CANADIAN CASES on EMPLOYMENT LAW Fourth Series/Quatri`Eme S´Erie Recueil De Jurisprudence Canadienne En Droit Du Travail

CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW Fourth Series/Quatri`eme s´erie Recueil de jurisprudence canadienne en droit du travail

VOLUME 25 (Cited 25 C.C.E.L. (4th))

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF/REDACTEUR´ EN CHEF M. Norman Grosman, B.SC., LL.B. Grosman, Grosman & Gale LLP Toronto, Ontario ASSISTANT EDITORS/ADJOINTS A` LA REDACTION´ Robert Bonhomme, D.E.C., B.L.L. Michael J. Weiler, B.A., LL.B. Heenan Blaikie LLP Boughton Law Corporation Montréal, Québec Vancouver, British Columbia Malcolm J. MacKillop, B.A., LL.B. Matthew L.O. Certosimo, B.A.(HONS.), Shields O’Donnell MacKillop LLP LL.B. Toronto, Ontario Borden Ladner Gervais Toronto, Ontario Magali Cournoyer-Proulx, D.E.C., LL.B. Heenan Blaikie LLP Montréal, Québec CARSWELL EDITORIAL STAFF/REDACTION´ DE CARSWELL Cheryl L. McPherson, B.A.(HONS.) Director, Primary Content Operations / Directrice des activités liées au contenu principal Bob Greenfield, B.A., J.D. Product Development Manager Nicole Ross, B.A., LL.B. Julia Fischer, B.A.(HONS.), LL.B. Supervisor, Legal Writing Supervisor, Legal Writing Susan Koster, B.A.(HONS.), LL.B. Michael Johnson, B.A.(HONS.), LL.B. Lead Legal Writer Lead Legal Writer Samantha Barr, B.A., J.D. Martin-Fran¸cois Parent, LL.B., LL.M., Senior Legal Writer DEA (PARIS II) Bilingual Legal Writer Melissa Dubien Content Editor Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation 167

[Indexed as: Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation] Procureur Général du Canada, demandeur et Nation Munsee- Delaware et Crystal Flewelling, défenderesses Crystal Flewelling, demanderesse et Nation Munsee-Delaware, Procureur Général du Canada, Procureur Général de l’Ontario, défendeurs Cour fédérale Docket: T-1043-13, T-1030-13 2015 FC 366, 2015 CF 366 René LeBlanc J. Heard: 23 septembre 2014 Judgment: 23 mars 2015 Aboriginal law –––– Employment law — Bands and First Nations as employers –––– In 2001, First Nation, Indian Band under Indian Act, hired employee, member of First Nation, to work in administration office — Employee’s duties evolved from data entry/file clerk to housing/finance clerk — Employee was dismissed in spring 2006, and filed complaint for unjust dismissal under s. 240 of Canada Labour Code — First Nation agreed matter governed by Code and adjudicator appointed — Parties awaited outcome of criminal charges against employee — When proceeding resumed, First Nation acknowledged employee was dismissed without cause and that damages was only outstanding question — In 2012, First Nation took position that employee’s employment was subject to provincial, not federal, regulation — In May 2013, adjudicator agreed that 2010 Supreme Court of Canada decision had changed legal landscape by determining that presumption that employment relationships subject to provincial regulation applied even when employer was First Nation — Applying “functional test” to determine that clerical work performed by employee was of type generally regulated by province, adjudicator found he had no jurisdiction — Employee and federal Attorney General brought applications for judicial review — Applications granted — Constitutional question relating to division of powers are reviewable on standard of correctness — Questions of fact, such as characterization of employment, are reviewable for reasonableness — Employer or entity in 2010 Supreme Court of Canada decision was not Indian Band, but separate and distinct legal entity, so case was distinguishable — Decision in 1982 Supreme Court of Canada case establishing that Indian Bands and Band Councils, as they governance authority from federal legislation, were federal undertakings for purposes of labour relations when engaged in general administration of Band affairs, including financial affairs, was still binding — Adjudicator 168 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

erred by relying exclusively on 2010 case without considering core function of Indian Band or Band Council — Administration of First Nation federal undertaking within meaning of Code — First Nation unable to establish inherent right to govern exempting it from application of Code — Decision of adjudicator quashed; matter referred back for determination of damages. Cases considered by Ren´e LeBlanc J.: Anderson and Fox Lake Cree Nation, Re (2013), (sub nom. Fox Lake Cree Nation v. Anderson) 445 F.T.R. 51 (Eng.), 2013 FC 1276, 2013 CarswellNat 4772, 2013 CF 1276, 2013 CarswellNat 5482, (sub nom. Fox Lake Cree Nation v. Anderson) [2014] 2 C.N.L.R. 150, 13 C.C.E.L. (4th) 289 (F.C.) — referred to Ardoch Algonquin First Nation & Allies v. Ontario (1997), (sub nom. Lovelace v. Ontario) 44 C.R.R. (2d) 285, 1997 CarswellOnt 1897, (sub nom. Lovelace v. Ontario) [1998] 2 C.N.L.R. 36, 26 O.T.C. 320 (note), 100 O.A.C. 344, (sub nom. Lovelace v. Ontario) 33 O.R. (3d) 735, (sub nom. Ardoch Algonquin First Nation v. Ontario) 148 D.L.R. (4th) 126, [1997] O.J. No. 2313 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Commissionaires (Great Lakes) v. Dawson (2011), 2011 CarswellNat 2805, 2011 FC 717, 2011 CF 717, 2011 CarswellNat 3778, 340 D.L.R. (4th) 351, 391 F.T.R. 216 (F.C.) — referred to Consolidated Fastfrate Inc. v. Western Canada Council of Teamsters (2009), 203 C.R.R. (2d) 247, [2009] Alta. L.R.B.R. 396, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 407, 188 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 1, 2009 CarswellAlta 1891, 2009 CarswellAlta 1892, 2009 SCC 53, 470 W.A.C. 50, 469 A.R. 50, 14 Alta. L.R. (5th) 203, [2010] 1 W.W.R. 1, D.T.E. 2009T-847, 94 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 2010 C.L.L.C. 220- 001, 395 N.R. 276, 313 D.L.R. (4th) 285, 81 C.C.E.L. (3d) 163, [2009] S.C.J. No. 53 (S.C.C.) — referred to Craig v. R. (2012), (sub nom. Craig v. Canada) 347 D.L.R. (4th) 385, [2012] 5 C.T.C. 205, 2012 SCC 43, 2012 CarswellNat 2737, 2012 CarswellNat 2738, (sub nom. Canada v. Craig) [2012] 2 S.C.R. 489, (sub nom. R. v. Craig) 2012 D.T.C. 5115 (Eng.), (sub nom. R. v. Craig) 2012 D.T.C. 5116 (Fr.), (sub nom. Minister of National Revenue v. Craig) 433 N.R. 111, [2012] S.C.J. No. 43 (S.C.C.) — referred to Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. U.G.W. (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031, [1979] 4 C.N.L.R. 21, 80 C.L.L.C. 14,006, 102 D.L.R. (3d) 385, 30 N.R. 421, 1979 CarswellOnt 715F, 1979 CarswellOnt 715 (S.C.C.) — referred to Francis v. Canada (Labour Relations Board) (1980), 1980 CarswellNat 96, (sub nom. P.S.A.C. v. Francis) [1981] 1 F.C. 225, [1981] 2 C.N.L.R. 126, (sub nom. St. Regis Indian Band Council v. Canada (Labour Relations Board)) 33 N.R. 56, 80 C.L.L.C. 14,048, 1980 CarswellNat 96F (Fed. C.A.) — followed Francis v. Canada (Labour Relations Board) (1982), (sub nom. P.S.A.C. v. Francis) [1982] 2 S.C.R. 72, [1982] 4 C.N.L.R. 94, 82 C.L.L.C. 14,208, 139 Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation 169

D.L.R. (3d) 9, 44 N.R. 136, 1982 CarswellNat 485F, 1982 CarswellNat 485, [1982] S.C.J. No. 62 (S.C.C.) — referred to Francis v. Mohawk Council of Kanesatake (2003), 2003 CFPI 115, 2003 Car- swellNat 2792, [2003] 3 C.N.L.R. 86, 2003 FCT 115, 227 F.T.R. 161, [2003] 4 F.C. 1133, 2003 CarswellNat 235, [2003] F.C.J. No. 156 (Fed. T.D.) — referred to Knebush v. Maygard (2014), 2014 FC 1247, 2014 CarswellNat 6179 (F.C.) — referred to Martin v. Canada (Attorney General) (2013), 2013 CarswellNat 90, 2013 FCA 15, 2013 C.L.L.C. 240-003, 275 C.R.R. (2d) 326, 2013 CAF 15, 442 N.R. 340, 2013 CarswellNat 2299, [2014] 3 F.C.R. 117 (F.C.A.) — referred to Native Child & Family Services of Toronto v. C.E.P. (2008), 2008 FCA 338, 2008 CarswellNat 3855, (sub nom. Native Child & Family Services of Toronto v. Communication, Energy & Paperworkers Union of Canada) [2009] 1 C.N.L.R. 218, 2008 CAF 338, 2008 CarswellNat 4911, (sub nom. Native Child & Family Services of Toronto v. Communication, Energy & Paperworkers Union of Canada) 2009 C.L.L.C. 220-022, (sub nom. Native Child & Family Services of Toronto v. Communication, Energy & Paperworkers Union of Canada) 382 N.R. 330, 302 D.L.R. (4th) 700, [2008] A.C.F. No. 1497, [2008] F.C.J. No. 1497 (F.C.A.) — referred to Native Child & Family Services of Toronto v. C.E.P. (2010), 2010 SCC 46, (sub nom. Communications, Energy & Paperworkers Union of Canada v. Native Child & Family Services of Toronto) [2010] 4 C.N.L.R. 279, D.T.E. 2010T- 730, (sub nom. CEPU v. Native Child & Family Services) 2010 C.L.L.C. 220-63, (sub nom. Communications, Energy & Paperworkers Union of Canada v. Native Child & Family Services of Toronto) [2010] 2 S.C.R. 737, 2010 CarswellNat 3988, 2010 CarswellNat 3989, (sub nom. Native Child & Family Services of Toronto v. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada) 408 N.R. 121, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 53, [2010] S.C.J. No. 46 (S.C.C.) — distinguished New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 372 N.R. 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, 2008 CSC 9, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, D.T.E. 2008T-223, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 Car- swellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, 2008 SCC 9, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9 (S.C.C.) — referred to NIL/TU,O Child & Family Services Society v. B.C.G.E.U. (2010), (sub nom. NIL/TU,O v. BCGSEU) 2010 C.L.L.C. 220-062, 11 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. NIL/TU,O Child & Family Services Society v. B.C. Government & Service Employees’ Union) [2010] 4 C.N.L.R. 284, D.T.E. 2010T-727, (sub 170 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

nom. NIL/TU,O Child & Family Services Society v. B.C. Government & Service Employees’ Union) [2010] 2 S.C.R. 696, 498 W.A.C. 1, 294 B.C.A.C. 1, 2010 SCC 45, 2010 CarswellBC 2937, 2010 CarswellBC 2938, 90 C.C.P.B. 1, 92 C.C.E.L. (3d) 221, (sub nom. NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. Government & Service Employees’ Union) 407 N.R. 338, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 21, [2010] 12 W.W.R. 402, 9 Admin. L.R. (5th) 161, [2010] S.C.J. No. 45 (S.C.C.) — followed Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Communications Workers of Canada (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 115, 28 N.R. 107, 98 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 79 C.L.L.C. 14,211, 1979 Car- swellNat 639F, 1979 CarswellNat 639 (S.C.C.) — referred to Perron v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 1187, [2003] 3 C.N.L.R. 198, [2003] O.T.C. 275, 105 C.R.R. (2d) 92, 32 C.P.C. (5th) 165, [2003] O.J. No. 1348 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to R. v. Henry (2005), 2005 SCC 76, 2005 CarswellBC 2972, 2005 CarswellBC 2973, 260 D.L.R. (4th) 411, 342 N.R. 259, (sub nom. R. c. Henry) [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609, 49 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, 219 B.C.A.C. 1, 361 W.A.C. 1, 376 A.R. 1, 360 W.A.C. 1, 33 C.R. (6th) 215, 202 C.C.C. (3d) 449, [2006] 4 W.W.R. 605, 136 C.R.R. (2d) 121, [2005] S.C.J. No. 76 (S.C.C.) — referred to R. v. Jones (1996), 1996 CarswellOnt 3987, 1996 CarswellOnt 3988, 50 C.R. (4th) 216, (sub nom. R. v. Gardner) 138 D.L.R. (4th) 204, (sub nom. R. v. Pamajewon) 27 O.R. (3d) 95, (sub nom. R. v. Pamajewon) [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 164, (sub nom. R. v. Pamajewon) 92 O.A.C. 241, (sub nom. R. v. Gardner) 109 C.C.C. (3d) 275, (sub nom. R. v. Pamajewon) 199 N.R. 321, (sub nom. R. v. Pamajewon) [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821, EYB 1996-67707 (S.C.C.) — referred to R. v. Vanderpeet (1996), [1996] 9 W.W.R. 1, 23 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, 50 C.R. (4th) 1, (sub nom. R. v. Van der Peet) 137 D.L.R. (4th) 289, (sub nom. R. v. Van der Peet) 109 C.C.C. (3d) 1, (sub nom. R. v. Van der Peet) 200 N.R. 1, (sub nom. R. v. Van der Peet) 80 B.C.A.C. 81, (sub nom. R. v. Van der Peet) [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, (sub nom. R. v. Van der Peet) [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 177, (sub nom. R. v. Van der Peet) 130 W.A.C. 81, 1996 CarswellBC 2309, 1996 CarswellBC 2310, EYB 1996-67132, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77 (S.C.C.) — referred to Statutes considered: Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2 Generally — referred to Pt. III — referred to s. 2 “federal work, undertaking or business” — considered s. 167 — considered s. 240 — referred to s. 241(2) — referred to s. 242 — referred to Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation Ren´e LeBlanc J. 171

Child, Family and Community Service Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 46 Generally — referred to Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 Generally — referred to s. 91 ¶ 24 — referred to Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, reprinted R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 44 s. 35 — considered First Nations Fiscal and Statistical Management Act, S.C. 2005, c. 9 Generally — referred to Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 Generally — referred to s. 2(1) “council of the band” — referred to s. 88 — considered

APPLICATIONS by federal Attorney General and employee of First Nation for judicial review of adjudicator’s decision that he lacked jurisdiction to hear unjust dismissal complaint under Canada Labour Code.

Roy Lee pour le Procureur g´en´eral du Canada Cynthia Mackenzie pour Crystal Flewelling Brian Daly pour la Nation Munsee-Delaware

Ren´e LeBlanc J.: I. Introduction 1 These two related cases, heard together, stem from a long and rather bitter labour dispute between the Respondent, Munsee-Delaware Nation (the Nation), and the Applicant, Crystal Flewelling. Ms Flewelling claims her employment was unjustly terminated by the Nation. She filed a complaint for unjust dismissal under section 240 of the Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985, c. L-2 (the Code) resulting in an adjudicator being appointed under section 242 of the Code (the Adjudicator). 2 On May 10, 2013, when the six-year long proceedings before the Ad- judicator were near completion, the Adjudicator, in the wake of the Su- preme Court of Canada decision in NIL/TU,O Child & Family Services Society v. B.C.G.E.U., 2010 SCC 45, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 696 (S.C.C.) (NIL/TU,O), ruled that he had no jurisdiction to consider Ms Flewelling’s complaint on the ground that her employment was provincially regulated. 3 The issue brought before this Court, by both Ms Flewelling and the Attorney General of Canada, is whether the Adjudicator erred in con- 172 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

cluding as he did. For the reasons that follow, I find that the Code applies to Ms Flewelling’s complaint and that, as a result, both the Attorney General and Ms Flewelling’s judicial review applications shall be granted.

II. Background A. Ms Flewelling’s Complaint 4 Ms Flewelling is a member of the Nation. She was hired by the Na- tion in September 2001 to work in its Administration offices. This was at the time Co-Management had been imposed by the Department of Ab- original Affairs and Northern Development Canada as a result of the Na- tion’s failure to meet its obligations regarding the management of its financial affairs. Over time, her duties evolved from those of a data entry/file clerk to those of a housing/finance clerk. Her employment was terminated in the spring of 2006. 5 The Nation is an Indian Band as defined under the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5. Reserve lands, located in southern Ontario, were set apart by the Crown for its use and benefit. The Nation’s population consists of approximately 600 people, with a little less than 200 members living on the reserve. It is governed by a Chief and Council elected in accordance with the Nation’s Custom Election Code. 6 In May 2006, Ms Flewelling filed a complaint of unjust dismissal under the Code. At the outset of the complaint process, the Nation took the position that it was an Indian Band recognised under the Indian Act and that its labour relations with its employees were governed by the Code. As the complaint could not be settled by an inspector appointed under section 241(2) of the Code, the matter was referred to the Adjudicator. 7 On January 28, 2008, the Adjudicator issued an award dismissing two preliminary non-constitutional, jurisdictional objections, raised by the Nation. The proceedings before the Adjudicator were then at a standstill for three years as the parties were awaiting the resolution of related criminal charges laid against Ms Flewelling. The adjudication proceedings resumed in the fall of 2011, at which point the Nation advised that it was no longer asserting cause for Ms Flewelling’s dismissal. As a result, the amount of damages payable to Ms Flewelling remained the only issue to be determined. Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation Ren´e LeBlanc J. 173

8 In the fall of 2012, when the hearings on this issue were well under way, the Nation asserted that Ms Flewelling’s employment was regulated by the labour laws of Ontario rather than the Code and that, as a result, the Adjudicator had no jurisdiction to hear and determine her complaint for unjust dismissal.

B. The Adjudicator’s Decision 9 On May 10, 2013, the Adjudicator ruled in favour of the Nation. He first noted that although the presumption, in Canada, is that employment relationships are regulated by the provinces, it had been widely accepted, as evidenced by the Nation’s position at the outset of the complaint proceedings, that the employment relationships of employees of First Na- tions were regulated by the Federal government, given Parliament’s authority over “Indians and Lands reserved for Indians” under subsection 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. 10 However, he agreed with the Nation’s assertion that the Supreme Court of Canada decision in NIL/TU,O changed the legal landscape in that regard by holding that the presumption that employment relationships are regulated by the provinces applied even when the employer was a First Nation. This meant, according to the Adjudicator, that when determining which of the provincial or federal labour laws apply to a given employment relationship, the fundamental nature of the inquiry was the same for First Nation employers as for any other federal heads of power. 11 The Adjudicator then proceeded with the first step of that inquiry, the “functional test”, and considered the nature, operations and habitual activities of the Nation in order to determine whether the Nation qualified as a “federal undertaking” under the Code. He held in this regard that the Nation’s activities were mostly concerned with policing, welfare, health, education and bingo and that those activities were all provincially regulated. Turning to the work performed by Ms Flewelling, the Adjudicator found that she was doing internal accounting and kept the Nation’s financial records for all its operations, including for the policing, welfare, health, education and bingo hall functions. He concluded that there was nothing in the work that Ms Flewelling was performing that was federally regulated. 12 Having found that the work performed by Nation’s employees in general, and by Ms Flewelling in particular, was of a type which is generally seen as provincially regulated, the Adjudicator concluded he had no jurisdiction to determine Ms Flewelling complaint. As a result, he held that 174 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

there was no need to proceed with the second stage of the inquiry and consider whether provincial regulation of the Nation’s labour relations would impair the core of the federal head of power over “Indians and Lands reserved for Indians.”

C. The Complaint’s Statutory Framework 13 The complaint filed by Ms Flewelling was brought under Part III of the Code which applies, according to section 167 of the Code, to “employment in or in connection with the operation of any federal work, undertaking or business”. Section 2 of the Code defines “federal work, undertaking or business” as, inter alia, “any work, undertaking or business that is within the legislative authority of Parliament.” 14 As indicated previously, the authority to legislate over “Indians and Lands reserved for Indians” belongs to Parliament.

III. Issue and Standard of Review 15 The issue to be decided is whether the Adjudicator erred in concluding that the employment relationship between Ms Flewelling and the Na- tion is governed by provincial law rather than the Code. 16 The appropriate standard of review applicable to constitutional questions relating, as is the case here, to division of powers issues is correctness (New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.), at para 58). The parties do not dispute this although the Nation contends, correctly in my view, that the Adjudica- tor’s findings regarding the underlying facts to the issue at hand, such as the characterization of the employment, are owed deference and are to be reviewed, as a result, on the standard of reasonableness (Commissionaires (Great Lakes) v. Dawson, 2011 FC 717, 391 F.T.R. 216 (F.C.); Anderson and Fox Lake Cree Nation, Re, 2013 FC 1276 (F.C.), at para 23).

IV. Analysis A. Constitutional Jurisdiction over Labour Relations 17 The Constitution Act, 1867 is silent as to whether the provincial legis- latures or Parliament has jurisdiction over labour relations. However, Ca- nadian courts have, historically, recognized that labour relations are pre- sumptively of provincial jurisdiction - as a matter falling within the provinces’ Property and Civil Rights head of power - and that the federal government has jurisdiction over that subject matter only by way of ex- Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation Ren´e LeBlanc J. 175

ception. That is, when the entity for which labour relations are at issue is a “federal work, undertaking or business” (Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396, [1925] J.C.J. No. 1 (Jud. Com. of Privy Coun.); Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Communications Workers of Canada (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 115 (S.C.C.); Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. U.G.W. (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031 (S.C.C.) (Four B); Consolidated Fastfrate Inc. v. Western Canada Council of Teamsters, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 407, 2009 SCC 53 (S.C.C.); NIL/TU,O, above). 18 To determine whether a work, undertaking or business’ labour relations is federally or provincially regulated involves the following two- step inquiry: a. The first step – also called the “functional test” – requires the Court to inquire into the nature, habitual activities and daily operations of the entity in question in order to determine whether it constitutes a federal work, undertaking or business; and b. If functional test is inconclusive, then the Court must inquire into whether provincial regulation of that entity‘s labour relations would impair the core of the federal head of power (Four B, above at p. 1045; NIL/TU,O, at para 6. 19 This approach, which is distinct from the one used to determine whether a particular piece of legislation falls within the legislative authority of Parliament or the provinces (NIL/TU,O at para 12), has, for the last 85 years, been “consistently endorsed and applied” by the Supreme Court of Canada (NIL/TU,O, at para 3).

B. The Position of the Parties 20 The Attorney General claims the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Francis v. Canada (Labour Relations Board) (1980), [1981] 1 F.C. 225 (Fed. C.A.), rev’d Francis v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 72 (S.C.C.) (Francis) is dispositive of the matter and was binding on the Adjudicator. It contends that Francis establishes that Indian bands and band councils, as they derive their governance authority from the Indian Act and other federal legislation, such as the First Nation Fiscal Management Act (SC 2005, c 9), are federal undertakings for the purposes of labour relations when they are engaged in their governance function and in the general administration of band affairs and reserves, including their financial affairs. 176 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

21 The Attorney General further contends that Francis is distinguishable from cases like NIL/TU,O where the employer or entity in question is not an Indian band but rather a distinct and separate legal entity, or from cases where the entity, although not, legally speaking, a separately incorporated body, is a separate and distinct operation from the Indian Band or Council. 22 Ms Flewelling adopts a similar view and stresses the fact that, contrary to NIL/TU,O, the Nation is not (i) a provincially incorporated body; (ii) a provincial corporation whose sole purpose is to provide child welfare services; (iii) a corporation subject to provincial legislation; (iv) a corporation whose operations are regulated exclusively by the province; or (v) an entity over which the province retains ultimate control regarding decision-making over its activities. 23 She claims that the essential function of the Nation’s Band Council is not to support police work, health care services, education, and employment in the Bingo Hall or to administer the welfare program. Rather, it is to protect the status, rights and privileges of First Nation’s persons, which is an integral part of federal jurisdiction over Indians and Lands reserved for Indians. She says that her work with the Nation was not specific to any particular discrete program but was rather related to the Nation’s financial affairs and to the management of housing on the Na- tion’s land. All her work, according to her, was ultimately under the control of the Nation’s Chief and Council and allowed the Nation to carry out its governance mandate and to comply with its obligations under the Indian Act and other related federal legislation. 24 The Nation disagrees. It claims that NIL/TU,O does not distinguish between an employer which is a First Nation and one which is a corporation formed by one or more First Nations nor does it hold that a First Nation’s activities can only be federal in nature. Rather, it contends that NIL/TU,O confirms that First Nations, like any other employers, should have its labour relations characterized under the functional test and not some other test. According to the Nation, this test is about what work activity is involved, not about who performs the work or for whom it is performed. It submits that, to the extent Francis applied some other test, it has been overruled by NIL/TU,O. 25 The Nation further claims that, as a First Nation, it has an inherent authority to govern, recognized within the Canadian Constitution. It says in this regard that it is governed by a Chief and a Council which are elected in accordance with the Nation’s Custom Code and which are not Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation Ren´e LeBlanc J. 177

organized or regulated by the Indian Act or its regulations. It is no longer correct, according to the Nation, to describe a First Nation as a creature of statute and First Nation Councils as creatures of the Indian Act. The Nation contends that even if First Nations were organized under the In- dian Act, they would be so organized subject to section 88 of that Act which extends the application of provincial laws of general application, like provincial labour relations laws, to Aboriginal people and their lands. 26 Here, it claims that Ms Flewelling’s habitual work activities — accounting and bookkeeping — are provincially regulated and only have, in any event, an insignificant portion of federal content. It submits that the fact that these activities were performed on behalf of a First Nation or for the benefit of Aboriginal people is irrelevant. It says that the Adjudi- cator was therefore correct in finding that the labour relations over these activities were provincially regulated and that he was without jurisdiction to entertain Ms Flewelling’s complaint under the Code.

C. Francis is still good law and was binding on the Adjudicator 27 This issue in this case turns on whether Frances is still good law in light of NIL/TU,O. If it is, then it is binding on both the Adjudicator and this Court, with the result that the Adjudicator’s ruling that he is without jurisdiction to consider Ms Flewelling’s complaint under the Code must be set aside. If it is no longer good law, then that ruling must stand. 28 Francis dealt with the certification, under the Code, of the Public Ser- vice Alliance of Canada as the bargaining agent for a group of employees of the St-Regis Indian Band (the Employees) engaged, for the most part, in “education administration, the administration of Indian lands and es- tate, the administration of welfare, the administration of housing, school administration, public works, the administration of an old age home, maintenance of roads, maintenance of schools, maintenance of water and sanitation services, and garbage collection” (Francis, at para 17). 29 Applying the teachings of Four B, Justice Heald (Justice Le Dain concurring on that point) characterized the function of the Employees generally as being “almost entirely concerned with the administration of the St-Regis Band of Indians”, as being “governmental in nature” and as coming under “the jurisdiction of the Indian Act” (Francis, at para 17). 30 Justice Heald then proceeded to a detailed analysis of the provisions of the Indian Act relating to the involvement of an Indian Band and its 178 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

Council to which that Act applies in the administration of the affairs of the Band. It is useful here to reproduce that analysis: (...) It is also instructive to peruse the various provisions of the Indian Act to determine the extent to which an Indian band and its council are involved in the administration of the affairs of an Indian band to which, as is the case here, the Indian Act applies. Section 20 states that no Indian is lawfully in possession of land in a reserve unless such possession is allotted to him by the band council and then approved by the Minister. Section 24 enables an Indian lawfully in possession of reserve lands to transfer that right to possession to another band member or to the band itself with the Minister’s approval. Sec- tion 25 provides that, in certain circumstances, an Indian’s right to possession of reserve lands shall revert to the band. Section 34 imposes a duty upon a band to maintain the roads, bridges, ditches and fences within the reserve occupied by that band. Section 37 provides that reserve lands shall not be sold, alienated, leased or otherwise disposed of unless they have been surrendered to the Crown by the band. Section 39 details the procedure to be followed by a band in making such surrender. Section 58 enables the Minister, with the consent of the band council, to improve, cultivate or lease unculti- vated or unused reserve lands. Under this section, the Minister is em- powered, with the consent of the band council, to dispose of sand, gravel, clay and other non-metallic substances upon or under reserve lands. Section 59 empowers the Minister, with the consent of the band council, to reduce or adjust the amount payable to the Crown in respect of the sale, lease or other disposition of surrendered reserve lands and furthermore, to reduce or adjust the amount payable to the band by an Indian in respect of a loan made to the Indian from band funds. Section 60 empowers the Governor in Council to grand to a band, at the request of that band, the right to exercise such control and management over reserve lands as the Governor in Council considers desirable. Counsel advised us that no such Order in Council subsists with respect to the St. Regis Indian Band. Sections 61 to 69 inclusive of the Act deal with the management of Indian moneys. Section 64 empowers the Minister, with the consent of the band council, to expend capital moneys of the band for various purposes: to distribute per capita to band members portions of the proceeds of sale of surrendered lands; for the construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, ditches, water courses and outer boundary fences; to purchase land for use by the band as a reserve or an addition to a reserve; to purchase for the band the interest of a band member in reserve lands; to purchase livestock and farm machinery for the band; to construct and maintain permanent improvements on the reserve; to Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation Ren´e LeBlanc J. 179

make loans to band members; to meet expenses necessarily inciden- tal to the management of reserve lands and band property; to construct houses for band members and to make loans to band members for building purposes; and generally, for any other purpose for the benefit of the band, in the opinion of the Minister. Section 66 empowers the Minister, with the consent of the band council to expend revenue moneys of the band for a number of purposes. Section 69 empowers the Governor in Council to allow a band to control, manage and expend in whole or in part its revenue moneys. Regulations pursuant to section 69 have been passed by the Governor in Council and apply to the St. Regis Indian Band4. These Regulations empower this Band, along with a large number of other bands in Canada to control, manage and expend its revenue moneys in whole or in part subject to the detailed provisions of the Regulations providing for bank accounts, signing officers, appointment of auditors, etc. Sec- tions 74 to 80 inclusive provide for the elections of chiefs and band councils. Sections 81 to 86 inclusive set out the powers of the band council. Section 81 empowers a band council to make by-laws for a large number of purposes: for the health of reserve residents; traffic regulation; observance of law and order; establishment of animal pounds; construction and maintenance of water courses, roads, bridges, ditches, fences and other local works; regulation of types of business to be carried on; building restrictions; allotment of reserve lands to members; noxious weed control; regulating and controlling water supplies; regulating and controlling sports, races, athletic contests and other amusements; and regulation of hawkers and peddlers, etc. (Francis, at paras 17-18) 31 Based on the powers conferred on the Band and its Council in the Indian Act and the evidence of the exercise of these powers by the Band and its Council, Justice Heald was satisfied that, contrary to Four B, which was concerned with the labour relations of four aboriginal individuals conducting a commercial business on an Indian reserve, the Em- ployees were “directly involved in activities related to Indian status” and that “the total administration of the Band [was] continuously concerned with the status and the rights and privileges of the Band Indians” (St- R´egis, at para 20). Paraphrasing the majority’s reasons in Four B, he concluded that the labour relations in issue were “an integral part of primary federal jurisdiction over Indians or Lands reserved for the Indians” and were, as a result, coming under federal legislative competence pursuant to section 91(24) of the Constitution Act 1867 (St-R´egis, at para 20). 180 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

32 As the activities engaged in by the Employees and the Band were being discharged under the authority of the Indian Act, Justice Heald was then satisfied that the administration of the St-Regis Band was a federal “work, undertaking or business” within the meaning of section 108(1) of the Code, that Parliament had therefore occupied the field respecting the Band’s labour relations, and that the Public Service Alliance of Canada was, as a result, constitutionally entitled to seek certification as a bargaining agent for the Employees under the Code (Francis, at para 22). 33 However, Justice Heald held that the St-Regis Band was not an “employer” within the meaning of the Code - that is a “person who employs one or more employees” - as it was not a “person” under either the Code or the Indian Act. As a result, he concluded that the Canada Labour Rela- tions Board had acted without jurisdiction in purporting to certify the Alliance. Chief Justice Thurlow, who did not come to a final conclusion on the issue of the constitutional applicability of the Code to the Employ- ees and the St-Regis Band, concurred with Justice Heald on that point. Justice Le Dain dissented. 34 Two years later, the Supreme Court of Canada overturned Justices Heald and Thurlow’s finding and held that the St-Regis Band Council could properly be considered an employer within the meaning of the Code on the ground that Band Councils were creatures of the Indian Act, that they were given power to enact by-laws for many specific purposes which are similar to those covered by the by-laws of a municipality and that they did, in fact, engage and pay employees to do work for them (Francis v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 72 (S.C.C.)). 35 The judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal in St Regis was rendered in the wake of — and in line with the analysis framework dictated by - Four B which clearly rejected the notion that the functional test is “inappropriate and ought to be disregarded where legislative competence is conferred not in terms of physical objects, things or systems, but to persons or groups of persons such as Indians or aliens” (Four B, at page 1045). As a result, the Federal Court of Appeal proceeded with its constitutional applicability analysis on the basis of the functional test and, as required by that test, directed its attention to the nature of the work being performed by the unit of employees in question and to the nature of the “business” or operation of a Band Council to which the Indian Act applies (St Regis, para 17). Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation Ren´e LeBlanc J. 181

36 Four B is the predecessor of NIL/TU,O when establishing whether labour relations in a First Nation employment context are to be governed by provincial or federal laws. In this regard, nothing in NIL/TU,O points to the Four B’s principles being discarded, disregarded or discredited. To the contrary, the majority in NIL/TU,O often refers to the test of Four B as the one that should be followed and applied (NIL/TU,O, at para 3, 15, 18, 23 and 40). It also refers to Four B as being the case, together with Northern Telecom, above, which sets out “most comprehensively” the legal test for determining the jurisdiction of labour relations on federal- ism grounds (NIL/TU,O, at para 3). 37 NIL/TU,O reiterated that this legal test had to be used regardless of the specific head of federal power engaged in a particular case, including, as stated in Four B, the power over “Indians and Lands reserved for Indians” (NIL/TU,O, at para 3). Applying the Four B test to the circumstances of that case (NIL/TU,O, at para 23) — a certification case like Francis - the Supreme Court found that the labour relations of the group of employees at issue fell under provincial jurisdiction. 38 However, these circumstances were somewhat different to those in Francis. From the outset, Madam Justice Abella, writing for the majority, underlined the “unique institutional structure” of the employer (NIL/TU,O, at para 1). This employer was a society - the NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society (the Society) — incorporated under British Columbia’s Society Act by a number of First Nations located in that province, to establish a child welfare agency that would provide “culturally sensitive” services to the children and families of those communities. The Society was regulated exclusively by the province and its employees exercised exclusively provincial delegated authority under British Columbia’s Child, Family and Community Service Act (NIL/TU,O, at para 36). It was funded by both the province and the federal government. This funding was the federal government’s sole involvement in the Society’s activities (NIL/TU,O, at para 34 and 40). 39 Madam Justice Abella found that the Society’s distinctiveness as a child welfare organization for Aboriginal communities did not take away “from its essential character as a child welfare agency that is in all respects regulated by the province” and concluded that its function was “unquestionably a provincial one” (NIL/TU,O, at para 39). 40 To borrow the terms used by Madam Justice Abella in NIL/TU,O, I do think it can be said, in the present case, that the employer is an agency “that is in all respects regulated by the province”, that its function is “un- 182 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

questionably a provincial one” and that Ms Flewelling exercised “exclusively provincial delegated authority” under a provincial legislation. Here, the employer is a Band Council to which the Indian Act applies and Ms Flewelling was engaged in the general administration of the band’s affairs, including on-reserve housing and matters concerning In- dian reserve lands. Her work activities were described by the Adjudicator as follows: The Complainant worked in the Employer’s finance department in the Nation’s office. She was the only employee in that department and so she did all the usual accounting duties. She maintained the Employer’s financial records, including accounts payable, accounts receivable, payroll, bank deposits and bank reconciliation. (Emphasis added) 41 The evidence before the Court shows that Ms Flewelling’s salary was paid out of federal monies received by the Nation; monies which con- sisted of the main share of the Nation’s funding. 42 According to St Regis, the business or operation of a Band Council is that of a local government deriving its authority from the Indian Act and the applicable regulations. It has a “comprehensive responsibility of a local government nature” (St Regis, Justice Le Dain, at para 27). It car- ries out governance functions through the employment of administrative employees. Ms Flewelling was one of those employees. 43 I agree with the Attorney General that the Adjudicator’s analysis is devoid of any consideration of the core functions of Indian bands and Band Councils that formed part of the analysis in Francis. His sole reli- ance on NIL/TU,O, which was concerned with the labour relations of a separately incorporated and provincially regulated child welfare service and which had nothing to do with the day-to-day administrative functions integral to running -the affairs of an Indian Band, is a reviewable error. 44 As in this case, the St-Regis Band was engaged in education administration, in the administration of welfare and in the delivery of healthcare in the form of the administration of an old age home. The Adjudicator ruled that these activities were provincially regulated and that, therefore, nothing in the work performed by Ms Flewelling was of the type which would normally be federally regulated. The fundamental nature of the “business” or operation of a Band and a Band Council, to which the In- dian Act applies, as depicted by the Federal Court of Appeal in Francis, is completely lost in that analysis. Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation Ren´e LeBlanc J. 183

45 I am not prepared to say that Francis was overruled by NIL/TU,O. The absence of any consideration of this crucial factor, is, in my view, fatal to the Adjudicator’s ruling. In other words, based on Francis, the functional test is conclusive that the administration of the Nation’s Band is a federal undertaking within the meaning of the Code. 46 The Nation claims that NIL/TU,O implicitly overrules Francis: Notwithstanding this Court’s long-standing approach, a different line of authority has uniquely emerged when courts are dealing with s. 91(24) (see Sappier v. Tobique Indian Band (Council) (1988), 87 N.R. 1 (F.C.A.); Qu’Appelle Indian Residential School Council v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Tribunal), [1988] 2 F.C. 226 (T.D.), at p. 239; Sagkeeng Alcohol Rehab Centre Inc. v. Abraham, [1994] 3 F.C. 449 (T.D.), at pp. 459-60). This divergent analysis proceeds, contrary to Four B, directly to the question of whether the “core” of the head of power is impaired, without applying the functional test first. (...) [Madame Justice Abella, para 19] 47 In my view, Francis is not listed as part of that “different line of authority” for a reason and that reason is that the functional test, as set out in Four B, was central to the Federal Court of Appeal’s approach and analysis to the question of the Code’s constitutional applicability to the labour relations issue at play. 48 The case of Native Child & Family Services of Toronto v. C.E.P., 2010 SCC 46, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 737 (S.C.C.), which was decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on the same day as NIL/TU,O, is not helpful to the Nation either. This case involved a very similar set of facts as NIL/TU,O as the employer in that case was an aboriginal children’s aid society that delivered services primarily to Indian and Metis families pursuant to Ontario’s Child and Family Services Act and an agreement with the Ontario government. The Supreme Court essentially endorsed its decision in NIL/TU,O and affirmed the Federal Court of Appeal decision where that Court found the links to federal jurisdiction over Indians in that case were even thinner than those in NIL/TU,O (Native Child & Family Services of Toronto v. C.E.P., 2008 FCA 338 (F.C.A.), at para 40). Nowhere in these two decisions is there any indication that Francis is no longer good law. 49 Neither is the decision of my colleague, Justice Russel Zinn in Anderson and Fox Lake Cree Nation, Re, 2013 FC 1276 (F.C.), an unjust dismissal matter - as in the present case - an indication that Francis has lost its precedential value, as contended by the Nation. First, in accordance with the stare decisis principle, only the Supreme Court of Canada 184 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

or the Federal Court of Appeal itself can overrule that decision (R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.); Craig v. R., 2012 SCC 43, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 489 (S.C.C.); Martin v. Canada (Attorney Gen- eral), 2013 FCA 15, [2014] 3 F.C.R. 117 (F.C.A.), at para 104). This has not occurred. Second, the First Nation in that case, also an Indian Band under the Indian Act, had set up a Negotiation Office which has as a “central purpose” the “negotiation of sophisticated commercial arrange- ments with other parties” (Fox Lake Cree Nation, at para 31). The First Nation was challenging the Code’s constitutional applicability to the unjust dismissal complaint filed by an employee of the Negotiation Office. The First Nation took the position that the Negotiation Office was a separate and distinct operation from the Band’s general administration and that the employee in question was not an employee of the First Nation generally, but of the Negotiation Office as a discrete unit. That position prevailed. In grating the First Nation’s judicial review application, Jus- tice Zinn held that the Negotiation Office was not vital or integral to the First Nation’s operations as an Indian Band (Fox Lake Cree Nation, at para 36-38). Therefore, contrary to Francis and to the situation in the present case, Fox Lake Cree Nation was concerned with a discrete unit separate and distinct from the Band’s general administration and central governance function and is, as a result, distinguishable. 50 Finally, I do not believe that the Nation’s assertion that it has an inherent authority to govern recognized by section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 and that, as a result, it is not subject to the regulation of federal laws such as the Indian Act, has any bearing on the outcome of this case. As both the Attorney General and Ms Flewelling correctly point out, such a right to self-government, in order to be legally enforceable, needs to emanate from either a negotiated self-government agreement with the government of Canada or a judicial declaration. When it is asserted in litigation, it needs, as any other kind of Aboriginal right, to be characterized in context and with sufficient specificity to allow a court to identify a practice, custom or tradition that is integral to the distinctive culture of the First Nation asserting that right (R. v. Vanderpeet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.), at para 46; R. v. Jones, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821 (S.C.C.), at para 24). 51 Here, the Nation adduced no evidence that could support a finding of such an inherent right to govern and certainly no evidence that its claim in this respect meets the test established in Van der Peet, above. Al- though First Nations do not owe their existence to the Indian Act or any other statute and that an Indian Band is more than a creature of statute, Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation Ren´e LeBlanc J. 185

they nevertheless constitute entities that, as Bands and Councils, are regulated by the Indian Act and exercise powers in accordance with that Act (Perron v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 3 C.N.L.R. 198 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para 22; Jack Woodward, Q.C., Native Law, vol 1, looseleaf, Toronto, Carswell, 2007 at 1-420). 52 It is trite law that Bands have statutory obligations under the Indian Act that ensure their political and financial accountability, both to their members and to the federal government (Ardoch Algonquin First Nation & Allies v. Ontario, [1997] O.J. No. 2313 (Ont. C.A.), at para 7; Knebush v. Maygard, 2014 FC 1247 (F.C.) at para 44). It is also clear that the Indian Act applies whether the Band Council is elected through the process prescribed by it pursuant to section 74 or through customary elections which are recognized by that Act (see the definition of “council of the band” in subsection 2(1) of the Indian Act; Francis v. Mohawk Council of Kanesatake, [2003] 4 F.C. 1133, 227 F.T.R. 161 (Fed. T.D.), at para 13). This is no different whether the Band Council seldomly uses its authority to pass by-laws. It remains an entity deriving its authority from the Indian Act. 53 There is no doubt that the aboriginal right to self-government, as recognized by the Constitution, can be asserted - but not in this case. It has neither been established nor asserted before the Adjudicator. Therefore, the Nation’s argument that its governance authority is not delegated from Parliament but rather, stems from its constitutionally protected right to self-govern must fail. 54 In sum, Francis is still good law. It was binding on the Adjudicator as it is on this Court. As it is dispositive of the present matter, the Attorney General and Ms Flewelling’s judicial review applications are granted and costs are awarded against the Nation in both cases. The present Judgment and Reasons will be filed in both dockets T-1030-13 and T-1043-13.

Judgment THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that: 1. The application for judicial review is granted. 2. The decision of the Adjudicator dated May 10, 2013, is quashed. 3. The matter is referred back to the Adjudicator for determination of the unjust dismissal complaint filed by the Appli- cant in Court docket T-1030-13. 186 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

4. Costs are awarded against the Respondent.

Ren´e LeBlanc J.:

[TRADUCTION FRANCAISE ¸ CERTIFIEE,´ NON REVIS´ EE]´

I. Introduction 1 La Cour est saisie de deux affaires connexes, instruites ensemble, qui découlent d’un conflit de travail, long et plutôt rude, opposant la défenderesse, la Nation Munsee-Delaware (la Nation), et la demanderesse, Crystal Flewelling. Madame Flewelling affirme avoir et´´ e congédiée injustement par la Nation. Elle a déposé une plainte de congédiement injuste en vertu de l’article 240 du Code canadien du travail, LRC 1985, c L-2 (le Code). Un arbitre a ensuite et´´ e nommé en vertu de l’article 242 du Code (l’arbitre). 2 Le 10 mai 2013, alors qu’approchait de son terme la procédure qui se déroulait déjà depuis six ans devant l’arbitre, celui-ci, a` la suite d’un arrêt de la Cour suprême du Canada, NIL/TU,O Child & Family Services Society v. B.C.G.E.U., 2010 SCC 45, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 696 (S.C.C.) (NIL/TU,O), a conclu qu’il n’avait pas compétence pour examiner la plainte de Mme Flewelling au motif que son emploi etait´ régi par les lois provinciales. 3 La question soumise qu’ont posée a` la Cour Mme Flewelling et le procureur général du Canada est celle de savoir si l’arbitre a eu tort de conclure comme il l’a fait. Pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis que le Code s’applique a` la plainte de Mme Flewelling et qu’en conséquence, les demandes de contrôle judiciaire du procureur général et de Mme Fle- welling doivent toutes deux etreˆ accueillies.

II. Les faits A. La plainte de Mme Flewelling 4 Madame Flewelling est membre de la Nation. Celle-ci l’a embauchée en septembre 2001 pour travailler dans ses locaux administratifs. C’était l’époque où la cogestion avait et´´ e imposée par le ministère des Affaires autochtones et du Développement du Nord canadien en raison du défaut de la Nation de s’acquitter de ses obligations dans la gestion de ses affaires financières. Au fil du temps, les tâches de Mme Flewelling, qui d’abord etaient´ celles d’une préposée aux ecritures´ et au classement, sont Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation René LeBlanc J. 187

devenues celles d’une préposée au logement et aux finances. Il a et´´ e mis fin a` son emploi au printemps de 2006. 5 La Nation est une bande indienne au sens de la Loi sur les Indiens, LRC 1985, c I-5. Les terres de la réserve, situées au sud de l’Ontario, ont et´´ e mises de côté par la Couronne a` l’usage et au profit de la Nation. La population de la Nation est d’environ 600 personnes dont un peu moins de 200 vivent dans la réserve. La Nation est gouvernée par un chef et un conseil elus´ conformément au Code electoral´ coutumier de la Nation. 6 En mai 2006, Mme Flewelling a déposé une plainte de congédiement injuste aux termes du Code. Dès le départ, la Nation a fait valoir qu’elle etait´ une bande indienne reconnue en vertu de la Loi sur les Indiens et que ses relations de travail avec ses employés relevaient du Code. L’inspecteur nommé en vertu du paragraphe 241(2) du Code n’ayant pu concilier les parties a` la plainte, le dossier fut renvoyé a` l’arbitre. 7 Le 28 janvier 2008, l’arbitre a rendu une décision rejetant deux exceptions préliminaires d’incompétence, de nature non constitutionnelle, opposées par la Nation. La procédure engagée devant l’arbitre est alors restée au point mort durant trois ans, les parties attendant l’issue d’accusations criminelles connexes déposées a` l’encontre de Mme Fle- welling. La procédure d’arbitrage a repris a` l’automne de 2011, et c’est alors que la Nation a fait savoir qu’elle n’invoquait plus de cause a` l’origine du congédiement de Mme Flewelling. Il ne restait donc plus qu’à fixer les dommages-intérêts devant etreˆ versés a` Mme Flewelling. 8 A` l’automne 2012, alors que l’audience sur cette question etait´ déjà bien avancée, la Nation a fait savoir que l’emploi de Mme Flewelling etait´ régi par les lois du travail de l’Ontario et non par le Code et qu’en consé- quence l’arbitre n’avait pas compétence pour instruire sa plainte de con- gédiement injuste.

B. La décision de l’arbitre 9 Le 10 mai 2013, l’arbitre s’est prononcé en faveur de la Nation. Il a d’abord fait remarquer que, bien qu’il soit acquis, au Canada, que les relations de travail relèvent des provinces, il avait et´´ e généralement admis, ainsi qu’en témoignait la position adoptée par la Nation au début de la procédure en vue d’instruire la plainte, que les relations de travail au sein des Premières Nations etaient´ régies par le gouvernement fédéral, en raison du pouvoir législatif du Parlement sur « les Indiens et les terres réservées pour les Indiens », conformément au paragraphe 91(24) de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867. 188 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

10 Cependant, il a convenu avec la Nation que la Cour suprême du Can- ada, dans l’arrêt NIL/TU,O, avait modifié l’état du droit sur ce point en jugeant que la présomption selon laquelle les relations de travail relèvent des provinces s’appliquait même lorsque l’employeur etait´ une Première Nation. Selon l’arbitre, cela signifiait que pour savoir si c’est la législa- tion provinciale ou la législation fédérale en matière de travail qui s’applique a` telle ou telle relation de travail, la nature de l’analyse etait´ foncièrement la même pour les employeurs des Premières Nations que pour les autres chefs de compétence fédérale. 11 L’arbitre s’est ensuite livré a` la première etape´ de cette analyse, a` savoir l’examen du « critère fonctionnel », et a examiné la nature, le mode de fonctionnement et les activités habituelles de la Nation pour savoir si la Nation pouvait etreˆ considérée comme une « entreprise fédér- ale » aux termes du Code. Il a estimé sur ce point que les activités de la Nation concernaient pour l’essentiel le maintien de l’ordre, l’aide sociale, la santé, l’éducation et le bingo et que ces activités etaient´ toutes régies par les lois provinciales. S’agissant du travail accompli par Mme Flewel- ling, il a constaté qu’elle s’occupait de comptabilité interne et tenait les registres financiers de la Nation pour l’ensemble de ses opérations, notamment pour les fonctions liées au maintien de l’ordre, a` l’aide sociale, a` la santé, a` l’éducation et a` la salle de bingo. Il a conclu qu’aucune des tâches qu’accomplissait Mme Flewelling ne relevait des lois fédérales. 12 Après avoir jugé que la nature du travail accompli par les employés de la Nation en général, et par Mme Flewelling en particulier, etait´ génér- alement considérée comme relevant des lois provinciales, l’arbitre a conclu qu’il n’avait pas compétence pour statuer sur la plainte de Mme Fle- welling. En conséquence, il a jugé qu’il ne lui etait´ pas nécessaire de passer a` la seconde etape´ de l’analyse et de se demander si la réglementa- tion provinciale des relations de travail de la Nation porterait atteinte au contenu essentiel du chef de compétence fédérale sur « les Indiens et les terres réservées pour les Indiens ».

C. Le cadre légal de la plainte 13 La plainte de Mme Flewelling a et´´ e déposée en vertu de la partie III du Code, laquelle s’applique, selon l’article 167 du Code, « a` l’emploi dans le cadre d’une entreprise fédérale ». Selon l’article 2 du Code, l’expression « entreprises fédérales » s’entend des « installations, Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation René LeBlanc J. 189

ouvrages, entreprises ou secteurs d’activité qui relèvent de la compétence législative du Parlement ». 14 Comme je l’ai indiqué plus haut, le pouvoir de légiférer sur « les In- diens et les terres réservées pour les Indiens » est dévolu au Parlement.

III. Question en litige et norme de contrôle 15 La question a` trancher est celle de savoir si l’arbitre a conclu a` tort que la relation de travail entre Mme Flewelling et la Nation est régie par le droit provincial plutôt que par le Code. 16 La norme de contrôle qui s’applique aux questions constitutionnelles concernant, comme c’est le cas en l’espèce, au partage des pouvoirs est celle de la décision correcte (New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.), au paragraphe 58). Les parties ne contestent pas cette norme de contrôle, mais la Nation affirme, a` juste titre a` mon avis, que les conclusions de l’arbitre sur les faits a` l’origine de la question a` trancher, telle la conclusion portant sur la manière de qualifier l’emploi, appellent la retenue judiciaire et doivent donc etreˆ revues selon la norme de la décision raisonnable (Commissionaires (Great Lakes) v. Dawson, 2011 FC 717, 391 F.T.R. 216 (F.C.); Anderson and Fox Lake Cree Nation, Re, 2013 FC 1276 (F.C.), au paragraphe 23).

IV. Analyse A. Compétence constitutionnelle sur les relations de travail 17 La Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 est muette sur la question de savoir qui, des législatures provinciales ou du Parlement, a compétence sur les relations de travail. Cependant, les tribunaux canadiens ont toujours con- sidéré que les relations de travail sont en principe de compétence provinciale — puisqu’il s’agit d’un sujet relevant du chef de compétence concernant la propriété et les droits civils dans la province - et que le gouvernement fédéral n’a compétence en la matière qu’à titre exception- nel. Plus exactement, lorsque l’entité où des relations de travail sont en cause est une « entreprise fédérale » (Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396, [1925] J.C.J. No. 1 (Jud. Com. of Privy Coun.); Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Communications Workers of Canada (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 115 (S.C.C.); Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. U.G.W. (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031 (S.C.C.) (Four B); Consolidated Fastfrate Inc. v. Western Canada Council of Teamsters, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 407, 2009 SCC 53 (S.C.C.); NIL/TU,O, précité). 190 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

18 Pour savoir si les relations de travail d’une entreprise sont régies par les lois fédérales ou par les lois provinciales, il faut procéder a` l’examen en deux etapes´ suivant: a. la première etape´ —egalement ´ appelée le « critère fonctionnel » - oblige la Cour a` s’enquérir de la nature, des ac- tivités habituelles et de l’exploitation quotidienne de l’entité en cause afin de savoir si elle constitue une entreprise fédérale; b. si le critère fonctionnel n’est pas concluant, la Cour doit alors se demander si la réglementation provinciale des relations de travail de cette entité porterait atteinte au contenu essentiel du chef de compétence fédérale (Four B, précité, a` la page 1045; NIL/TU,O, au paragraphe 6). 19 Cette démarche, qui se distingue de celle employée pour savoir si une loi en particulier relève du pouvoir législatif du Parlement ou des provinces (NIL/TU,O, au paragraphe 12), a et´´ e, au cours des 85 dernières an- nées, « constamment retenu[e] et appliqué[e] » par la Cour suprême du Canada (NIL/TU,O, au paragraphe 3).

B. Les thèses des parties 20 Le procureur général soutient qu’un arrêt de la Cour d’appel fédérale, Francis v. Canada (Labour Relations Board) (1980), [1981] 1 F.C. 225 (Fed. C.A.), infirmé par Francis v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 72 (S.C.C.) (Francis), scelle le sort de la présente affaire et lie l’arbitre. Selon lui, l’arrêt Francis atteste que les bandes indiennes et les conseils de bandes, qui tiennent leur pouvoir de gouvernance de la Loi sur les Indiens et d’autres lois fédérales, par exemple la Loi sur la gestion financière des premières nations (LC 2005, c 9), sont des entreprises fédérales pour ce qui concerne les relations de travail lorsqu’elles exercent leurs fonctions de gouvernance et leurs activités d’administration générale des affaires de la bande et des réserves, notamment leurs affaires financières. 21 Le procureur général affirme aussi qu’une distinction doit etreˆ etablie´ entre l’arrêt Francis et certains arrêts - l’arrêt NIL/TU,O, par exemple — dans lesquels l’employeur ou l’entité en cause n’est pas une bande indienne, mais plutôt une entité juridique distincte, ou des affaires dans lesquelles l’entité - bien qu’il ne s’agisse pas, sur le plan juridique, d’un organe distinct constitué en personne morale - est exploitée séparément de la bande indienne ou du conseil de bande. Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation René LeBlanc J. 191

22 Madame Flewelling est du même avis et souligne que, contrairement a` l’arrêt NIL/TU,O, la Nation n’est pas (i) un organe constitué en personne morale sous le régime des lois provinciales; (ii) une personne morale provinciale dont l’unique objet est de fournir des services d’aide a` l’enfance; (iii) une personne morale soumise aux lois provinciales; (iv) une personne morale dont les activités sont régies exclusivement par la province; ni (v) une entité sur laquelle la province exerce un contrôle ultime pour les décisions se rapportant a` ses activités. 23 Madame Flewelling affirme que la fonction essentielle du conseil de bande de la Nation n’est pas d’appuyer le travail de la police, les services de soins de santé, l’éducation et l’emploi dans la salle de bingo, ni d’administrer le programme de bien-être social. Elle consiste plutôt a` protéger le statut, les droits et les privilèges des membres de la Première Nation, et fait ainsi partie intégrante de la compétence fédérale sur les Indiens et sur les terres réservées pour les Indiens. Elle dit que son travail au sein de la Nation ne se rapportait pas explicitement a` un programme donné, mais plutôt aux affaires financières de la Nation et a` la gestion du logement sur le territoire de la Nation. Tout son travail, d’après elle, relevait en fin de compte du contrôle du chef et du conseil de la Nation et permettait a` la Nation d’accomplir son mandat de gouvernance et de se conformer aux obligations que lui impose la Loi sur les Indiens et d’autres lois fédérales connexes. 24 La Nation n’est pas de cet avis. Elle soutient que l’arrêt NIL/TU,O ne fait aucune distinction entre un employeur qui est une Première Nation et un autre qui est une personne morale formée d’une ou de plusieurs Premières Nations, et qu’il ne dit pas non plus que les activités d’une Première Nation ne peuvent etreˆ que des activités de nature fédérale. La Nation affirme plutôt que l’arrêt NIL/TU,O confirme que le critère fonctionnel, et non un autre critère, devrait permettre de qualifier les relations de travail des Premières Nations — tout comme celles de tout autre employeur. Selon la Nation, le critère fonctionnel porte sur l’activité qui est exercée, non sur la personne qui l’exerce, ni sur celle pour qui elle est exercée. La Nation soutient que, dans la mesure où l’arrêt Francis a ap- pliqué un autre critère, cet arrêt a et´´ e renversé par l’arrêt NIL/TU,O. 25 La Nation affirme aussi qu’en sa qualité de Première Nation, elle dé- tient un pouvoir inhérent de se gouverner, reconnu dans la Constitution canadienne. Elle dit, a` ce propos, qu’elle est gouvernée par un chef et un conseil elus´ conformément au Code coutumier de la Nation, lesquels ne sont pas assujettis a` la Loi sur les Indiens ou a` ses textes réglementaires 192 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

et dont l’organisation ne relève pas non plus de ces textes législatifs. Selon la Nation, il n’est plus exact de dire qu’une Première Nation est créée par le législateur, et que les conseils des Premières Nations sont créés par la Loi sur les Indiens. La Nation fait valoir que, même si l’organisation des Premières Nations relevait de la Loi sur les Indiens, cette organisation serait assujettie a` l’article 88 de cette Loi, lequel rend les lois provinciales d’application générale, telles les lois provinciales sur les relations de travail, applicables aux peuples autochtones et a` leurs territoires. 26 En l’espèce, la Nation affirme que les activités habituelles de Mme Flewelling - comptabilité et tenue de livres - sont régies par les lois provinciales et ne comportent, en tout etat´ de cause, qu’une portion in- fime de contenu fédéral. D’après la Nation, le fait que telles activités etaient´ exercées au nom d’une Première Nation ou au profit d’un peuple autochtone est dénué de pertinence. Elle dit que l’arbitre a donc conclu a` raison que les relations de travail liées a` ces activités etaient´ régies par les lois provinciales et qu’il n’avait pas compétence pour statuer sur la plainte que Mme Flewelling a déposée en vertu du Code.

C. L’arrêt Francis fait toujours autorité et liait l’arbitre 27 La question soulevée dans la présente affaire est celle de savoir si l’arrêt Francis fait toujours autorité compte tenu de l’arrêt NIL/TU,O. Dans l’affirmative, il lie l’arbitre et la Cour, et la décision de l’arbitre selon laquelle il n’a pas compétence pour statuer sur la plainte déposée par Mme Flewelling en vertu du Code doit par conséquent etreˆ annulée. Si l’arrêt Francis ne fait plus autorité, la décision de l’arbitre doit etreˆ confirmée. 28 L’arrêt Francis traitait de l’accréditation, conformément au Code, de l’Alliance de la fonction publique du Canada comme agent de négocia- tion d’un groupe d’employés de la bande indienne de Saint-Régis (les employés), qui pour la plupart s’occupaient « d’administration en matière d’éducation, de l’administration de terres et de patrimoines d’Indiens, de l’administration du bien-être, de l’administration en matière d’habitation, d’administration scolaire, de travaux publics, de l’administration d’un foyer pour personnes ag´ˆ ees, de l’entretien des routes, de l’entretien d’écoles, de l’entretien du système d’approvisionnement en eau et du système sanitaire, et de l’enlèvement des ordures ménagères » (Francis, au paragraphe 17). Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation René LeBlanc J. 193

29 Appliquant les enseignements de l’arrêt Four B, le juge Heald (aux motifs duquel a souscrit sur ce point le juge Le Dain) avait défini les fonctions des employés, en termes généraux, « comme se rapportant presque exclusivement a` l’administration de la bande d’Indiens de Saint- Régis », et, selon lui, « ces fonctions [étaient] de nature gouvernementale et relev[aient] de la Loi sur les Indiens » (Francis, au paragraphe 17). 30 Puis le juge Heald avait entrepris une analyse détaillée des dispositions de la Loi sur les Indiens relatives au rôle exercé par une bande indienne et par son conseil, auxquels cette loi s’applique pour l’administration des affaires de la bande. Il est utile ici de répéter cette analyse: [...] Il est egalement´ instructif de parcourir les diverses dispositions de la Loi sur les Indiens pour déterminer dans quelle mesure une bande d’Indiens et son conseil participent a` l’administration des affaires d’une bande d’Indiens a` laquelle, comme en l’espèce, s’applique la Loi sur les Indiens. L’article 20 prévoit qu’un Indien n’est légalement en possession d’une terre dans une réserve que si la possession lui en a et´´ e accordée par le conseil de la bande avec l’approbation subséquente du Ministre. L’article 24 prévoit qu’un In- dien qui est légalement en possession d’une terre dans une réserve peut, avec l’approbation du Ministre, transférer ce droit a` la bande ou a` un autre membre de celle-ci. L’article 25 prévoit que, dans certaines circonstances, le droit d’un Indien a` la possession d’une terre retourne a` la bande. L’article 34 impose a` la bande l’obligation d’assurer l’entretien des routes, ponts, fossés et clôtures dans la ré- serve qu’elle occupe. L’article 37 prévoit que les terres dans une ré- serve ne doivent etreˆ vendues, aliénées ni louées, ou qu’il ne doit en etreˆ autrement disposé, que si elles ont et´´ e cédées a` Sa Majesté par la bande. L’article 39 prévoit les modalités auxquelles doit se conformer la bande pour faire une telle cession. L’article 58 autorise le Ministre, avec le consentement du conseil de la bande, a` améliorer, cultiver ou louer un terrain, inculte ou inutilisé. En vertu de ce même article, le Ministre peut, avec le consentement du conseil de la bande, disposer du sable, du gravier, de la glaise et des autres substances non métalliques qui se trouvent sur des terres ou dans le sous-sol d’une réserve. L’article 59 autorise le Ministre, avec le consentement du conseil de la bande, a` réduire ou ajuster le montant payable a` Sa Majesté relativement a` la vente, location ou autre aliénation de terres situées dans une réserve qui sont cédées et en outre, a` réduire ou ajuster le montant qu’un Indien doit payer a` la bande pour un prêt consenti a` cet Indien sur les fonds de la bande. L’article 60 autorise le gouverneur en conseil a` accorder a` la bande qui en fait la demande 194 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

le droit d’exercer, sur des terres situées dans une réserve qu’elle occupe, tels contrôle et administration qu’il estime désirables. L’avocat nous a signalé qu’il ne subsiste aucun décret en conseil semblable pour ce qui concerne la bande d’Indiens de Saint-Régis. Les articles 61 a` 69 inclusivement concernent l’administration des deniers des In- diens. En vertu de l’article 64, le Ministre peut, avec le consentement du conseil d’une bande, effectuer des dépenses de deniers au compte de capital de la bande a` diverses fins: pour distribuer per capita aux membres de la bande une partie du produit de la vente de terres cédées; pour etablir´ et entretenir des routes, ponts, fossés, cours d’eau et clôtures de délimitation extérieure dans les réserves; pour acheter des terrains que la bande emploiera comme réserve ou comme addition a` une réserve; pour acheter pour la bande les droits d’un membre de la bande sur des terrains dans une réserve; pour acheter des animaux ou des machines agricoles pour la bande; pour etablir´ et entretenir des améliorations ou ouvrages permanents dans la réserve; pour consentir des prêts aux membres de la bande; pour subvenir aux frais nécessairement accessoires a` la gestion des terres situées sur la réserve et des biens appartenant a` la bande; pour con- struire des maisons destinées aux membres de la bande et pour consentir des prêts aux membres de la bande aux fins de construction; et, généralement, pour toute autre fin qui d’après le Ministre est a` l’avantage de la bande. L’article 66 autorise le Ministre, avec le consentement du conseil d’une bande, a` effectuer la dépense de deniers de revenu de la bande a` diverses fins. En vertu de l’article 69, le gouverneur en conseil peut permettre a` une bande de contrôler, administrer et dépenser la totalité ou une partie de ses deniers de revenu. Le gouverneur en conseil a adopté, en vertu de l’article 69, des Règlements qui s’appliquent a` la bande indienne de Saint-Régis. Ces Règlements autorisent cette bande, de même qu’un grand nombre d’autres bandes au Canada, a` contrôler, administrer et dépenser la totalité ou une partie de leurs deniers de revenu sous réserve des modalités prévues aux Règlements relativement aux comptes en ban- que, aux signataires autorisés, a` la nomination de vérificateurs, etc. Aux articles 74 a` 80 inclusivement, il est question de l’élection des chefs et des conseils de bande. Les articles 81 a` 86 inclusivement prévoient les pouvoirs du conseil de bande. L’article 81 autorise le conseil de bande a` etablir´ des statuts administratifs dans un grand nombre de domaines: la santé des habitants de la réserve; la réglementation de la circulation; l’observation de la loi et le maintien de l’ordre; l’établissement de fourrières; l’établissement et l’entretien de cours d’eau, routes, ponts, fossés, clôtures et autres ouvrages locaux; la réglementation des caté- Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation René LeBlanc J. 195

gories d’entreprises permises; la réglementation de la construction; la répartition des terres de la réserve entre les membres de la bande; l’enrayement des herbes nuisibles; l’établissement et la réglementa- tion de services d’eau; la réglementation et le contrôle de sports, courses, concours athlétiques et autres amusements; la réglementa- tion des marchands ambulants et colporteurs, etc. (Francis, aux paragraphes 17 et 18.) 31 Se fondant sur les pouvoirs conférés a` la bande et a` son conseil par la Loi sur les Indiens, ainsi que sur la preuve de l’exercice de tels pouvoirs par la bande et par son conseil, le juge Heald s’est dit convaincu que, contrairement a` l’arrêt Four B, qui s’intéressait aux relations de travail de quatre particuliers autochtones exploitant un commerce dans une réserve indienne, les employés « particip[aient] directement a` des activités [...] reliées au statut d’Indien » et que « [d]ans son ensemble, l’administration de la bande se rapport[ait] continuellement au statut et aux droits et privi- lèges des Indiens de la bande » (Francis, au paragraphe 20). Reprenant les motifs exposés par les juges majoritaires dans l’arrêt Four B, il con- cluait que les relations de travail en l’espèce faisaient « partie intégrante de la compétence fédérale principale sur les Indiens ou les terres réservées aux Indiens » et que, en conséquence, elles relevaient de la compétence législative fédérale en application du paragraphe 91(24) de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 (Francis, au paragraphe 20). 32 Comme les activités auxquelles se livraient les employés et la bande etaient´ exercées en application de la Loi sur les Indiens, le juge Heald etait´ dès lors persuadé que l’administration de la bande de Saint-Régis etait´ un « ouvrage, entreprise ou affaire » de compétence fédérale au sens du paragraphe 108(1) du Code, que le Parlement avait donc occupé le champ se rapportant aux relations de travail de la bande et que l’Alliance de la fonction publique du Canada etait´ par conséquent fondée, sur le plan constitutionnel, a` obtenir une accréditation comme agent de négociation du groupe d’employés aux termes du Code (Francis, au paragraphe 22). 33 Toutefois, le juge Heald a estimé que la bande de Saint-Régis n’était pas un « employeur » au sens du Code — c’est-à-dire une « personne qui emploie un ou plusieurs employés » - puisqu’elle n’était pas une « personne » au sens du Code ou de la Loi sur les Indiens. Il est donc arrivé a` la conclusion que la Commission des relations du travail du Canada avait outrepassé sa compétence en accréditant l’Alliance. Le juge en chef Thurlow, qui n’est pas arrivé a` une conclusion définitive sur la question de l’applicabilité constitutionnelle du Code aux employés et a` la bande 196 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

de Saint-Régis, a souscrit aux motifs du juge Heald sur ce point. Le juge Le Dain a emis´ une opinion dissidente. 34 Deux ans plus tard, la Cour suprême du Canada infirmait les conclusions des juges Heald et Thurlow et jugeait que le conseil de la bande de Saint-Régis pouvait validement etreˆ considéré comme un employeur au sens du Code, au motif que les conseils de bande etaient´ créés par la Loi sur les Indiens, qu’ils etaient´ investis du pouvoir d’établir des statuts pour de nombreuses fins précises qui sont semblables a` celles que visent les règlements d’une municipalité, et que, de fait, ils embauchaient des employés qui travaillaient pour eux et qu’ils payaient (Francis v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 72 (S.C.C.)). 35 L’arrêt Francis de la Cour d’appel fédérale avait et´´ e rendu peu de temps après l’arrêt Four B — et dans le respect du cadre analytique prescrit par cet arrêt — lequel rejetait clairement l’idée selon laquelle le critère fonctionnel est « inapproprié et devrait etreˆ ecart´´ e lorsque la com- pétence législative est attribuée non pas en des termes se rapportant a` des objets matériels, a` des choses ou a` des systèmes, mais a` des personnes ou groupes de personnes comme les Indiens ou les aubains » (Four B, aux pages 1046 et 1047). La Cour d’appel fédérale avait alors entrepris son analyse de l’applicabilité constitutionnelle sur le fondement du critère fonctionnel et, comme le prescrivait ce critère, elle s’était intéressée a` la nature du travail accompli par l’unité d’employés en question et a` la nature des « affaires » ou de l’exploitation d’un conseil de bande auquel s’applique la Loi sur les Indiens (Francis, au paragraphe 17). 36 L’arrêt Four B est le prédécesseur de l’arrêt NIL/TU,O pour la question de savoir si les relations de travail au sein d’une Première Nation seront régies par les lois provinciales ou par les lois fédérales. Sur ce point, l’arrêt NIL/TU,O ne dit nulle part que les principes enonc´´ es dans l’arrêt Four B doivent etreˆ ecart´´ es, abandonnés ou discrédités. Au con- traire, les juges majoritaires, dans l’arrêt NIL/TU,O, parlent souvent du critère de l’arrêt Four B comme du critère qui devrait etreˆ suivi et appli- qué (NIL/TU,O, aux paragraphes 3, 15, 18, 23 et 40). Ils evoquent´ souvent aussi l’arrêt Four B comme etant´ le précédent, outre l’arrêt Northern Telecom, précité, qui expose « de la manière la plus complète » le critère juridique servant a` déterminer si les relations de travail relèvent de la compétence fédérale (NIL/TU,O, au paragraphe 3). 37 Dans l’arrêt NIL/TU,O, la Cour suprême a rappelé que ce critère juridique devait etreˆ employé quel que soit le chef de compétence fédér- ale concerné dans une affaire donnée, y compris, comme indiqué dans Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation René LeBlanc J. 197

l’arrêt Four B, le chef de compétence fédérale sur « les Indiens et les terres réservées aux Indiens » (NIL/TU,O, au paragraphe 3). Après avoir appliqué le critère de l’arrêt Four B aux circonstances de l’espèce (NIL/TU,O, au paragraphe 23) — une affaire d’accréditation comme dans l’arrêt Francis — la Cour suprême a jugé que les relations de travail du groupe d’employés en cause relevaient de la compétence provinciale. 38 Toutefois, l’affaire NIL/TU,O etait´ quelque peu différente de l’affaire Francis. D’entrée de jeu, madame la juge Abella, rédigeant les motifs des juges majoritaires, soulignait de la « structure [...] unique » de l’employeur (NIL/TU,O, au paragraphe 1). Cet employeur etait´ une so- ciété — la NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society (la NIL/TU,O) — constituée en vertu de la Society Act de la Colombie- Britannique par plusieurs Premières Nations situées dans cette province, pour l’établissement d’un service d’aide a` l’enfance qui fournirait des services « adaptés a` la réalité culturelle » des enfants et des familles de ces communautés. La NIL/TU,O etait´ régie exclusivement par la province, et ses employés exer¸caient des pouvoirs délégués de compétence exclusivement provinciale prévus par la Child, Family and Community Service Act de la Colombie-Britannique (NIL/TU,O, au paragraphe 36). La NIL/TU,O etait´ financée par la province et par le gouvernement féd- eral.´ Ce financement etait´ la seule participation du gouvernement fédéral dans les activités de l’organisme (NIL/TU,O, aux paragraphes 34 et 40). 39 Madame la juge Abella a estimé que le caractère distinctif de la NIL/TU,O en tant que service d’aide a` l’enfance pour les collectivités autochtones ne pouvait lui faire perdre « sa nature essentielle d’agence d’aide a` l’enfance qui est réglementée a` tous egards´ par la province », et elle a conclu que sa fonction etait´ « incontestablement provinciale » (NIL/TU,O, au paragraphe 39). 40 Empruntant les mots employés par madame la juge Abella dans l’arrêt NIL/TU,O, je ne crois pas que l’on puisse dire, dans la présente affaire, que l’employeur est une agence « qui est réglementée a` tous egards´ par la province », que sa fonction est « incontestablement provinciale » et que Mme Flewelling exer¸cait « des pouvoirs délégués de compétence exclusivement provinciale » conférés par une loi provinciale. En l’espèce, l’employeur est un conseil de bande auquel s’applique la Loi sur les Indiens, et Mme Flewelling s’occupait de l’administration générale des affaires de la bande, notamment du loge- 198 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

ment dans la réserve, ainsi que des affaires concernant les terres de la réserve indienne. Ses activités ont et´´ e décrites ainsi par l’arbitre: [TRADUCTION] La plaignante travaillait au service des finances de l’employeur, dans les bureaux de la Nation. Etant´ la seule employée de ce service, elle accomplissait toutes les tâches habituelles liées a` la comptabilité. Elle tenait les registres financiers de l’employeur, notamment les comptes fournisseurs, les comptes clients, le livre de paie, les dépôts bancaires et les etats´ de rapprochement bancaire. (Non souligné dans l’original.) 41 Selon la preuve produite a` la Cour, le salaire de Mme Flewelling etait´ payé a` même les deniers fédéraux re¸cus par la Nation; des deniers qui représentaient la majeure partie du financement de la Nation. 42 Selon l’arrêt Francis, les affaires ou activités d’un conseil de bande sont celles d’un gouvernement local qui tient son pouvoir de la Loi sur les Indiens et des règlements applicables. Les fonctions ainsi exercées sont considérées comme une « responsabilité globale de la nature d’un gouvernement local » (Francis, le juge Le Dain, au paragraphe 27). Il exerce ses fonctions de gouvernance en recrutant des employés des services administratifs. Madame Flewelling comptait parmi ces employés. 43 Je suis d’accord avec le procureur général pour dire que l’arbitre, dans son analyse, s’abstient de tout examen des fonctions essentielles des bandes indiennes et des conseils de bande, un examen qui faisait partie de l’analyse dans l’arrêt Francis. Il s’est fondé uniquement sur l’arrêt NIL/TU,O, lequel concernait les relations de travail d’un service d’aide a` l’enfance, constitué séparément et régi par les lois provinciales, et qui n’avait rien a` voir avec les fonctions administratives quotidiennes inhér- entes a` la gestion des affaires d’une bande indienne. L’arbitre a de ce fait commis une erreur susceptible de contrôle. 44 Comme c’est le cas en l’espèce, la bande de Saint-Régis s’occupait d’administration scolaire, d’administration de programmes d’aide sociale et de distribution de services de soins de santé, plus précisément de l’administration d’un foyer pour personnes ag´ˆ ees. L’arbitre a estimé que ces activités etaient´ régies par les lois provinciales et que le travail accompli par Mme Flewelling ne renfermait donc aucun el´´ ement susceptible de relever en principe des lois fédérales. La nature fondamentale des « affaires » ou de l’exploitation d’une bande indienne et d’un conseil de bande, auxquelles s’applique la Loi sur les Indiens, comme les dépeignait Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation René LeBlanc J. 199

la Cour d’appel fédérale dans l’arrêt Francis, est complètement occultée dans cette analyse. 45 Je ne suis pas disposé a` dire que l’arrêt Francis a et´´ e renversé par l’arrêt NIL/TU,O. L’absence de tout examen de ce facteur capital justifie a` mon avis l’annulation de la décision de l’arbitre. Autrement dit, compte tenu de l’arrêt Francis, le critère fonctionnel permet d’affirmer que l’administration de la bande de la Nation est une entreprise fédérale au sens du Code. 46 La Nation soutient que l’arrêt NIL/TU,O rend implicitement caduque l’arrêt Francis: En dépit de la démarche appliquée depuis longtemps par notre Cour, il s’est développé un courant jurisprudentiel différent et ce, uniquement dans le cadre de litiges portant sur le par. 91(24) (voir Conseil de la bande de Tobique c. Sappier, [1988] A.C.F. nº 435 (QL) (C.A.); Qu’Appelle Indian Residential School Council c. Canada (Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne), [1988] 2 C.F. 226 (1re inst.), p. 239; Sagkeeng Alcohol Rehab Center Inc. c. Abraham, [1994] 3 C.F. 449 (1re inst.), p. 459-460). Suivant cette différente analyse, et contrairement a` Four B, le tribunal passe directement a` la question de savoir s’il y atteinte au « contenu essentiel » d’un chef de compétence fédéral, sans appliquer d’abord le critère fonctionnel. [Madame la juge Abella, au paragraphe 19] 47 A` mon avis, si l’arrêt Francis ne figure pas dans ce « courant jurisprudentiel différent », c’est pour une raison, et cette raison est que le critère fonctionnel, enonc´´ e dans l’arrêt Four B, jouait un rôle central dans la manière dont la Cour d’appel fédérale avait considéré et analysé la question de l’applicabilité constitutionnelle du Code a` la question qu’elle devait trancher en matière de relations de travail. 48 L’arrêt Native Child & Family Services of Toronto v. C.E.P., 2010 SCC 46, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 737 (S.C.C.), rendu par la Cour suprême du Canada le même jour que l’arrêt NIL/TU,O n’appuie aucunement la thèse de la Nation. Cette affaire présentait des faits très semblables a` celui de l’affaire NIL/TU,O, puisque l’employeur y etait´ une société d’aide aux enfants autochtones qui fournissait des services principalement aux familles indiennes et métisses, conformément a` la Loi sur les services a` l’enfance et a` la famille de l’Ontario et en vertu d’un accord conclu avec le gouvernement de l’Ontario. La Cour suprême y entérinait essentiellement son arrêt NIL/TU,O et y confirmait l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel fédér- ale pour qui les liens avec la compétence fédérale sur les Indiens etaient,´ dans cette affaire, encore plus ténus que ceux constatés dans l’arrêt 200 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

NIL/TU,O (Native Child & Family Services of Toronto v. C.E.P., 2008 FCA 338 (F.C.A.), au paragraphe 40). La Cour suprême ne laisse aucunement entendre dans ces deux arrêts que l’arrêt Francis ne fait plus autorité. 49 Le jugement Anderson and Fox Lake Cree Nation, Re, 2013 FC 1276 (F.C.), rendu par mon collègue le juge Russell Zinn, - une affaire de con- gédiement injuste comme celle dont il s’agit en l’espèce — ne donne pas non plus a` penser que l’arrêt Francis a perdu sa valeur de précédent comme le soutient la Nation. Premièrement, en vertu du principe du stare decisis, seules la Cour suprême du Canada ou la Cour d’appel fédérale elle-même peuvent ecarter´ ce précédent (R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.); Craig v. R., 2012 SCC 43, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 489 (S.C.C.); Martin v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FCA 15, [2014] 3 F.C.R. 117 (F.C.A.), au paragraphe 104). Cela n’est pas arrivé. Deuxièmement, dans le jugement Nation crie de Fox Lake, la Première Nation, elle aussi une bande indienne au sens de la Loi sur les Indiens, avait mis sur pied un bureau de négociation dont l’« objet essentiel » etait´ « de négocier des ententes commerciales complexes avec d’autres parties » (Nation crie de Fox Lake, au paragraphe 31). La Première Na- tion contestait l’applicabilité constitutionnelle du Code a` la plainte de congédiement injuste déposée par un employé du Bureau de négociation. Selon la Première Nation, l’exploitation du Bureau de négociation etait´ séparée et distincte de l’administration générale de la bande, et l’employé en cause n’était pas un employé de la Première Nation en général, mais plutôt un employé du Bureau de négociation en tant qu’unité séparée. La Première Nation a eu gain de cause. Faisant droit a` la demande de con- trôle judiciaire déposée par la Première Nation, le juge Zinn a estimé que le Bureau de négociation n’était pas une partie essentielle ou intégrante des activités de la Première Nation a` titre de bande indienne (Nation crie de Fox Lake, aux paragraphes 36 a` 38). Par conséquent, contrairement a` l’arrêt Francis et a` la présente affaire, la Cour devait, dans le jugement Nation crie de Fox Lake, examiner une unité particulière qui etait´ séparée et distincte de l’administration générale de la bande et de sa fonction de gouvernance centrale. Il y a donc lieu d’établir une distinction entre ce jugement et l’espèce. 50 Enfin, la Nation affirme qu’elle est investie d’un pouvoir inhérent de se gouverner qui lui est reconnu par l’article 35 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 et, par conséquent, qu’elle n’est pas assujettie aux lois fédérales telles que la Loi sur les Indiens, mais je ne crois pas que cet argument puisse modifier de quelque manière l’issue de la présente af- Canada (Attorney General) v. Munsee-Delaware Nation René LeBlanc J. 201

faire. Comme le font observer a` juste titre le procureur général et Mme Flewelling, ce droit a` l’autonomie gouvernementale, pour etreˆ juridique- ment exécutoire, doit emaner´ soit d’un accord d’autonomie gouvernementale négociée avec le gouvernement du Canada, soit d’un jugement déclaratoire. Quand ce droit est revendiqué dans un litige, il doit, comme tout autre genre de droit ancestral, etreˆ placé dans son contexte et pré- senter une spécificité suffisante pour permettre a` un tribunal de constater l’existence d’une pratique, d’une coutume ou d’une tradition faisant partie intégrante de la culture distinctive de la Première Nation qui revendique ce droit (R. v. Vanderpeet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.), au paragraphe 46; R. v. Jones, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821 (S.C.C.), au paragraphe 24). 51 En l’espèce, la Nation n’a présenté aucun el´´ ement de preuve qui puisse permettre de conclure a` l’existence d’un tel droit inhérent de se gouverner, et certainement rien qui puisse etablir´ que le droit qu’elle revendique satisfait au critère etabli´ dans l’arrêt Van der Peet, précité. S’il est vrai que les Premières Nations ne doivent pas leur existence a` la Loi sur les Indiens ni a` quelque autre loi et qu’une bande indienne est davantage qu’une création de la loi, elles constituent néanmoins des en- tités qui, comme les bandes et les conseils, sont régies par la Loi sur les Indiens et exercent leurs pouvoirs conformément a` cette Loi (Perron v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 3 C.N.L.R. 198 (Ont. S.C.J.), au paragraphe 22; Jack Woodward, c.r., Native Law, volume 1, editions´ a` feuilles mobiles, Toronto, Carswell, 2007, a` la page 1-420). 52 Il de droit constant que la Loi sur les Indiens impose aux bandes des obligations par lesquelles elles doivent rendre compte, sur les plans poli- tique et financier, tant a` leurs membres qu’au gouvernement fédéral (Ardoch Algonquin First Nation & Allies v. Ontario, [1997] O.J. No. 2313 (Ont. C.A.), au paragraphe 7; Knebush v. Maygard, 2014 FC 1247 (F.C.), au paragraphe 44). Il est clair egalement´ que la Loi sur les Indiens s’applique, que le conseil de bande soit elu´ au moyen du processus etabli´ par lui conformément a` l’article 74, ou par l’entremise d’élections cou- tumières, qui sont reconnues par ladite Loi (voir la définition de « conseil de la bande », au paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur les Indiens; Francis v. Mohawk Council of Kanesatake, [2003] 4 F.C. 1133, 227 F.T.R. 161 (Fed. T.D.), au paragraphe 13). La situation n’est pas différente si le conseil de bande utilise rarement son pouvoir de prendre des règlements. Il demeure une entité qui tient son pouvoir de la Loi sur les Indiens. 202 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

53 Il ne fait aucun doute que le droit ancestral a` l’autonomie gouvernementale, reconnu par la Constitution, peut etreˆ revendiqué — mais ce n’est pas le cas en l’espèce. Il n’a pas et´´ e etabli´ ni revendiqué devant l’arbitre. Par conséquent, l’argument de la Nation selon lequel son pouvoir de gouvernance ne lui vient pas du Parlement, mais découle plutôt de son droit a` l’autonomie gouvernementale, un droit protégé par la Constitution, ne saurait etreˆ retenu. 54 En bref, l’arrêt Francis fait toujours autorité. Il liait l’arbitre, tout comme il lie la Cour. Puisque ce précédent scelle le sort de la présente affaire, les demandes de contrôle judiciaire du procureur général et de Mme Flewelling sont accueillies, et la Nation est condamnée aux dépens dans les deux dossiers. Le présent jugement motivé sera versé dans les deux dossiers, T-1030-13 et T-1043-13.

Jugement LA COUR: 1. ACCUEILLE la demande de contrôle judiciaire. 2. ANNULE la décision de l’arbitre datée du 10 mai 2013. 3. RENVOIE l’affaire a` l’arbitre pour qu’il statue a` nouveau sur la plainte de congédiement injuste déposée par la demanderesse dans le dossier T-1030-13. 4. CONDAMNE la Nation défenderesse aux dépens. Hiamey c. Conseil Scolaire de district Catholique 203

[Indexed as: Hiamey c. Conseil Scolaire de district Catholique Centre-Sud] Godfred Kwakhu Hiamey, Appelant et Conseil Scolaire de District Catholique Centre-Sud, Association des Enseignants et des Enseignantes Franco-Ontariens, Nelligan O’Brien Payne s.r.l., Sack Goldblatt Mitchell s.r.l., Ordre des Enseignantes et Enseignants de l’Ontario, Commission des Relations de Travail de l’Ontario, Barreau du Haut Canada, Conseil de la Magistrature de l’Ontario, Tribunal des Droits de la Personne de l’Ontario Commission des Relation, Intim´e Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Divisional Court) Docket: Toronto DC-13-345-JR, DC-13-346-JR 2015 ONSC 5113 Perkins, Kruzick, Thorburn JJ. Heard: 11 mai 2015 Judgment: 13 aoˆut 2015* Human rights –––– Practice and procedure — Judicial review — Standard of review –––– Applicant teacher was dismissed during his first year teaching after receiving three unsatisfactory reports — Union grieved reports, but withdrew grievances — Applicant brought unfair labour practices complaint against union, which was dismissed — Applicant brought complaint against commission to Judicial Council of Ontario, which was dismissed — Applicant brought complaints against lawyers involved to Law Society which were dismissed — Applicant brought human rights complaints against the above parties, alleging discrimination against him on grounds of race and colour — Complaints were dismissed on grounds of delay, no probable chance of success, and immunity — Application for re-examination dismissed and applicant was declared vexatious — Applicant sought judicial review — Application dismissed — Decisions of tribunal not unreasonable — No indication that tribunal forgot, ignored or misinterpreted evidence before it — No evidence ribunal’s findings did not fit in a range of reasonable conclusions.. Education law –––– Teachers — Termination of employment — Dismis- sal — Procedure — Requirements of natural justice –––– Applicant teacher

*A corrigendum issued by the court on August 17, 2015 has been incorporated herein. 204 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th) was dismissed during his first year teaching after receiving three unsatisfactory reports — Union grieved reports, but withdrew grievances — Applicant brought unfair labour practices complaint against union, which was dismissed — Appli- cant brought complaint against commission to Judicial Council of Ontario, which was dismissed — Applicant brought complaints against lawyers involved to Law Society which were dismissed — Applicant brought human rights complaints against the above parties, alleging discrimination against him on grounds of race and colour — Complaints were dismissed on grounds of delay, no probable chance of success, and immunity — Application for re-examination dismissed and applicant was declared vexatious — Applicant sought judicial review — Application dismissed — Decisions of tribunal not unreasonable — No indication that tribunal forgot, ignored or misinterpreted evidence before it — No evidence ribunal’s findings did not fit in a range of reasonable conclusions.. Cases considered by Perkins, Kruzick, Thorburn JJ.: Gigliotti c. Collège des Grands Lacs (Conseil d’administration) (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 2783, 2005 CarswellOnt 2883, (sub nom. Syndicat des employés de la fonction publique de l’Ontario v. Collège des Grands Lacs) 200 O.A.C. 101, 76 O.R. (3d) 561 (Eng.), 76 O.R. (3d) 581 (Fr.), [2005] O.J. No. 2762, 76 O.R. (3d) 561, [2005] O.J. No. 2759 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Goguen v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board) (2010), 2010 HRTO 969, [2010] O.H.R.T.D. No. 940 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to Hiamey c. Barreau du Haut-Canada (2012), 2012 HRTO 604, [2012] O.H.R.T.D. No. 691 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to Hiamey c. Commission des relations de travail de l’Ontario (2012), 2012 HRTO 814, [2012] O.H.R.T.D. No. 826 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to Hiamey c. Conseil scolaire de district Catholique Centre-Sud (2012), 2012 HRTO 301, [2012] O.H.R.T.D. No. 411 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to Hiamey v. A.E.F.O. (2011), 2011 CarswellOnt 5099, 2011 CarswellOnt 5100, (sub nom. Hiamey v. Ass’n des enseignantes & enseignants franco- ontariens) 199 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 307, [2011] O.L.R.D. No. 2378 (Ont. L.R.B.) — referred to Hiamey v. A.E.F.O. (2011), 2011 CarswellOnt 7732, 2011 CarswellOnt 7733, [2011] O.L.R.D. No. 2911, [2011] O.L.R.D. No. 3189 (Ont. L.R.B.) — referred to Hiamey v. AEFO (2013), 2013 CarswellOnt 10133, 2013 CarswellOnt 10134, [2013] O.L.R.D. No. 2826 (Ont. L.R.B.) — referred to Hiamey v. Conseil scolaire de district Catholique Centre-Sud (2012), 2012 HRTO 1331, [2012] O.H.R.T.D. No. 1389 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to Hiamey c. Conseil Scolaire de district Catholique 205

Keele North Recycling Inc. v. Ontario (Human Rights Tribunal) (2013), 2013 ONSC 268, 2013 CarswellOnt 2010, [2013] O.J. No. 1289 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — considered Kipiniak v. Ontario Judicial Council (2012), 2012 ONSC 5866, 2012 Carswell- Ont 14214, 298 O.A.C. 389, [2012] O.J. No. 5299 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Phipps v. Toronto Police Services Board (2012), 2012 ONCA 155, 2012 Cars- wellOnt 3992, 35 Admin. L.R. (5th) 167, (sub nom. Shaw v. Phipps) 289 O.A.C. 163, (sub nom. Shaw v. Phipps) 347 D.L.R. (4th) 616, [2012] O.J. No. 2601, (sub nom. Shaw v. Phipps) 75 C.H.R.R. D/246 (Ont. C.A.) — followed Statutes considered: Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 Generally — referred to Education Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.2 Generally — referred to s. 277.40.5(1) [en. 2006, c. 10, s. 46] — referred to Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 Generally — referred to s. 45.8 [en. 2006, c. 30, s. 5] — considered Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A s. 74 — referred to Ontario College of Teachers Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 12 Generally — referred to s. 26 — referred to s. 30(3) — considered

APPLICATION for judicial review of a decision of the Human Rights Tribunal dismissing application of dismissal of complaints and finding that applicant was vexatious litigant.

M. Hiamey pour lui-même Me Christian Paquette pour l’intimé, Conseil scolaire de district catholique Cen- tre-Sud Me Lise Leduc pour l’intimé, l’association des enseignantes et des enseignants Franco-Ontariens Me Sean McGee pour l’intimé, Nelligan O’Brien Payne s.r.l. Me Patrick A. Thompson pour l’intimée, I’Ordre des enseignantes et des enseignants de l’Ontario Me Voy Stelmaszynski pour l’intimée, Commission des relations de travail de l’Ontario Me Aaron Dantowitz pour l’intimé, le Barreau du Haut-Canada Me Myriam Seers pour l’intimé, le Conseil de la magistrature de l’Ontario 206 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

Me Margaret Leighton pour l’intim´e, le Tribunal des droits de la personne de l’Ontario

Per curiam: A. Nature de L’Instance Introduction 1 Le requérant, Godfred Kwaku Hiamey, porte en révision judiciaire quatre décisions du Tribunal des droits de la personne de l’Ontario (« le Tribunal ») selon huit requêtes. Dans les huit requêtes, M. Hiamey al- lègue la discrimination dans le domaine de l’emploi et des contrats au motif de la race, de la couleur et des représailles.

La Preuve 2 M. Hiamey etait´ employé par le Conseil scolaire de district catholique Centre-Sud (« le Conseil scolaire ») a` titre d’enseignant. Lors de sa pre- mière année d’enseignement, il a re¸cu trois evaluations´ de rendement insatisfaisantes. Le 29 juin 2009, le Conseil scolaire a mis fin a` l’emploi de M. Hiamey a` cause de ces trois evaluations.´ 3 Le 3 juillet 2009, le Conseil scolaire a déposé une plainte auprès de l’Ordre des enseignantes et des enseignants de l’Ontario (« l’Ordre des enseignants ») au sujet des motifs de la cessation d’emploi de M. Hiamey comme prescrit par l’article 277.40.5(1) de la Loi sur l’éducation, L.R.O. 1990, c. E.2. L’Ordre des enseignants a re¸cu la plainte du Conseil scolaire et a entamé une enquête relative au congédiement de M. Hiamey en vertu de l’article 26 de la Loi de 1996 sur l’Ordre des enseignantes et des enseignants de l’Ontario, L.O. 1996, c. 12. 4 Le 6 mars 2013, le Comité de discipline de l’Ordre des enseignants (« le Comité ») a rendu sa décision a` l’égard de la plainte déposée contre M. Hiamey suite a` son congédiement: voir Ordre des enseignantes et enseignants de l’Ontario c Hiamey 2013 LNONCTD 33. Le Comité etait´ saisi de la question de l’incompétence de M. Hiamey au sens de l’article 30(3) de la Loi de 1996 sur l’Ordre des enseignantes et des enseignants de l’Ontario. Il s’agissait de déterminer si l’Ordre des enseignants devait révoquer le certificat de qualification professionnelle ou l’attestation de compétence comme enseignant de M. Hiamey, ou l’assortir de restrictions qui pourraient avoir une incidence sur son employabilité dans toute la province. Hiamey c. Conseil Scolaire de district Catholique Per curiam 207

5 Le Comité a conclu, au para. 39, que: « Bien qu’il ait et´´ e jugé insatisfaisant, le rendement du membre en salle de classe ne représente pas une preuve d’incompétence au sens du paragraphe 30(3) de la Loi ». Cependant, le Comité s’est penché sur l’absence de preuve suffisante pour etablir´ l’incompétence de M. Hiamey, aux paras. 40 a` 42: ... [L]e comité est de l’avis que la preuve qui lui a et´´ e présentée ne suffit pas a` libérer l’Ordre du fardeau de la preuve qui lui incombe. Le comité peut seulement déterminer la compétence du membre selon la preuve présentée. Dans cette affaire, le comité n’a pas obtenu les preuves suffisantes pour déterminer l’incompétence du membre. Les evaluations,´ quoiqu’insatisfaisantes pour les fins du conseil scolaire a` titre d’employeur, démontrent clairement qu’il y avait un niveau d’amélioration quant au rendement du membre pendant la période en cause. Cette preuve vient en quelque sorte appuyer la thèse du membre comme quoi le délai afin de compléter les evalu-´ ations de son rendement a et´´ e précipité afin de justifier les fins du conseil scolaire. L’Ordre a limité sa preuve aux evaluations´ de rendement par la direction. Selon le comité, la preuve n’est pas suffisante en raison des faits de cette affaire afin de déterminer que le membre est incompétent... Le comité reconnaˆıt que le rendement du membre n’a pas satisfait toutes les attentes du conseil scolaire, mais compte tenu de l’insuffisance de preuve convaincante, le comité n’est pas convaincu de l’incompétence du membre sur la prépondérance des probabilités. Pour ces motifs, le comité rejette le recours recherché par l’Ordre. 6 Le syndicat représentant M. Hiamey, l’Association des enseignantes et des enseignants franco-ontariens (AEFO), a déposé deux griefs con- testant les evaluations´ du rendement de M. Hiamey et a retenu les services de Lisa Leduc du cabinet Sack Goldblatt Mitchell s.r.l. pour la rep- résenter dans la procédure de grief. Les griefs ont et´´ e renvoyés a` l’arbitrage, mais l’AEFO les a retirés avant la tenue de la séance d’arbitrage. L’AEFO a expliqué sa décision de retirer les griefs dans une lettre de neuf pages adressé a` M. Hiamey, dans laquelle l’AEFO con- cluait que les griefs n’avaient que peu ou pas de probabilités de réussite, et ce, pour plusieurs raisons, notamment: • le Conseil scolaire jouit d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire considérable en ce qui concerne son evaluation´ des enseignants, ce qui rend difficile de contester ses conclusions en la matière; 208 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

• le seuil de ce qui constitue l’exercice raisonnable de ce pouvoir d’évaluation discrétionnaire est encore plus bas en ce qui touche les enseignants dont c’est la première année d’enseignement; et • l’AEFO a fait enquête sur la suggestion de M. Hiamey que ses evaluations´ insatisfaisantes et la cessation de son emploi aient et´´ e en rapport avec sa race (opinion fondée sur certains commentaires que l’intéressé aurait entendus dans son milieu de travail) ou avec certaines allégations de harcèlement sexuel formulées a` son encontre et l’AEFO avait conclu qu’il etait´ impossible d’établir un quelconque lien avec les faits, principalement parce que les deux premières evaluations´ insatisfaisantes avaient eu lieu avec les incidents mentionnés. Voir Hiamey v. A.E.F.O., [2011] O.L.R.D. No. 2378 (Ont. L.R.B.), au para. 12.

B. Les Plaintes de M. Hiamey Plainte de pratique déloyale de travail 7 M. Hiamey a déposé une plainte de pratique déloyale de travail contre son syndicat l’AEFO (« Commission ») car il n’était pas d’accord avec la décision de l’AEFO de ne pas renvoyer ses griefs a` l’arbitrage. Il a al- légué que l’AEFO a manqué a` son devoir de représentation lorsque le Conseil scolaire a mis fin a` son emploi et que l’AEFO a enfreint l’article 74 de la Loi de 1995 sur les relations de travail, L.O. 1995, c. 1, Annexe A, en décidant de retirer les griefs avant la séance d’arbitrage. La Com- mission a rejeté la plainte de M. Hiamey le 8 août 2011: voir Hiamey v. A.E.F.O., [2011] O.L.R.D. No. 3189 (Ont. L.R.B.). 8 Le 15 juin 2013, M. Hiamey a demandé a` la Commission de réex- aminer sa décision du 8 août 2011 rejetant la plainte de pratique déloyale. La demande de réexamen déposée par M. Hiamey etait´ fondée sur la décision du Comité de discipline de l’Ordre des enseignants rendue le 6 mars 2013 refusant de déclarer M. Hiamey « incompétent » pour enseigner au sens du paragraphe 30(3) de la Loi de 1996 sur l’Ordre des enseignantes et des enseignants de l’Ontario. L’argument de M. Hiamey etait´ a` l’effet que la conclusion de l’Ordre des enseignants démontrait que la décision du Conseil scolaire de lui congédier n’était pas justifiée. 9 Le 15 juillet 2013, la Commission a rejeté la demande de réexamen de M. Hiamey: voir Hiamey v. AEFO, [2013] O.L.R.D. No. 2826 (Ont. L.R.B.). La Commission a noté que les qualifications professionnelles de Hiamey c. Conseil Scolaire de district Catholique Per curiam 209

M. Hiamey n’étaient pas en cause dans les griefs retirés par l’AEFO, ni dans la requête devant la Commission sur la question a` savoir si « les décisions de l’AEFO puissent etreˆ qualifiées d’“arbitraires” ou de “discriminatoires”, ou encore caractérisées par la “mauvaise foi” » (para. 11). 10 La Commission a conclu, au para. 11, que le fait que le Comité de discipline de l’Ordre des enseignants a refusé de déclarer M. Hiamey « incompétent » pour enseigner « n’est pas tel qu’il pourrait vraisembl- ablement modifier l’issue de la précédente décision de la Commission, selon laquelle le requérant n’a pas présenté de faits pouvant permettre de conclure que l’AEFO a contrevenu a` l’article 74 de la Loi ».

Plainte déposée auprès du Conseil de la magistrature 11 M. Hiamey a aussi porté plainte contre la vice-présidente de la Com- mission qui a rendu la décision rejetant sa plainte de pratique déloyale de travail auprès du Conseil de la magistrature de l’Ontario (CMO). Le 5 octobre 2011, le CMO a avisé M. Hiamey par ecrit´ qu’il ne mènerait pas d’enquête sur la conduite de la vice-présidente de la Commission puisqu’elle n’est pas juge provinciale et donc ne relève pas de sa compé- tence. Le CMO a donc avisé a` M. Hiamey d’adresser ses préoccupations directement a` la Commission. 12 M. Hiamey a présenté des plaintes auprès de la Commission, mais il a egalement´ poursuivi sa plainte contre la vice-présidente de la Commis- sion devant le CMO. En janvier 2012, le CMO a indiqué a` M. Hiamey pour une deuxième fois qu’aucune enquête ne serait menée a` l’égard de la vice-présidente de la Commission, car elle n’a pas le statut de juge provincial.

Plaintes déposées auprès du Barreau du Haut-Canada 13 M. Hiamey a déposé deux plaintes auprès du Barreau du Haut-Can- ada (« Barreau »). La première etait´ contre Me Lise Leduc et son cabinet d’avocats Sack Goldblatt Mitchell s.r.l. concernant la représentation de l’AEFO lors du grief déposé contre le Conseil scolaire. La deuxième plainte déposée auprès du Barreau etait´ contre Me Julie Skinner et son cabinet Nelligan O’Brien Payne s.r.l. relativement a` la représentation de l’AEFO dans le cadre de la plainte déposée par le Conseil scolaire contre M. Hiamey auprès de l’Ordre des enseignants. 14 La directrice de réglementation professionnelle du Barreau, Me Zeynep Onen, a avisé M. Hiamey le 15 septembre 2011 que le Barreau n’allait pas faire d’enquête vis-à-vis la conduite des deux avocates et al- 210 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

lait fermer les dossiers. Les raisons a` l’appui de cette décision est que le Barreau n’enquête pas une plainte s’il y a un autre processus légal qui tranche la même question sauf dans des circonstances exceptionnelles. En l’espèce, M. Hiamey avait déposé une plainte auprès du Tribunal et de la Commission soulevant la même question. Le Barreau a egalement´ avisé M. Hiamey que s’il n’était pas satisfait après la conclusion de ces deux instances, il pourrait déposer une autre plainte auprès du Barreau.

Requêtes devant le Tribunal des droits de la personne 15 Le 20 décembre 2010, un an et demi après son congédiement, M. Hiamey a déposé une requête auprès du Tribunal des droits de la personne contre le Conseil scolaire et l’AEFO alléguant que son congédie- ment etait´ discriminatoire et qu’il etait´ victime de discrimination dans le domaine de l’emploi et des contrats au motif de la race, de la couleur et des représailles. 16 Le 15 février 2011, M. Hiamey a déposé une requête contre Nelligan O’Brien Payne s.r.l. et Julie Skinner pour discrimination dans le domaine de l’emploi et des contrats au motif des représailles. 17 Le 25 février 2011, M. Hiamey a déposé trois autres requêtes au Tri- bunal pour discrimination dans le domaine de l’emploi et des contrats au motif de la race, de la couleur et des représailles contre le Conseil scolaire, l’AEFO, l’Ordre des enseignants et Sack Goldblatt Mitchell s.r.l.. 18 Le 12 décembre 2011, M. Hiamey a déposé une requête au Tribunal contre le Barreau et Me Onen alléguant que le Barreau avait l’obligation d’intervenir immédiatement et de retirer Me Leduc comme procureur et que le Barreau n’est pas intervenu parce qu’« il est noir et les deux avocates sont blanches ». 19 Le 22 décembre 2011, M. Hiamey a déposé une requête au Tribunal contre la Commission des relations de travail et la vice-présidente de la Commission, Mme McKellar, au motif de la race et de la couleur. Il a prétendu que la décision et le comportement de la Commission sont as- similables a` de la discrimination a` son egard.´

C. Décisions Faisant L’Objet de la Révision Judiciaire Décision du 22 février 2012 20 Le 22 février 2012, le Tribunal a rejeté la requête déposée contre le Conseil scolaire pour cause de retard, ainsi que les requêtes contre l’AEFO, le cabinet Sack Goldblatt Mitchell s.r.l., le cabinet Nelligan Hiamey c. Conseil Scolaire de district Catholique Per curiam 211

O’Brien Payne s.r.l. et l’Ordre des enseignants au motif qu’elles n’avaient aucune chance raisonnable d’être accueillies: voir Hiamey c. Conseil scolaire de district Catholique Centre-Sud, 2012 HRTO 301, [2012] O.H.R.T.D. No. 411 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.). Selon le Tribu- nal, il n’existait aucun fondement factuel etayant´ l’allégation de M. Hiamey que les intimés ont enfreint ses droits protégés par le Code.

Décision du 29 mars 2012 21 Le 29 mars 2012, le Tribunal a rejeté la requête contre le Barreau et Me Onen a` la suite d’une audience sommaire au motif qu’elle n’avait aucune chance raisonnable d’être accueillie: voir Hiamey c. Barreau du Haut-Canada, 2012 HRTO 604, [2012] O.H.R.T.D. No. 691 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.). Les motifs du Tribunal se lisent comme suit au para. 10: « Après avoir considéré les documents et les observations ecrites´ et orales des parties, le Tribunal rejette la Requête. Il n’y a sim- plement pas d’élément de preuve proposé par le requérant qui soutient un lien entre la conduite des intimés et un motif interdit de discrimination. »

Décision du 23 avril 2012 22 Le 23 avril 2012, le Tribunal a rejeté la requête déposée contre la Commission des relations de travail: voir Hiamey c. Commission des relations de travail de l’Ontario, 2012 HRTO 814, [2012] O.H.R.T.D. No. 826 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.). Le Tribunal a conclu que la requête portait sur la prise de décision et l’arbitrage de la plainte que M. Hiamey a présentée a` la Commission et que lorsque les arbitres, y compris les arbitres de la Commission, exercent ce type de fonctions, ils sont pro- tégés par le principe d’immunité arbitrale: voir Goguen v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), 2010 HRTO 969, [2010] O.H.R.T.D. No. 940 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.). Par conséquent, le Tribunal a jugé que la requête n’était pas de son ressort puisque le principe de l’immunité arbitrale rendait la requête irrecevable.

Décision du 6 juillet 2012 23 M. Hiamey a déposé des demandes de réexamen des trois décisions du Tribunal: (i) la décision du 22 février 2012; (ii) la décision du 29 mars 2012; et (iii) la décision du 23 avril 2012. Les demandes de réexamen n’ont pas et´´ e déposées a` l’intérieur du délai de 30 jours suivant la date de la décision prescrite par la règle 26.1 des Règles de procédure du Tribunal. 212 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

24 Dans une décision en date du 6 juillet 2012, le Tribunal s’est pro- noncé sur les trois questions suivantes: a. La requête déposée contre le Conseil de la magistrature de l’Ontario et Ana Brigido devrait-elle etreˆ rejetée au motif qu’elle n’a aucune chance raisonnable d’être accueillie? b. Les demandes de M. Hiamey devraient-elles etreˆ réexaminées? c. M. Hiamey devrait-il etreˆ déclaré plaideur quérulent par le Tribunal? Voir Hiamey v. Conseil scolaire de district Catholique Centre-Sud, 2012 HRTO 1331, [2012] O.H.R.T.D. No. 1389 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.). 25 Concernant la requête déposée contre le CMO et Mme Brigido, le Tribunal a rejeté celle-ci concluant qu’elle n’avait aucune chance raisonnable d’être accueillie. Les motifs du Tribunal se lisent ainsi: [12] Après examen des observations détaillées des parties, j’estime que la présente Requête n’a aucune chance raisonnable d’être accueillie. Il est clair que le CMO n’a pas compétence sur les plaintes déposées a` l’encontre des membres des tribunaux administratifs, ce qui inclut la CRTO. Le mandat du CMO se limite a` enquêter sur la conduite des juges provinciaux. Le CMO a envoyé au requérant deux lettres expliquant de fa¸con très simple la portée de son mandat, dont il conteste la véracité. Toutefois, même si le requérant estime que le CMO se trompe dans l’interprétation de son mandat aux termes de la Loi, il n’existe absolument aucun el´´ ement de preuve pour etayer´ sa conviction que l’interprétation du CMO etait´ un prétexte pour an- nuler sa demande en raison d’un motif interdit. Après examen de la correspondance entre les parties et de leurs observations respectives, j’estime qu’il n’existe aucun el´´ ement de preuve d’une quelconque conduite eventuelle´ du CMO ou de ses employés qui puisse raison- nablement attester une violation du Code des droits de la personne, L.R.O 1990, chap. H.19, tel que modifié (ci-après le « Code »). Dans la mesure où j’ai décidé que la présente Requête n’a aucune chance raisonnable d’être accueillie, je ne traiterai pas des autres arguments qui ont et´´ e avancés par le CMO. 26 En ce qui concerne les demandes de réexamen, le Tribunal les a rejetés pour les raisons suivantes: [23] Après examen des observations du requérant, j’estime qu’il n’y a pas lieu de réexaminer les Décisions. Les arguments du requérant sont essentiellement les mêmes que ceux qu’il a formulés par le passé a` l’appui de ses requêtes. J’estime que le requérant n’a etabli´ Hiamey c. Conseil Scolaire de district Catholique Per curiam 213

l’existence d’aucun des critères enonc´´ es dans la règle nº 26 qui en- traˆıneraient le réexamen de la décision définitive du Tribunal. 27 Enfin, le Tribunal a déclaré que M. Hiamey est un « plaideur quérulent » sur la base des motifs suivants: [30] J’ai etudi´´ e l’historique de cette affaire et constaté que le requér- ant a déposé des requêtes contre douze intimés. Toutes ces requêtes font suite a` son congédiement par le Conseil. J’estime qu’il a « réu- tilisé » cet ev´´ enement initial dans ses requêtes ultérieures contre des avocats et des organismes décisionnaires indépendants. Chaque fois que le requérant est mécontent de la conduite d’un organisme, il l’accuse de se trouver dans une situation de conflit d’intérêts, d’être de mauvaise foi et de travailler dans l’intérêt de son ancien employeur, et il dépose des requêtes au Tribunal a` son encontre pour discrimination. Le requérant a adopté une pratique systématique con- sistant a` déposer des requêtes qui sont dénuées de fondement, si bien que le Code et les processus du Tribunal ont et´´ e utilisés comme des mécanismes lui permettant d’interjeter appel de toute décision qui lui est défavorable. [31] J’estime par ailleurs que la conduite manifestée par le requérant pendant ces procédures est vexatoire. Le requérant a bombardé les parties et le Tribunal de courriers hebdomadaires répétitifs dans lesquels il présente des demandes de plus en plus abusives a` l’encontre des intimés. Bien que j’aie rejeté la Requête contre le Conseil au motif qu’elle n’a aucune chance raisonnable d’être accueillie sur le fond, il a continué d’affirmer que le Conseil a admis l’avoir congédié pour des motifs d’ordre discriminatoire et que j’en ai pris acte. Sa correspondance et ses requêtes sont egalement´ répétitives sur le fond. Il n’a de cesse d’écrire au Tribunal pour formuler des demandes de recours de plus en plus importantes a` l’encontre des intimés. Le re- quérant continue d’écrire au Tribunal chaque fois que l’Ordre lui ad- resse un courrier, l’accusant de harcèlement et de discrimination. Le requérant n’accepte pas les décisions antérieures du Tribunal et il a ouvertement affirmé, de fa¸con répétée, qu’il refuse de se conformer a` la jurisprudence du Tribunal, qu’il qualifie de « sale »...... [33] Compte tenu de l’ensemble des requêtes formulées par le re- quérant auprès de ce Tribunal et des autres demandes persistantes et infructueuses qu’il a présentées contre les intimés, je déclare en con- séquence que le requérant est un plaideur quérulent pour ce qui est des questions faisant suite ou liées a` son congédiement par le Conseil ou a` des procédures connexes, et qu’il ne peut initier aucune requête 214 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

a` ce sujet aupr`es du Tribunal des droits de la personne de l’Ontario sans obtenir au pr´ealable son autorisation.

D. Questions en Litige 1. Quelle est la norme de contrôle applicable en matière de révision judiciaire? 2. Est-ce qu’il y a une erreur nécessitant une révision judiciaire?

E. Positions des Parties Le requérant 28 M. Hiamey soutient qu’il est un enseignant compétent qui a et´´ e con- gédié abusivement par le Conseil scolaire dans l’irrespect total de son contrat de travail, de la convention collective et de la Loi sur l’éducation, ainsi qu’en violation de ses droits reconnus par le Code des droits de la personne, L.R.O. 1990, c. H.19, (« Code ») parce qu’il est noir. Il affirme egalement´ qu’il a et´´ e faussement accusé devant l’Ordre des enseignants. D’après lui, la phrase suivante prononcée par le comité de discipline de l’Ordre des enseignants atteste qu’il est un enseignant compétent: « Le comité peut seulement déterminer la compétence du membre selon la preuve présentée... » 29 Selon M. Hiamey, le Conseil scolaire admet l’avoir congédié après plusieurs incidents de discrimination. En appui de cette affirmation, M. Hiamey cite la phrase suivante: « Le Conseil [scolaire] est d’avis que le dernier incident de discrimination s’est produit a` la date du congédiement du requérant, en juin 2009 »: voir Hiamey c. Conseil scolaire de district Catholique Centre-Sud, 2012 HRTO 301, [2012] O.H.R.T.D. No. 411 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.), au para. 23. 30 M. Hiamey affirme que l’AEFO a enfreint l’article 74 de la Loi de 1995 sur les relations de travail, L.O. 1995, c. 1, Annexe A, et lui a refusé toute aide financière pour lui faire abandonner sa réclamation. 31 Il argumente que Julie Skinner de Nelligan O’Brien Payne s.r.l. qui a et´´ e mandatée par l’AEFO pour le défendre a voulu, par la tromperie, lui faire signer une entente pour le nuire. 32 M. Hiamey soumet que le Barreau du Haut-Canada s’est fait com- plice de discrimination en refusant de sanctionner les actes de Lise Leduc du cabinet Sack Goldblatt Mitchell s.r.l. et de Julie Skinner du cabinet Nelligan O’Brien Payne s.r.l. Hiamey c. Conseil Scolaire de district Catholique Per curiam 215

33 Concernant le CMO, M. Hiamey déclare que celui-ci a menti en faisant croire que la Vice-présidente de la Commission des relations de travail de l’Ontario, Mary Anne McKellar, n’a pas et´´ e nommée par la province. 34 M. Hiamey allègue que le Tribunal a enfreint ses droits protégés par le Code des droits de la personne de la fa¸con suivante: • en refusant de sanctionner les intimés pour la discrimination présumée a` son egard;´ • en employant des pratiques discriminatoires a` son profit et au profit des intimés pour le nuire; • en refusant de lui rendre toutes les preuves qu’il a remises au Tri- bunal après l’audience du 25 avril 2014; • en rendant des décisions sommaires sans tenir d’audience publique; et • en lui qualifiant de plaideur quérulent et lui interdisant de déposer d’autres requêtes sans l’autorisation du Tribunal. 35 En guise de réparation, M. Hiamey demande a` cette cour de lui rendre les réparations suivantes: • la révision des décisions du Tribunal; • sa réintégration immédiate dans un poste d’enseignant; • la reconnaissance de ses droits et privilèges; et • des dommages-intérêts.

Les intimés 36 Tous les intimés affirment que la norme de contrôle judiciaire applicable aux décisions du Tribunal est celle de la décision raisonnable. 37 Les intimés maintiennent que le requérant ne fait etat´ d’aucune erreur manifeste dans les motifs du Tribunal concernant la prescription de sa Requête ou la déclaration de plaideur quérulent. 38 Les intimés soumettent donc que la présente requête soit rejetée.

Conseil scolaire de district catholique Centre-Sud 39 Le Conseil scolaire est d’avis que M. Hiamey n’a pas mis en cause le raisonnement du Tribunal ni les tests juridiques applicables. 40 Le Conseil scolaire est d’avis que la cour devrait rejeter la requˆete en r´evision judiciaire, car M. Hiamey n’a fait etat´ d’aucune erreur manifeste 216 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

dans les motifs de la décision du Tribunal. Il n’a pas mis en cause le raisonnement du Tribunal ni les fondements factuels ou juridiques du Tribunal. 41 Le Conseil scolaire soulève aussi que M. Hiamey reprend a` nouveau les mêmes arguments qu’il a déjà avancés devant le Tribunal. Il n’y a aucune indication que le Tribunal a oubliée, négliger d’examiner ou mal interpréter la preuve. De plus, la requête en révision judiciaire a et´´ e dé- posée bien au-delà du délai de six mois identifié comme le seuil par la jurisprudence et donc devrait etreˆ rejetée. 42 Le fait que l’Ordre des enseignants ait jugé qu’il puisse retenir son certificat d’enseignement ne lui donne aucune raison de poursuivre une révision judiciaire, car le test juridique pertinent aux fins de l’Ordre est distinct de celui qui prévaut sous le régime des droits de la personne. Tel que précise la décision de l’Ordre: « Bien qu’il ait et´´ e juge insatisfaisant, le rendement du membre en salle de classe ne représente pas une preuve d’incompétence au sens du paragraphe 30(3) de la Loi [de 1996 sur l’Ordre des enseignantes et des enseignants de l’Ontario] ».

Ordre des enseignantes et enseignants de l’Ontario 43 L’Ordre des enseignants soutient que la décision du Tribunal du 22 février 2012 de rejeter la requête de M. Hiamey a` l’encontre de l’Ordre des enseignants etait´ raisonnable. 44 Le Tribunal a egalement´ conclu que la plainte de M. Hiamey n’avait aucun rapport avec un motif de discrimination en vertu du Code, car M. Hiamey n’a pas démontré un lien entre le traitement de sa plainte par l’Ordre des enseignants et un motif prévu par le Code. 45 Puisque M. Hiamey n’a pas identifié une seule conclusion de fait dér- aisonnable ni une erreur de droit commise par le Tribunal en rejetant sa requête au motif que celle-ci n’avait aucune chance raisonnable d’être accueillie, l’Ordre des enseignants demande a` cette cour de rejeter la présente requête en révision judiciaire. L’Ordre des enseignants soutient egalement´ que la présente requête devrait etreˆ rejetée pour cause de retard.

Association des enseignantes et enseignants franco-ontariens et Sack Goldblatt Mitchell s.r.l. 46 L’AEFO affirme qu’il n’y a aucune raison a` réviser la décision du Tribunal rejetant les requêtes de M. Hiamey compte tenu du fait qu’il n’y Hiamey c. Conseil Scolaire de district Catholique Per curiam 217

a aucun el´´ ement de preuve supportant l’all´egation de M. Hiamey que l’AEFO a agi de fa¸con discriminatoire envers lui.

Conseil de la magistrature de l’Ontario 47 Le CMO soutient que la décision du Tribunal du 6 juillet 2012 rejetant la requête a` l’encontre du CMO et de sa registrateure adjointe, Mme Ana Brigido, est a` la fois raisonnable et correcte. D’abord, cette cour ne peut intervenir que si la décision du Tribunal est manifestement déraison- nable en vertu de l’article 45.8 du Code des droits de la personne et donc il faut faire preuve d’une grande retenue. Egalement,´ le pouvoir de révi- sion judiciaire de cette cour envers une décision du CMO de rejeter une plainte est circonscrit et se limite a` assurer que: (a) la procédure suivie etait´ conforme a` la Loi sur les tribunaux judiciaires, L.R.O. 1990, c. C.43, et aux procédures du CMO et que (b) le résultat est l’un des résultats disponibles sous la Loi sur les tribunaux judiciaires: voir Kipiniak v. Ontario Judicial Council, 2012 ONSC 5866, 298 O.A.C. 389 (Ont. Div. Ct.), au para. 11. 48 De plus, le CMO soulève qu’il n’existe aucun droit de révision auprès du Tribunal quant aux décisions du CMO de rejeter une plainte. La com- pétence du Tribunal se limite a` déterminer s’il y a eu discrimination au sens du Code des droits de la personne. Puisqu’il n’existait aucun el´´ e- ment de preuve attestant que le CMO ou Mme Brigido a violé le Code des droits de la personne en rejetant la plainte du requérant au motif qu’elle n’était pas a` l’encontre d’un juge provincial, le CMO soutient que le Tribunal n’a pas agi de manière déraisonnable en rejetant la demande de M. Hiamey. Par conséquent, le CMO est d’avis que cette cour devrait rejeter la requête en révision judiciaire.

Barreau du Haut-Canada 49 Le Barreau soutient que M. Hiamey n’a pas identifié en quoi la déci- sion initiale et la décision de réexamen du Tribunal etaient´ déraison- nables. En ce qui a trait a` la décision initiale du Tribunal de rejeter la requête déposée par M. Hiamey en raison du fait qu’il n’y avait aucun fondement factuel a` son allégation selon laquelle le Barreau et Me Onen avaient enfreint le Code des droits de la personne, le Barreau affirme que la décision est raisonnable. En ce qui concerne la décision de réexamen, le Barreau soutient que la conclusion du Tribunal de ne pas accueillir la demande de réexamen de M. Hiamey puisqu’il n’a pas rempli les conditions de réexamen prévues par la règle 26.5 des Règles de procédure du 218 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

Tribunal est raisonnable. Le Barreau avance egalement´ que la requête en révision judiciaire devrait etreˆ rejetée pour cause de retard.

Nelligan O’Brien Payne s.r.l. 50 Nelligan O’Brien Payne affirme que cette cour doit faire preuve de déférence et préserver la décision du Tribunal pour les raisons qui suivent. Premièrement, la décision du Tribunal rejetant la requête de M. Hiamey contre Nelligan O’Brien Payne est raisonnable et correcte. Deuxièmement, M. Hiamey n’a pas allégué d’erreurs de droit, ni de conclusions de fait déraisonnables dans la décision initiale du 22 février 2012 ou dans la décision de réexamen du 6 juillet 2012. Troisièmement, M. Hiamey soulève pour la première fois une question qui n’a pas et´´ e soulevée devant le Tribunal, a` savoir si Nelligan O’Brien Payne s.r.l. a enfreint l’article 74 de la Loi de 1995 sur les relations de travail relativement a` son obligation de représenter M. Hiamey de fa¸con impartiale. Quatrièmement, la requête de M. Hiamey a et´´ e faite hors du délai de six mois etabli´ par la jurisprudence pour le dépôt d’une requête en révision judiciaire.

F. Analyse et Conclusions Quelle est la norme de contrôle applicable en matière de révision judiciaire? 51 L’article 45.8 du Code des droits de la personne enonce´ ce qui suit: Sous réserve de l’article 45.7 de la présente loi, de l’article 21.1 de la Loi sur l’exercice des compétences légales et des règles du Tribunal, toute décision du Tribunal est définitive et non susceptible d’appel et elle ne peut etreˆ modifiée ou annulée dans le cadre d’une requête en révision judiciaire ou de toute autre instance a` moins d’être manifestement déraisonnable. 52 La Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a confirmé dans l’arrêt Phipps v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2012 ONCA 155, 289 O.A.C. 163 (Ont. C.A.), au para. 10, que la norme de contrôle en matière de révision judiciaire applicable aux décisions du Tribunal est celle de la décision raisonnable: An Adjudicator’s decision is not subject to appeal, but only to judicial review: see s. 45.8 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 (the Code). All counsel agree that the Divisional Court properly identified “reasonableness” as the appropriately deferential standard of review on an application for judicial review of the Adjudicator’s Hiamey c. Conseil Scolaire de district Catholique Per curiam 219

conclusion of discrimination: see Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190. In recognition that the Adjudicator “has a specialized expertise” in the area, the Divisional Court explained that the reasonableness standard accords “the highest degree of deference ... with respect to [the Adjudicator’s] determinations of fact and the interpretation and application of human rights law” (at para. 41). 53 Selon la Cour divisionnaire dans l’affaire Keele North Recycling Inc. v. Ontario (Human Rights Tribunal), 2013 ONSC 268, [2013] O.J. No. 1289 (Ont. Div. Ct.), au para. 20, si le tribunal a « clairement expliqué » le fondement de toutes les conclusions de fait tirées et si celles-ci sont « etay´´ ees de fa¸con rationnelle » selon les el´´ ements de preuve, la décision est raisonnable.

Est-ce qu’il y a une erreur de la part du Tribunal nécessitant une révision judiciaire? 54 M. Hiamey est mécontent de la décision du Conseil scolaire de mettre fin a` son emploi et de la décision du Tribunal de rejeter ses requêtes découlant de son congédiement alléguant une discrimination de la part des intimés a` son egard.´ Toutefois, ce fait n’est pas suffisant pour etablir´ l’existence d’une infraction au Code des droits de la personne. 55 La question devant le Tribunal n’avait rien a` faire avec la compétence de M. Hiamey en tant qu’enseignant. La question devant le Tribunal etait´ s’il y avait discrimination envers ou harcèlement contre M. Hiamey. 56 Le Tribunal a conclu qu’il n’y avait aucun lien entre son congédie- ment et un motif de discrimination prévu par le Code. 57 La question de l’incompétence d’un enseignant au sens de l’article 30(3) de la Loi de 1996 sur l’Ordre des enseignants est distincte de la question de la qualité de son rendement répondant aux attentes du Con- seil scolaire, ou de la question a` savoir si le Conseil avait un motif val- able pour le congédier. La conclusion du Comité de discipline selon laquelle M. Hiamey n’est pas incompétent n’est donc pas pertinente a` la détermination a` savoir si les intimés ont violé le Code des droits de la personne et fait preuve de discrimination a` l’encontre de M. Hiamey sur la base de sa couleur ou sa race. 58 M. Hiamey ne fait etat´ d’aucune erreur manifeste dans les motifs du Tribunal concernant le rejet de ses requêtes ou la déclaration de plaideur quérulent. 59 Je souscris a` l’argument du Conseil scolaire qu’il n’y a aucune indication que le Tribunal aurait oublié, négligé d’examiner ou mal interprété 220 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

la preuve dont il disposait et encore moins d’indications que les conclusions du Tribunal ne s’inscrivaient pas dans un eventail´ de conclusions raisonnables. 60 Concernant la décision du 29 mars 2012, le Tribunal n’a pas agi de manière déraisonnable en rejetant la demande de M. Hiamey puisqu’il n’existait aucun el´´ ement de preuve attestant que le CMO ou Mme Brigido a violé le Code des droits de la personne en rejetant la requête au motif qu’elle n’était pas a` l’encontre d’un juge provincial. Aussi, il n’y avait aucun fondement factuel a` l’allégation de M. Hiamey que le Bar- reau et Me Onen avaient enfreint le Code des droits de la personne. 61 En ce qui a trait a` la décision du Tribunal datée du 6 juillet 2012 rejetant les demandes de réexamen, M. Hiamey fondait sa demande de réexamen sur la décision du Comité de discipline de l’Ordre des enseignants par laquelle le Comité a refusé de lui déclarer « incompétent » pour enseigner au sens de la Loi de 1996 sur l’Ordre des enseignantes et des enseignants de l’Ontario. Pourtant, la décision du Comité de discipline n’a aucune pertinence quant a` la question de savoir si le Tribunal et les intimés ont agi de fa¸con discriminatoire envers M. Hiamey. Il n’existe aucune preuve attestant que le Tribunal a rejeté les demandes de réexamen de M. Hiamey pour des raisons discriminatoires. 62 Il est important de souligner le fait que M. Hiamey n’a pas allégué d’erreurs de droit, ni de conclusions de fait déraisonnables de la part du Tribunal dans ses décisions. 63 Bref, il n’y a aucun el´´ ement de preuve appuyant l’allégation de M. Hiamey que le Tribunal ou les intimés ont agi de fa¸con discriminatoire envers lui. Je suis d’avis que les décisions du Tribunal de rejeter les re- quêtes déposées par M. Hiamey contre le Conseil scolaire, l’AEFO, le CMO, le Barreau, Zeynep Onen, l’Ordre des enseignants, Nelligan O’Brien Payne s.r.l., Julie Skinner, Sack Goldblatt Mitchell s.r.l., Lise Leduc, la Commission des relations de travail et Mary Anne McKellar sont raisonnables. 64 Enfin, les intimés soulèvent le fait que la requête en révision judiciaire déposée par M. Hiamey a et´´ e faite hors du délai de six mois etablis´ par la jurisprudence pour le dépôt d’une requête en révision judiciaire: voir Gigliotti c. Collège des Grands Lacs (Conseil d’administration) (2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 581 (Fr.) (Ont. Div. Ct.), au para. 30. Ayant déterminé que les décisions du Tribunal sont raisonnables, j’estime qu’il n’est pas nécessaire de traiter de cet argument. Hiamey c. Conseil Scolaire de district Catholique Per curiam 221

65 Pour les motifs qui précèdent, la présente requête en révision judiciaire est rejetée. Application dismissed. 222 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

[Indexed as: Decision No. 1529/15] Decision No. 1529/15 Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal Docket: 1529/15 2015 ONWSIAT 1805 B. Doherty V-Chair Heard: July 16, 2015 Judgment: August 17, 2015 Labour and employment law –––– Workers’ compensation legislation — Compensation — Entitlement to compensation — Pre-existing condition — Miscellaneous –––– Workplace Safety and Insurance Board awarded non-economic loss benefit for permanent impairment to worker in 1990 on basis that her elbows and wrists were injured due to her work as retail clerk at drugstore — In 1998, worker began working as card dealer for casino employer — In 2000, worker reported workplace injury involving her spine and upper extremities related to repetitive work as card dealer — Board decided to amalgamate 2000 claim with 1990 claim on basis that worker’s symptoms and disability in 2000 was recurrence of 1990 claim, and paid wage loss benefits in connection with recurrence — Appeals Resolution Officer (ARO) confirmed that there was no new accident in 2000, and found worker did not have entitlement for injuries to her cervical or thoracic spine because changes were degenerative changes unrelated to her duties at casino — Worker appealed — Appeal dismissed — Evi- dence did not establish worker sustained injuries to either her shoulders or her neck in 2000 — Given that conclusion, there was no need to determine whether her work activities as card dealer posed risk for development of musculoskeletal disorder involving shoulders or neck — There was no permanent impairment or entitlement for additional wage loss benefits. Cases considered by B. Doherty V-Chair: Decision No. 181/07 (2007), 2007 ONWSIAT 199 (Ont. W.S.I.A.T.) — referred to Decision No. 192/12 (2013), 2013 ONWSIAT 678 (Ont. W.S.I.A.T.) — distinguished Decision No. 2051/11 (2011), 2011 ONWSIAT 2620 (Ont. W.S.I.A.T.) — distinguished Decision No. 575/13 (2013), 2013 ONWSIAT 681 (Ont. W.S.I.A.T.) — distinguished Kamara v. Ontario (Workplace Safety & Insurance Appeals Tribunal) (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 2894, [2009] O.J. No. 2080 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Decision No. 1529/15 B. Doherty V-Chair 223

Statutes considered: Workers’ Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. W.11 Generally — referred to s. 1(1) “impairment” — considered s. 4(1) — considered Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 16, Sched. A Generally — referred to s. 2(1) “accident” — referred to s. 2(1) “impairment” — considered s. 2(1) “permanent impairment” — considered s. 13(1) — considered s. 124(2) — considered s. 126(1) — considered

APPEAL by worker from decision of Appeals Resolution Officer affirming decision of Workplace Safety and Insurance Board denying entitlement to benefits for workplace injury.

S. Dajczak for Worker No one for Employer in the 1990 claim S. Roberts for Employer in the 2000 claim

B. Doherty V-Chair: Reasons (i) Introduction 1 The worker appeals the decision of Appeals Resolution Officer (ARO) MacMillan of the Workplace Safety & Insurance Board (the Board) dated May 15, 2013. In a hearing based on the documentary evidence, including written submissions from the worker’s representative dated August 29, 2012 and January 10, 2013, the ARO denied the worker’s objection to Board decisions regarding a disablement accident claimed to have occurred on March 30, 2000. The ARO referred to the worker’s prior claim relating to a disablement with an accident date of March 14, 1990, in which the Board had accepted that the worker sustained injuries in the areas of her elbows and wrists as a result of her work as a retail clerk, with a 23% non-economic loss (NEL) benefit for permanent impairments of her elbows and wrists. Subsequently, in 1998, the worker began working as a card dealer for the casino employer, and reported a workplace injury with a date of accident of March 30, 2000 involving her spine and upper extremities said to be related to repetitive 224 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

card dealing. Following a review, the Board had amalgamated the 2000 claim with the 1990 claim on the basis that the worker’s symptoms and disability in 2000 constituted a recurrence in her 1990 claim. 2 The ARO confirmed the decision that there was no new accident on March 30, 2000. Referring to Tribunal Medical Discussion Papers, the ARO found that the worker did not have entitlement for injuries to her cervical or thoracic spine because the changes seen on imaging were degenerative or age-related, and not related to the worker’s work duties as a card dealer at the casino. 3 The 1990 employer did not participate in the hearing of the appeal. The employer at the time of the 2000 claim, the casino, did participate. The issues in the appeal were clarified at the outset of the hearing to be the following: 1. whether the worker experienced a (new) work-related injury on March 30, 2000 2. whether she is entitled to benefits for injuries to her cervical spine, thoracic spine and upper extremities, including shoulders 3. whether she sustained a permanent impairment as a result of injuries to any or all of those areas 4. whether she is entitled to additional wage loss benefits beyond April 29, 2001 4 I heard testimony from two witnesses, the worker and R.A., shift manager with the casino employer.

(ii) Background evidence (a) The March 14, 1990 workplace accident 5 The worker, who was born in 1960, is right-handed. She experienced work-related injuries involving bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) and ulnar nerve entrapment as a result of her work as a retail clerk at a drugstore. The Board accepted the disablement claim, with a date of accident of March 14, 1990. The worker underwent bilateral carpal tunnel releases and ulnar nerve decompression surgery in 1990. 6 She eventually returned to full-time work on May 22, 1991 with restrictions. Those restrictions were not to use a price gun and to be cau- tious about repetitive activity of the upper extremities and heavy lifting. Decision No. 1529/15 B. Doherty V-Chair 225

7 The worker had persisting symptoms and was referred to Dr. J. Danial whose report of July 6, 1994 to the worker’s family physician Dr. G. Kuprowski states that no neurological problem (including carpal tunnel syndrome, ulnar neuropathy, thoracic outlet syndrome, or cervical radiculopathy) was detected. Although it is somewhat difficult to make out because of the Board stamp obscuring the text, Dr. Danial appears to say that the worker may have fibromyalgia. 8 The Board accepted that she had permanent impairments as a result of her 1990 work-related accident. She was assessed for a NEL benefit. In 1995, her whole person impairment for her bilateral elbow and CTS/wrist-related impairments was rated at 23%. 9 The worker returned to see Dr. Danial in December 1995 for right upper extremity symptoms1 which she attributed to an increased workload at the store. Dr. Danial’s report of December 11, 1995 discusses nerve conduction studies, which were normal, and suggested that the main problem was tendinitis, which he expected would improve after the holiday season when her workload lessened.

(b) The March 30, 2000 claim 10 The worker was working as a card dealer, principally Blackjack, for the casino employer at the time of her March 2000 injury claim. She was 39 years old and had begun working for that employer in July 1998. The employer’s representative provided an Employment History at the hearing which shows her status (casual, part-time, full-time temporary) and changes in status and jobs at the casino from 1998 until 2014. 11 In her testimony, the worker described her work as a Blackjack dealer. She usually worked the 8:00 pm to 4:00 am shift. She stood at a table which she thought was approximately 36 inches high. There were seven spots for players at the time. She would use her left hand to take cards from the card shoe. She stated that she needed to “push” to get a card out of the card shoe. She testified that she used her right hand to deal two cards to each player and to herself. She would then ask the players if they wanted another card. She would take money from the players and would pay the winners.

1The term “upper extremity” is used here to mean the shoulder, arm, forearm, wrist and hand. 226 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

12 She stated that she had to watch the whole table to prevent cheating. She would have to turn her head as well as bend her head down (that is, flex her neck). She testified that she had difficulty reaching across the table to the spot position opposite her; she testified that her arm was not that long. 13 She would deal for one hour and then have a 20 minute break. This cycle was repeated throughout the shift. She described always moving her arms in the 60 minutes that she was dealing, stating that the 20 minute rest break that followed was inadequate. 14 She stated that the casino was very busy in the period from 1998 to 2000 and she had an average of five players at her table. 15 The worker testified that she found that her arms became very sore and the soreness went into her shoulders and neck. She had stiffness in her neck. She referred to having no place to rest her arms, stating that she could not rest her arms on the table because that would be unprofessional. 16 The worker stated that the soreness that she experienced in 2000 was not like the problems that she had had in 1990, which she indicated involved her wrists and numbness. 17 She testified that on March 30, 2000, she could not continue working. She stopped working (and was off work for a few months) and saw her family physician, Dr. Kuprowski, that day. He completed a Form 8, Phy- sician’s First Report, for the Board regarding his consultation with the worker. The Form 8 report refers only to left arm symptoms (that is, there is no reference to the right upper extremity, the neck, or the chest). In describing the worker’s history, Dr. Kuprowski told the Board that the worker had an increase in the soreness in her left arm with dealing Blackjack. He referred to her previous work-related injury in 1990. His diagnosis was expressed as “overuse syndrome left arm” and, with respect to restrictions, he referred to “no left arm work.” 18 Dr. Kuprowski also completed a casino Functional Abilities Form on March 30, 2000 providing restrictions relating to the worker’s left arm. 19 The worker completed a Form 6, Worker’s Report of Injury/Disease, for the Board on April 23, 2000, reporting injuries involving both sides of her neck, left shoulder, elbow and wrist, and right shoulder and arm, which she attributed to her work as a card dealer. She described experiencing pain while pulling the cards from the card shoe. She also referred Decision No. 1529/15 B. Doherty V-Chair 227

to the affected areas as hot and swollen. She described a date of injury of March 30, 2000. 20 The casino employer completed a Form 7, Employer’s Report of In- jury/Disease, on April 20, 2000. It took the position that the worker’s symptoms did not arise out of and in the course of her employment with the casino. The casino employer referred to the worker’s prior upper extremity problems in the 1990 claim, and advised that the worker had indicated that her condition might be related to pulling the cards out of the card shoe, but also indicated that it could be related to her prior compensable condition. When asked about this at the hearing, the worker stated that she did not think or did not remember telling the employer that her symptoms could be related to her prior compensable condition. Her representative later submitted that the worker did not know at that point what her symptoms related to. 21 Accompanying its Form 7 report, the casino provided information to the Board relating to the worker’s work as a card dealer. The cycle involving 60 minutes of dealing followed by a 20 minute break was repeated six times in a shift. A (1998) Physical Demands Analysis (PDA) for the Blackjack dealer job was provided. The PDA refers to varying degrees of neck flexion being required, stating that neck flexion is generally prolonged. Shoulder positions, elbow positions, and wrist/hand movements are described. 22 The worker was referred for physiotherapy and was seen by an orthopaedic surgeon. In a short report dated April 18, 2000, orthopaedic surgeon Dr. G. Annisette referred to the worker’s development of pain in her arms, extending into her chest and neck, which “came on from repetitive use.” The orthopaedic surgeon described diffuse tenderness in the joints of the worker’s upper extremities and full range of motion, and referred to a clinical impression of repetitive strain injury involving both upper extremities. I observe that Dr. Annisette’s attribution of the worker’s symptoms to work-related repetitive strain injury is provided without any discussion of the work activities or the physical demands of the worker’s job, that is, the conclusory statement lacks a foundation. 23 The worker was referred to neurologist Dr. H. Desai. His report of May 26, 2000 describes the worker’s chief complaints as pain in the mandibular region and in the neck (although the neurologist also states, inconsistently, that there were no complaints of neck pain, and so it is hard to know what should be inferred from this report with respect to neck pain). The worker complained of painful lymph nodes in her neck. 228 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

The neurologist described his findings on examination (the only real finding was tenderness in the worker’s neck) and stated that the nerve conduction studies had been normal. 24 Family physician Dr. Kuprowski provided a short handwritten note dated June 1, 2000 that refers to the worker’s arm pain and weakness which he stated he felt was overuse syndrome of both arms, directly related to her job description of card dealer. In offering his opinion, Dr. Kuprowski does not describe any history or findings on clinical examination, and does not indicate what he understands the worker’s work activities as a card dealer to involve. 25 The worker returned to modified work, graduated hours, on June 12, 2000, handing out pay stubs. She had been paid full wage loss benefits by the Board to that point (and she received partial benefits thereafter, until April 2001). 26 The June 21, 2000 memorandum of a review by Board medical consultant Dr. Heckadon discusses the worker’s prior (1990) claim, with continuing symptoms and some treatment over the years. Dr. Heckadon was of the opinion that the worker’s hand/wrist/arm problems in 2000 reflected an aggravation of her prior (compensable) condition. With respect to her complaints relating to her neck, the medical records had referred to lymphadenopathy, which the medical consultant stated was not likely related to the worker’s job duties, though the symptoms would compound her complaints. 27 Following the review by the Board medical consultant, the claims adjudicator spoke with the worker. The adjudicator’s memorandum of June 23, 2000 states that the adjudicator advised the worker that he or she was accepting ongoing entitlement involving the worker’s arms, and was amalgamating the 2000 claim into the 1990 claim. The adjudicator also advised the worker that entitlement was not being accepted for a neck injury/condition, as it was not related to her work. 28 The 2000 claim was accordingly considered by the Board as a recurrence of the 1990 claim. 29 The worker was seen by Dr. P. Charron, a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation, on July 11, 2000. The physiatrist’s report of July 18, 2000 to the worker’s family physician refers to an eight-year history of symptoms involving her arms. The worker told Dr. Charron that she began to experience severe neck and arm pain at the end of March 2000. The pain had been of sudden onset, when she was dealing. She also described swelling in her hands and weakness in her arms. Dr. Decision No. 1529/15 B. Doherty V-Chair 229

Charron described his examination and stated that he found little objective evidence of impairment. He arranged for further investigations. 30 The August 29, 2000 report of Dr. Charron to the family physician describes the many investigations carried out in connection with the symptoms reported by the worker, all of which were normal. There was a positive RA (which I take to be rheumatoid arthritis) factor in the bloodwork, but Dr. Charron did not think that it was clinically significant, and the worker had an appointment to see a rheumatologist in October. The physiatrist stated that he had been unable to identify any significant organic pathology to account for the worker’s bilateral arm symptoms. 31 The worker was subsequently seen by rheumatologist Dr. J. Rodri- gues. His October 17, 2000 report of his initial assessment of the worker describes his physical examination. The only relevant finding was tenderness. The rheumatologist expressed the opinion that the worker did not have an inflammatory arthritis and stated that her pain was likely work-related. 32 Dr. Rodrigues wrote a report dated April 2, 2001 to the casino physician. The rheumatologist referred to having seen the worker in October 2000. She had subsequently been involved in a motor vehicle accident, on December 20, 2000. The worker told the rheumatologist that she had some mild tightness in her neck and upper back as a result of the motor vehicle accident. Dr. Rodrigues referred to his opinion in 2000 that the worker’s upper extremity pain was likely related to her work, an overuse type of syndrome. As far as limitations were concerned, the rheumatologist told the casino employer that he felt that the worker would likely have difficulty doing any repetitive work with her upper extremities, and that she may need some rest periods if she was doing continuous work with her upper extremities. 33 The limitations described by the rheumatologist do not appear to be very different from those in place as a result of the worker’s 1990 claim (that included no repetitive activity of the upper extremities). 34 The worker testified that she was on modified work for a number of months following her return to work in June 2000. In April 2001, she returned to her regular job as a dealer on a graduated basis. In October of that year, the worker was laid off as a result of a decline in the casino’s business following 9/11. 35 The last contemporaneous medical report in the claim file relating to the worker’s condition following her 2000 claim is the November 29, 2001 report from neurologist Dr. Desai to the family physician. The neu- 230 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

rologist described the worker’s CT scan of the cervical spine (and the MRI of her brain) as normal. The worker was told that she had regional myofascial pain syndrome. Dr. Desai indicated that he did not intend to see the worker again. 36 After November 2001, there is a gap in the medical documentation in the 1990 claim file (which includes the 2000 claim) until 2010. 37 The worker returned to work briefly following the lay-off, for a little over a week, at Christmas 2001, and was later recalled in late August 2002. When she returned to work at that time, her position was as an attendant in the employee dining room/restaurant. That was a full-time temporary position. In December 2002, she returned to her regular job as a part-time dealer. 38 She testified that she could not continue working as a dealer and applied for a temporary position in the employee dining room/restaurant. The Employment History shows that the worker began working there in August 2004 following her return to work from personal and non-compensable medical leaves (for approximately one month in March 2003 and subsequently for approximately one year from August 2003 until August 2004). The position in the employee dining room/restaurant was initially a full-time temporary position. The worker testified that she had been seeking full-time hours. She ultimately moved into a permanent part-time position there. She testified that some of the physical demands relating to her work as an attendant were significant, for example, having to lift containers of milk and garbage bags. She stated, however, that she considered her job in the employee dining room/restaurant to be less physically demanding than dealing cards because the work activities were not as constant. 39 She did not return to her job as a card dealer after 2004. 40 The worker was asked by her representative about her symptoms in the period between 2000 and 2004. She testified that she continued to have tightness in her shoulders and the back of her neck as well as difficulty sleeping because of pain, and that she had had treatment during that period. 41 In response to a leading question from her representative, the worker stated that there was no time that she was pain-free after 2000, to the time of her next workplace accident in 2008. She testified that there was no change in her symptoms over this period of eight years. Decision No. 1529/15 B. Doherty V-Chair 231

42 In response to a question from the casino employer’s representative, the worker stated that she did not recall any modifications in her work after 2001.

(c) The July 11, 2008 injury (claim number ending in 450) 43 The worker has reported a number of work-related injuries in the years since 2000. The claims subsequent to 2000 are not in issue in this appeal, but some of the information contained in the claim files is relevant to the worker’s claims in this appeal. 44 The worker sustained a work-related injury involving her right shoulder and neck on July 11, 2008 while lifting a garbage bag. She was seen by a Dr. Ziter who completed a Form 8 dated July 11, 2008 referring to a right trapezius strain. 45 The Board accepted the claim. The worker was off work on July 12, 2008 and then from July 26, 2008 to August 18, 2008. She returned to work on August 19, 2008 to a full-time temporary position in the employee dining room. 46 An MRI of the cervical spine done on September 4, 2008 showed a number of anomalies (including mild disc desiccation, arthropathy, disc- osteophyte complex, narrowing of the neural foramina, and disc bulging).

(d) The August 15, 2010 claim (claim number ending in 080) 47 The worker reported an injury on August 15, 2010, involving her right shoulder and upper back while lifting a garbage bag. She did not lose any time from work. The claim was accepted by the Board. 48 Updates provided to the Tribunal by the Board suggest that the worker’s claims relating to this workplace accident are ongoing. The worker testified that she did not fully recover from the August 15, 2010 injury and worked modified duties in the employee dining room/restaurant from 2010. 49 The updates indicate that the Board obtained copies of the clinical notes and records of family physician Dr. Kuprowski from June 20, 2008 to November 25, 2014. The clinical notes and records were, however, not provided to the Tribunal by the Board. The information in the clinical notes and records is summarized in the December 9, 2014 Action Memo of the Long-Term Case Manager in the August 2010 claim. There are a number of references to the worker being seen by the family physician for depression, for which she was prescribed medication. 232 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

(e) The November 14, 2010 injury claim (claim number ending in 043) 50 The worker made a claim of a further workplace injury on November 14, 2010 involving her neck, upper back and left shoulder while lifting garbage bags. There was no lost time and the claim was accepted by the Board for health care benefits.

(f) Subsequent medical reporting and the worker’s objection to the amalgamation in 2000 51 The worker had an MRI of her complete spine on December 19, 2010. The report of that imaging refers to multilevel degenerative changes in the cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine regions. 52 The worker was referred back to physiatrist Dr. Charron, whom she saw on January 6, 2011. The physiatrist’s report of that date to the family physician indicates that the worker told him that she had been experiencing pain in the area between her neck and shoulders since August “which she reports seemed to begin spontaneously.” She had had some symptoms of neck region pain about five years earlier. She also described “a tearing sensation through the right arm.” He suggested that it would be reasonable for her to see a surgeon regarding the possibility of decompression. 53 In August 2012, the worker’s representative objected to the amalgamation of the 1990 and 2000 claims. Following a review by the case manager, the decision to amalgamate the claims and deny entitlement for a neck injury/condition was upheld. 54 The worker was apparently seen by neurosurgeon Dr. T. Dang in July 2013. According to the December 9, 2014 Action Memo of the Long- Term Case Manager in the August 2010 claim, the neurosurgeon advised her to avoid high-impact activities and prolonged neck positioning, and referred to possible fibromyalgia. The worker was referred back to rheumatologist Dr. Rodrigues. 55 The worker was seen by orthopaedic surgeon Dr. D. Fleming, whose report of April 22, 2014 describes, among other things, the surgeon’s findings on physical examination. Neurological examination was normal. The worker had full range of motion in her shoulders but complained of increased tone in her trapezius. The MRI showed some stenosis in the middle of the cervical spine. There was, however, no indication for surgery. The surgeon stated that the worker had degenerative stenosis, which might worsen with time, but there were no neurological findings Decision No. 1529/15 B. Doherty V-Chair 233

that warranted intervention. Dr. Fleming noted that she had been reviewed repeatedly. 56 According to the December 9, 2014 Action Memo of the Long-Term Case Manager in the August 2010 claim, the June 23, 2014 report of rheumatologist Dr. Rodrigues provides a diagnosis of probable fibromyalgia. A number of other medical conditions, including depression, are described in that report. 57 In August 2014 the worker was moved to another position with the casino employer, working in line control in the dining room/restaurant. 58 She had another MRI of her cervical spine on October 3, 2014, the findings of which are summarized in the December 9, 2014 Action Memo of the Long-Term Case Manager in the August 2010 claim.

(g) The November 19, 2014 claim 59 The worker made another claim of work-related neck injury, occurring on November 19, 2014. She stopped working that day (and has not returned to work). Family physician Dr. Kuprowski provided reports to the Board indicating that the worker was unable to work. 60 The worker attributed her symptoms to having to turn her head to greet customers and direct them to the cashier. In a telephone conversa- tion with a case manager on November 27, 2014, the worker described a specific onset of pain when she turned her head/neck quickly to look be- hind her. 61 On December 8, 2014, the worker told the case manager that her pain involved the entire right side of her body and that she had difficulty walking and was dragging her leg to walk. 62 The Board denied the claim of a new workplace accident in Novem- ber 2014. 63 A January 14, 2015 report from physiatrist Dr. Charron, which appears to be incomplete, describes his previous consultations and the multiple symptoms in multiple areas of the body reported by the worker that day. Dr. Charron noted that the worker was seeing Dr. Rodrigues in connection with fibromyalgia. She had undergone further investigations. The physiatrist noted his examination revealed some non-organic findings. He described the investigations of her neck in the past showing moderate to severe cervical osteoarthritis. The fibromyalgia complicated her pres- entation. Dr. Charron decided to investigate her right leg symptoms. 234 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

64 The worker testified that she is not receiving disability benefits. She received 15 weeks Employment Insurance benefits after she stopped working in November 2014. She applied for Canada Pension Plan disability benefits but her application was denied.

(h) Documentary evidence relating to musculoskeletal disorders and the worker’s work as a Blackjack dealer 65 There are a number of ergonomic reports in evidence, provided by the parties, as well as the Board Ergonomics Resource Guide. 66 One of the reports provided by the casino employer is titled Ergo- nomic Analysis of the Upper Limb and Low Back Demands Associated with Blackjack Dealing and is dated March 17, 2000, revised January 15, 2004. 67 The Executive Summary of this study by Dr. J. Potvin, professor at the University of Windsor with a PhD in kinesiology, et al. states that its purpose was to estimate the forces required of the shoulder, back and forearm muscles during Blackjack dealing. In addition, data regarding the range of postures and the time spent in various posture ranges were collected for the back, shoulder and wrist joints. The measurements were done so that an assessment could be made of the injury risk associated with Blackjack dealing. 68 The data were collected in June 1999 from six blackjack dealers. Simulation of their job activities was done and a number of different kinds of measurements were taken. The conclusion of the study was that: “Blackjack dealing does not pose a risk of repetitive strain injury to the shoulder, low back and wrist/forearms for most individuals.” That conclusion was based on the following information: • The dealers work continuously for 60 minutes, followed by a 20 minute rest break. A 1994 study by Kilbon states that symptoms and signs of musculoskeletal disorders have been observed in physically-demanding repetitive work exceeding one hour. • The EMG results indicated that the muscle forces in the shoulder, back extensors and forearm flexors were substantially lower than the limit set for moderate and unacceptable risk as determined by Jonsson in 1982. • While there were frequent movement of the hands and shoulders observed, these movements were generally found to have small rotations such that the dealers spent most of the time in the neutral Decision No. 1529/15 B. Doherty V-Chair 235

ranges for each joint. Very little time was observed to be spent in the more hazardous extreme ranges of motion. • Most of the reaches were to an area close to the dealer. Thus, the movements of the arm and wrist do not appear to have been super- imposed on static work in the shoulder. In fact, the shoulder muscles spent almost half the time completely resting. 69 Another report provided by the casino employer is a September 1997 Ergonomic Study titled Duties of Blackjack Dealer [at the employer’s casino]. The study was authored by Mr. J. Saindon, who holds a Master of Applied Science degree in Occupational Health and Safety and a cer- tificate in ergonomics. He is described as a consultant in the fields of ergonomics and occupational hygiene and safety. The Summary of the study includes the following information and opinion: • The objective of the study was to identify the negative aspects that could be associated with the work performed by the dealers working at the Blackjack tables. • The purpose of the study was to determine if known risk factors causing musculoskeletal injuries were present within the scope of a Blackjack dealer’s work and whether they presented a risk of musculoskeletal injuries, particularly with respect to the upper extremities. • The work of a Blackjack dealer was observed and certain characteristics were evaluated, to verify if the risk factors generally associated with musculoskeletal injuries were present and, if so, to establish their level of importance. • Their observations and analysis led to the following conclusions: • The work performed by the Blackjack dealer is not repetitive work. • The physical efforts required by the dealer to perform the principal duties are below the recommended acceptable ergonomic limits. • No other work-related risk factor known to cause musculoskeletal injuries is present in the scope of the Blackjack dealer’s work. 70 The worker’s representative provided two reports of Occupational Health Clinics for Ontario Workers Inc. (OHCOW). 236 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

71 The first report is dated December 20, 2012 and is authored by Mr. J. Casey, an OHCOW ergonomist. Mr. Casey holds a Master of Science degree (majoring in occupational ergonomics) and is a Certified Profes- sional Ergonomist. This report relates to another worker, claiming to have developed CTS as a result of his work duties at the casino as a part- time Blackjack and Poker dealer. The redacted report was provided to the Board by the worker’s representative with her January 10, 2013 written submissions for what it had to say about the neck and shoulder injury risks. 72 Mr. Casey refers to a review of over 40 epidemiologic studies by the U.S. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, which concluded that there was evidence for a causal relationship between highly repetitive work and neck and neck/shoulder musculoskeletal disorders, as well as strong evidence that work involving high levels of static contrac- tion, prolonged static loads or extreme working postures involving the neck/shoulder muscles poses an increased risk for neck/shoulder musculoskeletal disorders. 73 The ergonomist describes deviated neck and shoulder postures when dealing. 74 Mr. Casey has a different opinion than Dr. Potvin et al. with respect to the ratio of work/break time, referring to a 1998 study by Colombini quantifying adequate work to rest ratios as 5:1 within each hour of repetitive work. 75 The second OHCOW report is dated June 22, 2015 and is authored by ergonomist Mr. N. Niforos. Mr. Niforos holds a Master’s degree in Human Kinetics and is a Certified Professional Ergonomist. He had been “asked to identify the presence of ergonomic risk factors in [the worker’s] work duties as a [dealer] as they relate to her upper extremity condition.” He does not state what that condition is. 76 The ergonomist met with the worker in mid-May 2015. No on-site ergonomic assessment of the work duties was completed, but detailed information was obtained from the worker and she demonstrated various tasks for the ergonomist. 77 The worker told Mr. Niforos that, as a dealer, she mainly dealt Black- jack and Poker, with 90% of her time dealing Blackjack, standing up at a table, with the remaining time spent dealing Poker. The report states that the worker described and simulated her duties dealing Blackjack. Vary- ing degrees of postural deviation were displayed. Given her rather short stature (52) and functional reach, the worker used a combination of trunk Decision No. 1529/15 B. Doherty V-Chair 237

flexion, axial rotation, shoulder flexion, neck extension and neck twisting in order to perform the necessary dealing tasks. 78 Mr. Niforos stated that, in dealing, the worker would commonly have to reach across the midline of her body, increasing the level of shoulder deviation and strain based upon her neck/shoulder region. In clearing the table of cards, she would use postures the same or similar to those described for dealing, but using her left hand/arm. In accessing the cards or holding the card shoe, located to her left, 30-40° of left shoulder abduction was involved. Some degree of bilateral shoulder abduction appeared to be a constant requirement while dealing. 79 With respect to the neck, the frequency and duration of neck flexion should be considered “high.” The ergonomist referred to the PDA description of neck flexion, including the statement that it was generally prolonged. It appears that the ergonomist was using the 1998 PDA. 80 Mr. Niforos stated that it was important to note that the neck postures were performed in conjunction with the deviated shoulder postures (flexion and abduction), further increasing the strain placed upon the shoulder and neck musculature. He referred to the generally prolonged neck flexion resulting in static working postures. In addition, as dynamic hand movement occurred, the rotator cuff muscles of the shoulder were acti- vated to not only move the shoulders but also to stabilize the shoulder joints. The ergonomist referred to the dealer being unable to rest his or her arms on the surface of the table. 81 In conclusion, the ergonomist expressed his opinion that it was clear that the worker’s duties as a dealer contained a number of ergonomic risk factors. Specifically, her upper extremities, both left and right, were subject to varying degrees of shoulder flexion, shoulder abduction and static working postures. Significant horizontal reaching beyond a full arm’s length was required, as well as deviated working postures of the neck, specifically, flexion coupled with twisting. The ergonomist stated that exposure to such workplace hazards contributes to the development of a musculoskeletal disorder, particularly of the upper extremities.

(i) Testimony of R.A., the casino employer’s shift manager 82 R.A. has been with the casino employer since it opened in 1994. She has been a shift manager since 1994. The shift manager’s job involves overseeing the general running of the floor. The hierarchy is that the card dealer’s supervisor reports to a pit manager who reports to the shift manager. 238 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

83 R.A. is familiar with the work of a Blackjack and Poker dealer. She worked as a dealer for a number of years until 1994 when she became a manager. She trains dealers. 84 A March 2007 updated Physical Demands Description (PDD) for the Blackjack dealer position had been provided to the Board by the casino employer’s representative. It was prepared by an ergonomics firm. There are differences between the 2007 PDD and the 1998 PDA provided to the Board by the casino employer when the claim was made in 2000. 85 R.A. testified that she did not know the background of the individual who prepared the 1998 PDA. He is described as the casino employer’s Employee Health Services Manager. R.A. expressed the opinion that the updated PDD more accurately describes the physical demands of the job of a Blackjack dealer between 1998 and 2000 than the 1998 PDA. She referred to what she considered to be some errors in the 1998 PDA, including the statement that neck flexion is generally prolonged. 86 R.A. described what a Blackjack dealer does. She stated that the dealer rests his or her left hand on the card shoe and right hand on the table while waiting for the player to decide what to do. She stated that it does not take a lot of force to pull a card out of the card shoe. 87 R.A. took issue with some of the statements made by OHCOW ergonomist Mr. Niforos in his report of June 22, 2015. With respect to his comment regarding the worker’s short stature and functional reach, R.A. stated that there was a step available for the dealer to stand on. This step would increase the reach of a dealer of short stature. R.A. disagreed with the suggestion that a dealer would need to hold the card shoe, with the shoulder joint in 30 to 40° of abduction. The shift manager disagreed with the statement that dealers are unable to rest their arms on the surface of the table. In discussing Mr. Niforos’ comments that dealers are trained and instructed to keep their eyes on the table at all times, a position involving neck flexion, R.A. stated that the direction to dealers to keep their eyes on the table means that the dealer is not to turn away from the table.

(j) Tribunal Medical Discussion Paper on the cervical spine 88 The Tribunal’s Medical Discussion Paper on the cervical spine, Neck and Arm Pain and Related Symptoms: Cervical Disc Disease was one of the Medical Discussion Papers included in the Case Record materials by Decision No. 1529/15 B. Doherty V-Chair 239

Tribunal staff for the hearing.2 The Paper was originally prepared in 2002 by Dr. J.F.R. Fleming, Professor Emeritus, Division of Neurosur- gery, University of Toronto, and affiliated with the University Health Network. It was revised in 2012 by Dr. J. Finkelstein, Associate Profes- sor in the Department of Surgery at the University of Toronto and an orthopaedic surgeon with Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre. 89 The Medical Discussion Paper discusses degenerative or aging changes in the spine: Progressive degenerative changes (aging changes) occur in the cervical spine of all adults. The nucleus portion of the discs gradually dries out and becomes thinner, allowing the adjacent vertebrae to become closer together. As a result, the annulus portion of the discs tends to “bulge”. Because the vertebral bodies come to lie closer together, there is increased wear and tear on the joints of the vertebral column, especially the unco-vertebral joints, the facet joints and disc margins, resulting in the gradual formation of bony overgrowths (“spurs”, “osteophytes”, “osteoarthritis”, “bone hypertrophy” - all synonyms in this context) at the disc margins, at the unco-vertebral joints and at the facet joints. This process is the normal aging process, and it begins in middle life. It is sometimes called “spondylosis”, and is present to a greater or lesser degree in all adults. The vast majority of individuals have these aging changes, even though the changes are quite advanced, are free of pain or any other symptoms. Various aging or degenerative changes such as bulging, degenerated or protruding discs, bony spurs or overgrowths,

2The Tribunal’s medical discussion papers deal with medical topics which frequently arise in appeals. They are intended to provide a broad and general overview of a medical topic that is frequently considered in Tribunal appeals. Each medical discussion paper is written by a recognized expert in the field, who has been recommended by the Tribunal’s medical counsellors. Each author is asked to present a balanced view of the current medical knowledge on the topic. Dis- cussion papers are not peer reviewed. They are written to be understood by lay individuals. Discussion papers do not necessarily represent the views of the Tri- bunal. A vice-chair or panel may consider and rely on the medical information provided in the discussion paper, but the Tribunal is not bound by an opinion expressed in a discussion paper in any particular case. Tribunal adjudicators recognize that it is always open to the parties to an appeal to rely on or to distinguish a medical discussion paper, and to challenge it with alternative evidence: see Kamara v. Ontario (Workplace Safety & Insurance Appeals Tribunal), [2009] O.J. No. 2080 (Ont. Div. Ct.). 240 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

and facet joint hypertrophy are seen in X-rays, CT scans or MR scans of the cervical spine in over half the adult population. (Okada et al. 2009)

(iii) Law and policy 90 The 1990 work-related accident is governed by the “pre-1997” Work- ers’ Compensation Act (the pre-1997 Act), as amended. The Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, as amended (the WSIA) would applied to a work-related accident in 2000. 91 Section 4(1) of the pre-1997 Act and section 13(1) of the WSIA provide that a worker who sustains an injury in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment is entitled to benefits. The definition of “accident” and the determination of a worker’s initial entitlement to benefits are the same under both Acts and Board policy. “Accident” is defined to include disablement arising out of and in the course of employment. 92 Under section 126(1) of the WSIA, the Tribunal is directed to apply Board policies in its decision-making. The policies are contained in the Board’s Operational Policy Manual (OPM). 93 OPM Document No. 11-01-01, Adjudicative Process (3 November 2008), sets out what is required for a worker to establish an initial entitlement to benefits. The policy states that all decision-makers use the same criteria for ruling on initial entitlement to benefits, namely, the “five point check system,” stating in part: An allowable claim must have the following five points ... • personal work-related injury • proof of accident, and • compatibility of diagnosis to accident or disablement history. 94 In determining whether a condition was caused by work duties, Tri- bunal case law holds that the worker does not need to show that the work duties were the sole cause of, or even the predominant contributor to, the condition; to establish entitlement, the work duties need only to have made a significant contribution to the condition. 95 “Impairment” is defined in both Acts to mean a physical or functional abnormality or loss resulting from an injury, and any psychological damage arising from the abnormality or loss. The term “permanent impair- Decision No. 1529/15 B. Doherty V-Chair 241

ment” is defined to mean impairment that continues to exist after the worker reaches maximum medical recovery (MMR). 96 The standard of proof in workers’ compensation proceedings is the balance of probabilities. Pursuant to subsection 124(2) of the WSIA, the benefit of the doubt is resolved in favour of the claimant where it is im- practicable to decide an issue because the evidence for and against the issue is approximately equal in weight.

(iv) Discussion, analysis and conclusions (a) Introduction 97 In this appeal, the worker claims to have sustained injuries to her shoulders and her neck in March 2000 as a result of her work duties as a Blackjack dealer, and permanent impairments as a result of those injuries. She contends that she sustained a new workplace accident in March 2000, involving injuries different from those sustained in her 1990 workplace accident. The casino employer contends that the symptoms that she reported in 2000 were correctly considered by the Board as a recurrence of her 1990 injury. 98 In considering the worker’s claims, I note that in the 25 years since her 1990 work-related injury, the worker has at times reported symptoms and disability involving a number of areas, including her shoulders and her neck. She has made a number of work-related gradual onset or specific incident injury claims over the years. 99 The medical reporting on file describes the worker’s many complaints of pain (and some other symptoms) over time. Her complaints of pain are frequently amorphous and include her chest, mandible and other areas in addition to her upper extremities and neck. The areas of reported symptoms have changed and expanded over time. As noted above, Dr. Kuprowski referred only to left arm symptoms in his March 30, 2000 Form 8. By the time the worker completed her Form 6 on April 23, 2000 (after not having worked for approximately three weeks), her reported areas of the injury had expanded to include the right upper extremity and neck. More recent reporting by the worker refers to the entire right side of her body. 100 I also observe that the history provided by the worker is frequently inconsistent. For example, when she saw Dr. Charron in January 2011, she described the pain between her neck and shoulders as having a spon- taneous onset in August of 2010. In her December 22, 2014 report of 242 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

recurrence in the 2010 claim, the worker told the Board that she felt that her problems involving her neck and upper extremities were the result of her “original” work injury, which in this context is the 2010 injury. That reporting by the worker is not consistent with the position that she takes in this appeal, that she sustained injuries to her neck and upper extremities in 2000 with permanent impairments. 101 The reliability of the worker’s testimony was called into question in her description of her post-1990 condition. She initially testified that following her surgeries in the early 1990s, she had no further problems from her 1990 work-related injuries. She referred to a 100% recovery after her surgeries, describing it as “amazing.” 102 That testimony appeared to be not consistent with the Board’s accept- ance of permanent impairments in those areas, with a 23% NEL rating. The testimony is clearly not consistent with the information provided in the report of the NEL assessment in 1994 (as well as other medical reporting and the worker’s own reporting to the Board). The information recorded in the 1994 NEL assessment records is that the worker reported continuing problems without great improvement despite surgery. She was described as very limited in function. The Activities of Daily Living Analysis Form completed in connection with the NEL assessment describes a number of functional problems. The July 6, 1994 report of Dr. Danial states that the worker’s symptoms had persisted and were worsen- ing. When this information was brought to the worker’s attention by the employer’s representative in cross-questioning, the worker stated that she did not remember that. When she was asked about the information in the NEL Activities of Daily Living Analysis Form, the worker stated that she then remembered having the difficulties described. She then acknowledged that she had a lot of continuing symptoms from her 1990 work- related injuries (which she testified she did not think would affect her ability to deal cards). 103 That the worker initially testified that she did not have further problems after her surgeries in 1990 - when the contemporaneous evidence indicates that she reported significant ongoing problems - raises serious concerns about the reliability of her testimony generally. 104 For the worker to establish an initial entitlement to benefits for a workplace accident on March 30, 2000, one of the criteria she must sat- isfy under OPM Document No. 11-01-01, Adjudicative Process, is that she sustained a work-related injury. In considering the evidence with respect to whether the worker sustained a work-related injury in March Decision No. 1529/15 B. Doherty V-Chair 243

2000, I will first address the evidence relating to injury and impairment. If I find that it is probable that the worker did sustain an injury, I will then consider whether the evidence establishes that it was likely due to her work activities as a card dealer.

(b) Analysis of the evidence relating to the March 2000 claim of injury 105 The worker has had many investigations and has seen a number of specialists since the claimed workplace accident in March 2000. How- ever, there is in the medical reporting very little evidence of clinical findings or impairment relating to the worker’s shoulders or neck to support her contention that she sustained injuries to those areas in March 2000 and that those injuries resulted in permanent impairments. 106 Dr. Charron, a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation, provided a detailed report of his assessment of the worker on July 11, 2000, a few months after the workplace accident claimed, concluding that: “Despite subjective symptoms there is little evidence of impairment.” 107 In his follow-up report on August 29, 2000, after further investigations had been carried out, the physiatrist confirmed that he was unable to identify any significant organic pathology that would explain the worker’s bilateral arm symptoms. He noted that her affect was quite flat, and stated that he suspected that psychosocial factors, including possibly depression, were contributing to her symptoms. Dr. Charron told the worker’s family physician in this report that he tried to explore that with her, but she was not very receptive. He had encouraged the worker to at least consider the possibility of depression further. 108 As noted above, it appears that the clinical notes that the Board obtained from the worker’s family physician in considering her 2010 claim refer to the worker being seen for depression (recognizing that those clinical notes begin in 2008, a number of years after Dr. Charron’s comments regarding depression). 109 I find the reports from Dr. Charron in 2000 persuasive. The specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation examined the worker, reviewed the results of the various investigations, and concluded that the symptoms she reported probably did not have a basis in a physical condition. 110 Rheumatologist Dr. Rodrigues expressed the opinion in his report of October 17, 2000 that he felt that the worker’s upper extremity and neck pain was likely work-related. I do not give a great deal of weight to this opinion. First, the context of the opinion was that the worker had been referred to the rheumatologist after reporting red and hot hands and her 244 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

bloodwork having shown a positive rheumatoid factor; the rheumatologist was ruling out an inflammatory arthritis as a possible diagnosis for the symptoms reported. (In his submissions, the casino employer’s representative referred to work-relatedness as the “default” diagnosis.) Sec- ond, there is no discussion by Dr. Rodrigues of the worker’s work duties. The rheumatologist’s attribution of the worker’s symptoms to her work duties is presumably based on what she reported to him, rather than a consideration of what was involved in the worker’s work activities and how those activities might pose a risk for the development of a musculoskeletal disorder. 111 The backdrop to the worker’s complaints of pain, since at least 1994, includes consideration of fibromyalgia, a chronic pain disorder considered for workers’ compensation purposes as involving chronic diffuse pain of unknown etiology which cannot be explained by a physical cause. 112 There is also evidence of depression, suggested by Dr. Charron in 2000, noting that the worker was not receptive to his suggestion that her complaints of pain might have a psychological basis. In her testimony at the hearing, the worker continued to deny that depression may be involved, stating that she was not happy because of the symptoms she was experiencing, rather than the other way around. And, despite the apparent references in the clinical notes of her family physician to depression and medication for depression, the worker testified that she did not think that Dr. Kuprowski had told her that he felt that she was suffering from depression. 113 The backdrop to the worker’s complaints of pain also includes an individual who appears to be very sensitive to perceived work-related injury, as evidenced by her report of a July 8, 2000 injury to the Board (the subject of Board claim number ending in 521). In that claim, the worker reported an injury claimed to have been caused by cold air from the air conditioner vent blowing down on top of her neck, said to have resulted in discomfort, swelling, and difficulty turning her neck. (This claim was denied by the Board.) 114 The specific areas the worker claims injury to in 2000 are the shoulders and neck. Although the thoracic spine and the “upper extremities” were described as areas of claimed injury, the claim relating to the thoracic spine was not pursued at the hearing and the only part of the upper extremities pursued was the shoulders. I will address the specific evidence relating to the shoulders and the neck. Decision No. 1529/15 B. Doherty V-Chair 245

Shoulder injury 115 Although the worker has reported shoulder pain that she attributes to her work activities as a Blackjack dealer in 2000, there is simply no evidence of any shoulder condition, pathology or impairment. There is no reliable evidence upon which I could find that the worker sustained an injury to either shoulder in March 2000. 116 There is no persuasive evidence of injury and there is no evidence of ongoing shoulder impairment. I note that Dr. Charron’s January 6, 2011 report states that the worker had full range of motion of the shoulders (though she described neck pain with shoulder movement). In 2014 orthopaedic surgeon Dr. Fleming also described full range of motion in the worker’s shoulders. 117 In her final submissions, the worker’s representative provided copies of three Tribunal decisions involving claims by casino card dealers for work-related shoulder injuries. Decision No. 2051/11 [2011 ONWSIAT 2620 (Ont. W.S.I.A.T.)], Decision No. 192/12 [2013 ONWSIAT 678 (Ont. W.S.I.A.T.)] and Decision No. 575/13 [2013 ONWSIAT 681 (Ont. W.S.I.A.T.)] either found that the workers in those cases had an entitlement to benefits for a work-related disablement injury or were premised on that finding. I have reviewed those decisions, which, in my view, are distinguishable for a number of reasons, including the fact that the workers in those cases had an identified shoulder disorder (such as tendinitis, frozen shoulder or rotator cuff tear). As discussed above, the evidence in this case consists of complaints of pain in, among other places, the shoulders, with no diagnosis and no findings. 118 The worker’s representative also referred to Tribunal decisions (including Decision No. 181/07 [2007 ONWSIAT 199 (Ont. W.S.I.A.T.)]) which went the other way, for which I would like to express my grati- tude; it is rare in my experience that a party’s representative will refer to Tribunal decisions that are not supportive of the client’s position.

Neck injury 119 The worker testified that her neck pain has persisted since March 2000. She stated that she has never been told what the problem in her neck is. 120 Notwithstanding the worker’s complaints of neck pain, there is little evidence of impairment or clinical findings. Dr. Charron’s January 6, 2011 report describes range of motion measurements in the worker’s cervical spine; there is no reference to any limitation. 246 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

121 The only physical abnormalities described in the medical reporting are found in the reports of imaging of the spine. There were anomalies reported on imaging of the cervical spine in 2008 as well as on subsequent imaging. The December 19, 2010 MRI of the worker’s cervical spine was described by Dr. Charron in his report of January 6, 2011 as showing some facet joint changes throughout that part of the spine, as well as other anomalies at certain levels, including arthrosis, a disc-osteophyte complex, disc protrusion with foraminal narrowing, and other degenerative disc changes. 122 It appears that the worker believes that her neck pain is related to the anomalies described in the imaging reports, and that at least some of those anomalies, including osteophytes (bony outgrowths), are due to injury, in this case, from her work activities. However, the Tribunal’s Med- ical Discussion Paper, Neck and Arm Pain and Related Symptoms: Cer- vical Disc Disease, excerpted above, states that osteophytes are part of the normal aging process and are present to some degree in all adults. The fact that the reports of imaging describe osteophytes is accordingly not evidence of injury. 123 In my view, there is insufficient evidence to come to a conclusion with respect to whether some of the anomalies seen on imaging of the cervical spine likely account for some of the worker’s reported neck and/or arm symptoms. Regardless, the anomalies described are degenerative, age-related changes.

(c) Conclusion with respect to whether the worker sustained a neck and/or shoulder injury in March 2000 124 The Board accepted that the worker experienced a recurrence of her 1990 injury and disability in March 2000, and paid her wage loss benefits for a period of time in connection with the recurrence. The worker claims that she sustained a new accident in 2000. In my view, however, the evidence does not establish that she sustained injuries to either her shoulders or her neck in 2000. 125 Given that conclusion, there is no need to determine whether her work activities as a Blackjack dealer posed a risk for the development of a musculoskeletal disorder involving the shoulders or the neck. It also follows that there is no permanent impairment or entitlement for additional wage loss benefits. Decision No. 1529/15 B. Doherty V-Chair 247

Disposition 126 The appeal is denied. Appeal dismissed. 248 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

[Indexed as: Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG] Khalid Eidoo and Cygnus Electronics Corporation, Plaintiffs and Infineon Technologies AG, Infineon Technologies Corporation, Infineon Technologies North America Corporation, Hynix Semiconductor Inc., Hynix Semiconductor America Inc., Hynix Semiconductor Manufacturing America, Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Semiconductor, Inc., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Samsung Electronics Canada Inc., Micron Technology, Inc. Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc. o/a Crucial Technologies, Mosel Vitelic Corp., Mosel Vitelic Inc. and Elpida Memory, Inc., Defendants Khalid Eidoo and Cygnus Electronics Corporation, Plaintiffs and Hitachi Ltd., Hitachi America, Hitachi Electronic Devices (USA), Hitachi Canada Ltd., Mitsubishi Electronic Corporation, Mitsubishi Electric Sales Canada Inc., Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics USA, Inc., Nanya Technology Corporation, Nanya Technology Corporation USA, NEC Corporation, NEC Corporation of America, NEC Canada, Renesas Electronics Corporation fka NEC Electronics Corporation, Renesas Electronics America, Inc. fka NEC Electronics America, Inc., Renesas Electronics Canada Ltd., Toshiba Corporation, Toshiba America Electronics Components Inc., Toshiba of Canada Limited, Winbond Electronics Corporation and Winbond Electronics Corporation America, Defendants Ontario Superior Court of Justice Docket: 05-CV-4340, 10-CV-15178CP 2015 ONSC 5493 Perell J. Heard: August 14, 2015 Judgment: September 2, 2015 Civil practice and procedure –––– Parties — Representative or class proceedings under class proceedings legislation — Orders, awards and related procedures — Aggregate awards –––– Settlement was reached in Ontario, Brit- ish Columbia and Quebec class proceedings alleging defendants conspired to fix prices of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) devices — Defendants agreed to pay $80 million to class members — Settlement and distribution pro- Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG 249 tocol were approved by courts in Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec — Dis- tribution protocol required certain claims of family members to be pooled — Plaintiffs in Ontario action alleged distribution protocol contravened Ontario Human Rights Code by providing adverse, differential treatment toward class members based on family status — Motion for directions was brought — Code does not apply to distribution schemes of judgments or settlements under Class Proceedings Act, 1992 — Distribution of funds from court judgment assessing damages or distribution of proceeds of settlement of damages claim is not services, goods, or facilities within ambit of Code — Even if Code applied, distribution protocol did not contravene it — Pooling of family member claims was reasonable way to curb windfall compensation. Human rights –––– Applicability of human rights legislation — Provincial legislation –––– Settlement was reached in Ontario, British Columbia and Que- bec class proceedings alleging defendants conspired to fix prices of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) devices — Defendants agreed to pay $80 million to class members — Settlement and distribution protocol were approved by courts in Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec — Distribution protocol required certain claims of family members to be pooled — Plaintiffs in Ontario action alleged distribution protocol contravened Ontario Human Rights Code by providing adverse, differential treatment toward class members based on family status — Motion for directions was brought — Code does not apply to distribution schemes of judgments or settlements under Class Proceedings Act, 1992 — Code does not apply to court orders — Distribution of funds from court judgment assessing damages or distribution of proceeds of settlement of damages claim is not services, goods, or facilities within ambit of Code — Even if Code applied, no disadvantage connected to any prohibited ground was proven — Pooling of family member claims was reasonable way to curb windfall compensation. Cases considered by Perell J.: Andrews v. Law Society (British Columbia) (1989), [1989] 2 W.W.R. 289, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 91 N.R. 255, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273, 25 C.C.E.L. 255, 36 C.R.R. 193, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 10 C.H.R.R. D/5719, 1989 CarswellBC 16, 1989 CarswellBC 701, EYB 1989-66977, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6 (S.C.C.) — referred to Armstrong v. British Columbia (Ministry of Health) (2010), 2010 BCCA 56, 2010 CarswellBC 275, 2 B.C.L.R. (5th) 290, [2010] 5 W.W.R. 210, 283 B.C.A.C. 167, 480 W.A.C. 167, 204 C.R.R. (2d) 209, (sub nom. R. v. Arm- strong) 211 C.R.R. (2d) 374 (note), 67 C.H.R.R. D/332, [2010] B.C.J. No. 216 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to Armstrong v. British Columbia (Ministry of Health) (2010), 2010 CarswellBC 1851, 2010 CarswellBC 1852, [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 128, 410 N.R. 383 250 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

(note), 298 B.C.A.C. 319 (note), 505 W.A.C. 319 (note), [2010] 2 S.C.R. v (S.C.C.) — referred to Baird v. Ontario (Workplace Safety & Insurance Appeals Tribunal) (2009), 2009 HRTO 99 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to Braithwaite v. Ontario (Attorney General) (2005), 2005 HRTO 31, 2005 Cars- wellOnt 10350 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — considered Braithwaite v. Ontario (Attorney General) (2007), 2007 CarswellOnt 8249, (sub nom. Ontario (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission)) 88 O.R. (3d) 455, (sub nom. Braithwaite v. Ontario (Attorney General)) 288 D.L.R. (4th) 138, (sub nom. Ontario (Attorney General) v. Human Rights Commission (Ont.)) 232 O.A.C. 102, (sub nom. Ontario (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission)) 165 C.R.R. (2d) 228, [2007] O.J. No. 4978, (sub nom. Ontario (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Human Rights Comm.)) 62 C.H.R.R. D/315 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.E.U. (1999), 1999 CarswellBC 1907, 1999 CarswellBC 1908, [1999] S.C.J. No. 46, (sub nom. British Columbia Government & Service Employees’ Union v. Public Service Employee Relations Commission) 99 C.L.L.C. 230-028, [1999] 10 W.W.R. 1, (sub nom. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U.) 176 D.L.R. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Public Service Employee Relations Commission (B.C.) v. British Columbia Government & Service Employees’ Union) 244 N.R. 145, 66 B.C.L.R. (3d) 253, (sub nom. Public Service Employee Relations Commission (B.C.) v. British Columbia Government & Service Employees’ Union) 127 B.C.A.C. 161, (sub nom. Public Service Employee Relations Commission (B.C.) v. British Columbia Government & Service Employees’ Union) 207 W.A.C. 161, 46 C.C.E.L. (2d) 206, 35 C.H.R.R. D/257, (sub nom. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U.) 68 C.R.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU) [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3, 7 B.H.R.C. 437 (S.C.C.) — considered Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission) (1990), 33 C.C.E.L. 1, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489, 113 N.R. 161, 12 C.H.R.R. D/417, [1990] 6 W.W.R. 193, 90 C.L.L.C. 17,025, 76 Alta. L.R. (2d) 97, 72 D.L.R. (4th) 417, 111 A.R. 241, 1990 CarswellAlta 149, 1990 CarswellAlta 656, EYB 1990-66937, [1990] S.C.J. No. 80 (S.C.C.) — referred to Christianson v. Ontario (Information & Privacy Commissioner) (2009), 2009 HRTO 203 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to Christianson v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (2009), 2009 HRTO 424, [2009] O.H.R.T.D. No. 427 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG 251

Corcoran v. Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation of the Diocese of Peterbor- ough (2009), 2009 HRTO 1600, [2009] O.H.R.T.D. No. 1546 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to Dallaire v. Les Chevaliers de Colomb (2011), 2011 HRTO 639 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG (2014), 2014 ONSC 6082, 2014 Carswell- Ont 14546 (Ont. S.C.J.) — followed Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG (2015), 2015 ONSC 2675, 2015 Carswell- Ont 5765 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG (2015), 2015 ONSC 3282, 2015 Carswell- Ont 7611 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG (2015), 2015 ONSC 3668, 2015 Carswell- Ont 8628 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Fair Parenting Inc. v. Durham Student Transportation Services (2014), 2014 HRTO 1744, [2014] O.H.R.T.D. No. 1769 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to Gibson v. Ontario (Attorney General) (2009), 2009 HRTO 870, [2009] O.H.R.T.D. No. 801 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — considered Knibbs v. Brant Artillery Gunners Club Inc. (2011), 2011 HRTO 1032, 2011 CarswellOnt 10734, 72 C.H.R.R. D/231 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to McCormick v. Fasken Martineau Dumoulin LLP (2014), 2014 SCC 39, 2014 CSC 39, 2014 CarswellBC 1358, 2014 CarswellBC 1359, 371 D.L.R. (4th) 246, [2014] 7 W.W.R. 209, 67 Admin. L.R. (5th) 177, 57 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2014 C.L.L.C. 230-024, 15 C.C.E.L. (4th) 1, 22 B.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. Fasken Martineau Dumoulin LLP v. Human Rights Tribunal (B.C.)) 458 N.R. 38, [2014] S.C.J. No. 39, [2014] A.C.S. No. 39, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 108, 79 C.H.R.R. D/178 (S.C.C.) — referred to Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education) (2012), 2012 SCC 61, 2012 CarswellBC 3446, 2012 CarswellBC 3447, 351 D.L.R. (4th) 451, [2012] 12 W.W.R. 637, 38 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 436 N.R. 152, (sub nom. British Columbia (Ministry of Education) v. Moore) 328 B.C.A.C. 1, (sub nom. British Columbia (Ministry of Education) v. Moore) 558 W.A.C. 1, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360, 75 C.H.R.R. D/369, [2012] A.C.S. No. 61, [2012] S.C.J. No. 61 (S.C.C.) — considered Nevo v. York University (2013), 2013 HRTO 1146 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to O’Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd. (1985), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 64 N.R. 161, 12 O.A.C. 241, 17 Admin. L.R. 89, (sub nom. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd.) 9 C.C.E.L. 185, 86 C.L.L.C. 17,002, 7 C.H.R.R. D/3102, [1986] D.L.Q. 89 (note), 52 O.R. (2d) 799 (note), 1985 CarswellOnt 887, 1985 CarswellOnt 946, (sub nom. 252 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd.) [1985] S.C.J. No. 74 (S.C.C.) — referred to Ontario (Director of Disability Support Program) v. Tranchemontagne (2010), 2010 ONCA 593, 2010 CarswellOnt 6821, 102 O.R. (3d) 97, 324 D.L.R. (4th) 87, 12 Admin. L.R. (5th) 179, (sub nom. Tranchemontagne v. Disability Support Program (Ont.)) 269 O.A.C. 137, [2010] O.J. No. 3812, (sub nom. Ontario (Disability Support Program) v. Tranchemontagne) 71 C.H.R.R. D/1, (sub nom. Ontario (Disability Support Program) v. Tranchemontagne) 222 C.R.R. (2d) 144, 12 Admin. L.R. (2d) 179 (Ont. C.A.) — followed Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Etobicoke (Borough) (1982), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202, 40 N.R. 159, 82 C.L.L.C. 17,005, 132 D.L.R. (3d) 14, 3 C.H.R.R. D/781, 1982 CarswellOnt 730, 1982 CarswellOnt 730F, [1982] S.C.J. No. 2 (S.C.C.) — referred to Option Consommateurs c. Infineon Technologie, a.g. (2014), EYB 2014- 243467, 2014 QCCS 4949, 2014 CarswellQue 10551 (C.S. Que.) — considered Option Consommateurs c. Infineon Technologies AG (2013), EYB 2013- 231130, 2013 QCCS 6395, 2013 CarswellQue 13282 (C.S. Que.) — considered Option consommateurs c. Infineon Technologies AG (2013), 2013 SCC 59, 2013 CarswellQue 10520, 2013 CarswellQue 10521, 364 D.L.R. (4th) 668, 45 C.P.C. (7th) 99, (sub nom. Infineon Technologies AG v. Option consommateurs) 450 N.R. 355, (sub nom. Infineon Technologies AG v. Option Con- sommateurs) [2013] 3 S.C.R. 600, [2013] S.C.J. No. 59, 20 B.L.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C.) — considered Paterno v. Salvation Army, Centre of Hope (2011), 2011 HRTO 2298, [2011] O.H.R.T.D. No. 2277 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — followed Phipps v. Toronto Police Services Board (2012), 2012 ONCA 155, 2012 Cars- wellOnt 3992, 35 Admin. L.R. (5th) 167, (sub nom. Shaw v. Phipps) 289 O.A.C. 163, (sub nom. Shaw v. Phipps) 347 D.L.R. (4th) 616, [2012] O.J. No. 2601, (sub nom. Shaw v. Phipps) 75 C.H.R.R. D/246 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Pieters v. Peel Law Assn. (2013), 2013 ONCA 396, 2013 CarswellOnt 7881, 116 O.R. (3d) 81, (sub nom. Peel Law Association v. Pieters) 306 O.A.C. 314, 9 C.C.E.L. (4th) 233, 363 D.L.R. (4th) 598, (sub nom. Peel Law Assn. v. Pieters) 77 C.H.R.R. D/177, [2013] O.J. No. 2695 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Infineon Technologies AG (2014), 2014 BCSC 1936, 2014 CarswellBC 3030 (B.C. S.C.) — considered Qu´ebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) c. Bombardier Inc. (2015), 2015 SCC 39, 2015 CSC 39, 2015 CarswellQue Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG 253

6297, 2015 CarswellQue 6298, 87 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, 387 D.L.R. (4th) 195 (S.C.C.) — referred to R. v. Kapp (2008), 2008 SCC 41, 2008 CarswellBC 1312, 2008 CarswellBC 1313, 79 B.C.L.R. (4th) 201, [2008] 8 W.W.R. 1, 37 C.E.L.R. (3d) 1, 232 C.C.C. (3d) 349, 294 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 376 N.R. 1, [2008] 3 C.N.L.R. 346, 58 C.R. (6th) 1, 256 B.C.A.C. 75, 431 W.A.C. 75, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 175 C.R.R. (2d) 185 (S.C.C.) — referred to Rai v. Ontario (Minister of Environment) (2012), 2012 HRTO 1744, [2012] O.H.R.T.D. No. 1774 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — considered Renaud v. Central Okanagan School District No. 23 (1992), [1992] 6 W.W.R. 193, (sub nom. Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud) 95 D.L.R. (4th) 577, (sub nom. Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud) [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970, (sub nom. Renaud v. Board of Education of Central Okanagan No. 23) 13 B.C.A.C. 245, (sub nom. Renaud v. Board of Education of Central Okanagan No. 23) 24 W.A.C. 245, (sub nom. Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud) 92 C.L.L.C. 17,032, 141 N.R. 185, 71 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145, 1992 CarswellBC 257, 16 C.H.R.R. D/425, 1992 CarswellBC 910, [1992] S.C.J. No. 75, EYB 1992-67039 (S.C.C.) — referred to Rock v. Toronto Community Housing Corp. (2013), 2013 HRTO 78, [2013] O.H.R.T.D. No. 62 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — followed Ruffolo v. York University (2009), 2009 HRTO 1086, [2009] O.H.R.T.D. No. 1061 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal c. Sexton (2007), 2007 SCC 4, 2007 CarswellQue 110, 2007 CarswellQue 111, (sub nom. McGill University Health Centre v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal) 2007 C.L.L.C. 230-006, (sub nom. McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal)) 356 N.R. 177, (sub nom. Syndicat des Employés de l’Hôpital Général de Montréal v. Centre Universitaire de Santé McGill) 277 D.L.R. (4th) 577, (sub nom. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal v. Centre Universitaire de Santé McGill) 159 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. CUSM c. Syndicat des Employés de L’HGM) [2007] 1 S.C.R. 161, [2007] S.C.J. No. 4, (sub nom. McGill Univesity Health Centre v. Syndicat des employés de L’Hôpital général de Montréal) 59 C.H.R.R. D/259 (S.C.C.) — followed VIA Rail Canada Inc. v. Canadian Transportation Agency (2007), 2007 SCC 15, 2007 CarswellNat 608, 2007 CarswellNat 609, 360 N.R. 1, 279 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [2007] S.C.J. No. 15, 59 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc.) [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650, (sub nom. Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. Via Rail Canada Inc.) 59 C.H.R.R. D/276 (S.C.C.) — referred to 254 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

Wing v. Niagara Falls Hydro Holding Corp. (2014), 2014 HRTO 1472, 2015 C.L.L.C. 230-005 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to Zaki v. Ontario (Ministry of Community & Social Services) (2009), 2009 HRTO 1595, 71 C.H.R.R. D/122 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) — considered Statutes considered: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 Generally — referred to s. 1 — considered s. 15 — considered Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6 Generally — referred to s. 24 — referred to s. 25 — referred to s. 26 — considered s. 26(1) — considered Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34 Pt. IV — referred to Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 Generally — referred to Preamble — referred to s. 1 — considered s. 3 — considered s. 9 — considered s. 10(1) “equal” — considered s. 10(1) “family status” — considered s. 10(1) “marital status” — considered s. 10(1) “services” — considered s. 10(1) “spouse” — considered s. 11 — considered s. 12 — considered s. 13 — considered s. 45.1 [en. 2006, c. 30, s. 5] — considered s. 46.1 [en. 2006, c. 30, s. 8] — considered s. 47 — considered s. 47(2) — considered Words and phrases considered: disadvantage A disadvantage is a distinction in treatment that: (a) imposes obligations, penalties, restrictions, or denials of benefits on persons with an attribute identified by the Code that are not imposed on others; and also (b) perpetuates prejudice or stereotyping. Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG 255 distribution scheme [D]istribution schemes are an intrinsic element of class actions and will arise in one of two ways. Where the defendant is found liable, distribution schemes will arise after there is a trial assessing the class member’s damages. Where the defendant agrees to a settlement and to pay compensation to the class, then a distribution scheme will arise as an aspect of the settlement . . . [D]istribution schemes are of infinite variety . . . [T]he Class Proceedings Act, 1992 envisions that distribution schemes . . . may differentiate between class members, who do not all have to receive the same allocation of the settlement proceeds. formal inequality Formal inequality is unequal treatment for those in similar situations and equal treatment for those in dissimilar situations. In contrast, substantive inequality recognizes that not all differences in treatment are violations of equality rights and that differences in treatment are sometimes necessary to achieve true equality. judgment proceeds Judgment proceeds or settlement proceeds are compensation for a civil wrong services, goods and facilities [T]he distribution of the funds from a court judgment assessing damages or the distribution of the proceeds of the settlement of a damages claim is not services, goods, or facilities within the ambit of the Human Rights Code. Although judges are an arm of government serving the public and although the administration of justice is a public service, judgments and orders, including the approval of a distribution scheme under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, are not “services, goods and facilities.” unlawful discrimination Unlawful discrimination may be defined as substantively differential treatment of a person or persons that creates a disadvantage and that is based on a personal attribute identified by the [Human Rights] Code.

MOTION for directions on whether distribution protocol in class proceeding settlement contravened Human Rights Code.

Odette Soriano, Robert A. Centa, Caroline Jones for Plaintiffs Eric Letts for Raja Khoury, Class Member 256 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

Perell J.: A. Introduction and Overview 1 Khalid Eidoo and Cygnus Electronics Corporation are the Represen- tative Plaintiffs in two actions in Ontario certified under the Class Pro- ceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6. There are parallel proceedings in British Columbia and Québec. The actions across the country have been ongoing for almost a decade, and progressive settlements have been reached and the actions have entered into an administrative phase pursuant to a Distribution Protocol that was approved by the courts in British Columbia, Ontario, and Québec. For the Ontario approval, see Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG, 2014 ONSC 6082 (Ont. S.C.J.). 2 This motion addresses the issue of whether a Distribution Protocol in a class action settlement that was approved by courts in British Colum- bia, Ontario, and Québec contravenes the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 by discriminating against Class Members by providing adverse, differential treatment toward them based solely on the personal characteristics of family status and marital status. 3 Not long before the implementation of the Distribution Protocol was approaching its completion, Class Counsel in Ontario were contacted by Eric Letts, an Ottawa, Ontario lawyer who alleged that the Distribution Protocol contravened the Human Rights Code. Mr. Letts threatened to initiate proceedings on behalf of a few clients who were Class Members for damages for the contravention of the Code. 4 The gobsmacked Class Counsel denied any contravention of the Code, and brought the matter of the alleged contravention of the Code to the court’s attention. Mr. Letts and Class Counsel then attempted to resolve the matter by an anti-suit agreement with Mr. Letts and his clients that Class Counsel wished the courts to authorize. I, however, ruled that the issue of an alleged violation of the Ontario Human Rights Code should be addressed on its merits and not by an agreement between Class Counsel and a few Class Members. See Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG, 2015 ONSC 2675 (Ont. S.C.J.) and Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG, 2015 ONSC 3668 (Ont. S.C.J.). 5 I ordered a motion for directions, which, after some twists and turns, is now before the court. The motion for directions morphed into a joint hearing of the courts of British Columbia, Ontario, and Québec. 6 For the reasons that follow, I find that the Ontario Human Rights Code does not apply to a Distribution Protocol in a class action. I further Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 257

find that had the Code been applicable, then the Distribution Protocol does not contravene the Code. 7 Accordingly, no action need be taken, and the administration of this class action should simply continue and run its course without adjustment.

B. Factual and Procedural Background 1. The Approval of the Distribution Plan 8 In 2005, pursuant to the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, Khalid Eidoo and Cygnus Electronics Corporation sued: Infineon Technologies AG, Infineon Technologies Corporation, Infineon Technologies North America Corporation, Hynix Semiconductor Inc., Hynix Semiconductor America Inc., Hynix Semiconductor Manufacturing America, Inc., Sam- sung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Semiconductor, Inc., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Samsung Electronics Inc., Micron Semicon- ductor Products, Inc. o/a Crucial Technologies, Mosel Vitelic Corp., Mo- sel Vitelic Inc. and Elpida Memory, Inc. 9 In 2010, in a second proposed class action, Mr. Eidoo and Cygnus Electronics sued: Hitachi Ltd., Hitachi America, Hitachi Electronic De- vices (USA), Hitachi Canada Ltd., Mitsubishi Electronic Corporation, Mitsubishi Electronic Sales Canada Inc., Mitsubishi Electric & Electron- ics USA, Inc., Nanya Technology Corporation, Nanya Technology Cor- poration USA, NEC Corporation, NEC Corporation of America, NEC Canada, Renesas Electronics Corporation fka NEC Electronics Corpora- tion, Renesas Electronics America, Inc. fka NEC Electronics American Inc., Renesas Electronics Canada Ltd., Toshiba Corporation, Toshiba America Electronics Components Inc., Toshiba of Canada Limited, Winbond Electronics Corporation and Winbond Electronics Corporation America. 10 There is a companion action in British Columbia in which Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. is the Representative Plaintiff. The British Columbia action is known as Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Infineon Technologies AG There is a companion action in Qu´ebec in which Option Consommateurs and Claudette Cloutier are the Representative Plaintiffs. The Qu´ebec action is known as Option Consommateurs c. Infineon Technologies AG [2013 CarswellQue 13282 (C.S. Que.)]. There were parallel proceedings in the United States. 258 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

11 All the actions concern allegations that the Defendants conspired to fix prices in DRAM (dynamic random access memory) devices. The 2010 action in Ontario was the means to add defendants as co-conspira- tors to the conspiracy alleged in the 2005 class action. The claims in the various actions were for: (a) breach of Part IV of the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34; (b) civil conspiracy; and (c) tortious interference with economic interests. 12 In Ontario, the Plaintiffs are represented by Harrison Pensa LLP and Sutts, Strosberg LLP. In British Columbia, the Plaintiff is represented by Camp Fiorante Matthews Mogerman. In Québec, the Plaintiffs are represented by Belleau Lapointe LLP. Class Counsel have been working together in all three jurisdictions. 13 The actions were very vigorously contested. Certification motions were initially unsuccessful in both British Columbia and Québec. Certifi- cation was granted, however, by the British Columbia Court of Appeal and the Québec Court of Appeal. 14 In the British Columbia action, the Defendants, other than Elpida Memory Inc., sought and were denied leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. A second attempt at leave to the Supreme Court of Canada was also sought on a reconsideration motion in the British Co- lumbia action. However, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was granted in the Québec action. The hearing before the Supreme Court of Canada was heard on October 17, 2012. On October 31, 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the authorization of the Québec action. The Supreme Court of Canada also found that indirect purchasers have a cause of action. See Option consommateurs c. Infineon Technologies AG, 2013 SCC 59 (S.C.C.). 15 During the course of the litigation, the focus of attention has been on the British Columbia action, where the parties proceeded through discov- eries and prepared for a trial that was scheduled and then rescheduled. 16 While advancing on the litigation track in British Columbia, the Plaintiffs from time to time negotiated settlements with some of the De- fendants and then sought court approvals for those settlements. In On- tario, consent certification orders for the purposes of the settlements were also obtained. 17 Eventually, the actions settled in their entirety, and a settlement and a Distribution Protocol were approved by the courts. The aggregate recovery for Class Members was $79.5 million. The deadline for objecting to Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 259

the Settlement Agreements was August 25, 2014, and no objections to the settlements were received. 18 In my Reasons for Decision approving the Distribution Protocol, Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG, 2014 ONSC 6082 (Ont. S.C.J.), I stated at paragraphs 24-49 and 68-76: Distribution Protocol [24] As the Settlement Fund has accumulated from the various settlements (apart from Counsel Fees and Disbursements), the funds were not distributed to Class Members in order to save the expense of multiple distributions and to formulate a fair distribution protocol. [25] Developing a fair protocol has been a challenge because Class Members are diverse and not similarly situated on the DRAM distribution chain, and it is a contentious matter about the amount of the overcharge absorbed at each level of the distribution chain. [26] Further, the anticipated take up rates are likely to be different between different categories of Class Members. Some Class Mem- bers have very small claims and will have much less incentive to submit their decade old claims than other Class Members, including public authorities, who suffered significant DRAM cost overcharges and who will be highly motivated to participate in the claims distribution process. [27] Under the proposed Distribution Protocol, the amount for distribution to the class will be the total of all settlement funds received in the proceedings, plus accrued interest, less Class Counsel’s approved fees and disbursements and approved administration and notice costs. [28] A great deal of time and effort was expended in formulating a distribution plan. In creating the Distribution Protocol, Class Counsel have: (a) adopted adversarial roles representing different levels of the DRAM distribution chain; (b) reviewed the substantial expert evidence filed and the plan of allocation approved in the parallel U.S. Action for indirect purchasers; (c) consulted with the Representative Plaintiffs and many other Class Members; (d) interviewed industry participants knowledgeable about various aspects of DRAM distribution; (e) retained an independent economist to opine on the distribution of loss and in particular where the overcharge came to rest in the chain of distribution; and, (f) retained retired Supreme Court Justice Ian Binnie who participated in communication and dissemination of information to Class Members, convened hearings to establish the Distribution Protocol and consider the expert evidence. The Honourable Mr. Binnie delivered a report on his findings. 260 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

[29] Class Counsel submit that the proposed Distribution Protocol reflects a balance of economic, practical and legal principles and contains a number of features which permit reasonable flexibility to adapt and respond to the needs of Class Members in the execution of the claims process. The Protocol also allows for further judicial review in the event that unfairness or inequity emerges in the implementation of the plan. [30] The Distribution Protocol divides the Settlement Fund into three Funds: (1) the End Consumer Fund: 50% of Settlement Fund; (2) the EMS (Electronic Manufacturing Services) Fund: 30% of Settlement Fund; and (3) the Other DRAM Purchaser Fund: 20% of Settlement Fund. [31] The End Consumer Fund applies to class members who purchased DRAM for their own use and not for resale in the same or modified form. This category includes a wide range of consumers from individuals, through small and medium-sized businesses, all the way up to the largest Canadian businesses and Canadian governmental entities at the municipal, provincial and federal levels. [32] The EMS Fund applies to claims by a class member for purchases of DRAM “in support of the manufacturing or assembly” of particular electronics products “by contract manufacturers or electronics manufacturing services firms pursuant to contracts with computer and/or non-computer original equipment manufacturers and/or other computer parts manufacturers for commercial resale in a modified form”. Claims for the purchase of DRAM to construct or assem- ble DRAM modules for commercial resale to End Consumers are excluded from claims on the EMS Fund. [33] The Other DRAM Purchaser Fund addresses claims by any class members which do not fall into the End Consumer or EMS Funds. The class members whose purchases fall within the Other DRAM Purchaser Fund are a varied group including resellers, contract manufacturers who are not EMS manufacturers, and many others. Because the purchases of class members that fall in this category will vary substantially, three sub-categories have been created in the Other DRAM Purchaser Fund. [34] A class member may claim in any Fund for which they have purchases of DRAM which qualify, and may claim in more than one Fund. [35] Because DRAM is used in a wide variety of electronics, claims will be based on a common unit of measure, the “Computer Equivalency Unit” (“CEU”). One CEU is equivalent to the average amount of DRAM in a computer during the class period. Other prod- Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 261

ucts containing DRAM are then assigned a CEU value based on their average DRAM content as compared to DRAM content of an average computer. For Class Members who purchased raw DRAM or DRAM in large quantities, there is an additional grid for assigning a CEU value to those purchases. [36] Each of the Funds has a dollar value assigned to it for each CEU. For End Consumers, each CEU is valued at $5. For EMS and Other DRAM Purchasers, each CEU is valued at $1.25. Among Other DRAM Purchasers Claims, this value will be further weighted according to whether the purchases are low, medium or high absorption. [37] Claims will be calculated by multiplying a Class Member’s purchases of DRAM by the CEU value for the product purchased and the dollar value per CEU for those purchases. End Consumers will receive a minimum payment of $20, and have a simplified claims process for small claims. [38] The Funds are designed to be self-contained, unless there is an unjust result after all claims are submitted. That is, absent an unjust result, even if one Fund is undersubscribed and another oversubscribed, the monies in the undersubscribed Fund will not be used to compensate the class members in the oversubscribed Fund. If any Fund is oversubscribed, the payouts to class members will be pro- rated down to the total amount in that Fund. [39] If a Fund is undersubscribed, Class Counsel may implement a pro-rata increase in the compensation payable to claimants entitled to compensation from that Fund, unless a pro-rata increase is determined to be inappropriate. If a pro-rata increase is inappropriate, Class Counsel will prepare a proposal for the Courts in respect of any excess monies remaining in an undersubscribed Fund prior to payouts on that Fund occurring. In such a case, excess monies may be employed to implement a pro-rata increase up to a level at which it is appropriate, or may be distributed cy pr`es, or may be used in part for each of those purposes. [40] Mr. Binnie, the Representative Plaintiffs and Class Counsel all recommend the approval of the Distribution Protocol as fair, reasonable and in the best interest of the class. Approval of Administration Protocol and Appointment of Claims Administrator [41] Class Counsel have developed the Administration Protocol, which is a set of rules which will guide the administrative implementation of the claims process and Distribution Protocol. The Adminis- 262 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

tration Protocol was designed to retain flexibility to deal with the claims process as it unfolds. The Administration Protocol provides for Class Counsel to play a continuing role in overseeing its implementation and the administration. [42] The Administration Protocol contemplates two routes within the claims process: (1) a simplified process for End Consumers who elect to claim the $20 minimum; and (2) a more in-depth process for all other claimants and for End Consumers who purchased sufficient amounts of DRAM to claim more than $20. [43] In both instances, claims will be filed via an online claims portal unless a Class Member does not have Internet access. [44] The Administration Protocol does not set out a claims form or list what will be accepted as proof, but rather provides principles for the submission of claims. This provides the Claims Administrator with the flexibility to adjust the claims forms if it becomes apparent that Class Members are having difficulty, and to accept differing forms of proof as appropriate. [45] An End Consumer who completes a simplified claim will not be required to provide any proof of their purchases beyond a declaration that they purchased at least one product containing DRAM during the class period. [46] Class Counsel propose that the claims period be 90 days, with flexibility for Class Counsel and the Claims Administrator to extend the claims period if they consider the extension to be necessary and reasonable for the fair administration of the Distribution Protocol. [47] The Administration Protocol provides for the appointment of an arbitrator to hear appeals from the Claims Administrator’s decisions. Class Counsel propose that Laura Bruneau be appointed as arbitrator. Ms. Bruneau has experience both as an arbitrator for appeals from claims administrators and in the administration of claims. She is a lawyer and fully bilingual. [48] Class Counsel are recommending that NPT RicePoint Class Ac- tion Services Inc. be appointed as Claims Administrator. NPT Rice- Point Class Action Services Inc. has bilingual capabilities and has been appointed claims administrator in other Canadian class actions, including other price-fixing conspiracy cases. [49] The Representative Plaintiffs support the approval of the Ad- ministration Protocol and appointment of Claims Administrator and Arbitrator. ... Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 263

Settlement Approval, Distribution Protocol, and Approval of Administration Protocol, and Appointment of Claims Administrator [68] Section 29(2) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 provides that a settlement of a class proceeding is not binding unless approved by the court. To approve a settlement of a class proceeding, the court must find that, in all the circumstances, the settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class: Fantl v. Transamerica Life Canada, [2009] O.J. No. 3366 (S.C.J.) at para. 57; Farkas v. Sun- nybrook and Women’s Health Sciences Centre, [2009] O.J. No. 3533 (S.C.J.) at para. 43; Kidd v. Canada Life Assurance Company, 2013 ONSC 1868. [69] In determining whether a settlement is reasonable and in the best interests of the class, the following factors may be considered: (a) the likelihood of recovery or likelihood of success; (b) the amount and nature of discovery, evidence or investigation; (c) the proposed settlement terms and conditions; (d) the recommendation and experience of counsel; (e) the future expense and likely duration of litigation; (f) the number of objectors and nature of objections; (g) the presence of good faith, arm’s-length bargaining and the absence of collusion; (h) the information conveying to the court the dynamics of, and the positions taken by, the parties during the negotiations; and, (i) the nature of communications by counsel and the representative plaintiff with class members during the litigation. See: Fantl v. Transamerica Life Canada, supra at para. 59; Corless v. KPMG LLP, [2008] O.J. No. 3092 (S.C.J.) at para. 38; Farkas v. Sunnybrook and Women’s Health Sciences Centre, supra, at para. 45; Kidd v. Canada Life Assurance Company, 2013 ONSC 1868. [70] In determining whether to approve a settlement, the court, without making findings of facts on the merits of the litigation, examines the fairness and reasonableness of the proposed settlement and whether it is in the best interests of the class as a whole having regard to the claims and defences in the litigation and any objections raised to the settlement: Baxter v. Canada (Attorney General) (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 481 (S.C.J.) at para. 10. An objective and rational assessment of the pros and cons of the settlement is required: Al-Harazi v. Quizno’s Canada Restaurant Corp. (2007), 49 C.P.C. (6th) 191 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 23. [71] The case law establishes that a settlement must fall within a zone of reasonableness. Reasonableness allows for a range of possible resolutions and is an objective standard that allows for variation depending upon the subject matter of the litigation and the nature of 264 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

the damages for which the settlement is to provide compensation: Parsons v. Canadian Red Cross Society, [1999] O.J. No. 3572 (S.C.J.) at para. 70; Dabbs v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Can- ada, supra. A settlement does not have to be perfect, nor is it necessary for a settlement to treat everybody equally: Fraser v. Falcon- bridge Ltd. (2002), 24 CPC (5th) 396 at para. 13; McCarthy v. Canadian Red Cross Society (2007), 158 ACWS (3d) 12 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 17. [72] In my opinion, having regard to the various factors used to determine whether to approve a settlement, the Settlement Agreements in the immediate case should be approved. [73] My view is that the settlements are an excellent result in a very difficult and very risky class action. [74] Similarly, the Distribution Protocol, which had to take into account very difficult economic and damage assessment issues in the marketplace for DRAM, is a fair and reasonable result for all Class Members. Courts use the same test to approve a distribution plan as to approve a settlement, and thus a plan of distribution will be appropriate if in all the circumstances, the plan of distribution is fair, reasonable and in the best interest of the class: Zaniewicz v. Zungui Haixi Corp., 2013 ONSC 5490at para. 59. [75] In the case at bar, the Distribution Protocol should be approved. [76] With one adjustment, the Administration Protocol and the appointment of the Claims Administrator should also be approved. The adjustment is that the claims period should be for a fixed 120 day period. I only see problems with administering a 90 day period that can be adjusted to a longer period.

2. The Distribution Protocol 19 The problem in the immediate case concerns whether the Distribution Protocol contravenes the Ontario Human Rights Code. The pertinent sections of the Distribution Protocol state: Canadian DRAM National Class Actions Distribution Protocol Allocation of Net Proceeds: (1) END CONSUMERS FUND 50% (2) EMS FUND 30% (3) OTHER DRAM PURCHASERS FUND 20% Rules for Distribution: 1. The net proceeds of all settlements and judgments in the Canadian DRAM national class actions will be distributed according to a Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 265

claims-made process to compensate Class Members for DRAM and/or DRAM Products they purchased between April 1, 1999 and June 30, 2002 (the “Class Period”). Compensation is only available for new product purchases and not used product purchases. 2. Class Members may not recover in relation to DRAM or DRAM Products compensated or released as part of U.S. Proceedings or a private settlement. 3. Three funds will be created: (1) the End Consumers Fund; (2) the EMS Fund; and (3) the Other DRAM Purchasers Fund. 4. Class Members will be entitled to advance claims in the following categories: (1) End Consumers Claims; (2) EMS Claims; and (3) Other DRAM Purchasers Claims. Class Members may advance claims in respect of more than one category, provided those claims are in compliance with rules applicable to each category. The claims process will be designed to assist Class Members to easily and effi- ciently advance their claims in all applicable categories. 5. All valid claims made will be converted to a common unit of measure (“CEU”) by the Claims Administrator based on the computer equivalent unit grid (“CEU Grid”) attached as Schedule A and compensation will be calculated by the Claims Administrator based on the rules set out in the claims categories below. 6. Compensation payable to Quebec Class Members will be subject to deduction in respect of the amounts payable to the Fonds d’aide aux recours collectifs. 7. Additional rules applicable to each claims category are as follows: End Consumers Claims: 8. An “End Consumers Claim” means a claim in respect of DRAM and/or DRAM Products purchased by a Class Member in the Class Period for the Class Member’s own use and not for commercial resale in the same or modified form. 9. End Consumers Claims will be advanced by Class Members against the End Consumers Fund. 10. The End Consumers Fund will be allocated 50% of the net proceeds. 11. The “End Consumers CEU Value” will be fixed at $4 per CEU. 12. The End Consumer DRAM and/or DRAM Product purchases of family members residing m in the same household must be pooled together and filed as a single End Consumer Claim. Persons under the age of eighteen (18) at the time of filing will not be permitted to file a claim except as part of a household claim. Compensation paya- 266 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

ble in respect of a household claim will be issued to the person filing the claim on behalf of the household. 13. The Claims Administrator will convert the reported DRAM and/or DRAM Product purchases for each valid End Consumers Claim received into CEUs based upon the CEU Grid. 14. The compensation payable for each valid End Consumers Claim will be calculated by the Claims Administrator by accepting the Class Member’s election of $20 in compensation or by multiplying the number of CEUs determined times the End Consumers CEU Value. 15. Each valid End Consumers Claim will be paid the greater of $20 or the compensation as calculated in the preceding paragraph out of the End Consumers Fund; subject to such pro-ration as may be required should there be insufficient monies in the End Consumers Fund to pay all valid End Consumers Claims. 16. If there are more monies allocated to the End Consumers Fund than are required to make payment of compensation to Class Mem- bers for all valid claims made against it, Class Counsel may implement a pro-rata increase in the compensation payable to Class Mem- bers. If a pro-rata increase is determined to be inappropriate, Class Counsel will prepare a proposal in respect of any excess money and will move to the Courts for approval of it prior to the distribution of the End Consumers Fund. In preparing a proposal in respect of how to distribute any excess monies, Class Counsel will consider all relevant factors including the utility and efficacy of a cy pres distribution, if appropriate. ... Residual Discretion for the Management of the Plan: 32. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if, following the claims process and the calculation of compensation in accordance with this Distribu- tion Protocol, Class Counsel have concerns that the claims process and/or Distribution Protocol has produced an unjust result on the whole or to any segment of the Class Members, they shall first determine whether the flexibility afforded by the rules of this Distribution Protocol can be applied in order to resolve any such issue. Failing that, Class Counsel may move to the Courts for approval of a reasonable modification to this Distribution Protocol to remedy any unjust result or for further directions with respect to the distribution of the net proceeds 33. In arriving at a proposal pursuant to paragraphs 16 and 31 or a determination that an unjust result has occurred, a modification is re- Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 267

quired or a decision to seek directions pursuant to paragraph 32, Class Counsel shall seek a consensus among themselves, failing which they may move to the Courts for a determination of any such issue.

3. The Implementation of the Distribution Protocol 20 After the courts approved the Distribution Protocol, there was a notice program in which television advertising featured prominently. End Consumers filed 888,041 minimum compensation claims and there were 32,158 other claims by End Consumers. 21 During the claims process, the Claims Administrator responded to more than 11,300 inquiries. No complaints were received about the pooling of the claims for compensation of family members.

4. Attributes of Distribution Schemes and Protocols 22 Before going on to describe the allegation that the Distribution Proto- col contravenes the Ontario Human Rights Code and how that allegation emerged, five aspects of distribution schemes in general and of the Dis- tribution Protocol in the immediate case in particular need to be noted. 23 First, distribution schemes are an intrinsic element of class actions and will arise in one of two ways. Where the defendant is found liable, distribution schemes will arise after there is a trial assessing the class member’s damages. Where the defendant agrees to a settlement and to pay compensation to the class, then a distribution scheme will arise as an aspect of the settlement, which is what occurred in the case at bar. 24 Second, distribution schemes are of infinite variety. Section 26 of the Class Proceedings Act empowers the court to direct any means of distribution of amounts awarded where there is an aggregate assessment (section 24) and even empowers the court to distribute moneys where there are individual issues trials (section 25). Section 26 of the Act states: Judgment distribution 26. (1) The court may direct any means of distribution of amounts awarded under section 24 or 25 that it considers appropriate. Idem (2) In giving directions under subsection (1), the court may order that, (a) the defendant distribute directly to class members the amount of monetary relief to which each class member is entitled by 268 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

any means authorized by the court, including abatement and credit; (b) the defendant pay into court or some other appropriate depos- itory the total amount of the defendant’s liability to the class until further order of the court; and (c) any person other than the defendant distribute directly to class members the amount of monetary relief to which each member is entitled by any means authorized by the court. Idem (3) In deciding whether to make an order under clause (2) (a), the court shall consider whether distribution by the defendant is the most practical way of distributing the award for any reason, including the fact that the amount of monetary relief to which each class member is entitled can be determined from the records of the defendant. Idem (4) The court may order that all or a part of an award under section 24 that has not been distributed within a time set by the court be applied in any manner that may reasonably be expected to benefit class members, even though the order does not provide for monetary relief to individual class members, if the court is satisfied that a reasonable number of class members who would not otherwise receive monetary relief would benefit from the order. Idem (5) The court may make an order under subsection (4) whether or not all class members can be identified or all of their shares can be exactly determined. Idem (6) The court may make an order under subsection (4) even if the order would benefit, (a) persons who are not class members; or (b) persons who may otherwise receive monetary relief as a result of the class proceeding. Supervisory role of the court (7) The court shall supervise the execution of judgments and the distribution of awards under section 24 or 25 and may stay the whole or any part of an execution or distribution for a reasonable period on such terms as it considers appropriate. Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 269

Payment of awards (8) The court may order that an award made under section 24 or 25 be paid, (a) in a lump sum, forthwith or within a time set by the court; or (b) in instalments, on such terms as the court considers appropriate. Costs of distribution (9) The court may order that the costs of distribution of an award under section 24 or 25, including the costs of notice associated with the distribution and the fees payable to a person administering the distribution, be paid out of the proceeds of the judgment or may make such other order as it considers appropriate. Return of unclaimed amounts (10) Any part of an award for division among individual class members that remains unclaimed or otherwise undistributed after a time set by the court shall be returned to the party against whom the award was made, without further order of the court. 25 Third, the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 envisions that distribution schemes, and settlements for that matter, may differentiate between class members, who do not all have to receive the same allocation of the settlement proceeds. In other words, while in some cases it may be appropriate to distribute the judgment or the settlement funds per capita dividing the fund by the number of class members, pursuant to s. 26(1) of the Act, the court may direct any means of distribution that it considers appropriate. 26 Fourth, ideally or optimally, if the access to justice goals of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and other class action statutes across the country are to be achieved, the judgment or the settlement funds should be distributed to the class members and not be refunded to the defendant or distributed cy pres, which achieves behaviour modification but not access to justice for individual class members. A fundamental policy factor underlying class action statutes across the country is the goal that class members should have access to justice and defendants should not get away with perpetrating small harms to many victims who as individuals would not sensibly incur the costs and risks of litigating for their individual claims. In other words, the ideal distribution scheme for a class action gets the compensation into the hands of the class members. 27 Ironically, achieving this goal can be frustrated by class members not taking up the recovery available to them. The practical realities of human nature are such that historically, take up rates of class action settlements 270 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

have been poor where the amounts to be distributed to individual class members are small, and in the case at bar, Justice Masuhara, Justice Ga- gnon, and myself, in assessing the appropriateness of the Distribution Protocol, were keenly interested in seeing what could be done to encourage End Consumer Class Members to actually make claims. 28 At the time of the approval hearing, the courts were informed by Class Counsel that affording End Consumers with minimum compensation of $20 regardless of whether they were able to prove purchases of DRAM products to substantiate such a loss was a design feature of the Distribution Protocol. The idea of minimum compensation was that although a minimum payment ran the risk of overcompensating some Class Members, a $20 payment was thought to be sufficient to entice End Consumers to take the time and the trouble to make a claim. 29 In the case at bar, the respective courts knew that those Class Mem- bers with substantial claims would be motivated to take the time and the trouble to make claims, but in assessing the appropriateness of the Distri- bution Protocol, Justice Masuhara, Justice Gagnon, and myself were interested in ensuring that there be a fulsome notice program and encour- agement to End Consumer Class Members to at least claim the readily available $20 compensation. 30 In his decision Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 2014 BCSC 1936 (B.C. S.C.), Justice Masuhara, in British Columbia, stated at paragraphs 29-31 and 36: 29. Claims will therefore largely be calculated by multiplying the CEU value (for the product purchased by the class member) by the class member’s volume of purchases (of that product) and the dollar value per CEU assigned to the appropriate Fund. End Consumers will receive a minimum payment of $20. 30. Because Class Counsel’s primary goal is to directly compensate real class members, Class Counsel is not currently proposing any cy pr`es distribution. If there are excess monies remaining in one or more of the Funds after the claims process has concluded and if Class Counsel determines that a pro-rata increase of the compensation payable is inappropriate, Class Counsel will prepare a proposal in respect of any excess money and will move to the Courts for approval of it prior to the distribution of the Fund. .... 31. Class Counsel state that they are committed to achieving the highest take-up rate possible. Class Counsel advise that they are determined to implement a robust and effective notice program to pro- Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 271

vide information about the claims process to class members and to encourage them to make claims. ... 36. I note the comment of Mr. Binnie that the process which Class Counsel engaged in to develop the Distribution Protocol was “thorough” and that Class Counsel took great care to apprise themselves of the merits of all claims, and to design a distribution which was fair and reasonable in light of that information. I agree as well that the Distribution Protocol “aims strongly to promote the distribution of funds to the people who suffered actual loss” and that the cy pres distribution, if any is left to be determined after the claims process is complete. 31 In the Québec decision, Option Consommateurs c. Infineon Technologie, a.g., 2014 QCCS 4949 (C.S. Que.), Justice Gagnon stated at paras. 78-80, 84 and 85: 78. Dans un objectif de simplification et d’équité, chaque réclama- tion doit etreˆ traitée en fonction du nombre d’unités de mesure auquel correspond tel ou tel type de produit. L’unité de mesure est le “CEU” pour “Computer Equivalency Unit”24. 79. Ainsi, un ordinateur (quelles qu’en soient les caractéristiques précises) vaut 1 CEU tandis qu’une imprimante (contenant beaucoup moins de DRAM) vaut 0,05 CEU. Et ainsi de suite. 80. De fa¸con a` motiver ceux parmi les consommateurs finaux qui ont acheté relativement peu de produits contenant de la DRAM, chacun de ceux-ci qui aura produit une réclamation valide recevra une compensation d’au moins 20 $. ... 84. Le Tribunal apprécie les efforts et a` la créativité des avocats qui, au terme de consultations appropriées, sont parvenues a` elaborer´ le Protocole de distribution. 85. Celui-ci parait concu en vue de proceder a une repartition adequate des montants nets recueillis, en reduisant la probabilite dun re- liquat important. 32 Fifth, with respect to the attributes of distribution schemes, there is nothing in the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 that refers to the Ontario Human Rights Code, and to be candid, the Code was not something on the court’s radar when I approved the settlement and the Distribution Protocol in the immediate case, or in any other case for that matter. The motion now before the court is a case of first instance about the applica- 272 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

tion, if any, of the Human Rights Code to judgments or settlements in class actions.

5. Mr. Letts’ Allegation that the Ontario Human Rights Code has been Contravened 33 On May 5, 2015, I received a letter from Jonathan J. Foreman of Har- rison Pensa LLP, one of a consortium of Class Counsel in Ontario. Mr. Foreman advised that Class Counsel had been contacted by Eric Letts, an Ottawa, Ontario lawyer acting for five Class Members, who had advised his clients that the Distribution Protocol that had been approved by the courts in Ontario, British Columbia, and Qu´ebec contravened ss. 1 and 3 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 and that Mr. Letts’ clients intended to request an amendment to the Distribution Protocol and damages pursuant to s. 46.1 of the Code. 34 As events unfolded, Mr. Letts’ challenge went beyond sections 1 and 3 of the Code to include challenges based on sections 9, 11, 12, and 13 of the Code. 35 In order to understand, Mr. Letts’ challenge to the Distribution Proto- col, the relevant provisions of the Human Rights Code are the Preamble and sections 1, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 45.1, 46.1 and 47, which state: Preamble Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and ina- lienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world and is in accord with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as proclaimed by the United Nations; And Whereas it is public policy in Ontario to recognize the dignity and worth of every person and to provide for equal rights and oppor- tunities without discrimination that is contrary to law, and having as its aim the creation of a climate of understanding and mutual respect for the dignity and worth of each person so that each person feels a part of the community and able to contribute fully to the development and well-being of the community and the Province; And Whereas these principles have been confirmed in Ontario by a number of enactments of the Legislature and it is desirable to revise and extend the protection of human rights in Ontario; Therefore, Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Ontario, enacts as follows: Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 273

PART I - FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION Services 1. Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to services, goods and facilities, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, marital status, family status or disability. ... Contracts 3. Every person having legal capacity has a right to contract on equal terms without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, marital status, family status or disability. ... 9. No person shall infringe or do, directly or indirectly, anything that infringes a right under this Part. PART II - INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION Definitions re: Parts I and II 10. (1) In Part I and in this Part, ... “equal” means subject to all requirements, qualifications and consid- erations that are not a prohibited ground of discrimination; “family status” means the status of being in a parent and child relationship; ... “marital status” means the status of being married, single, widowed, divorced or separated and includes the status of living with a person in a conjugal relationship outside marriage; ... “services” does not include a levy, fee, tax or periodic payment imposed by law; “spouse” means the person to whom a person is married or with whom the person is living in a conjugal relationship outside marriage. ... 274 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

Constructive discrimination 11.(1) A right of a person under Part I is infringed where a requirement, qualification or factor exists that is not discrimination on a prohibited ground but that results in the exclusion, restriction or prefer- ence of a group of persons who are identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination and of whom the person is a member, except where, (a) the requirement, qualification or factor is reasonable and bona fide in the circumstances; or (b) it is declared in this Act, other than in section 17, that to discriminate because of such ground is not an infringement of a right. (2) The Tribunal or a court shall not find that a requirement, qualification or factor is reasonable and bona fide in the circumstances unless it is satisfied that the needs of the group of which the person is a member cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the person responsible for accommodating those needs, considering the cost, outside sources of funding, if any, and health and safety requirements, if any. Idem (3) The Tribunal or a court shall consider any standards prescribed by the regulations for assessing what is undue hardship. Discrimination because of association 12. A right under Part I is infringed where the discrimination is because of relationship, association or dealings with a person or persons identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination. Announced intention to discriminate 13. (1) A right under Part I is infringed by a person who publishes or displays before the public or causes the publication or display before the public of any notice, sign, symbol, emblem, or other similar rep- resentation that indicates the intention of the person to infringe a right under Part I or that is intended by the person to incite the infringement of a right under Part I. Opinion (2) Subsection (1) shall not interfere with freedom of expression of opinion. ... Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 275

PART IV — HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTERIO ... Dismissal in accordance with rules 45.1 The Tribunal may dismiss an application, in whole or in part, in accordance with its rules if the Tribunal is of the opinion that another proceeding has appropriately dealt with the substance of the application. PART V - GENERAL ... Civil remedy 46.1 (1) If, in a civil proceeding in a court, the court finds that a party to the proceeding has infringed a right under Part I of another party to the proceeding, the court may make either of the following orders, or both: 1. An order directing the party who infringed the right to pay monetary compensation to the party whose right was infringed for loss arising out of the infringement, including compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect. 2. An order directing the party who infringed the right to make restitution to the party whose right was infringed, other than through monetary compensation, for loss arising out of the infringement, including restitution for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect. Same (2) Subsection (1) does not permit a person to commence an action based solely on an infringement of a right under Part I. Act binds Crown 47. (1) This Act binds the Crown and every agency of the Crown. Act has primacy over other Acts (2) Where a provision in an Act or regulation purports to require or authorize conduct that is a contravention of Part I, this Act applies and prevails unless the Act or regulation specifically provides that it is to apply despite this Act. 36 In response to Mr. Foreman’s letter, I directed my assistant Cindy Elphinstone to email Mr. Foreman, with copies to Mr. Letts and Heather Rumble Peterson, who is also of Class Counsel, the message that I was not prepared to deal with the matter by a telephone conference but should 276 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

counsel wish, a motion could be brought on short notice for May 19, 22, 25, or 28, 2015. 37 None of the parties brought a motion, and on May 20, 2015, I received by email a five-page letter from Mr. Letts who advised that: “The pending issue is not yet before the Court and it is my clients’ prerogative and right to prosecute their case as they choose and in accordance with the Rules of [Civil] Procedure.” The next correspondence, which was also sent on May 20, 2015, was an email message sent by Mr. Foreman to my assistant, Ms. Elphinstone, and copied to Mr. Letts and Ms. Peter- son, which my assistant forwarded to me. Mr. Foreman told Ms. Elphin- stone that “we are prepared to have a reporting case conference on the status of Mr. Letts’ complaint.” Mr. Foreman’s correspondence with Ms. Elphinstone prompted another letter from Mr. Letts on May 21, 2015. 38 I put an end to this procedure by making a direction that it stop, and I ordered Class Counsel, within 14 days, to serve and file a notice of motion and supporting affidavit material for a motion for directions, which I scheduled for July 24, 2015. See Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG, 2015 ONSC 3282 (Ont. S.C.J.). 39 The parties apparently did not wish to resolve the matter as I had directed. There were discussions and negotiations between Mr. Letts and Class Counsel, and Mr. Letts and his clients signed a letter agreement with Class Counsel in this action and in the companion actions in Qu´ebec and British Columbia. In their resolution of the matter, Class Counsel, Mr. Letts, and his clients agreed that the problems with the Human Rights Code could be resolved by giving the Claims Administrator an instruction to be posted on the claims website for the duration of the claims process. The proposed instruction was as follows: When more than one claim is filed for the same household, the claims administrator shall provide the class members with the opportunity to explain the circumstances of their claims. The claims administrator may permit a reasonable adjustment of the distribution rules in order to facilitate such claims as it considers appropriate. In doing so, the claims administrator may require reasonable proof and explanation by the class member. 40 With the making and dissemination of this instruction, Mr. Letts and his clients agreed to withdraw any complaint they may have and to certify that no motion will be made or any administrative proceeding taken in any forum in respect of the Canadian DRAM plan of settlement administration and claims process. The letter agreement provided that the Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 277

instruction was not to be effective unless and until it was approved by the Superior Court of Québec and the Supreme Court of British Columbia. 41 In my opinion, the parties’ approach to resolving the allegation that the Distribution Protocol violated the Ontario Human Rights Code was inappropriate, and I ordered that the motion for directions continue. In Reasons for Decision, Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG, 2015 ONSC 3668 (Ont. S.C.J.), I stated at paras. 11-12: [11] Whatever is going on here, it does not work and whatever it is, it is not an appropriate and responsible way for the court to supervise a class proceeding. The proposed instruction may or may not be adequate to address what may or may not be a problem, raised by persons who may or may not have standing to challenge the approved settlement distribution scheme, but, in any event, the Court cannot endorse whatever this is at the whim of Class Counsel and Mr. Letts and his clients without ruling on the merits of the underlying dispute. The Court cannot indirectly endorse an anti-suit injunction prohibit- ing Mr. Letts’ clients from taking administrative proceedings that may or may not be available to them assuming that they are entitled to make claims notwithstanding the releases that are a part of the court approved settlement. The claim for costs is problematic. Why should costs be paid out of the settlement fund absent an actual ruling on the merits of the motion? [12] The motion for directions shall proceed so that the Court can make a ruling on the merits. 42 The motion for directions, however, did not proceed on July 24, 2015, because Class Counsel from across the country requested that a joint hearing of the courts in British Columbia, Ontario, and Québec be held. 43 I agreed to a joint hearing, as did Justice Masuhara of the British Co- lumbia Superior Court and Justice Gagnon of the Québec Superior Court, and the joint hearing was scheduled for August 14, 2015. 44 With the joint hearing for directions scheduled, without asking per- mission, Mr. Letts’ client, Raja Khoury, brought a cross-motion, among other things, to have Mr. Letts appointed Class Counsel of a subclass in order to sue Class Counsel for negligence. The cross-motion prompted an emergency case conference. At the case conference, I adjourned the cross-motion, and I made the following endorsement: This is a case conference to address the cross-motion brought by Raja Khoury, a class member that seeks the appointment of Mr. Letts as Class Counsel for a subclass and advances a negligence claim against other Class Counsel. I am adjourning the cross-motion sine 278 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

die to allow Class Counsel to bring a motion to quash. The adjourn- ment shall not affect Mr. Khoury’s standing on the motion returnable on August 14, 2015. I allow Mr. Khoury’s affidavit to be filed for the August 14, 2015 motion and direct that he may be cross-examined in Ottawa, such cross-examination to be scheduled before August 10, 2015.

6. The Pooling of Family Claims 45 The festering point of the dispute between the parties is paragraph 12 of the Distribution Protocol, which requires the claims of family members to be pooled. Paragraph 12 states: 12. The end consumer DRAM and/or DRAM Product purchases of family members residing m in the same household must be pooled together and filed as a single End Consumer Claim. Persons under the age of eighteen (18) at the time of filing will not be permitted to file a claim except as part of a household claim. Compensation payable in respect of a household claim will be issued to the person filing the claim on behalf of the household. 46 In order to resolve the argument that there has been a contravention of the Ontario Human Rights Code, it is necessary to understand precisely the economic effect of the pooling of family claims. 47 In this regard, it is necessary to appreciate that the pooling of claims has no economic effect if the members of the family seek compensation beyond the $20 minimum compensation. In this circumstance, the pooling of claims is just a matter of administrative convenience and has no substantive impact on the individual family member’s claims. Thus, for example, if four family members had in the aggregate claims for more than $20, they could file a standard claim form and although they would receive a single payment, they could divide the money amongst themselves as appropriate. 48 The requirement of the pooling of claims by family members does have an economic effect if the family members collectively do not have claims beyond the $20 minimum compensation. If the family has not purchased at least four DRAM devices, then the pooling of the claims means that the family, collectively, can only receive one minimum $20 payment. 49 By way of illustration, under the Distribution Protocol, a family of four members who collectively purchased three DRAM products during the class period are taken to have suffered a $15 injury from price-fixing and with a pooled claim, the family members will receive $20 compensa- Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 279

tion for their $15 injury. They will not, however, receive $80 worth of aggregate compensation for their $15 injury, which they would receive if their claims were not pooled. 50 Mr. Khoury argues that this illustration demonstrates that the four family members have suffered discrimination on the grounds of family status or marital status from the pooling of their claims. Class Counsel submits, however, that there is no discrimination to Class Members in receiving $5 of windfall compensation, (i.e. $20 for three claims worth $5 each) which they can share as they see fit, instead of receiving $65 of windfall compensation (i.e. $80 for three claims worth $5 each).

7. The Complaints of Raja Khoury, Greta Sawma, and Allan Drummond 51 In the course of the run up to the motion now before the court, which had been prompted by my response to the interaction between Mr. Letts and Class Counsel, three of Mr. Letts’ clients; namely Raja Khoury, Greta Sawma, and Allan Drummond, delivered affidavits. 52 Class Counsel point out that Mr. Khoury, Ms. Sawma, and Mr. Drummond never applied for compensation or invoked the mechanisms in the Distribution Protocol that empower the courts with a residual discretion to manage the administration of the settlement. While this point is true, I am going to ignore it as a factor in my analysis below, and from an analytical prospective, I will assume that Mr. Khoury, Ms. Sawma, and Mr. Drummond made the claims available to them under the Distribution Protocol. 53 Ms. Sawma resides with her son, who was 11 or 12 years old during the Class Period. During this period, Ms. Sawma purchased less than four DRAM products. Thus, she has a pooled claim of $20. 54 Mr. Drummond resides with his two adult sons, and it is not clear whether they were adults during the Class Period. The Drummonds know that they purchased DRAM products during the Class Period but they do not know how many and they have no proof of purchases. Mr. Drum- mond has a pooled claim of $20. 55 Mr. Khoury lives with his wife, his daughter, who was a young child during the Class Period, and his parents. Although he knows of three DRAM products that were purchased during the Class Period and believes that his family may have also bought other products, there is no proof of any purchases. Mr. Khoury has a pooled claim of $20. 280 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

C. The Arguments of the Parties 1. Mr. Khoury’s Argument 56 Mr. Khoury submits that none of myself, Justices Masuhara and Ga- gnon, and former Supreme Court Justice Binnie, who prepared the report about the Distribution Protocol, expressly considered whether it contravened human rights legislation. 57 I can immediately say that I agree with this submission. However, granted that the matter was not expressly considered, the important issue is what would have been the outcome had the courts considered whether human rights legislation applied to the Distribution Protocol. In this regard, Mr. Khoury submits that the courts would have concluded that the Distribution Protocol discriminates against Class Members on the grounds of family status and marital status contrary to s. 1 of the Code. 58 Mr. Khoury submits that paragraph 12 of the Distribution Protocol contravenes s. 1 of the Code because it uses family or marital status to determine the quantum, process, and availability of the benefits of the settlement distribution process with adverse consequences. His argument is summarized in paragraphs 50 to 52, 57, 59, and 85 of his factum, which state: 50. The current Distribution Protocol operates in a discriminatory manner because it provides adverse, differential treatment towards some End-User Class Members based solely on the unrelated and protected personal characteristics of family status and marital status. 51. As described above in the Facts and within the Distribution Pro- tocol, End-User Class Members who reside with another family member have a different, more cumbersome and less advantageous scheme for receiving Settlement funds based solely on their 2015 family/marital status. 52. End-user class members who currently reside within a family with another end-user class member: (a) Lose their individual autonomy to make decisions, contract into the settlement and benefit from the settlement merely because they happen to reside with another class member 14-16 years after incurring the price-fixing damages; (b) Lose their individual autonomy to have their damages and settlement determined on their individual merit; (c) Receive 50%, or less, than other class members assuming their family shares the settlement proceeds; Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 281

(d) Have increased documentary requirements (itemizing purchases) and evidentiary requirements while still receiving a lesser amount of settlement proceeds; (e) Have increased administrative and intra-family negotiations and discussions; and (f) Experience the propagation and dissemination of prejudicial and discriminatory attitudes within their province and communities. ... 57. Without even an explanation, the Distribution Protocol violates section 64 of the Family Law Act, and all modern Ontario concepts of individual rights, by forcing End User class members who happen to be spouses with another End User class member in 2015 and who want to participate in the Settlement to forgo an independent, separate and distinct legal personality. ... 59. The DRAM Distribution Protocol acts exactly contrary to the Law Commission’s recommendation by creating a distribution regime that makes unsupported, stereotypical and prejudiced assump- tions about family structures and dynamics. ... 85. The example case of Mr. Raja Khoury demonstrates that the Dis- tribution Protocol prevented Mr. Khoury, a class member, from filing an independent claim. He would have had to get the consent and co- operation of his various family members with whom he resided to execute a claim. He would then have to either proceed with a simplified claim, or spend time and energy researching each family member’s historic purchases. If he then did file a claim, he would subsequently or at some point, have to engage in negotiations respecting the most equitable manner to distribute the settlement. The settlement that he received, whether for 2,3,4 or 5 family members as the case may be, would be much smaller per capita than if he were residing with roommates instead of family members. If he proceeded with a simplified claim, he would receive (assuming equal sharing) perhaps $4.00 instead of the $20 that he would receive if he were treated as an individual. 59 Mr. Khoury submits that section 3, which provides a right to contract without discrimination, and section 12, which captures discrimination because of a person’s relationship with a person(s) identified by a prohib- 282 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

ited ground of discrimination, have been contravened. His argument is set out in paragraphs 71 and 72 of his factum, which state: 71. The Distribution Protocol is propagating a contracting process within the meaning of the Section 3 of the Code which provides that “Every person having legal capacity has a right to contract on equal terms without discrimination because of ... marital status, family status.” 72. The Distribution Protocol also violates s. 12 of the Ontario Human Rights Code because it bases the treatment of individuals in the contracting process and in the provision of a benefit. 60 Finally, Mr. Khoury submits that Class Counsel have contravened the Code in their provision of services to the End Consumer Class Members. I will describe this argument in the discussion portion of these Reasons for Decision.

2. The Argument of Class Counsel 61 Class Counsel submits that the court’s finding that the Distribution Protocol was fair reasonable and in the best interests of the class as a whole is a finding that the Distribution Protocol does not contravene the Ontario Human Rights Code and that it would be detrimental to the in- tegrity of the class actions regime if late-breaking challenges, such as the one raised by Mr. Khoury, were allowed. 62 Class Counsel submit that Mr. Khoury is estopped from attacking the Distribution Protocol and that his objection is a collateral attack on the court’s approval Order and an abuse of the court’s process. 63 Further still, in arguments that I will detail below, Class Counsel submits that the Human Rights Code is not engaged or if it is engaged, it is not contravened by the Distribution Protocol.

D. Analysis and Discussion 1. Introduction and Overview 64 As I shall explain below, it is my opinion that the Ontario Human Rights Code does not apply to distribution schemes of judgments or settlements under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992. That finding is dispositive of this motion. However, in the analysis and discussion below, I shall go further and assume that the Code does apply to distribution schemes, and I shall examine whether the Distribution Protocol in the case at the bar contravenes the Code. Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 283

65 I shall also examine whether Class Counsel contravened the Human Rights Code in promoting the Distribution Protocol to the courts across the country. 66 Assuming the Code applies, my conclusion is that it has not been contravened in any of the ways submitted by Mr. Letts on behalf of Mr. Khoury and the other clients who perceived a violation of their rights under the Code. I also conclude that Class Counsel has not contravened the Code.

2. The Estoppel, Collateral Attack and Abuse of Process Arguments 67 I shall decide on its merits Mr. Khoury’s challenge that the Distribu- tion Protocol contravenes the Ontario Human Rights Code. Therefore, I shall say no more about Class Counsel’s arguments that counter Mr. Letts’ arguments on behalf of Mr. Khoury and others on technical grounds and not on their merits. 68 In particular, I shall not discuss Class Counsel’s submission that Mr. Khoury’s arguments should be rejected on the grounds that the challenge to the approved Distribution Protocol comes too late or is precluded on the grounds of estoppel, collateral attack, or abuse of process. 69 Although I previously held that the Distribution Protocol was fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the Class Members, including the End Consumer Class Members, as noted above, at the time of the fairness hearing, I did not consider the Distribution Protocol through the lens of the Ontario Human Rights Code. 70 I should note that had I actually considered the matter, s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, set out above, provides that the Human Rights Tri- bunal may dismiss an application if the Tribunal is of the opinion that another proceeding has appropriately dealt with the substance of the application. 71 See: Paterno v. Salvation Army, Centre of Hope, 2011 HRTO 2298 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.); Rock v. Toronto Community Housing Corp., 2013 HRTO 78 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.). These authorities suggest that had the issue of the Human Rights Code been raised at the time of the approval hearing, this court could have addressed the issue of whether there was a contravention of the Code and that the Human Rights Tribunal would then have likely recognized the court’s decision as dispositive of any human rights complaint. 284 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

3. The Human Rights Code and Class Proceedings 72 The Human Rights Code is quasi-constitutional legislation and is to be given a broad and purposive interpretation: Ontario (Director of Disability Support Program) v. Tranchemontagne, 2010 ONCA 593 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 69. 73 The preamble of the Code emphasizes the importance of recognizing the inherent dignity of all members of the human family. Section 9 provides that no person shall infringe or do, directly or indirectly, anything that infringes a right under the Code. Pursuant to s. 47 (2) of the Code, it applies and prevails over other legislation unless the other statute or regulation specifically provides that the Code is excluded. 74 There are both similarities and differences between the Human Rights Code and s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which creates a broad right to be free of discrimination by government actors or agents subject to a limited defence of justification provided by s. 1 of the Charter. The Charter, however, does not operate in the private sector, and although the Human Rights Code applies in both the private and public sectors, it has a scope or ambit; it does not prohibit all discrimination in society. 75 Rather, the Human Rights Code creates a right to be free of discrimination only in the prescribed social areas of services, accommodation, contracts, employment, and vocational associations. 76 See: McCormick v. Fasken Martineau Dumoulin LLP, 2014 SCC 39 (S.C.C.); Dallaire v. Les Chevaliers de Colomb, 2011 HRTO 639 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.); Fair Parenting Inc. v. Durham Student Transportation Services, 2014 HRTO 1744 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) at paras. 6-7; Wing v. Niagara Falls Hydro Holding Corp., 2014 HRTO 1472 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) at para. 50; Corcoran v. Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation of the Diocese of Peterborough, 2009 HRTO 1600 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) at para. 9. 77 Mr. Khoury argues that the Distribution Protocol contravenes s. 1 of the Code which provides that every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to “services, goods and facilities,” which are not defined terms save to the extent that s. 10 of the Code specifies that services do not include a levy, fee, tax, or periodic payment imposed by law. 78 In Rai v. Ontario (Minister of Environment), 2012 HRTO 1744 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) and Braithwaite v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2005 HRTO 31 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.), affd. Braithwaite v. Ontario Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 285

(Attorney General) (2007), 88 O.R. (3d) 455 (Ont. Div. Ct.) the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal held that “services” is something which is of benefit that is provided by one person to another or to the public. In my opinion, however, the distribution of the funds from a court judgment assessing damages or the distribution of the proceeds of the settlement of a damages claim is not services, goods, or facilities within the ambit of the Human Rights Code. 79 Although judges are an arm of government serving the public and although the administration of justice is a public service, judgments and orders, including the approval of a distribution scheme under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, are not “services, goods and facilities.” Put simply, the Human Rights Code does not apply to court orders. 80 This opinion about the ambit of services under the Code is shared by the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal. In Gibson v. Ontario (Attorney Gen- eral), 2009 HRTO 870 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.), the applicant alleged discrimination on the basis of family status in the provision of services by three Family Court judges who had ordered him to make child support payments in excess of what he felt was reasonable or fair. The Tribunal dismissed the claim, and it held that the content, reasons, and result of a court order are not “services” within the meaning of the Code. 81 In Zaki v. Ontario (Ministry of Community & Social Services), 2009 HRTO 1595 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.), the Tribunal held that while a statutory decision making process is “services”, the decision rendered by the decision-maker is not part of the service. The Ontario Human Rights Tribunal has repeatedly held that the content, reasons, and the result contained in a decision of a statutory decision-maker are not part of the service to the public provided by the statutory decision-maker: Dallaire v. Les Chevaliers de Colomb, supra at para. 29. See also: Baird v. Ontario (Workplace Safety & Insurance Appeals Tribunal), 2009 HRTO 99 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.); Christianson v. Ontario (Information & Privacy Commissioner), 2009 HRTO 203 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.), reconsideration refused 2009 HRTO 424 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.). 82 Judgment proceeds or settlement proceeds are compensation for a civil wrong, and an injured class member does not receive a service when he or she receives a sum of money meant to restore him or her to the position he or she was in but for the civil wrong or in the position he or she would have been had the civil wrong not occurred. 83 In the case at bar, Class Members alleged that they paid too much for products with DRAM because of the alleged price-fixing of the Defend- 286 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

ants. Without admitting liability, the Defendants agreed to pay $80 million to the Class Members. The distribution of those funds was not the distribution of a service. It was compensation for settling a price-fixing complaint. 84 I, therefore, conclude that the Ontario Human Rights Code does not apply to the Distribution Protocol that was approved by the courts of British Columbia, Ontario, and Qu´ebec. This conclusion is dispositive of the motion before the court and entails that nothing need be done in re- gards to the Distribution Protocol.

4. Assuming the Code Applies, Has It Been Contravened? (a) Discrimination under the Ontario Human Rights Code 85 As indicated above, although the above conclusion is dispositive of the motion before the court, I shall assume that the Ontario Human Rights Code does apply to distribution schemes under the Class Proceed- ings Act, 1992. Assuming the Code applies, the issue then is whether Mr. Khoury has demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination that creates a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice, pre-existing disadvantage or stereotyping. 86 Unlawful discrimination may be defined as substantively differential treatment of a person or persons that creates a disadvantage and that is based on a personal attribute identified by the Code. 87 The person alleging discrimination bears the onus of showing substantive inequality in how he or she is treated as opposed to formal inequality. Formal inequality is unequal treatment for those in similar situations and equal treatment for those in dissimilar situations. In contrast, substantive inequality recognizes that not all differences in treatment are violations of equality rights and that differences in treatment are sometimes necessary to achieve true equality. The person alleging discrimination bears the onus of showing substantive inequality that creates a disadvantage. 88 A disadvantage is a distinction in treatment that: (a) imposes obligations, penalties, restrictions, or denials of benefits on persons with an attribute identified by the Code that are not imposed on others; and also (b) perpetuates prejudice or stereotyping. 89 Not every distinction that creates a disadvantage is discriminatory. In Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal c. Sexton, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 161 (S.C.C.) at para. 49, in a passage adopted by the Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 287

Court of Appeal in Ontario (Director of Disability Support Program) v. Tranchemontagne, supra at para. 93, Justice Abella stated: 49. ... [T]here is a difference between discrimination and a distinction. Not every distinction is discriminatory. It is not enough to im- pugn ... conduct on the basis that what was done had a negative impact on an individual in a protected group. Such membership alone does not, without more, guarantee access to a human rights remedy. It is the link between that group membership and the arbitrariness of the disadvantaging criterion or conduct, either on its face or in its impact, that triggers the possibility of a remedy. .... 90 In determining whether there has been discriminatory treatment, the Court must determine whether the impugned treatment truly creates a disadvantage and whether the protected attribute played a role in creating the disadvantage. There must be a connection, albeit not necessarily a causal connection, between the adverse treatment and the ground of discrimination: Pieters v. Peel Law Assn., 2013 ONCA 396 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 59-60; Qu´ebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) c. Bombardier Inc., 2015 SCC 39 (S.C.C.) at paras. 45-52. 91 To demonstrate prima facie discrimination, a complainant must demonstrate that: (1) he or she has an attribute protected from discrimination under the Code; (2) he or she experienced disadvantageous treatment not imposed on others; and (3) the protected attribute was a factor in the adverse impact; i.e. there is a connection between the protected characteristic or prohibited ground and the impugned treatment. 92 In Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education), 2012 SCC 61 (S.C.C.) at para. 33, Justice Abella for the Supreme Court stated that to demonstrate prima facie discrimination, complainants are required to show: (1) that they have a characteristic protected from discrimination under the Code; (2) that they experienced an adverse impact with respect to the service; and (3) that the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact. 93 The complainant, however, is not required to prove that the entity alleged to have discriminated intended to discriminate against him or her: Qu´ebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) c. Bombardier Inc., supra at para. 40. 94 If a prima facie case of discrimination has been established, then the burden shifts to the entity alleged to have discriminated to justify the conduct or practice, within the framework of the exemptions available 288 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

under the human rights statutes; if the prima facie discriminatory conduct cannot be justified, then discrimination has been proven: Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education), supra. 95 In British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.E.U., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), sometimes referred to as the Meiorin case, the Supreme Court discussed justification in the context of the British Columbia government dismissing Ms. Meiorin as a forest firefighter because she had failed an aerobic fitness test. At para. 54 of her judgment, Justice McLachlin, as she then was, described justification as involving satisfying a three-step test; that is: (1) the prima facie discriminatory standard is rationally connected to the performance of the job; (2) the standard was adopted in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary for the performance of the job; and (3) the standard was reasonably necessary for the performance of the job and it was impossible to accommodate the employee subject to the discriminatory standard without imposing undue hardship upon the employer. 96 Beyond employment situations and speaking about justification in the broader context, to justify what has been shown to be prima facie discrimination, the entity alleged to have discriminated must show that: (1) it investigated alternative approaches; (2) the discriminatory conduct was reasonably necessary to establish a broader goal; and (3) it could not have done anything else reasonable or practical to avoid the negative impact on the individual. See: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.E.U., supra; Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Etobicoke (Borough), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202 (S.C.C.); Renaud v. Central Okanagan School District No. 23, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 (S.C.C.); Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489 (S.C.C.); VIA Rail Canada Inc. v. Canadian Transportation Agency, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650 (S.C.C.). 97 See also: Phipps v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2012 ONCA 155 (Ont. C.A.); Armstrong v. British Columbia (Ministry of Health) (2010), 283 B.C.A.C. 167 (B.C. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 128 (S.C.C.); R. v. Kapp, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.); Andrews v. Law Society (British Columbia), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) at para. 169; and O’Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.).

(b) Discrimination with respect to a Service, Good, or Facility 98 In the case at bar, I agree with the submissions of Class Counsel that Mr. Khoury and the others have failed to show any disadvantage that is Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 289

connected to any prohibited ground. If compensation for the harm caused by price-fixing to End Consumers can be regarded as a benefit, then, in my opinion, the restriction imposed by the pooling of family member’s claims that restricts overcompensation (windfall payments) is not a disadvantage. The purpose of the minimum $20 payment was to encourage claimants to apply for compensation not to encourage windfall payments. The pooling of the claims might have been a disadvantage to individual family members who were deprived of claiming more than $20, but under the Distribution Protocol they are not precluded from applying for more than $20. 99 However, if I am wrong and the pooling of the claims of family members is a disadvantage, then it is a disadvantage that does not perpetuate prejudice or stereotyping. The pooling of claims is no affront to the dignity of the individual members of the family unit. It is not an affront to the dignity a woman to have to pool a claim for compensation with the other members of her family. 100 However, if again I am wrong and the pooling of claims of family members is a disadvantage that perpetuates prejudice or stereotyping, then, in my opinion, the prima facie discrimination was justified and, therefore, does not count as discrimination. 101 The purpose of the minimum payments was to encourage the take-up of compensation by End Consumers harmed by price-fixing and the pooling of family members claims for the minimum was a reasonable way to curb windfall compensation, which would be unfair to other Class Members, especially if the demand on the End Consumer settlement funds exceeded the funds and a ratable distribution would reduce the payment to Class Members.

(c) Discrimination with respect to a Contractual Process 102 As noted above, Mr. Khoury submits the Distribution Protocol propa- gates a contracting process within the meaning of the s. 3 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, which provides that every person having legal capacity has a right to contract on equal terms without discrimination because of marital status, family status. He submits that the contracting process of the Distribution Protocol violates s. 12 of the Code because it bases the treatment of individuals in the contracting process based on family status or marital status. 103 Apart from the fact that there is no discrimination for the reasons described above, there is no merit to these submissions, because the Distri- 290 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

bution Protocol is not a contracting process. The Class Member’s right or opportunity to participate in the distribution process is not contractual in nature but rather is an incident of the settlement of their legal claims arising from price-fixing. 104 In any event, s. 12 of the Code is not pertinent to the circumstances of the immediate case. 105 Section 12 deals with what might be called discrimination by association; i.e., where a person who is not a member of a group subject to prejudice and discrimination is the victim of discrimination because of his association or relationship with that group: Nevo v. York University, 2013 HRTO 1146 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.); Knibbs v. Brant Artillery Gunners Club Inc., 2011 HRTO 1032 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.). There is no perceivable discrimination by association arising from the Distribu- tion Protocol.

5. The Human Rights Claim Against Class Counsel 106 Mr. Khoury argues that within the settlement process, Class Counsel were providing a service and providing a benefit by: (a) litigating a matter on behalf of the End Consumer Class Members; (b) settling a matter on behalf of the End Consumer Class Members and (c) devising a Distri- bution Plan on behalf of the End Consumer Class Members. He argues that Class Counsel have discriminated in providing services and that the discrimination is overt and that the Distribution Plan is an announced intention to discriminate as contemplated by s. 13 of the Code and thus there is no possibility or exception to justify the impugned conduct. 107 While I accept that Class Counsel has a solicitor and client relationship with Class Members and thus are providing legal services to the Class Members, for the reasons expressed above, the devising of a Distri- bution Plan that called for the pooling of claims by family members is not discriminatory conduct. 108 As discussed above, it is an inevitable incident of class actions that there will be a distribution of the proceeds of a judgment or of a settlement and with the instructions of the Representative Plaintiff it will fall on Class Counsel to develop a distribution scheme that is fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the class as a whole. 109 As explained above, there is no prima facie case of discrimination or the discrimination is justified, and thus Class Counsel cannot be faulted for devising a discriminatory Distribution Plan, which they did not do. Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG Perell J. 291

110 It also follows that Class Counsel did not breach s. 13 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, because the Distribution Protocol is not the publication of a notice that indicates that Class Counsel intended to infringe a right under the Code or that Class Counsel intended to incite the infringement of a right under the Code. See Ruffolo v. York University, 2009 HRTO 1086 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.).

E. Conclusion 111 For the above reasons, I conclude that there is no merit to the arguments that the Distribution Protocol contravenes the Ontario Human Rights Code and, accordingly, no action need be taken. 112 At the argument of the motion, both parties reserved the right to ask for costs. 113 If the parties cannot agree about the matter of costs, they may make submissions in writing beginning with Class Counsel’s submissions within 20 days of the release of these Reasons for Decision followed by Mr. Khoury’s submissions within a further 20 days. Order accordingly. 292 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

[Indexed as: Peterborough (City) v. CUPE] Canadian Union of Public Employees, Applicant v The Corporation of the City of Peterborough, Respondent Ontario Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal Docket: 1581-14-PE Patrick Kelly V-Chair, Ann Burke Member, Irene Harris Member Judgment: August 31, 2015 Human rights –––– Pay equity legislation — Miscellaneous –––– City and union agreed to Pay Equity Plan which included proportional value method of comparison — City and union agreed to amended plan in 2003 (2003 Plan), and all male job classes were used to generate male wage line for comparison purposes — In 2004, parties undertook new, gender-neutral job evaluation exercise which resulted in job banding and compensation system — Residential Mechan- ical Inspector (RMI) job class became vacant in 2011 and city had difficulty recruiting qualified candidate — RMI was hired at market adjustment rate in 2013 — Pay Equity Commission determined that city was not required to amend proportional value line for maintenance purposes, and that RMI was not representative male job class — Union brought application under Pay Equity Act — Application granted — City breached its duty to maintain pay equity — City’s obligation to maintain pay equity under Act was in respect of 2003 Plan — RMI was properly included as representative male job class in proportional value exercise that resulted in creation of male wage line — Act does not say representative male job class can later be treated as unrepresentative — No s. 8 exemptions applied — Parties’ 2004 banding and compensation system did not constitute pay equity plan subject to maintenance requirement under Act — Act did not shield city from its obligation to maintain 2003 Plan following market pay adjustment made in relation to RMI job class — City to review proportional value wage line used to establish 2003 Plan, taking into account market adjustment rate for RMI. In 2003, the city and the union amended their Pay Equity Plan (2003 Plan). The 2003 Plan provided that pay equity would be maintained using the proportional value method of comparison. All male job classes in the bargaining unit were used to generate a male wage line for comparison purposes. In 2004, the parties undertook a new, gender-neutral job evaluation exercise which resulted in a job banding and compensation system. The Residential Mechanical Inspector (RMI) job class became vacant in 2011, and the city had difficulty finding a qualified candidate to fill the position. In Peterborough (City) v. CUPE 293

2012, the parties negotiated a Letter of Agreement which outlined the protocol for applying market adjustments to salaries of positions when the city was unable to recruit a qualified candidate because of external job market reasons. An RMI was hired in 2013 at a market adjustment rate. The union alleged pay equity was not being maintained because the city refused to include the market adjustment rate given to the RMI in its proportional value line. The Pay Equity Commission determined that, while increases to the male RMI job class did not qualify as a permissible wage difference under s. 8(1)(e) of the Pay Equity Act, the city was not required to amend the proportional value line for maintenance purposes. The Commission determined the RMI was not a representative male job class. The union filed an application under the Act. Held: The application was granted. Per Patrick Kelly, Vice-Chair (Irene Harris, Member, concurring): The city breached its duty to maintain pay equity. In the circumstances, the Act did not shield the city from its obligation to maintain the 2003 Plan following the market pay adjustment made to the RMI job class. The city must review the proportional value wage line used to establish the 2003 Plan, taking into account the market adjustment rate for the RMI job class, and pay any adjustments. The city’s duty to maintain pay equity under the Act, as opposed to maintenance of the banding and compensation system under the collective agreement, is in respect of the 2003 Plan. The RMI job class was properly included as a representative male job class in the proportional value exercise that resulted in the creation of the male wage line in 2003. The Act does not say expressly that a representative male job class can later be treated as unrepresentative. No exemptions under s. 8 of the Act applied. The parties’ 2004 banding and compensation system did not constitute a pay equity plan subject to the maintenance requirement under the Act. The parties’ Letter of Agreement required a review of related positions where the city assigns a market adjustment to any position. Per Anne Burke, Member (dissenting): The application should be dismissed. The city was not required to amend the proportional value line or ensure its continued correctness taking into account the market adjusted pay rate of the RMI job class, and did not breach its duty to maintain pay equity. The 2003 Plan between the parties did not state that certain male job classes would continue to be used for maintenance purposes, notwithstanding that all male job classes were used to generate a male wage line for comparison purposes. The compensation practices flowing from the post-2003 Plan banding and compensation system, and not the proportional value line from the 2003 Plan itself, are what must be maintained by the city for pay equity purposes. 294 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

The market adjustment rate applied to the RMI did not reflect the true internal value of the work it performed. The Letter of Agreement demonstrated that the parties were alert to the distorting effects that market forces might bear on the internal value and associated compensation of bargaining unit jobs, and that in those limited circumstances, the city could depart from the compensation policy reflected in the banding system agreed to in 2004. In the circumstances, the city should not be statutorily required to consider drawing a new male wage line as a maintenance measure in response to the market adjustment wage increase for the RMI. Cases considered by Patrick Kelly V-Chair, Irene Harris Member: Call-A-Service Inc v. An Anonymous Employee (April 28, 2008), Doc. 1812-06- PE (Ont. P.E.H.T.) — referred to Hudson v. Hamilton Police Assn. (2010), 2010 CarswellOnt 18002 (Ont. P.E.H.T.) — distinguished Niagara (Regional Municipality) v. CUPE, Local 1287 (1999), 9 P.E.R. 25, 1999 CarswellOnt 7610 (Ont. P.E.H.T.) — distinguished O.N.A. v. Women’s Christian Assn. of London (1995), 6 P.E.R. 171, 1995 Cars- wellOnt 7025 (Ont. P.E.H.T.) — referred to Ongwanada v. OPSEU, Local 433 (2001), 12 P.E.R. 1, 2001 CarswellOnt 10844, [2001] O.P.E.D. No. 9 (Ont. P.E.H.T.) — considered Welland County General Hospital v. S.E.I.U., Local 204 (1994), 5 P.E.R. 12, [1994] O.P.E.D. No. 36, 1994 CarswellOnt 7267 (Ont. P.E.H.T.) — considered Windsor Star (The) v. C.E.P., Local 517-G (2009), [2009] O.P.E.D. No. 34, 2009 CarswellOnt 9784 (Ont. P.E.H.T.) — considered

Cases considered by Ann Burke Member (dissenting): Hudson v. Hamilton Police Assn. (2010), 2010 CarswellOnt 18002 (Ont. P.E.H.T.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion O.N.A. v. Women’s Christian Assn. of London (1995), 6 P.E.R. 171, 1995 Cars- wellOnt 7025 (Ont. P.E.H.T.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion Statutes considered by Patrick Kelly V-Chair, Irene Harris Member: Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A Generally — referred to Pay Equity Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.7 Generally — referred to Pt. II — referred to Pt. III — referred to s. 4 — considered s. 7(1) — considered Peterborough (City) v. CUPE Kelly V-Chair, Harris Member 295

s. 8(1) — considered s. 8(1)(e) — considered s. 8(2) — considered s. 21.3 [en. 1993, c. 4, s. 12] — considered s. 21.3(1) [en. 1993, c. 4, s. 12] — considered

APPLICATION by union alleging breach of Pay Equity Act.

Steve Lillico, Alison Davidson, Lynda Bolton, Jeremy Bender for Applicant Lauri Reesor, Bob Kidd, Cathy Lloyd for Responding Party

Patrick Kelly V-Chair, Irene Harris Member:

1 This is an application under the Pay Equity Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.7 as amended (“the Act”) in respect of an Order dated January 6, 2014 by Review Officer Gregory St. Pierre. 2 The matter proceeded by way of a hearing on April 23, 2015.

The Facts 3 The applicant, Canadian Union of Public Employees and its Local 126 (“Local 126”), and the respondent, Corporation of the City of Peter- borough (“the City”) reached an agreed statement of facts (“the ASF”) for the purposes of the hearing in this matter. The parties elected not to call any evidence and argued their respective positions based upon the ASF. 4 The ASF reads as follows: 1. The Applicant, the Canadian Union of Public Employees and its Local 126 (“Local 126”) is the certified bargaining agent representing approximately 213 full time and 48 part time employees of the Respondent, the Corporation of the City of Peterborough (“the City”). 2. The City is a municipality in eastern Ontario and is the employer of approximately 1300 employees. The City is considered a Part II Public Sector Employer for the purposes of the Pay Equity Act (“the Act”). 3. The terms and conditions of employment for its members are set out in a collective agreement between the parties. 4. As required by the Act, the City and Local 126 negotiated a Pay Equity Plan dated September 29, 1992 which was deemed approved pursuant to the Act. 296 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

5. As a result of the Act’s subsequent amendment, the parties agreed on or about March 7, 1996 to amend the deemed approved Pay Eq- uity Plan to include the proportional value method of comparison (“the 1996 Agreement”). The 1996 Agreement required that in the future wage lines be implemented as soon as possible after negotiations but did not further stipulate any future maintenance process for pay equity purposes. 6. The 1996 Agreement was replaced in 2003. On or about June 1, 2003, the City and Local 126 agreed to an Amended 2003 Propor- tional Value Plan for Local 126. The parties agreed that pay equity would be maintained using the proportional value method of comparison in accordance with Part III of the Act. 7. The Amended 2003 Proportional Value Plan does not state that certain male job classes will continue to be used for maintenance purposes. The Amended 2003 Proportional Value Plan does not create a joint maintenance process. The Amended 2003 Proportional Value Plan states the proportional value method will be used for the maintenance of pay equity in accordance with Part III of the Act. 8. The Amended 2003 Proportional Value Plan used all male comparators to generate a male wage line for comparison purposes. The Residential Mechanical Inspector (formerly called Building Inspector III) was included in generating the male wage line. 9. The Residential Mechanical Inspector was a new male job class in 2001 and thus was not previously used for pay equity comparison purposes. 10. The Amended 2003 Proportional Value Plan continued to use a modified Currie, Coopers and Lybrand gender neutral comparison system to evaluate male and female job classes within Local 126. 11. In or around 2004, the parties undertook a new gender neutral job evaluation exercise including internal equity for all bargaining unit job classes. As a result of that exercise, all job classes (male and female job classes) were evaluated and banded into the 12 “job class” bands that have existed since 1996. The negotiated gender neutral points bands for Local 126 are 45 points wide, set out in Schedule A to the collective agreement and as follows: 1 220 to 265 points 2 266 to 311 points 3 312 to 357 points 4 358 to 403 points 5 404 to 449 points 6 450 to 495 points Peterborough (City) v. CUPE Kelly V-Chair, Harris Member 297

7 496 to 541 points 8 542 to 587 points 9 588 to 633 points 10 634 to 679 points 11 680 to 725 points 12 726 to 771 points 12. Each job class within a band receives the same rate of pay and benefits regardless of gender dominance. Each job class also receives the same negotiated increase each year as set out in the collective agreement, regardless of gender dominance. In specific cases identified in Schedule A to the collective agreement, an incumbent may get “pink circled” and receive the higher wage associated with the incumbent’s original job rating but any wage increase is based on the lower band in which the job has been re- evaluated and placed. 13. The Residential Mechanical Inspector was placed in band 10 as a result of this exercise between the parties. 14. It is this banding and compensation system that is now maintained between the parties, not the original proportional value line from the Amended 2003 Proportional Value Plan. 15. On or about July 8, 2011 the Residential Mechanical Inspector job class became vacant due to the incumbent’s resignation. The Res- idential Mechanical Inspector job class is a single incumbent job class. 16. Commencing in July 2011, the City attempted to recruit for the vacant position and posted a notice of vacancy for the position across various job websites and media outlets at the original job rate set out in the collective agreement. The City was unsuccessful in finding a qualified candidate for the job class. 17. On or about July 25, 2011, the City conducted an inter-jurisdictional market salary survey for municipalities across Ontario for job classes within the Building Services Decision at the City. The market survey revealed that the City’s original job rate set out in the collective agreement for the Residential Mechanical Inspector was lower than any other municipalities across Ontario. It was similarly noted that all Inspector positions in the Building Services Division were paid lower than at other municipalities across Ontario. 18. By February 2012, the City remained unsuccessful in its attempts to recruit for the Residential Mechanical Inspector job class. 19. On February 2, 2012, the City entered into a Letter of Agreement with Local 126 which outlined a protocol for applying market adjust- 298 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

ments to salaries of positions when the City was unable to recruit a qualified candidate because of external job market reasons. 20. The Letter of Agreement is set out in Appendix D to the collective agreement. The terms of Appendix D are as follows: Re: Market Adjustments The Parties Agree as Follows: 1. Where the City can demonstrate that due to external job market reasons, it is impossible to attract and recruit qualified candidates for a position based on the evaluated job class rate of pay, the Division Head, Human Resources and the affected Department Head(s) may find it necessary to pay more than the rate of pay associated with the evaluated pay band, and may authorize assignment to a higher rate of pay and will advise the Union accordingly. 2. The vacancy shall be reposted internally in accordance with Article 10, indicating that a market adjustment will be applied. 3. All employees (incumbents) assigned to the affected position title will be increased to the higher pay band. However, if the vacancy is not filled or recruitment is cancelled, the market adjustment will not be applied. 4. An employee whose position is reclassified to a higher job class shall receive the new rate of pay in the new job class in accordance with their wage progression level in the old job class. 5. If the market adjusted position is a single incumbent position, and the position becomes vacant, the City may post the vacancy at the evaluated salary level rather than at the adjusted rate. 6. If the market adjusted position is a multi-incumbent position, and one of those positions becomes vacant, it will be posted at the market adjusted rate. 7. A review will be undertaken of any other related position which is affected by the market adjustment. 8. The JJEC shall be advised of all cases where rates other than at the evaluated job classes are in effect. Peterborough (City) v. CUPE Kelly V-Chair, Harris Member 299

21. The recruitment process for the Residential Mechanical Inspector spanned nearly two years. At least seventeen applicants were considered but were not qualified. 22. As held by the Review Officer in the Order, the chronology for the recruitment of the Residential Mechanical Inspector is as follows: Date of Posting Location of Salary Number Result job Number Posting Range of posting Candidates July-Au- 11-P-25 Ontario $53,330.42 0 inter- One inter- gust Building to nal&newline;5viewed but 2011 Officials $56,006.08 external not success- Association (original ful website; job rate) City of Pe- terborough website October 11-P-25 Peterbor- $53,330.42 6 appli- None were 2011 (repost) ough This to cants interviewed Week — 56,006.08 because they classified ad (original were not and Munici- job rate) qualified pal World website May 12-P-17 City of Pe- $64,052.52 1 internal Competition 2012 terborough to appli- placed on website in- $67,266.30 cant — hold due to ternal post- (market ad- competi- pay equity ing justment tion concerns applied) February 13-P-13 Peterbor- $53,330.42 4 appli- None were 2013 ough This to cants interviewed Week — $56,006.08 because they classified (original did not meet ad; City of job rate) qualifica- Peterbor- tions ough — internal posting 300 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

Date of Posting Location of Salary Number Result job Number Posting Range of posting Candidates March 13-P-13 Canada Mu- $64,052.52 1 internal Successful 2013 (re-post) nicipal to applicant candidate Jobs — $67,266.30 hired website; Pe- (market ad- terborough justment Examin- applied) er — news- paper Local 126 cannot confirm nor deny this process. 23. It was not until the week of March 8 to 14, 2013 that a successful candidate was hired for the single incumbent job class of Residential Mechanical Inspector. The new hire was hired at a market adjustment rate given the difficulty in recruiting. 24. The market adjustment rate to the salary range for the Residential Mechanical Inspector equated to $10,722 to $11,260.22 (i.e. the original annual salary range of $53,330.42 to $56,006.08 for 2011 was increased to $64,052.52 to $67,266.30 for 2012). 25. Approximately one month later, on or about April 12, 2013, Lo- cal 126 filed a grievance alleging that pay equity was not being maintained. 26. The parties attempted to reach an agreement with respect to the issue of the Residential Mechanical Inspector and pay equity maintenance, however, they were unsuccessful. As a result, the City filed an Application for Review Services with the Commission. 27. The Pay Equity Commission (“the Commission”) issued a decision dated January 6, 2014 in which it determined that there was no contravention of the Act. Specifically, the Commission determined that while increases made to the male job class of the Residential Mechanical Inspector did not qualify as a permissible wage difference under section 8(1)(e) of the Act, the City was not required to amend the proportional value line for maintenance purposes. The Commission determined the Residential Mechanical Inspector was not a representative male job class. 28. Since the filing of this Application, the City has encountered the same issue with respect to the following additional three male job classes falling within the Building Services Division, for which a market adjustment has been applied: Peterborough (City) v. CUPE Kelly V-Chair, Harris Member 301

(a) Senior Plumbing Inspector • Vacant as of April 1, 2013 and posted April 12, 2013 at job rate. Four applicants of which 2 were interviewed with no successful candidate. • Posted with market adjustment December 23, 2013. Seven applicants were interviewed with no successful candidate. • Posted again with market adjustment May 22, 2014. Internal applicant was promoted as an under fill. (b) Inspector Residential & Small Buildings • Vacant as of November 11, 2013. And posted with market adjustment January 9, 2014. Twenty-one applicants of which 2 were interviewed and one candidate was successful. • The other two incumbents also received the market adjustment as per Appendix D. • The job was posted at market rate as the qualifications were similar to the other positions that were previously unsuccessful in filling at job rate. • Second vacancy posted on August 8, 2014 with the market adjustment. Nineteen applicants of which 1 was interviewed and was successful. (c) Inspector Large and Complex Buildings • Vacant August 30, 2013 and posted at job rate on May 8, 2013. Ten applicants of which 1 was interviewed and was not successful. • Posted December 23, 2013 with market adjustment. 11 applicants of which 2 were interviewed • One successful candidate hired and the other incumbents also received the market adjustment as per Ap- pendix D • Second vacancy as of July 30, 2014 and posted June 19, 2014 with market adjustment. One internal applicant was successful.

The Positions of the Parties 5 Local 126 submits that it is significant that the Amended 2003 Pro- portional Value Plan (“the 2003 Plan”) utilized all male job classes within the bargaining unit, including the Residential Mechanical Inspec- 302 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

tor, for the generation of male wage line. Local 126 contends, therefore, that, in fulfilling its obligation to maintain compensation practices that provide for pay equity, the City is precluded from ignoring the market adjustment rate given to the Residential Mechanical Inspector. It must take that rate into account, and, if necessary, adjust the male wage line accordingly. Local 126 relies upon the decision of the then Chair in O.N.A. v. Women’s Christian Assn. of London (1995), 6 P.E.R. 171 (Ont. P.E.H.T.) [hereinafter Parkwood Hospital (No. 2)] for the proposition that all male jobs must be included in calculating the male pay wage line. 6 Local 126 submits that the City’s refusal to take into account the market adjusted rate for the Residential Mechanical Inspector is, in reality, an ill-conceived attempt to amend the 2003 Plan unilaterally, which, in a unionized environment, an employer cannot do without the agreement of the trade union — see Call-A-Service Inc v. An Anonymous Em- ployee [(April 28, 2008), Doc. 1812-06-PE (Ont. P.E.H.T.)] 2008 CanLII 88827. In Local 126’s submission, the City is endeavouring to re-write the 2003 Plan, and that this is something the Act does not, and the Tribu- nal cannot, countenance. 7 Local 126 says the situation is no different than, in a job-to-job comparison system, an employer refusing to adjust a female job class in circumstances where its male job class comparator received an increase in wages. The pay equity maintenance requirement obliges an employer to close any gaps between female job classes and their male job class comparators. Local 126 says that that is the situation in this case. The Resi- dential Mechanical Inspector job class (and subsequently three other male job classes), which was included in the establishment of the male wage line pursuant to the 2003 Plan, was assigned a substantial wage increase in May 2012 and March 2013, culminating in the hire in early March 2013 of an internal candidate within the new, higher wage rate. Local 126 submits that, in the absence of an exemption under section 8.1 of the Act (none of which apply in this case) the City is statutorily obli- gated to amend the male wage line having regard to the market adjustment rate now in existence for the Residential Mechanical Inspector job class, and to make any pay equity adjustments for female job classes that may be required as a result. 8 The City’s position is as follows. There was no obligation upon the City pursuant to the Act, and no agreement between the parties in the 2003 Plan, to negotiate maintenance of pay equity with Local 126. All Peterborough (City) v. CUPE Kelly V-Chair, Harris Member 303

that the City is required to do in future pursuant to the 2003 Plan is maintain pay equity using the proportional value method. 9 Since the 2003 Plan, the parties have taken the approach that all jobs, regardless of gender dominance, should be paid according to their relative internal value. All jobs within the banding system in the parties’ collective agreement, regardless of their gender dominance, are paid the same rate of pay. This is the compensation system that is now being maintained. 10 Section 21.3 is central to the issues in this case. It describes how pay equity is achieved using the proportional value method of comparison. Maintenance of pay equity is in relation to the achievement of pay equity. The achievement of pay equity under section 21.3 requires comparisons between female job classes and “representative male job classes” (or representative groups thereof); and, if warranted, a proportional adjustment in the job rate of the female job class having regard to the value of its work compared to the value of the representative male job class. 11 The Residential Mechanical Inspector job class was a “representative male job class”, as were all other male job classes, within the meaning of section 21.3 of the Act and under the 2003 Plan. However, following a somewhat prolonged and unsuccessful attempt to hire an individual into the position at the rate of pay dictated by the Residential Mechanical In- spector’s placement in band 10 under the collective agreement, the City and Local 126 devised a market adjustment plan that facilitated the setting of a higher rate of pay under certain circumstances. Thus, in the City’s view, the Residential Mechanical Inspector was no longer a “representative male job class”. Accordingly, in fulfilling its statutory obligation to maintain pay equity, the City was not required by the Act or pursuant to the 2003 Plan, having regard to the market adjusted rate for the Residential Mechanical Inspector job class, to re-draw the male wage line that had been established for the purposes of the 2003 Plan. The achievement of pay equity under section 21.3 (and therefore, concomi- tantly, the maintenance of pay equity) does not require that female job classes be compared to all male job classes, but only to representative male job classes. The City argues that its interpretation of “representative male job class” is both correct and reasonable. 12 In support of its position, the City referred us to the following decisions: Hudson v. Hamilton Police Assn. [2010 CarswellOnt 18002 (Ont. P.E.H.T.)], 2010 Can LII 61163 and Niagara (Regional Municipality) v. 304 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

CUPE, Local 1287 [1999 CarswellOnt 7610 (Ont. P.E.H.T.)], 1999 Can LII 14829.

Analysis and Conclusions 13 The issues in this matter are whether or not the City is maintaining pay equity and, specifically, whether or not the Act requires the City to amend the proportional value line or ensure its continued correctness taking into account the market adjusted pay rate of the Residential Mechani- cal Inspector job class. For the reasons that follow, we find that the City in breach of its duty to maintain pay equity. 14 The provisions of the Act relevant to the issues in dispute are: 4. (1) The purpose of this Act is to redress systemic gender discrimination in compensation for work performed by employees in female job classes. (2) Systemic gender discrimination in compensation shall be identified by undertaking comparisons between each female job class in an establishment and the male job classes in the establishment in terms of compensation and in terms of the value of the work performed. ... 7. (1) Every employer shall establish and maintain compensation practices that provide for pay equity in every establishment of the employer. ... 8. (1) This Act does not apply so as to prevent differences in compensation between a female job class and a male job class if the employer is able to show that the difference is the result of, (a) a formal seniority system that does not discriminate on the basis of gender; (b) a temporary employee training or development assignment that is equally available to male and female employees and that leads to career advancement for those involved in the program; (c) a merit compensation plan that is based on formal performance ratings and that has been brought to the attention of the employees and that does not discriminate on the basis of gender; (d) the personnel practice known as red-circling, where, based on a gender-neutral re-evaluation process, the value of a position has been down-graded and the compensation of the incumbent employee has been frozen or his or her increases in com- Peterborough (City) v. CUPE Kelly V-Chair, Harris Member 305

pensation have been curtailed until the compensation for the down-graded position is equivalent to or greater than the compensation payable to the incumbent; or (e) a skills shortage that is causing a temporary inflation in compensation because the employer is encountering difficulties in recruiting employees with the requisite skills for positions in the job class. (2) After pay equity has been achieved in an establishment, this Act does not apply so as to prevent differences in compensation between a female job class and a male job class if the employer is able to show that the difference is the result of differences in bargaining strength. ... 21.3 (1) Pay equity is achieved for a female job class under the proportional value method of comparison, (a) when the class is compared with a representative male job class or representative group of male job classes in accordance with this section; and (b) when the job rate for the class bears the same relationship to the value of the work performed in the class as the job rate for the male job class bears to the value of the work performed in that class or as the job rates for the male job classes bear to the value of the work performed in those classes, as the case may be. 15 The Act is remedial and pro-active in nature. It is designed to redress the harmful effects of gender pay discrimination against females in the workplace. Its aim is to bridge the wage gap between comparable male and female job classes in establishments, and once bridged, to prevent regression. The Act, however, permits some limited exceptions to the rule against differences in compensation between comparable male and female job classes. The Tribunal is a creature of the Act, and as such “has no power to unilaterally create exceptions to the Act.”1 16 Employers to whom the Act applies are required to establish and maintain compensation practices that provide for pay equity (subsection 7(1)). There is no issue that the City established compensation practices that provide for pay equity, through a negotiated process with Local 126,

1Windsor Star (The) v. C.E.P., Local 517-G, [2009] O.P.E.D. No. 34 (Ont. P.E.H.T.) 306 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

which ultimately resulted in the 2003 Plan. There is also no dispute between the parties that it is the City, not Local 126, which is statutorily required to maintain those compensation practices. That point is under- scored in paragraph 7 of the ASF where it is stated that “[t]he Amended 2003 Proportional Value Plan does not create a joint maintenance process.” Nevertheless, Local 126, as bargaining agent, is statutorily re- strained from agreeing to compensation practices that violate the Act. Presumably, that is why it filed a grievance in April 2013 shortly after the City hired the Residential Mechanical Inspector at the market adjustment rate without considering the effect of the higher rate of pay on the male wage line that had been created pursuant to the 2003 Plan. 17 The City’s argument seems to conflate the maintenance of pay equity and the maintenance of the compensation system under the collective agreement. The ASF, however, makes clear that these are two different concepts. Paragraph 7 of the ASF provides that “[t]he Amended 2003 Proportional Value Plan states the proportional value method will be used for the maintenance of pay equity in accordance with Part III of the Act.” This is to be compared with paragraph 14 of the ASF wherein it is stated that the banding and compensation system negotiated between the parties in 2004 and incorporated into their collective agreement “is now maintained between the parties, not the original proportional value line from the Amended 2003 Proportional Value Plan.” The clause “maintained between the parties” must be understood in the context of the collective agreement that contains the banding and compensation system (which, unlike the 2003 Plan, makes no distinction between female and male job classes), and in the context of the applicable statutory regime that governs the parties’ collective bargaining relationship (i.e., the La- bour Relations Act, 1995). We do not construe paragraph 14 to mean that the City and Local 126 reached an agreement to conduct a joint pay equity maintenance process going forward, based upon the newly negotiated banding and compensation system, or that the new system itself constituted a pay equity plan or an amended pay equity plan that is subject to maintenance within the meaning of the Act.2 The City and Local 126

2Indeed, article 23.1 of the collective agreement between the parties appears to recognize a distinction between “the Pay Equity Program” and “the internal pay policy” reflected in the banding and compensation system at Schedule A of the collective agreement. And as the Tribunal noted in Welland County General Hospital Welland County General Hospital v. S.E.I.U., Local 204 (1994), 5 Peterborough (City) v. CUPE Kelly V-Chair, Harris Member 307

may well have certain interests, rights and obligations, joint or otherwise, in relation to the banding and compensation system insofar as it constitutes a term or condition of the collective agreement between them. However, the City’s obligation to maintain pay equity under the Act (as opposed to maintenance of the banding and compensation system under the collective agreement) is in respect of the 2003 Plan. 18 Section 8 of the Act sets out a brief list of exemptions to the general rule that there shall not be differences in compensation between comparable male and female job classes.3 The City did not argue that any of the section 8 exemptions apply, including the “skills shortage” exemption in subsection 8(1)(e).4 Clearly, the payment of the market adjustment rate to the Residential Mechanical Inspector, a male job class, created a potential wage gap between it and comparable female job classes that previously had been closed through the 2003 Plan. The City says, however, that its pay equity maintenance obligation is not engaged because the Residential Mechanical Inspector is no longer a “representative male job class” within the meaning of subsection 21.3(1) of the Act, although it was such under the 2003 Plan. 19 In support of its argument, the City relies on Hudson, supra. In that matter, the employer developed a pay equity plan using the proportional value method. The employer’s establishment contained four female job classes and four male job classes. However, two of the male job classes, Executive Officer and Administrator, both senior executives, were not evaluated and were not taken into account in setting the male wage line. Their salaries were required by By-law to be calculated by reference to the salary of a position external to the employer (i.e. a First Class Con- stable employed by the Hamilton police force). The complainant, who occupied an accounting or bookkeeping position, challenged the pay equity plan, claiming that her female job class ought to have been com-

P.E.R. 12 (Ont. P.E.H.T.), the Act does not incorporate pay equity plans into collective agreements (although pay equity adjustments are incorporated). 3In Ongwanada v. OPSEU, Local 433, [2001] O.P.E.D. No. 9 (Ont. P.E.H.T.), the Tribunal wrote that, “[s]ection 8 of the Act describes the limited circumstances in which it is acceptable for different job rates to attach to comparably valued male and female job classes.” 4In its response to Local 126’s application, the City said it did not agree with the finding of the Review Officer that subsection 8(1)(e) did not apply, but that it was prepared to accept it for the purposes of this proceeding. 308 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

pared with the Executive Officer and Administrator positions. The employer took the position that those particular jobs were not representative male job classes under subsection 21.3(1). The Tribunal agreed with the employer. It viewed the two male job classes in question as not representative of the group of employees to which the complainant belonged. In coming to that conclusion, the Tribunal was clearly influenced by the fact that the salaries of the two male job classes were determined solely by reference to the salary level of a position in an entirely different organization. Accordingly, the employer was not required, as part of the achievement of pay equity, to compare the complainant’s job class to that of the disputed male job classes, as they were not representative male job classes. 20 The Hudson case is not on all fours with this case. It involved a non- union pay equity plan, and the question before the Tribunal did not concern pay equity maintenance, but rather whether or not the employer had achieved pay equity through the proportional value process. Moreover, the employer in that case, unlike the City in this matter, had no control over the compensation payable to the two male job classes in question. The Tribunal found that pay equity had been achieved notwithstanding the exclusion of the two male job classes from the male wage line, because those job classes were not “representative”. In reaching that finding, the Tribunal was most influenced by the fact that the compensation for the disputed male job classes was determined by a By-law and by reference to the salary of a position in an external organization. 21 The Hudson case does not set out, or even anticipate, the circumstances that would justify the emergence of a wage gap between comparable female and male job classes after the achievement of pay equity. It does not stand for the principle that a job class identified in a negotiated pay equity plan as a representative male job class may later be treated as non-representative under certain conditions. 22 One of the problems with the City’s argument that a male job class that was representative for the purposes of achieving pay equity may not be representative for purposes of pay equity maintenance is that there is no express language under the Act to support such a proposition. Subsec- tion 23.1(1) confines itself to the conditions upon which the achievement of pay equity using the proportional value method is determined. On the other hand, the Act, in section 8, expressly sets out the specific circumstances in which discrepancies in compensation between comparable male and female will not be treated as unlawful. In a sense, what the City Peterborough (City) v. CUPE Kelly V-Chair, Harris Member 309

is proposing in this case is a new set of circumstances that it says ought to exempt it from having to engage in the maintenance process and avoid the consequences that might otherwise follow such a review. 23 A further problem with the position of the City is found in the Letter of Agreement described at paragraph 20 of the ASF. Although the Letter of Agreement confers wide discretion to the City to assign a higher rate of pay than the rate established under the collective agreement to any position, paragraph 7 (“A review will be undertaken of any other related position which is affected by the market adjustment.”) contemplates that market pay adjustments do not necessarily occur in isolation. Paragraph 7 of the Letter of Agreement recognizes that a pay adjustment to one position can affect other related positions. In such circumstances a “review” is required, and presumably such a review is intended to lead to remedial consequences if warranted. This is precisely the kind of process that the maintenance of pay equity envisions. After pay equity has been achieved, circumstances in the workplace may change over time, and may warrant corrective action so that pay equity is maintained. An adjustment in the compensation of a male job comparator is just one such obvious example. 24 In summary: there is no question that, in respect of the 2003 Plan, the Residential Mechanical Inspector was properly included as a representative male job class for purposes of the proportional value exercise that resulted in the creation of the male wage line. The Act does not say expressly that a representative male job class can later be treated as unrepresentative. None of the section 8 exemptions apply in this case. The parties’ 2004 banding and compensation system does not constitute a pay equity plan or an amended pay equity plan that is subject to the maintenance requirement under the Act. The Letter of Agreement between the parties specifically requires a review of related positions where the City assigns a market adjustment to any given position. In light of all these circumstances, we are not persuaded that the Act shields the City from its obligation to maintain the 2003 Plan following the market pay adjustment made in relation to the Mechanical Residential Inspector job class. 25 For these reasons, the application is granted. 26 We declare that the City has failed to maintain pay equity, and is therefore in violation of subsection 7(1) of the Act. 27 We order the City to review the proportional value wage line that was used to establish the 2003 Plan, taking into account the market adjustment rate for the Mechanical Residential Inspector job class, and to pay 310 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

any pay equity adjustments that may, as a result, be payable to female job classes retroactive to the date of employment of the incumbent in the Mechanical Residential Inspector job class in March 2013.

Ann Burke Member (dissenting):

28 I respectfully dissent from the majority decision. For the reasons that follow, I would find that the City was not required to amend the proportional value line or ensure its continued correctness taking into account the market adjusted pay rate of the Residential Mechanical Inspector job class, and is therefore not in breach of its duty to maintain pay equity. 29 The 2003 Plan between the parties does not state that certain male job classes will continue to be used for maintenance purposes, notwithstanding that all male job classes were used to generate a male wage line for comparison purposes. All that the 2003 Plan establishes regarding maintenance, is that the Act’s proportional value method will be used for the maintenance of pay equity. 30 While all of the facts set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts (“the ASF”) are relevant to the determination in this matter, some of the facts are more significant than others, and bear further comment. First of all, I note the parties’ agreement that the compensation practices flowing from the post-2003 Plan banding and compensation system described in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the ASF, and not the proportional value line from the 2003 Plan itself, are what must be maintained by the City for pay equity purposes: see paragraph 14 of the ASF. That compensation system reflects a compensation policy to pay all jobs within a pay band, whether male or female or gender neutral job classes, the same rate of pay. That, in my view, signifies the parties’ acknowledgement that, be it male or female or gender neutral, the value of any particular job, as determined by its placement in a particular band, will determine its level of compensation. Thus, for example, because all the jobs listed in Band 10, including the Residential Mechanical Inspector, perform work of rela- tively equal value to the City, they are paid within the same pay range. Such a system of compensation, properly constructed within the parame- ters of the Act, tends to redress any systemic gender wage discrimination that may have previously existed, and thus fulfills the purpose of the Act. 31 The ASF also establishes that, notwithstanding the value to the City of the work performed by the male job class of Residential Mechanical Inspector, the corresponding compensation payable to it (and all other Peterborough (City) v. CUPE Ann Burke Member 311

jobs by virtue of their inclusion in Band 10) was insufficient to attract any candidate over a lengthy period of time. Local 126 specifically recognized this dilemma in the Letter of Agreement described at paragraph 20 of the ASF. It acknowledged that, where external job market conditions made it impossible for the City to find a suitable candidate to fill a job at the rate of pay corresponding to its internal value, the City could assign a higher rate of pay to that job. That was the situation with respect to the Residential Mechanical Inspector. Thus pursuant to the Letter of Intent, the City assigned the Residential Mechanical Inspector a market adjustment rate. That effectively put the compensation paid to a Residen- tial Mechanical Inspector even beyond the highest band in the compensation system applicable to the bargaining unit. But its placement there had nothing to do with its internal value to the City. 32 The City argued, and Local 126 did not disagree, that this case turns largely on the statutory interpretation of “representative male job class” within section 21.3(1). That term was the subject of considerable analysis in the Hudson v. Hamilton Police Assn. [2010 CarswellOnt 18002 (Ont. P.E.H.T.)] decision referred to in the majority decision which, in my view, is useful in the disposition of this proceeding. Beginning at paragraph 51, the Tribunal wrote: 51. The PV methodology provides a means by which the value/compensation ratio of female job classes in an establishment may be compared to the value/compensation ratio of male job classes in an establishment. The Act is clear that the value/compensation ratio of male job classes is to be determined having regard to one or more “representative male job classes”. The term “representative” is not defined in the Act, however its plain English meaning suggests a part standing in for a whole: clearly “representative” implies that it is not necessary to include “every” male job class in the PV analysis: Representative: serving as portrayal or symbol that presents or can present ideas to the mind; representa- tional; typical of a class or classes, containing typical specimens of all or many classes. [The Concise Oxford Dictionary (7th Ed) 1982] 52. A useful starting point for considering what “representative” might mean in this context is to recall the purpose of the Act, and the stage in the pay equity process at which the PV analysis occurs. The Act has its overall purpose the redressing of “gender discrimination” in compensation for work performed by employees in female job 312 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

classes. The process by which gender discrimination in compensation is identified involves multiple steps. The PV analysis occurs close to the end of the pay equity process — by the time it is over the only thing left to do is to state a protocol for paying out any required requirements that have been identified. It is instructive to consider what steps have already taken place: job classes have been identified; their gender predominance has been determined; an appropriate evaluation tool has been selected; job data has been gathered and the job classes have been evaluated on skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions; the point value or ranking of the jobs has occurred; and any job-to-job comparisons between male and female job classes have been identified. All of the similarities/dissimilarities in the job duties and responsibilities and conditions under which it is performed have already been taken account of in the process. By the time the PV methodology is applied the exercise has become a mathematical calculation of determining the point value/compensation ratio that best reflects the prevailing non-gender-biased (i.e. predominantly male) wage line or formula that applies to the job classes in the establishment. In this context, “representative male job class” cannot mean job classes that are “representative” of the duties performed in the work place or that perform like duties to female job classes. Rather, it must mean male job classes that are “representative” or reflective of how the employer compensates its employees when not influenced by gender-bias about the value of women’s work. We therefore reject Ms. Hudson’s submission that the EO and Adminis- trative job classes are representative because they work in the office along with her, and the Club Manager and Caretaker are not because their duties are dissimilar. 53. The Act has a targeted purpose: the redressing of “gender discrimination” in compensation. There may be a variety of factors that influence how employees are paid: who their employer is and what its sources of revenue are; where they work (the economic conditions of the local market); whether they are unionized; the bargaining strength of their union; whether they possess skills that are in short supply. The Act does not aim to “undo” or redress the effect of any of these factors, but is rather respectful of them, as reflected by the following stipulations applying where pay equity plans must be prepared: • Each employer must examine its own compensation practices. There is no industry- wide or broader comparison required (section 7(1)). Peterborough (City) v. CUPE Ann Burke Member 313

• The examination of compensation practices for each employer occurs on an establishment by establishment basis (i.e. by geographical location) (sections 7(1) and 13(1)). • There is a separate examination of compensation practices and a separate pay equity plan required for each “group” of employees in an establishment, that is for each bargaining unit in an establishment and for the unorganized employees in that establishment (section 14(1)). • Male job class comparators for female job classes are sought in the first instance within the same employee “group”. Rep- resentative male job classes for the purposes of PV are also sought in the first instance within the same employee “group” (sections 6(4) and 21.3(2)). • After pay equity has been achieved, differences in compensation between a female and male job class need not be re- dressed if they are the result of bargaining strength (section 8(2)). • Where a male job class of equal value to a female job class is paid an inflated rate because of a skills shortage, that difference is permissible, and no adjustment to the female job class rate is required (section 8(1)(e)). 54. The above observations provide some guidance about what might be considered a representative male job class for the purposes of PV. Representative male job classes are those that will best reflect the value/compensation ratio at which male job classes in the “group” are compensated. They should therefore be job classes within the same employee “group” where that is possible, and should not include a job class that is paid an anomalous rate (like the inflated rate of the male job class with skills that are in short supply). These points are addressed in a publication of the Pay Equity Office that Ms. Hudson relied on in her evidence: Step by Step to Pay Equity: Volume 3 — Using the Proportional Value Comparison Method. This publication clearly states that jobs that are paid much higher or much lower than their value are not to be included because they will distort the wage line. We agree with this observation. (emphasis added) 33 The Tribunal went on to find that the Executive Officer and Adminis- trator were not representative male job classes within the meaning of subsection 21.3 of the Act because, among other things, their value/compensation ratios were so dramatically different from the value/compensation ratios of the other two male jobs as to be judged by 314 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

the Tribunal to be “anomalous”; and secondly, and more significantly, because the salaries of the Executive Director and Administrator were tied to an external referent — the First Class Constable of an external organization. In other words, the wages of the Executive Director and Administrator did not reflect the manner in which the employer paid its male job classes for the value of the work they performed. 34 Local 126 did not offer an alternative interpretation of “representative male job class” or suggest why the Tribunal’s interpretation in Hud- son was incorrect. In my view, the Tribunal’s analysis of section 21.3 was sound. Furthermore, to the extent that O.N.A. v. Women’s Christian Assn. of London [1995 CarswellOnt 7025 (Ont. P.E.H.T.)], supra, stands for the proposition that all male job classes within an establishment must be used for the purpose of establishing proportional value — and I have considerable doubt that that decision does stand for such a proposition — I would not follow that decision. Clearly, the statute, and in particular subsection 21.3(1), does not go that far. However, the decision of the majority seems to suggest that once a representative male job class, always a representative male job class. I see no reason under the Act why that must be the case. 35 There is no question that, for the purposes of the 2003 Plan, the Resi- dential Mechanical Inspector was properly included for purposes of the proportional value exercise that resulted in the 2003 Plan. The compensation it was paid as a job in Band 10 reflected its value for work performed. It was therefore properly included with all other male job classes to establish the male wage line. 36 The market adjustment rate applied to the Residential Mechanical In- spector in 2012, which effectively took the position beyond the scope of compensation of the highest band of jobs in the bargaining unit, does not reflect the true internal value of the work it performs. Rather, the market adjustment rate was necessitated solely by market conditions which ham- pered the City’s ability to fill the vacancy when the incumbent left its employ. The market adjustment rate for the Residential Mechanical In- spector does not raise any issue of gender wage discrimination in the sense of over-valuation of the work of a male job class or under-valuation of the work of a female job class. Its current rate of pay, which exceeds that of any other bargaining unit position, makes it one of those “anomalous” male job classes which would tend to distort the male wage line. Peterborough (City) v. CUPE Ann Burke Member 315

37 Another way to think about the issue raised in this application is this. Suppose that the circumstances of this case occurred at the very time the parties were endeavouring to achieve pay equity using the proportional value method. That is, assume that the City had experienced the same difficulties finding a candidate to fill the position of Residential Mechanic Inspector, and that it made the market adjustment rate increase pursuant to the agreement of the parties as set out in the Letter of Intent. Had Local 126 filed an application claiming that the City’s refusal to include the Residential Mechanic Inspector on the male wage line constituted a failure to establish compensation practices that provide for pay equity or a failure to achieve pay equity? It seems to me unlikely that in those circumstances the Tribunal would characterize the Residential Mechanic Inspector as a representative male job class and require its inclusion for purposes of drawing the male wage line and reaching a pay equity plan. Rather, it seems likely, having regard to the analysis in the Hudson decision, that the Residential Mechanic Inspector in those circumstances would be viewed as an “anomalous” male job class, and that its exclusion from the male wage line would be justified, and not a violation of the Act’s requirement to establish compensation practices that provide for pay equity. If that is so, why then should Local 126 be placed in a better position pursuant to the pay equity maintenance provisions of the Act as compared to the Act’s imperative to achieve pay equity? 38 The Letter of Intent is a significant consideration in the determination of this matter. It demonstrates that the parties were alert to the distorting effects that market forces might bear on the internal value and associated compensation of bargaining unit jobs, and that in those limited circumstances, the City could depart from the established principles that under- score the compensation policy reflected in the banding system agreed to in 2004. In a sense, this allowed the City to pluck the Residential Mechanic Inspector job class from Band 10 and assign it a rate that exceeded all other bargaining unit job classes as if its value exceeded their value. In such circumstances, the City is not required, as part of its obligation to maintain pay equity, to re-visit the male wage line that was established in respect of the 2003 Plan. 39 The decision of the majority seems to suggest that there is no way that a representative male job class utilized for the achievement of pay equity can ever become “non representative” in the maintenance period following the achievement of pay equity. In my view, there is no reason in principle to construe the Act in that fashion, particularly where, as 316 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

here, it is clear that the market adjustment rate for the Residential Mechanic Inspector has nothing to do with gender discrimination. 40 Given the unique circumstances of this case, I would have found that the City is not statutorily required to consider drawing a new male wage line as a maintenance measure in response to the market adjustment wage increase for the Residential Mechanical Inspector. 41 For these reasons, I would have dismissed the application. Application granted. Phipps v. Canada Post Corp. 317

[Indexed as: Phipps v. Canada Post Corp.] Ronald Phipps, Applicant and Canada Post Corporation, Respondent Federal Court Docket: T-127-15 2015 FC 1080 Patrick Gleeson J. Heard: August 18, 2015 Judgment: September 15, 2015 Human rights –––– Practice and procedure — Commissions, tribunals and boards of inquiry — Complaints and pleadings — Summary dismissal of complaint — Miscellaneous –––– Complainant, who identified himself as Afri- can-Canadian, was employed by corporation as letter carrier since 2002 — Complainant resigned in November 2013 and filed complaint with Canadian Human Rights Commission alleging that, compared with Caucasian and Asian employees, he was treated in adverse and differential manner by supervisory personnel, and subjected to harassment in workplace — Commission investigator issued report recommending complaint be dismissed because complainant failed to bring forward evidence demonstrating adverse differential treatment due to his national/ethnic origin, colour or sex; termination of his employment; or that he experienced harassment at workplace due to his national/ethnic origin, colour or sex — Commission provided complainant with opportunity to make submission on investigation report — Commission ultimately dismissed complaint on the basis that inquiry was not warranted because evidence against corporation did not support complainant’s allegations of discriminatory treatment and harassment — Complainant brought application for judicial review of commission’s decision — Application dismissed — Commission’s decision was reasonable — Complainant and corporation were treated in even-handed manner in placing information before Commission as part of investigative process, or in respect of commission’s direction that volume of material to be considered in response to investigation report would be limited — There was no error or breach of fairness as result of commission limiting length of complainant’s initial complaint or his response to investigation report — Investigator interviewed witnesses suggested by complainant with direct knowledge and information related to complainant’s specific allegations or who had responsibilities within corporation or union that would have given them knowledge of alleged incidents, had they been reported — Complainant failed to supply direct evidence to support allegations of discriminatory conduct, and witnesses interviewed either 318 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th) failed to identify corroborating evidence or disclosed non-discriminatory basis for alleged actions — As result, investigator’s decision not to pursue further witnesses or documentation was not unreasonable omission amounting to failure to investigate. Human rights –––– Practice and procedure — Commissions, tribunals and boards of inquiry — Evidence — Witnesses –––– Commission investigator issued report recommending complaint be dismissed because complainant failed to bring forward evidence demonstrating adverse differential treatment due to his national/ethnic origin, colour or sex; termination of his employment; or that he experienced harassment at workplace due to his national/ethnic origin, colour or sex — Commission ultimately dismissed complaint on the basis that inquiry was not warranted because evidence against corporation did not support complainant’s allegations of discriminatory treatment and harassment — Complain- ant brought application for judicial review of commission’s decision — Applica- tion dismissed — Complainant failed to supply direct evidence to support allegations of discriminatory conduct, and witnesses interviewed either failed to identify corroborating evidence or disclosed non-discriminatory basis for alleged actions — As result, investigator’s decision not to pursue further witnesses or documentation was not unreasonable omission amounting to failure to investigate. Cases considered by Patrick Gleeson J.: Bell Canada v. C.E.P. (1998), 98 C.L.L.C. 230-047, 1998 CarswellNat 2203, (sub nom. Bell Canada v. Communications, Energy & Paperworkers Union of Canada) 233 N.R. 87, [1998] F.C.J. No. 1609, (sub nom. Bell Canada v. Communications, Energy & Paperworkers Union of Canada) [1999] 1 F.C. 113, 167 D.L.R. (4th) 432, (sub nom. Bell Canada v. C.E.P.U. (No. 3)) 33 C.H.R.R. D/1, (sub nom. Bell Canada v. Communications, Energy & Paperworkers Union of Canada) 159 F.T.R. 160 (note), 13 Admin. L.R. (3d) 64, 1998 CarswellNat 2814 (Fed. C.A.) — considered Boshra v. Canada (Attorney General) (2011), 2011 FC 1128, 2011 CarswellNat 4890, 2011 CF 1128, 2011 CarswellNat 3958, 398 F.T.R. 60 (Eng.) (F.C.) — referred to CUPE v. Air Canada (2013), 2013 FC 184, 2013 CarswellNat 469, 2013 CF 184, 2013 CarswellNat 1804, 2013 C.L.L.C. 230-018, 53 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, [2013] F.C.J. No. 230, (sub nom. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Airline Division v. Air Canada) 428 F.T.R. 162 (Eng.) (F.C.) — considered Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission) (1996), 40 C.R.R. (2d) 81, (sub nom. Bell v. Canada (Human Rights Commission)) 140 D.L.R. (4th) 193, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854, 204 N.R. 1, 27 C.H.R.R. D/173, 43 Admin. L.R. (2d) 155, 26 C.C.E.L. (2d) 1, 1996 CarswellNat 1693, 1996 CarswellNat 1694, [1996] S.C.J. No. 115, EYB 1996-67303 (S.C.C.) — considered Phipps v. Canada Post Corp. 319

Khela v. Mission Institution (2014), 2014 SCC 24, 2014 CarswellBC 778, 2014 CarswellBC 779, [2014] S.C.J. No. 24, 368 D.L.R. (4th) 630, 64 Admin. L.R. (5th) 171, 9 C.R. (7th) 1, 455 N.R. 279, 307 C.C.C. (3d) 427, 2014 CSC 24, (sub nom. Khela v. Mission Institution (Warden)) 599 W.A.C. 91, (sub nom. Mission Institution v. Khela) [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502, (sub nom. Mission Institution v. Khela) 306 C.R.R. (2d) 66, (sub nom. Khela v. Mission Institution (Warden)) 351 B.C.A.C. 91 (S.C.C.) — referred to Khosa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2009), 2009 SCC 12, 2009 CarswellNat 434, 2009 CarswellNat 435, 82 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, [2009] S.C.J. No. 12, 77 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 385 N.R. 206, 304 D.L.R. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration) v. Khosa) [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.) — referred to Lee v. Bank of Nova Scotia (2002), 2002 FCT 753, 2002 CarswellNat 1740, 2002 CFPI 753, 2002 CarswellNat 2747, 21 C.C.E.L. (3d) 33, 222 F.T.R. 223, 44 C.H.R.R. D/249, [2002] F.C.J. No. 1050 (Fed. T.D.) — considered Lubaki v. Bank of Montreal Financial Group (2014), 2014 FC 865, 2014 Car- swellNat 3681, 2014 CF 865, 2014 CarswellNat 4270 (F.C.) — referred to New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 2008 SCC 9, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, D.T.E. 2008T-223, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 372 N.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, 2008 CSC 9 (S.C.C.) — considered Shaw v. Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2013), 2013 FC 711, 2013 Car- swellNat 2222, 2013 CF 711, 2013 CarswellNat 3154, 435 F.T.R. 176 (Eng.) (F.C.) — referred to Slattery v. Canada (Human Rights Commission) (1994), [1994] 2 F.C. 574, (sub nom. Slattery v. Canadian Human Rights Commission) 73 F.T.R. 161, (sub nom. Slattery v. Canada (Human Rights Commission) (No. 1)) 22 C.H.R.R. D/205, 1994 CarswellNat 271, 1994 CarswellNat 271F, [1994] F.C.J. No. 181 (Fed. T.D.) — considered Slattery v. Canada (Human Rights Commission) (1996), 118 F.T.R. 318 (note), 205 N.R. 383, 1996 CarswellNat 348, [1996] F.C.J. No. 385 (Fed. C.A.) — referred to Tahmourpour v. Canada (Solicitor General) (2005), 2005 FCA 113, 2005 Car- swellNat 841, 39 C.C.E.L. (3d) 229, [2005] F.C.J. No. 543, 2005 C.L.L.C. 230-017, 332 N.R. 60, 27 Admin. L.R. (4th) 315, 2005 CAF 113, 2005 Car- swellNat 3078 (F.C.A.) — referred to 320 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

Statutes considered: Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 Generally — referred to s. 7 — referred to s. 14 — referred to s. 26 — referred to s. 40 — referred to s. 43(1) — referred to s. 44 — referred to s. 44(1) — referred to s. 44(3)(b)(i) — pursuant to s. 49 — referred to Public Service Employment Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, ss. 12, 13 Generally — referred to

APPLICATION by complainant for judicial review of decision of Canadian Human Rights Commission dismissing complaint.

Ronald Phipps, Applicant for himself Shaffin A. Datoo for Respondent

Patrick Gleeson J.:

1 This is an application for judicial review of the Canada Human Rights Commission’s [Commission] decision, pursuant to subparagraph 44(3)(b)(i) of the Canada Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6 [CHRA], to dismiss the applicant’s complaint against Canada Post Corporation [CPC]. The Commission found that the evidence did not support the applicant’s allegations of discriminatory treatment and harassment pursuant to sections 7 and 14 of the CHRA. 2 For the reasons that follow the application is dismissed.

I. Background 3 The applicant is a self-represented litigant who identifies himself as an African Canadian male. The respondent employed the applicant as a letter carrier commencing in December of 2002. The applicant was a member of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers [CUPW]. CPC and the CUPW are parties to a collective agreement which sets out wages and working conditions for unionized employees. 4 On November 8, 2013 the applicant resigned from CPC. On or about November 28, 2013, the applicant filed a complaint with the Commission Phipps v. Canada Post Corp. Patrick Gleeson J. 321 alleging that in comparison to Caucasian and Asian employees of CPC he was treated in an adverse and differential manner by supervisory personnel and subjected to harassment in the workplace. The applicant’s complaint alleges discrimination from 2002, but primarily focuses on alleged discriminatory conduct between February 2012 and November 2013. He alleged seven specific instances of discrimination in the initial complaint and during the investigation: 1. a supervisor made comments to the applicant that were libelous and slanderous when he inquired about overtime pay on April 30, 2013 but that CPC supervisors took no such exception to Asian and Caucasian employees booking overtime in similar circumstances; 2. he was called to a disciplinary meeting on April 19, 2013 for alleged misplacement of mail when Asian and Cauca- sian employees were not subject to supervisory intervention in similar circumstances; 3. he was directed by his supervisor on March 28, 2013 not to be in possession of mail while riding his bike when Cauca- sian peers were permitted to use bicycles, personal cars, or golf carts to assist them in the performance of their mail delivery duties; 4. CPC failed to address numerous acts of vandalism committed with respect to cars the applicant had parked on CPC property prior to 2012, and that post 2012 he alleged he had five bicycles vandalized in the parking lot at his place of employment; 5. he was subjected to excessive work hours and paid less than his Caucasian and Asian peers; 6. he was tricked into resigning from his employment on No- vember 8, 2013 when, a CPC manager led him to believe, at a meeting on October 7, 2013, that CPC would accept his proposal to resign and settle all outstanding grievances in exchange for a cash payment from CPC; and 7. he was subjected to racial and intra-racial slurs in the workplace and, despite complaints to both CPC and CUPW, no action was taken. 322 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

5 CPC provided a written response to the applicant’s complaint. The applicant subsequently provided the Commission with numerous written submissions between March, and September 2014. 6 On May 21, 2014, a Commission Investigator wrote to the applicant advising that she would be investigating the applicant’s complaint. In conducting the investigation the Commission Investigator reviewed the applicant’s and respondent’s written material, interviewed the applicant, and interviewed the following additional individuals: (1) CPC Supervi- sor, Michael Mak; (2) CPC Human Rights and Legislated Programs Of- ficer, Kelly Edmunds; (3) the applicant’s CPC Supervisor, John Jackson; (4) the CPC Manager of Delivery Operations, Joseph Mateus; (4) CPC Letter Carrier, Jeffrey Chaisson; and (5) CUPW Grievance Officer, Learie Charles. 7 On November 6, 2014, the Commission Investigator issued an Inves- tigation Report recommending the dismissal of the applicant’s complaints pursuant to subparagraph 44(3)(b)(i) of the CHRA because the applicant failed to bring evidence demonstrating: (1) adverse differential treatment due to his national/ethnic origin, colour or sex; (2) the termination of his employment; or (3) that he experienced harassment at the workplace due to his national/ethnic origin, colour or sex. 8 The Commission provided the applicant with an opportunity to provide submissions on the Investigation Report, which he did on November 11, 2014. The applicant’s response notes that his ability to defend himself was compromised by many factors that include; (1) the CPC and CUPW employees that provided feedback to the Commission were pro- tecting their own employment and a culture of discrimination; (2) that he was forced to defend his rights without video or audio tape while also doing his best to protect former Caucasian and Asian peers he viewed as friends; and, (3) the failure of the Investigator to review CPC written log books which would have demonstrated that despite written policies and a collective agreement management frequently relied on a clause in the collective agreement intended to ensure mail delivery in adverse circumstances to advance bias and unwritten rules that primarily benefitted Cau- casian and Asian employees. The applicant also expressed concerns with the Investigator’s apparent failure to contact a list of potential witnesses the applicant had provided. The applicant further raised a number of fresh allegations of differential treatment based on race and gender discrimination by CPC employees and CUPW officers, and stated that his complaint has been mishandled by various Commission representatives. Phipps v. Canada Post Corp. Patrick Gleeson J. 323

II. Decision 9 On January 15, 2015 the Commission dismissed the complaint and closed the file pursuant to subparagraph 44(3)(b)(i) of the CHRA, finding an inquiry into the complaint was not warranted. The Commission’s decision letter advises the applicant that prior to rendering the decision the Commission reviewed both the Investigation Report and the response provided by the applicant. 10 The Commission’s decision letter does not provide further reasons in support of the decision. As such, the Investigation Report itself constitutes the reasons for the decision (Boshra v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 1128 (F.C.) at para 48, (2011), 398 F.T.R. 60 (Eng.) (F.C.)). 11 The Investigation Report describes the complaint and the investigation process followed in addressing each of the three areas where discrimination on a prohibited ground was alleged. In each case the first step in the investigation was to examine whether there was support for the applicant’s allegation. This involved a consideration of each of the specific allegations and whether the evidence established the constituent elements of the alleged discrimination. Step 2, which was to be pursued only where there was evidence supporting the allegation of discrimination on a prohibited ground, involved a consideration of whether or not the respondent’s actions could be reasonably explained. 12 The Investigation Report set out each of the applicant’s allegations, reviewed the information obtained in the course of the investigation, and reached a conclusion in respect of each.

A. Adverse Differential Treatment 13 The Commission addressed the five specific instances cited by the applicant, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate adverse differential treatment due to his race, colour, national or ethnic origin and/or sex. 14 First, the Commission found the evidence did not support the applicant’s contention that a CPC supervisor made a “specific charge of double dipping” against the applicant after the applicant had requested overtime for preparing unaddressed mail. The Commission found that the collective agreement between CPC and CUPW contained a specific process for overtime requests. This process allowed a supervisor to determine the reason for an employee’s request for overtime. The supervisor’s use of the expression “double dipping” in addressing the applicant’s request for overtime was an attempt to impress upon the applicant that the 324 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

request was not proper practice as a bonus was paid for work related to unaddressed flyer preparation under the collective agreement. Claiming overtime to perform this work would result in an employee being paid twice. The applicant brought no evidence demonstrating that the CPC subjected the applicant to an inconsistent process or that Caucasian and Asian letter carriers were subject to a different process. 15 Second, the evidence did not support the applicant’s reported reason for being asked to attend a meeting relating to undelivered mail on April 19, 2013. Instead, the Commission found the evidence demonstrated that CPC had asked the applicant to attend a meeting regarding the mis-delivery of mail to an address on his route. The applicant did not attend the scheduled meeting as was his right under the collective agreement. The Commission found no evidence that the CPC took any specific disciplinary action against the applicant for either failed delivery and/or his non- attendance at the meeting. Furthermore, the Commission found that the applicant provided no evidence to support the allegation that management was negligent in addressing violations of the collective agreement by unnamed Caucasian and Asian employees. 16 Third, the evidence did not demonstrate that CPC discriminatorily prohibited the applicant from delivering mail when riding his bicycle on March 28, 2013. There was evidence that at least two mail carriers did use bicycles prior to March 2013 but not after that date. The Commission found that the evidence indicated that health and safety concerns guided CPC’s request that the applicant not use his bicycle to deliver mail. The Commission also noted that the collective agreement allows a carrier to request the use of a golf cart or a similar cart to assist in mail delivery. The Commission found no evidence that the applicant ever requested the provision of a golf or similar cart to assist him or whether his route could have accommodated such use. 17 Fourth, no evidence supported the existence of alleged incidents of racially motivated vandalism. The Commission held that both CUPW and Canada Post Labour Relations have processes to address incidents of vandalism so long as the complainant brings proof. However, the Com- mission found that the applicant never reported incidents of vandalism to CUPW or to CPC. The Commission held that the failure to report the alleged incidents precluded a conclusion that the respondent had failed to act. The Commission also notes that the applicant did not provide any evidence to show the alleged damage such as pictures or statements. Phipps v. Canada Post Corp. Patrick Gleeson J. 325

18 Fifth, the Commission found there was no evidence to support the allegation that CPC refused to adequately compensate the applicant for assignments that exceeded an eight hour day. The applicant provided no information respecting financial advantages to the Asian and Caucasian peers whom he believed had superior advantages to him. The Commis- sion found that the evidence showed a process existed under the collective agreement to address employee concerns if he/she believed there had been an undervaluing of his/her route. The applicant did not pursue this avenue. Furthermore, the Commission found that when the applicant raised the issue of improper compensation with his CUPW representative the applicant was unwilling to provide any specific information. The applicant also alleged a claw back of wages when an insurer denied a portion of the applicant’s short term disability claim. The Commission found nothing inappropriate in the CPC recovering the overpaid funds. The Investigation Report also notes the applicant’s position that the insurer unfairly terminated his sick leave and finds that the applicant chose not to appeal the insurer’s decision.

B. Termination of Employment 19 The Commission found that the evidence did not support the applicant’s allegation that CPC tricked him into resigning. Rather the Com- mission found that the evidence demonstrated that the applicant volunta- rily resigned from his employment to access the commuted value of his pension which he would not be able to do once he reached 50 years of age. His 50th birthday was approaching. The Commission also noted that the applicant stated he had financial issues which the denial of sick benefits exacerbated all of which led him to submit his resignation to access his pension benefits.

C. CPC failed to provide a harassment free work environment 20 The Commission found that the applicant did not have a record of an incident where he alleged being subjected to racial slurs in the form of a written message on the wall of an apartment building on his route. The Investigation Report notes that the applicant says that he could not state whether or not he had reported the incident to management or the CUPW and the Commission finds that it appears the incident was not reported. As a result the Commission could not conclude that CPC had failed to act. It also held that the evidence demonstrates that CPC had a clear policy regarding workplace discrimination/harassment which outlines the responsibilities of management, union and employees in addressing is- 326 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

sues of this nature. Finally, the Commission made an alternative finding that the evidence does not support that this incident occurred.

III. Positions of the Parties A. Applicant 21 The applicant asserts that the Commission’s decision to dismiss his complaint is not worthy of any deference. His memorandum of fact and law reasserts the complaints and allegations advanced in his initial complaint, and advances additional allegations of discriminatory conduct by CPC employees. In oral submissions the applicant describes the Com- mission as being almost relentless in their attempts to direct the applicant back to CPC to address allegations of discrimination. He states that his verbal and written communications with the Commission were improperly interpreted by Commission employees and that interaction with the Commission investigator by telephone was combative on the part of the investigator. The applicant’s record discloses the following bases upon which the Commission’s decision is being challenged:

(1) Procedural Fairness 22 The applicant implies that the Commission breached its duty of procedural fairness by limiting the length of his submissions in advancing his original complaint and in responding to the Commission’s Investiga- tion Report. He argues that these limitations were very detrimental to attaining a just result. He further alleges ongoing communication problems with Commission employees that left him with no choice but to support his position with additional documents, emails to the Commis- sion and telephone calls.

(2) Failure to interview all witnesses and review all documents 23 The applicant also argues that the Commission improperly failed to interview all of the individuals the applicant identified as witnesses in his various communications with the Commission and to review relevant records and documents.

(3) Findings Unreasonable 24 The applicant advances various allegations in his submissions to support the argument that the Commission’s decision to dismiss his complaint was unreasonable. These allegations are not all found in the original complaint and in many cases it is unclear when they occurred relative Phipps v. Canada Post Corp. Patrick Gleeson J. 327

to the time period addressed in the applicant’s complaint. The allegations include: 1. Caucasian letter carriers were allowed to book over-time, regardless of the protocols in place but that he and another dark-skinned letter carrier were forced to comply with CPC protocols; 2. A situation involving a CPC supervisor who made racist re- marks about Black males, including the applicant. The applicant’s submissions also indicate that this individual’s employment was subsequently terminated by CPC for inappropriate workplace conduct in relation to a female Afri- can-Canadian employee; 3. CPC management’s failure to take action against a CPC employee who used racial slang in front of Caucasian and Asian Supervisors and CUPW Representatives and referred to the applicant in a derogatory manner. The applicant further alleges this individual spat in his face during a dispute over the return of another employee’s overtime form and no action was taken; and 4. CPC management’s failure to take action in response to an incident where the screws from the stool at the applicant’s workstation were removed, causing the stool to collapse with injury to the applicant when he attempted to sit down.

(4) Remedies 25 The applicant is seeking relief in the form of monetary damages and what is described as a public service remedy to address the overlap between municipal bodies, tribunals and commissions that lack the authority to handle legal complaints against federal regulated entities and or companies and organizations with a unionized workforce.

(5) Additional written material 26 At the outset of his oral submissions the applicant sought to put a lengthy written document before the Court containing his oral arguments and submissions. The respondent objected to the document and the Court denied the request. The applicant presented the full contents of the document to the Court as his oral submission. 328 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

B. Respondent 27 The respondent argues that the Commission’s decision to dismiss the complaint in this case engages questions of mixed fact and law. The respondent notes that previous jurisprudence has adopted reasonableness as the appropriate standard of review where a complaint has been dismissed by the Commission pursuant to subparagraph 44(3)(b)(i) of the CHRA. The respondent submits that the Commission’s decision in this case should be reviewed on a reasonableness standard. 28 The respondent undertakes a point-by-point summary of the Commis- sion’s decision and submits that each finding was supported by the evidence and reasonable.

IV. Issues 29 After reviewing the applicant’s record and hearing his oral submissions, I would frame the issues raised as follows: 1. Did the Commission improperly limit the length of the applicant’s written submissions in making his initial complaint and in responding to the Investigation Report? 2. Did the Commission err in not interviewing all identified witnesses and considering documents identified by the applicant? 3. Was the Commission’s decision to dismiss the applicant’s complaint reasonable?

V. Analysis A. Standard of Review 30 The applicant’s arguments relating to Commission imposed limitations on the length of his written submissions, as well as the decision not to interview all of the applicant’s proposed witnesses engage the question of whether or not the Commission conducted a thorough and neutral investigation; meaning was the Commission’s process procedurally fair (Slattery v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1994] F.C.J. No. 181 (Fed. T.D.) at paras 49, 69, (1994), 73 F.T.R. 161 (Fed. T.D.), aff’d [1996] F.C.J. No. 385, 205 N.R. 383 (Fed. C.A.)) [Slattery]). I will discuss this duty of procedural fairness later in these reasons. Alleged breaches of procedural fairness are to be reviewed on a standard of correctness (Khela v. Mission Institution, 2014 SCC 24 (S.C.C.) at para 79, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502 (S.C.C.); Khosa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship Phipps v. Canada Post Corp. Patrick Gleeson J. 329

& Immigration), 2009 SCC 12 (S.C.C.) at para 43, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.)). 31 The decision to dismiss the applicant’s complaint engaged questions of mixed fact and law that involves the exercise of discretion. This is a question to be reviewed by this Court using the standard of reasonableness: (Lubaki v. Bank of Montreal Financial Group, 2014 FC 865 (F.C.) at para 37; Shaw v. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2013 FC 711 (F.C.) at para 24, (2013), 435 F.T.R. 176 (Eng.) (F.C.)). 32 In reviewing the decision of the Commission I am also mindful that Parliament intended to extend a significant degree of latitude to the Com- mission in the performance of its functions. As noted by Justice Robert D´ecary in Bell Canada v. C.E.P., [1998] F.C.J. No. 1609, 13 Admin. L.R. (3d) 64 (Fed. C.A.) [Bell Canada] at para 38: [38] The Act grants the Commission a remarkable degree of latitude when it is performing its screening function on receipt of an investigation report. Subsections 40(2) and 40(4) and sections 41 and 44 are replete with expressions such as “is satisfied”, “ought to”, “reasonably available”, “could more appropriately be dealt with”, “all the circumstances”, “considers appropriate in the circumstances” which leave no doubt as to the intent of Parliament. The grounds set out for referral to another authority (subsection 44(2)), for referral to the President of the Human Rights Tribunal Panel (paragraph 44(3)(a)) or for an outright dismissal (paragraph 44(3)(b)) involve in varying degrees questions of fact, law and opinion (see Latif v. Canadian Human Rights Commission, [1980] 1 F.C. 687 (C.A.), at page 698, Le Dain J.A.), but it may safely be said as a general rule that Parlia- ment did not want the courts at this stage to intervene lightly in the decisions of the Commission. 33 I therefore will apply the correctness standard of review in addressing Issues 1 and 2. Issue 3 will be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness, recognizing the broad degree of latitude the language of section 44 of the CHRA extends to the Commission in making decisions on the referral or the outright dismissal of complaints.

B. Role of the Commission 34 Before addressing the decision of the Commission there is value in considering the role and function of the Commission in the complaint process established under the CHRA. 35 The Commission is established under section 26 of the CHRA and consists of a Chief Commissioner, a Deputy Chief Commissioner and 330 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

three to six members. Section 32 provides for the appointment of such officers and employees as necessary for the proper conduct of the work of the Commission in accordance with the Public Service Employment Act, SC 2003, c. 22, ss 12, 13. 36 Complaints alleging discriminatory practice are received by the Com- mission and, with exceptions, where the Commission has reasonable grounds to believe a person has engaged or is engaging in a discriminatory practice, as defined in the CHRA, the Commission may initiate a complaint (section 40). Where a complaint is initiated, the Commission may designate a person to investigate the complaint (section 43(1)). The Investigator shall investigate and submit a report to the Commission (section 44(1)). 37 Upon receipt of the report the Commission will dispose of the complaint in one of three manners: (1) refer the complaint to an appropriate external authority where the Commission is of the opinion that the complainant ought to exhaust grievance or review procedures otherwise reasonably available or the complaint could be more appropriately dealt with by means of a procedure provided for under an Act of Parliament other than the CHRA; (2) where the Commission believes an inquiry is warranted, refer the complaint to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal requesting the Chairperson to institute an inquiry under section 49 of the CHRA; or (3) where the Commission is satisfied that an inquiry into the complaint is not warranted, having had regard to all of the circumstances, dismiss the complaint. 38 As noted in Bell Canada at para 35 the role of the Commission is one of “an administrative and screening body” (citing Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854 (S.C.C.) at para 58 [Cooper]) and does not decide a complaint on its merits. The primary function of the Commission is the assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence before it (Cooper at para 53).

C. Did the Commission improperly limit the length of the applicant’s submissions? 39 On the applicant’s complaint form, the Commission advises that the text setting out a complainant’s allegations must not be more than three letter-sized pages and goes on to prescribe margin and font sizes (applicant’s record page 28). However, that same complaint form also states that further documentation may be sought if the complaint is accepted. The applicant argues, the respondent was subject to no prescribed limit in Phipps v. Canada Post Corp. Patrick Gleeson J. 331

the response provided to the complaint. Similarly, the applicant objects to the 10-page limit imposed on his submissions responding to the Inves- tigation Report. The record does not indicate if a similar limit was imposed on the respondent. As a practical matter, the respondent did not provide any comments on the Investigation Report. 40 In Lee v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2002 FCT 753 (Fed. T.D.) at paras 40, 42, 44, (2002), 222 F.T.R. 223 (Fed. T.D.) [Lee], Justice Carolyn Layden-Stevenson held that while an imposed page limit, in and of itself may not be objectionable, fairness requires that any such limits be applied in an even-handed manner. I concur. 41 In this case the length of the initial complaint document was limited by the Commission whereas the respondent’s submissions in response were not. In addressing this question it is necessary to recognize the purpose of the initial complaint in the Commission’s process. The complaint is an initiating document used to allow the Commission to undertake an initial assessment as to whether or not the complaint will be accepted. It is not the sole basis for reaching a final decision on the complaint. This is reflected on the complaint form which, I repeat, states that further documentation is receivable if the complaint is accepted. 42 The Commission sought input from CPC after it had determined that the complaint would be accepted and investigated. It is in this context that CPC was requested to respond to the complaint and provide any documents supporting the CPC position. The applicant also provided additional submissions and documentation on numerous occasions after the determination to accept the complaint was made. The Commission further provided the applicant with contact information for the Investigator and an invitation to contact the Investigator. I am satisfied that the applicant and respondent were treated in an even-handed manner in placing information before the Commission as part of the investigation process. 43 Similarly, there is no indication of uneven or unequal treatment in respect of the Commission’s direction that the volume of material to be considered in response to the Investigation Report would be limited. As noted above, the imposition of a length restriction in and of itself is not objectionable. It is reflective of the need to consider the Commission’s interest in “maintaining a workable and administratively effective system” (CUPE v. Air Canada, 2013 FC 184 (F.C.) at para 67, (2013), 53 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1 (F.C.) [Air Canada]). 44 Unlike the situation in Lee, this is not a case where the Commission imposed conditions on one party but not the other. As noted, the record 332 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

does not indicate if CPC was given similar direction on the length limitations in commenting on the Investigation Report, but the question is moot in that the CPC did not make submissions. As such I find the there was no error or breach of fairness as a result of the Commission limiting the length of the applicant’s initial compliant or his response to the In- vestigation Report.

D. Failing to interview all witnesses and consider all documents 45 In determining the nature and extent of its inquiries the Commission has a procedural duty of fairness in investigating complaints. Justice Marc Nadon in Slattery determined that the content of this duty of fairness for such an investigation requires satisfying “at least two conditions: neutrality and fairness” (Slattery at para 49). However, while the Court reviews the Commission’s ability to meet this duty of fairness on the standard of correctness, my colleague Justice Anne Mactavish, discussing Slattery and other case law in Air Canada emphasized that the Courts should be deferential when reviewing an Investigator’s decision on whether to investigate a matter further: [65] Insofar as the requirement of thoroughness is concerned, the Federal Court observed in Slattery that “deference must be given to administrative decision-makers to assess the probative value of evidence and to decide to further investigate or not to further investigate accordingly”. As a consequence, “[i]t should only be where unreasonable omissions are made, for example where an investigator failed to investigate obviously crucial evidence, that judicial review is warranted”: at para 56. [66] As to what will constitute “obviously crucial evidence”, this Court has stated that “the ‘obviously crucial test’ requires that it should have been obvious to a reasonable person that the evidence an applicant argues should have been investigated was crucial given the allegations in the complaint”: Gosal v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 570, [2011] F.C.J. No. 1147at para. 54; Beauregard v. Canada Post, 2005 FC 1383, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1676at para. 21. [67] The requirement for thoroughness in investigations must also be considered in light of the Commission’s administrative and financial realities, and the Commission’s interest in “maintaining a workable and administratively effective system”: Boahene-Agbo v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1611, 86 F.T.R. 101at para. 79, citing Slattery, above, at para. 55. [68] With this in mind, the jurisprudence has established that the Commission investigations do not have to be perfect [emphasis ad- Phipps v. Canada Post Corp. Patrick Gleeson J. 333

ded]. As the Federal Court of Appeal observed in Tahmourpour v. Canada (Solicitor General), 2005 FCA 113, [2005] F.C.J. No. 543at para. 39: Any judicial review of the Commission’s procedure must recognize that the agency is master of its own process and must be afforded considerable latitude in the way that it conducts its investigations. An investigation into a human rights complaint cannot be held to a standard of perfection; it is not required to turn every stone [emphasis added]. The Commission’s resources are limited and its case load is heavy. It must therefore balance the interests of complainants in the fullest possible investigation and the demands of administrative efficacy. [Citations omitted in original] [69] The jurisprudence has also established that some defects in an investigation may be overcome by providing the parties with the right to make submissions with respect to the investigation report. [70] For example, in Slattery, the Court observed that where, as here, the parties have an opportunity to make submissions in response to an investigator’s report, it may be possible to compensate for more minor omissions in the investigation by bringing the omissions to the Commission’s attention. As a result, “it should be only where complainants are unable to rectify such omissions that judicial review would be warranted”. This would include situations “where the omission is of such a fundamental nature that merely drawing the decision-maker’s attention to the omission cannot compensate for it”. Ju- dicial intervention may also be warranted where the Commission “explicitly disregards” the fundamental evidence: all quotes from Slattery, above at para. 57. 46 The applicant identified 25 potential witnesses in correspondence to the Commission dated September 9, 2014. Some of these potential witnesses are identified by first name only or by the function they perform within CPC. The Commission Investigator did interview those individuals with direct knowledge and information related to the applicant’s specific allegations or had responsibilities within CPC or CUPW that would have given them knowledge of the incidents alleged by the applicant had they been reported. These witnesses were: (1) Mr. Michael Mak, whom the applicant alleged accused him of double dipping, attempting to call a disciplinary meeting, and clawing back monies paid to him without authorization; (2) the applicant’s supervisor, Mr. John Jackson, who instructed the applicant not to ride his bicycle while on his mail route; (3) 334 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

Mr. Jeff Chaisson who uses a CPC vehicle or his own motor vehicle but not a bicycle to deliver mail; (4) Mr. Learie Charles, the applicant’s union representative who confirmed that the applicant often did not follow the procedures in making a claim to the CUPW regarding his issues with overtime, vandalism and harassment; and (5) Kelly Edmunds, the Human Rights Representative who stated the applicant did not make complaints related to vandalism and harassment in accordance with CPC’s policy. 47 It was open to the Investigator to pursue further witnesses and information. However, the record reveals that the applicant was unable to supply direct evidence to support the allegations of discriminatory conduct. The witnesses interviewed either failed to identify corroborating evidence of discriminatory conduct or disclosed a non-discriminatory basis for the alleged actions. In the circumstances I am not satisfied that the Commission Investigator’s decision to not pursue further witnesses or documentation constituted an unreasonable omission amounting to a failure to investigate obviously crucial evidence or otherwise undermined the thoroughness of the investigation (Air Canada at para 65). It was open for the Investigator to conclude after having interviewed the above noted witnesses, considering the documentation provided by CPC and considering the documentation and submissions of the applicant that further investigation would not be pursued. The Investigator must balance the interests of the complainant in the fullest possible investigation and the demands of administrative efficacy (Tahmourpour v. Canada (Solicitor General), 2005 FCA 113 (F.C.A.) at para 39, (2005), 332 N.R. 60 (F.C.A.)). 48 That said, one issue does arise with documents relating to the incident of the alleged racial slur on a building on his route, which raises questions on the thoroughness of the investigation and the reasonableness of the decision, both of which I address below.

E. Reasonableness of the decision to dismiss the complaint 49 The applicant’s written and oral submissions advance numerous allegations relating to the Commissions work and CPC. While the applicant very capably and respectfully advanced his position before the Court, the fact remains that his arguments do not displace any of the key findings of the Commission as set out in the Investigation Report and discussed earlier in these reasons. I am left to conclude that the findings are reasonable Phipps v. Canada Post Corp. Patrick Gleeson J. 335

despite the applicant’s heartfelt disagreement with the outcome of the process. 50 As mentioned above, I note that there are two documents in the applicant’s record that suggests that he did bring the incident involving the alleged racial slur on a building on his route to the attention of CPC supervisors and CPC’s Human Rights Representative. 51 These documents appear in Exhibit C to the applicant’s affidavit. That affidavit attaches three Exhibits and categorizes them as follows at page 8 of the application record: For clarity, my Exhibit Book is presented in three distinct sections. A: Data I communicated to the CHRC - and data I received from the CHRC. B. Narrative of telephone conversations with CHRC staff. C: Information from my Personnel file and delivery violation material from CPC [emphasis in original]. 52 This implies that the Exhibit C documents were not before the Com- mission Investigator when conducting the investigation, although the applicant advised in making his oral submissions that these documents were before the Commission. 53 On the matter of the racial slur, the Investigation Report notes that the applicant could not state whether or not he had reported the incident to management or the CUPW, “He states that he did not trust that either would address the matter appropriately” (Investigation Report at para 96). There is no indication that the applicant brought this correspondence to the attention of the Commission during the investigation and there is no independent evidence in the applicant’s record to confirm the correspondence in question was sent. 54 In responding to the Investigation Report, the applicant does address the Commission’s finding of a lack of evidence to support the allegations related to the racial slur and vandalism. His comments, however, do not point to these documents or any other supporting evidence. Rather he addresses the limitation on the length of his original complaint thus failing to take the opportunity to shed any further light on his allegation; he left the Commission with his admitted inability to recall whether he even reported the incident in question to management or the CUPW. I would also note that these documents do not amount to evidence establishing that the alleged event occurred they simply indicate that the applicant 336 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 C.C.E.L. (4th)

may have brought the alleged incident to the attention of CPC supervisors. 55 It would have been preferable, had this information been before the Commission, for it to have been addressed in the Investigation Report. However, in and of itself, it does not in my opinion amount to a failure of the Commission to meet its duty of fairness. Nor does the lack of men- tion of this information render the finding of the Commission that the applicant did not report this incident unreasonable. 56 Even if it did render the conclusion on the incident unreasonable, it does not disrupt the Commission’s alternative finding at para 100 of the Investigation Report that the evidence did not support that this incident even occurred: “As the evidence does not support that the incident occurred or that the employer was notified it cannot be concluded that the employer failed to act [emphasis added].” 57 In summary I am satisfied that the Commission’s decision in this case falls within the range of legally defensible outcomes based on the facts and the law (New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9 (S.C.C.) at para 47, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.)) and dismiss the application.

Judgment THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the application is dismissed. The respondent is awarded costs in the amount of $500.00. Application dismissed.