IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER Third Series/Troisi`Eme S´Erie Recueil De Jurisprudence En Droit De L’Immigration VOLUME 97 (Cited 97 Imm

IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER Third Series/Troisi`eme s´erie Recueil de jurisprudence en droit de l’immigration VOLUME 97 (Cited 97 Imm. L.R. (3d))

EDITORS-IN-CHIEF/REDACTEURS´ EN CHEF Cecil L. Rotenberg, Q.C. Mario D. Bellissimo, LL.B. Barrister & Solicitor Ormston, Bellissimo, Rotenberg Don Mills, Ontario Toronto, Ontario Certified Specialist Certified Specialist

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CARSWELL, A DIVISION OF THOMSON REUTERS CANADA LIMITED One Corporate Plaza Customer Relations 2075 Kennedy Road Toronto 1-416-609-3800 Toronto, Ontario Elsewhere in Canada/U.S. 1-800-387-5164 M1T 3V4 Fax 1-416-298-5082 www.carswell.com E-mail www.carswell.com/email Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) 173

[Indexed as: Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General)] Attorney General of Canada, Appellant and Pritpal Singh Mavi, Maria Cristina Jatuff de Altamirano, Nedzad Dzihic, Rania El- Murr, Oleg Grankin, Raymond Hince, Homa Vossoughi and Hamid Zebaradami, Respondents Attorney General of Ontario, Appellant and Pritpal Singh Mavi, Maria Cristina Jatuff de Altamirano, Nedzad Dzihic, Rania El- Murr, Oleg Grankin, Raymond Hince, Homa Vossoughi and Hamid Zebaradami, Respondents and South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario, Canadian Council for Refugees, Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence against Women and Children and Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Interveners Supreme Court of Canada Docket: 33520 2011 SCC 30 McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ. Heard: December 9, 2010 Judgment: June 10, 2011 Immigration and citizenship –––– Admission — Immigrants — Family class — Dependent family member –––– Sponsors brought applications to sponsor family members for entry to Canada and signed required undertakings promising to provide for relatives’ needs and to ensure relatives would not require social assistance during sponsorship period — Immigration Act and its successor Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) provided that amount of social assistance paid to relative during sponsorship period was debt owed by sponsor to government and that debt “may be recovered” either by federal or provincial government that made payment — Ontario sought repayment — Eight sponsors claimed they were unable to pay due to circumstances beyond their control — Sponsors brought application for declaration discharging them from debt — Application was dismissed — Trial judge found that IRPA did not impose obligation on government to consider sponsors’ circumstances on case-by-case basis — Trial judge found that Parliament intended to simplify debt enforcement and did not intend there to be formalized process — Use of “may be recovered” did not require exercise of discretion or give rise to duty of procedural fairness — Sponsors appealed — Appeal was allowed — Trial judge erred in finding that words “may be recovered” were merely enabling and did not also confer discretion on governments — Federal and provincial govern- 174 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d) ments have case-by-case discretion whether to enforce sponsorship debt, taking into account sponsor’s submissions concerning sponsor’s circumstances and those of his or her sponsored relatives — Ontario was found to have fettered its discretion by adopting policies that were inconsistent with provisions of family class immigration regime — Duty of procedural fairness is owed when governments enforce sponsorship debt — Duty of procedural fairness included obligation to provide sponsors with process for explaining their own and their sponsored relative’s relevant personal and financial circumstances, obligation to consider those circumstances, and obligation to inform any sponsor who makes submissions that their submissions have been considered and of decision — Governments appealed — Appeal allowed in part — Court of Appeal erred in finding that Ontario fettered its discretion — Duty of fairness was owed to sponsors but Ontario’s procedures met that duty as they provided for some opportunity for sponsors to make submissions and allowed for deferral of repayment — Ability to forgive was not required to meet duty of fairness. Administrative law –––– Requirements of natural justice — Right to hearing — Duty of fairness –––– Sponsors brought applications to sponsor family members for entry to Canada and signed required undertakings promising to provide for relatives’ needs and to ensure relatives would not require social assistance during sponsorship period — Immigration Act and its successor Immi- gration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) provided that amount of social assistance paid to relative during sponsorship period was debt owed by sponsor to government and that debt “may be recovered” either by federal or provincial government that made payment — Ontario sought repayment — Eight sponsors claimed they could not pay due to circumstances beyond their control — Spon- sors brought application for declaration discharging them from debt — Applica- tion was dismissed — Trial judge found that IRPA did not impose obligation on government to consider sponsors’ circumstances on case-by-case basis — Spon- sors appealed — Appeal was allowed — Court of Appeal found that trial judge erred by finding that government was not required to accord sponsors at least some elements of procedural fairness — Duty of fairness existed — Decision on how much of sponsorship debt to collect involved taking final position that is specific to individual sponsors — Relationships were contractual but also had significant public law component — Decision had serious financial and familial implications for sponsors — Governments’ duty of procedural fairness includes obligation to provide process for individual sponsors to explain their relevant personal and financial circumstances, obligation on government to consider those circumstances, and obligation to inform sponsor who makes submissions that submissions have been considered and of decision made — Wording of undertakings created legitimate expectation on part of sponsors that government would consider negotiating settlement of sponsorship debt as there was contem- plation of considering abuse or other circumstances, and in order to consider them, government had to hear sponsor’s submissions — Governments ap- Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) 175 pealed — Appeal allowed in part — Court of Appeal erred in finding that On- tario fettered its discretion — Duty of fairness was owed to sponsors but On- tario’s procedures met that duty as they provided for some opportunity for sponsors to make submissions and allowed for deferral of repayment — Ability to forgive was not required to meet duty of fairness. Administrative law –––– Discretion of tribunal under review — Fettered discretion –––– Sponsors brought applications to sponsor family members for entry to Canada and signed required undertakings promising to provide for relatives’ needs and to ensure relatives would not require social assistance during sponsorship period — Immigration Act and its successor Immigration and Refu- gee Protection Act (IRPA) provided that amount of social assistance paid to relative during sponsorship period was debt owed by sponsor to government and that debt “may be recovered” either by federal or provincial government that made payment — Ontario sought repayment — Eight sponsors claimed they were unable to pay due to circumstances beyond their control — Sponsors brought application for declaration discharging them from debt — Application was dismissed — Trial judge found that IRPA did not impose obligation on government to consider sponsors’ circumstances on case-by-case basis — Sponsors appealed — Appeal was allowed — Ontario’s policy to require full payment in every case improperly fettered or restricted discretion of decision-maker and amounted to improper fettering of its discretion — By limiting examples it had given to financial considerations or abuse regarding forgiveness of debt, Ontario effectively restricted other considerations that were open to decision-makers when deciding whether to defer sponsorship debt due to sponsor’s financial circumstances — Policy was inconsistent with overall legislative purposes and thus improperly fettered province’s discretion — Requirement of “documented extraordinary circumstances” raised bar higher than versions of undertakings that mandated consideration of “other circumstances” or “other appropriate circumstances” — By restricting its decision-making to deferral of enforcement based on financial circumstances and by raising bar to require documented extraordinary financial circumstances, Ontario precluded itself from doing what was contemplated by legislative scheme — Governments appealed — Appeal allowed in part — Court of Appeal erred in finding that Ontario fettered its discretion — There was no conflict between policy and discretion — Minister could defer but not forgive debts and that was perfectly allowable policy given legislation, policy reasons for getting assurances and contractual nature of debt — IRPA does not require broader discretion than was allowed. Public law –––– Social programs — Welfare benefits — Recovery of benefits — By province or territory –––– Sponsors brought applications to sponsor family members for entry to Canada and signed required undertakings promising to provide for relatives’ needs and to ensure relatives would not require social assistance during sponsorship period — Immigration Act and its successor Im- 176 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d) migration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) provided that amount of social assistance paid to relative during sponsorship period was debt owed by sponsor to government and that debt “may be recovered” either by federal or provincial government that made payment — Ontario sought repayment — Eight sponsors claimed they were unable to pay due to circumstances beyond their control — Sponsors brought application for declaration discharging them from debt — Ap- plication was dismissed — Trial judge found that IRPA did not impose obligation on government to consider sponsors’ circumstances on case-by-case basis — Trial judge found that Parliament meant to simplify debt enforcement process and not provide sponsors with opportunity to make submissions — Trial judge found that Parliament did not intend there to be formalized process for debt enforcement and found that “may be recovered” did not require exercise of discretion or give rise to duty of procedural fairness — Sponsors appealed — Appeal was allowed — Trial judge erred in finding that words “may be recovered” were merely enabling and did not also confer discretion on governments — Federal and provincial governments have case-by-case discretion whether to enforce sponsorship debt, taking into account sponsor’s submissions concerning sponsor’s circumstances and those of his or her sponsored relatives — Ontario was found to have fettered its discretion by adopting policies that were inconsistent with provisions of family class regime — Sponsors were owed duty of procedural fairness — Duty included obligation to provide sponsors with process for explaining their own and their sponsored relative’s relevant personal and financial circumstances, obligation to consider those circumstances, and obligation to inform any sponsor who makes submissions that their submissions have been considered and of decision — Governments appealed — Appeal allowed in part — Court of Appeal erred in finding that Ontario fettered its discretion — Duty of fairness was owed to sponsors but Ontario’s procedures met that duty as they provided for some opportunity for sponsors to make submissions and allowed for deferral of repayment — Ability to forgive was not required to meet duty of fairness. Public law –––– Social programs — Welfare benefits — Recovery of benefits — Miscellaneous –––– Sponsors brought applications to sponsor family members for entry to Canada and signed required undertakings promising to provide for relatives’ needs and to ensure relatives would not require social assistance during sponsorship period — Immigration Act (IA) and its successor Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) provided that amount of social assistance paid to relative during sponsorship period was debt owed by sponsor to government and that debt “may be recovered” either by federal or provincial government that made payment — Ontario sought repayment — Eight sponsors claimed they were unable to pay due to circumstances beyond their control — Sponsors brought application for declaration discharging them from debt — Ap- plication was dismissed — Trial judge found that IRPA did not impose obligation on government to consider sponsors’ circumstances on case-by-case ba- Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) 177 sis — Trial judge found that undertakings given under IA were enforceable under IRPA — Sponsors appealed — Appeal was allowed — Trial judge did not fail in finding that undertakings signed under IA were enforceable under IRPA — Section 201 of IRPA expressly stated that Regulations “may provide for measures regarding the transition” between old and new Acts, including “measures regarding financial and enforcement matters” — Transition provisions addressed undertakings — Section 337 of Immigration and Refugee Pro- tection Regulations provided that sponsor who was approved and who provided undertaking under IA was deemed to be sponsor approved under new regime — Express statutory language was not required to make old undertakings enforceable under IRPA — There was no ambiguity in transition provisions — Plain reading of s. 351(1) of Regulations in context lead to conclusion that Governor in Council intended undertakings given under IA to remain in effect and to be governed or controlled by and enforceable under IRPA — Section 351(2) of Regulations specifically provides for recovery of sponsorship debt accumulated under old undertakings — Government’s intention to impose new regime on old undertakings was evident from other provisions in Regulations — Governments appealed — Appeal allowed in part — Court of Appeal erred in finding that On- tario fettered its discretion — Duty of fairness was owed to sponsors but On- tario’s procedures met that duty as they provided for some opportunity for sponsors to make submissions and allowed for deferral of repayment — Ability to forgive was not required to meet duty of fairness. Immigration et citoyenneté –––– Admission — Immigrants — Catégorie du regroupement familial — Membre a` la charge de la famille –––– Repondants ´ ont présenté des demandes de parrainage de membres de leur famille en vue de leur admission au Canada et se sont engagés a` subvenir a` leurs besoins et de s’assurer qu’ils n’aient pas recours a` l’aide sociale pendant la période de parrainage — Loi sur l’immigration et la loi qui l’a remplacée, la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés (LIPR), prévoyaient que les montants d’aide sociale versés aux proches d’un répondant pendant la période de parrainage constituaient une dette du répondant envers le gouvernement et qu’ils « peuvent etreˆ recouvrés » par le gouvernement fédéral ou provincial ayant fait le paiement — Province de l’Ontario a entrepris des mesures de recouvrement — Huit répondants ont fait valoir qu’ils se trouvaient dans l’impossibilité de rembourser les sommes d’argent en raison de circonstances hors de leur con- trôle—Répondants ont déposé une demande en jugement déclaratoire les libér- ant des dettes — Demande a et´´ e rejetée — Juge des requêtes a conclu que la LIPR n’exigeait pas du gouvernement qu’il considère la situation de chaque ré- pondant — Juge des requêtes a conclu que l’intention du législateur etait´ de simplifier le recouvrement des créances et non de mettre en place un processus formel — Emploi des mots « peut recouvrer » ne supposait pas l’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire ni ne donnait naissance a` une obligation de respecter l’équité procédurale — Répondants ont interjeté appel — Appel a et´´ e ac- 178 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d) cueilli — Juge des requêtes a commis une erreur en concluant que les mots « peut recouvrer » etaient´ simplement habilitants et ne conféraient pas de pouvoir discrétionnaire aux gouvernements — Gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux avaient la discrétion de décider, dans chaque cas, de procéder au recouvrement des créances, compte tenu des observations présentées par le ré- pondant au sujet de sa situation et celle de la personne parrainée — On a conclu que la province de l’Ontario avait entravé sa discrétion en adoptant des politiques qui ne respectaient pas les dispositions du régime applicable en matière d’immigration d’un parent — Obligation fondée sur l’équité procédurale doit etreˆ respectée lorsque les gouvernements procèdent au recouvrement des cré- ances liées au parrainage — Obligation de respecter l’équité procédurale comprenait l’obligation de fournir aux répondants l’occasion d’exposer leur situation personnelle et financière ainsi que celles du proche qu’ils parrainaient, l’obligation de prendre en considération ces el´´ ements de même que l’obligation d’informer tout répondant ayant présenté des observations que celles-ci avaient et´´ e prises en considération et qu’une décision avait et´´ e prise — Gouvernements ont formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli en partie — Cour d’appel a commis une erreur en concluant que la province de l’Ontario avait entravé sa discré- tion — Obligation fondée sur l’équité procédurale devait etreˆ respectée a` l’égard des répondants mais les procédures de la province de l’Ontario satisfaisaient cette obligation puisqu’elles prévoyaient que les répondants avaient l’occasion de présenter des observations et permettaient de reporter le remboursement — Il n’était pas nécessaire, pour satisfaire aux exigences´ de l’équité procédurale, de pouvoir renoncer aux créances. Droit administratif –––– Exigences de justice naturelle — Droit a` l’audition — Devoir d’agir equitablement´ –––– Repondants ´ ont présenté des demandes de parrainage de membres de leur famille en vue de leur admission au Canada et se sont engagés a` subvenir a` leurs besoins et de s’assurer qu’ils n’aient pas recours a` l’aide sociale pendant la période de parrainage — Loi sur l’immigration et la loi qui l’a remplacée, la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés (LIPR), prévoyaient que les montants d’aide sociale versés aux proches d’un répondant pendant la période de parrainage constituaient une dette du répondant envers le gouvernement et qu’ils « peuvent etreˆ recouvrés » par le gouvernement fédéral ou provincial ayant fait le paiement — Province de l’Ontario a entrepris des mesures de recouvrement — Huit répondants ont fait valoir qu’ils se trouvaient dans l’impossibilité de rembourser les sommes d’argent en raison de circonstances hors de leur contrôle—Répondants ont dé- posé une demande en jugement déclaratoire les libérant des dettes — Demande a et´´ e rejetée — Juge des requêtes a conclu que la LIPR n’exigeait pas du gouvernement qu’il considère la situation de chaque répondant — Répondants ont interjeté appel — Appel a et´´ e accueilli — Cour d’appel a conclu que la juge des requêtes avait commis une erreur en concluant que le gouvernement n’était pas obligé de respecter, en partie du moins, l’équité procédurale a` l’égard des Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) 179 répondants — Obligation d’agir equitablement´ existait — Pour déterminer le montant dû a` recouvrer, il fallait prendre une position définitive propre a` chaque répondant — Relations etaient´ contractuelles mais comportaient egalement´ un important aspect de droit public — Répondants etaient´ sujets a` d’importantes conséquences d’ordre financier et familial a` la suite de cette décision — Obliga- tion des gouvernements de respecter l’équité procédurale comprend l’obligation de fournir aux répondants l’occasion d’exposer leur situation personnelle et financière, l’obligation de prendre en considération ces el´´ ements de même que l’obligation d’informer tout répondant ayant présenté des observations que celles-ci avaient et´´ e prises en considération et qu’une décision avait et´´ e prise — Libellé des engagements créait des attentes légitimes chez les répondants que le gouvernement prendrait en considération la possibilité de négocier un arrangement relatif a` la créance de parrainage puisqu’on y prévoyait la possibilité de considérer une situation abusive ou d’autres circonstances, a` condition que le gouvernement entende les observations des parrains — Gouvernements ont formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli en partie — Cour d’appel a commis une erreur en concluant que la province de l’Ontario avait entravé sa discrétion — Obligation fondée sur l’équité procédurale devait etreˆ respectée a` l’égard des répondants mais les procédures de la province de l’Ontario satisfaisaient cette obligation puisqu’elles prévoyaient que les répondants avaient l’occasion de pré- senter des observations et permettaient de reporter le remboursement — Il n’était pas nécessaire, pour satisfaire aux exigences´ de l’équité procédurale, de pouvoir renoncer aux créances. Droit administratif –––– Pouvoir discrétionnaire du tribunal faisant l’objet d’une révision — Entrave a` la discrétion –––– Repondants ´ ont présenté des demandes de parrainage de membres de leur famille en vue de leur admission au Canada et se sont engagés a` subvenir a` leurs besoins et de s’assurer qu’ils n’aient pas recours a` l’aide sociale pendant la période de parrainage — Loi sur l’immigration et la loi qui l’a remplacée, la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés (LIPR), prévoyaient que les montants d’aide sociale versés aux proches d’un répondant pendant la période de parrainage constituaient une dette du répondant envers le gouvernement et qu’ils « peuvent etreˆ recouvrés » par le gouvernement fédéral ou provincial ayant fait le paiement — Province de l’Ontario a entrepris des mesures de recouvrement — Huit répondants ont fait valoir qu’ils se trouvaient dans l’impossibilité de rembourser les sommes d’argent en raison de circonstances hors de leur contrôle—Répondants ont dé- posé une demande en jugement déclaratoire les libérant des dettes — Demande a et´´ e rejetée — Juge des requêtes a conclu que la LIPR n’exigeait pas du gouvernement qu’il considère la situation de chaque répondant — Répondants ont interjeté appel — Appel a et´´ e accueilli — Politique de la province de l’Ontario exigeant le remboursement complet dans tous les cas entravait ou restreignait indûment la discrétion du décideur et equivalait´ a` une entrave indue a` son pouvoir discrétionnaire — En limitant les exemples de considérations 180 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d) financières ou de situations abusives relativement a` la renonciation aux cré- ances, la province de l’Ontario, dans les faits, empêchait les décideurs de con- sidérer d’autres el´´ ements au moment de décider de reporter la dette de parrainage en raison de la situation financière du répondant — Politique contredisait les objectifs principaux de la loi et entravait ainsi la discrétion de la province de fa¸con indue — Exigence que des « circonstances exceptionnelles [bien documentées] » soient présentes etablissait´ une norme plus stricte que celle fondée sur le critère de « toute autre situation » ou celui des « circonstances valables » prévus dans certains engagements — En for¸cant ses décideurs a` reporter le recouvrement des créances sur le fondement de la situation financière et en etablissant´ une norme plus stricte pour exiger des circonstances exceptionnelles bien documentées, la province de l’Ontario s’empêchait de faire ce qui etait´ prévu par le régime statutaire — Gouvernements ont formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli en partie — Cour d’appel a commis une erreur en concluant que la province de l’Ontario avait entravé sa discrétion — Il n’y avait aucune incompatibilité entre la politique et l’exercice de la discrétion — Minis- tre pouvait reporter le remboursement des dettes mais pas y renoncer et cela constituait une politique parfaitement acceptable compte tenu de la législation, des raisons politiques pour obtenir des assurances ainsi que de la nature contractuelle des créances — LIPR n’exigeait pas une discrétion plus importante que ce qui etait´ permis. Droit public –––– Programmes sociaux — Prestations d’aide sociale — Recouvrement des prestations — Par une province ou un territoire –––– Re- ´ pondants ont présenté des demandes de parrainage de membres de leur famille en vue de leur admission au Canada et se sont engagés a` subvenir a` leurs besoins et de s’assurer qu’ils n’aient pas recours a` l’aide sociale pendant la période de parrainage — Loi sur l’immigration et la loi qui l’a remplacée, la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés (LIPR), prévoyaient que les montants d’aide sociale versés aux proches d’un répondant pendant la période de parrainage constituaient une dette du répondant envers le gouvernement et qu’ils « peuvent etreˆ recouvrés » par le gouvernement fédéral ou provincial ayant fait le paiement — Province de l’Ontario a entrepris des mesures de recouvrement — Huit répondants ont fait valoir qu’ils se trouvaient dans l’impossibilité de rembourser les sommes d’argent en raison de circonstances hors de leur con- trôle—Répondants ont déposé une demande en jugement déclaratoire les libér- ant des dettes — Demande a et´´ e rejetée — Juge des requêtes a conclu que la LIPR n’exigeait pas du gouvernement qu’il considère la situation de chaque ré- pondant — Juge des requêtes a conclu que le législateur voulait simplifier le processus de recouvrement des créances mais ne désirait pas donner aux ré- pondants l’occasion de présenter des observations — Juge des requêtes a conclu que l’intention du législateur n’était pas de mettre en place un processus formel de recouvrement des créances et que les mots « peut recouvrer » ne supposaient pas l’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire ni ne donnaient naissance a` une obli- Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) 181 gation de respecter l’équité procédurale — Répondants ont interjeté appel — Appel a et´´ e accueilli — Juge des requêtes a commis une erreur en concluant que les mots « peut recouvrer » etaient´ simplement habilitants et ne conféraient pas de pouvoir discrétionnaire aux gouvernements — Gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux avaient la discrétion de décider, dans chaque cas, de procéder au recouvrement des créances, compte tenu des observations présentées par le ré- pondant au sujet de sa situation et celle de la personne parrainée — On a conclu que la province de l’Ontario avait entravé sa discrétion en adoptant des politiques qui ne respectaient pas les dispositions du régime applicable en matière d’immigration d’un parent — Il y avait une obligation fondée sur l’équité procédurale a` l’égard des répondants — Obligation comprenait l’obligation de fournir aux répondants l’occasion d’exposer leur situation personnelle et financière ainsi que celles du proche qu’ils parrainaient, l’obligation de prendre en considération ces el´´ ements de même que l’obligation d’informer tout ré- pondant ayant présenté des observations que celles-ci avaient et´´ e prises en con- sidération et qu’une décision avait et´´ e prise — Gouvernements ont formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli en partie — Cour d’appel a commis une erreur en concluant que la province de l’Ontario avait entravé sa discrétion — Obligation fondée sur l’équité procédurale devait etreˆ respectée a` l’égard des répondants mais les procédures de la province de l’Ontario satisfaisaient cette obligation puisqu’elles prévoyaient que les répondants avaient l’occasion de présenter des observations et permettaient de reporter le remboursement des dettes — Il n’était pas nécessaire, pour satisfaire aux exigences´ de l’équité procédurale, de pouvoir renoncer aux créances. Droit public –––– Programmes sociaux — Prestations d’aide sociale — Recouvrement des prestations — Divers –––– Repondants ´ ont présenté des demandes de parrainage de membres de leur famille en vue de leur admission au Canada et se sont engagés a` subvenir a` leurs besoins et de s’assurer qu’ils n’aient pas recours a` l’aide sociale pendant la période de parrainage — Loi sur l’immigration (LI) et la loi qui l’a remplacée, la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés (LIPR), prévoyaient que les montants d’aide sociale versés aux proches d’un répondant pendant la période de parrainage constituaient une dette du répondant envers le gouvernement et qu’ils « peuvent etreˆ recouvrés » par le gouvernement fédéral ou provincial ayant fait le paiement — Province de l’Ontario a entrepris des mesures de recouvrement — Huit répondants ont fait valoir qu’ils se trouvaient dans l’impossibilité de rembourser les sommes d’argent en raison de circonstances hors de leur contrôle—Répondants ont dé- posé une demande en jugement déclaratoire les libérant des dettes — Demande a et´´ e rejetée — Juge des requêtes a conclu que la LIPR n’exigeait pas du gouvernement qu’il considère la situation de chaque répondant — Juge des re- quêtes a conclu que les engagements pris en vertu de la LI valaient sous le ré- gime de la LIPR — Répondants ont interjeté appel — Appel a et´´ e accueilli — Juge des requêtes n’a pas commis d’erreur en concluant que les engagements 182 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d) pris sous le régime de la LI valaient sous le régime de la LIPR — Article 201 de la LIPR prévoyait spécifiquement que les règlements « régissent les mesures visant la transition » entre l’ancienne loi et la nouvelle, notamment les « mesures financières ou d’exécution » — Dispositions transitoires s’appliquaient aux engagements — Article 337 du Règlement sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés prévoyait que le répondant qui a et´´ e autorisé et qui a pris un engagement sous le régime de la LI etait´ considéré comme un répondant autorisé sous le nouveau régime — Il n’était pas nécessaire d’avoir une disposition législative spécifique pour que les engagements soient valables en vertu de la LIPR — Dis- positions transitoires ne présentaient aucune ambigu¨ıté — Simple lecture de l’art. 351(1) du Règlement pris dans son contexte permettait de conclure que l’intention du Gouverneur en conseil etait´ que les engagements pris en vertu de la LI demeurent en vigueur, soient régis par la LIPR et soient exécutés sous son régime — Article 351(2) du Règlement prévoit expressément le recouvrement des créances de parrainage nées en vertu des anciens engagements — Il etait´ evident,´ a` la lecture d’autres dispositions du Règlement, que le gouvernement avait l’intention de soumettre les anciens engagements au nouveau régime — Gouvernements ont formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli en partie — Cour d’appel a commis une erreur en concluant que la province de l’Ontario avait entravé sa discrétion — Obligation fondée sur l’équité procédurale devait etreˆ respectée a` l’égard des répondants mais les procédures de la province de l’Ontario satisfaisaient cette obligation puisqu’elles prévoyaient que les ré- pondants avaient l’occasion de présenter des observations et permettaient de reporter le remboursement des dettes — Il n’était pas nécessaire, pour satisfaire aux exigences´ de l’équité procédurale, de pouvoir renoncer aux créances. Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) immigrants can be sponsored for entry to Canada by members of their family. In the family class immigrants are not assessed for their ability to support themselves but have their sponsor assume responsibility for them. Any claims on social assistance by that person are recoverable by the government from the sponsor. If the immigrant receives social assistance, the sponsor is deemed to be in default and the federal or provincial government may take action to collect the money. The government of Ontario took action against the eight people who had acted as sponsors for family members who had collected social assistance. The sponsors sought declarations to avoid payment. The applications were dismissed. The trial judge found that the IRPA showed there was Parliamentary intent to create a collection procedure that was administrative and that the government did not have a discretion to consider circumstances of sponsors on a case-by-case basis. The trial judge also found that the IRPA did not impose any duty of fairness towards sponsors and there was no ability in process for sponsors to make submissions before debts are collected. The trial judge found that the agreements were subject to contract law and that the sponsors were aware they would be liable when they signed the agreements. Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) 183

The sponsors appealed and the appeal was allowed. The Court of Appeal found that both the IRPA and its predecessor Immigration Act (IA) conferred a case- by-case discretion for the collection of a sponsorship debt as the word “may” in s. 118(2) of the IA and s. 145(2) of the IRPA was an indicator of some discretion for the Minister. The Court of Appeal also found that Ontario had improperly fettered or abused its discretion as it required a defaulting sponsor to repay the amount in full in every case regardless of circumstances. Settlement is contemplated in IRPA regulations and should be an option. When Ontario granted deferrals based on “documented extraordinary circumstances”, it was applying a more onerous standard than was contemplated by undertakings. The Court of Appeal also held that the governments owed a duty of procedural fairness to the sponsors and that a process must be provided so that sponsors could explain their individual circumstances and know that their information was heard and the matter was decided. As the undertakings contained a statement that the government would consider “other appropriate circumstances” in exercising its discretion, a legitimate expectation of consideration of personal situations was created. The Court of Appeal also found that the IA undertakings were enforceable under the IRPA. Canada and Ontario appealed. Held: The appeal was allowed in part. Per Binnie J. (McLachlin C.J.C., LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ. concurring): The government is restrained by the consideration of procedural fairness in making enforcement decisions regarding the debts of the sponsors. The Crown does have a limited discretion regarding the collection of the sponsorship as it can defer but not forgive the debt. This discretion attracts the duty of fairness. There is no exclusionary language in the IRPA or the IA, thus it could not be assumed that Parliament intended to allow immigration officials to be permitted to unfairly apply the legislation in collecting the debts. As procedural fairness must be determined in context, it is reasonable to consider the exchange of assurance for admission. The debt is not a benefits program. The reason for the sponsors assuring the debt is the serious concern about the public cost of the use of social programs. Ontario’s procedure for debt collection was compatible with both efficient debt collection and fairness. The duty of procedural fairness requires certain measures, including (1) notifying the sponsor at their last known address, (2) afford- ing the sponsor the opportunity to explain in writing their personal circumstances that militate against immediate collection, (3) consideration of any relevant circumstances, and (4) notification of the decision. Ontario’s policies and procedures met these requirements. Ontario did not fetter its discretion in applying this policy and met the required duty of fairness for the sponsors in this matter. While the leading case on requiring procedural fairness does make it clear that it is not required in situations governed by contract, the recovery of monies from 184 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d) sponsors arises from a cause of action that is essentially statutory. The terms of immigration sponsorship including the possibility of repayment are controlled by statute, and the undertaking is required by the IRPA and contains terms fixed by the Minister under his statutory power. The purpose and context of the IRPA do not exclude the duty of fairness as it includes a discretion to recover the debt. There is nothing in the IRPA that requires the debt be recovered regardless of the circumstances of the sponsor. The IRPA uses the words “may be recovered”, and the use of the word “may” connotes a measure of discretion which attracts the duty of fairness. While it is clear that Parliament intended the IRPA to simplify the debt collection process, nothing in the new provisions showed that they intended the collections to be done unfairly. Enforcing debt repayment without any discretion would not advance the purposes of the IRPA. The Court of Appeal erred in finding that the province’s collection policy did not allow the decision-maker to consider the relevant facts of the case and arbi- trarily imposed application of the policy. There was no conflict between On- tario’s policy and scope of discretion. Ontario did not improperly fetter the exercise of its statutory discretion. The Minister was entitled to change policy within legal limits, and allowing deferral of debt rather than forgiveness was not fettering discretion so far as to make it invalid. The federal legislative framework did not require a broader discretion. The expression at the time of the undertaking that the government may not enforce the debt does not mean that the government has to forgive the debt. That deferral, not forgiveness, is available is clear from the undertakings. However, an opportunity to make submissions regarding deferral in cases of abuse or other circumstances is a legitimate expectation from the wording of the undertakings where there are allegations of abuse or in other appropriate circumstances. Sous le régime de la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés (LIPR), des immigrants peuvent etreˆ parrainés en vue de leur entrée au Canada par des membres de leur famille. Le membre de la famille ne fait pas l’objet d’un examen pour déterminer sa capacité de subvenir a` ses besoins, c’est plutôt le ré- pondant qui assume toute responsabilité a` leur egard.´ Toute réclamation concernant l’aide sociale de cette personne peut etreˆ recouvrée par l’Etat´ auprès du répondant. Si l’immigrant re¸coit de l’aide sociale, le répondant est considéré comme etant´ en défaut et le gouvernement provincial ou fédéral peut entamer des procédures afin de récupérer l’argent. Le gouvernement de l’Ontario a en- tamé des procédures a` l’encontre de huit personnes (les répondants) qui avaient accepté de parrainer des membres de leur famille ayant re¸cu de l’aide sociale. Les répondants ont demandé des jugements déclaratoires les soustrayant a` leur obligation de remboursement. Les demandes ont et´´ e rejetées. La juge des requêtes a conclu qu’il ressortait de la LIPR que le législateur avait voulu etablir´ une procédure de recouvrement de Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) 185 nature purement administrative et que le gouvernement n’était pas investi du pouvoir discrétionnaire d’apprécier dans chaque cas la situation de chaque ré- pondant. La juge des requêtes a egalement´ conclu que la LIPR n’imposait aucune obligation d’équité envers les répondants et qu’aucune disposition de la loi ne permettait aux répondants de présenter des observations avant qu’il y ait recouvrement. La juge des requêtes a conclu que les engagements relevaient du droit contractuel et que les répondants savaient qu’ils seraient tenus responsables lorsqu’ils ont conclu les engagements. Les répondants ont interjeté appel et l’appel a et´´ e accueilli. La Cour d’appel a conclu que la LIPR, de même que la loi qui la précédait, la Loi sur l’immigration (LI), conféraient le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’apprécier dans chaque cas l’opportunité de recouvrer la somme due puisque, s’agissant de l’interprétation de l’art. 118(2) de la LI et de l’art. 145(2) de la LIPR, l’emploi du verbe « pouvoir » indiquait que le ministre jouissait d’un certain pouvoir discrétionnaire. La Cour d’appel a egalement´ conclu que la province de l’Ontario avait indûment abusé de son pouvoir discrétionnaire ou entravé son exercice puisqu’elle exigeait des répondants en défaut qu’ils remboursent le montant complet dans tous les cas, peu importe les circonstances. La possibilité d’un arrangement est prévu dans le règlement pris en vertu de la LIPR et devrait etreˆ envisagée. Lorsque la province de l’Ontario a accordé des délais fondés sur l’existence de « circonstances exceptionnelles documentées », elle etablissait´ une norme plus stricte que celle prévue dans les engagements. La Cour d’appel a de plus estimé que les gouvernements etaient´ tenus de respecter le principe de l’équité procédurale a` l’égard des répondants et avaient l’obligation d’établir un processus permettant aux répondants de faire etat´ de leur propre situation, de savoir qu’ils etaient´ entendus et qu’une décision serait prise. L’affirmation, reproduite dans les engagements, selon laquelle l’Etat´ considérerait « d’autres circonstances valables » dans l’exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire a fait naˆıtre chez les répondants l’attente légitime qu’il serait tenu compte de la situation propre a` chacun d’eux. La Cour d’appel a finalement statué que les engagements contractés sous le régime de la LI pouvaient etreˆ exécutés en application de la LIPR. Le gouvernement du Canada et celui de l’Ontario ont formé un pourvoi. Arrêt: Le pourvoi a et´´ e accueilli en partie. Binnie, J. (McLachlin, J.C.C., LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Roth- stein, Cromwell, JJ., souscrivant a` son opinion) : Lorsqu’il entreprend de recouvrer une créance auprès d’un répondant, l’Etat´ doit respecter l’équité procédurale. La Couronne a, de fait, un certain pouvoir discrétionnaire dans le recouvrement d’une telle créance, en ce qu’elle peut accorder un délai de remboursement mais ne peut renoncer a` la créance. Ce pouvoir discrétionnaire suppose le respect de l’équité procédurale. Ni la LIPR ni la LI ne renferment de disposition ecartant´ la présomption, on ne pourrait donc pas en déduire que le législateur a voulu que ses agents d’immigration puissent appliquer la loi de 186 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d) fa¸con inéquitable lorsqu’ils procèdent a` des recouvrements de créances. Comme l’obligation de respecter l’équité procédurale est fonction du contexte, il est raisonnable de prendre en considération l’assurance fournie par le répondant en contrepartie de l’admission au pays de l’immigrant. La créance ne concerne pas un programme gouvernemental de versement de prestations. La grande inquié- tude que soulèvent les coûts associés a` l’utilisation des programmes sociaux justifie que le répondant cautionne la dette. La procédure suivie par la province de l’Ontario en matière de recouvrement des créances etait´ compatible avec a` la fois le recouvrement efficient des créances et le traitement equitable´ des répondants en défaut. La nature de l’obligation de respecter l’équité procédurale exige, entre autres, (1) de donner au répondant un avis de sa réclamation a` sa dernière adresse connue, (2) de lui accorder un délai pour exposer par ecrit´ les circonstances personnelles et financières qui militeraient contre le recouvrement immédiat de la créance, (3) de tenir compte de tout el´´ ement pertinent et (4) d’informer le répondant de sa décision. Les politiques et les procédures suivies par la province de l’Ontario satisfaisaient ces exigences. La politique ontarienne en cause n’entravait pas le pouvoir discrétionnaire du ministre et satisfaisait a` l’exigence de l’équité procédurale a` l’égard des ré- pondants en l’espèce. Bien que l’arrêt de principe en matière d’équité procédurale ecartait´ clairement l’équité procédurale lorsqu’un contrat s’appliquait, la procédure de recouvrement de sommes dues auprès des répondants découlait d’un droit d’action essentiellement d’origine législative. La loi fixe et régit les conditions du parrainage, y compris l’éventualité de remboursements, et l’engagement est exigé par la LIPR et est assujetti a` des conditions déterminées par le ministre en vertu de son pouvoir statutaire. L’objet et le contexte de la LIPR, en prévoyant l’exercice d’un pouvoir discré- tionnaire dans le cadre du processus de recouvrement des créances, n’excluent pas l’obligation de respecter l’équité procédurale. Aucune disposition de la LIPR ne requiert que la créance soit recouvrée sans egard´ a` la situation dans laquelle se trouve le répondant. L’emploi, dans la LIPR, des mots « peut recouvrer » et « peuvent etreˆ recouvrés », de même que l’emploi du verbe « pouvoir », connotent un certain pouvoir discrétionnaire qui suppose le respect de l’équité procédurale. Bien que l’intention du législateur de simplifier le processus de recouvrement des créances ressortait clairement de la LIPR, les nouvelles dispositions n’indiquaient pas que le recouvrement devrait etreˆ fait de fa¸con inéquitable. Il ne servirait pas les fins de la LIPR de recouvrer les créances sans exercer quelque pouvoir discrétionnaire a` l’endroit des répondants. La Cour d’appel a commis une erreur en concluant que la politique de recouvrement de la province ne permettait pas au décideur de prendre en compte les faits pertinents, mais le contraignait plutôt a` une application arbitraire de la politique. Il n’y avait pas d’incompatibilité entre la politique ontarienne de recouvrement Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) 187 et la portée du pouvoir discrétionnaire. L’Ontario n’a pas indûment entravé l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire que lui confère la loi. Il etait´ loisible au ministre d’apporter des modifications a` la politique dans la mesure permise par la loi, et permettre le report de dettes plutôt que d’y renoncer ne constituait pas une entrave au pouvoir discrétionnaire au point d’être invalide. Le cadre législa- tif fédéral n’exigeait pas un plus grand pouvoir discrétionnaire. L’affirmation, exprimée au moment de prendre l’engagement, selon laquelle le gouvernement peut ne pas recouvrer les créances ne signifie pas que le gouvernement avait l’obligation d’y renoncer. Le fait qu’un report, et non une renonciation, soit envisageable ressort clairement des engagements. Toutefois, lorsque des situations abusives sont alléguées ou lorsque d’autres circonstances appropriées se présentent, on peut légitimement s’attendre, a` la lecture des engagements, a` ce que l’on puisse avoir l’occasion de présenter des observations concernant le report de dettes. Cases considered by Binnie J.: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1999), 1 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 14 Admin. L.R. (3d) 173, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 1999 CarswellNat 1124, 1999 CarswellNat 1125, 243 N.R. 22, [1999] S.C.J. No. 39 (S.C.C.) — considered C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour) (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 1803, 2003 SCC 29, 2003 CarswellOnt 1770, 2003 C.L.L.C. 220-040, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, (sub nom. Canadian Union of Public Employees v. Ontario (Minister of Labour)) 173 O.A.C. 38, (sub nom. Canadian Union of Public Employees v. Ontario (Minister of Labour)) 66 O.R. (3d) 735 (note), 226 D.L.R. (4th) 193, (sub nom. Canadian Union of Public Employees v. Ontario (Minister of Labour)) 304 N.R. 76, 50 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, REJB 2003-41592, [2003] S.C.J. No. 28 (S.C.C.) — referred to Canada 3000 Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 149, 183 O.A.C. 201, 235 D.L.R. (4th) 618, 3 C.B.R. (5th) 207, (sub nom. Greater Toronto Airports Authority v. International Lease Finance Corp.) 69 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Cardinal v. Kent Institution (1985), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643, [1986] 1 W.W.R. 577, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 44, 63 N.R. 353, 69 B.C.L.R. 255, 16 Admin. L.R. 233, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 118, 49 C.R. (3d) 35, 1985 CarswellBC 402, 1985 CarswellBC 817, [1985] S.C.J. No. 78 (S.C.C.) — considered Centre hospitalier Mont-Sina¨ı c. Québec (Ministre de la Santé & des Services sociaux) (2001), (sub nom. Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister of Health & Social Services)) 200 D.L.R. (4th) 193, (sub nom. Mount Sinai Hospital Centre v. Quebec (Minister of Health & Social Services)) 271 N.R. 104, 2001 SCC 41, 2001 CarswellQue 1272, 2001 CarswellQue 1273, 36 Admin. L.R. (3d) 71, (sub nom. Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec 188 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

(Minister of Health & Social Services)) [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281, [2001] S.C.J. No. 43, REJB 2001-24843 (S.C.C.) — referred to Houde v. Quebec (Catholic School Commission) (1977), 80 D.L.R. (3d) 542, 17 N.R. 451, 1977 CarswellQue 56, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 937, 1977 CarswellQue 56F (S.C.C.) — referred to Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19 (1990), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653, 69 D.L.R. (4th) 489, [1990] 3 W.W.R. 289, 30 C.C.E.L. 237, 90 C.L.L.C. 14,010, 43 Admin. L.R. 157, 83 Sask. R. 81, D.T.E. 90T-475, 1990 Car- swellSask 146, 1990 CarswellSask 408, 106 N.R. 17, [1990] S.C.J. No. 26, EYB 1990-67929 (S.C.C.) — considered Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2004), 45 B.L.R. (3d) 161, 41 C.C.P.B. 106, 2004 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8112, 242 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 324 N.R. 259, 189 O.A.C. 201, 17 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 152, 75 O.R. (3d) 479 (note), 2004 CarswellOnt 3172, 2004 CarswellOnt 3173, 2004 SCC 54, [2004] S.C.J. No. 51, REJB 2004- 68722 (S.C.C.) — considered Moreau-Bérubé c. Nouveau-Brunswick (2002), (sub nom. Conseil de la magistrature (N.-B.) v. Moreau-Bérubé) 245 N.B.R. (2d) 201, (sub nom. Conseil de la magistrature (N.-B.) v. Moreau-Bérubé) 636 A.P.R. 201, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 249, 2002 SCC 11, 2002 CarswellNB 46, 2002 CarswellNB 47, 36 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Nouveau-Brunswick (Conseil de la magistrature) v. Moreau-Bérubé) 281 N.R. 201, (sub nom. Moreau-Bérubé v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council)) 209 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [2002] S.C.J. No. 9, REJB 2002-27816 (S.C.C.) — referred to New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 372 N.R. 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, D.T.E. 2008T-223, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, 2008 SCC 9, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9 (S.C.C.) — distinguished Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk (Regional Municipality) Commissioners of Po- lice (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311, 88 D.L.R. (3d) 671, 78 C.L.L.C. 14,181, 23 N.R. 410, 1978 CarswellOnt 609F, 1978 CarswellOnt 609 (S.C.C.) — considered Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control & Licensing Branch) (2001), 2001 SCC 52, 2001 CarswellBC 1877, 2001 CarswellBC 1878, (sub nom. Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. Liquor Control & Licensing Branch (B.C.)) 155 B.C.A.C. 193, (sub nom. Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. Liquor Control & Licensing Branch (B.C.)) 254 W.A.C. 193, [2001] 10 W.W.R. 1, 34 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 204 D.L.R. (4th) 33, 274 N.R. 116, 93 Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) 189

B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781, [2001] S.C.J. No. 17, REJB 2001- 25683 (S.C.C.) — referred to Optical Recording Corp. v. Canada (1990), (sub nom. R. v. Optical Recording Laboratories Inc.) 90 D.T.C. 6647, 1990 CarswellNat 382, 41 F.T.R. 240 (note), 1990 CarswellNat 715, [1991] 1 F.C. 309, [1990] 2 C.T.C. 524, 116 N.R. 200 (Fed. C.A.) — referred to Peter G. White Management Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage) (2006), 2006 FCA 190, 2006 CarswellNat 1438, 350 N.R. 113, 2006 Car- swellNat 4213, 271 D.L.R. (4th) 361, 2006 CAF 190, [2007] 2 F.C.R. 475 (F.C.A.) — referred to R. v. Crosson (1999), (sub nom. Canada v. Crosson) 169 F.T.R. 218, 1999 Car- swellNat 1065 (Fed. T.D.) — referred to R. v. Rhine (1980), 1980 CarswellNat 630, (sub nom. Canada v. Prytula) 116 D.L.R. (3d) 385, 34 N.R. 290, (sub nom. Prytula v. R.) [1980] 2 S.C.R. 442, 1980 CarswellNat 630F (S.C.C.) — considered Ward-Price v. Mariners Haven Inc. (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 1514, 199 D.L.R. (4th) 68, 42 R.P.R. (3d) 39, 159 O.A.C. 117, 57 O.R. (3d) 410, [2001] O.J. No. 1711 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Statutes considered: Canada Student Loans Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-23 Generally — referred to Financial Administration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11 Generally — referred to s. 23 — referred to Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 Generally — referred to s. 108(2) — considered s. 114(1)(c) — considered s. 115 — considered s. 118(1) — referred to s. 118(2) — referred to Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 Generally — referred to s. 2(2) — considered s. 3 — considered s. 3(1)(d) — considered s. 3(1)(e) — considered s. 3(1)(j) — considered s. 3(3)(f) — considered s. 12 — referred to s. 14(2)(e) — considered s. 145(2) — considered s. 145(3) — considered 190 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

s. 146 — considered Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21 s. 11 — referred to Prairie Grain Advance Payments Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-18 Generally — referred to Regulations considered: Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-172 s. 5(2)(g) [am. SOR/97-145] — considered Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 s. 132 — referred to s. 132(1) — considered s. 135 — considered s. 135(b)(i) — considered

APPEAL of judgment reported at Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) (2009), [2009] O.J. No. 4792, 5 Admin. L.R. (5th) 184, 98 O.R. (3d) 1, 313 D.L.R. (4th) 137, 259 O.A.C. 33, 85 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 2009 ONCA 794, 2009 CarswellOnt 6992 (Ont. C.A.).

POURVOI a` l’encontre d’un jugement publi´e a` Mavi v. Canada (Attorney Gen- eral) (2009), [2009] O.J. No. 4792, 5 Admin. L.R. (5th) 184, 98 O.R. (3d) 1, 313 D.L.R. (4th) 137, 259 O.A.C. 33, 85 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 2009 ONCA 794, 2009 CarswellOnt 6992 (Ont. C.A.).

Urszula Kaczmarczyk, Christine Mohr, for Appellant, Attorney General of Canada Robert H. Ratcliffe, Sara Blake, Baaba Forson, for Appellant, Attorney General of Ontario Lucas E. Lung, Lisa Loader, for Respondents, Pritpal Singh Mavi, Maria Cris- tina Jatuff de Altamirano, Oleg Grankin, Raymond Hince, Homa Vossoughi Lorne Waldman, Jacqueline Swaisland, for Respondent, Nedzad Dzihic Hugh M. Evans, for Respondents, Rania El-Murr, Hamid Zebaradami Ranjan K. Agarwal, Daniel T. Holden, for Intervener, South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario Chantal Tie, Carole Simone Dahan, Aviva Basman, for Intervener, Canadian Council for Refugees Geraldine Sadoway, for Intervener, Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence against Women and Children Guy R´egimbald, for Intervener, Canadian Civil Liberties Association Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie J. 191

Binnie J.:

1 Since 1978, Canada has allowed Canadian citizens or permanent residents to sponsor their relatives to immigrate to Canada. Family reunification was an important objective of the former Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, and remains so under the successor legislation enacted in 2001 as the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (“IRPA”). Of the over 2 million permanent residents admitted to this country between 1997 and 2007, 615,000 (or 27%) are members of the family class. If such persons after arriving in Canada obtain social assistance (contrary to their sponsor’s undertaking of support), the sponsor is deemed to have defaulted and either the provincial or federal government may recover from the sponsor the cost of providing social assistance. 2 The present proceedings were initiated by eight sponsors who denied liability under their undertakings. As will be explained, the undertakings are valid contracts but they are also structured, controlled and supplemented by federal legislation. The debts created thereby are not only contractual but statutory, and as such their enforcement is not exclusively governed by the private law of contract. The issue raised by this appeal is the extent to which, if at all, the government is constrained by considerations of procedural fairness in making enforcement decisions in relation to these statutory debts. 3 The Attorney General of Canada argues (and the applications judge agreed) that the Crown is not required even to notify an allegedly defaulting sponsor of its claim prior to filing with the Federal Court a ministerial certificate of the alleged debt which becomes, automatically, enforceable as if it were a judgment of that court. He argues that the legislation imposes on the Crown a duty (not a discretion) to collect sponsorship debts in full. He denies that in carrying out this duty there is any obligation of procedural fairness. 4 On a proper interpretation of the governing legislation, however, I believe the Crown does have a limited discretion in these collections. The discretion enables the governments to delay enforcement action having regard to the sponsor’s circumstances and to enter into agreements re- specting terms of payment, but not simply to forgive the statutory debt. On the evidence, Ontario has had in place a discretionary policy respect- ing the collection of family sponsorship debts for many years, both before and after the enactment of the IRPA in 2001. 192 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

5 In the exercise of this discretion, which Parliament has made clear is narrow in scope, the Crown is bound by a duty of procedural fairness. The content of this duty is fairly minimal. The Crown is obliged prior to filing a certificate of debt with the Federal Court (i) to notify a sponsor at his or her last known address of its claim; (ii) to afford the sponsor an opportunity within limited time to explain in writing his or her relevant personal and financial circumstances that are said to militate against immediate collection; (iii) to consider any relevant circumstances brought to its attention keeping in mind that the undertakings were the essential conditions precedent to allowing the sponsored immigrant to enter Can- ada in the first place; and (iv) to notify the sponsor of the government’s decision. This is a purely administrative process. It is a matter of debt collection. There is no obligation on the government decision maker to give reasons. The existence of the debt is, in the context of this particular program, reason enough to proceed. 6 Although the respondents took the position in the courts below that they should be altogether “discharged from their sponsorship obligations” (Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) (2009), 2009 ONCA 794, 98 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 6), they took the less extravagant position in this Court that they do not dispute that undertakings are enforceable. Nor do they dispute that undertakings should be enforced in the overwhelming majority of cases. They are merely asking that the [governments] properly exercise the discretion that was granted to them and consider their circumstances before making the decision to enforce. 7 The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the Ontario government’s deferral policy improperly fettered its statutory discretion in a manner “inconsistent with the overall legislative scheme” (para. 132). While I agree (as stated) with the court below that the sponsors are entitled to a basic level of procedural fairness, my view is that the Ontario guidelines are quite adequate in that regard and are consistent with the statutory scheme. Moreover, the contention of the respondent sponsors that they are entitled to a more elaborate “process” of decision making must be rejected. We are, after all, dealing with statutory debt collection. I would allow the appeal in part but as these appeals can properly be characterized as test cases, I would do so without costs.

I. Facts 8 Foreign nationals may apply to become permanent residents and eventually citizens, under three broad categories: the family class, the Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie J. 193

economic class and the refugee class (IRPA, s. 12). A permanent resident or citizen wishing to sponsor a family member initiates the process by making a sponsorship application. Sponsors must be over 18 years of age, and meet detailed financial and other requirements. Family class members are not assessed independently on their ability to support themselves. Since they obtain their permanent residence status on the sole basis of being in a familial relationship with a sponsor, they are not required to meet the financial or other selection requirements which are imposed on other classes of immigrants.

A. The Sponsors 9 The respondents to this appeal are eight sponsors whose relatives received social assistance and who are therefore deemed to have defaulted on their undertaking. 10 The respondent Dzihic sponsored his fianc´ee in 2002. His allegation is that when she arrived in Canada she refused to live with him or marry him. Mr. Dzihic notified the immigration department and an order was made for her deportation. However, his fianc´ee appealed the order suc- cessfully without any notice to or input from Mr. Dzihic. He says he was unaware of her success or the fact that she subsequently received social assistance totalling $10,510.65 as of July 2007, for which he is now responsible. 11 The respondent El-Murr sponsored her father, mother and two brothers in 1995 while she was unemployed. Her husband was employed at the time and he cosigned the undertaking. After the family members arrived in Canada, Ms. El-Murr left her husband because of alleged abuse and she went on social assistance as did her parents and one brother. The debt amount as of February 2006 is $94,242.16 and she says she cannot afford to repay this amount. 12 The respondent Grankin sponsored his mother in 1999. He claims that he subsequently lost his job and had to apply for social assistance. He was thus unable to support his mother after her arrival in Canada. His mother applied for social assistance and received it. Mr. Grankin states that had he known he was responsible for repaying the benefits, he would not have permitted his mother to apply for assistance. As of June 2007 his total debt was $54,426.39. 13 The respondent Hince married Ms. Patel who was on a visitor’s visa in 2002. She returned to India and Mr. Hince sponsored her and her daughter to return to Canada. They did so in 2006 and lived briefly with 194 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

Mr. Hince, then left. He says he was unaware that she subsequently received social assistance. His job is low paying and does not permit him, he says, to repay the social assistance amount due as of June 2007 of $10,547.65. He believes he was exploited by Ms. Patel to enable her to gain immigration status. 14 The respondent de Altamirano and her husband sponsored her mother in 2000. After arriving in Canada, her mother suffered a stroke. Ms. de Altamirano applied for benefits to pay for her mother’s institutional care. She alleges that she was encouraged to do so by a case worker and did not realize that she would have a responsibility to repay the benefits — as of May 2007 said to be $54,559.99. 15 The respondent Mavi sponsored his father in 1996. He alleges he did not read the application or understand it. His father arrived in Canada in 1997 and lived with Mr. Mavi. There was a falling out and the father left. Mr. Mavi learned in 2005 that his father had collected benefits and he contacted the government to advise that his own health was not good, which limited his ability to work. The amount of benefits said to be owed as of June 2005 is $17,818.08. 16 The respondent Vossoughi applied to sponsor her mother at a time when she was married. In 2002, she left her husband because, she says, of abuse. In 2003, her mother arrived in Canada. Ms. Vossoughi says she could not support her mother and her mother went on social assistance. She alleges she did not realize she was responsible for repaying the benefits. The amount said to be owed pursuant to the undertaking as of July 2007 is $28,754.71. 17 The respondent Zebaradami sponsored his fianc´ee in 2000. She arrived in Canada in 2001 but only stayed with him for a few weeks, then left him for another man. She received social assistance benefits of $22,158.02 as of July 2007. Mr. Zebaradami says he was duped and that his former fianc´ee only used him to gain status in Canada. 18 The Government of Ontario, which in each case paid the social assistance to the needy relative, took steps to enforce the debt against each of the sponsors. In applications filed in the Ontario Superior Court of Jus- tice, the eight sponsors sought various declarations the result of which, if granted, would be to avoid payment, either temporarily or permanently.

B. The Undertakings 19 The undertakings signed by Grankin, Zebaradami and de Altamirano contained the following statement with respect to the possibility that en- Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie J. 195

forcement might be deferred (with similar statements made in the undertakings signed by Vossoughi, Dzihic and Hince): The Minister may choose not to take action to recover money from a Sponsor or a Sponsor’s spouse (if Co-signer) who has defaulted in a situation of abuse or in other appropriate circumstances. The decision of the Minister not to act at a particular time does not cancel the debt, which may be recovered by the Minister when circumstances have changed. [Emphasis added.]

C. Federal and Provincial Policies 20 The Memorandum of Understanding between Canada and Ontario of 2004 (“MOU”), provides for the sharing of information in order to facilitate, inter alia, the enforcement of sponsorship debts. Section 6 of the MOU states that sponsorship debts are “payable on demand”, but that default may be cured in cases where a province accepts partial payment of the debt. Ontario will apply its own guidelines to determine whether collection action should be undertaken immediately or deferred, e.g. in cases of family violence. 21 The Ontario policy itself states that certain cases of default would not be referred for collection, namely where the person is incapacitated and unable to pay, where there is evidence of domestic violence, where the sponsor himself or herself is in receipt of social assistance, or where other “documented extraordinary circumstances” exist. The Attorney General of Ontario contends (unlike his federal counterpart) that the federal legislation does permit a measure of discretion, and that Ontario’s policies are fully compliant. He claims however that relations between Ontario and the sponsors are governed only by rules applicable to private contracts. 22 The respondent sponsors contend (and the Court of Appeal agreed) that the wording of the undertakings should be taken into account in the interpretation of the governing legislation.

II. Statutory Framework 23 Pursuant to s. 132 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regula- tions, SOR/2002-227, a sponsor is obliged to reimburse the Crown in right of Canada or a province, for the cost of every benefit provided as social assistance to the sponsored family member during the term of undertaking — formerly 10 years but now 3 years for a spouse or a depen- 196 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

dent child 22 years of age or older and 10 years for a dependent child less than 22 years of age and all other family members (s. 132(1)). The undertakings set out the obligations of the sponsor, the duration of the undertaking, the consequences of default and stated that the undertaking would be binding notwithstanding any change in the sponsor’s personal circumstances. 24 Section 108(2) of the former Immigration Act authorized the federal government to enter into agreements with the provinces for the purposes of implementing immigration programs. Section 114(1)(c) authorized the executive to create regulations with respect to sponsorships and s. 115 allowed the Minister to create forms necessary to implement the program (such Ministerial authority was the basis for the undertakings at issue here, which were drafted by the Department of Citizenship and Immigra- tion and signed by each sponsor). Pursuant to s. 118(1) of the former Act, the federal government could assign an undertaking to a province in order to allow that province to recover social assistance payments from the sponsor directly. The new IRPA eliminated the need for such an assign- ment of the debt. 25 The collection procedure under the old Immigration Act was also more cumbersome than under the new IRPA. The former s. 118(2) required governments to obtain a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction in order to enforce the sponsorship debt. Public monies spent as a result of a breach of an undertaking were deemed to be a “debt due to Her Majesty in right of Canada or in right of the province to which the undertaking is assigned” and “may be recovered from the person or organization that gave the undertaking”. Section 5(2)(g) of the old Regula- tions stated that default on an existing undertaking was a bar to additional sponsorships (Regulations Amending the Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/97-145, s. 3). 26 In 2002, the IRPA made important changes to the rules governing the family immigration class. Section 14(2)(e) confers broad powers to make regulations with respect to sponsorship undertakings. Section 145(2) is central to the issue of the Minister’s discretion on this appeal. It states in relevant part: ... an amount that a sponsor is required to pay under the terms of an undertaking is payable on demand to Her Majesty in right of Canada and Her Majesty in right of the province concerned and may be recovered by Her Majesty in either or both of those rights. Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie J. 197

The respondent sponsors contend that “may” is permissive and indicates, they say, the existence of a Crown discretion to collect or not to collect the debt. 27 The IRPA streamlined the enforcement of sponsorship debt. It is no longer necessary for the federal undertakings to be assigned to the provinces before they can be enforced by the province. Furthermore, s. 145(3) negates the effect of limitations statutes by prescribing that the debt may be recovered “at any time”. 28 Governments no longer even have to obtain a judgment to engage Federal Court processes to enforce the debt. Section 146 allows the Min- ister to certify the debt immediately or within 30 days of default, depend- ing on the circumstances, and register that certificate with the Federal Court, giving it the same force as a judgment. 29 The new Regulations provide in s. 135 that default begins when the government makes a payment and ends when the sponsor either reimburses the government “in full or in accordance with an agreement with that government”, or when the sponsor ceases to be in breach of the undertaking. The Attorney General of Canada takes comfort from the IRPA’s elimination of any judicial process prior to the Minister’s authority to invoke Federal Court enforcement. The respondent sponsors, on the other hand, argue that elimination of prior judicial authorization makes it all the more important that the Minister act fairly and get the facts straight before initiating what they regard as an overly harsh statutory collection procedure.

III. Judicial History A. Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Wilson J.) 30 The applications judge found that the IRPA and its Regulations, when viewed as a whole, showed a Parliamentary intent to create a collection procedure that was “purely administrative in nature” (para. 50). The government is not vested with a discretion to consider on a case-by-case basis whether or not to enforce the debt. The government’s duty is to collect. The legislation does not impose any duty of fairness towards sponsors in default. Neither the statute nor the regulations permit sponsors to make submissions before their debts are collected (para. 54). 31 According to the applications judge, the sponsorship agreements are governed by contract law (para. 55). The sponsors entered into the agreements voluntarily (para. 57). The contractual undertakings should be 198 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

construed in light of the purpose of the statute which is debt collection (para. 58). The doctrine of frustration does not apply (para. 59). The Ap- plicants were aware that they would be liable if a sponsored relative became financially dependent on the state (para. 59). The applications for various declarations sought by the sponsors were therefore dismissed.

B. Court of Appeal (Laskin, Simmons and Lang JJ.A.) 32 On appeal, the issues were restricted to administrative law grounds, specifically: (1) whether the Acts confer upon the governments a case- by-case discretion concerning the recovery of sponsorship debt; (2) whether Canada and Ontario abused this discretion; (3) whether Canada and Ontario owe sponsors a duty of procedural fairness; and (4) whether the undertakings given under the old Act are enforceable under the new Act. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. 33 On the first issue, the Court of Appeal found that both Acts confer a caseby- case discretion in the collection of sponsorship debt (para. 89). In construing s. 118(2) of the old Act and s. 145(2) of the new Act, the word “may” indicates some degree of discretion on the part of the Minister. 34 According to the Court of Appeal, the applications judge erred “in part, because she failed to take proper account of the Regulations and forms” which are “essential components of an integrated [immigration] scheme” (paras. 91 and 95). The Court of Appeal noted that since 1999 the undertakings have included a provision that allowed a sponsor to negotiate a settlement with the government concerned (para. 98). In addition, the undertakings under both Acts stated that the governments “may” choose not to collect the debt (paras. 103-104). Since Parliament did not eliminate this discretion in the 2002 amendments, it is reasonable to infer that it intended there to be some flexibility in terms of debt collection. 35 On the second issue, the Court of Appeal went further. In light of the wording of the undertaking, Ontario had improperly “fettered or abused the exercise of its discretion” in part because its policy required that a “‘defaulting sponsor ... repay the full amount of the debt’” (paras. 125- 26). This prohibited a settlement for less than the full amount, an option which is expressly contemplated by s. 135(b)(i) of the new Regulations. Since the policy required full repayment in every case, regardless of the circumstances, this amounted to an improper fettering of the Minister’s discretion under the statute (para. 127). Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie J. 199

36 Furthermore, Ontario’s policy of only granting deferrals based on “documented extraordinary circumstances” was a more onerous standard than the existence merely of “appropriate circumstances” contemplated by the undertakings (paras. 132-33), and was to that extent invalid. 37 On the third issue, the Court of Appeal held that the governments owed a duty of procedural fairness to the sponsors (para. 135). It was held that the government was obliged to provide “a process” for individual sponsors to explain their relevant personal and financial circumstances, to consider those circumstances, and to inform the sponsor that their submissions had been considered and to tell them of the decision (para. 147). The provision in the undertakings that the government will consider “other appropriate circumstances” in exercising its discretion created a legitimate expectation that the government will consider their individual circumstances (para. 148). Finally, the court held that undertakings given under the old Immigration Act are enforceable under the IRPA.

IV. Analysis 38 The doctrine of procedural fairness has been a fundamental component of Canadian administrative law since Nicholson v. Haldimand- Norfolk (Regional Municipality) Commissioners of Police (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.), where Chief Justice Laskin for the majority adopted the proposition that “in the administrative or executive field there is a general duty of fairness” (p. 324). Six years later this principle was affirmed by a unanimous Court, per Le Dain J.: “... there is, as a general common law principle, a duty of procedural fairness lying on every public authority making an administrative decision which is not of a legislative nature and which affects the rights, privileges or interests of an individual”: Cardinal v. Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643 (S.C.C.), at p. 653. The question in every case is “what the duty of procedural fairness may reasonably require of an authority in the way of specific procedural rights in a particular legislative and administrative context” (Cardinal, at p. 654). See also Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653 (S.C.C.), at p. 669; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.), at para. 20; and Centre hospitalier Mont-Sina¨ı c. Qu´ebec (Ministre de la Sant´e & des Services sociaux), 2001 SCC 41, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281 (S.C.C.), at para. 18. More recently, in New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.), Bastarache and LeBel JJ. adopted the proposition that “[t]he 200 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

observance of fair procedures is central to the notion of the ‘just’ exercise of power” (para. 90) (citing D. J. M. Brown and J. M. Evans, Judi- cial Review of Administrative Action in Canada (loose-leaf), at p. 7-3). 39 Accordingly, while the content of procedural fairness varies with circumstances and the legislative and administrative context, it is certainly not to be presumed that Parliament intended that administrative officials be free to deal unfairly with people subject to their decisions. On the contrary, the general rule is that a duty of fairness applies. See G. R´egimbald, Canadian Administrative Law (2008), at pp. 226-27, but the general rule will yield to clear statutory language or necessary implication to the contrary: Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control & Licensing Branch), 2001 SCC 52, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781 (S.C.C.), at para. 22. There is no such exclusionary language in the IRPA and its predecessor legislation. 40 In determining the content of procedural fairness a balance must be struck. Administering a “fair” process inevitably slows matters down and costs the taxpayer money. On the other hand, the public also suffers a cost if government is perceived to act unfairly, or administrative action is based on “erroneous, incomplete or ill-considered findings of fact, conclusions of law, or exercises of discretion” (Brown and Evans, at p. 7-3; see also D. J. Mullan, Administrative Law (2001), at p. 178). 41 Once the duty of procedural fairness has been found to exist, the particular legislative and administrative context is crucial to determining its content. We are dealing here with ordinary debt, not a government benefits or licensing program. It is clear from the legislative history of the IRPA that over the years Parliament has become increasingly concerned about the shift to the public treasury of a significant portion of the cost of supporting sponsored relatives. Family reunification is based on the essential condition that in exchange for admission to this country the needs of the immigrant will be looked after by the sponsor, not by the public purse. Sponsors undertake these obligations in writing. They understand or ought to understand from the outset that default may have serious financial consequences for them. 42 A number of factors help to determine the content of procedural fairness in a particular legislative and administrative context. Some of these were discussed in Cardinal, a case involving an inmate’s challenge to prison discipline which stressed the need to respect the requirements of effective and sound public administration while giving effect to the overarching requirement of fairness. The duty of fairness is not a “one-size- Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie J. 201

fits-all” doctrine. Some of the elements to be considered were set out in a non-exhaustive list in Baker to include (i) “the nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it” (para. 23); (ii) “the nature of the statutory scheme and the ‘terms of the statute pursuant to which the body operates’” (para. 24); (iii) “the importance of the decision to the individual or individuals affected” (para. 25); (iv) “the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision” (para. 26); and (v) “the choices of procedure made by the agency itself, particularly when the statute leaves to the decision-maker the ability to choose its own procedures, or when the agency has an expertise in determining what procedures are appropriate in the circumstances” (para. 27). Other cases helpfully provide additional elements for courts to consider but the obvious point is that the requirements of the duty in particular cases are driven by their particular circumstances. The simple overarching requirement is fairness, and this “central” notion of the “just exercise of power” should not be diluted or obscured by jurisprudential lists developed to be helpful but not exhaustive. 43 Here the nature of the administrative decision is a straightforward debt collection. Parliament has made clear in the statutory scheme its intention to avoid a complicated administrative review process. Neverthe- less, as the Court of Appeal correctly observed, the nature of the decision in this case is final and specific in nature. It may result in the filing of a ministerial certificate in the Federal Court which is enforceable as if it were a judgment of that court. The IRPA does not provide a mechanism for sponsors to appeal the enforcement decision. Here, as in Knight, the absence of other remedies militates in favour of a duty of fairness at the time of the enforcement decision (see also Baker, at para. 24). The effect of the decision on the sponsors is significant. Sponsorship debts can be very large and accumulate quickly, as is evident from the amounts the respondents are said to owe the government in this case. 44 The legislation leaves the governments with a measure of discretion in carrying out their enforcement duties, and in this case Ontario’s procedure is perfectly compatible with both efficient debt collection and fairness to the defaulting sponsors. I will deal separately below with the issue of legitimate expectations. 45 In these circumstances I believe the content of the duty of procedural fairness does not require an elaborate adjudicative process but it does (as stated earlier) oblige a government, prior to filing a certificate of debt with the Federal Court, (i) to notify a sponsor at his or her last known 202 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

address of its claim; (ii) to afford the sponsor an opportunity within limited time to explain in writing his or her relevant personal and financial circumstances that are said to militate against immediate collection; (iii) to consider any relevant circumstances brought to its attention keeping in mind that the undertakings were the essential conditions precedent to allowing the sponsored immigrant to enter Canada in the first place; and (iv) to notify the sponsor of the government’s decision. Given the legislative and regulatory framework, the non-judicial nature of the process and the absence of any statutory right of appeal, the government’s duty of fairness in this situation does not extend to providing reasons in each case (Baker, at para. 43). This is a situation, after all, merely of holding sponsors accountable for their undertakings so that the public purse would not suffer by reason of permitting the entry of family members who would otherwise not qualify for admission. 46 Ontario has adopted a collection policy along these lines. There is no evidence before us that the minimal procedural protections afforded by Ontario have in any way undermined or frustrated the debt collection objective or resulted in unfairness to family sponsors.

A. The Contract Argument 47 The Attorneys General resist the application of a duty of procedural fairness in part on a theory that the claims against the sponsors are essentially contractual in nature. Dunsmuir, they say, stands for the proposition that procedural fairness does not apply to situations governed by contract. However, in this case, unlike Dunsmuir, the governments’ cause of action is essentially statutory. 48 Dunsmuir dealt with an employment relationship that was found by the Court to be governed by contract. The fact the contracting employee was a senior public servant did not turn a private claim for breach of contract into a public law adjudication. Here, on the other hand, the terms of sponsorship are dictated and controlled by statute. The undertaking is required by statute and reflects terms fixed by the Minister under his or her statutory power. The Attorneys General characterize sponsors as mere contract debtors but even contract debtors are ordinarily entitled to receive notice of a claim and the opportunity to defend against it. 49 The existence of the undertaking does not extricate the present disputes from their public law context. There is ample precedent for contracts closely controlled by statute to be enforced as a matter of public Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie J. 203

law. In R. v. Rhine, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 442 (S.C.C.), for example, the Court dealt with two appeals for breach of contract: the first was a claim to recover an advance payment under the Prairie Grain Advance Payments Act, and the second was a government claim to recover principle and interest owing on a student loan made pursuant to the Canada Student Loans Act. The defendants took the position that enforcement of a private law contract is a matter of provincial law and thus outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. In both appeals, the jurisdictional challenge was rejected. The contracts were creatures of statute. Laskin C.J. noted: What we have here is a detailed statutory framework under which advances for prospective grain deliveries are authorized as part of an overall scheme for the marketing of grain produced in Canada. An examination of the Prairie Grain Advance Payments Act itself lends emphasis to its place in the overall scheme. True, there is an undertaking or a contractual consequence of the application of the Act but that does not mean that the Act is left behind once the undertaking or contract is made. At every turn, the Act has its impact on the undertaking so as to make it proper to say that there is here existing and valid federal law [i.e. the statute] to govern the transaction which became the subject of litigation in the Federal Court. [p. 447] See also Peter G. White Management Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2006 FCA 190, [2007] 2 F.C.R. 475 (F.C.A.), at para. 72; R. v. Crosson (1999), 169 F.T.R. 218 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 36. 50 Similarly, while the sponsors’ undertakings here have some contractual aspects, it is the statutory framework that closely governs the rights and obligations of the parties and opens the door to the requirements of procedural fairness. As stated earlier, s. 145(2) of the IRPA makes any debt owing pursuant to an undertaking payable to and recoverable by either federal or provincial Crown. Furthermore, s. 132(1) of the Regula- tions makes sponsors liable for any social assistance paid to the sponsored relative. Section 135 of the Regulations defines “default”. Finally, the enforcement of the undertaking in Federal Court is governed by s. 146 of the IRPA. Just as in Rhine, the undertaking at every turn is a crea- ture of statute. 51 The situation here does not come close to the rather narrow Dunsmuir employment contract exception from the obligation of procedural fairness. As the Dunsmuir majority itself emphasized: This conclusion does not detract from the general duty of fairness owed by administrative decision makers. Rather it acknowledges that in the specific context of dismissal from public employment, disputes 204 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

should be viewed through the lens of contract law rather than public law. [Emphasis added; para. 82.] Dunsmuir was not intended to and did not otherwise diminish the requirements of procedural fairness in the exercise of administrative authority.

B. The Statutory Exclusion Argument 52 There is no doubt that the duty of fairness, being a doctrine of the common law, can be overridden by statute. The Attorneys General argue that the legislation does so in the present case. I do not agree. Such a conclusion is not consistent with the legislative text, context or purpose.

(1) The Statutory Text 53 Central to the collection procedure is s. 145(2) of the new Act and, to a lesser extent, its predecessor s. 118(2) of the old Act, which provide (with emphasis added) as follows: Debts due — sponsors 145. ... (2) Subject to any federal-provincial agreement, an amount that a sponsor is required to pay under the terms of an undertaking is payable on demand to Her Majesty in right of Canada and Her Majesty in right of the province concerned and may be recovered by Her Maj- esty in either or both of those rights. Recovery for breach of undertaking 118. ... (2) Any payments of a prescribed nature made directly or indirectly to an immigrant that result from a breach of an undertaking referred to in subsection (1) may be recovered from the person or organization that gave the undertaking in any court of competent jurisdiction as a debt due to Her Majesty in right of Canada or in right of the province to which the undertaking is assigned. The statements that the “sponsor is required to pay” and that the amount owing is “payable on demand” leave no doubt about the existence of a statutory debt. The words “may be recovered” occur in both Acts. 54 The applications judge thought the word “may” simply enables either level of government to enforce the undertaking. The point, however, is that nothing in the relevant sections explicitly requires Her Majesty to pursue collection of debts irrespective of the circumstances. Legislative Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie J. 205

use of the word “may” usually connotes a measure of discretion (Inter- pretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 11). This is as one would expect. It seems too clear for argument that Parliament intended the federal and provincial Crowns to deal with debt collection in a rational, reasonable and cost-effective way. The Attorney General of Canada concedes that Ministers have a “management discretion” in the conduct of departmen- tal affairs. See, e.g., Optical Recording Corp. v. Canada (1990), [1991] 1 F.C. 309 (Fed. C.A.), at p. 323. Effective management requires some measure of flexibility. Flexibility necessarily entails discretion. 55 However circumscribed, the existence of a discretion attracts a level of procedural fairness appropriate to its exercise.

(2) The Statutory Context 56 As the Attorneys General point out, several provisions of the IRPA affirm the obligatory nature of the undertaking and strengthen enforcement measures as compared to the old Immigration Act. Nevertheless, the evidence that Parliament intended in the new Act to facilitate the collection of sponsorship debts does not mean it intended this to be done unfairly. 57 The Regulations are also an important part of the statutory context. In Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Ser- vices), 2004 SCC 54, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 152 (S.C.C.), Deschamps J. noted that regulations “can assist in ascertaining the legislature’s intention”, particularly where the statute and the regulations form an integrated scheme (para. 35). See also Canada 3000 Inc., Re (2004), 69 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 102-4; Ward-Price v. Mariners Haven Inc. (2001), 57 O.R. (3d) 410 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 29. Professor Sullivan notes at p. 370 of her treatise that “[w]hen regulations are made to complete the statutory scheme, they are clearly intended to operate together [with the enabling statute] and to be mutually informing” (Sullivan on the Con- struction of Statutes (5th ed. 2008) (emphasis added)). Section 2(2) of the IRPA states that references to “this Act” include the Regulations. 58 Regulations under the IRPA are made under a broad authority with respect to a number of matters including family class immigration and sponsorship undertakings. Section 135 of the Regulations, which informed the Court of Appeal’s finding of a Ministerial discretion states: Default 135. For the purpose of subparagraph 133(1)(g)(i), the default of a sponsorship undertaking 206 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

..... (b) ends, as the case may be, when (i) the sponsor reimburses the government concerned, in full or in accordance with an agreement with that government, for amounts paid by it, or (ii) the sponsor ceases to be in breach of the obligation set out in the undertaking. The Attorney General of Canada argues that this provision does not mean that the government can make “an agreement” to forgive the debt, which he says can only be done under the terms of the Financial Admin- istration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11, s. 23 (“FAA”). Rather, he says, this provision merely defines default for the purpose of a person’s eligibility to sponsor additional family members. 59 The fact is however that the Regulations do distinguish between payment “in full” and payments “in accordance with an agreement with that government”. This can only mean that the government is authorized to limit enforcement to whatever amount is agreed upon with the sponsor, and no floor or ceiling (short of forgiveness) is fixed by the Regulation. The amount and terms of repayment are therefore within the discretion of the government decision maker. An agreement requiring a sponsor to pay $20 a month on a $20,000 debt may never result in the full amount being paid, but it would nevertheless be an “agreement” within s. 135(b)(i) which governments are authorized to make. 60 The Attorney General of Canada contends that agreements for less than the full amount would be tantamount to a write-off in violation of the procedures set out in the FAA. However, in my view, what is contemplated in s. 135(b)(i) of the Regulations is not a write-off but “agreed” levels of deferred enforcement. The FAA is a statute of very general application. It does not preclude Parliament from enacting more specialized legislative schemes for the management and enforcement of debts owed to the Crown under particular statutory programs. The IRPA is an example of such a specialized collection regime. 61 Unlike the Court of Appeal, I interpret the IRPA and its regulations without reference to the terms of the sponsorship undertakings themselves, which are drafted by the Minister and his officials and can be (and are) modified from time to time. At best the undertakings reflect an administrative interpretation of the legislative framework. It would be different in the case of forms that are actually appended to statutes, and which therefore carry the authority of Parliament, which is not the case Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie J. 207

here. See Houde v. Quebec (Catholic School Commission) (1977), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 937 (S.C.C.), at p. 947; Sullivan, at pp. 408-9.

(3) The Statutory Purpose 62 Section 3 of the IRPA states the Act is intended to encourage family reunification but also recognizes that successful integration of immigrants involves “mutual obligations for new immigrants and Canadian society”, as follows: Objectives — immigration 3. (1) The objectives of this Act with respect to immigration are ..... (d) to see that families are reunited in Canada; (e) to promote the successful integration of permanent residents into Canada, while recognizing that integration involves mutual obligations for new immigrants and Cana- dian society; ..... (j) to work in cooperation with the provinces to secure better recognition of the foreign credentials of permanent residents and their more rapid integration into society...... Application (3) This Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that ..... (f) complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory. Debt collection without any discretion in relation either to sponsors or their relatives would not advance the purposes of the IRPA. It would hardly promote “successful integration” to require individuals to remain in abusive relationships. Nor would the attempted enforcement of a debt against individuals without means to pay further the interest of “Cana- dian society”. Forcing a sponsor into bankruptcy may or may not deliver a short-term return, but hardly enhances the bankrupt’s chances of becoming a positive contributor to Canadian society. Excessively harsh treatment of defaulting sponsors may risk discouraging others from bringing their relatives to Canada, which would undermine the policy of promoting family reunification. Clearly Parliament’s intent is to require the full debt to be paid if and when the sponsor is in a position to do so, 208 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

even incrementally over many years pursuant to an “agreement” under s. 135(b)(i) of the Regulations. There is no reason why a sponsor who eventually wins a lottery should be relieved of the full measure of the debt at the expense of the taxpayer regardless of when the win occurs. 63 Nevertheless, in dealing with defaulting sponsors, the government must act fairly having regard to their financial means to pay and the existence of circumstances that would militate against enforcement of immediate payment (such as abuse). Ontario’s policy seeks to balance the interests of promoting immigration and family reunification on the one hand, and preventing abuse of the sponsorship scheme on the other. Dis- cretion in the enforcement of sponsorship debt allows the government to further this objective. 64 For these reasons, I would reject the Attorneys General’s argument that the existence of an administrative discretion that attracts procedural fairness is excluded by the text, context and purpose of the legislation.

C. Did Ontario Improperly Fetter the Exercise of Its Statutory Discretion? 65 The Court of Appeal noted that “[d]iscretion is fettered or abused when a policy is adopted that does not allow the decision-maker to consider the relevant facts of the case, but instead compels an inflexible an arbitrary application of policy” (para. 124). The court concluded that the Ontario collection policy conflicts with the intended scope of the discretion. With respect, I do not agree that there is a conflict. As discussed earlier, the legislation allows the Minister to defer but not forgive sponsorship debt. This is also Ontario’s policy. The policy provides that “[t]he defaulting sponsor is required to repay the full amount of debt. There is no forgiveness of the debt by the Ministry”. 66 The federal Minister of Citizenship and Immigration can change the content of the undertakings, as indeed he has over the years, just as the provincial Minister of Community and Social Services changes the enforcement policy from time to time. Policies are necessary to guide the action of the multitude of civil servants who operate government programs. The Minister is entitled to set policy within legal limits. It cannot be said that the Ontario policy here so “fetters” the discretion as to be invalid. 67 The Court of Appeal also concluded that Ontario’s policies were less favourable to the sponsors than the terms of some of the sponsorship undertakings. However, as discussed above, the terms of the undertakings Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie J. 209

are merely expressions of administrative interpretation. They are not, in my view, tools to construe the statutory framework itself. The importance of the signed undertakings in the administrative law context is that they lay the foundation for the application of the doctrine of legitimate expectations, as discussed below. However, with great respect for the Court of Appeal, I do not agree that the federal legislative framework mandates a broader discretion in favour of defaulting sponsors than On- tario permits. It was quite open to Ontario to adopt the collection policy that it did, in my opinion.

D. The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations 68 Where a government official makes representations within the scope of his or her authority to an individual about an administrative process that the government will follow, and the representations said to give rise to the legitimate expectation are clear, unambiguous and unqualified, the government may be held to its word, provided the representations are procedural in nature and do not conflict with the decision maker’s statutory duty. Proof of reliance is not a requisite. See Centre hospitalier Mont-Sina¨ı c. Québec (Ministre de la Santé & des Services sociaux), at paras. 29-30; Moreau-Bérubé c. Nouveau-Brunswick, 2002 SCC 11, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 249 (S.C.C.), at para. 78; and C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539 (S.C.C.), at para. 131. It will be a breach of the duty of fairness for the decision maker to fail in a substantial way to live up to its undertaking: Brown and Evans, at pp. 7-25 and 7-26. 69 Indeed it would be somewhat ironic if the government were able to insist on the sponsor living up to his or her undertaking to the letter while at the same time walking away from its own undertakings given in the same document. Generally speaking, government representations will be considered sufficiently precise for purposes of the doctrine of legitimate expectations if, had they been made in the context of a private law contract, they would be sufficiently certain to be capable of enforcement. 70 Here the undertakings reaffirm that the government can defer, but not forgive, sponsorship debt. The respondents Grankin, Zebaradami, and de Altamirano, signed undertakings under the old Immigration Act in which 210 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

the federal government represented that it possessed and would exercise a measure of discretion in the matter of enforcement: CONSEQUENCES OF DEFAULT ..... The Minister may choose not to take action to recover money from a Sponsor or a Sponsor’s spouse (if Co-signer) who has defaulted in a situation of abuse or in other appropriate circumstances. The decision of the Minister not to act at a particular time does not cancel the debt, which may be recovered by the Minister when circumstances have changed. [Emphasis added.] While default can be cured by making arrangements for repayment, it is clear that no representation is made that the debt will be cancelled, even when the Minister exercises his or her discretion to defer enforcement with or without a s. 135(b)(i) agreement. The Vossoughi and Dzihic undertakings are substantially the same. 71 The essential elements of the undertakings remained unchanged under the new Act. The Hince undertaking of November 20, 2002, signed under the IRPA, reads in relevant part as follows: I understand that all social assistance paid to the sponsored person or his or her family members becomes a debt owed by me to Her Maj- esty in right of Canada and Her Majesty in right of the province concerned. As a result, the Minister and the province concerned have a right to take enforcement action against me (as sponsor or co-signer) alone, or against both of us. The Minister and the province concerned may choose not to take enforcement action to recover money from me if the default is the result of abuse or in other circumstances. The decision not to act at a particular time does not cancel the debt. The Minister and the province concerned may recover the debt when circumstances have changed. [Emphasis added. 72 While the terms of the IRPA undertakings support the position of the Attorneys General that the debt is not forgiven, they also support the sponsors’ contention of a government representation to them that there exists a discretion not to take enforcement action “in a situation of abuse or in other appropriate circumstances” (pre-2002) or “if the default is the result of abuse or in other circumstances” (post-2002). Such representations do not conflict with any statutory duty and are sufficiently clear to preclude the government from denying to the sponsor signatories the ex- Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie J. 211

istence of a discretion to defer enforcement. Given the legitimate expectations created by the wording of these undertakings I do not think it open to the bureaucracy to proceed without notice and without permitting sponsors to make a case for deferral or other modification of enforcement procedures.

E. Ontario’s Policy Provides an Appropriate Measure of Procedural Fairness 73 The Ontario procedure takes the form of a series of letters notifying sponsors that a sponsored relative has applied for social assistance and that he or she is now in default. The letters in most cases made clear Ontario’s openness to consideration of mitigating factors or financial circumstances or other reasons why the debt should not immediately be enforced. This is the correct practice because under the Ontario policy the local social assistance agents are supposed to consider these factors before deciding to refer the matter for collection. Ontario Works and the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) set out a process for dealing with family abuse between a sponsor and sponsored person. The Family Violence and Sponsorship Debt Recovery information sheet describes how the officers should deal with alleged abuse and/or family violence cases. Ontario requires that if such information comes to the officer’s attention collection efforts are to stop immediately. 74 If the sponsor does not agree to repay the debt and resume supporting his or her sponsored relative, the matter is ordinarily referred to the Overpayment Recovery Unit (“ORU”) for collection. The ORU will then send additional notice letters and if the sponsor responds, the ORU will solicit the sponsor’s financial information to determine his or her ability to support his or her relative and repay the debt. If the sponsor does not cooperate, the matter is referred to Canada Revenue Agency’s Refund Set-Off Program, which withholds any tax refunds or credits for the benefit of the province. 75 In this process there is a limited but real opportunity for the sponsor to make representations to the government regarding the particular circumstances surrounding a default. There is no hearing and no appeal procedure but there is a legitimate expectation that the government will consider relevant circumstances in making its enforcement decision and a duty of procedural fairness to do so. However, the wording of the government’s representations in the undertaking are sufficiently vague to leave the government’s choice of procedure very broad. Clearly no 212 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

promises are made of a positive outcome from the sponsors’ point of view. The Ontario guidelines fully comply with the statutory requirements, in my opinion, but this is not to say that each province and territory must proceed in an identical fashion. The essential requirements are that procedural fairness be observed and that the terms of the undertakings be respected by governments as well as by the sponsors who are alleged to be in default. 76 The sponsors contend that the government is under a duty to inform them as soon as a sponsored relative obtains public assistance. It is un- fair, they say, for the government to allow debt to accumulate unbe- knownst to them. This is of particular concern when the relationship between sponsor and relative has broken down and the sponsor is unaware that the relative is seeking or receiving social assistance. Counsel point out that demand for payment from a number of the sponsors was not made before their indebtedness became relatively large and after the passage of a considerable period of time (for example, Mr. Grankin, four and a half years after his mother was first granted social assistance; Ms. de Altamirano, three years from the application for social assistance for her mother; Ms. Vossoughi, close to two years after the sponsor applied for social assistance for her sponsored mother). I agree that good debt management practice would suggest that demand be made as soon as the government payments to or on behalf of the sponsored relative commence. Nonetheless, it is inherent in the sponsor’s support obligation that the sponsor is to keep track of the sponsored relative he or she has undertaken to support. Family class immigrants are admitted solely on the basis of their relationship to the sponsor. In return, the sponsor, not the government, is “responsible for preventing the family member and any accompanying dependents from becoming dependent on public social assistance programs”. Accordingly, the risk of a rogue relative properly lies on the sponsor, not the taxpayer. 77 In the material before us it is clear that each of the eight sponsors was notified of the default and was in communication with the Ministry, in some cases through legal counsel. The facts considered relevant by the sponsors were put forward by some of the respondents. Others simply ignored the government’s reasonable requests. Mr. Hince, for example, declined to disclose his financial situation on the financial assessment forms and did not respond to the government’s letters. Ms. Vossoughi did not reply to the two notification letters sent to her after she had been advised that her mother had applied for social assistance. Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie J. 213

78 The Ministry, after consideration of whatever information was provided, generally advised each of the respondent sponsors that the sponsorship undertakings remained in effect but that the government was open to the negotiation of a repayment plan. At least one of the respondent sponsors did negotiate a repayment plan and, it seems, has been making monthly payments. However, the respondents then initiated these proceedings. In my respectful view the policies adopted by Ontario would, if respected in its collection efforts, satisfy the legitimate procedural expectations of the sponsors, and meet the basic requirements of procedural fairness. The respondent sponsors’ claims to the contrary should be rejected.

V. Disposition 79 These actions arose out of claims for declaratory relief. In light of the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed in part and the following declarations will issue: (i) Canada and Ontario have a discretion under the IRPA and its Reg- ulations to defer but not forgive debt after taking into account a sponsor’s submissions concerning the sponsor’s circumstances and those of his or her sponsored relatives. (ii) Ontario did not improperly fetter its exercise of statutory discretion in adopting its policy. Its terms are consistent with the requirements of the statutory regime and met the legitimate procedural expectations of the respondent sponsors created by the text of their respective undertakings. (iii) Canada and Ontario owe sponsors a duty of procedural fairness when enforcing sponsorship debt. (iv) The content of this duty of procedural fairness include the following obligations: (a) to notify a sponsor at his or her last known address of the claim; (b) to afford the sponsor an opportunity within limited time to explain in writing his or her relevant personal and financial circumstances that are said to militate against immediate collection; (c) to consider any relevant circumstances brought to its attention keeping in mind that the undertakings were the essential conditions precedent to allowing the sponsored immigrant to enter Canada in the first place; (d) to notify the sponsor of the government’s decision; (e) without the need to provide reasons. 214 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

(v) That the above requirements of procedural fairness were met in the cases of the eight respondent sponsors. 80 As these proceedings can properly be characterized as test cases to resolve certain legal issues of public importance all parties will bear their own costs on the appeal and on the application for leave to appeal.

Binnie, J.:

1 Depuis 1978, citoyens et résidents permanents canadiens peuvent parrainer les membres de leur famille qui sont désireux d’immigrer au Can- ada. La réunification des familles etait´ un objectif important de l’ancienne Loi sur l’immigration, L.R.C. 1985, ch. I-2, et elle le demeure sous le régime de la loi qui la remplace depuis 2001, la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés, L.C. 2001, ch. 27 (la « LIPR »). Vingt-sept p. cent (615 000) des plus de deux millions de résidents permanents admis au pays de 1997 a` 2007 l’ont et´´ e au titre du regroupement familial. Lorsqu’un parent ainsi parrainé a recours a` l’assistance sociale malgré l’engagement du répondant de subvenir a` ses besoins, ce dernier est réputé manquer a` ses obligations, et l’administration provinciale ou fédérale peut lui réclamer le coût ainsi supporté par l’Etat.´ 2 Les instances a` l’origine du pourvoi ont et´´ e engagées par huit ré- pondants qui niaient toute responsabilité résultant de leurs engagements. Comme je l’explique ci-après, l’engagement constitue un contrat valide mais, par ailleurs, des dispositions législatives fédérales déterminent sa forme, le régissent et le complètent. La dette qui en résulte n’est pas seulement contractuelle, mais aussi légale, de sorte que son recouvrement n’est pas uniquement assujetti au droit contractuel privé. Dans la présente affaire, la Cour doit décider si, lorsqu’il entreprend de recouvrer une telle créance légale, l’Etat´ doit respecter l’équité procédurale et, dans l’affirmative, dans quelle mesure il y est tenu. 3 Le procureur général du Canada prétend — et la juge des requêtes lui donne raison — que la Couronne peut, sans même en informer au préal- able le répondant qui serait en défaut, déposer a` la Cour fédérale un certificat ministériel constatant la créance alléguée, lequel est alors im- médiatement exécutoire comme s’il s’agissait d’un jugement de la cour. Il soutient que la Couronne a légalement l’obligation (et non le pouvoir discrétionnaire) de recouvrer intégralement la somme due par un ré- Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie, J. 215

pondant et il nie qu’elle soit tenue au respect de l’équité procédurale lorsqu’elle s’acquitte de cette obligation. 4 J’estime toutefois que, correctement interprétées, les dispositions législatives applicables confèrent a` la Couronne un certain pouvoir dis- crétionnaire dans le recouvrement d’une telle créance. Les administrations peuvent donc reporter les mesures de recouvrement eu egard´ a` la situation du répondant et conclure un accord relatif aux modalités de remboursement, mais elles ne peuvent pas simplement renoncer a` la cré- ance légale. La preuve révèle que depuis de nombreuses années — tant avant qu’après l’adoption de la LIPR en 2001 — , l’Ontario applique une politique discrétionnaire a` l’égard du recouvrement des sommes dues par des répondants. 5 Dans l’exercice de ce pouvoir discrétionnaire, dont le législateur lim- ite clairement la portée, il incombe a` la Couronne de respecter l’équité procédurale; il s’agit d’une obligation somme toute minimale. Avant de déposer le certificat de créance a` la Cour fédérale, la Couronne doit (i) donner au répondant un avis de sa réclamation a` sa dernière adresse connue, (ii) lui accorder un délai pour exposer par ecrit´ les circonstances personnelles et financières qui militeraient contre le recouvrement im- médiat de la créance, (iii) tenir compte de tout el´´ ement pertinent qui lui est signalé en se rappelant que l’engagement du répondant etait´ au départ la condition préalable essentielle a` l’admission au Canada de l’immigrant parrainé et (iv) informer le répondant de sa décision. La procédure est purement administrative. Il s’agit de recouvrer une créance. Le décideur administratif n’a nulle obligation de donner des motifs a` l’appui de sa mesure. En ce qui concerne ce programme précis, l’existence de la dette justifie a` elle seule la mesure de recouvrement. 6 Les intimés ont soutenu devant les juridictions inférieures qu’ils devaient etreˆ entièrement [TRADUCTION] « libérés de leurs obligations a` titre de répondants » (Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) (2009), 2009 ONCA 794, 98 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), par. 6), mais devant notre Cour, leurs prétentions sont plus raisonnables car ils: [TRADUCTION] ne contestent pas que les engagements sont susceptibles d’exécution ni que, dans presque tous les cas, il convient d’en obtenir l’exécution. Ils demandent simplement que [l’Etat]´ exerce convenablement son pouvoir discrétionnaire et qu’il tienne compte de la situation de l’intéressé avant de prendre la décision de recouvrer une créance. 216 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

7 La Cour d’appel de l’Ontario conclut que la politique du gouvernement ontarien en matière de report entrave indûment son pouvoir discré- tionnaire en ce qu’elle est [TRADUCTION] « incompatible avec le ré- gime législatif dans son ensemble » (par. 132). Même si je conviens (je le rappelle) avec le tribunal inférieur que le répondant a droit au respect d’un minimum d’équité procédurale, j’estime que les lignes directrices ontariennes sont tout a` fait adéquates sous ce rapport et conformes aux dispositions législatives applicables. De plus, il faut ecarter´ la prétention des répondants intimés voulant qu’ils aient droit a` l’étoffement du processus décisionnel. Il ne s’agit après tout que du recouvrement d’une créance légale. Je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi en partie, mais comme les appels peuvent a` juste titre etreˆ qualifiés de causes types, je le ferais sans adjuger de dépens.

I. Les faits 8 L’étranger désireux d’acquérir la résidence permanente puis la citoyenneté canadiennes peut présenter une demande au titre de l’une ou l’autre des trois catégories générales prévues: le regroupement familial, l’immigration economique´ et les réfugiés (LIPR, art. 12). Le résident permanent ou citoyen canadien qui souhaite parrainer un membre de sa famille entame le processus en présentant une demande de parrainage. Le répondant doit etreˆ ag´ˆ e de 18 ans ou plus et satisfaire a` des exigences précises, notamment sur le plan financier. Le membre de la famille ne fait pas l’objet d’un examen pour déterminer sa capacité de subvenir a` ses besoins. En effet, la résidence permanente lui etant´ accordée sur le seul fondement de son lien de parenté avec le répondant, il n’a pas a` satisfaire aux exigences, notamment financières, qui s’appliquent aux immigrants d’autres catégories.

A. Les répondants 9 Les intimés en l’espèce sont huit répondants réputés avoir manqué a` leur engagement du fait que la personne parrainée a bénéficié d’assistance sociale. 10 En 2002, M. Dzihic a parrainé sa fiancée qui, une fois arrivée au Can- ada, aurait refusé de vivre avec lui ou de l’épouser. Il en a informé le ministère de l’Immigration, qui a pris une mesure d’expulsion contre l’intéressée. Celle-ci a cependant interjeté appel et obtenu l’annulation de la mesure sans en informer l’intimé, qui dit avoir aussi ignoré qu’elle avait par la suite touché des prestations d’assistance sociale qui, en juillet Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie, J. 217

2007, totalisaient 10 510,65 $ et qu’il est aujourd’hui tenu de rembourser. 11 En 1995, Mme El-Murr a parrainé son père, sa mère et ses deux frères. Elle etait´ sans emploi, mais son mari travaillait et a cosigné l’engagement. Après l’arrivée des membres de sa famille au Canada, Mme El-Murr a quitté son mari parce qu’il aurait fait preuve de violence a` son endroit. Ses parents, un de ses frères et elle ont dû recourir a` l’assistance sociale. La somme due s’élevait en février 2006 a` 94 242,16 $, et l’intimée se dit incapable de la rembourser. 12 M. Grankin a parrainé sa mère en 1999. Il dit avoir perdu son emploi par la suite et avoir et´´ e contraint de demander des prestations d’assistance sociale. Une fois sa mère arrivée au Canada, il ne pouvait subvenir a` ses besoins, de sorte qu’elle a demandé et obtenu de l’assistance sociale. M. Grankin affirme que s’il avait su qu’il devrait rembourser les prestations, il n’aurait pas laissé sa mère en demander. En juin 2007, sa dette totale s’élevait a` 54 426,39 $. 13 En 2002, M. Hince a epous´´ e Mme Patel, qui visitait alors le Canada munie du visa requis. Mme Patel est rentrée en Inde, puis M. Hince l’a parrainée ainsi que sa fille. Elles sont revenues au pays en 2006 et ont vécu peu de temps avec M. Hince, puis elles l’ont quitté. L’intimé affirme qu’il ignorait que Mme Patel avait subséquemment touché des prestations d’assistance sociale. Comme son emploi n’est pas très rémunér- ateur, il n’est pas en mesure de rembourser les prestations versées, qui s’élevaient en juin 2007 a` 10 547,65 $. Il croit que Mme Patel s’est simplement servie de lui pour immigrer au Canada. 14 En 2000, Mme de Altamirano a parrainé sa mère conjointement avec son mari. Après son arrivée au Canada, la mère de l’intimée a subi un accident vasculaire cérébral. Mme de Altamirano a demandé des prestations pour l’hébergement de sa mère dans un centre de soins. Elle dit y avoir et´´ e incitée par l’agent au dossier et ne pas avoir compris qu’elle aurait a` rembourser les prestations, lesquelles se chiffraient en mai 2007 a` 54 559,99 $. 15 En 1996, M. Mavi a parrainé son père. Il n’aurait ni lu ni compris la demande. En 1997, son père est arrivé au pays et a habité chez lui. Leur relation s’est détériorée, puis le père est parti. En 2005, M. Mavi a appris que son père avait touché des prestations. Il a alors communiqué avec les autorités compétentes pour les informer de ses problèmes de santé et de son aptitude limitée au travail. Les prestations dont on lui réclame le remboursement se chiffraient au mois de juin 2005 a` 17 818,08 $. 218 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

16 Mme Vossoughi etait´ mariée lorsqu’elle a entrepris de parrainer sa mère. En 2002, elle s’est séparée de son mari parce qu’il aurait et´´ e violent. En 2003, sa mère est arrivée au Canada. L’intimée ne pouvait subvenir aux besoins de sa mère qui, tout comme elle, a donc eu recours a` l’assistance sociale. Mme Vossoughi dit ne pas avoir et´´ e consciente du fait qu’il lui faudrait rembourser les prestations. Le montant dû au titre de l’engagement s’élevait en juillet 2007 a` 28 754,71 $. 17 En 2000, M. Zebaradami a parrainé sa fiancée, qui est arrivée au Can- ada en 2001. Après n’avoir cohabité avec lui que quelques semaines, sa fiancée l’a quitté pour un autre homme. En juillet 2007, elle avait touché 22 158,02 $ de prestations d’assistance sociale. M. Zebaradami prétend avoir et´´ e dupé et que sa fiancée s’est servie de lui pour immigrer au Canada. 18 Le gouvernement de l’Ontario, qui dans chacun des cas a versé les prestations d’assistance sociale au parent dans le besoin, a entrepris d’en recouvrer le montant. Les huit répondants ont demandé a` la Cour supér- ieure de justice de l’Ontario de rendre divers jugements déclaratoires les soustrayant temporairement ou a` jamais a` leur obligation de remboursement.

B. Les engagements 19 Les engagements signés par M. Grankin, M. Zebaradami et Mme de Altamirano précisent ce qui suit relativement a` la possibilité de reporter le recouvrement de sommes dues (les engagements signés par Mme Vos- soughi, M. Dzihic et M. Hince comportent une clause analogue): Le Ministre peut décider de ne prendre aucune mesure pour recouvrer les sommes dues d’un Répondant et du conjoint cosignataire qui ont manqué a` leur engagement parce qu’ils se trouvaient dans une situation abusive ou dans d’autres circonstances valables. Une telle décision du Ministre, prise a` un moment bien pré- cis, n’a pas pour effet d’annuler les dettes; le Ministre peut recouvrer les sommes dues lorsque la situation du Répondant et du conjoint cosignataire change. [Je souligne.]

C. Les politiques appliquées aux paliers fédéral et provincial 20 Le Protocole d’entente Canada - Ontario sur l’échange de renseignements - 2004 vise a` faciliter entre autres le recouvrement d’une somme due par un répondant. Son article 6 dispose qu’une telle somme est Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie, J. 219

« payable sur demande », mais que le débiteur peut remédier au manquement en remboursant partiellement la somme avec l’accord de la province. L’Ontario applique ses propres lignes directrices pour déterminer si, dans un cas de violence familiale, il convient de prendre immédiate- ment des mesures de recouvrement ou de les reporter. 21 La politique ontarienne elle-même prévoit certains cas où le manquement a` l’engagement ne donne pas lieu a` des mesures de recouvrement, notamment lorsque le répondant ne peut payer la somme due en raison d’une incapacité, lorsque la violence familiale est etablie,´ lorsque le ré- pondant est lui-même prestataire d’aide sociale ou lorsqu’il existe d’autres « circonstances exceptionnelles [bien documentées] ». Le procureur général de l’Ontario soutient (contrairement a` son homologue fédéral) que la loi fédérale confère effectivement un certain pouvoir dis- crétionnaire et que la politique de la province est tout a` fait conforme. Il prétend cependant que les rapports entre la province et les répondants sont seulement régis par les règles applicables aux contrats de gré a` gré. 22 Les répondants intimés avancent (et la Cour d’appel leur donne raison) qu’il faut prendre en compte le libellé des engagements pour in- terpréter les dispositions législatives applicables.

II. Le cadre légal 23 Suivant l’art. 132 du Règlement sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés, DORS/2002-227, le répondant est tenu de rembourser a` Sa Majesté du chef du Canada ou de la province en cause les prestations versées au parent parrainé a` titre d’assistance sociale pendant la durée de l’engagement, laquelle etait´ auparavant de 10 ans, mais est désormais de 3 ans pour l’époux ou l’enfant a` charge ag´ˆ e de 22 ans ou plus et de 10 ans pour l’enfant a` charge ag´ˆ e de moins de 22 ans et tout autre membre de la famille (par. 132(1)). L’engagement prévoit les obligations du ré- pondant, sa période de validité et les conséquences de son non-respect; il précise en outre qu’il demeure opposable au répondant indépendamment de la modification de sa situation personnelle. 24 Le paragraphe 108(2) de l’ancienne Loi sur l’immigration autorisait le gouvernement fédéral a` conclure avec les provinces des accords de mise en œuvre des programmes d’immigration. L’alinéa 114(1)c) ac- cordait le pouvoir de prendre des règlements sur le parrainage, et l’art. 115 permettait au ministre d’établir les formulaires nécessaires a` la mise en œuvre du programme (c’est en application de ce pouvoir que les engagements signés par les répondants intimés ont et´´ e rédigés par le minis- 220 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

tère de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration). Suivant le par. 118(1) de l’ancienne loi, le gouvernement fédéral pouvait céder un engagement a` une province afin qu’elle puisse recouvrer directement du répondant le montant des prestations d’assistance sociale versées. La nouvelle LIPR rend inutile la cession de la créance. 25 Aussi, la procédure de recouvrement etait´ plus contraignante sous le régime de l’ancienne Loi sur l’immigration que sous celui de la LIRP. L’ancien par. 118(2) obligeait l’administration en cause a` obtenir d’un tribunal compétent un jugement lui permettant de recouvrer la somme due par le répondant. Les fonds publics versés a` cause du manquement a` un engagement etaient´ réputés constituer des « créances de Sa Majesté du chef du Canada ou de la province a` qui la cession a et´´ e faite » et pouvaient « etreˆ recouvrés ... auprès de la personne ou du groupe qui a pris l’engagement ». Suivant l’alinéa 5(2)g) de l’ancien règlement, le manquement a` un engagement faisait obstacle a` tout autre parrainage (Règlement modifiant le Règlement sur l’Immigration de 1978, DORS/97-145, art. 3). 26 En 2002, la LIPR a profondément modifié les règles applicables a` l’immigration au titre du regroupement familial. L’alinéa 14(2)e) confère le pouvoir général de prendre des règlements en matière d’engagement de parrainage. Le paragraphe 145(2), dont en particulier le passage qui suit, est déterminant pour ce qui est de savoir si, en l’espèce, le ministre jouit ou non d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire: ... le montant que le répondant s’est engagé a` payer au titre d’un engagement est payable sur demande et constitue une créance de Sa Majesté du chef du Canada et de Sa Majesté du chef de la province que l’une ou l’autre, ou les deux, peut recouvrer. Les répondants intimés prétendent que l’emploi du verbe « pouvoir » rend la mesure facultative et investit la Couronne du pouvoir discrétion- naire de recouvrer ou non la créance. 27 La LIPR a simplifié l’exécution de l’obligation du répondant. Il n’est plus nécessaire que l’engagement pris vis-à-vis de l’Etat´ fédéral soit cédé a` la province pour que celle-ci puisse le faire respecter. En outre, le par. 145(3) fait obstacle a` la prescription en disposant que « le recouvrement de la créance n’est pas affecté par le seul ecoulement´ du temps ». 28 Les administrations n’ont même plus a` engager une instance en Cour fédérale pour recouvrer les sommes qui leur sont dues. L’article 146 permet au ministre de constater par certificat le montant en souffrance sans délai ou dans les 30 jours qui suivent le manquement, selon les cir- Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie, J. 221

constances, et d’enregistrer le certificat a` la Cour fédérale pour qu’il soit assimilé a` un jugement de celle-ci. 29 L’article 135 du nouveau règlement dispose que le manquement a` un engagement commence dès le paiement par l’administration et prend fin lorsque le répondant rembourse l’administration « en totalité ou selon tout accord conclu » avec elle, ou bien lorsqu’il s’acquitte de l’obligation a` laquelle il y avait manquement. Le procureur général du Canada in- voque la suppression dans la LIPR de toute instance judiciaire préalable a` l’exercice du pouvoir ministériel de recourir a` l’exécution en Cour fédérale. Les répondants intimés soutiennent pour leur part que cette suppression requiert d’autant plus que le ministre agisse avec equit´´ e et s’assure des faits avant d’entamer une procédure de recouvrement qu’ils jugent trop radicale.

III. L’historique judiciaire A. Cour supérieure de justice de l’Ontario (la juge Wilson) 30 La juge des requêtes conclut qu’il appert de la LIPR et de son règle- ment d’application, considérés dans leur ensemble, que le législateur a voulu etablir´ une procédure de recouvrement [TRADUCTION] « de nature purement administrative » (par. 50). Selon elle, le gouvernement n’est pas investi du pouvoir discrétionnaire d’apprécier dans chaque cas l’opportunité de recouvrer ou non la créance, son obligation consiste a` recouvrer les sommes dues et il n’est pas légalement tenu de faire preuve d’équité envers les répondants en défaut. Aucune disposition de la loi ou du règlement ne permet au répondant de présenter des observations avant qu’il y ait recouvrement (par. 54). 31 Pour la juge des requêtes, les engagements relèvent du droit contractuel (par. 55), les répondants les ont pris librement (par. 57) et les engagements contractuels doivent etreˆ interprétés au regard de l’objet de la loi, a` savoir le recouvrement des créances (par. 58). Qui plus est, la thé- orie de l’impossibilité d’exécution ne s’applique pas (par. 59), car les intéressés savaient qu’ils devraient rembourser les sommes versées si les personnes parrainées devenaient a` la charge de l’Etat´ (par. 59). La juge refuse donc aux répondants les jugements déclaratoires demandés.

B. Cour d’appel de l’Ontario (les juges Laskin, Simmons et Lang) 32 La Cour d’appel n’a et´´ e saisie que de questions de droit administratif: (1) les lois confèrent-elles aux administrations le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’apprécier dans chaque cas l’opportunité de recouvrer la créance d’un 222 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

répondant, (2) le Canada et l’Ontario ont-ils exercé ce pouvoir discré- tionnaire abusivement, (3) etaient-ils´ tenus au respect de l’équité procédurale vis-à-vis des répondants et (4) les engagements contractés sous le régime de l’ancienne loi sont-ils susceptibles d’exécution sous le régime de la nouvelle. La Cour d’appel a accueilli l’appel. 33 En ce qui concerne la première question, la Cour d’appel estime que les deux lois confèrent le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’apprécier dans chaque cas l’opportunité de recouvrer la somme due par le répondant (par. 89) et que, s’agissant de l’interprétation du par. 118(2) de l’ancienne loi et du par. 145(2) de la nouvelle, l’emploi du verbe « pouvoir » indique que le ministre jouit d’un certain pouvoir discrétionnaire. 34 Selon la Cour d’appel, la juge des requêtes est dans l’erreur [TRA- DUCTION] « en partie parce qu’elle a omis de bien tenir compte du règlement et des formulaires », qui constituent des « el´´ ements essentiels d’un régime intégré [d’immigration] » (par. 91 et 95). La Cour d’appel signale que, depuis 1999, l’engagement renferme une clause permettant au répondant de négocier un arrangement avec l’administration en cause (par. 98). De plus, les engagements intervenus sous le régime de l’une et l’autre lois confèrent aux administrations la faculté de ne pas prendre de mesures pour recouvrer la créance (par. 103-104). Puisque le législateur n’a pas supprimé ce pouvoir discrétionnaire lors de la modification en 2002, on peut logiquement conclure qu’il a voulu que le régime de recouvrement soit empreint d’une certaine souplesse. 35 En ce qui a trait a` la deuxième question, la Cour d’appel va plus loin. Vu le libellé de l’engagement, elle estime que l’Ontario a indûment [TRADUCTION] « abusé de son pouvoir discrétionnaire ou entravé son exercice », notamment parce que sa politique prévoit qu’un « [répondant] en défaut doit rembourser le montant intégral de la dette » (par. 125- 126). Dès lors, nul accord de remboursement d’un montant moindre ne peut intervenir, contrairement a` ce que prévoit expressément le sous-al. 135b)(i) du nouveau règlement. Puisque la politique exige le paiement intégral dans tous les cas, peu importe les circonstances, elle entrave in- dûment l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire que la loi confère au ministre (par. 127). 36 La Cour d’appel ajoute que la politique ontarienne consistant a` ne reporter le paiement de la dette que s’il existe des « circonstances exceptionnelles [bien documentées] » etablit´ une norme plus stricte que celle fondée sur le critère des « circonstances valables » prévu dans les en- Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie, J. 223

gagements (par. 132-133). Dans cette mesure, elle juge la politique invalide. 37 En ce qui concerne la troisième question, la Cour d’appel statue que les administrations etaient´ tenues au respect de l’équité procédurale vis- a-vis` des répondants (par. 135). A` son avis, elles avaient l’obligation d’établir un « processus » permettant au répondant de faire etat´ des el´´ e- ments pertinents de sa situation personnelle et financière, d’examiner ces el´´ ements, d’informer le répondant de leur prise en considération et de lui communiquer la décision (par. 147). La clause des engagements selon laquelle l’administration examinera « d’autres circonstances valables » dans l’exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire a fait naˆıtre chez les ré- pondants l’attente légitime qu’il serait tenu compte de la situation propre a` chacun (par. 148). Enfin, la Cour d’appel statue que les engagements contractés sous le régime de l’ancienne Loi sur l’immigration peuvent etreˆ exécutés en application de la LIPR.

IV. Analyse 38 Depuis l’arrêt Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk (Regional Municipality) Commissioners of Police (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.), l’équité procédurale est une composante fondamentale du droit administratif canadien. Le juge en chef Laskin y reprend, au nom des juges majoritaires, l’affirmation voulant que [TRADUCTION] « dans le domaine administratif ou exécutif, [on applique] l’obligation générale d’agir equitablement´ » (p. 324). Six ans plus tard, dans un jugement unanime rédigé par le juge Le Dain, notre Cour confirme le principe: « ... a` titre de principe général de common law, une obligation de respecter l’équité dans la procédure incombe a` tout organisme public qui rend des décisions administratives qui ne sont pas de nature législative et qui touchent les droits, privilèges ou biens d’une personne » (Cardinal v. Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643 (S.C.C.), a` la p. 653). Il s’agit donc de déterminer dans chaque cas « ce que l’obligation de respecter l’équité dans la procédure peut raisonnablement exiger des autorités en tant que droit précis en matière de procédure dans un contexte législatif et administratif donné » (Cardinal, p. 654). Voir aussi Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653 (S.C.C.), p. 669, Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.), par. 20, et Centre hospitalier Mont-Sina¨ı c. Québec (Ministre de la Santé & des Services sociaux), 2001 SCC 41, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281 (S.C.C.), par. 18. Plus récemment, dans l’arrêt New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.), 224 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

les juges Bastarache et LeBel reconnaissent le principe selon lequel [TRADUCTION] « [l]e respect de l’équité dans la procédure est essentiel a` la notion d’exercice “équitable” du pouvoir » (par. 90) (citant D. J. M. Brown et J. M. Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada (feuilles mobiles), p. 7-3). 39 Par conséquent, même si les exigences de l’équité procédurale varient en fonction des circonstances et du contexte législatif et administratif, on ne peut certainement pas présumer que le législateur a voulu permettre a` l’administration de traiter inéquitablement ses administrés. La règle générale veut au contraire qu’il y ait obligation de faire preuve d’équité (voir G. Régimbald, Canadian Administrative Law (2008), p. 226-27), sauf disposition législative claire ou déduction nécessaire ecartant´ son application: Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control & Licensing Branch), 2001 SCC 52, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781 (S.C.C.), par. 22. Ni la LIPR ni la loi qu’elle a remplacée ne renferment pareille disposition ecartant´ la présomption. 40 Déterminer en quoi consiste l’équité procédurale requiert la mise en balance de plusieurs el´´ ements. Le caractère « equitable´ » d’un processus accroˆıt inévitablement sa durée et son coût pour le contribuable. Par contre, la perception que l’Etat´ agit inéquitablement ou que les mesures administratives s’appuient sur des [TRADUCTION] « conclusions de fait ou de droit ou des décisions discrétionnaires qui sont erronées, in- complètes ou irréfléchies » inflige elle aussi un coût a` la société (Brown et Evans, p. 7-3; voir egalement´ D. J. Mullan, Administrative Law (2001), p. 178). 41 Une fois l’obligation d’équité procédurale etablie,´ le contexte législa- tif et administratif en cause est fondamental a` sa définition. La présente espèce ne concerne pas un programme gouvernemental de versement de prestations ou d’octroi d’autorisations, mais une créance ordinaire. L’historique de la LIPR révèle qu’au fil des ans, le législateur est devenu de plus en plus préoccupé du transfert au trésor public d’une partie importante des frais de subsistance des immigrants parrainés. La réunifica- tion des familles a pour assise la condition essentielle que c’est le ré- pondant, et non l’Etat´ qui, en contrepartie de l’admission au pays de l’immigrant parrainé, satisfait aux besoins de ce dernier. Le répondant s’y engage par ecrit.´ Il comprend dès le départ — ou il le devrait — que le non-respect de ses obligations l’expose a` de graves conséquences financières. Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie, J. 225

42 Divers facteurs permettent de déterminer en quoi consiste l’équité procédurale dans un contexte législatif et administratif donné, et certains d’entre eux sont examinés dans l’arrêt Cardinal. Cette affaire dans laquelle un détenu contestait une mesure de discipline carcérale a mis en lumière la nécessité de concilier les besoins d’une administration publique a` la fois efficace et rigoureuse et l’exigence, primordiale, de l’équité. L’obligation d’équité ne s’applique pas de la même manière dans tous les cas. Certains facteurs a` considérer sont enonc´´ es dans Baker, soit (i) « la nature de la décision recherchée et le processus suivi pour y parvenir » (par. 23), (ii) « la nature du régime législatif et les “termes de la loi en vertu de laquelle agit l’organisme en cause” » (par. 24), (iii) l’importance de la décision pour les personnes visées (par. 25), (iv) « les attentes légitimes de la personne qui conteste la décision » (par. 26) et (v) « les choix de procédure que l’organisme fait lui-même, particulièrement quand la loi laisse au décideur la possibilité de choisir ses propres procé- dures, ou quand l’organisme a une expertise dans le choix des procédures appropriées dans les circonstances » (par. 27). Certes, d’autres arrêts ont ajouté des el´´ ements a` cette liste, mais il faut retenir que dans un cas donné, la nature de l’obligation dépendra des circonstances particulières de l’affaire. L’obligation prépondérante est l’équité, et cette notion « cen- trale » d’« exercice equitable´ du pouvoir » ne saurait etreˆ diluée ou oc- cultée par des enum´´ erations judiciaires utiles, mais non exhaustives. 43 En l’espèce, la décision administrative a purement et simplement trait au recouvrement d’une créance. Les dispositions applicables expriment clairement l’intention du législateur d’éviter la mise en place d’un processus d’examen administratif compliqué. Cependant, la Cour d’appel relève a` juste titre que la décision visée en l’espèce est de nature défini- tive et particulière. Elle peut déboucher sur le dépôt en Cour fédérale d’un certificat ministériel susceptible d’exécution comme s’il s’agissait d’un jugement de celle-ci. La LIPR ne prévoit pas de mécanisme permettant au répondant d’en appeler de la décision de recouvrer la créance. Comme dans l’affaire Knight, l’absence de recours milite en faveur d’une obligation d’équité a` l’étape de la décision d’entreprendre le recouvrement (voir aussi Baker, par. 24.). Les répercussions de la déci- sion sur le répondant sont importantes. La somme qu’il doit peut etreˆ substantielle et augmenter rapidement, et c’est le cas de celles réclamées par l’administration en l’espèce. 44 Le cadre légal confère aux administrations un certain pouvoir discré- tionnaire dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions d’application de la loi et, dans la présente affaire, la procédure ontarienne est parfaitement compat- 226 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

ible a` la fois avec le recouvrement efficient des créances et le traitement equitable´ des répondants en défaut. J’examine ci-après séparément la question des attentes légitimes. 45 Dans ces circonstances, je suis d’avis que la nature de l’obligation d’équité procédurale ne commande pas un processus décisionnel com- plexe, mais (comme je l’indique précédemment) qu’elle oblige l’Etat,´ préalablement au dépôt du certificat de créance a` la Cour fédérale, (i) a` donner au répondant un avis de sa réclamation a` sa dernière adresse connue, (ii) a` lui accorder un délai pour exposer par ecrit´ les circonstances personnelles et financières qui militeraient contre le recouvrement im- médiat de la créance, (iii) a` tenir compte de tout el´´ ement pertinent qui lui est signalé en se rappelant que l’engagement du répondant etait´ au départ la condition préalable essentielle a` l’admission au Canada de l’immigrant parrainé et (iv) a` informer le répondant de sa décision. Vu le cadre légis- latif et réglementaire, la nature non judiciaire du processus et l’absence de tout droit d’appel légal, l’obligation d’équité faite a` l’Etat´ dans le cas qui nous occupe ne va pas jusqu’à le contraindre a` motiver chacune de ses décisions (Baker, par. 43). Après tout, il s’agit uniquement de faire en sorte que le répondant respecte son engagement afin que le contribuable ne soit pas lésé par l’admission au pays d’un membre de sa famille par ailleurs inadmissible. 46 L’Ontario a adopté une politique de recouvrement a` l’avenant. Le dossier n’établit pas que les mesures minimales de protection procédurale prévues par la province ont de quelque manière compromis ou contrecarré l’objectif du recouvrement des créances ou fait en sorte que les répondants soient victimes d’iniquité.

A. L’argument contractuel 47 Les procureurs généraux invoquent la nature essentiellement contractuelle des réclamations pour contester l’existence d’une obligation d’équité procédurale envers les répondants. Ils avancent que l’arrêt Dun- smuir ecarte´ l’équité procédurale lorsqu’un contrat s’applique. Or, en l’espèce, le droit d’action de l’administration est essentiellement d’origine législative, ce qui n’était pas le cas dans l’affaire Dunsmuir. 48 Dans l’arrêt Dunsmuir, la Cour statue sur un lien d’emploi qui, selon elle, ressortit au droit contractuel. Même si l’employé contractuel etait´ un haut fonctionnaire, le recours privé pour rupture de contrat n’est pas devenu pour autant un recours de droit public. Par contre, dans la présente affaire, la loi fixe et régit les conditions du parrainage. Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie, J. 227

L’engagement du répondant procède d’une exigence légale, et ses clauses sont etablies´ par le ministre en vertu d’un pouvoir qu’il tient de la loi. Les procureurs généraux qualifient le répondant de simple débiteur contractuel. Or, habituellement, même le débiteur contractuel a droit a` un avis de la réclamation et est admis a` la contester. 49 Malgré l’engagement contracté, le présent litige ressortit toujours au droit public. La jurisprudence offre de nombreux exemples de contrat etroitement´ régi par la loi et dont l’exécution obéit aux principes du droit public. Dans l’arrêt R. v. Rhine, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 442 (S.C.C.), par exemple, la Cour devait statuer dans deux affaires de rupture de contrat, l’une concernant le remboursement d’un paiement anticipé versé sous le ré- gime de la Loi sur les paiements anticipés pour le grain des Prairies, et l’autre, le recouvrement du capital et des intérêts d’un prêt etudiant´ con- senti sous le régime de la Loi canadienne sur les prêts aux etudiants´ . Les défendeurs soutenaient que l’exécution d’un contrat de droit privé relevait du droit provincial, de sorte que la Cour fédérale n’avait pas compétence. Dans les deux cas, la Cour rejette leur thèse au motif que les contrats tirent leur origine de la loi. Le juge en chef Laskin fait observer: Nous sommes en présence d’un cadre législatif détaillé qui autorise des paiements anticipés pour des livraisons eventuelles´ de grain; c’est un el´´ ement d’un plan d’ensemble pour la commercialisation du grain produit au Canada. Un examen de la Loi sur les paiements an- ticipés pour le grain des Prairies elle-même met en lumière la place que celle-ci prend dans le plan d’ensemble. Certes, l’application de la Loi emporte un engagement ou des conséquences contractuelles, mais cela ne veut pas dire que la Loi est mise a` l’écart une fois l’engagement pris ou le contrat signé. La Loi a constamment des répercussions sur l’engagement, de sorte que l’on peut dire a` bon droit qu’il existe une législation fédérale valide qui régit l’opération, objet du litige devant la Cour fédérale. [p. 447] Voir egalement´ Peter G. White Management Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2006 FCA 190, [2007] 2 F.C.R. 475 (F.C.A.), par. 72; R. v. Crosson (1999), 169 F.T.R. 218 (Fed. T.D.), par. 36. 50 De fa¸con analogue, même si les engagements des répondants présentent des aspects contractuels, le cadre légal régit de près les droits et les obligations des parties et ouvre la voie a` l’application de l’équité procédurale. Rappelons que suivant le par. 145(2) de la LIPR, la somme due par un répondant est payable a` la Couronne fédérale ou provinciale, qui peut la recouvrer. En outre, le par. 132(1) du Règlement rend le ré- pondant redevable des prestations versées a` titre d’assistance sociale a` la 228 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

personne parrainée, et l’art. 135 du Règlement définit le « manquement ». Enfin, l’art. 146 de la LIPR régit l’exécution de l’engagement en Cour fédérale. Tout comme celui en cause dans l’affaire Rhine, l’engagement demeure toujours assujetti a` la loi. 51 Il n’y a pas la moindre ressemblance entre la situation en l’espèce et l’exception de portée passablement etroite´ qui, dans l’arrêt Dunsmuir, soustrait le contrat d’emploi a` l’application de l’équité procédurale. Les juges majoritaires soulignent eux-mêmes dans cet arrêt: Cette conclusion n’affaiblit pas l’obligation générale faite aux décideurs administratifs d’agir avec equit´´ e. Elle reconnaˆıt plutôt que dans le contexte particulier du renvoi de la fonction publique, c’est le droit contractuel, et non le droit public, qui préside au règlement des différends. [Je souligne; par. 82.] Dans Dunsmuir, la Cour n’entend pas réduire par ailleurs l’obligation d’équité procédurale dans l’exercice du pouvoir de l’administration, et elle ne le fait pas.

B. La thèse de l’exception légale 52 Il est incontestable qu’un texte de loi peut ecarter´ l’application d’une notion de common law comme l’obligation d’équité, et les procureurs généraux soutiennent que la LIPR le fait en l’espèce. Je ne suis pas de leur avis. Tant le libellé de la loi que son contexte et son objet s’opposent a` une telle conclusion.

(1) Le libellé de la loi 53 Le paragraphe 145(2) de la nouvelle loi et, dans une moindre mesure, le par. 118(2) de l’ancienne forment le pivot de la procédure de recouvrement. En voici le texte (je souligne): Créance: répondants 145. ... (2) Sous réserve de tout accord fédéro-provincial, le montant que le répondant s’est engagé a` payer au titre d’un engagement est payable sur demande et constitue une créance de Sa Majesté du chef du Can- ada et de Sa Majesté du chef de la province que l’une ou l’autre, ou les deux, peut recouvrer. Rupture de l’engagement 118. ... Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie, J. 229

(2) Les montants réglementaires versés directement ou indirectement a` l’immigrant, par suite d’une rupture de l’engagement visé au paragraphe (1), peuvent etreˆ recouvrés, devant tout tribunal compé- tent, auprès de la personne ou du groupe qui a pris l’engagement, a` titre de créances de Sa Majesté du chef du Canada ou de la province a` qui la cession a et´´ e faite. L’énoncé selon lequel « le répondant s’est engagé a` payer » et celui voulant que le montant soit « payable sur demande » dissipent tout doute quant a` l’existence d’une créance légale. Les deux textes autorisent le recouvrement (« peut recouvrer » dans le premier, et « peuvent etreˆ recouvrés » dans le second). 54 Selon la juge des requêtes, le législateur emploie le verbe « pouvoir » uniquement pour habiliter l’un ou l’autre ordre de gouvernement a` faire respecter l’engagement. Ce qu’il faut souligner toutefois c’est qu’aucune des dispositions applicables n’exige expressément de Sa Majesté qu’elle recouvre une créance sans tenir compte des circonstances. Habituelle- ment, l’emploi du verbe « pouvoir » par le législateur connote un certain pouvoir discrétionnaire (Loi d’interprétation, L.R.C. 1985, ch. I-21, art. 11). C’est l’interprétation qui paraˆıt la plus naturelle. Il paraˆıt trop manifeste pour soutenir le contraire que le législateur a voulu un recouvrement des créances —a ` l’échelon fédéral ou provincial — ration- nel, sensé et economique.´ Le procureur général du Canada reconnaˆıt qu’un ministre jouit d’un « pouvoir discrétionnaire administratif » dans la gestion de son ministère. Voir, p. ex., Optical Recording Corp. v. Can- ada (1990), [1991] 1 F.C. 309 (Fed. C.A.), p. 323. Il n’y a pas d’administration efficace possible sans une certaine souplesse, et la souplesse emporte nécessairement le pouvoir discrétionnaire. 55 Quelque limité qu’il soit, le pouvoir discrétionnaire suppose une certaine mesure d’équité procédurale adaptée a` son exercice.

(2) Le contexte légal 56 Les procureurs généraux font valoir que plusieurs dispositions de la LIPR confirment la nature obligatoire de l’engagement et renforcent les mesures de recouvrement par rapport a` ce que prévoyait l’ancienne Loi sur l’immigration. Toutefois, la preuve que le législateur a voulu, en adoptant la nouvelle loi, faciliter le recouvrement des sommes dues par des répondants ne permet pas de conclure que son intention ait et´´ e que les mesures soient prises inéquitablement. 230 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

57 Le Règlement constitue aussi un volet important du contexte légal. Dans l’arrêt Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services), 2004 SCC 54, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 152 (S.C.C.), la juge Deschamps dit que la consultation du règlement « est utile dans la déter- mination de l’intention du législateur », surtout lorsque la loi et ses règle- ments forment un tout (par. 35). Voir par ailleurs Canada 3000 Inc., Re (2004), 69 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), par. 102-104, Ward-Price v. Mariners Haven Inc. (2001), 57 O.R. (3d) 410 (Ont. C.A.), par. 29. Comme le fait remarquer la professeure Sullivan, [TRADUCTION] « [l]orsqu’un règlement sert a` compléter le régime législatif, il est clair que l’intention du législateur est que la loi et le règlement soient appli- qués ensemble et forment un tout » (je souligne): Sullivan on the Con- struction of Statutes (5e ed.´ 2008), p. 370. En outre, le par. 2(2) de la LIPR enonce´ que toute mention de celle-ci vaut mention du Règlement. 58 La LIPR confère un large pouvoir de réglementation dans différents domaines, dont l’immigration d’un parent et l’engagement du répondant. L’article 135 du Règlement, sur lequel s’appuie la Cour d’appel pour conclure a` l’existence d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire ministériel, est ainsi libellé: Défaut 135. Pour l’application du sous-alinéa 133(1)g)(i), le manquement a` un engagement de parrainage: ..... b) prend fin dès que le répondant: (i) d’une part, rembourse en totalité ou selon tout accord conclu avec l’administration intéressée les sommes payées par celle-ci, (ii) d’autre part, s’acquitte de l’obligation prévue par l’engagement a` l’égard de laquelle il y avait manquement. Le procureur général du Canada prétend que cette disposition ne permet pas a` l’administration de conclure un « accord » de remise de dette, pareille renonciation ne pouvant intervenir qu’en application de la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques, L.R.C. 1985, ch. F-11, art. 23 (la « LGFP »). Il soutient qu’elle précise seulement ce qui constitue un manquement aux fins de déterminer si le répondant peut ou non parrainer un autre membre de sa famille. 59 Il demeure toutefois que le Règlement distingue entre paiement « en totalité » et paiement « selon tout accord conclu avec l’administration Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie, J. 231

intéressée ». La seule interprétation possible est que l’administration est autorisée a` ne recouvrer que le montant convenu avec le répondant, et que le Règlement ne prescrit aucun remboursement minimum ou maximum (la remise totale etant´ cependant exlue). Le montant et les conditions du remboursement relèvent donc du pouvoir discrétionnaire de l’administration. L’accord qui prévoirait le remboursement d’une créance de 20 000 $ a` raison de 20 $ par mois pourrait ne jamais permettre le paiement intégral de la dette, mais il s’agirait néanmoins d’un « accord » au sens de l’al. 135b)(i) qui ressortirait au pouvoir de l’administration en cause. 60 Le procureur général du Canada prétend qu’un accord de remboursement partiel constituerait une radiation de créance et contreviendrait a` la procédure prévue par la LGFP. J’estime cependant que ce n’est pas la radiation de la créance qui est envisagée au sous-al. 135b)(i) du Règle- ment, mais bien son recouvrement echelonn´´ e a` raison de montants « con- venus ». La LGFP est une loi d’application très générale. Elle n’empêche pas le législateur fédéral d’établir des régimes particuliers de gestion et de recouvrement de sommes dues a` la Couronne dans le cadre de certains programmes créés par loi. La LIPR constitue un tel régime de recouvrement particulier. 61 Contrairement a` la Cour d’appel, j’interprète la LIPR et le Règlement sans egard´ au texte des engagements de parrainage, car ce texte est etabli´ par le ministre et ses fonctionnaires et peut changer (et change effectivement) a` l’occasion. Les engagements sont tout au plus le reflet d’une interprétation administrative du cadre législatif. Il en irait autrement d’un formulaire annexé au texte de la loi, qui y serait dès lors assimilé, mais ce n’est pas le cas des documents considérés en l’espèce. Voir l’arrêt Houde v. Quebec (Catholic School Commission) (1977), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 937 (S.C.C.), p. 947; Sullivan, p. 408-409.

(3) L’objet de la Loi 62 A` son l’article 3, la LIPR enonce´ que son objet est de favoriser la réunification des familles, mais elle reconnaˆıt egalement´ que l’intégration des immigrants suppose « des obligations pour les nouveaux arrivants et pour la société canadienne »: Objet en matière d’immigration 3. (1) En matière d’immigration, la présente loi a pour objet: ..... d) de veiller a` la réunification des familles au Canada; 232 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

e) de promouvoir l’intégration des résidents permanents au Canada, compte tenu du fait que cette intégration suppose des obligations pour les nouveaux arrivants et pour la société canadienne; ..... j) de veiller, de concert avec les provinces, a` aider les ré- sidents permanents a` mieux faire reconnaˆıtre leurs titres de compétence et a` s’intégrer plus rapidement a` la société. Interprétation et mise en œuvre ..... (3) L’interprétation et la mise en œuvre de la présente loi doivent avoir pour effet: ..... f) de se conformer aux instruments internationaux portant sur les droits de l’homme dont le Canada est signataire. Il ne servirait pas les fins de la LIPR de recouvrer les créances sans exercer quelque pouvoir discrétionnaire a` l’endroit des répondants ou des personnes parrainées. Ce n’est guère favoriser l’« intégration » d’une personne que de l’empêcher de se soustraire a` une situation de violence. Il n’est pas non plus dans l’intérêt de la « société canadienne » de prendre des mesures pour recouvrer une créance auprès d’un débiteur qui n’a pas les moyens de rembourser la somme due. Acculer un répondant a` la faillite pourrait produire un résultat a` court terme mais, par la suite, le failli pourrait difficilement faire un apport positif a` la société canadienne. Une trop grande intransigeance vis-à-vis des répondants en défaut risque de décourager le parrainage au Canada et de compromettre ainsi la réunification des familles. A` l’évidence, l’intention du législateur est de recouvrer intégralement la somme due lorsque le répondant est en mesure de la rembourser, même par versements echelonn´´ es sur plusieurs années suivant un « accord » au sens du sous-al. 135b)(i) du Règlement. Aucun motif ne justifie que, dans l’éventualité où il gagnerait a` la loterie, le répondant soit dispensé du paiement intégral de sa dette au détriment du contribuable, peu importe le moment où la chance le favorise. 63 Cependant, le gouvernement doit traiter equitablement´ le répondant en défaut au regard de sa capacité financière et de la situation (de violence ou autre) dans laquelle il se trouve lorsqu’elle milite contre le recouvrement immédiat. La politique ontarienne vise a` etablir´ un equilibre´ entre la promotion de l’immigration et de la réunification des familles, d’une part, et la prévention de l’abus du régime de parrainage, Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie, J. 233

d’autre part. L’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire dans le recouvrement de la somme due par un répondant permet d’atteindre cet objectif. 64 Pour ces motifs, je rejette la thèse des procureurs généraux voulant que le texte, le contexte et l’objet de la loi ecartent´ l’exercice par l’administration d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire emportant l’application de l’équité procédurale.

C. L’Ontario a-t-elle indûment entravé l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire que lui confère la loi? 65 Pour la Cour d’appel, [TRADUCTION] « [i]l y a abus du pouvoir discrétionnaire ou entrave a` son exercice lorsqu’une politique ne permet pas au décideur de prendre en compte les faits pertinents, mais le contraint plutôt a` une application inflexible et arbitraire » (par. 124). Elle conclut que la politique ontarienne de recouvrement est incompatible avec la portée du pouvoir discrétionnaire voulue par le législateur. Bien humblement, je ne pense pas qu’il y ait incompatibilité. Je le répète, la loi permet au ministre de reporter le recouvrement de la somme due par un répondant, mais non d’y renoncer. Il en va de même de la politique appliquée par la province en ce qu’elle prévoit que [TRADUCTION] « le répondant en défaut est tenu au remboursement intégral de sa dette. Le ministère n’accorde pas de remise de dette ». 66 Le ministre fédéral de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration peut modi- fier la teneur de l’engagement, comme il l’a fait au fil des ans, de même que le ministre provincial des Services sociaux et communautaires modifie a` l’occasion la politique de recouvrement. Les politiques sont nécessaires pour orienter l’action des nombreux fonctionnaires affectés a` l’application des programmes gouvernementaux. Le pouvoir du ministre d’établir des politiques est circonscrit par la loi. On ne saurait dire de la politique ontarienne en cause qu’elle « entrave » le pouvoir discrétion- naire du ministre au point d’être invalide. 67 La Cour d’appel conclut egalement´ que les politiques de l’Ontario sont moins favorables au répondant que les conditions de certains engagements. Rappelons toutefois que l’engagement ne constitue en fait que l’expression d’une interprétation administrative. Il ne saurait permettre d’interpréter la loi elle-même. L’importance de l’engagement signé dans le contexte du droit administratif réside dans le fait qu’il jette les bases de l’application de la théorie de l’attente légitime analysée plus loin. Or, malgré tout le respect que je dois a` la Cour d’appel, je ne crois pas que le cadre législatif fédéral prescrit un plus grand exercice du 234 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

pouvoir discrétionnaire que celui permis par la province en faveur des répondants en défaut. L’Ontario pouvait fort bien, selon moi, adopter la politique de recouvrement en cause.

D. La théorie de l’attente légitime 68 Lorsque dans l’exercice du pouvoir que lui confère la loi, un représentant de l’Etat´ fait des affirmations claires, nettes et explicites qui auraient suscité chez un administré des attentes légitimes concernant la tenue d’un processus administratif, l’Etat´ peut etreˆ lié par ces affirmations si elles sont de nature procédurale et ne vont pas a` l’encontre de l’obligation légale du décideur. La preuve que l’intéressé s’est fié aux affirmations n’est pas nécessaire. Voir les arrêts Centre hospitalier Mont- Sina¨ı c. Québec (Ministre de la Santé & des Services sociaux), par. 29- 30; Moreau-Bérubé c. Nouveau-Brunswick, 2002 SCC 11, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 249 (S.C.C.), par. 78; C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539 (S.C.C.), par. 131. Constitue un manquement a` son obligation d’équité l’omission substantielle du décideur de respecter sa parole: Brown et Evans, p. 7-25 et 7-26. 69 En effet, il serait en quelque sorte ironique que l’administration puisse exiger du répondant qu’il respecte son engagement a` la lettre si, de son côté, elle pouvait se soustraire a` celui qu’elle prend dans le même document. En général, on juge suffisamment précise pour les besoins de la théorie de l’attente légitime l’affirmation gouvernementale qui, si elle avait et´´ e faite dans le contexte du droit contractuel privé, serait suffisamment claire pour etreˆ susceptible d’exécution. 70 En l’espèce, les engagements confirment que l’administration peut reporter le recouvrement de sa créance, mais non remettre la dette du ré- pondant. Les engagements signés par M. Grankin, M. Zebaradami et Mme de Altamirano relèvent de l’ancienne Loi sur l’Immigration, et l’administration fédérale y affirme posséder et exercer un certain pouvoir discrétionnaire en matière de recouvrement: CONSEQUENCES´ DE LA RUPTURE DE L’ENGAGEMENT ..... Le Ministre peut décider de ne prendre aucune mesure pour recouvrer les sommes dues d’un Répondant et du conjoint cosignataire qui ont manqué a` leur engagement parce qu’ils se trouvaient dans une situation abusive ou dans d’autres circonstances valables. Une telle décision du Ministre, prise a` un moment bien pré- cis, n’a pas pour effet d’annuler les dettes; le Ministre peut recouvrer Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie, J. 235

les sommes dues lorsque la situation du Répondant et du conjoint cosignataire change. [Je souligne.] Un accord de remboursement peut remédier au manquement, mais l’annulation de la dette n’est clairement pas envisagée, même lorsque le ministre exerce son pouvoir discrétionnaire de reporter le recouvrement avec ou sans l’accord visé au sous-al. 135b)(i). Les engagements signés par Mme Vossoughi et M. Dzihic sont pour l’essentiel equivalents.´ 71 Les el´´ ements fondamentaux de l’engagement demeurent inchangés pour l’application de la nouvelle loi. Les clauses pertinentes de l’engagement signé par M. Hince le 20 novembre 2002 sous le régime de la LIPR sont les suivantes: Je comprends que toutes les prestations d’aide sociale versées a` la personne parrainée ou aux membres de sa famille sont considérées comme des dettes que je dois rembourser a` Sa Majesté du chef du Canada et a` Sa Majesté du chef de la province intéressée. Par consé- quent, le ministre et la province intéressée ont le droit de prendre une mesure d’exécution contre moi seul (le répondant ou le cosignataire) ou contre nous deux. Le ministre et la province intéressée peuvent décider de ne prendre aucune mesure pour recouvrer les sommes dues auprès de moi si j’ai manqué a` mon engagement parce que je me trouvais dans une situation de violence ou toute autre situation. Une telle décision, prise a` un moment bien précis, n’aura pas pour effet d’annuler les dettes. Le ministre et la province intéressée peuvent recouvrer les sommes dues lorsque la situation aura changé. [Je souligne.] 72 Si le libellé des engagements relevant de la LIPR etaye´ la thèse des procureurs généraux voulant que la dette ne soit pas remise, il etaye´ tout autant la prétention des répondants selon laquelle le gouvernement leur a affirmé détenir le pouvoir discrétionnaire de ne pas prendre de mesure de recouvrement « dans une situation abusive ou dans d’autres circonstances valables » (avant 2002) ou « dans une situation de violence ou toute autre situation » (après 2002). Ces affirmations ne sont pas incom- patibles avec une obligation légale et elles sont suffisamment claires pour empêcher l’administration de nier l’existence du pouvoir discrétionnaire de reporter le recouvrement. Compte tenu des attentes légitimes suscitées par le libellé de ces engagements, je ne crois pas que l’administration puisse agir sans donner de préavis et sans permettre aux répondants de faire valoir des motifs justifiant le report du recouvrement ou quelque autre modification de la procédure d’exécution. 236 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

E. La politique de l’Ontario assure une equit´´ e procédurale adéquate 73 La procédure suivie par l’Ontario revêt la forme de lettres informant les répondants que la personne parrainée a demandé de l’assistance sociale et qu’il y a de ce fait manquement a` l’engagement. Dans la plupart des cas, les lettres indiquent clairement que la province est dis- posée a` prendre en compte soit des circonstances atténuantes, soit une situation financière ou autre justifiant le report du recouvrement de la créance. Cette fa¸con de faire est la bonne, car suivant la politique ontarienne, les agents régionaux d’assistance sociale sont censés examiner ces el´´ ements avant de transmettre le dossier au service du recouvrement. Ontario au travail et le Programme ontarien de soutien aux personnes handicapées (« POSPH ») etablissent´ la marche a` suivre en cas de violence entre le répondant et la personne parrainée. Un document portant sur la violence familiale et le recouvrement de la somme due par un répondant précise les etapes´ a` suivre lorsque la violence, conjugale ou autre, est alléguée. La politique ontarienne veut que l’on mette fin a` la procédure de recouvrement dès que l’agent au dossier est informé de l’existence d’une telle situation. 74 Lorsque le répondant refuse de rembourser la somme due et recom- mence a` subvenir aux besoins de la personne qu’il parraine, le dossier est normalement transmis a` l’Unité de recouvrement des paiements ex- cédentaires (« URPE »). Celleci envoie alors d’autres avis et, lorsque le répondant y donne suite, elle lui demande de fournir des renseignements financiers permettant de déterminer sa capacité de subvenir aux besoins de la personne parrainée et de rembourser la dette. Lorsque le répondant ne coopère pas, le dossier est transmis au programme de compensation de dettes par remboursement de l’Agence du revenu du Canada, qui re- tient tout remboursement ou crédit d’impôt au bénéfice de la province. 75 Cette procédure offre au répondant une possibilité limitée mais réelle d’informer l’administration des circonstances particulières du manquement. Il n’y a ni audience ni appel, mais il existe une attente légitime que l’administration tiendra compte de faits pertinents avant de décider des mesures d’exécution a` prendre ainsi qu’une obligation correspondante fondée sur l’équité procédurale. Toutefois, dans les engagements, les affirmations de l’administration sont formulées de manière suffisamment vague pour que l’Etat´ ait les coudées franches dans le choix de la procé- dure a` engager. Il est clair qu’elles ne promettent aucune issue favorable du point de vue des répondants. A` mon sens, les lignes directrices de l’Ontario sont parfaitement conformes aux exigences légales, mais Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie, J. 237

chacune des provinces et chacun des territoires peuvent adopter leur propre procédure. Les exigences fondamentales sont le respect de l’équité procédurale et l’observation du libellé de l’engagement a` la fois par l’Etat´ et par le répondant dont le défaut est allégué. 76 Les intimés prétendent que lorsque la personne parrainée devient prestataire d’assistance sociale, l’administration a l’obligation d’en informer sans délai le répondant. Ils ajoutent qu’il est injuste que l’administration laisse le montant de la créance s’accroˆıtre a` leur insu, surtout lorsque la relation s’est détériorée avec la personne parrainée et que le répondant ignore que celle-ci a demandé ou touche des prestations d’assistance sociale. Leurs avocats soulignent qu’un certain nombre d’entre eux ne se sont vu réclamer le paiement de la somme due qu’une fois celle-ci devenue assez importante et qu’après un laps de temps considérable (par exemple, M. Grankin, quatre ans et demi après que sa mère eut obtenu l’assistance sociale, Mme de Altamirano, trois ans après sa demande de prestations pour sa mère et Mme Vossoughi, près de deux ans après qu’elle eut demandé, a` titre de répondante, de l’assistance sociale pour sa mère parrainée). Je conviens qu’une bonne gestion des créances voudrait que l’on réclame le remboursement des prestations dès leur versement au proche parrainé. Or, l’obligation alimentaire du répondant emporte nécessairement celle de se tenir au courant des faits et gestes de la personne parrainée. L’étranger qui immigre par la voie du regroupement familial est admis sur le seul fondement de son lien avec le répondant. En contrepartie, le répondant doit « veiller a` ce que le parent et toute personne a` charge qui l’accompagne n’aient pas besoin de recourir aux programmes d’aide sociale gouvernementaux », l’Etat´ n’ayant pas d’obligation de soutien. C’est donc au répondant d’assumer le risque que la personne parrainée fasse des siennes, et non au contribuable. 77 Il ressort du dossier que les huit répondants ont tous et´´ e avisés du manquement et qu’ils ont communiqué avec le ministère, certains par l’entremise d’un avocat. Certains d’entre eux ont fait valoir les faits qu’ils jugeaient pertinents. D’autres ont simplement omis de donner suite aux demandes raisonnables de l’administration. Par exemple, M. Hince a refusé de remplir le formulaire qui aurait permis de déterminer sa situation financière et il n’a pas répondu aux lettres de l’administration. Mme Vossoughi n’a pas répondu aux deux avis qui lui ont et´´ e transmis après qu’elle eut et´´ e informée que sa mère avait demandé de l’assistance sociale. 238 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

78 Après examen des el´´ ements d’information réunis, le ministère a généralement fait savoir a` chacun des répondants que son engagement continuait de s’appliquer, mais qu’il etait´ possible de négocier les modal- ités de remboursement. Au moins un répondant a effectivement négocié un plan de remboursement et verserait des mensualités. Toutefois, les ré- pondants ont ensuite engagé les instances a` l’origine du présent pourvoi. J’estime que si les mesures de recouvrement prises sous son régime la respectent, la politique de l’Ontario répond aux attentes légitimes des ré- pondants sur le plan de la procédure et satisfait aux exigences fondamentales de l’équité procédurale. Il convient de rejeter les prétentions contraires des répondants intimés.

V. Dispositif 79 Les instances ont pour origine des demandes de jugements déclaratoires. Au vu des motifs qui précèdent, le pourvoi est accueilli en partie et la Cour déclare ce qui suit. (i) La LIPR et son règlement d’application confèrent au Canada et a` l’Ontario le pouvoir discrétionnaire de reporter le recouvrement d’une créance, mais non de remettre une dette, après avoir tenu compte des observations du répondant au sujet de sa situation et de celle de la personne parrainée. (ii) La politique de l’Ontario n’entrave pas indûment l’exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire. Les modalités que la province y etablit´ sont compatibles avec les exigences du régime légal et répondent aux attentes légitimes sur le plan de la procédure créées par le libellé des engagements. (iii) Le Canada et l’Ontario ont l’obligation de faire preuve d’équité procédurale envers un répondant lorsqu’ils recouvrent une créance de parrainage. (iv) Cette obligation d’équité procédurale exige: (a) de donner au ré- pondant un avis de la réclamation a` sa dernière adresse connue, (b) de lui accorder un délai pour exposer par ecrit´ les circonstances financières ou autres qui militeraient contre le recouvrement immédiat de la créance, (c) de tenir compte de tout el´´ ement pertinent qui lui est signalé en se rappelant que l’engagement etait´ au départ la condition préalable essentielle a` l’admission au Can- ada de l’immigrant parrainé, (d) d’informer le répondant de la dé- cision de l’administration, et ce, (e) sans qu’il n’y ait besoin de donner de motifs a` l’appui. Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) Binnie, J. 239

v) Les exigences d’équité procédurale susmentionnées ont et´´ e respectées pour les huit répondants intimés. 80 Puisque les instances peuvent a` juste titre etreˆ qualifiées de causes types pour le règlement de certaines questions de droit qui sont d’intérêt public, toutes les parties supporteront leurs propres frais de justice en appel et a` l’étape de la demande d’autorisation d’appel. Appeal allowed in part. Pourvoi accueilli en partie. 240 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General): Case Comment Randolph K. Hahn

The recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General)1 is a disappointing one. At issue was the extent of discretion a province may have in the enforcement of sponsorship debts. As most readers of this note will know those who sponsor family members to become permanent residents of Canada provide undertakings to support the family member and if the family member goes on social assistance then either the federal government or the provincial government can take steps to recover from the sponsor the cost of providing social assistance. Many may presume this to fair. Surely someone who relies on his or her status to sponsor a family member to Canada should understand that if contrary to the undertaking provided the sponsored relative goes on social assistance, then the sponsor should be liable for the cost accordingly. This would help offset some of the costs resulting from someone going on social assistance within a certain time of them becoming a permanent resident. As well one would think that it would oblige a sponsor to consider very carefully the possible consequences of sponsorship particularly so for those who sponsor spouses. Until not long ago Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the provincial authorities did not have systems in place such that when someone obtained social assistance from a province there was an effective mechanism to proceed against the sponsor for reimbursement. Moreover as this decision points out the legislative provisions under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”) are such that the enforcement of such debts is easier than under the former Immigration Act. No doubt there are many cases where the system has been abused and taken advantage of. But there are also many instances when sponsors face significant debts yet their circumstances are sympathetic. In this case one respondent sponsored a fianc´ee who appears to have taken ad-

1(2011), 2011 SCC 30 (S.C.C.), reported ante at p. 173. Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) : Case Comment 241 vantage of him since she refused to live with him or marry him. The sponsor notified the authorities and this led to a removal order for the person who had been sponsored but she managed to appeal that order without any notice or input from the respondent. Subsequently she went on social assistance. Another respondent sponsored her parents and brothers and after their arrival left her husband (a co-signer) because of alleged abuse. She went on social assistance as did some of her family members. Another respondent sponsored her mother who after arriving in Canada suffered a stroke. This respondent applied for benefits to pay for her mother’s institutional care (she said she was encouraged to do so by a caseworker) and did not realize this would mean that she was liable to repay the government. IRPA states that an amount that a sponsor is required to pay pursuant to the terms of an undertaking is payable upon demand and may be recovered by the government.2 In this case in the Ontario Superior Court the applications judge decided that the collection procedure was “purely administrative in nature” and that the government was not vested with the discretion on a case-by-case basis whether or not to enforce the debt. The Ontario Court of Appeal took a different approach. It concluded that the Province of Ontario had fettered its discretion because of a policy that did not allow for forgiveness of part (or all) of the debt. The Court decided that the government owed a duty of fairness to provide a process for individual sponsors to explain their relevant personal and financial circumstances. The Court of Appeal considered section 135 of the Immi- gration and Refugee Protection Regulations (the “Regulations”) which references a sponsorship undertaking ending when the sponsor reimburses the government “in full or in accordance with an agreement with that government.” The Ontario Court of Appeal was of the view that this meant there was ministerial discretion as to whether the full debt ought to be re-paid. The Supreme Court of Canada believes otherwise. The Court did agree there is a duty of fairness such that a sponsor who is liable for a debt must be notified and moreover to allow for representations about the tim-

2Section 145(2) 242 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d) ing of the collection. However the Court does not believe that the government is obliged to consider the possibility of part or all of the debt being forgiven. It is understandable that the Supreme Court of Canada would be reluctant to interpret the legislation such that there must be a comprehensive administrative process with all kinds of mechanisms that ultimately delay the enforcement of debts. But surely it is not too much to ask that given the language of the Regulations a provincial government should have a policy that allows for the possibility of representations as to why a debt should not have to be re paid in full. Decent hard-working people can find themselves being taken advantage of through no fault of their own or can face unexpected circumstances. It is disappointing that the Su- preme Court of Canada did not uphold all of the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal. Bledy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) 243

[Indexed as: Bledy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)] Josef Bledy, Helena Samkova, Adam Frantisek Bledy, Jenifer Bleda, Josef Bledy (Jr), Applicants and The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent Federal Court Docket: IMM-3354-10 2011 FC 210 André F.J. Scott J. Heard: February 2, 2011 Judgment: February 22, 2011 Immigration and citizenship –––– Refugee protection — Practice and procedure in refugee claims — Judicial review — Miscellaneous issues –––– Ap- plicants were citizens of Czech Republic including mother, father and three mi- nor children — Applicants claimed systemic racial discrimination in home country due to Czech Roma heritage — Discrimination ranged from repeated severe physical and sexual violence, to ambivalence and open hostility on part of police force — Applicants further claimed they would receive inadequate health care and children would receive inadequate education if they returned to Czech Republic — Applicants applied to Immigration and Refugee Board in order to be declared Convention refugees or persons in need of protection; application was denied — Applicants applied for judicial review of decision — Application granted — Board made distinction between “discrimination” and “persecution”, acknowledging that applicants had undoubtedly faced discrimination, but did not articulate why wide-ranging discrimination did not amount, cumulatively, to persecution — Board erred in fact that it only referenced two physical attacks out of several mentioned by applicant, and two attacks referenced were only two with which Board found credibility issues — Board erred in state protection analysis by inadequately surveying country conditions evidence — Application for judicial review allowed with no question of general importance to certify. Immigration and citizenship –––– Refugee protection — Elements of protected refugee status — Protection of country of nationality — Sufficiency of state protection –––– Applicants were citizens of Czech Republic including mother, father and three minor children — Applicants claimed systemic racial discrimination in home country due to Czech Roma heritage — Discrimination ranged from repeated severe physical and sexual violence, to ambivalence and open hostility on part of police force — Applicants further claimed they would receive inadequate health care and children would receive inadequate education 244 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d) if they returned to Czech Republic — Applicants applied to Immigration and Refugee Board in order to be declared Convention refugees or persons in need of protection; application was denied — Applicants applied for judicial review of decision — Application granted — Board made distinction between “discrimination” and “persecution”, acknowledging that applicants had undoubtedly faced discrimination, but did not articulate why wide-ranging discrimination did not amount, cumulatively, to persecution — Board erred in fact that it only referenced two physical attacks out of several mentioned by applicant, and two attacks referenced were only two with which Board found credibility issues — Board erred in state protection analysis by inadequately surveying country conditions evidence — Application for judicial review allowed with no question of general importance to certify. Immigration and citizenship –––– Refugee protection — Elements of protected refugee status — Fear of persecution — What constituting persecution — Discrimination or harassment –––– Applicants were citizens of Czech Republic including mother, father and three minor children — Applicants claimed systemic racial discrimination in home country due to Czech Roma heritage — Discrimination ranged from repeated severe physical and sexual violence, to ambivalence and open hostility on part of police force — Applicants further claimed they would receive inadequate health care and children would receive inadequate education if they returned to Czech Republic — Applicants applied to Immigration and Refugee Board in order to be declared Convention refugees or persons in need of protection; application was denied — Applicants applied for judicial review of decision — Application granted — Board made distinction between “discrimination” and “persecution”, acknowledging that applicants had undoubtedly faced discrimination, but did not articulate why wide- ranging discrimination did not amount, cumulatively, to persecution — Board erred in fact that it only referenced two physical attacks out of several mentioned by applicant, and two attacks referenced were only two with which Board found credibility issues — Board erred in state protection analysis by inadequately surveying country conditions evidence — Application for judicial review allowed with no question of general importance to certify. Cases considered by André F.J. Scott J.: Aguilar Soto c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté & de l’Immigration) (2010), 2010 CarswellNat 5116, 2010 FC 1183, 2010 CarswellNat 4443, 2010 CF 1183 (F.C.) — referred to Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1998), 157 F.T.R. 35, 1998 CarswellNat 1981, [1998] A.C.F. No. 1425, [1998] F.C.J. No. 1425 (Fed. T.D.) — considered Cosgun v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2010), 2010 FC 400, 2010 CarswellNat 871, 2010 CF 400, 2010 CarswellNat 2630 (F.C.) — referred to Bledy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) 245

Kaleja v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2010), 2010 Car- swellNat 2274, 2010 CF 252, 2010 CarswellNat 502, 2010 FC 252, [2010] F.C.J. No. 291 (F.C.) — considered Liang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2008), 2008 FC 450, 2008 CarswellNat 922, 2008 CarswellNat 2398, 2008 CF 450, [2008] F.C.J. No. 572 (F.C.) — referred to Mendez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2008), 2008 Car- swellNat 2780, 2008 CF 584, 2008 CarswellNat 1499, 2008 FC 584, [2008] F.C.J. No. 771 (F.C.) — referred to Mete v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2005), 2005 CF 840, 2005 CarswellNat 5608, 2005 FC 840, 2005 CarswellNat 1702, 46 Imm. L.R. (3d) 232, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1050 (F.C.) — followed Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2009), 2009 CF 768, 2009 CarswellNat 4155, 82 Imm. L.R. (3d) 273, 2009 FC 768, (sub nom. Rahman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)) 348 F.T.R. 69 (Eng.), 2009 CarswellNat 2487 (F.C.) — considered Munderere v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2008), 2008 FCA 84, 2008 CAF 84, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 129, 2008 CarswellNat 600, 2008 CarswellNat 601, 291 D.L.R. (4th) 68, 377 N.R. 259 (F.C.A.) — followed New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 372 N.R. 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, D.T.E. 2008T-223, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, 2008 SCC 9, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9 (S.C.C.) — followed Oyarzo v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1981), 1981 Car- swellNat 187F, [1982] 2 F.C. 779, 1981 CarswellNat 187 (Fed. C.A.) — followed Perez Burgos c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyennet´e & de l’Immigration) (2006), 2006 CarswellNat 4515, 2006 CF 1537, 2006 FC 1537, 64 Imm. L.R. (3d) 300, 2006 CarswellNat 6019, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1924 (F.C.) — referred to Retnem v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1991), 1991 Car- swellNat 53, 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 317, 132 N.R. 53, [1991] F.C.J. No. 428 (Fed. C.A.) — referred to Tetik v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2009), 2009 Car- swellNat 4194, 2009 FC 1240, 2009 CF 1240, 2009 CarswellNat 5901, 86 Imm. L.R. (3d) 154 (F.C.) — followed 246 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

Statutes considered: Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 s. 72(1) — pursuant to s. 96 — considered s. 97(1) — referred to

APPLICATION for judicial review of decision of Refugee Protection Division refusing applicants’ claim for refugee protection after determining that applicants were neither convention refugees or persons in need of protection.

Daniel Radin, for Applicants Brad Gotkin, for Respondent

Andr´e F.J. Scott J.:

1 This is an application, pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigra- tion and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Board), dated May 25, 2010, refusing the applicants’ claim for refugee protection after determining that they were neither convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. 2 For the reasons discussed below, I am allowing this application for judicial review.

Background 3 Mr. Josef Bledy (the principal applicant) was born May 5, 1983 and is a citizen of the Czech Republic. He and his family (together, the applicants) — his common-law spouse, Helena Samkova (born October 10, 1983), his son, Josef Bledy Jr. (born June 10, 2002), his daughter, Jenifer Bledy (born February 3, 2004), and his son, Adam Frantisek Bledy (born September 24, 2008) — arrived in Canada on December 17, 2009 and claimed refugee protection on December 19, 2009. 4 The applicants claimed protection as convention refugees, alleging a well-founded fear of persecution in the Czech Republic based on their Roma ethnicity. Failing a successful claim under section 96 of the IRPA, the applicants also claimed protection under subsection 97(1) of the IRPA, based on their fear of being victims of further violence in the Czech Republic, as well as based on their assertion that they, as Romani citizens, would receive inadequate healthcare if returned to the Czech Republic. Bledy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) Andr´e F.J. Scott J. 247

5 In the principal applicant’s Personal Information Form (PIF), he alleged the following facts in support of his family’s claim: (a) In kindergarten, the principal applicant had been verbally harassed for being a Roma child. He defended himself physically and was expelled. (b) Both the principal applicant and his spouse received their education via “special” schools for children with mental disabilities. (c) The Czech students at the regular school would swear, demean and attack both the principal applicant and his spouse because they were Roma. They complained to the teachers and director, but no action was taken. (d) As a child, the principal applicant was prevented from participating in sports (hockey, soccer, karate) organized by his home municipality, because he attended a “special” school. (e) Josef Jr. was also placed in a “special” school despite his parents’ attempts to register him in a regular school and despite the fact that his parents believed he had performed well on his entrance exams. (f) The principal applicant was prevented from participating in a bricklayer apprenticeship due to insufficient education. Although he had been registered at the employment office since he was 15 years old, he had received only limited employment because of his poor schooling and his ethnicity. (g) In August of 2005, while in Pisek to visit his aunt, the principal applicant and his cousin were attacked by 12 skinheads who yel- led various racial slurs. They were kicked until the cousin had a concussion. The aunt called the police, but the police laughed at them and accused them of provoking the attack. (h) In January of 2006, while at a disco in Protivin, the principal applicant and two cousins were attacked by a group of 30-40 skinheads. One cousin was stabbed, while the principal applicant and the other cousin had concussions and were bleeding. The other patrons at the disco did nothing to intervene. The police were called, but they accused the boys of provoking the skinheads. The police did not write up a report. (i) In August of 2007, the principal applicant’s mother-in-law was raped and beaten by a man who swore at her using various racial slurs. She was left in the woods unconscious. The police laughed 248 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

at her and suggested she made it up or that it was her fault. De- spite having evidence (a description of the car and semen sam- ples), and despite the applicants checking with the police on mul- tiple occasions, the police never found the assailant. (j) In December of 2007, the applicants were visiting their parents in Vimperk for Christmas. On Christmas day, their house was set on fire, but it was saved by firefighters. The next day, the basement was set on fire, it was again extinguished. On December 28th, the roof was set on fire and on the 29th, the whole roof burned down along with part of the house. Although the applicants did not see the attackers, they heard on the news that it was a “racist attack”. The applicants’ parents were given alternate temporary accommodations by the city. However, those alternate accommodations had no water, toilet, or bathroom. (k) In November of 2008, the principal applicant, his spouse and her four cousins, were attacked by 6 skinheads with baseball bats while at a local pub celebrating the christening of Adam. Before fleeing the scene, the skinheads let off 5 pistol rounds as a warn- ing. The police called an ambulance and left in pursuit of the attackers. Although the police took statements from the principal applicant and his family, the applicants never heard anything further about the investigation. 6 At the hearing before the Board, the principal applicant added the following additional allegations in support of his family’s claim: (a) In 1992, when he was a young boy, his cousin was attacked and killed by skinheads. Counsel for the applicants provided the Board with a video recording of a news report regarding the incident. (b) The principal applicant’s eldest son was attacked on his first day of school by a group of 6 Czech boys. His son came home with a black eye, but the teacher said that his son had started the fight. (c) The principal applicant’s brother-in-law, Stefan, was attacked in the Czech Republic only three days after being returned home from Canada following a denied refugee claim. (d) There are skinheads among the Czech police. On one occasion, a police officer approached the principal applicant in the park and asked, “What are you black mug doing here?” Bledy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) Andr´e F.J. Scott J. 249

Impugned Decision 7 The Board began its reasons by noting that it had “some credibility concerns.” First, it indicated that the principal applicant testified that he had suffered a concussion as a result of the attack in Pisek and that he had spent some time in hospital, whereas, in his PIF he did not mention that he was in hospital. The Board found this to be an embellishment and that the applicant was, in fact, never in hospital as a result of any skinhead attacks. Second, the Board concluded that “some of the details surrounding the rape are inaccurate” and therefore gave “little weight to the statement that the rape occurred because the second claimant’s mother was of Roma ethnicity”. This finding was due to a discrepancy between the principal applicant’s PIF and his testimony with regards to the number of attackers involved. 8 The Board then went on to discuss “discrimination vs. persecution”. It acknowledged that Romani children in the Czech Republic are still “systematically turned away from regular schools” and sent to remedial schools that cater to developmental disabilities. It further acknowledged that these remedial schools provide substandard levels of education that do “not meet the minimum requirements for dignity.” 9 It then referred to a report from the Roma Education Fund which indicated there had been improvements in recent years: preparatory classes for children from difficult backgrounds, additional teachers’ assistants to work in schools that had a high proportion of Roma, free preschool education, secondary school scholarships for Roma students, abolition of special-education schools, and increased government funding. The Board also referred to a government program entitled, “Reintegration of Roma Pupils”, the objective of which was to correct cases where Romani students were wrongfully placed in remedial schools. It also pointed to a decision of the European Court of Human Rights [ECHR] which determined that the Czech Republic had indirectly discriminated against certain students by placing them in remedial schools. The verdict obliged the Czech Republic to enact legislation prohibiting discrimination against Romani children in the education system. 10 The Board acknowledged that the treatment of the applicants, in placing them in remedial schooling, was “obviously a form of discrimination along with the verbal insults and the physical assaults.” However, it found that since steps were being taken to deal with this discrimination, and since the ECHR decision meant that the applicants would have a remedy with regards to their eldest son’s placement, the Board concluded 250 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

that the situation with respect to education did not rise to the level of persecution. 11 Turning to the principal applicant’s difficulty in finding employment, the Board acknowledged that there may have been some discrimination. 12 With respect to the allegation that the police had discriminated against the principal applicant by calling him names, the Board noted that this had only occurred once. 13 The Board then considered two of the alleged assaults. Regarding the alleged attack in Pisek in 2005, the Board reiterated that it had “some concerns about the embellishment of the details” surrounding that incident. Regarding the alleged fires during Christmas of 2007, the Board concluded that there was no persuasive evidence that the fires were set because the inhabitants were Roma. 14 The Board then indicated that the word “persecution” had been ascribed the meaning of “sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection.” The Board indicated that the physical attacks on the applicants would be canvassed in the subsequent section on state protection and that; ultimately, there was no persuasive evidence of a sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection. 15 It concluded its analysis of persecution by stating: “I have also considered these matters singularly and cumulatively and find that they do not rise to the level of persecution in either instance.” 16 On the issue of state protection, the Board found that because the Czech Republic is a democracy, the presumption of state protection is strong. The Board pointed to Czech legislation which provided protection for the Roma, including anti-discrimination and hate crimes legislation. It specifically pointed to reforms in the Czech police force: the introduction of Roma Police Assistants, the recruitment of Romani police officers, and the training of police on how to better interact with minorities. The Board also noted that the Czech judiciary had prosecuted a number of hate crimes committed against the Roma and that the number of such proceedings had increased in recent years. In addition to the police, the Board pointed to other avenues of assistance for the Romani: the Czech Ombudsman, the approximately 400 Romani NGOs, the Czech Trade Inspectorate, the Czech Helsinki Committee to investigate cases of police misconduct, and the Social Inclusion Agency. The Board concluded that the “preponderance of the documentary evidence indicates that the Czech Republic government is making very serious efforts to Bledy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) Andr´e F.J. Scott J. 251

provide protection to the Roma whether as victims of hate crime, assist in obtaining health care or education, or inclusion into Czech society.” 17 With respect to the 2006 incident at the disco, the Board found that it was apparent that the police investigated the situation and took statements from bystanders and concluded that no charges were to be laid. It found that it would be difficult to arrive at a clear picture of what occurred without any police reports or other statements. With respect to the incident at the pub in 2008, the Board noted that the police arrived and chased after the attackers. As such, the police did take some action. Fur- thermore, the police were actively involved in investigating the fires. On the whole, the Board concluded that in cases where the applicants asked for police help, there was evidence that the police responded. Although the applicants’ may not have been satisfied with the result, the Board found that they had not rebutted the presumption of state protection with clear and convincing evidence. 18 Ultimately, the Board rejected the applicants’ claim for protection.

Issues 19 The issues before the Court are the following: (a) Did the Board err in finding that the applicants did not face persecution in the Czech Republic? (b) Did the Board err in finding that state protection was available to the applicants in the Czech Republic?

Standard of Review 20 The identification of persecution behind incidents of discrimination or harassment has consistently been reviewed by this Court against a standard of reasonableness: see Tetik v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2009 FC 1240, 86 Imm. L.R. (3d) 154 (F.C.), at para 25; Liang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2008 FC 450, 166 A.C.W.S. (3d) 950 (F.C.), at para 12. It is also well-established that the standard of review to apply to the issue of state protection is reasonableness: see Tetik, above, at para 25; Mendez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2008 FC 584, 168 A.C.W.S. (3d) 596 (F.C.) at paras 11-13. 252 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

21 In New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.), at para 47, the Supreme Court of Canada held that: ...reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decisionmaking process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.

Argument and Analysis (a) Did the Board err in finding that the applicants did not face persecution in the Czech Republic? 22 The applicants argue that the Board erred by not properly considering whether, cumulatively, the discrimination and the physical attacks they experienced in the Czech Republic constituted persecution. They claim that the Board simply proceeded sequentially through their evidence without appreciating the totality of it. They argue that it was incumbent on the Board to explain why it found that their experiences, cumulatively, did not amount to persecution. 23 The applicants further submit that the Board compounded this error by only addressing two of the incidents of harassment and physical attack - the 2005 incident in Pisek, and the 2007 fire incident - as part of its persecution analysis, and left other incidents for consideration as part of the state protection analysis only. They allege that the Board completely failed to address certain incidents, such as: the murder of the principal applicant’s cousin (which was supported by video evidence), the attack on the principal applicant’s son, and the attack on the principal applicant’s brother-in-law. 24 The applicants also argue that the Board erred in its treatment of the documentary evidence as to persecution. They submit that the Board was selective in its treatment of the evidence regarding education, and that it completely ignored the country conditions documents on issues such as: physical attacks, employment discrimination, and housing discrimination. The applicants claim that it was incumbent on the Board to explicitly discuss this evidence as it ran counter to the Board’s ultimate conclusion that the applicants’ experiences had not amounted to persecution. 25 The respondent argues that the Board considered the physical attacks on the applicants, singularly and cumulatively, and reasonably found that they did not rise to the level of persecution. The respondent submits that Bledy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) Andr´e F.J. Scott J. 253

every serious incident alleged by the applicants had been dealt with in the Board’s reasons. Ultimately, the respondent contends, the applicants have not demonstrated that the Board’s finding as to a lack of persecution was unreasonable. 26 In order to be considered a convention refugee under section 96 of the IRPA, an applicant must demonstrate that they hold a well-founded fear of being persecuted on the basis of their race, religion, nationality, mem- bership in a particular social group, or because of their political opinion. 27 It has been recognized, on numerous occasions, that where the evidence establishes a series of actions which can be characterized as discriminatory, if not persecutory, it is incumbent on the Board to consider the cumulative nature of that conduct in order to determine whether, if taken together, it might constitute a valid basis for a well-founded fear of persecution. The Federal Court of Appeal indicated in Munderere v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2008 FCA 84, 291 D.L.R. (4th) 68 (F.C.A.), at para 44, that: ...the Board is duty bound to consider all of the events which may have an impact on a claimant’s claim that he or she has a well founded fear of persecution, including those events which, if taken individually, do not amount to persecution, but if taken together, may justify a claim to a well founded fear of persecution. 28 Justice Eleanor Dawson in Mete v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2005 FC 840, 46 Imm. L.R. (3d) 232 (F.C.), at paras 4-6, indicated: 4 The following three legal principles are not controversial. First, in Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1984), 55 N.R. 129, the Federal Court of Appeal defined persecution in terms of: to harass or afflict with repeated acts of cruelty or annoyance; to afflict persistently; to afflict or punish because of particular opinions or adherence to a particular creed or mode of worship; a particular course or period of systematic infliction of punishment directed against those holding a particular belief; and persistent injury or annoyance from any source. 5 Second, in cases where the evidence establishes a series of actions characterized to be discriminatory, and not persecutory, there is a requirement to consider the cumulative nature of that conduct. This requirement reflects the fact that prior incidents are capable of forming the foundation of present fear. See: Retnem v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991), 132 N.R. 53 (F.C.A.). This is also expressed in the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 254 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

for Determining Refugee Status (“Handbook on Refugee Status”) in the following terms, at paragraph 53... 6 Third, it is an error of law for the RPD not to consider the cumulative nature of the conduct directed against a claimant. See: Bobrik v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1994), 85 F.T.R. 13 (T.D.) at paragraph 22, and the authorities there reviewed by my colleague Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer. [Emphasis added] 29 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (the “UN Handbook”) explains the rationale behind the requirement to consider the cumulative nature of past experiences, it indicates that: [53]...an applicant may have been subjected to various measures not in themselves amounting to persecution (e.g. discrimination in different forms), in some cases combined with other adverse factors (e.g. general atmosphere of insecurity in the country of origin). In such situations, the various elements involved may, if taken together, produce an effect on the mind of the applicant that can reasonably justify a claim to well-founded fear of persecution on “cumulative grounds”... 30 The obligation to consider the cumulative effect of past treatment also reflects the principle that prior incidents are capable of forming the basis of present fear: see Retnem v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immi- gration) (1991), 132 N.R. 53, 27 A.C.W.S. (3d) 481 (Fed. C.A.). As Chief Justice Arthur Thurlow indicated in Oyarzo v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1981), [1982] 2 F.C. 779 (Fed. C.A.): ...since it is the foundation for a present fear that must be considered, such incidents in the past are part of the whole picture and cannot be discarded entirely as a basis for fear, even though what has happened since has left them in the background. 31 A careful reading of the Board’s decision leaves no doubt that it was aware of its obligation to consider the cumulative effects of the applicants’ past experiences in order to determine whether the applicants held a well-founded fear of persecution, as opposed to mere discrimination, in the Czech Republic. At paragraph 26 of its reasons, the Board asked the right question: “Does the discrimination suffered by these claimants amount to persecution when considered singularly or cumulatively?” However, the Board posed this question only after considering the applicants’ past experiences sequentially; it first considered the discrimination Bledy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) Andr´e F.J. Scott J. 255

they faced surrounding education, then the employment discrimination, followed by the discrimination by the police, and finally the physical assaults. The Board went on, after presenting a definition of “persecution”, to conclude: “I have... considered these matters singularly and cumulatively and find that they do not rise to the level of persecution in either instance.” It failed to provide any analysis of the cumulative effects of the discriminatory incidents and explain why these incidents, in the ag- gregate, did not amount to persecution. 32 Justice Yves de Montigny made a similar observation in Tetik v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2009 FC 1240, 86 Imm. L.R. (3d) 154 (F.C.), at para 27: ...The RPD was obviously aware of the cumulative persecution test, but in fact did not review the discriminatory acts as a whole and proceeded sequentially through the chronology recounted by the applicants without appreciating the totality or cumulative effect of their uncontradicted evidence about the treatment that they had endured. This was a crucial error... 33 The Board’s analysis in the present case is also somewhat similar to the analysis at issue in Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2009 FC 768, 348 F.T.R. 69 (Eng.) (F.C.). Justice James Russell, in that case, indicated, at paras 65-67: 65 The Board says at paragraph 21 that the determination that the Applicant will not be persecuted if returned to Lebanon is made “by not only scrutinizing the various forms of discrimination that the claimant has endured, but also by examining the various forms of discrimination cumulatively.” The Board then goes on to scrutinize “the various forms of discrimination” separately, but never provides any real explanation as to why the cumulative impact does not amount to persecution. 66 As Justice Dawson pointed out in Mete v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FC 840 at paragraph 9 “it is insufficient for the RPD to simply state that it has considered the cumulative nature of the discriminatory acts.” 67 As in Mete, the Board in the present case “completely failed to consider the cumulative effect of the conduct characterized ... to be discriminatory or harassing, as required by the Federal Court of Ap- peal in Retnem, [1991] F.C.J. No. 428, and as explained in the Hand- book on Refugee Status.” It is not enough for the Officer to simply say that he has examined “the various form of discrimination cumulatively.” The reasons need to articulate why the long history of ap- palling discrimination by the State of Lebanon against the Applicant 256 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

as a stateless Palestinian does not amount to persecution. There is no indication in the Decision as to what test and what reasoning the Board applied to the issue of whether the cumulative impact of discrimination did not amount to persecution. [Emphasis added] 34 Since the Board specifically acknowledged in its reasons that what the applicants had experienced with respect to their education, the repeated verbal insults, and the numerous physical assaults, was “obviously” discriminatory in nature, and since the Board acknowledged that there “may have been discrimination” relating to the principal applicant’s employment, it was incumbent on the Board to explain why this wide- ranging discrimination did not amount, cumulatively, to persecution. 35 I also support the applicants’ view that the Board erred in only men- tioning two of the assaults as part of its “discrimination vs. persecution” analysis: the 2005 incident in Pisek, with which the Board had credibility concerns, and the 2007 house fires. The Board indicated, “[t]he physical attacks on the claimants are considered in the following section on state protection.” However, as the applicants rightly point out, this is problematic: it suggests that the Board did not necessarily consider the totality of the physical assaults before determining that the cumulative effect of the attacks, coupled with the discrimination in other areas, did not amount to persecution. Justice de Montigny in Tetik, above, at para 29, indicated: 29 Furthermore, I agree with the applicants that the RPD did not consider the most serious harassment acts in the persecution analysis, but only in the state protection part of its reasons. The RPD focused on the minor incidents and on the events that do not even constitute discrimination (ostracism by the families, Ceday’s treatment in kindergarten) in the part of its reasons dealing with persecution. The more serious incidents of threats and assaults were discussed but only in the context of state protection. The physical assaults they have suffered should have been considered in the cumulative effect analysis; failing to do so means that the RPD did not consider the totality of the circumstances before concluding there was an absence of persecution. [Emphasis added] 36 Some of the alleged assaults were not referenced by the Board at all. Assaults that were mentioned by the principal applicant for the first time at the hearing before the Board (and not mentioned in the applicants’ PIFs) were not considered by the Board in its reasons. Included amongst the incidents omitted by the Board from its reasons were: the allegation Bledy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) Andr´e F.J. Scott J. 257

that the principal applicant’s cousin had been attacked and killed by skinheads in 1992, the allegation that the principal applicant’s eldest son was attacked on his first day of school, as well as the allegation that the principal applicant’s brother-in-law had recently been attacked in the Czech Republic following a failed refugee claim in Canada. Since the Board did not indicate that it had any credibility concerns with respect to these allegations, it should have considered these assaults as part of its cumulative analysis. 37 Finally, with respect to the applicants’ argument that the Board erred in its treatment of the documentary evidence as to Romani persecution in the Czech Republic, Justice John O’Keefe did indicate at para 25, in Kaleja v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FC 252 (F.C.), that, “the principle that documentary evidence on persecution of a particular social group should be seriously evaluated is applicable to Roma cases.” The Board adequately addressed the documentary evidence as it pertained to access to education by noting both that there was “still a lot of prejudice” in this regard, and that measures were being taken to improve the situation. However, the Board failed to canvass the documentary evidence related to the other areas of concern raised by the applicants, principally: employment and the fear of being physically attacked. 38 For example, the US Department of State (US DOS) report on the human rights practices in the Czech Republic entitled, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008” (February 25, 2009), indicated that: The law prohibits employment discrimination based on ethnicity; however, Roma continued to face discrimination in both employment and education. Precise figures were unavailable, but the unemployment rate for Roma was estimated to be approximately 75 percent. Some employers refused to hire Roma and requested that local labour offices not send them Romani applicants. [Emphasis added] 39 Instead of addressing any of the country conditions evidence as to employment, the Board determined that, “there may have been discrimination” in relation to the principal applicant’s employment. This failure by the Board to acknowledge reliable documentary evidence linking discrimination to very high levels of unemployment for Roma in the Czech Republic constitutes an error to properly engage with the evidence before it. 258 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

40 The same US DOS report addressed the issue of physical attacks against the Roma. It indicated, “Neo Nazis, members of the far right Workers Party, and skinheads attacked and harassed Roma and other minorities during the year,” as well as that, “[m]embers and sympathizers of skinhead organizations were the most frequent perpetrators of acts of interethnic violence, particularly against Roma.” The Board should have addressed this type of objective country conditions evidence before making a determination as to whether what the applicants had faced in the Czech Republic amounted to persecution or merely discrimination. 41 These omissions by the Board lead me to conclude that the Board’s determination that the applicants’ experiences in the Czech Republic did “not rise to the level of persecution” was unreasonable. The Board failed to conduct a proper cumulative analysis, failed to sufficiently address the individual incidents of mistreatment alleged by the applicants, and failed to adequately canvas the objective country conditions documents.

(b) Did the Board err in finding that state protection was available to the applicants in the Czech Republic? 42 The applicants argue that the Board erred by referring to, and taking note of, only selective documentary evidence on the issue of state protection. They submit that the Board ignored or failed to take note of documentary evidence that tended to demonstrate that state protection was, in fact, inadequate for similarly situated individuals in the Czech Republic. 43 The applicants further submit that the Board erred by not properly considering their previous unsuccessful attempts to obtain protection in the Czech Republic. They point out that the Board completely failed to address state protection in the context of the adult applicants’ allegations that: they were ignored by their teachers when they were attacked as children, they were laughed at by the police after the 2005 attacks in Pisek, they were laughed at by the police with respect to the 2007 rape, nobody was punished with respect to the murder of the principal applicant’s cousin in 1992, the principal applicant’s cousin was unable to receive police protection regarding the incident in 2010, and that the police have skinheads among them and had used racist insults against the principal applicant and other Roma in the past. 44 Overall, the applicants argue that the mere existence of state protection remedies is insufficient, and that an assessment of the adequacy of state protection includes determining whether, in practice, those remedies are useful. The applicants argue that, in light of the errors in analyzing Bledy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) Andr´e F.J. Scott J. 259

the country conditions documents, as well as the errors in assessing the applicants’ personal attempts to obtain state protection, the Board’s analysis of the adequacy of state protection was unreasonable. 45 The respondent argues that the applicants did not satisfy the legal or evidentiary burden of providing evidence of sufficient probative value to rebut the presumption of state protection. As such, the respondent submits that the Board’s decision that state protection in the Czech Republic was adequate was reasonable. 46 The Board focused the bulk of its state protection analysis on considering the country conditions evidence set out in the IRB issue paper entitled, “Czech Republic: Fact-finding Mission Report on State Protection” (June 2009). As outlined above, the Board pointed to legislative prohibi- tions on discrimination as well as measures implemented to reform the country’s police force and increase access to protection for the Romani population. The Board concluded that the, “preponderance of the documentary evidence” indicated that the Czech government was making “very serious efforts” to protect the Roma. 47 However, as this Court has pointed out on a number of occasions, the mere willingness of a state to ensure the protection of its citizens is not sufficient in itself to establish its ability. Protection must have a certain degree of effectiveness: see Perez Burgos c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyennet´e & de l’Immigration), 2006 FC 1537, 160 A.C.W.S. (3d) 696 (F.C.); Aguilar Soto c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyennet´e & de l’Immigration), 2010 FC 1183 (F.C.) at para 32. As such, an applicant can rebut the presumption of state protection by demonstrating either that a state is unwilling, or that a state is unable to provide adequate protection: see Cosgun v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FC 400 (F.C.) at para 52. 48 Completely absent from the Board’s discussion was any recognition of the objective evidence pointing towards a potential inadequacy in state protection. For instance, the 2009 Amnesty International Report on Human Rights in the Czech Republic indicated: The government again failed to implement adequate antidiscrimina- tion provisions. The Roma continued to experience discrimination, particularly in accessing education, housing and health, as well as threats of attacks by far-right groups. 260 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

The US DOS report on the human rights practices in the Czech Republic entitled, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008” (Febru- ary 25, 2009), indicated: The laws prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, disability, language, or social status; however, significant societal discrimination against Roma and women persisted. The Board’s own Response to Information Request, CZE102667.EX (December 12, 2007) stated: However, according to the ERRC, in 2006 there was “near total impunity for racial discrimination against Roma” in the Czech Republic (1 Mar. 2007). The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) states that in the majority of cases involving neo-Nazis targeting minorities, including Roma, “authorities, including the police, turned a blind eye” (IHF 2007). According to IPS, a survey conducted in 2006 found that “courts rarely investigate cases of racial discrimination” (6 Apr. 2007), although further details on this survey could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate. An earlier Response to Information Request, CZE100727.E (January 26, 2006) provided: However, the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) remarked that police “often failed to act adequately” in cases of violent attacks against Roma in 2004 (IHF 27 June 2005) and, according to the United States (US) Department of State, there remained some “judicial inconsistency in dealing firmly with racially and ethnically motivated crimes” (Country Reports 2004 28 Feb. 2004, Sec. 5). Even the document relied on by the Board, the 2009 issue paper, indicated: Other NGO interlocutors claimed that the police tended to address acts of extremism only when they were considered serious or too high-profile to ignore... 49 In the present case, I find that it was unreasonable for the Board to have focused on the “very serious efforts” being employed by the Czech Republic to protect Romani citizens to the exclusion of the evidence showing that, in practice, those efforts may have been inadequate. The Board was not required to refer to every piece of evidence placed before it. However, in view of the fact that reliable and relevant country conditions evidence supporting the applicants’ position had been presented, the Board had an obligation to acknowledge that evidence and explain Bledy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) Andr´e F.J. Scott J. 261

why it was satisfied that, despite that evidence, the government’s “very serious efforts” were sufficient: see Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1998), 157 F.T.R. 35, 83 A.C.W.S. (3d) 264 (Fed. T.D.). 50 Given the Board’s unreasonable treatment of the objective country conditions evidence, it is unnecessary to move on to consider the Board’s treatment of the applicants’ personal experiences with respect to state protection. The Board’s unreasonable treatment of the country conditions evidence undermines its conclusion as to the existence of state protection. As such, there was a lack of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the Board’s decision-making process which rendered its overall determination unreasonable.

Conclusion 51 Since the Board failed to properly analyze the question of persecution, and since the Board erred in its state protection analysis by inadequately surveying the country conditions evidence, I am allowing this application for judicial review.

Judgment THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that: 1. the application for judicial review is allowed; and 2. there is no question of general importance to certify. Application granted. 262 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

[Indexed as: Arora v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)] Vishal Arora, Applicant and The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent Federal Court Docket: IMM-3091-10 2011 FC 241 John A. O’Keefe J. Heard: February 8, 2011 Judgment: March 1, 2011 Immigration and citizenship –––– Admission — Temporary entry (visi- tors) — Foreign workers –––– A applied for work permit and temporary resident visa as intracompany transferee under s. 205(a) of Immigration and Refu- gee Protection Regulations — Immigration officer refused A’s application — Officer found A had not demonstrated he met requirements of intracompany transferee such that he should be exempted from applying for labour market opinion and receive work permit and temporary resident visa — Officer found discrepancies between letter from A’s employer and A’s submitted forms regarding his annual salary — Officer was not satisfied A worked as senior executive or held managerial level position due to his age, level of education, limited experience with company, modest income and lack of evidence as to his prior work experience — A brought application for judicial review — Application granted — Officer was required to determine whether A was senior executive or manager such that he qualified for s. 205(a) exemption in Regulations — To do this, officer needed to assess qualities listed in provision of Citizenship and Im- migration Canada Foreign Worker Manual which detailed what executive capacity and managerial capacity entailed — Officer did not refer to these qualities, nor to letter from A’s employer indicating his current job duties and proposed job duties in Canada — Factors noted by officer could not be substituted for assessment of qualities of manager outlined in manual — Several of factors noted by officer were irrelevant to assessment — Officer failed to consider whether A’s position met qualities of senior executive or manager and used inappropriate criteria in assessing application — Decision did not meet reasonableness standard. Cases considered by John A. O’Keefe J.: Khosa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2009), 82 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 2009 SCC 12, 2009 CarswellNat 434, 2009 CarswellNat 435, 304 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 77 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 385 N.R. 206, (sub nom. Canada Arora v. Canada (MCI) John A. O’Keefe J. 263

(Citizenship & Immigration) v. Khosa) [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, [2009] S.C.J. No. 12 (S.C.C.) — referred to New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 372 N.R. 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, D.T.E. 2008T-223, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, 2008 SCC 9, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9 (S.C.C.) — followed Samuel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2010), 2010 Car- swellNat 950, 2010 CF 223, 2010 CarswellNat 435, 2010 FC 223 (F.C.) — referred to Statutes considered: Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 s. 72(1) — pursuant to Regulations considered: Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 s. 205 — referred to s. 205(a) — considered

APPLICATION for judicial review of decision of immigration officer refusing applicant’s application for work permit and temporary resident visa as intracompany transferee under s. 205(a) of Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations.

Chantal Desloges, for Applicant Melissa Mathieu, for Respondent

John A. O’Keefe J.:

1 This is an application pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the Act) for judicial review of a decision of an immigration officer of the Immigration Section of the High Commission of Canada in Delhi, India (the officer), dated May 10, 2010, wherein the officer refused the applicant’s application for a Cana- dian work permit. 2 The applicant requests that the decision of the officer be set aside and the application remitted for redetermination by a different officer. 264 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

Background 3 Vishal Arora (the applicant) was born on September 6, 1987 in Meham, India. 4 The applicant completed high school in 2005 and alleges that he began working for Ghandi Infotech as a telemarketer in June 2005. At Ghandi Infotech, he states that he supervised two teams of telemarketers. The applicant further alleges that he joined Assent India in May 2006 as a business development executive. 5 The applicant joined One Touch Solutions India (OTS India) as a business development manager in September 2007. He states that his main duties are to contact companies in the United Kingdom and Austra- lia and offer them OTS telemarketing services. The applicant states that as the business grew, he was in charge of approximately 25 people. Cur- rently, the staff he supervises is approximately 58 people including account managers, team leaders and supervisors. 6 The applicant was offered a position to work in Canada on a temporary basis with OTS Canada. 7 The applicant applied for a Canadian work permit and temporary resident visa as an intracompany transferee under subsection 205(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (the Regulations). 8 The normal application process requires foreign nationals seeking a temporary resident visa and work permit to apply for a labour market opinion (LMO) assessing the economic impact of hiring a foreign national for the position sought. Section 205 of the Regulations provides an exemption from the LMO requirement for intra-company transferees.

Officer’s Decision 9 Through a combination of a refusal letter and the Computer Assisted Immigration Processing System (CAIPS) notes, the officer found that the applicant had not demonstrated that he met the requirements of an intra- company transferee such that he should be exempted from applying for an LMO and receive a work permit and temporary resident visa. 10 The officer found discrepancies between a letter from the applicant’s employer and the applicant’s submitted forms with respect to his annual salary. 11 The officer was not satisfied that the applicant works as a senior executive or holds a managerial level position due to his age (23 years old), Arora v. Canada (MCI) John A. O’Keefe J. 265

his level of education (grade 12), his limited experience with the company (less than three years), his modest income and the lack of evidence with respect to his prior work experience.

Issues 12 The issues are as follows: 1. What is the appropriate standard of review? 2. Did the officer ignore letters of the applicant’s past work experience? 3. Did the officer ignore evidence or base her decision on extraneous criteria?

Applicant’s Written Submissions 13 The applicant submits that the officer erred by importing subjective and extraneous criteria into her assessment. The officer improperly considered the applicant’s age, lack of post-secondary education, limited number of years with the company and level of income to determine whether the applicant is a senior manager. These factors are not mentioned in the Citizenship and Immigration Canada Foreign Worker Man- ual (FW1 Manual) in outlining the positions of senior executive or manager. Rather, the FW1 Manual specifically states that only one year of management experience in the past three years is necessary. 14 Further, the position of business development manager under the NOC 0621 only requires the completion of secondary school. It was a reviewable error to require a higher education than that set down in the NOC. 15 The applicant submits that the officer’s reasons are inadequate as she did not indicate on what basis she concluded the applicant’s salary to be modest. 16 The applicant also submits that the officer failed to consider the details of the applicant’s current duties with OTS India when making her assessment. These duties demonstrated the applicant’s managerial role. 17 Finally, the officer failed to take into consideration the evidence of the applicant’s previous employment.

Respondent’s Written Submissions 18 The respondent submits that the factors considered by the officer are not irrelevant or subjective. Rather, the officer must make a determina- 266 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

tion as to whether transferees are qualified for the job positions for which they apply and the officer is not limited to the general considerations included in the policy manual. The officer was required to assess all information presented to her as stipulated in the processing manual. 19 It was reasonable for the officer to consider the applicant’s age and education as both are unusually low for a position as a senior executive or manger. 20 It was also reasonable for the officer to find that the applicant is a relatively junior employee as the applicant has limited experience with OTS India and there were no other letters or documentary evidence on file from previous employers, despite the submissions made by the applicant that there were. 21 The officer based her decision in part on the discrepancies between the applicant’s bank statements and the statements from the applicant’s employer concerning his salary. It was reasonable for the officer to com- pare the applicant’s current salary of approximately $8,000 to that which he would receive in Canada, $65,000 and determine that he currently makes a modest salary. 22 The respondent submits that the officer fully considered the letters from OTS India outlining the applicant’s current duties in India and prospective duties in Canada. However, the officer concluded that based on the entirety of the evidence, the applicant had not shown he worked as a senior executive or managerial level position.

Analysis and Decision Issue 1 What is the appropriate standard of review? 23 A refusal of a temporary work permit is an administrative decision made within the officer’s legislative authority and is ostensibly a determination of fact (see Samuel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immi- gration), 2010 FC 223 (F.C.) at paragraph 26). In accordance with the direction of the Supreme Court of Canada, administrative fact finding is afforded a high degree of deference and reasonableness is the appropriate standard of review for the immigration officer’s factual determination (see Khosa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.) at paragraph 46). Arora v. Canada (MCI) John A. O’Keefe J. 267

Issue 2 Did the officer ignore letters of the applicant’s past work experience? 24 The applicant submits that his application included documents from his previous employers Ghandi Infotech, Delhi Call Centers and Assent India. 25 The officer did not mention these letters in the CAIPS notes, the respondent asserts that such letters were not included in the application for the Canadian Work Permit and the letters are not included in the certified tribunal record. 26 As such, I cannot find that the letters were before the officer in determining the application or that she ignored such letters.

Issue 3 Did the officer ignore evidence or base her decision on extraneous criteria? 27 The officer was required to determine whether the applicant was a senior executive or manager such that he qualified for the subsection 205(a) exemption in the Regulations. 28 In order to do this, the officer needed to assess the qualities listed in section 5.31 of the FW1 Manual. This section details what executive capacity and managerial capacity entail. 29 The officer did not refer to these qualities, nor did she refer to the letter from the applicant’s employer indicating his current job duties and proposed job duties at OTS Canada. 30 Rather, the officer was not satisfied that the applicant works as a senior executive or manager because of his age, education level, limited experience with the company, lack of evidence of past work experience and modest salary. 31 While these factors may play a part in an officer’s assessment, they cannot be substituted for an assessment of the qualities of a manger as outlined in the FW1 Manual. 32 In addition, several factors noted by the officer were irrelevant to the assessment. For example, the officer was concerned that the applicant could not be a senior executive at the age of 23 years. However, age is not a factor listed in the FW1 Manual and not allowing the exemption under subsection 205(a) of the Regulations based on the applicant’s age is inappropriate. 33 In addition, the officer noted with concern that the applicant had limited experience with the company — only three years — and therefore he 268 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

must be a relatively junior employee. The problem with the officer’s finding is that the FW1 Manual explicitly states that the applicant must show only one year of managerial experience at the company for which he is applying for a work permit. 34 Finally, neither the FW1 Manual nor the Regulations require a certain salary level before an applicant can be considered a senior executive or manager. As such, it was an error for the officer to draw a negative infer- ence from the finding that the applicant made a modest salary. 35 The officer’s failure to consider whether the applicant’s position met the qualities of a senior executive or manager and her use of inappropriate criteria in assessing the applicant’s application is not a decision making process demonstrating justification, transparency and intelligibility as required by the reasonableness standard of New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.) at paragraph 47. 36 As such, I would allow the judicial review. 37 The decision of the officer is therefore set aside and the matter is referred to a different officer for redetermination. 38 Neither party wished to submit a proposed serious question of general importance for my consideration for certification.

Judgment 39 IT IS ORDERED that the application for judicial review is allowed and the matter is referred to a different officer for redetermination. Application granted.

Annex Relevant Statutory Provisions Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001, c. 27 72.(1) Judicial review by the Federal Court with respect to any matter — a decision, determination or order made, a measure taken or a question raised — under this Act is commenced by making an application for leave to the Court. Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 205. A work permit may be issued under section 200 to a foreign national who intends to perform work that Arora v. Canada (MCI) John A. O’Keefe J. 269

(a) would create or maintain significant social, cultural or economic benefits or opportunities for Canadian citizens or permanent residents; (b) would create or maintain reciprocal employment of Canadian citizens or permanent residents of Canada in other countries; (c) is designated by the Minister as being work that can be performed by a foreign national on the basis of the following criteria, namely, (i) the work is related to a research, educational or training program, or (ii) limited access to the Canadian labour market is necessary for reasons of public policy relating to the competitiveness of Canada’s academic institutions or economy; or (d) is of a religious or charitable nature. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, FW 1, Foreign Worker Manual 5.31. Canadian Interests: Significant benefit — intra-company transferees R205(a), C12 A) General The intra-company category was created to permit international companies to temporarily transfer qualified employees to Canada for the purpose of improving management effectiveness, expanding Cana- dian exports, and enhancing the competitiveness of Canadian entities in overseas markets. The entry of intra-company transferees is guided by the IRPA regulations and the general provisions of this section, and is supplemented by provisions contained in international trade agreements for citizens of signatory countries. Harmonization of IRPA and NAFTA intracompany transferee provisions means that there are now no differ- ences in terms of entry requirements and work permit durations. • Qualified intra-company transferees require work permits and are LMO exempt under R205(a), C12, as they provide significant economic benefit to Canada through the transfer of their expertise to Canadian businesses. This applies to foreign nationals from any country. • Regulation 204(a) provides LMO exemption code T24 for qualified intra-company transferees who are citizens of a country that has signed an international agreement with Can- ada, namely NAFTA (and similar FTAs) and the GATS, and supplements the IRPA general provisions. 270 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

General requirements Intra-company transferees may apply for work permits under the general provision if they: • are seeking entry to work in a parent, subsidiary, branch, or affiliate of a multinational company; • will be undertaking employment at a legitimate and continuing establishment of that company (where 18-24 months can be used as a reasonable minimum guideline); • are taking a position in a Executive, Senior Managerial, or Specialized Knowledge capacity; • have been employed (via payroll or by contract) by the company outside Canada in a similar full-time position (not accumulated part-time) for one year in the three-year period immediately preceding the date of application. Extensions may be granted up to the 5 and 7 year maximums referred to in the tables at the end of this section (5.31) and in the table in section 11.2. ... D) Qualifying job positions Executives and senior managers As in NAFTA, this group includes persons in the senior executive or managerial categories, in possession of a letter from a company conducting business in Canada, identifying the holder as an employee of a branch, subsidiary, affiliate or parent of the company which is located outside Canada. The holder must be transferring to a Senior Executive or Managerial level position at a permanent and continuing establishment of that company in Canada for a temporary period. Executive capacity means that the employee primarily: • directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the organization; • establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; • exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and • receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. Managerial capacity means that the employee primarily: • manages the organization, a department, subdivision, function, or component of the organization; Arora v. Canada (MCI) John A. O’Keefe J. 271

• supervises and controls the work of: • other managers or supervisors; • professional employees, or • manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization. • has the authority to hire and fire, or recommend these and other personnel actions, such as promotion and leave authorization; if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organization hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and, • exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which the employee has the authority. In general, executives and managers plan, organize, direct, or control the activities of a business, or a division of a business (e.g. Vice Pres- ident of Marketing), either independently or through middle managers. They are frequently responsible for the implementation of the policies of a business. More senior persons, either alone or in conjunction with a board of directors, may formulate policies which establish the direction to be taken by the business. 272 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

[Indexed as: Kamara v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)] Zainab Kamara, Applicant and The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent Federal Court Docket: IMM-1146-10 2011 FC 243 John A. O’Keefe J. Heard: September 15, 2010 Judgment: March 1, 2011 Immigration and citizenship –––– Admission — Appeals and judicial review — Appeal division — Procedure –––– Applicant was citizen of Sierra Le- one who was granted Convention refugee status in Canada — Applicant’s first language was Creole, and she understood some spoken English but could not read English — Visa officer denied permanent residence to applicant’s husband J as member of family class — Applicant appealed to Immigration Appeal Divi- sion of Immigration and Refugee Board — At hearing, applicant was represented by unpaid counsel who was neither lawyer nor member of Canadian So- ciety for Immigration Consultants — Creole-English interpreter was provided for hearing via telephone — Applicant answered questions posed to her in both Creole and English — Applicant indicated in her affidavit that she believed that she had duty to attempt to answer in English — Connection to interpreter was lost during hearing, after which J was asked questions and testified in English — Board refused to overturn decision of visa officer — Board concluded that applicant’s marriage to J was not genuine, finding, inter alia, that applicant was not credible witness — Applicant brought application for judicial review — Appli- cation granted — Applicant did not make informed waiver of her right to continuous interpretation — There were so many inconsistencies in transcript of hearing that it could not be known what decision of board might have been had continuous interpretation been present — There was breach of procedural fairness. Cases considered by John A. O’Keefe J.: Khosa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2009), 82 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 2009 SCC 12, 2009 CarswellNat 434, 2009 CarswellNat 435, 304 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 77 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 385 N.R. 206, (sub nom. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration) v. Khosa) [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, [2009] S.C.J. No. 12 (S.C.C.) — followed Kamara v. Canada (MCI) John A. O’Keefe J. 273

Korponey v. Canada (Attorney General) (1982), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 41, 65 C.C.C. (2d) 65, 26 C.R. (3d) 343, 132 D.L.R. (3d) 354, 44 N.R. 103, 1982 Carswell- Que 7, 1982 CarswellQue 104 (S.C.C.) — followed Mohammadian v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2001), 2001 CarswellNat 2839, [2001] 4 F.C. 85, 14 Imm. L.R. (3d) 130, 271 N.R. 91, 2001 FCA 191, 2001 CarswellNat 1159, [2001] F.C.J. No. 916 (Fed. C.A.) — referred to New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 372 N.R. 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, D.T.E. 2008T-223, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, 2008 SCC 9, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9 (S.C.C.) — followed R. v. Tran (1994), 1994 CarswellNS 24, 1994 CarswellNS 435, 32 C.R. (4th) 34, 170 N.R. 81, 117 D.L.R. (4th) 7, 133 N.S.R. (2d) 81, 380 A.P.R. 81, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 218, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 951, 23 C.R.R. (2d) 32, EYB 1994-67408, [1994] S.C.J. No. 16 (S.C.C.) — followed Statutes considered: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 s. 14 — considered Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 Generally — referred to s. 12(1) — referred to s. 72(1) — pursuant to s. 162(2) — referred to

APPLICATION for judicial review of decision of Immigration Appeal Division of Immigration and Refugee Board wherein board refused to overturn decision of visa officer denying permanent residence to applicant’s husband as member of family class.

David Matas, for Applicant Nalini Reddy, for Respondent

John A. O’Keefe J.:

1 This is an application pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the Act) for judicial review 274 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

of a decision of the Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board), dated February 1, 2010, wherein the Board refused to overturn a decision by a visa officer denying permanent residence to the applicant’s husband as a member of the family class. 2 The applicant requests an order quashing the decision of the Board and remitting the matter back for redetermination by a newly constituted panel.

Background 3 Zainab Kamara (the applicant) was born on December 25, 1983. She is a citizen of Sierra Leone. The applicant’s first language is Creole. She understands some spoken English but cannot read English. 4 According to the applicant, she met Ibrahim Jalloh (Mr. Jalloh) in 1994 in Sierra Leone. She fled Sierra Leone to Guinea due to warfare while Mr. Jalloh remained in Sierra Lione. The applicant returned to Si- erra Leone only once, six months prior to leaving for Canada. Although her testimony is somewhat unclear, the applicant asserts that she saw Mr. Jalloh in person at that time. The applicant became pregnant by another man in Guinea before coming to Canada. She ultimately gave birth to her daughter in Canada. In 2001, the applicant was granted Convention refugee status in Canada. The applicant had a proxy marriage with Mr. Jalloh in 2004. 5 In 2006, Mr. Jalloh applied for permanent residence in Canada under subsection 12(1) of the Act as the spouse of the applicant. He was inter- viewed by a visa officer in Accra, Ghana on March 13, 2008. The visa officer found that Mr. Jalloh and the applicant did not have a bona fide relationship and that it was a relationship of convenience for the sole purpose of gaining status under the Act. 6 The applicant appealed the visa officer’s decision to the Board. A hearing was scheduled for November 16, 2009 but was adjourned because of an inability to contact an interpreter. 7 On January 25, 2010, the appeal hearing went ahead. At the hearing, the applicant was represented by unpaid counsel who was neither a lawyer nor a member of the Canadian Society for Immigration Consultants. 8 A Creole-English interpreter was provided for the hearing via telephone. The applicant answered questions posed to her in both Creole and English. She states in her affidavit that she believed that she had a duty to attempt to answer in English. Kamara v. Canada (MCI) John A. O’Keefe J. 275

9 After a break, the Board contacted Mr. Jalloh as a witness for the applicant.The connection with the interpreter was lost after Mr. Jalloh had answered several questions. The Board tried unsuccessfully to recon- nect with the interpreter. The Board asked the applicant if she wanted to proceed for the questioning of Mr. Jalloh without an interpreter.

Board’s Decision 10 The Board ultimately concluded that the applicant’s marriage to Mr. Jalloh was not genuine. 11 The Board found that the applicant was not a credible witness. Her testimony lacked detail, she was evasive and hesitant. By way of example, the Board referred to a response given by the applicant when she was asked to specify the date when she last sent money to Mr. Jalloh. She first stated that it was in 2009 and then said that it was somewhere between 2006 and 2009. The Board found this undermined her credibility. 12 The Board found that Mr. Jalloh was effective in his communication in English and his testimony was more responsive and clearer than the applicant’s. 13 The Board found that the applicant’s evidence suggested that her relationship with Mr. Jalloh was one that stopped and was re-established after the applicant’s daughter was born, rather than the on-going relationship that the applicant alleged. 14 The Board found that neither party demonstrated substantial knowledge of the other. Mr. Jalloh did not know the name of the applicant’s daughter’s school or the grade she was in. The applicant had not told Mr. Jalloh that she had changed jobs to a better paying position as a care aide. The Board found that the lack of sharing coupled with the lack of substantial knowledge of each other and the applicant’s evasive testimony undermined credibility of the claim of a genuine marriage. 15 The Board found that when asked why the applicant did not sponsor Mr. Jalloh until after she had been in Canada for two years, the applicant answered that it was because she was not financially secure. Mr. Jalloh answered that it was because he was not financially secure. In addition, the applicant also testified that she sent Mr. Jalloh $100 to $200 per month. The Board found that this financial burden would have been lifted if the applicant had sponsored Mr. Jalloh earlier. The Board found that the explanation for delay was not consistent between the applicant and Mr. Jalloh and was therefore not credible. 276 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

16 The Board also found that the fact that the applicant had not seen Mr. Jalloh in nine years, even though she was earning sufficient income to visit him in Ghana, undermined the claim that it was a genuine marriage. 17 Based on the above findings, the Board concluded that the applicant had not proven that her marriage to Mr. Jalloh was genuine or that it was not entered into primarily to acquire any status or privilege under the Act.

Issues 18 The following are the issues: 1. What is the appropriate standard of review? 2. Did the absence of continuous interpretation breach the duty of fairness owed to the applicant?

Applicant’s Written Submissions 19 The applicant submits that her right to a fair hearing was denied because of the absence of continuous interpretation. She submits that the standard of review is correctness. 20 The applicant answered some questions in English and others in Cre- ole. She had trouble expressing herself in English but submits that the Board allowed her to proceed in English as she saw fit. 21 The applicant submits that her counsel at the time was not experienced and did not know she could object to the applicant responding in English. 22 The applicant submits that she did not realize the harm that declining to use the interpreter would have on the presentation of her case until she received the reasons for the decision. The effect of not using an interpreter was never explained to her. 23 The applicant submits that a duty of fairness analysis must consider the choices of procedures made by the Board. The applicant submits that the Board did not follow its procedures regarding interpretation set out in the Immigration Division Guide. The applicant submits that the Board did not determine whether the applicant had sufficient command of En- glish to allow the hearing to proceed without an interpreter. Ultimately, the Board must decide whether there should be interpretation and although the applicant spoke in English voluntarily, it was the Board’s duty to constantly evaluate whether she required the assistance of an interpreter. Kamara v. Canada (MCI) John A. O’Keefe J. 277

24 The applicant submits that there was no legally valid waiver of the right to interpretation because she did not have full knowledge of the rights that interpretation was enacted to protect and knowledge of the effect of the waiver. 25 The applicant submits that the hearing should not have continued without interpretation. 26 The applicant submits that the responses that she and Mr. Jalloh gave were affected by the lack of interpretation. Because the Board based its decision on these responses, the decision must be sent back to a newly constituted panel for redetermination.

Respondent’s Written Submissions 27 The respondent submits that there was no breach of the duty of fairness by allowing the applicant to testify, at times, in English. The applicant testified in English less than one quarter of the time. In addition, of the portions of the applicant’s testimony that the Board referred to in its decision, only one was in English. As such, the facts do not support the assertion that the English testimony was problematic or was the cause of the Board’s concerns about the applicant’s lack of credibility and full answers. 28 The respondent submits that the applicant was well aware of her right to the assistance of an interpreter because the hearing had been previously adjourned for lack of an interpreter. 29 The respondent submits that the Board put the applicant on notice about the need to provide full, complete answers. The applicant cannot now submit that she did not understand the importance of providing complete and detailed answers simply because she testified in English some of the time. 30 The respondent submits that the applicant was required to raise any concerns about the language of the proceedings at the first opportunity. The applicant implicitly waived her right to interpretation because she had the interpreter available to her and chose not to use it, without any suggestion that there was a problem with the interpretation. The applicant also expressly waived her right during her testimony. 31 The respondent submits that the questioning of Mr. Jalloh without an interpreter was initiated by the applicant’s counsel and then continued with consent of the applicant’s counsel when the Minister’s counsel began to ask questions of Mr. Jalloh. In addition, the applicant and her 278 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

counsel from the hearing aver in their affidavits that they did not object to continuing without an interpreter because they wanted to avoid another delay, thus acknowledging that they knew they could object and chose not to. 32 Finally, the respondent submits that the Board member was aware of and sensitive to language issues throughout the proceedings. He advised the applicant to wait for the interpretation to finish before answering to make sure that she fully understood. He also clarified the applicant’s responses several times to ensure that she had been understood. 33 Based on these submissions, there was no breach of the duty of fairness, according to the respondent.

Analysis and Decision Issue 1 What is the appropriate standard of review? 34 The question of adequate interpretation raises issues of procedural fairness. The Supreme Court of Canada has limited the standards of review for administrative decisions to correctness and reasonableness (see New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.) at paragraph 45). However, despite the changes, the Supreme Court left the standard of review for questions of procedural fairness intact (see Khosa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.) at paragraph 43). As such, the question of whether an applicant’s right to a fair hearing has been breached remains to be reviewed on the standard of correctness.

Issue 2 Did the absence of continuous interpretation breach the duty of fairness owed to the applicant? 35 In R. v. Tran, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 951, [1994] S.C.J. No. 16 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada considered the application of section 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) to the trial of a criminally accused. Section 14 states that: A party or witness in any proceedings who does not understand or speak the language in which the proceedings are conducted or who is deaf has the right to the assistance of an interpreter. 36 Chief Justice Lamer held in Tran above, that the criteria used to determine whether the standard of interpretation required by section 14 of the Charter was met “... include, and are not necessarily limited to, con- tinuity, precision, impartiality, competency and contemporaneousness” Kamara v. Canada (MCI) John A. O’Keefe J. 279

(at paragraph 57). The Chief Justice said of continuous interpretation that, “... breaks in interpretation and/or summaries of the proceedings have usually not been viewed in a favourable light” and should not be “encouraged or allowed” (at paragraphs 58 and 60). 37 These markers of adequate interpretation are accepted for proceedings at the Immigration and Refugee Board (see Mohammadian v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2001 FCA 191, [2001] 4 F.C. 85 (Fed. C.A.) at paragraph 4). Accordingly, the Guide to Pro- ceedings before the Immigration Division states in Chapter 6.1 that “the right to the assistance of an interpreter requires that all that is said during the proceeding must be interpreted.” 38 The applicant is only concerned in this case that the interpretation was not continuous. Not all of the questions posed to the applicant were translated into English and the applicant answered some questions directly in English. In addition, after the connection with the interpreter was lost, the applicant’s witness, Mr. Jalloh, was asked questions and testified entirely in English. As such, there was not continuous interpretation during the applicant’s hearing.

Did the applicant waive the right to interpretation? 39 The applicant submits that she felt required to respond to questions in English. She further submits that her counsel, during the hearing, was inexperienced and did not know that she could object to the applicant testifying in English. She submits that there was no valid legal waiver because she did not have full knowledge of the rights that interpretation was enacted to protect and she did not understand the effect that waiver would have on those rights. 40 In Tran above, following Korponey v. Canada (Attorney General), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 41 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court held that a valid waiver of a procedural right must be “... clear and unequivocal and must be done with full knowledge of the rights the procedure was enacted to protect and the effect that waiver will have on those rights” (at paragraph 78). The Court further added that waiver of the rights in section 14 of the Charter requires that the waiver be made personally and that the Court must be satisfied that “nature of the right and the effect on that right of waiving it have been explained to the accused” (at paragraph 78). 41 I have reviewed the transcript of the hearing and I have come to the conclusion that the applicant did not make an informed waiver of her right to continuous interpretation. She originally, at the adjournment of 280 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

the hearing, had informed the member that an interpreter was required. I cannot understand how this would change at the reconvened hearing. 42 There are so many inconsistencies in the transcript of the hearing, I cannot know what the decision of the Board may have been had continuous interpretation been present. 43 As a result, I find that there has been a breach of procedural fairness and the application for judicial review must be allowed. 44 The applicant has proposed serious questions of general importance for my consideration for certification. I am not prepared to certify any question as the questions raised are not serious questions of general importance that would be dispositive of the appeal.

Judgment 45 IT IS ORDERED that the application for judicial review is allowed and the matter is referred to a different panel of the Board for redetermination. Application granted.

Annex Relevant Statutory Provisions Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, R.S. 2001, c. 27 12.(1) A foreign national may be selected as a member of the family class on the basis of their relationship as the spouse, common-law partner, child, parent or other prescribed family member of a Cana- dian citizen or permanent resident. 72.(1) Judicial review by the Federal Court with respect to any matter — a decision, determination or order made, a measure taken or a question raised — under this Act is commenced by making an application for leave to the Court. 162.(2) Each Division shall deal with all proceedings before it as in- formally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit. Guide to Proceedings before the Immigration Division, Chapter 6, Lan- guage of Proceedings and Interpreter 6.1 INTRODUCTION The considerations of natural justice referred to in subsection 162(2) of the Act require, among other things, that the Immigration Division make arrangements to ensure that the person concerned understands Kamara v. Canada (MCI) John A. O’Keefe J. 281

the proceeding and can express himself or herself at the hearing. This explains the importance of holding the hearing in the official language (English or French) spoken by the person concerned or, if this is not possible, of providing him or her with an interpreter. In addition, the Charter provides for the right of any person to use the official language of his or her choice in court and the right to the assistance of an interpreter, the latter right is also provided for by the Canadian Bill of Rights. ... 6.2 GENERALLY ... However, in order for the hearing to be held in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the fundamental rights of the parties, the member must verify that the choice of the official language for the hearing has been acted upon and that an interpreter has been provided if one is needed. If an interpreter is provided, the member must ensure that the interpretation is adequate. As the Supreme Court of Canada held in Tran, “[...] The principle underlying all of the interests protected by the right to interpreter assistance under s. 14 is that of linguistic understanding.” [our emphasis] At the hearing, the member deals with the issues of the language of the proceeding and the need for an interpreter at the same time. At the outset of the hearing, the member must ensure that the person concerned has a sufficient command of the language in which the hearing is to take place. If the person does not, the member must change the language of the proceeding [see 6.3 — Language of the proceeding] or request an interpreter to interpret frome one official language to the other. If the member finds that the person does not have a sufficient command of either official language, the member must call for an interpreter to interpret from the language of the proceeding into the first language of the person concerned and vice versa [see 6.4 — Interpreter]. ... 6.4 INTERPRETER 6.4.1 Determining whether an interpreter is needed ... Even when an interpreter is present at the beginning of the hearing, a change of interpreter may be necessary if there are interpretation problems. The member must remain alert to detect any interpretation problem that may arise and should not hesitate to adjourn the hearing 282 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

to change the interpreter if necessary [see also 6.6.4 — Quality of the interpretation]. When the first language of the person concerned is neither English nor French and the hearing proceeds without an interpreter anyway, the member must constantly ensure during the course of the hearing that the person does not require the assistance of an interpreter. In short, even if the matter of the assistance of an interpreter is, in principle, settled at the outset of the hearing, the member must continue to be vigilant throughout the entire hearing when the language of the proceeding is not the first language of the person concerned. 6.5 DUTY TO PROVIDE AN INTERPRETER No provision of the Act deals specifically with the assistance of an interpreter. However, in order to comply with the principles of natural justice and the right to the assistance of an interpreter that is guar- anteed by the Charter and by the Canadian Bill of Rights, the Divi- sion must provide an interpreter when it thinks that one is needed. Rule 17 governs the practice and procedure of the Immigration Divi- sion when an interpreter is required. ... 6.5.5 Witnesses Whether they are called by the person concerned or by the Minister’s counsel, witnesses have the right to the assistance of an interpreter if they do not have a command of the language of the proceeding. It is rare for witnesses to need an interpreter. If one is necessary, the Division must provide an interpreter at the request of either party. ... 6.6.2 Waiver of the right to an interpreter Occasionally, the person concerned may prefer to proceed without an interpreter, even though he or she has difficulties with English or French. When the person’s language deficiencies are not significant, his or her decision to go ahead without an interpreter may be accepted. However, if the lack of interpretation will adversely affect the smooth conduct of the hearing and the panel’s ability to make a decision in the case, the member can be expected to request the services of an interpreter. In all cases, the person concerned must fully understand his or her right to the assistance of an interpreter. Dirar v. Canada (MPSEP) 283

[Indexed as: Dirar v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness)] Elmuataz Tagelsir Ibrahim Dirar, Applicant and The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondents Federal Court Docket: IMM-4012-10 2011 FC 246 Anne Mactavish J. Heard: February 17, 2011 Judgment: March 1, 2011 Immigration and citizenship –––– Exclusion and removal — Inadmissible classes — Security — Terrorists –––– Applicant was Sudanese citizen — Im- migration Division of Immigration and Refugee Board found applicant to be inadmissible to Canada on security grounds — Board found that applicant was member of organization, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), that engaged, had engaged, or would engage in terrorism — Applicant brought application for judicial review — Application granted — Board erred in assessing whether JEM could be properly characterized as terrorist organization — In examining whether JEM was terrorist organization, board commenced its analysis with observation that applicant had conceded that JEM was organization that engaged, had engaged, or would engage in terrorism — Counsel for Minister was unable to identify any point in proceedings before board where applicant made such concession — Indeed, substantial portion of written submissions provided to board by applicant’s counsel challenged Minister’s contention that JEM was terrorist organization — This error raised concerns as to degree of care taken by board in matter, and it also suggested that applicant’s submissions were ignored or misconstrued by board, which by itself was sufficient basis for quashing decision — There were also concerns with board’s treatment of documentary evidence relating to nature of activities carried out by JEM — Finding that individual was inadmissible to Canada for being member of terrorist organization was serious one, with extremely negative potential consequences for individual involved — As result, great care must be taken to ensure that finding is properly made — That was not done here. 284 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

Cases considered by Anne Mactavish J.: Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1998), 157 F.T.R. 35, 1998 CarswellNat 1981, [1998] A.C.F. No. 1425, [1998] F.C.J. No. 1425 (Fed. T.D.) — referred to Jalil v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2006), 52 Imm. L.R. (3d) 256, [2006] 4 F.C.R. 471, 2006 CarswellNat 445, 2006 FC 246, 2006 CF 246, 2006 CarswellNat 2548, [2006] F.C.J. No. 320 (F.C.) — referred to Mugesera c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyennet´e & de l’Immigration) (2005), (sub nom. Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)) 197 C.C.C. (3d) 233, 2005 SCC 40, 2005 CarswellNat 1740, 2005 Car- swellNat 1741, 254 D.L.R. (4th) 200, 28 Admin. L.R. (4th) 161, 30 C.R. (6th) 39, (sub nom. Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immi- gration)) 335 N.R. 229, 47 Imm. L.R. (3d) 16, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, [2005] S.C.J. No. 39, EYB 2005-91971 (S.C.C.) — followed Omer v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2007), 2007 FC 478, 2007 CarswellNat 1019, 2007 CF 478, 2007 CarswellNat 3451, [2007] F.C.J. No. 642 (F.C.) — referred to Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2002), 2002 SCC 1, 37 Admin. L.R. (3d) 159, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 CarswellNat 7, 2002 Car- swellNat 8, 18 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 208 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 281 N.R. 1, 90 C.R.R. (2d) 1, [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, REJB 2002-27423 (S.C.C.) — considered Statutes considered: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s. 83.01(1) “terrorist activity” [en. 2001, c. 41, s. 4] — referred to Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 s. 33 — considered s. 34(1) — referred to s. 34(1)(c) — considered s. 34(1)(f) — considered

APPLICATION for judicial review of decision of Immigration Division of Im- migration and Refugee Board which found applicant to be inadmissible to Can- ada on security grounds.

Barbara Jackman, Hadyat Nazami, for Applicant Alexis Singer, for Respondent

Anne Mactavish J.:

1 Elmuataz Tagelsir Ibrahim Dirar seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board Dirar v. Canada (MPSEP) Anne Mactavish J. 285

which found him to be inadmissible to Canada on security grounds. The Board found that he was a member of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), an organization that engages, has engaged, or will engage in terrorism. 2 Mr. Dirar says that the Board erred in concluding that JEM was a terrorist organization. He contends that the Board also erred in finding that he was a member of JEM, rather than the Justice and Equality Move- ment Students’ Leadership (JEM-SL), an unrelated and non-violent organization. Mr. Dirar says that the Board further erred by preferring an immigration officer’s unsworn notes of an interview with Mr. Dirar, over Mr. Dirar’s sworn testimony. 3 For the reasons that follow, I find that the Board erred in assessing whether JEM can be properly characterized as a terrorist organization. Consequently, the application will be allowed. In light of my conclusion on the first issue, it is not necessary to deal with the other issues raised by Mr. Dirar.

Background 4 Mr. Dirar is a Sudanese citizen who was born in Saudi Arabia in 1982. He and his family returned to live in the Darfur region of Sudan in 1987. 5 Mr. Dirar moved to Khartoum in 1999 in order to finish his secondary school studies and to attend university. From 2001 to 2005 he attended the Sudan University of Science and Technology. He says that while he was at university, he joined JEM-SL. According to Mr. Dirar, JEM-SL is a non-violent organization whose goal is to publicize the conduct of the current Sudanese government, to promote the interests of Darfurian students, and to bring attention to the slaughter occurring in Darfur. 6 Mr. Dirar states that he was active in JEM-SL, and was involved in organizing demonstrations and giving speeches. As a result of his activities, he was detained twice by the Al-Ihtiati Al Markazi, a branch of the police force specially trained to deal with riots and demonstrations. After his second detention, Mr. Dirar claims that he ceased his involvement in JEM-SL. He says that he nevertheless remained in contact with its leader, Alwathik Yasin. 7 Because he believed that the security forces had labeled him as an active opponent of the government, Mr. Dirar says that he feared for his safety. He left Sudan on July 27, 2007 for the United States, traveling on 286 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

a student visa. He stayed in the United States until September 5, 2007, when he crossed into Canada and claimed refugee protection. 8 As a result of his claim for refugee protection, Mr. Dirar was inter- viewed by agents of both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Canada Border Services Agency. His hearing before the Immigration Division took place on February 11, 2009 and January 13, 2010, and notes of Mr. Dirar’s interviews were put into evidence before the Board.

The Board’s Decision 9 The Board found that JEM-SL was a part of JEM, and was not a sepa- rate and unrelated organization. The Board further found that Mr. Dirar was a member of JEM. 10 In concluding that JEM was a terrorist organization, the Board adopted the definition of terrorism from Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) at para. 96, where the Supreme Court of Canada described terrorism as: Any ... act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civil- ian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 11 Reference was also made by the Board to the definition of “terrorist activity” contained in subsection 83.01(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S., 1985, c. C-46. 12 According to the Board, there was credible documentary evidence that showed that JEM is an organization that engages, has engaged, or will engage in terrorism. This evidence includes documents that discuss serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, which may amount to war crimes. Specifically, these acts included the murder of civilians and pillage in West Darfur.

The Legislative Authority for the Decision 13 Before turning to examine the arguments advanced by Mr. Dirar, it is helpful to first review the legislative framework governing inadmissibility findings such as this. Dirar v. Canada (MPSEP) Anne Mactavish J. 287

14 The inadmissibility finding in this case was made under the provisions of section 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,, S.C. 2001, c.27, the relevant portions of which provide that: 34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for ... (c) engaging in terrorism; ... (f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c). 34. (1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour raison de sécurité les faits suivants: ... c) se livrer au terrorisme; ... f) etreˆ membre d’une organisation don=t il y a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’elle est, a et´´ e ou sera l’auteur d’un acte visé aux alinéas a), b) ou c). 15 In making a finding under section 34(1) of the Act, an immigration officer is also guided by section 33 of IRPA, which provides that: 33. The facts that constitute inadmissibility under sections 34 to 37 include facts arising from omissions and, unless otherwise provided, include facts for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have occurred, are occurring or may occur. 33. Les faits — actes ou omissions — mentionnés aux articles 34 a` 37 sont, sauf disposition contraire, appréciés sur la base de motifs raisonnables de croire qu’ils sont survenus, surviennent ou peuvent survenir.

Analysis 16 The determinative issue in this application is the Board’s finding that JEM is a terrorist organization. This is a question of mixed fact and law and is reviewable against the standard of reasonableness: see, for example, Omer v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2007 FC 478, 157 A.C.W.S. (3d) 601 (F.C.) at para. 9, and Jalil v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2006 FC 246, 52 Imm. L.R. (3d) 256 (F.C.), at paras. 19 and 20. 288 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

17 The Supreme Court of Canada described the “reasonable grounds to believe” evidentiary standard as requiring “something more than mere suspicion, but less than the standard applicable in civil matters of proof on the balance of probabilities”. The Supreme Court has stated that reasonable grounds will exist “where there is an objective basis for the belief which is based on compelling and credible information”: Mugesera c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyennet´e & de l’Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100 (S.C.C.) at para. 114. 18 In examining whether JEM was a terrorist organization, the Board commenced its analysis with the observation that Mr. Dirar had conceded that JEM is an organization that engages, has engaged, or will engage in terrorism. Counsel for the Minister has, however, been unable to identify any point in the proceedings before the Immigration Division where Mr. Dirar made such a concession. Indeed, a substantial portion of the written submissions provided to the Board by Mr. Dirar’s counsel challenge the Minister’s contention that JEM is a terrorist organization. 19 We cannot know the extent to which this error influenced the Board’s appreciation of the documentary evidence, but it does raise concerns as to the degree of care taken by the Board in this matter. It also suggests that Mr. Dirar’s submissions were ignored or misconstrued by the Board, which, by itself, is a sufficient basis for quashing the decision. 20 However, I am also concerned with the Board’s treatment of the documentary evidence relating to the nature of the activities carried out by JEM. 21 The Darfur region of western Sudan has seen a great deal of conflict over the last decade due to ethnic tensions between the Afro-Arab and non-Afro-Arab populations. On the government side of the conflict are the official Sudanese military and police, as well as the “Janjaweed”, an Arab militia group which allegedly acts on behalf of the Government, and benefits from impunity for their actions. 22 Commencing in February of 2003, rebel groups in Darfur rose up against the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed. There are two main rebel groups involved in this rebellion - the Sudan Liberation Movement or Army (the “SLM/A”) and the Justice and Equality Movement. These organizations are primarily made up of members of the non-Arab Mus- lim Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit tribes. 23 The conflict in Darfur has been very bloody, with some estimates put- ting the loss of life in Darfur in the hundreds of thousands. The United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur found that the Dirar v. Canada (MPSEP) Anne Mactavish J. 289

Sudanese Government has committed violations of humanitarian and international law that might be considered to be war crimes. The Interna- tional Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for President Omar al- Bashir for his alleged complicity in war crimes and crimes against hu- manity committed against the people of Darfur. 24 It is against this backdrop that the activities of the JEM must be assessed. 25 It is clear from the documentary evidence that in addition to the SLM/A and JEM, there are numerous other rebel groups involved in the conflict in Darfur, some of which also call themselves “JEM”. Moreover, JEM itself has gone through a series of splits, with a number of different, unrelated organizations carrying on activities under the “JEM” banner. Indeed, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism Report refers to four different, autonomous JEM splinter groups, three of which continue to refer to themselves as “JEM”. 26 Other documentary evidence indicates that there are at least 12, and possibly as many as 16 rebel groups that have their origins in either JEM or the SLM/A. 27 None of this evidence was addressed by the Board. Nor did the Board make any effort to determine which JEM organization Mr. Dirar was a member of. 28 Moreover, the documentary evidence before the Board indicates that it is not always possible to determine which rebel group had been responsible for which activity. In particular, a United Nations report noted that most reports of actions by rebel groups do not distinguish between activities carried out by JEM, and those carried out by the SLM/A. The same report goes on to observe that the SLM/A is the larger military actor of the two groups, whereas JEM “is more political, and has limited military capacity”. 29 Indeed, a number of the reports of the actions by rebel groups that were relied upon by the Board in this case do not distinguish between activities that were carried out by JEM organizations and those carried out by the SLM/A. Even in the case of activities specifically attributed to JEM, the Board made no attempt to determine which JEM organization was responsible for which allegedly terrorist activity. 30 Finally, the Board refers to a 2003 attack carried out on the town of Kulbus by members of JEM as an example of a terrorist act. It appears that civilians, including a child, were killed in the attack. However, the 290 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

United Nations itself recognized that “[a]rguably, the town of Kulbus was a military target”, which could take the attack outside of the definition of a terrorist act. No reference was made to this statement, which clearly calls the Board’s finding that the attack amounted to a terrorist act into question. Given that this evidence ran directly contrary to the Board’s finding on a key issue, it was an error not to deal with it: Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1998] F.C.J. No. 1425, 157 F.T.R. 35 (Fed. T.D.) at paras. 14-17. 31 The situation in Darfur is undoubtedly murky, and atrocities have been committed by both sides of the conflict. Nevertheless, a finding that an individual is inadmissible to Canada for being a member of a terrorist organization is a serious one, with extremely negative potential consequences for the individual involved. As a result, great care must be taken to ensure that the finding is properly made. That was not done here.

Conclusion 32 For these reasons, the application for judicial review is allowed. On the consent of the parties, the style of cause is amended to add the Min- ister of Citizenship and Immigration.

Certification 33 Mr. Dirar has suggested questions for certification relating to the Board’s treatment of notes of an interview of Mr. Dirar carried out by a CBSA officer. Given that it has not been necessary to address that issue in this decision, it follows that the questions posed by Mr. Dirar are not dispositive of this case. Consequently, I decline to certify them.

Judgment THIS COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that: 1. This application for judicial review is allowed, and the matter is remitted to a differently constituted panel of the Immigration Di- vision for re-determination in accordance with these reasons; 2. The style of cause is amended to add the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. 3. No serious question of general importance is certified. Application granted. Campos Quevedo v. Canada (MCI) 291

[Indexed as: Campos Quevedo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)] Mayra Paola Campos Quevedo, Sigrid Campos Quevedo, Applicants and The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent Federal Court Docket: IMM-3456-10 2011 FC 297 Simon Noël J. Heard: February 28, 2011 Judgment: March 10, 2011 Immigration and citizenship –––– Refugee protection — Practice and procedure in refugee claims — Judicial review — Natural justice — General principles –––– Applicants were citizens of Mexico — Principle applicant claimed that she had suffered abuse by former partner and that she had been unable to obtain adequate response from law enforcement agencies — Applicant fled with her daughter to Canada and sought asylum as refugees or persons in need of protection — Immigration and Refugee Board (Board) rejected applicants’ claim on ground that sufficient state protection was available in Mex- ico — Applicants applied for judicial review — Application granted — Board’s analysis of sufficiency of state protection was deficient, rendering decision unreasonable — Decision indicated that Board failed to properly consider principal applicant’s evidence with respect to Gender Guidelines, which constituted reviewable error — Board’s analysis of state protection was largely theoretical and did not address documentary evidence specific to case at hand — Board failed to give adequate justification for decision — Matter referred back to Board to be determined by differently constituted panel. Cases considered by Simon Noël J.: Aguirre v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2010), 2010 CF 916, 2010 CarswellNat 3341, 2010 FC 916, 2010 CarswellNat 4052, [2010] F.C.J. No. 1116 (F.C.) — considered Alexander v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2009), 2009 Car- swellNat 5510, 2009 CF 1305, 357 F.T.R. 222 (Eng.), 2009 CarswellNat 4566, 2009 FC 1305, 88 Imm. L.R. (3d) 75, [2009] F.C.J. No. 1682 (F.C.) — referred to Avila c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté & de l’Immigration) (2006), 2006 CarswellNat 635, 2006 CF 359, 2006 FC 359, 2006 CarswellNat 4738, (sub 292 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

nom. Avila v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)) 295 F.T.R. 35 (Eng.), [2006] F.C.J. No. 439, [2006] A.C.F. No. 439 (F.C.) — followed Bautista v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2010), 2010 CF 126, 2010 CarswellNat 1440, 2010 CarswellNat 260, 2010 FC 126, [2010] F.C.J. No. 153 (F.C.) — referred to Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1998), 157 F.T.R. 35, 1998 CarswellNat 1981, [1998] A.C.F. No. 1425, [1998] F.C.J. No. 1425 (Fed. T.D.) — followed Flores Campos c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyennet´e & de l’Immigration) (2010), 2010 CF 842, 2010 CarswellNat 3069, 2010 CarswellNat 3722, 2010 FC 842 (F.C.) — referred to Isakova v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2008), 2008 CF 149, 2008 CarswellNat 5356, 322 F.T.R. 276 (Eng.), 2008 CarswellNat 261, 2008 FC 149, [2008] F.C.J. No. 188 (F.C.) — referred to New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 372 N.R. 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, D.T.E. 2008T-223, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, 2008 SCC 9, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9 (S.C.C.) — followed Ward v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1993), (sub nom. Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward) 103 D.L.R. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward) 153 N.R. 321, 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85, 1993 Car- swellNat 90, 1993 CarswellNat 1382, [1997] I.N.L.R. 42, (sub nom. Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward) [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, [1993] S.C.J. No. 74, EYB 1993-67292 (S.C.C.) — referred to Zepeda v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2008), 2008 Car- swellNat 2671, 2008 FC 491, 2008 CarswellNat 1084, 2008 CF 491, [2009] 1 F.C.R. 237, [2008] F.C.J. No. 625 (F.C.) — followed Statutes considered: Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 Generally — referred to

APPLICATION for judicial review of decision of Immigration and Refugee Board refusing to recognize applicants as refugees or persons in need of protection pursuant to Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Luis Antonio Monroy, for Applicant Samantha Reynolds, for Respondent Campos Quevedo v. Canada (MCI) Simon No¨el J. 293

Simon No¨el J.:

1 Mayra Paola Campos Quevedo, the principal Applicant, is a citizen of Mexico who alleges having suffered abuse at the hands of her then-boyfriend. She sought asylum in Canada with her daughter, but her claim was denied by the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB). By way of a decision dated April 6, 2010, the IRB ruled that the Applicants were neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection under the statutory regime of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (IRPA). Leave was granted on November 30, 2010. 2 After relating the principal facts of the case, the IRB tackled the issue of the law on state protection. Then, having set out the legal principles, the IRB determined that the protection offered by Mexico would be reasonably forthcoming should the principal Applicant be willing to avail herself of it. It was indicated that there was no persuasive evidence to show that the police were not investigating the allegations. The IRB noted that the principal Applicant should have sought protection from other authorities. The responses given in terms of state protection were deemed to be “not credible and were largely unsubstantiated and were not consistent with the documentary evidence”. While the IRB did discuss the documentary evidence, the IRB decided in favour of the evidence to the effect that Mexico was making progress and that protection was available for battered women. As such, the claim for asylum was denied as clear and convincing evidence was not put forward to rebut the presumption of state protection.

I. Standard of Review 3 The Applicants set out many arguments in support of their application for judicial review. While their position is considerably more nuanced, the Court subsumes the Applicants’ pleadings in one, more general question: did the IRB err in assessing the existence of state protection for battered women in Mexico? 4 Being a mixed question of fact and law, this question is to be reviewed on the standard of reasonableness, whereby the Court is to consider whether the decision falls within the range of acceptable outcomes defensible in fact and law (New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9 (S.C.C.), at para 47; Bautista v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FC 126 (F.C.); Flores 294 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

Campos c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyennet´e & de l’Immigration), 2010 FC 842 (F.C.)).

II. Analysis 5 The IRB’s decision is unreasonable: its analysis of the sufficiency of state protection is deficient. The Court is also concerned with the coherence and the completeness of the IRB’s analysis. 6 Firstly, it is adequate to reproduce paragraph 19 of the IRB’s reasons in its entirety, in order to better illustrate the concerns about coherence in the impugned decision: I find that the principal claimant is merely speculating that the police were not investigating her allegations. When asked if she knew what Jovani’s activities were since she left him, the principal claimant indicated that he went into hiding after the nightclub he was working at closed down. I find that it would be difficult for the police to pursue Jovani for the assaults and threats on the principal claimant if he was in hiding. Furthermore, the police took action when the principal claimant’s mother reported Jovani’s threats to them in February 2009. A summons for Jovani to appear before the Department of Pre- liminary Investigations was issued on April 7, 2009. The principal claimant does not know the outcome of this investigation. There was no persuasive evidence that would indicate that the police were not investigating all of the principal claimant’s allegations. 7 Statements within this paragraph are hard to reconcile. The IRB notes that it would be difficult for the police to find Jovani, and therefore meet the state’s obligations to protect its population. On the other hand, it is indicated that there is no persuasive evidence indicating that the police were not investigating. These statements are at odds with each other. Also, the lack of “persuasive evidence” results from a selective reading of the principal Applicant’s statements. One of these statements is to the effect that an Official at the Public Ministry wrote a report only after the insistence of her stepfather. The IRB noted this fact at paragraph 4, but omitted a necessary fact: that the principal Applicant had recognized this officer as one of her boyfriend’s collaborators in the drug trade. Since the Applicant’s credibility was not directly reproached by the IRB, it had the duty to include this important fact, or at the very least explain why it was not considered, in order for the statement that the principal Applicant is “merely speculating” to be adequate. Furthermore, in terms of “persuasive evidence indicating that the police were not investigating”, the principal Applicant did indeed say she received a call from the Public Prose- Campos Quevedo v. Canada (MCI) Simon No¨el J. 295

cutor’s office to the effect that information about her complaint could not be obtained because of Jovani’s influential friends. The IRB noted this evidence at paragraph 4, but did not address its validity or why it was not to be considered. Again, as credibility was not clearly at play, the IRB should have dealt with this information in its reasons, more so as any neutral reader could have considered the evidence as “persuasive”. 8 Generic statements that “all the evidence” was considered do not suffice in this case. Before stating that there was no “persuasive evidence”, the IRB had the duty to meaningfully address the evidence and the principal Applicant’s statements, especially if these could reasonably be seen as addressing the IRB’s concerns with the sufficiency of state protection. The fact that the IRB must address the evidence before it, especially when it appears as possible “persuasive evidence”, is a well established principle in immigration law (see, inter alia, Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1998), 157 F.T.R. 35 (Fed. T.D.); Zepeda v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2008 FC 491 (F.C.); Avila c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyennet´e & de l’Immigration), 2006 FC 359 (F.C.)). 9 In this case, the IRB’s broad statement to the effect that the principal Applicant’s responses were “not credible and were largely unsubstantiated and were not consistent with the documentary evidence” may have been nuanced. The facts of the case may have called for a more sensible assessment of the situation. Among these facts is that the principal Appli- cant approached the authorities six (6) times with gender-based violence, without having concrete evidence that the state was taking steps to protect her. Hence, it is clear that beyond the general statement that the “Guidelines had been considered”, the IRB failed in this case in addressing the considerations put forth by the Gender Guidelines. In doing so, a reviewable error was committed (Isakova v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2008 FC 149 (F.C.)). Here, it is not the case of the Guidelines bolstering a sketchy claim and presenting testimony as truth, as may have been the case in Avila c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyennet´e & de l’Immigration), 2006 FC 359 (F.C.), but rather a case where the Gender Guidelines were not meaningfully addressed. 10 In regards to the documentary evidence and the sufficiency of state protection, it is apparent that the IRB proceeded with what has been called pro forma analysis (see, for example, Alexander v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2009 FC 1305 (F.C.)). Evi- dently, the principles of state protection are such that an asylum-seeker 296 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

must exhaust internal recourses before seeking the surrogate protection of refugee law (Ward v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigra- tion), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (S.C.C.)). However, the Court makes its own the ratio of Mister Justice De Montigny in Aguirre v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FC 916 (F.C.), at para 20: The case law is replete with statements confirming that it is not sufficient for a state to make efforts to provide protection; an objective assessment must also establish that the state is able to do so in practice: see, inter alia, Avila v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FC 359 (CanLII), 2006 FC 359; Sanchez v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2009 FC 101 (CanLII), 2009 FC 101; Capitaine v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2008 FC 98 (CanLII), 2008 FC 98. However, the Panel does not seem to be alert to this distinction, and does not refer to any documentary evidence showing that the resources devoted to combating crime have produced any tangible results. 11 In this case, this clear distinction was not considered, as the IRB’s analysis of the protection offered was largely theoretical. It did not address the documentary evidence pointing to how the laws and measures taken manifest themselves concretely. At the very least, the IRB is required to meaningfully address why evidence is not considered (Cepeda- Gutierrez, above). In this case, it is clear that the generic statements to the effect that the Member would be at fault if it did not address the contrary evidence do not suffice. Also, the Court is concerned of the IRB’s use of legislative and policy measures as justification for sufficient state protection, while at the same time citing later documents that clearly indicate that said measures have failed or are not efficient. 12 Surely, there has to be an effort on the part of the IRB to go further than presenting a general view that state protection is available in Mex- ico. Clear, informative and updated analysis has to be made. 13 It may be the case that the summons issued to Jovani is determinative of the outcome. Also, the IRB may make findings similar to those made in this case. However, as is recognized by case law, adequate justification must be given to do so, which was not the case here. In order for a reviewing court to duly acquit itself of its duties, due consideration must be given to the justification of the decision, and not only the final outcome of the decision (Dunsmuir, above, at para 47: “A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes”). Campos Quevedo v. Canada (MCI) Simon No¨el J. 297

14 As such, the proper remedy here is to grant the application and send the matter back for redetermination by a newly constituted panel of the IRB. 15 No question for certification was submitted and none will be certified.

Judgment THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the application is allowed. The matter is to be sent for redetermination by a newly constituted panel of the IRB. No question is certified. Application granted. 298 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

[Indexed as: Noor v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)] Mohammad Anis Noor, Applicant and The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent Federal Court Docket: IMM-3586-10 2011 FC 308 Andr´e F.J. Scott J. Heard: February 8, 2011 Judgment: March 15, 2011 Immigration and citizenship –––– Admission — Immigrants — Skilled workers — Categories (point system) — Miscellaneous factors –––– Appli- cant was citizen of India — Applicant’s sister was Canadian citizen who resided in Canada — Applicant applied for permanent residency under federal skilled workers class — New visa office-specific instructions package, which specified new requirements for proving close relative was residing in Canada, was posted on internet some months prior to applicant submitting application, but applicant used older kit — Immigration officer issued negative decision — Applicant received zero points for adaptability on basis that no documents had been submitted as evidence that his sister was currently residing in Canada — Immigration Program Manager (IPM) refused applicant’s request to reconsider negative decision — IPM did not consider new documents applicant had submitted — Appli- cant brought application for judicial review — Application granted — IPM did not fetter his discretion, as he did make decision not to reopen file, after finding no error had been made by original officer — There was no duty on IPM to consider new evidence in issue — However, it was clear to visa officer that applicant was using older kit, which had recently been changed, yet he was afforded no opportunity to rectify this simple error — Letter sent to applicant simply directed him to Citizenship and Immigration Canada website for “Visa office-specific forms and a list of supporting documents require by the Visa office” — There was no specific indication these requirements would have changed — Even with low duty of fairness, in specific circumstances of this case, that duty required visa officer to consider new documents. Cases considered by Andr´e F.J. Scott J.: Athar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2007), 2007 Car- swellNat 5400, 2007 CF 177, 2007 CarswellNat 417, 2007 FC 177 (F.C.) — considered Noor v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) 299

Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1998), 157 F.T.R. 35, 1998 CarswellNat 1981, [1998] A.C.F. No. 1425, [1998] F.C.J. No. 1425 (Fed. T.D.) — considered Chan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1996), 1996 Car- swellNat 937, 1996 CarswellNat 2580, 34 Imm. L.R. (2d) 259, 114 F.T.R. 247, [1996] 3 F.C. 349, 136 D.L.R. (4th) 433, 37 C.R.R. (2d) 112, 43 Ad- min. L.R. (2d) 314 (Fed. T.D.) — considered Hassani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2006), 2006 CF 1283, 2006 CarswellNat 5123, [2007] 3 F.C.R. 501, 2006 CarswellNat 3387, 2006 FC 1283, 302 F.T.R. 39 (Eng.), [2006] F.C.J. No. 1597 (F.C.) — considered Jonas v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2006), 2006 Car- swellNat 756, 2006 FC 398, 2006 CF 398, 2006 CarswellNat 2967, [2006] F.C.J. No. 501 (F.C.) — referred to Kurukkal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2009), 2009 Car- swellNat 6078, 98 Admin. L.R. (4th) 242, 2009 FC 695, 2009 CarswellNat 2147, 347 F.T.R. 60 (Eng.), [2010] 3 F.C.R. 195, 81 Imm. L.R. (3d) 263, [2009] F.C.J. No. 866 (F.C.) — considered Kurukkal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2010), 406 N.R. 313, 324 D.L.R. (4th) 292, 2010 CarswellNat 3298, 2010 FCA 230, 8 Ad- min. L.R. (5th) 271, 2010 CarswellNat 4400, 2010 CAF 230, 91 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, [2010] A.C.F. No. 1159, [2010] F.C.J. No. 1159 (F.C.A.) — considered Lak v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2007), 2007 FC 350, 2007 CarswellNat 756, 62 Imm. L.R. (3d) 101, 2007 CF 350, 2007 Car- swellNat 3449, [2007] F.C.J. No. 488 (F.C.) — referred to Malik v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2009), 2009 CF 1283, 2009 CarswellNat 5826, 2009 FC 1283, 2009 CarswellNat 4345, [2009] F.C.J. No. 1643 (F.C.) — followed New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 372 N.R. 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, D.T.E. 2008T-223, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, 2008 SCC 9, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9 (S.C.C.) — followed Nouranidoust v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1999), [2000] 1 F.C. 123, 172 F.T.R. 115, 1999 CarswellNat 1369, 1999 CarswellNat 3055, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1100 (Fed. T.D.) — followed Patel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2002), 2002 Car- swellNat 1290, 288 N.R. 48, 2002 CAF 55, 2002 FCA 55, 2002 CarswellNat 300 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

301, 23 Imm. L.R. (3d) 161, [2002] F.C.J. No. 178 (Fed. C.A.) — referred to Risco-Flores v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2004), 43 Imm. L.R. (3d) 125, 2004 FC 1412, 2004 CarswellNat 3612, 2004 Car- swellNat 4473, 2004 CF 1412, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1722 (F.C.) — referred to Statutes considered: Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 s. 18.1(4)(d) [en. 1990, c. 8, s. 5] — referred to Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 Generally — referred to s. 2(2) — considered s. 11(1) — considered s. 12(2) — considered s. 72(1) — pursuant to Regulations considered: Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 Generally — referred to s. 75(1) — considered s. 76(1)(a) — considered s. 83(1)(d) — considered s. 83(5) — considered

APPLICATION for judicial review of decision of Immigration Program Man- ager refusing applicant’s request to reconsider negative decision on his application for permanent residency under federal skilled workers class.

Katherine Ramsey, for Applicant Neeta Logsetty, for Respondent

Andr´e F.J. Scott J.:

1 This is an application for judicial review of the decision of David Manicom, Immigration Program Manager (Manager), of the Canadian High Commission, pursuant to s 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001 c 27 (Act) by Mohammad Anis Noor (Appli- cant). Mr. Manicom refused the Applicant’s request to reconsider the negative decision on his application for permanent residency under the Federal Skilled Workers Class. Leave for this file was granted on No- vember 10, 2010 by Justice Near. Noor v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) Andr´e F.J. Scott J. 301

I. The Facts 2 The Applicant is a citizen of India, born in Mumbai on January 3, 1956. His application for permanent residency in Canada also included his wife, Noorjehan Noor, and their three (3) sons (born in 1985, 1988 and 1989). The Applicant applied for the Federal Skilled Workers Class as a financial manager. The Applicant’s sister, Nadira Gopalani, is a Ca- nadian citizen and has resided in Canada since 2002. 3 The Applicant alleges that while preparing his application in March 2009, he printed the New Delhi-specific visa application kit, dated 08- 2008, from the internet. The 08-2008 kit, under the “Adaptability” criteria relating to points awarded for the presence of a relative in Canada, contained the following documentation requirements: (a) Proof of relationship to your close relative in Canada, such as birth, marriage or adoption certificates; (b) If your close relative is a permanent resident of Canada: photocopy of his or her Record of Landing (IMM 1000), Confir- mation of Permanent Residence or Permanent Resident Card; (c) If your close relative is a Canadian citizen: proof of Canadian citizenship, such as a photocopy of pages of a Canadian passport or Canadian citizenship card. 4 On an unspecified date in April 2009, a new Visa Office-Specific In- structions package for New Delhi (04-2009) was posted on the internet. The new requirements for proving that a close relative was residing in Canada now included the following, in addition to the previous requirements: Documents submitted as proof of residency in Canada must be less than six (6) months old. Example of documents: (a) income tax assessment (Canada Revenue Agency) for the relative, (b) telephone bills, a. credit card invoices, b. employment document, and/or c. bank statements. 5 The Applicant took several months to prepare the main forms for his family’s application, and then submitted them to the Centralized Intake Office in Sydney, Nova Scotia on June 10, 2009. In an email sent on July 28, 2009, the CIO informed the Applicant that his application was eligible, and requested the full application with further documentation. The 302 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

email directed the Applicant to the Visa Office-Specific Instructions on Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s website for more information on the required documentation. 6 The Applicant alleges that as he had previously prepared all of the documents needed for his application (i.e. when he originally printed out the old instructions in March), he simply gathered together those documents and submitted them on September 11, 2009. He included a copy of the checklist from the 08-2008 kit. 7 On November 19, 2009, a negative decision was issued to the Appli- cant. The Designated Immigration Officer informed the Applicant that he did not meet the requirements for permanent residence as a skilled worker. The Applicant had received the following point totals: Age: 2 points; Education: 25 points; Official language proficiency: 16 points; Experience: 21 points; Arranged employment: 0 points; Adaptability: 0 points, for a total of 64 points. The Officer noted that this fell below the minimum requirement of 67 points. The Officer also noted that the Ap- plicant was awarded 0 points for adaptability, because no documents had been submitted as evidence that his sister was currently residing in Can- ada, though the Applicant had been asked on July 28 for all further documentation. 8 On December 21, 2009, the Applicant submitted a request for reconsideration of this decision. He had become aware of the changes to the documentation requirements, and attached additional proof of his sister’s residency, including pay stubs showing her Toronto employer, as well as utility and phone bills for her Toronto residence. 9 When he did not receive a reply, the Applicant submitted an application for judicial review in this Court (IMM-236-10). He was later informed that his reconsideration would not be dealt with while the judicial review was pending. He withdrew the application for judicial review. Due to some confusion, CIC was not aware of this until Applicant’s counsel informed them on April 30, 2010. The reconsideration decision was therefore issued on May 6, 2010.

II. The Decision under Review 10 The reconsideration decision is found on pages 5 and 6 of the Com- puter-Assisted Immigration Processing System (CAIPS) notes. Mr. Man- icom notes that he verified with the CIC webmaster that the 04-2009 kit was available online in April 2009. Noor v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) Andr´e F.J. Scott J. 303

11 Mr. Manicom notes in the portion of the decision sent to the Appli- cant (also included in the CAIPS notes) that the Applicant had attached the 08-2008 kit in his application, but that the 04-2009 kit had been available online some months prior to the original submission of his application to the Sydney CIO office, and five months prior to the submission of his full application in September 2009. It was reasonably expected that the Applicant would refer to the 04-2009 kit, which specified the need for documentation in support of his sister’s residency in Canada in order to obtain the five (5) points. The documentation noted on file included copies of her citizenship card and passport, her Landing Record from 2001, and her Indian birth certificate. There was therefore no error in the original decision. 12 No mention was made of the new documents submitted by the Applicant.

III. The Relevant Legislation 13 The relevant portions of the Act are as follows: Act includes regulations 2. (2) Unless otherwise indicated, references in this Act to “this Act” include regulations made under it. Application before entering Canada 11. (1) A foreign national must, before entering Canada, apply to an officer for a visa or for any other document required by the regulations. The visa or document may be issued if, following an examination, the officer is satisfied that the foreign national is not inadmissible and meets the requirements of this Act. Economic immigration 12. (2) A foreign national may be selected as a member of the economic class on the basis of their ability to become economically established in Canada. Terminologie 2. (2) Sauf disposition contraire de la présente loi, toute mention de celle-ci vaut egalement´ mention des règlements pris sous son régime. Visa et documents 11. (1) L’étranger doit, préalablement a` son entrée au Canada, demander a` l’agent les visa et autres documents requis par règlement. L’agent peut les délivrer sur preuve, a` la suite d’un contrôle, que 304 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

l’étranger n’est pas interdit de territoire et se conforme a` la présente loi. Immigration economique´ 12. (2) La sélection des etrangers´ de la catégorie « immigration economique´ » se fait en fonction de leur capacité a` réussir leur etab-´ lissement economique´ au Canada. The following sections of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regu- lations, SOR/2002-227, are also relevant: Class 75. (1) For the purposes of subsection 12(2) of the Act, the federal skilled worker class is hereby prescribed as a class of persons who are skilled workers and who may become permanent residents on the basis of their ability to become economically established in Canada and who intend to reside in a province other than the Province of Quebec. Selection criteria 76. (1) For the purpose of determining whether a skilled worker, as a member of the federal skilled worker class, will be able to become economically established in Canada, they must be assessed on the basis of the following criteria: (a) the skilled worker must be awarded not less than the minimum number of required points referred to in subsection (2) on the basis of the following factors, namely, (i) education, in accordance with section 78, (ii) proficiency in the official languages of Canada, in accordance with section 79, (iii) experience, in accordance with section 80, (iv) age, in accordance with section 81, (v) arranged employment, in accordance with section 82, and (vi) adaptability, in accordance with section 83; Adaptability (10 points) 83. (1) A maximum of 10 points for adaptability shall be awarded to a skilled worker on the basis of any combination of the following elements: [...] (d) for being related to a person living in Canada who is described in subsection (5), 5 points; and Noor v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) André F.J. Scott J. 305

[...] Family relationships in Canada 83. (5) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(d), a skilled worker shall be awarded 5 points if (a) the skilled worker or the skilled worker’s accompanying spouse or accompanying common-law partner is related by blood, marriage, common-law partnership or adoption to a person who is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident living in Canada and who is (i) their father or mother, (ii) the father or mother of their father or mother, (iii) their child, (iv) a child of their child, (v) a child of their father or mother, (vi) a child of the father or mother of their father or mother, other than their father or mother, or (vii) a child of the child of their father or mother; or (b) the skilled worker has a spouse or common-law partner who is not accompanying the skilled worker and is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident living in Canada. Catégorie 75. (1) Pour l’application du paragraphe 12(2) de la Loi, la catégorie des travailleurs qualifiés (fédéral) est une catégorie réglementaire de personnes qui peuvent devenir résidents permanents du fait de leur capacité a` réussir leur etablissement´ economique´ au Canada, qui sont des travailleurs qualifiés et qui cherchent a` s’établir dans une province autre que le Québec. Critères de sélection 76. (1) Les critères ci-après indiquent que le travailleur qualifié peut réussir son etablissement´ economique´ au Canada a` titre de membre de la catégorie des travailleurs qualifiés (fédéral): a) le travailleur qualifié accumule le nombre minimum de points visé au paragraphe (2), au titre des facteurs suivants: (i) les etudes,´ aux termes de l’article 78, (ii) la compétence dans les langues officielles du Canada, aux termes de l’article 79, (iii) l’expérience, aux termes de l’article 80, (iv) l’âge, aux termes de l’article 81, 306 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

(v) l’exercice d’un emploi réservé, aux termes de l’article 82, (vi) la capacité d’adaptation, aux termes de l’article 83; Capacité d’adaptation (10 points) 83. (1) Un maximum de 10 points d’appréciation sont attribués au travailleur qualifié au titre de la capacité d’adaptation pour toute combinaison des el´´ ements ci-après, selon le nombre indiqué: [...] d) pour la présence au Canada de l’une ou l’autre des personnes visées au paragraphe (5), 5 points; [...] Parenté au Canada 83. (5) Pour l’application de l’alinéa (1)d), le travailleur qualifié ob- tient 5 points dans les cas suivants: a) l’une des personnes ci-après qui est un citoyen canadien ou un résident permanent et qui vit au Canada lui est unie par les liens du sang ou de l’adoption ou par mariage ou union de fait ou, dans le cas où il l’accompagne, est ainsi unie a` son epoux´ ou conjoint de fait: (i) l’un de leurs parents, (ii) l’un des parents de leurs parents, (iii) leur enfant, (iv) un enfant de leur enfant, (v) un enfant de l’un de leurs parents, (vi) un enfant de l’un des parents de l’un de leurs parents, autre que l’un de leurs parents, (vii) un enfant de l’enfant de l’un de leurs parents; b) son epoux´ ou conjoint de fait ne l’accompagne pas et est citoyen canadien ou un résident permanent qui vit au Canada.

IV. Issues and Standard of Review 14 This application for judicial review raises the following issues: A. Did the Immigration Program Manager fetter his discretion by failing to consider the Applicant’s evidence of his sister’s residency in Canada, and by upholding the Immigration Officer’s decision to refuse his application for permanent residency without considering this evidence? Noor v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) Andr´e F.J. Scott J. 307

B. In the unique circumstances of this case, were the Applicant’s rights to procedural fairness breached in that he was not given an opportunity to provide evidence of his sister’s residency in Can- ada, given that the Visa Office had recently modified its requirement in this regard? 15 The parties agree that the first issue is subject to a standard of review of reasonableness, following New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9 (S.C.C.), para 47. The Applicant notes that s18.1(4)(d) of the Federal Courts Act allows for the Court’s intervention where the decision-maker has made a finding of fact without regard to the evidence before it, and cites Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1998), 157 F.T.R. 35 (Fed. T.D.), paras 17 and 27, and Risco-Flores v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immi- gration), 2004 FC 1412 (F.C.), para. 6. 16 The second issue, being one of procedural fairness, is subject to the standard of correctness. The Applicant cites in support Lak v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2007 FC 350 (F.C.), and Jonas v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2006 FC 398 (F.C.), para 9, for the proposition that a breach of procedural fairness must, in and of itself, quash a decision even if the outcome may have been the same without the breach.

V. Analysis A. Did the Immigration Program Manager unreasonably fetter his discretion? 17 The Applicant notes firstly that the Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, and the CIC Overseas Processing Manual, OP6: Federal Skilled Workers and its instruction guide, Application for Per- manent Residence, Federal Skilled Workers Class, are all silent on what evidence is required to prove that a close relation resides in Canada. The only place where the documentation requirements are set out is in the online Visa Office-Specific Instructions for New Delhi. 18 The Applicant notes that if he had been able to prove that his sister resides in Canada, he would have received five (5) points in the Adapta- bility category. This would have brought his total to 69 points, and he would have been eligible to receive permanent residence. The documents regarding his sister’s residency were therefore very important to his case, and should have been considered upon the reconsideration of the application. The Applicant notes that in his reconsideration request, he ex- 308 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

plained why he had not been aware of the changes in the documentation requirements (i.e. the recent nature of the changes and the lack of public- ity of the change), and included new documents that, according to the 04- 2009 Kit, should have been sufficient to prove his sister’s residency. 19 The Applicant submits that the Immigration Program Manager had the jurisdiction to consider this new ‘evidence’, and that he failed to exercise his jurisdiction in ignoring the evidence. The Applicant cites the decision, which states “[the] documents on the file, which I have examined, include nothing to demonstrate residency in Canada”. While this did not rise to the level of functus officio, as the Manager did reconsider the file, he therefore either refused to consider the new evidence, or erred by failing to consider it. The Applicant submits that the officer had the jurisdiction to consider the new evidence, and cites Chan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1996] 3 F.C. 349 (Fed. T.D.), para 28, where Justice Cullen wrote: I think that the Visa Officer has jurisdiction to reconsider his decision, particularly when new information comes to light. [...] If the new information was persuasive, I have little doubt that the Visa Of- ficer would have jurisdiction to issue a new decision, granting a visa. 20 Justice Reed held at para 24: “It is clear that Immigration Officers and Visa Officers, as a matter of practice, often reconsider their decisions on the basis of new evidence”. The Applicant further relies on Kurukkal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2009 FC 695 (F.C.), in which an Immigration Officer had refused to reconsider a negative decision following an applicant’s submission of a death certificate for his late wife, after receiving a negative decision based on the failure to provide this document when asked to do so by the Officer. At paragraph 71 of the decision, after canvassing the jurisprudence, Madam Justice Mactavish held: It does not, however, follow from this that an officer can never consider additional information provided by an applicant after the initial H&C decision has been made. Rather, these cases simply stand for the proposition that there is no obligation on an Immigration Of- ficer...to go back to an applicant in an effort to ferret out additional information supporting the application, when that information has not been provided by the applicant him- or herself. 21 The Applicant argues that the reasoning in Kurukkal was adopted in the Federal Skilled Workers permanent residence context in Malik v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2009 FC 1283 (F.C.), at para 41. The Applicant argues that the Manager therefore not only had Noor v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) Andr´e F.J. Scott J. 309

the jurisdiction to consider the new evidence, but the duty to do so, as a serious issue was at stake. The Applicant cites Cepeda-Gutierrez, above, at para 17: [The] more important the evidence that is not mentioned specifically and analyzed in the agency’s reasons, the more willing a court may be to infer from the silence that the agency made an erroneous finding of fact ‘without regard to the evidence’. 22 In the Applicant’s further memorandum, he addresses the Federal Court of Appeal’s conclusions on Kurukkal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FCA 230 (F.C.A.), where it was held that Visa Officers do in fact have the discretion to reconsider a decision, and functus officio does not apply. The Applicant reiterates that the Man- ager failed to exercise this discretion by refusing to consider the new evidence, and was therefore not responsive to the actual reconsideration request. The Applicant notes that the request clearly explained the Appli- cant’s situation and included the new documentation, and notes that the Manager considered only the file as it existed at the time of the original submissions, which was an exercise in futility as the Applicant stated outright in his request that the documents had not been submitted before. 23 The Applicant notes that Mr. Manicom stated in cross-examination that the changes to the instruction kit were not publicized in any manner (transcript p 15). He also stated that he felt that his jurisdiction was con- fined to reviewing the original materials (pp 7-8), and found that there was “no reason to consider new documents” as the “case was completed” (pp 12-13). He explicitly foreclosed the possibility of considering documents submitted after a decision had been rendered, on the basis of his estimation that the “visa processing system overseas would no longer be functional” if late documents were accepted (p 13). The Applicant argues that the Manager’s discretion was rendered meaningless, as he was of the opinion that new documents should not be considered in the context of a reconsideration request (p 9). The Applicant reiterates the decisions of Chan, Nouranidoust v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) [1999 CarswellNat 1369 (Fed. T.D.)], Kurukkal, and Malik. The Appli- cant cites paragraph 23 of Nouranidoust: The Immigration Officer undertook a reconsideration of the applicant’s application for landing but, for whatever reason, ignored the new evidence that had been presented as the basis for the reconsideration request. As such, the decision should be set aside unless the Immigration Office had no authority to undertake the reconsideration. 310 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

24 The Respondent counters that the Manager did not fail to exercise his discretion to reconsider, and that he did in fact reconsider the file, but found no breach of procedural fairness in arriving at the original decision to deny the application, and therefore refused to reopen the original file. The Respondent also cites Kurukkal and Malik. 25 The Respondent cites paragraph 5 of the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Kurukkal, and argues that the decision-maker’s obligation is to consider, in all relevant circumstances, whether to exercise the discretion to reconsider. The Respondent argues that this was done in this case, and that the Manager decided that the case did not warrant reopening the file. It was the Applicant’s responsibility to include the required documents, and he failed to do so. His remedy would therefore be to make a new application for permanent residence. 26 In Kurukkal, Madam Justice Layden-Stevenson held at para. 5: The judge directed the immigration officer to consider the new evidence and to decide what, if any, weight should be attributed to it. In our view, that direction was improper. While the judge correctly concluded that the principle of functus officio does not bar a reconsideration of the negative section 25 determination, the immigration officer’s obligation, at this stage, is to consider, taking into account all relevant circumstances, whether to exercise the discretion to reconsider. 27 A close reading of the cases cited by the Applicant (Malik, Kurukkal, Nouranidoust) reveals that the issue raised was to determine whether once the original decision had been made, the reviewing officer was functus officio and could not accept any new evidence or even reconsider the decision at all. The cases all held that the reviewing officer was not functus officio, this Court does not agree with the Applicant’s proposition, especially in light of the above-cited paragraph from Madam Justice Layden-Stevenson’s judgment, that the Manager was under a legal obligation to do anything other than exercise his discretion whether to reopen the case or not. Since the Manager did in fact consider this, found that there was no error caused by the Visa Office (as the Applicant had used an older kit though the new one had been online for five (5) months before his full application was submitted) and decided not to reopen the file he exercised his discretion. Kurukkal holds that there is no a duty on the reviewing Officer to consider any new evidence, as long as the Of- ficer does in fact make a discretionary decision on whether to reopen the case or not. Noor v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) Andr´e F.J. Scott J. 311

28 The Malik case was similar to the present one, where an applicant had submitted inadequate documentation to prove a relative’s Canadian residency. In Malik, the letter sent to the applicant was more explicit regarding the documents required (a list was provided, rather than a direction to a website). Justice Mainville found that there was no evidence that the applicant had submitted new documentation along with his request for reconsideration, but left open the possibility that if this had occurred, the reviewing Officer should have considered the new documents (para 45). He also encouraged, though he could not order, the respondent to reconsider the application again following the judgment, as the applicant had submitted the documents in the judicial review proceeding (para 49). He explicitly made his conclusions subject to the (at the time) forthcoming Court of Appeal decision in Kurukkal. 29 It is therefore our conclusion that the Officer did not actually fetter his discretion, as he did make the decision not to reopen the file, after finding that no error had been made by the original Officer. This Court cannot find any legal obligation on him to consider evidence submitted after the decision, as per Kurukkal. While the Court agrees that he had the jurisdiction to consider the new evidence, it also finds that there was no duty to do so.

B. Was there a breach of procedural fairness? 30 The Applicant notes that his own failure to submit the correct documents on his original application resulted from the very recent changes to the Visa Office-Specific Instructions posted online. He notes that this was a dramatic and important change, not widely publicized but rather buried in an otherwise unmodified instruction kit. He further points out that the Visa Officer was clearly aware that he was using the old kit, as he attached a copy of its checklist with his application, but that rather than give him the opportunity to correct his application, his application was rejected. The Applicant acknowledges that the Visa Officer may not always be under an obligation to inform an applicant of the deficiencies of his application, but argues that in the unique circumstances of this case, procedural fairness required that he be given some kind of opportunity to provide the missing documents, in view of the recent modification, which was only ascertainable by reading the extra bullet point. The Applicant notes the Officer’s explanation that the refusal to rectify his file came about because of the “reasonable expectation” that he check the new instructions, but argues that this was in fact unreasonable in the circumstances of this case. 312 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

31 The Applicant notes that there is no duty of fairness case that is directly on point. However, he cites from Athar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2007 FC 177 (F.C.), which canvassed jurisprudence on cases involving permanent residence applicants facing credibility concerns at hearings, and whether they should be informed of the deficiencies of their applications. At para. 17 of Athar: [There] may still be a duty on the part of a Visa Officer, in certain situations, to provide an applicant with the opportunity to respond to his or her concerns, in accordance with the rules of procedural fairness. 32 Athar also cites Hassani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immi- gration), 2006 FC 1283 (F.C.), where Justice Mosley wrote: [It] is clear that where a concern arises directly from the requirements of the legislation or related regulations, a Visa Office will not be under a duty to provide an opportunity for the applicant to address his or her concerns. Where however the issue is not one that arises in this context, such a duty may arise. 33 The Applicant argues that the requirements in this case did not arise from the Act or the regulations, which do not lay out any documentation requirements, but rather from a change in a specific policy. It would have been easy to give the Applicant the opportunity to rectify his application, especially as the Visa Officer was aware that he used the incorrect kit, and this would have satisfied the duty of fairness in the unique circumstances of this case. 34 The Respondent counters that in the Visa Officer decisions, the content of the duty of fairness when determining visa applications has been held to be towards the lower end of the range, as per Patel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2002 FCA 55 (Fed. C.A.), para 10, and Malik, para 29. Given that the Applicant must establish certain criteria to succeed in his application, the Respondent argues that the Ap- plicant should assume that the Visa Officer’s concerns will arise directly from the Act and the regulations, and the onus remains on him to provide the correct documentation. Here, the Applicant was asked to submit a full application, including the documents listed in the Visa Office-Spe- cific Instructions. The Respondent argues that the Applicant was specifically directed to use the 04-2009 Kit, and that this was available five (5) months prior to the submission of his full application. 35 The Applicant is correct in pointing out that the documentation requirements are not set out in the Act or the regulations, but only in the Noor v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) Andr´e F.J. Scott J. 313

online instruction kit. While this Court did not find that Malik and Nouranidoust could support the Applicant’s first issue, the comments made by the judges in those cases (advising that new documentation ought to be allowed in certain cases) is persuasive in the context of the duty of fairness owed to someone in the Applicant’s distinct situation. It was clear to the Visa Officer that the Applicant was using the older kit, which had recently been changed, yet he was afforded no opportunity to rectify this simple error. Furthermore, the Respondent is incorrect in stating that the Applicant was specifically advised to use the 04-2009 Kit. The letter sent to the Applicant on July 28 (found as Exhibit B to the Applicant’s affidavit, Applicant’s Record p 31) simply directs him to the CIC website for “Visa office-specific forms and a list of supporting documents require by the Visa office”. There is no specific indication at all that these requirements would have changed. 36 The Applicant clearly stated in his request for reconsideration that he had used the old instruction kit. The Court finds that this should have been clear to the Officer making the initial decision, as a copy of the kit’s checklist was attached. Even with a low duty of fairness, in the specific circumstances of this case, that duty required the Visa Officer to consider the new documents.

Judgment THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the Application for judicial review is allowed and the matter is remitted to an immigration officer for reconsideration. There is no general question to certify. Application granted. 314 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

[Indexed as: Javier Luna v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)] Francisco Javier Luna (a.k.a. Francisco Javie Luna), Applicant and The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent Federal Court Docket: IMM-2982-10 2011 FC 320 James W. O’Reilly J. Heard: January 18, 2011 Judgment: March 17, 2011 Immigration and citizenship –––– Refugee protection — Elements of protected refugee status — Protection of country of nationality — Sufficiency of state protection –––– Applicant was citizen of Mexico in city where drug cartels and affiliated gangs were prevalent and violent — Applicant anonymously reported drug trafficking which regularly occurred outside of bar where he was employed — Applicant went to visit sister in Canada shortly after incident and while he was away, number of drug traffickers were arrested — Applicant was informed that member of notoriously violent cartel had been trying to locate him; applicant believed they would harm him if he returned to Mexico — Appli- cant applied for refugee status; application was dismissed on basis that applicant had access to adequate state protection — Applicant applied for judicial review — Application granted — Board committed errors that rendered decision unreasonable and warranted intervention — Board made factual errors which caused it to overlook evidence particular to applicant’s home city and capacity of Mexican authorities to provide protection to citizens targeted by specific cartel that had threatened applicant — Board’s analysis did not address applicant’s particular circumstances and failed to refer to relevant evidence — Board failed to discharge specific claim before it — Matter referred back to Board to be determined by different panel. Cases considered by James W. O’Reilly J.: Medina v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2008), 2008 FC 728, 2008 CF 728, 2008 CarswellNat 3892, 2008 CarswellNat 1932 (F.C.) — referred to Orozco Velasquez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2010), 2010 CarswellNat 5214, 2010 CF 1201, 2010 FC 1201, 2010 CarswellNat 4583 (F.C.) — referred to Javier Luna v. Canada (MCI) James W. O’Reilly J. 315

Velasco Moreno v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2010), 92 Imm. L.R. (3d) 119, 2010 CarswellNat 3684, 2010 FC 993 (F.C.) — referred to

APPLICATION for judicial review of decision of Immigration and Refugee Board dismissing applicant’s claim for refugee protection on basis that state protection was available to him.

Patricia Wells, for Applicant Tamrat Geheyehu, for Respondent

James W. O’Reilly J.: I. Overview 1 Mr. Francisco Javier Luna fled Mexico in 2008 and sought refugee protection in Canada on the basis that he feared reprisals from drug cartels at home. He had called authorities to report on drug trafficking taking place outside the bar where he worked. After he left Mexico to visit his sister in Canada, some drug dealers were arrested. He claims that they will harm him if he returns. 2 A panel of the Immigration and Refugee Board dismissed Mr. Luna’s claim on the basis that he had not shown that state protection was unavailable to him in Mexico. Mr. Luna argues that the Board made factual errors and overlooked important evidence that was relevant to the issue of state protection. He asks me to overturn the Board’s decision and order a new hearing before a different panel. I agree that the Board made a reviewable error in its treatment of the issue of state protection and will, therefore, allow this application for judicial review.

II. Factual Background 3 Mr. Luna worked at a bar in Ciudad Juarez, where drug cartels and affiliated gangs are prevalent and violent. One member of the Juarez Car- tel, Sergio Castro, suspected Mr. Luna of providing information to authorities about the cartel’s members and activities. In fact, before leaving Mexico, Mr. Luna made an anonymous call to authorities in which he described drug trafficking at the bar where he worked. The army apparently acted on that information and arrested a number of drug dealers. Later, Mr. Luna learned that Mr. Castro was looking for him. He fears that Mr. Castro will harm him if he returns. 316 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

III. The Board’s Decision 4 According to the Board, the main issue arising from Mr. Luna’s claim was state protection. However, before analyzing that issue, the Board made two clear factual errors. First, it stated that Mr. Luna was from Ciudad Jujuzi in the state of Chiguaga, instead of Ciudad Juarez in the state of Chihuahua. Second, it stated that Mr. Luna feared only the Azte- cas Cartel. Mr. Luna had referred to both the Aztecas gang and the Jua- rez Cartel in his evidence. The Board did not mention the Juarez Cartel in its reasons. 5 The Board went on to discuss the circumstances in Mexico generally. It mentioned that Mexico: • is a democracy (which increases the evidentiary burden on a claimant to show a lack of state protection); • is in control of its territory; • has security forces and makes serious efforts to fight crime, including drug trafficking, and corruption; and • has problems with crime, corruption and inefficiency, but is attempting to address these problems. 6 The Board also noted that Mr. Luna’s anonymous phone call sparked a response by Mexican authorities, showing that state protection is, in fact, forthcoming on request.

IV. Did the Board Err on the Issue of State Protection? 7 Mr. Luna argues that the Board made serious factual errors and overlooked important evidence in its analysis of state protection. As these two submissions are related, I will deal with them together. 8 The Board did not correctly identify the location where Mr. Luna lived, nor the proper agent of persecution. The latter is not as egregious an error as the former, given that Mr. Luna had mentioned the Aztecas gang in his testimony and it was associated with the primary organization he feared — the Juarez Cartel. 9 Still, in the circumstances of this case, the Board’s errors caused it to overlook evidence particular to Ciudad Juarez and the capacity of Mexi- can authorities to provide protection to citizens targeted by the Juarez Cartel for reprisals. Instead, the Board relied primarily on evidence of a general nature about state institutions in Mexico and examples of sincere efforts on Mexico’s part to deal with its crime and corruption difficulties. There was only one example of state action relevant to Mr. Luna’s cir- Javier Luna v. Canada (MCI) James W. O’Reilly J. 317

cumstances — the reaction to his anonymous phone call. But that evidence was of little assistance in deciding whether state officials could offer protection to a person suspected by a drug cartel of being an informant. 10 Accordingly, the Board’s analysis did not address Mr. Luna’s particular circumstances — where he lived, whom he feared or what state appa- ratus was available to him in that location against that particular agent of persecution. As such, the Board failed to refer to the evidence before it that was relevant to those subjects. As a result, the Board failed to discharge its obligation to address the specific claim before it: Medina v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2008 FC 728 (F.C.); Velasco Moreno v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FC 993 (F.C.); Orozco Velasquez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FC 1201 (F.C.). 11 In my view, the Board’s decision was unreasonable. It did not fall within the range of possible, defensible outcomes based on the law and the facts before it.

V. Conclusion and Disposition 12 By failing to analyze Mr. Luna’s particular circumstances, the Board’s analysis of state protection was flawed, and its conclusion was unreasonable. Therefore, I must allow this application for judicial review. Neither party proposed a question for certification, and none is stated.

Judgment THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that: 1. This application for judicial review is granted. The matter is referred back to the Board for a new hearing before a different panel. 2. No question of general importance is stated. Application granted. 318 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

[Indexed as: Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. Dhaliwal] The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Applicant and Rajwant Singh Dhaliwal, Respondent Federal Court Docket: IMM-4982-10 2011 FC 252 Michael L. Phelan J. Heard: February 25, 2011 Judgment: March 2, 2011 Immigration and citizenship –––– Enforcement — Arrest and detention — Detention review — General principles –––– Respondent was citizen of India living in Canada with common-law spouse and children — Respondent had long history of deceit and misrepresentation of his identity with immigration officials — Canada Border Services Agency received anonymous information about respondent’s identity; when confronted, respondent claimed he would defy law in order to remain in Canada and would resist removal — Respondent was arrested — Respondent was released with terms; respondent failed to attend admissibility hearing — Respondent was arrested for obtaining and using false documents; tribunal of Immigration and Refugee Board ordered respondent’s release from detention due to minimal risk of flight — Applicant brought application for judicial review — Application granted — Respondent’s strength of intention to remain in Canada was not evidence of likelihood of compliance — Tribunal failed to consider respondent’s admissions that he would break law to stay in Canada and would not report to removal to India if so ordered — Tribu- nal erred in failing to consider critical evidence of respondent’s past words and behaviour and consequently rendered unreasonable decision — Decision to release quashed. Immigration and citizenship –––– Enforcement — Arrest and detention — Grounds — Miscellaneous grounds –––– Respondent was citizen of India living in Canada with common-law spouse and children — Respondent had long history of deceit and misrepresentation of his identity with immigration officials — Canada Border Services Agency received anonymous information about respondent’s identity; when confronted, respondent claimed he would defy law in order to remain in Canada and would resist removal — Respondent was arrested — Respondent was released with terms; respondent failed to attend admissibility hearing — Respondent was arrested for obtaining and using false documents; tribunal of Immigration and Refugee Board ordered respondent’s re- Canada (MCI) v. Dhaliwal Michael L. Phelan J. 319

lease from detention due to minimal risk of flight — Applicant brought application for judicial review — Application granted — Respondent’s strength of intention to remain in Canada was not evidence of likelihood of compliance — Tribunal failed to consider respondent’s admissions that he would break law to stay in Canada and would not report to removal to India if so ordered — Tribu- nal erred in failing to consider critical evidence of respondent’s past words and behaviour and consequently rendered unreasonable decision — Decision to release quashed. Cases considered by Michael L. Phelan J.: Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1998), 157 F.T.R. 35, 1998 CarswellNat 1981, [1998] A.C.F. No. 1425, [1998] F.C.J. No. 1425 (Fed. T.D.) — referred to Walker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2010), 2010 FC 392, 2010 CarswellNat 1050, 2010 CarswellNat 2161, 2010 CF 392, 89 Imm. L.R. (3d) 151, 210 C.R.R. (2d) 79 (F.C.) — followed Statutes considered: Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 s. 58(1) — considered Regulations considered: Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 s. 244(a) — considered s. 245 — considered

APPLICATION for judicial review of decision of Immigration and Refugee Board ordering release of respondent from detention subject to terms.

Ms Marjan Double, for Applicant Mr. Jasdeep S. Mattoo, for Respondent

Michael L. Phelan J.: I. Introduction 1 The matter under judicial review is a decision of a member of the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (Tribunal) dated August 12, 2010 to order the Respondent released from detention upon terms principally of the obligation to report to CBSA every two weeks. 320 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

II. Background 2 The Respondent is a citizen of India who over the last 15 years has had a checkered immigration history of misrepresentation and deceit. He is currently living in Canada with his common-law spouse and two children. 3 His immigration history included lying about his relationship with his common-law wife and her first husband — his uncle; fraudulently obtaining a school certificate and passport by using a false name; obtaining a work visa under his false name and continuing to use his false passport and work permit. 4 Finally, in March 2010, the CBSA, as a result of an anonymous “tip”, was informed of the Respondent’s true identity. 5 Before the CBSA investigation was completed, the Respondent’s common-law wife filed a spousal sponsored permanent resident application under the Respondent’s false name. 6 When confronted by CBSA with the truth of his identity, the Respon- dent continued to lie until he finally conceded his false identity. At that time the Respondent informed CBSA that (a) he had no fear of returning to India (he had been there a few months before); (b) he would defy Canadian law so as to remain in Canada; and (c) he would resist removal. He was arrested on June 15, 2010. 7 A s. 44 inadmissibility report was issued and at a hearing on June 17, 2010, the admissibility issue was put over to August 9, 2010. The Re- spondent was released upon terms. He was ordered to attend the August 9, 2010 hearing. 8 On the Friday before the August 9 admissibility hearing, the Respon- dent filed a refugee claim. The effect of a refugee claim is to render an admissibility determination moot. 9 The Respondent failed to attend the admissibility hearing. 10 The next day, August 10, 2010, the Respondent was arrested at home. The grounds of arrest were the obtaining and use of fraudulent documents. At the detention hearing that day the Tribunal granted release and in so doing noted the following key points: • obtaining and using false documents; • strong motivation to stay in Canada; • attendance at a June 15 interview and absence of any removal order; Canada (MCI) v. Dhaliwal Michael L. Phelan J. 321

• failure to appear at the August 9 hearing was unimportant due to mootness. 11 As a result, the Tribunal ordered the Respondent’s release from detention because the risk of flight was minimal.

III. Legal Analysis 12 Section 58(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act governs the release and detention of persons: 58. (1) The Immigration Division shall order the release of a permanent resident or a foreign national unless it is satisfied, taking into account prescribed factors, that (a) they are a danger to the public; (b) they are unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility hearing, removal from Canada, or at a proceeding that could lead to the making of a removal order by the Minister under subsection 44(2); (c) the Minister is taking necessary steps to inquire into a reasonable suspicion that they are inadmissible on grounds of security or for violating human or international rights; or (d) the Minister is of the opinion that the identity of the foreign national has not been, but may be, established and they have not reasonably cooperated with the Minister by providing relevant information for the purpose of establishing their identity or the Minister is making reasonable efforts to establish their identity. 58. (1) La section prononce la mise en liberté du résident permanent ou de l’étranger, sauf sur preuve, compte tenu des critères régle- mentaires, de tel des faits suivants: a) le résident permanent ou l’étranger constitue un danger pour la sécurité publique; b) le résident permanent ou l’étranger se soustraira vraisemblablement au contrôle, a` l’enquête ou au renvoi, ou a` la procé- dure pouvant mener a` la prise par le ministre d’une mesure de renvoi en vertu du paragraphe 44(2); c) le ministre prend les mesures voulues pour enquêter sur les motifs raisonnables de soup¸conner que le résident permanent ou l’étranger est interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux; d) dans le cas où le ministre estime que l’identité de l’étranger n’a pas et´´ e prouvée mais peut l’être, soit l’étranger n’a pas 322 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

raisonnablement coopéré en fournissant au ministre des renseignements utiles a` cette fin, soit ce dernier fait des efforts valables pour etablir´ l’identité de l’étranger. 13 Section 244(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regula- tions establishes the factors referred to in s. 58(1) relevant to this matter: 244. (a) is unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility hearing, removal from Canada, or at a proceeding that could lead to the making of a removal order by the Minister under subsection 44(2) of the Act; 244. a) du risque que l’intéressé se soustraie vraisemblablement au contrôle, a` l’enquête, au renvoi ou a` une procédure pouvant mener a` la prise, par le ministre, d’une mesure de renvoi en vertu du paragraphe 44(2) de la Loi; Section 245 lists the factors to be considered: 245. For the purposes of paragraph 244(a), the factors are the following: (a) being a fugitive from justice in a foreign jurisdiction in relation to an offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament; (b) voluntary compliance with any previous departure order; (c) voluntary compliance with any previously required appear- ance at an immigration or criminal proceeding; (d) previous compliance with any conditions imposed in respect of entry, release or a stay of removal; (e) any previous avoidance of examination or escape from cus- tody, or any previous attempt to do so; (f) involvement with a people smuggling or trafficking in persons operation that would likely lead the person to not appear for a measure referred to in paragraph 244(a) or to be vulner- able to being influenced or coerced by an organization involved in such an operation to not appear for such a measure; and (g) the existence of strong ties to a community in Canada. 245. Pour l’application de l’alinéa 244a), les critères sont les suivants: a) la qualité de fugitif a` l’égard de la justice d’un pays etranger´ quant a` une infraction qui, si elle etait´ commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction a` une loi fédérale; Canada (MCI) v. Dhaliwal Michael L. Phelan J. 323

b) le fait de s’être conformé librement a` une mesure d’interdiction de séjour; c) le fait de s’être conformé librement a` l’obligation de com- paraˆıtre lors d’une instance en immigration ou d’une instance criminelle; d) le fait de s’être conformé aux conditions imposées a` l’égard de son entrée, de sa mise en liberté ou du sursis a` son renvoi; e) le fait de s’être dérobé au contrôle ou de s’être evad´´ e d’un lieu de détention, ou toute tentative a` cet egard;´ f) l’implication dans des opérations de passage de clandestins ou de trafic de personnes qui mènerait vraisemblablement l’intéressé a` se soustraire aux mesures visées a` l’alinéa 244a) ou le rendrait susceptible d’être incité ou forcé de s’y soustraire par une organisation se livrant a` de telles opérations; g) l’appartenance réelle a` une collectivité au Canada. 14 The standard of review for detention hearings was confirmed in Walker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FC 392 (F.C.), as reasonableness with deference owed in so far as the decisions are fact-based. 25 The Immigration Division’s analysis is central to its role as a trier of fact. As such, the Division’s findings are to be given significant deference by the reviewing Court. The Division’s findings should stand unless its reasoning process was flawed and the resulting decision falls outside the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law: Dunsmuir, above, at para. 47. 26 In a case such as this one, there might be more than one reasonable outcome. However, as long as the process adopted by the Immi- gration Division and its outcome fits comfortably with the principles of justification, transparency and intelligibility, it is not open to a reviewing court to substitute its own view of a preferable outcome: Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] S.C.J. No. 12, at para. 59. 15 The issue in this case is the reasonableness of the determination that the Respondent does not present a flight risk — that he is not a person who will not attend immigration proceedings or otherwise comply with immigration orders. The Respondent’s long standing use of deceit is only relevant to the extent that it touches upon his likelihood of such non- compliance. Also not relevant to that risk analysis is his late filing of a 324 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

refugee claim except to confirm the obvious, and what he has stated, that he intends to stay in Canada by any means — fair or foul. 16 However, the strength of the intention to stay in Canada is not evidence of likelihood of compliance. The desire to stay in Canada must be a given (otherwise the Respondent would leave and render proceedings moot) but it also provides a powerful motive to avoid any immigration proceeding which can lead to or does result in removal. The Tribunal’s reliance on this factor as assurance of attendance is misplaced. 17 There are a number of problems with the Tribunal’s decision; however, the most fundamental was the Tribunal’s failure to consider the Re- spondent’s admissions that he would break the law to stay in Canada and that he would not report to removal to India if so ordered. There is not one word about this evidence nor is there any evidence to suggest that either he did not say what was reported or that it was taken out of context. 18 These admissions are important here given the background of the Re- spondent’s past efforts to avoid compliance with Canadian law from the use of false identities, uttering misrepresentations and false documents, to non-attendance at immigration proceedings. It is no answer to assume (because no evidence was led) that the Respondent did not appear because the August 9 hearing would not proceed. 19 The greater the importance of the evidence, the greater the obligation of a decision maker to address that evidence (Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1998), 157 F.T.R. 35 (Fed. T.D.)). Relevant to the issue of whether the Respondent would appear at subsequent immigration proceedings is not only his past behaviour but also his past words. Those words are consistent with his past behaviour. 20 Therefore, the Tribunal erred in failing to consider critical evidence and rendered an unreasonable decision.

IV. Conclusion 21 Therefore, this judicial review will be granted, and the decision to release is quashed. There is no need to refer the matter back as the issues of his flight risk may come again if the Respondent is arrested. 22 There is no question for certification. Canada (MCI) v. Dhaliwal Michael L. Phelan J. 325

Judgment THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the application for judicial review is granted, and the decision to release is quashed. Application granted. 326 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

[Indexed as: Martinez Munoz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)] Jenny Patricia Martinez Munoz, Robinson Barbosa Ceballos, Lizbeth Vanessa Tovar Martinez, Jocelin Barbosa Martinez, Applicants and Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent Federal Court Docket: IMM-4738-10 2011 FC 325 Douglas R. Campbell J. Heard: March 16, 2011 Judgment: March 17, 2011 Immigration and citizenship –––– Refugee protection — Elements of protected refugee status — Fear of persecution — Well-founded fear –––– Claimant operated avocado business and began to pay extortion money in Co- lombia — Few months later, because he was unable to make payments, claimant was severely beaten and lives of his family were threatened — Claimant and his family did not make report to authorities, and instead fled Colombia — Claim- ant and his family ultimately claimed refugee protection in Canada — Refugee protection division denied claim — Claimant brought application for judicial review — Application granted — Decision was set aside and matter was referred back for redetermination by differently constituted panel — Division failed to make determination to which claimant was entitled — Rather than appropriately determine whether claimant’s fear of reporting was “objectively unreasonable”, division offered opinion on different question — Division was prepared to reject claim for protection on failure to report — To have done so would have been to decide claim in reviewable error, as nature and quality of claimant’s reason for not reporting was not evaluated according to law. Cases considered by Douglas R. Campbell J.: Hinzman, Re (2007), 2007 CarswellNat 950, 2007 FCA 171, (sub nom. Hinzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)) 282 D.L.R. (4th) 413, 2007 CarswellNat 3596, 63 Imm. L.R. (3d) 13, 2007 CAF 171, (sub nom. Hinzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)) 362 N.R. 1, 61 Admin. L.R. (4th) 313, [2007] F.C.J. No. 584 (F.C.A.) — considered New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 372 N.R. 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Martinez Munoz v. Canada (MCI) Douglas R. Campbell J. 327

Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, D.T.E. 2008T-223, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, 2008 SCC 9, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9 (S.C.C.) — referred to

APPLICATION by claimant for judicial review of division’s decision denying claimant’s claim for refugee protection.

Howard P. Eisenberg, for Applicants Leanne Briscoe, for Respondent

Douglas R. Campbell J.:

1 The present Application concerns a Colombian family’s claim for refugee protection from the FARC in Colombia. The essence of the claim is that, in April 2004, the Applicant father operated a wholesale avocado business in Cali and, on its demand, began to pay extortion money to FARC. By December 2004, because he was unable to make the payments, he was severely beaten and the lives of his family were threatened. As a result, the family fled and ultimately claimed refugee protection in Canada on March 25, 2008. 2 The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denied the claim. It is important to note that no negative credibility finding was made with respect to the truth of the evidence offered in support of the claim. In denying the claim the RPD made the following findings: I am satisfied that the claimants failed to establish that for them state protection would be inadequate in Cali where they have lived in the past, or in the alternative that Bogota does not meet both requirements of a viable internal Flight Alternative (IFA). Hence, I reject the claims. Analysis: In Cali, the claimants made no attempt to seek the assistance of the authorities when extortion was demanded. Even after being beaten, the claimant did not make a report to the authorities in late 2004. The claimant testified that he did not make a report on the instruction of the FARC. He believed that if he went to the authorities, it would make the situation worse since the FARC would find out he had made a report. 328 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

I am not aware of reliable reports of businessmen who refused to pay extortion being harmed in Cali in late 2004 or past 2004. The Immigration and Refugee Board (the “Board”) has been unable to find evidence that persons have been harmed in large urban cities during this period. Academics have reported their opinion that FARC has such a capacity but even if that is the case, there is no reliable evidence that FARC has used this capacity to harm persons such as the claimant or their family in urban areas such as Cali when demands were not met if the victims used the assistance of the authorities. I note the facts of this case suggest the claimant’s father has had his truck stolen by guerrillas in 2005. As of the date of the hearing, this is the only incident reported by a member of the claimant’s family. The father still lives in Cali today. The theft of the truck was reported, however there was no mention that the father believed it was related to his son’s problems. There is no evidence the guerrillas retaliated as a result of the police report concerning the stolen truck. Since the claimant’s father made a report and is still able to reside in Cali, I am satisfied that the claimant’s fear of retaliation if he had taken similar action is not justified. As a result, I am satisfied the claimants failed to establish that for them state protection would have been inadequate if they had requested it in 2004 before leaving Colombia. In the alternative is Bogota a viable IFA due to the existence of adequate state protection today? I am satisfied this is the case. (Decision, paras. 13 to 24) 3 Thus, the Applicant father’s reason for not seeking state protection is the fear that somehow the information would get from the police to FARC. The test with respect the acceptance of this reason in the context of a claim for protection is stated in Hinzman, Re, 2007 FCA 171 (F.C.A.) at paragraph 57: Reading all these authorities together, a claimant coming from a democratic country will have a heavy burden when attempting to show that he should not have been required to exhaust all of the recourses available to him domestically before claiming refugee status. In view of the fact that the United States is a democracy that has adopted a comprehensive scheme to ensure those who object to military service are dealt with fairly, I conclude that the appellants have adduced insufficient support to satisfy this high threshold. Therefore, Martinez Munoz v. Canada (MCI) Douglas R. Campbell J. 329

I find that it was objectively unreasonable for the appellants to have failed to take significant steps to attempt to obtain protection in the United States before claiming refugee status in Canada. [Emphasis added] 4 I find that the RPD failed to make the determination to which the Applicant was entitled. Rather than appropriately determine whether the claimant’s fear of reporting was “objectively unreasonable”, the RPD offered an opinion on the different question: whether businessmen who refused to pay were harmed by FARC in Cali, or other large urban cities, in 2004. The fact that the Applicant’s father had no difficulty reporting the theft of the truck to the police is completely irrelevant: he was not reporting life-threatening extortion under fear of retaliation. It is clear from the reasons that the RPD was prepared to reject the claim for protection on the failure to report. I find that to have done so would be to decide the claim in reviewable error because the nature and quality of the Appli- cant’s reason for not reporting was not evaluated according to law as expressed in Hinzman, and, therefore, is not defensible (New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.), para. 47). Indeed, apparently to guard against such a possible outcome upon judicial review, the RPD went on to make an Internal Flight Alternative finding “in the alternative”. 5 During the course of the hearing of the present Application, I identi- fied the error to Counsel for the Applicant and Respondent, but nevertheless, requested argument on the alternative finding. Having thought the matter through, I have concluded that it was inappropriate to do so. In my opinion, if a central determination is reached in an RPD decision which has the potential of ending a claimant’s hope for obtaining protection, and that determination is found to be erroneous, regardless of the argued merit of any alternative finding, I believe that it is only fair to set such a decision aside. I find that this is the just result in the present case.

Order Accordingly, the decision under review is set aside and the matter is referred back for redetermination by a differently constituted panel. There is no question to certify. Application granted. 330 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

[Indexed as: Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. B004] The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Applicant and B004, Respondent Federal Court Docket: IMM-1177-11 2011 FC 331 Richard G. Mosley J. Heard: March 16, 2011 Judgment: March 17, 2011 Immigration and citizenship –––– Enforcement — Arrest and detention — Detention review — General principles –––– Respondent was citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Canada aboard ship transporting nearly five hundred people from Gulf of Thailand — In Sri Lanka, respondent was employed with several organizations in areas of country formerly controlled by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) — Respondent maintained social media page containing pro-LTTE videos and songs — Respondent assisted with navigation aboard ship in exchange for more comfortable accommodations for he and his wife — Re- spondent was detained upon arrival in Canada on ground that he posed danger to public — In detention review before member of Immigration and Refugee Board, board member found that respondent did not pose danger to public and released him on $5,000 bond with conditions that included reporting for admissibility hearing — Applicant Minister brought application seeking stay of decision — Application dismissed — Minister submitted insufficient evidence pointing to respondent’s involvement with LTTE in Sri Lanka and some evidence was presented by respondent demonstrating that such involvement was unlikely — Board member found that respondent did not represent any threat to public; as such, respondent could not be found to represent unacceptable risk to public — No evidence was submitted which showed that respondent was part of organization that arranged for voyage and there was no evidence that organizers and crew constituted criminal organization pursuant to s. 121(2) of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act — No evidence that respondent constituted present or future danger to public of Canada — Board member considered all relevant evidence and determined that bond was reasonable alternative to detention; there were no grounds on which to interfere with decision. Canada (MCI) v. B004 331

Cases considered by Richard G. Mosley J.: Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. B157 (2010), 2010 FC 1314, 2010 CarswellNat 5022, 2010 CarswellNat 5686, 2010 CF 1314 (F.C.) — distinguished Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. B386 (2011), 2011 Car- swellNat 1137, 2011 CF 140, 2011 FC 140, 2011 CarswellNat 314 (F.C.) — considered Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. Gill (2003), 2003 Car- swellNat 4422, 2003 CF 1398, 242 F.T.R. 126, 2003 CarswellNat 3918, 2003 FC 1398, 33 Imm. L.R. (3d) 204 (F.C.) — referred to Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. Thanabalasingham (2003), 2003 CarswellNat 4755, 2003 CF 1225, 2003 CarswellNat 3294, 2003 FC 1225, 32 Imm. L.R. (3d) 269, 241 F.T.R. 12, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 523, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1548 (F.C.) — considered Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. Thanabalasingham (2004), 2004 FCA 4, 2004 CarswellNat 22, 236 D.L.R. (4th) 329, 315 N.R. 91, 247 F.T.R. 159 (note), 10 Admin. L.R. (4th) 285, 38 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 572, 2004 CarswellNat 782, 2004 CAF 4, [2004] F.C.J. No. 15 (F.C.A.) — referred to Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. X (2010), 2010 CarswellNat 4201, 2010 FC 1095, 93 Imm. L.R. (3d) 209 (F.C.) — considered Canada (Minister of Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness) v. Karimi- Ashad (2010), 92 Imm. L.R. (3d) 32, 2010 CarswellNat 5080, 2010 CF 964, 373 F.T.R. 292 (Eng.), 2010 CarswellNat 3530, 2010 FC 964 (F.C.) — referred to New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 372 N.R. 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, D.T.E. 2008T-223, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, 2008 SCC 9, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9 (S.C.C.) — referred to Noor v. Canada (Employment Insurance Commission) (2000), 2000 Car- swellNat 782, [2000] F.C.J. No. 574 (Fed. C.A.) — referred to Sahin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1994), 30 Imm. L.R. (2d) 33, 1994 CarswellNat 1425, 1994 CarswellNat 1425F, [1995] 1 F.C. 214, 85 F.T.R. 99, 24 C.R.R. (2d) 276, [1994] F.C.J. No. 1534 (Fed. T.D.) — referred to Walker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2010), 2010 FC 392, 2010 CarswellNat 1050, 2010 CarswellNat 2161, 2010 CF 392, 89 Imm. L.R. (3d) 151, 210 C.R.R. (2d) 79 (F.C.) — referred to 332 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

Williams v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1997), 1997 Car- swellNat 430, 129 F.T.R. 240 (note), 1997 CarswellNat 2709, 212 N.R. 63, [1997] 2 F.C. 646, 4 Admin. L.R. (3d) 200, 147 D.L.R. (4th) 93, [1997] F.C.J. No. 393 (Fed. C.A.) — considered Williams v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1997), 150 D.L.R. (4th) viii (note), 224 N.R. 320 (note), [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 332 (S.C.C.) — referred to Statutes considered: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 Generally — referred to s. 7 — referred to Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 s. 58 — considered s. 58(1) — considered s. 72 — considered s. 121(2) “criminal organization” — referred to Rules considered: Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22 R. 21(2) — considered Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 R. 55 — considered Regulations considered: Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 Generally — referred to s. 244 — considered s. 245 — considered s. 246 — considered s. 246(b) — considered s. 246(c) — considered s. 248 — considered

APPLICATION by Minister of Citizenship and Immigration seeking stay of decision of Immigration and Refugee Board releasing respondent from immigration detention.

Helen Park, for Applicant Laura Best, for Respondent Canada (MCI) v. B004 Richard G. Mosley J. 333

Richard G. Mosley J.:

1 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration seeks a stay of the decision releasing the respondent from immigration detention made by Mem- ber Shaw-Dyck of the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Ref- ugee Board on February 18, 2011. An interim stay was ordered on consent on February 22, 2011 pending a full hearing on the merits of the motion. These proceedings are subject to a confidentiality order respect- ing the identity of the respondent issued on December 9, 2010. 2 The Minister also seeks an expedited decision on his application for leave and for judicial review of the Member’s release decision. The respondent does not consent to leave being granted but in the interests of obtaining a decision on all matters, and of judicial economy, the respondent agrees that the motion for a stay and the merits of the application should be heard together. 3 The record filed by the applicant contains, attached as an exhibit to an affidavit, a copy of all of the documents in the file maintained by the Immigration Division of the Board with respect to the respondent, including a transcript of the proceedings before Member Shaw- Dyck on February 18, 2011. 4 I am satisfied that the Court should dispense with the need to perfect the application for leave and judicial review, grant the leave application and dispense with the need for the tribunal and the parties to file further materials in this proceeding. In arriving at this conclusion I have considered s. 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (“IRPA”), Rule 55 of the Federal Courts Rules and Rule 21 (2) of the Federal Court Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, the records filed by both parties and the oral submissions of counsel for the parties at a hearing conducted by videoconference on Wednesday, March 16, 2011. Accordingly, I will deal with the merits of the application for judicial review in these reasons for judgment and judgment.

Background: 5 The respondent is a 33-year-old citizen of Sri Lanka. He was a crew member of the MV Sun Sea, a ship that transported 492 men, women and children from the Gulf of Thailand to Canada. His role was to assist with the navigation of the ship and to keep watch while the ship was at sea. In return, he was compensated by being assigned a berth for himself and his wife in the crew’s quarters. The respondent says that he was asked to 334 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

assume this role when the original crew abandoned the ship and the captain called for volunteers. He says that he was given a one day course in navigation by the captain. 6 In the proceedings before the Board, the respondent filed information about his employment with several foreign nongovernmental organizations in Sri Lanka, including in areas of the country formerly controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (“LTTE”). He also served as a driver for a doctor at a hospital in that region who is being investigated by the Sri Lankan government for involvement with the LTTE. There is evidence that the respondent maintained a Facebook account with pro- LTTE videos and songs and information received from other migrants that his computer studies in Malaysia were supported by the LTTE, an allegation which the respondent denies. 7 The respondent has been detained since his arrival in Canada on Au- gust 13, 2010. Initially, this was to establish his identity. That was confirmed without much difficulty as he had copies of his identity documents with him and the originals were forwarded by his family in Sri Lanka. His wife was released from detention on November 9, 2010 under conditions which require her to reside with the respondent’s cousin in Toronto. The cousin has also offered to serve as a bonds person for the respondent. Both the respondent and his wife owe substantial sums of money to the organizers of the Sun Sea voyage. 8 In the hearing before Member Shaw-Dyck on February 18, 2011, the Minister submitted that the respondent was a danger to the public, and that he would be unlikely to appear for his admissibility hearing. This required the Member to consider the factors set out in s. 58 of the IRPA and prescribed by sections 245, 246 and 248 of the Immigration and Ref- ugee Protection Regulations (“the IRP Regulations”).

Legislative Framework: 9 Subsection 58(1) of the IRPA states that permanent residents or foreign nationals who are detained shall be released unless certain of the below factors are established: 58. (1) The Immigration Division shall order the release of a permanent resident or a foreign national unless it is satisfied, taking into account prescribed factors, that (a) they are a danger to the public; (b) they are unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility hearing, removal from Canada, or at a proceeding that could Canada (MCI) v. B004 Richard G. Mosley J. 335

lead to the making of a removal order by the Minister under subsection 44(2); (c) the Minister is taking necessary steps to inquire into a reasonable suspicion that they are inadmissible on grounds of security or for violating human or international rights; or (d) the Minister is of the opinion that the identity of the foreign national has not been, but may be, established and they have not reasonably cooperated with the Minister by providing relevant information for the purpose of establishing their identity or the Minister is making reasonable efforts to establish their identity. 58. (1) La section prononce la mise en liberté du résident permanent ou de l’étranger, sauf sur preuve, compte tenu des critères régle- mentaires, de tel des faits suivants: a) le résident permanent ou l’étranger constitue un danger pour la sécurité publique; b) le résident permanent ou l’étranger se soustraira vraisemblablement au contrôle, a` l’enquête ou au renvoi, ou a` la procé- dure pouvant mener a` la prise par le ministre d’une mesure de renvoi en vertu du paragraphe 44(2); c) le ministre prend les mesures voulues pour enquêter sur les motifs raisonnables de soup¸conner que le résident permanent ou l’étranger est interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux; d) dans le cas où le ministre estime que l’identité de l’étranger n’a pas et´´ e prouvée mais peut l’être, soit l’étranger n’a pas raisonnablement coopéré en fournissant au ministre des renseignements utiles a` cette fin, soit ce dernier fait des efforts valables pour etablir´ l’identité de l’étranger. 10 Section 244 of the IRP Regulations says that: 244. For the purposes of Division 6 of Part 1 of the Act, the factors set out in this Part shall be taken into consideration when assessing whether a person (a) is unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility hearing, removal from Canada, or at a proceeding that could lead to the making of a removal order by the Minister under subsection 44(2) of the Act; (b) is a danger to the public; or (c) is a foreign national whose identity has not been established. 336 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

244. Pour l’application de la section 6 de la partie 1 de la Loi, les critères prévus a` la présente partie doivent etreˆ pris en compte lors de l’appréciation: a) du risque que l’intéressé se soustraie vraisemblablement au contrôle, a` l’enquête, au renvoi ou a` une procédure pouvant mener a` la prise, par le ministre, d’une mesure de renvoi en vertu du paragraphe 44(2) de la Loi; b) du danger que constitue l’intéressé pour la sécurité publique; c) de la question de savoir si l’intéressé est un etranger´ dont l’identité n’a pas et´´ e prouvée. 11 Section 245 applies to the determination of flight risk and reads as follows: 245. For the purposes of paragraph 244(a), the factors are the following (a) being a fugitive from justice in a foreign jurisdiction in relation to an offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament; (b) voluntary compliance with any previous departure order; (c) voluntary compliance with any previously required appear- ance at an immigration or criminal proceeding; (d) previous compliance with any conditions imposed in respect of entry, release or a stay of removal; (e) any previous avoidance of examination or escape from cus- tody, or any previous attempt to do so; (f) involvement with a people smuggling or trafficking in persons operation that would likely lead the person to not appear for a measure referred to in paragraph 244(a) or to be vulner- able to being influenced or coerced by an organization involved in such an operation to not appear for such a measure; and (g) the existence of strong ties to a community in Canada. 245. Pour l’application de l’alinéa 244a), les critères sont les suivants: a) la qualité de fugitif a` l’égard de la justice d’un pays etranger´ quant a` une infraction qui, si elle etait´ commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction a` une loi fédérale; b) le fait de s’être conformé librement a` une mesure d’interdiction de séjour; Canada (MCI) v. B004 Richard G. Mosley J. 337

c) le fait de s’être conformé librement a` l’obligation de com- paraˆıtre lors d’une instance en immigration ou d’une instance criminelle; d) le fait de s’être conformé aux conditions imposées a` l’égard de son entrée, de sa mise en liberté ou du sursis a` son renvoi; e) le fait de s’être dérobé au contrôle ou de s’être evad´´ e d’un lieu de détention, ou toute tentative a` cet egard;´ f) l’implication dans des opérations de passage de clandestins ou de trafic de personnes qui mènerait vraisemblablement l’intéressé a` se soustraire aux mesures visées a` l’alinéa 244a) ou le rendrait susceptible d’être incité ou forcé de s’y soustraire par une organisation se livrant a` de telles opérations; g) l’appartenance réelle a` une collectivité au Canada 12 Section 246 of the IRP Regulations sets out a number of factors that a Member at a detention review hearing must consider when determining whether the individual in question is a danger to the public. The portions relevant to this review are as follows: 246. For the purposes of paragraph 244(b), the factors are the following: [...] (b) association with a criminal organization within the meaning of subsection 121(2) of the Act; (c) engagement in people smuggling or trafficking in persons; [...] 246. Pour l’application de l’alinéa 244b), les critères sont les suivants: [...] b) l’association a` une organisation criminelle au sens du paragraphe 121(2) de la Loi; c) le fait de s’être livré au passage de clandestins ou le trafic de personnes; [...] 13 Section 248 outlines additional factors that are to be considered before a decision is rendered on detention or release: 248. If it is determined that there are grounds for detention, the following factors shall be considered before a decision is made on detention or release: (a) the reason for detention; 338 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

(b) the length of time in detention; (c) whether there are any elements that can assist in determining the length of time that detention is likely to continue and, if so, that length of time; (d) any unexplained delays or unexplained lack of diligence caused by the Department or the person concerned; and (e) the existence of alternatives to detention. 248. S’il est constaté qu’il existe des motifs de détention, les critères ci-après doivent etreˆ pris en compte avant qu’une décision ne soit prise quant a` la détention ou la mise en liberté: a) le motif de la détention; b) la durée de la détention; c) l’existence d’éléments permettant l’évaluation de la durée probable de la détention et, dans l’affirmative, cette période de temps; d) les retards inexpliqués ou le manque inexpliqué de diligence de la part du ministère ou de l’intéressé; e) l’existence de solutions de rechange a` la détention.

Decision Under Review: 14 The Board Member found that, “by the narrowest of margins, the balance of probabilities that you will not appear for your admissibility hearing, does exist” but that he did not pose any present or future danger to the public. She found that a $5000 bond to be posted by the respondent’s cousin coupled with terms including reporting, non-association and residence conditions were valid alternatives to detention.

Issues: 15 As a preliminary matter, the respondent objected to a number of documents in Volume 2 of the applicant’s Motion Record as not properly being before the Court. These documents had not been placed before the Immigration Division and, as such, could not be considered on the application for judicial review: Noor v. Canada (Employment Insurance Com- mission), [2000] F.C.J. No. 574 (Fed. C.A.) at para. 6. At the hearing, counsel for the applicant stated that they were included for the purpose of the stay motion and would not be relied upon in the application for judicial review. 16 The substantive issues which remain are: Canada (MCI) v. B004 Richard G. Mosley J. 339

a. Did the Member make an error in law with respect to the legal threshold for continued detention on the basis of danger to the public? b. Did the Member misconstrue the factors under subparagraphs 246 (b) and 246 (c) of the IRP Regulations in coming to her conclusion that the respondent was not a danger to the public? c. Did the member give a complete analysis of the respondent’s flight risk? d. Did the member err in her conclusion on alternatives to detention?

Analysis: 17 The applicant submits that, in so far as the Member may have misconstrued or ignored the IRP Regulations, the standard of review should be one of correctness. That only applies when the Member fails to consider the appropriate factors altogether as in Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. Gill, 2003 FC 1398, 242 F.T.R. 126 (F.C.) at paragraph 26. 18 Detention reviews are primarily fact based decisions. As stated by Justice Michael Phelan in Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. X, 2010 FC 1095 (F.C.) at paragraph 18, and repeated by Chief Justice Allan Lutfy in Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. B386, 2011 FC 140 (F.C.), at paragraph 9, detention hearings are often “rough and ready” proceedings. But, they are conducted by members of the Immigration Division who have considerable expertise in such matters as my colleague Justice Johanne Gauthier noted in Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. Thanabalasingham, 2003 FC 1225 (F.C.) at paragraph 42, upheld at 2004 FCA 4 (F.C.A.): As career civil servants, they are in a position to acquire significant expertise over the years. In fact, with respect to detention reviews, previous adjudicators, which have now become members of the Im- migration Division have potentially acquired numerous years of dealing with similar problems... This is especially so when one considers that with respect to some criteria set out in the regulations (such as the likely length of time the person will be detained), members of the Immigration Division have definitely better knowledge and expertise than this Court. 19 Thus, they are owed significant deference: Walker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FC 392, 89 Imm. L.R. 340 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

(3d) 151 (F.C.) at paras. 25-26. This Court is only to intervene if the decision does not fall within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law: New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9 (S.C.C.) at para. 47. As such, the standard of review is that of reasonableness: Canada (Minister of Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness) v. Karimi-Ashad, 2010 FC 964, 92 Imm. L.R. (3d) 32 (F.C.) at para. 16. 20 Where an individual’s liberty interests are at stake, detention and release decisions must also be reviewed with a view to the detained person’s s.7 Charter rights: Sahin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Im- migration) (1994), [1995] 1 F.C. 214 (Fed. T.D.) at paras. 25-27; Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. Thanabalasingham, above at para. 14. 21 The burden of establishing that the respondent presented a danger to the public lay with the Minister on a balance of probabilities. I agree with the respondent that the Member did not err in law or in fact when she concluded that the Minister had not met that burden. This is not a case similar to that recently heard by my colleague Justice De Montigny, Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. B157, 2010 FC 1314 (F.C.), in which there was considerable evidence of the respondent’s support for, and involvement with, the LTTE. 22 In this case, the evidence relating to danger was found by another member of the Immigration Division to be “very thin”. Virtually all of the Minister’s submissions before Member Shaw-Dyck and indeed, before this Court on the question of danger to the public, related to the respondent’s work on the ship. There is little to point to the respondent’s involvement with the LTTE in Sri Lanka and there is evidence from some of those for whom he worked there, including a Canadian NGO official, stating that such involvement was unlikely. 23 The applicant submits that the Member did not evaluate the evidence in light of the test set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in Williams v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1997] F.C.J. No. 393 (Fed. C.A.), leave to appeal dismissed, [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 332 (S.C.C.), that is whether an individual represents an “unacceptable risk to the public.” Member Shaw-Dyck described the test she applied in the following terms: ... I am unable to conclude simply from your activities on board the ship that at this particular moment you represent any kind of danger to the public of Canada, either presently or in the future. Canada (MCI) v. B004 Richard G. Mosley J. 341

24 I agree with the respondent that this test is broader than that required by Williams. A person who does not represent “any kind of danger to the public” does not meet the threshold of “unacceptable risk to the public”. 25 There is no doubt that those who arranged to transport several hundred migrants in a vessel of dubious seaworthiness and without a properly qualified and trained crew put the lives of all on the boat in jeop- ardy, as counsel for the applicant repeatedly asserted. To the extent that the respondent assisted by acting as a navigator or watchmen aboard the boat in return for more comfortable accommodations for he and his wife, he undoubtedly aided and abetted those who arranged this voyage. But there is no evidence on the record that was before the Member, as far as I can see, that the respondent was part of the organization that made those arrangements. Moreover, no evidence was led to establish that the organizers and crew constituted a criminal organization as defined in subsection 121 (2) of the IRPA. 26 A finding that the respondent was a member of the crew that brought the vessel to Canada’s shores does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that his release would constitute a danger to the public of Canada as the Minister appears to assert. I agree with Member Shaw-Dyck that the basis for detention on this ground has to be “something more than theory.” There has to be some evidence that the respondent is a present and future danger to the public of Canada. 27 It is clear from the transcript of the Member’s reasons that she did consider IRP Regulation 246 (c) in determining whether the respondent was a danger to the public. While she did not make a specific finding as to the respondent’s engagement in people smuggling, she concluded that the facts of the case did not establish that the respondent’s involvement was sufficient to pose a danger. This was a finding that was reasonably open to her on the evidence. 28 With respect to the risk that the respondent would not appear for proceedings with respect to his admissibility to Canada, the Minister raised two arguments before the Member: that the respondent had an outstand- ing debt to the smugglers and that the respondent’s relationship with his cousin in Toronto was not close. The Member considered both of these questions. She addressed the alleged inconsistencies in the respondent’s descriptions of the debt owed by both himself and his wife and the fact that the respondent faced an inadmissibility hearing with potential adverse consequences. Based on these factors, she did find that the respondent was a flight risk. Her analysis in that regard was sufficient. 342 IMMIGRATION LAW REPORTER 97 Imm. L.R. (3d)

29 Having reached the conclusion that there was a flight risk, the Mem- ber was required conduct the Charter-based analysis under s. 248 of the IRP Regulations. She considered the length of time respondent had been in detention, the length of time that detention was likely to continue if he were not released and existence of alternatives to detention. She noted that the proposed bonds person was the respondent’s first cousin and had been cross-examined by Minister’s counsel at the hearing. The cousin was a Canadian citizen and steadily employed. The amount of the bond was a substantial amount in relation to his income. He was prepared to provide the respondent with the residence and willing to supervise and take responsibility for the respondent. On that evidence, it was open to the Member to find that there was a reasonable alternative to detention. 30 In the result, there are no grounds on which this Court could or should interfere with the Member’s decision. The parties were given an opportunity to propose questions for certification and none were received.

Judgment IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT that: 1. The applicant’s application for leave for judicial review is hereby granted; 2. The application for judicial review of the decision releasing the respondent from immigration detention made by the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board on February 18, 2011 is dismissed; 3. The interim stay of the release order is vacated; 4. There are no questions for certification. Application dismissed.