 1962 in idem, Wirken und Reden (Ludwigsburg 1966), pp. 166–85, here p. 179. 45 See Hanns Jürgen Küsters, ‘Walter Hallstein und die Verhandlungen über die Between concentration movement and people's party 31 Römischen Verträge 1955–1957’, in Wilfried Loth, William Wallace and Wolfgang Wessels (eds), Walter Hallstein—Der /ergessene Europäer ? (Bonn 1995), pp. 81– 105. 46 Unterredung zwischen Adenauer und vom 29 September 1956, Aufzeichnung, 1 October 1956, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin, Abgabeliste Ministerbüro, vol. 155. 47 Berthold Martin an von Brentano, 10 August 1960, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Nachlass zu Guttenberg, vol. 177, excerpt in Horst Möller and Klaus Hildebrand (eds), Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Frankreich: Dokumente 1949–1963, vol. 3 (Munich 1997), pp. 636–9, here p. 636. 48 Lappenküper, ‘Beziehungen’, pp. 1558–619 and pp. 1723–1840; Reiner Marcowitz, Option für Paris? Unionsparteien, SPD und Charles de Gaulle 1958 bis 1969 (Munich 1996), pp. 49–85, 109–31 and 146–64. 49 ‘Rede Erhards vor der Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik und der Österreichischen Industriellen-Vereinigung in Wien, 8 February 1961’, in idem, Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik. Der Weg der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft (Düsseldorf, Vienna and Frankfurt/Main 1962), pp. 543–58, here pp. 554–5. 50 Press conference de Gaulle, 23 July 1964, in idem, Discours et Messages, vol. 4 (Paris 1970), pp. 222–37, here p. 228. 51 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Staatsmann 1952–1967 (Stuttgart 1991), p. 886. 52 Volker Hentschel, Ludwig Erhard. Ein Politikerleben (Munich and Landsberg am Lech 1996), pp. 498–507. 53 See press conference de Gaulle, 4 February 1965, in idem, Discours, vol. 4, pp. 325–42, here p. 338; Knud Linsel, Charles de Gaulle und Deutschland 1914–1969 (Sigmaringen 1998), pp. 236–40. 54 See Horst Osterheld, Die Aussenpolitik unter Bundeskanzler Ludwig Erhard 1963– 1966 (Düsseldorf 1992), pp. 238–54; Hentschel, Ludwig Erhard, pp. 579–88; Marcowitz, Option, pp. 202–20. 55 Pridham, Christian Democracy, p. 145. 56 See Hentschel, Ludwig Erhard, pp. 613–49; Hildebrand, Von Erhard zur Grossen Koalition, pp. 202–31. 57 at the SPD Party Council, 30 June 1967, quoted in Hildebrand, Von Erhard zur Grossen Koalition, p. 317. 58 See ibid., pp. 301–23; Schmoeckel and Kaiser, Regierung, pp. 203–30. 59 Schönbohm, Volkspartei, p. 99. 60 See Wolfgang Falke, Die Mitglieder der CDU. Eine empirische Studie zum Verhältnis von Mitglieder- und Organisationsstruktur der CDU 1971–1977 (Berlin 1982); Haungs, CDU, pp. 176–7; Schönbohm, Volkspartei, pp. 160–253. 61 Ibid., p. 99. 62 Ibid., p. 94. 63 See ‘Grundsatzprogramm der CDU’, October 1978, in Christliche Demokratie in Deutschland, pp. 992–1031. 64 See Haungs, CDU, pp. 170–5. 65 See Frank Bösch, ‘Kontinuität im Umbruch. Die CDU/CSU auf dem Weg ins neue Christian democracy in Europe since 1945 32 Jahrhundert’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, vol. 5 (2000), pp. 12–21, here pp. 18–19; see also Heiner Geissler, Zeit, das Visier zu öffnen (Cologne 1998); , Vision 21. Ein Gegenmodell zur rot-grünen Republik (Frankfurt/Main 1998); Horst Poller, Rechts oder Links ? Niedergang und Erneuerung der CDU (Munich 1998); Joachim Rogosch, Wie christlich ist die CDU? Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit ( 1999); Jürgen Rüttgers, Zeitenwende—Wendezeiten. Das Jahr 2000- Projekt: Die Wissensgesellschaft (Berlin 1999). 66 See Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, Parteienfinanzierung in der Bewährung’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, vol. 16 (2000), pp. 15–22; Erwin K.Scheuch and Ute Scheuch, Die Spendenkrise—Parteien ausser Kontrolle (Reinbek bei 2000), pp. 55– 134; Friedbert Pflüger, Ehrenwort. Das System Kohl und der Neubeginn (Stuttgart 2000). 67 Friedbert Pflüger, ‘Den Staatsmann Kohl ehren—das System Kohl überwinden. Wie die CDU ihre Glaubwürdigkeit wiedergewinnen kann’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 April 2000. 68 Angela Merkel, ‘Die von Helmut Kohl eingeräumten Vorgänge haben der Partei Schaden zugefügt’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 December 1999. 69 Schäuble in an interview with the television station Phoenix, 6 April 2000. For an excerpt see General—Anzeiger, 4 April 2000. See also Volker Zastrow,’ “Ich bin gnadenlos hereingelegt worden”. Die 100.000-Mark Geschichte lässt den CDU— Vorsitzenden Schäuble nicht los’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 February 2000. 70 Franz Walter and Frank Bösch, ‘Das Ende des christdemokratischen Zeitalters? Zur Zukunft eines Erfolgsmodells’, in Tobias Dürr and Rüdiger Soldt (eds), Die CDU nach Kohl (Frankfurt/Main 1998), pp. 46–58. 71 Warnfried Dettling, ‘Das Ende der Grabesruhe. Was heisst heute konservativ? In der Opposition muss sich die CDU als Volkspartei neu erfinden’, Die Zeit, 1 October 1998.